The Kabbalat Shabbat Memorandum       Sivan 5773

by Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber

The recent rather
acrid debate on women leading the Kabbalat Shabbat service appeared, at first,
to be primarily a halachic one. But it soon overflowed into additional areas,
revealing it as a clearly political polemic. Indeed, I found the whole
discussion which appeared on a whole series of blogs, and a major published
article, most astonishing. We are not talking about women reading the Torah
and/or having aliyot. The criticisms raised against this practice I can well
appreciate, though I disagree with them and have sought to refute them.

But here we are
talking about a practice first established in the latter years of the 16th
cent., among a small group of people, disciples of the Ari ha-Kadosh in Safed,
which took place outside the confines of the synagogue looking over the hills
and watching the sunset, and reciting some psalms and piyyutim. It gradually
spread to other venues, first being practiced outside the synagogue in the
courtyard, and, later, when in the synagogue, recited at the bimah, rather
than the chazan’s lectern, clearly to emphasize its different status from the Maariv
service. In many communities there is no sheliah tzibbur leading the
service; rather the congregants sing the Psalms together. Indeed, in small
communities often the service begins even before there is a minyan of
ten men, and the congregation wait for the requisite number in order to say Barchu.

But the debate
about Kabbalat Shabbat was intended to have far broader implications,
for, by the same argument it would also disallow women to lead Pesukei
de-Zimra, for example. Indeed, this tendentious aim is overtly revealed by
yet another argument put forward, namely that a Shaliah tzibbur must
have a full beard; something that obviously excludes women, (Shulhan
Aruch 53:6). The reason given is the dignity of the congregation, kevod
ha-tzibbur, which is clearly irrelevant in present day society.  Both the Maharam Mi-Rotenberg and the Rashba
agree that the congregation can waive this requirement.  The original ruling applied only to
permanent shlichei tzibbur, not to occasional readers, and, on occasion,
even a thirteen-year old, who has reached maturity may lead the service.
Additionally, the Biur Halachah writes that this requirement may be
waived when there is no one else to fulfill this function. And finally, this
restriction referred to very specific prayers, such as Keriat Shema, on
fast-days in Eretz Yisrael because of drought, and The High Holidays. In any
case, nowadays hardly any synagogue requires its reader to be bearded; even
American Rabbis are often clean-shaven, because the plain meaning of that
ruling is that a service should be led by one who is mature, i.e.
post-bar-mitzvah. And a thirty-year old without a beard is fully eligible to
serve as a shaliah tzibbur. Indeed some of greatest hazzanim were
beardless, such as the Koussevitzky brothers, Mosheh, David, Jacob and Simhah,
Leibele Waldman, Leibele Glanz, Zavel Kwartin, Shmuel Malavsky, to list only a
few of the best-known names.

Two additional
arguments were put forward. Firstly, that for Kabbalat Shabbat, the Shaliah
Tzibbur wears a tallit. This, of course, is in the case where there
is a Shaliah Tzibbur. Now according to the Magen Avraham (Orah
Hayyim 18:1) citing the Bayit Hadash (Bah) one really should
remove the tallit one is wearing when one says Barechu since it is night
and one does not wear tzitzit at night. And so many Aharonim
specifically rebuked those who wore a tallit at night. However, those
who did so, did so because of kabbalistic reasons related to Kevod Shabbat,
and not kevod ha-tzibbur. Indeed, there were even those who wore a
tallit for kiddush at home, and kiddush at home is hardly a tefillat
tzibbur or rabbim, (see J. Levy, Minhag Yisrael Torah 1,
Brooklyn 1994, pp.87-88).

The second point
raised was, curiously enough, from R. David Sperber, my grandfather’s Teshuvot:
Afrakasta de-Anya, (3rd ed, Israel 2002, vol.4, p.215). There he
says that if one cannot find a minyan, at least try to pray with two
other people, since this would constitute a tefillat rabbim, which is
more readily accepted by God. He derives this from a passage in Hayyei Adam
(Klal 68:11) who says that every mitzvah which can be done be-haburah
in a group, should be so done, and not as an individual, because “the
greater the number of people, the greater is the honour to the king.” If
three people give tzedakah, does that make it a rabbim? If three
people declaim Psalms together does that make it a tefillat rabbim?
Surely the term my grandfather zt”l used was not intended to give a
special status to the group of three, but merely to say that such a mitzvah
or prayer is more acceptable before the Holy One Blessed be He, than that of a
single individual. (His other reference to vol.2 p.211 is quite irrelevant to
this issue.)

