A Note Regarding Dayan Simcha Zelig Rieger’s View

of Opening a Refrigerator Door on Shabbat

Rabbi Michael J. Broyde

Introduction

Thank you to Rabbi Yaacov Sasson for his comments on
footnote 59 of the article “The Use of
Electricity on Shabbat and Yom Tov” found in the Journal of Halacha and
Contemporary Society, 21:4-47 (Spring 1991) co-written by Rabbi Jachter and
myself.  It is always nice to have people
commenting on articles written more than 25 years ago.[1]

Before delving into the halacha, it is worth clarifying some preliminary
facts – in particular, whether refrigerators even had automatic lights during
the first half of the 1930s.  Some
commenters have suggested that such lights were not yet present, or that they
were limited to rare and expensive refrigerators.  This is not correct.  I reproduce below a wide variety of newspaper
ads from the early 1930s that show that a range of refrigerator models by many
manufacturers at various price points featured automatic interior lights (see attachments here). These
include a Frigidaire priced at $157.50, a GE priced at $99.50, a Majestic model
with no price, a Frigidaire priced at $119.50, a Leonard priced at $114.75 and
many more.[2]  And while some of the publications appear
targeted to the upper class, many others are clearly meant for wider audiences
– particularly those available on installment plans (“$5 down, 15¢ a day”;
“Nothing down! 20¢ a day!”; “$7 Initial Payment – enables you to enjoy any of
these refrigerators immediately. Investigate our convenient budget payment
plans.”).[3] Thus, even in the early 1930s, interior
lights were a readily available feature in the refrigerators that were becoming
increasingly common in American households.[4] Claims that “normal” or “typical”
refrigerators did not have lights are belied by the many ads taken from diverse
periodicals that are reproduced here.[5]

A Summary of the Original Article

The relevant section of the article is
about using refrigerators on Shabbat, and states in part:

A. Refrigerators

The opening of a
refrigerator door on Shabbat has been the topic of vigorous debate in past
decades. Opening the refrigerator door allows warm air to enter, thus causing a
drop in temperature which causes the motor to go on sooner. If one accepts that
turning the motor on during Shabbat is prohibited, then it would appear that
opening the refrigerator door on Shabbat when the motor is not already56 running
is prohibited. Indeed, many prominent rabbinic decisors have adopted this
position.57 However, many authorities58 assert that
one is permitted to open a refrigerator even when the motor is off.59

The footnotes to the above-quoted text observe:

56. Opening
the door when the motor is already running is permissible because all that is
done then is causing the motor to stay on for a longer period of time; see also
section V. 

57. See Har Zvi 1:151; Mishnat Rabbi Aharon, 1:4; Minchat
Yitzchak 3:24; and Chelkat Yaakov, 1:54. Rabbi
Ovadia Yosef, Yabia Omer 1:21 and Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Edut Leyisrael p. 152, recommend that one be
stringent in this regard, although they both accept that it is permissible to
open a refrigerator even when the motor is off. 

58. Rabbi
Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s argument can be found in his Minchat Shlomo pp. 77-91. Others who are lenient
include Rabbi Waldenberg,Tzitz Eliezer 8:12
and 12:92, Rabbi Uziel, Piskei
Uziel no. 15. Rabbi Aharon
Lichtenstein reports that Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik subscribes to the
lenient position in this regard. 

59. Almost
all authorities accept that it is forbidden to open a refrigerator when the
light inside will go on. Notwithstanding one’s lack of intent to turn on the
light when opening the refrigerator, this action is forbidden, since the light
will inevitably go on (pesik resha). 

However, Rabbi S.Z.
Rieger (the Dayan of Brisk) rules leniently in this regard (Hapardes 1934, volume three). His lenient
ruling is based on two assumptions. First, he states that when the forbidden
act has no benefit to the one who performs it, and it is only incidental (psik
resha d’lo nicha leh), no prohibition exists. Rabbi Rieger assumes that the lenient ruling of the Aruch (see Aruch defining the word “sever“)
is accepted. Second, Rabbi Rieger states that the light in the refrigerator
provides no benefit to the one opening the door.

His first assumption is disputed by most authorities (see Yabia Omer 1:21,5; Minchat Shlomo p. 87). The consensus appears not to
accept theAruch’s ruling
as normative. The second assertion appears to be entirely incorrect. The light
serves as a convenience to locate items in the refrigerator and cannot be
described as having no benefit to one who opens the door.

Most authorities, however, maintain that it is acceptable
to ask a Gentile to open the door of the refrigerator even if the light will go
on: see Iggerot Moshe, Orach
Chaim 2:68; and Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah pp. 100-101.So too, it would appear to
these authors that one could allow a fellow Jew to open the door when he does
not know the light will go on, as that is only in the category of mitasek (unknowing) and thus permitted; see e.g.,Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik, Shiurim
Lezeicher Avi Mori, p.30 n. 58; but see Teshuvot
R. Akiva Eiger #9. 

(bold emphasis added)

Rabbi Sasson’s Criticism

Rabbi Sasson is commenting on the words in
the second paragraph of footnote 59 (the bold sentences above).  He proposes that the article is wrong in its
understanding of the view of Dayan Simcha Zelig Rieger who did not, he claims,
permit the turning on of the light in the refrigerator, but only the
motor.  Rabbi Sasson states:

Lo hayu dvarim me-olam. Rav Simcha Zelig did not permit opening a refrigerator when the
light inside will go on. Rav Simcha Zelig wrote (Hapardes 1934, num. 3, page 6)
that it is permitted to open the refrigerator since the intention is to remove
an item, “v’aino mechavein lehadlik et ha-elektri.” The authors misinterpreted this
statement to be a reference to an electric light in the refrigerator.

And his argument is:

However, it is clear from a simple
reading of the articles to which Rav Simcha Zelig was responding that the topic
under discussion at the time was triggering the motor by opening the door and allowing warm
air to enter; lights and light bulbs are not mentioned at all. In the first of
those articles (Hapardes 1931, num. 2, page 3), the language of “hadlaka”
is used in reference to the refrigerator motor, and Rav Simcha Zelig’s language
of “lehadlik et ha-elektri” appears to parallel the language
used there.

As an additional proof, he notes:

In the second of those articles
(Hapardes 1931, num. 3 page 6), the act of triggering the motor is referred to
as “havara” and “havara b’zerem ha-chashmali“,
and Rav Simcha Zelig used a similar nomenclature, “lehadlik et
ha-elektri” to refer to triggering the motor.

Based on this Rabbi Sasson concludes:

Rav Simcha Zelig’s position was that it
is permitted to open a refrigerator when the motor
will then go on, as triggering the motor is classified as a psik resha d’lo ichpat lei,
which is equivalent to lo
nicha lei. Rav Simcha Zelig
never addressed opening a refrigerator when the light will go on. 

(footnotes omitted)

A Review of the Teshuva and
a Defense of the Second Paragraph of Footnote Fifty Nine

The relevant paragraph of the teshuva by
Dayan Rieger reads simply:

And in the matter of the artificial
[electric] icebox it appears that since when one opens the door of the box to
get something from there and does not intend to ignite (light) the electricity
it is a psik resha that he does not care about, even to light in way
that is a psik resha.

The rest of the teshuva by Dayan Rieger
presents his view of the halacha in cases in which there is a psik resha d’lo
ichpat lei, which is that this is a dispute between Tosaphot and the
Aruch.  Furthermore, Rav Chaim M’brisk
maintains that the Rambam is in agreement with the Aruch, and the custom is
like the Aruch; therefore, it is completely proper to rely on the Aruch in
cases in which there is a psik resha d’lo nicha lei.[6]

A careful reader of the first sentence,
and indeed of the entire teshuva, can sense that there is some ambiguity here
about the electrical object referred to, since Dayan Rieger does not specify
the source or consequence of igniting the electricity. I am inclined to
reinforce the original explanation that it was the light based on the following
three observations.

First, the many articles in Hapardes do not
necessarily use as interchangeable the terms zerem chashmali or chut
chashmali or chut elektriki with
the term hidlik et haelektrik – which
seems to have a different connotation. 
Particularly in the Yiddish spoken culture of that time, the term
“electric” seems to have meant “lights” and not electricity or motor.  Rabbi Sasson’s claim that the phrase “havara
b’zerem ha-chashmali” and Rav Simcha Zelig phrase “lehadlik et
ha-elektri” are identical is, I think, not indubitably correct.  Elektriki, according to my colleague
at Emory, Professor Nick Block, more likely means the light than anything else
in 1930s Yiddish.  This is particularly true in my
opinion, when added to the word “le’hadlik,” a word of ignition.

Second, and much more importantly, the halachic
analysis presented by Dayan Rieger addresses a direct action, while everyone
else who discusses the motor speaks about an indirect action.  This is very important to grasp.  The light in the refrigerator immediately
turns on when the door is opened, as the opening of the door also opens the
switch that controls the incandescent light. 
Not so the motor, which is controlled by a thermostat; opening the door
usually leads to an increase of air temperature inside the refrigerator, which
eventually directs the motor to go on.

As the editor of Hapardes notes (in
volume 5), there are persuasive grounds to permit the opening of the
refrigerator door based on two distinct principles of enormous halachic
importance that are deeply grounded in factual reality: davar she’eno
mitkaven and grama; it is based on this that many poskim to this day
permit a refrigerator door to be opened, as our article from 25 years ago
notes.

Simply put, many times when the
refrigerator is opened, the motor does not go on at all, since for the motor to
go on immediately, the refrigerator must be at just a certain temperature such
that the warm air immediately causes the thermostat to turn the motor on.  Sometimes the motor is already on, sometimes
the motor is not hastened, and sometimes there is a very long time delay.  This reality gives rise to important halachic
grounds discussed in our article and quoted by many poskim, including many
before and after the great Dayan Rieger.

But Dayan Rieger makes no mention of
this: he does not discuss grama, or davar she’eno mitkaven or any
of these other factors that apply to indirect action.  Instead, he assumes that when the
refrigerator door is opened, the electrical object under discussion is always ignited, and it does so
immediately and directly, thus causing a melacha. This is the
formulation of pesik resha, which
inexorably causes melacha each and every time — in contrast to grama,
davar she’eno mitkaven or any other principles of indirect or delayed or
uncertain causation.

Dayan Rieger is not speaking about acts
caused indirectly, uncertainly or after a delay – he is speaking about an
action that directly and immediately occurs and is fully and directly caused by
my opening the door.  As he writes in his
first paragraph:

ובדבר התבת קרח מלאכותי נראה כיון דכשפותח
את דלת התיבה הוא כדי לקבל משם איזו דבר ואינו מכיון להדליק את העלעקטרי הוי פסיק
רישיה דלא איכפת ליה אפילו להדליק אם הוא באופן שהוא פסיק רישיה.

No intermediary (like a thermostat) and
no indirect or delayed causation is present in the case Dayan Rieger is
discussing – the prohibited action is caused by the door opening.  The act of opening the door turns on the elektri
according to Dayan Rieger.  His
halachic insight is that even when such causation is direct, it is of no value
to the opener of the door, who just wants to take some food out; it is a psik
resha of no benefit.  Factually,
this is not an accurate description of the motor at all, which frequently does
not turn on immediately, but it does correctly describe the mechanism of the refrigerator
light.  Dayan Rieger implicitly
concedes that if one were to open the door with the intent to turn on the light
(or motor), that would be assur min ha-torah, since he sees no indirect
causation in the process, something that most poskim think is not at all true
for the motor.

Professor Sara Reguer noted by email to
me that “my grandfather conferred with scientists and specialists in
electricity before giving his response,” and given this fact it is extremely
unlikely that he missed such a basic point that anyone who repeatedly opened
and closed a refrigerator would have observed. 
This was simply not true about refrigerator motors as the original
question notes explicitly in Hapardes Volume 2. This technological assumption
about the refrigerator is true about the light, which always turns on when the
door is opened, but not about the motor.

I would also note two additional factors
for consideration. First, the other substantive halachic logic employed by
Dayan Rieger which analogizes elektriki to sparks seems to me to be a
closer analogy to a light than to a motor which is hardly fire at all; sparks,
like incandescent lights, are fire according to halacha.  Secondly, there has been a regular subset of
poskim (as shown by Rabbi Abadi’s most recent teshuva, Ohr Yitzchak 2:166) who
adopt the exact analysis and view of Dayan Rieger and view the light as lo
ichpat since one does not want it and a light is on already.  If Dayan Rieger is speaking about the motor,
he has gotten the facts terribly wrong as well as provided a halachic chiddush
that is totally unneeded, whereas if he is speaking about the light, he has
adopted a halachic view that has some company, and gotten the facts correct.
Furthermore, his halachic analysis is needed to reach the desired result.

Given these factors – the linguistic
ambiguity, the presence of logic that is discussing a psik resha and not
a grama or a davar she’eno mitkaven, the analogy to sparks and
the parallel teshuva by Rabbi Abadi reaching the same conclusion and employing
the same logic for lights – I am still inclined to think (as the original
article notes) that this teshuva is speaking about the light and not the motor.

On the other hand, there is a good and natural
impulse to read halachic literature conservatively and to press for
interpretations that align gedolim with one other and not leave outliers
with halachic novelty.[7]  Furthermore, I do recognize that many
halachic authorities who have cited Dayan Rieger’s teshuva have quoted it in
the context of the motor and not the light,, as Rabbi Sasson claims
is the proper reading.[8]  But, I think these citations are less than
dispositive for the following important reason: Those who quote Dayan Rieger’s
view as something to consider about the motor note that his analysis is
halachically wrong (see for example, both Yabia Omer OC 1:21 [paragraphs 7-11
are explicitly directly at explaining why Dayan Riegler’s halachic explanation
for motors is wrong] and Minchat Shlomo 1:10 [section 7 calls this logic אולם לענ”ד צ”ע הרבה] who both note deep
problems with Dayan Reigler’s analysis as applied to the motor).[9]  Poskim generally spend less time and ink
explicating the views of authorities whom they believe to have reached inapt or
incorrect conclusions of fact or law compared with those whom they cite in
whole or in part to bolster their own analysis. Simply put, the precedential
value of how one posek cites another when they centrally disagree is not
as great.  

Thus, when given two choices of how to
understand what an eminent posek wrote, I prefer an approach that is both
halachically plausible and factually correct rather than one what is
halachically unneeded and factually wrong.[10]

Conclusion

In sum, while there is some ambiguity in
Dayan Rieger’s teshuva, the recent (ca. 1930) introduction of lights in
refrigerators, the fact that Dayan Rieger makes no mention of grama, davar
she’eno mitkaven or any of the other classical grounds for discussing the
motor, and from the fact that he uses the Yiddish word for light, all incline
me to think that he is speaking about the light, although I understand the
ambiguity.  Let me add, lehalacha,
as the original article notes, that I think such a view is not halachically
normative in that we do not follow the view of the Aruch as a general matter.

Having said all that, in hindsight I
would have worded footnote 59 a bit differently to reflect more of the nuance
that is present in this post (and may in fact do so if the article is ever
republished).

Postscript

Allow me to
note my general agreement with Rabbi Sasson’s conclusion when he writes:

I would add two endnotes – when surveying Halachot with significant practical
implications, such as in the realm of Hilchot
Shabbat, it is an author’s responsibility to ensure that all sources are
cited accurately, lest a reader rely on an incorrect citation with the result
of Chillul Shabbat.
Secondly, when confronted with a Halachic position of a Gadol B’Yisrael that seems to
be entirely erroneous, the possibility that the Gadol’s position is being misunderstood must
be explored.

This is true even when the citation is
in a footnote and even when it is noted as not normative.  More generally, readers of blog posts about
nuanced textual disputes should, whenever they can, go back to the original
sources and check for themselves. (The editors of the Seforim Blog should be
commended for helping their contributors include images of such texts for the
benefit of the readership.)

Let me also add a final endnote of my
own: While vigorous debate
has always been a fundamental part of Torah study within the confines of the
beit midrash, and while online forums have brought intelligent Torah
conversations to a much wider group of participants (and observers), the tone
and tenor of these conversations often take on the harsh, acerbic voice of the
internet at large. I generally find that the sharper the rhetorical tone, the
less value the substance has. Orthodox Judaism today would benefit greatly from
deep, substantive conversations on a whole host of halachic and hashkafic
matters that are conducted in a respectful manner. We certainly could use more
light and less heat.