(On a personal
note, I might add, that in order fully to understand my sainted grandfather’s
ruling, one has to appreciate his particular brand of hassidic piety, which was
a blend of halachah, kabbalah and a special brand of hassidut. See my father’s
introduction in his Michtam le-David on the Torah.

His belief in the
efficacy of prayers was all so evident to anyone who saw him in prayer.  I served him in his latter years and
received my semichah from him.)

Now my learned
colleagues knew all these facts, which are plainly evident to anyone who is
conversant with the relevant sources. Nonetheless, they chose to disregard
them, or to reinterpret them in a forced fashion.

So looking more
closely at the discussion, it becomes evident that rather than this being a
genuinely halachic debate, it is more a socio-political polemic, built on shaky
grounds and dressed in the somewhat misleading garb of halachic disquisition.

(And see now the
very significant comments of Prof. Marc B. Shapiro, (link), and Rabbi Zev Farber’s responses to Rabbi R. Freundel’s articles.)

Another note on
Women’s aliyot.

One of the
central points of controversy between those who permit women’s aliyot and those
who do not, is the understanding of the critical text in B. Megillah 23a which
states that “all are counted among the seven aliyot, even women and
children. But the Rabbis said: ‘A woman should not read the Torah because of
the dignity of the community’ “. It is this final section that is the main
source of the controversy. Some have claimed that “But the Rabbis said: A
woman should not read…” is an absolute decree that cannot be changed.
Others – myself included – have argued that this is advice, rather than a
decree, limited by the principle of “the dignity of the community”.
That is to say, if there is no such slight on the community, the advice becomes
irrelevant. I argued that most of the places where the phrase “But the
Rabbis said” may be understood as “advice” and not
“decree”. Recently Ephraim Bezalel Halivni sought to show that in
many instances “But the Rabbis said” should clearly be understood as
a “decree” formulation. However, he himself (Studies in Liturgy
and Reading The Torah, Jerusalem 2012, p.160) agrees that there are examples
where this phrase can be understood as “advice”. Hence, even
according to his position, he will have to agree that it is possible
that in our Megillah text “But the Rabbis said” may be advice. In
other words there is an element of uncertainty (safek) as to the precise
interpretation of that text.

And even if we
were to interpret it, as have some, as a decree, it is a decree with a reason.
Now there exists a well-known controversy between Rambam and Raavad as to
whether when the reason for a decree is no longer relevant the decree is still
in force; Rambam says yes, and Raavad disagrees. It is true that in such
controversies we follow the Rambam; however, it is equally true that it is not certain
that he is correct.  Perhaps the
Raavad’s position is more correct. In other words, there still exists an
element of uncertainty (a safek) as to who is right. It is just that in
accordance with certain pragmatic rules of halachic adjudications (pesak),
we follow the ruling of Rambam.

Moreover, R.
Yosef Messas added a further consideration, arguing that even according to the
view of Rambam, this principle only applies where there is a fear that the
original reason could be relevant in the future. But in a case where there is
little or no reason to think that the reason will resurface, the original
prohibitions may be disregarded, (Otzar Michtavim 1, 454; cf. Marc B.
Shapiro, Conversations 7, 2010, p.101). Here too, we may be fairly
certain that in our modern society the dignity of the community will not be
impugned by a woman’s aliyah even in the future, in addition to which, we have
already pointed out that a community can, according to both the Maharam
Mi-Rotenburg and the Rashba, forgo their dignity should they so wish.

Now, I cannot say
that R. Messas’ interpretation is necessarily correct.  There exists a safek, in fact, a
triple sfek sfeka: (i) what is the correct interpretation of B.
Megillah’s phrase, (ii) whether to rule like Rambam or the Raavad, and (iii) even
if one follows Rambam, should we accept R. Messas’ interpretation that it
applies even when there is little or no reason to think that the reason will
resurface.

Without going
into all the details of the very complex kuntres sfek-sfeka, surely here
we should rule: sfek sfeka le-kula, most leniently, admitting the
permissibility of women’s aliyot, especially when added to all our other
arguments.

Final Note

And finally, a
somewhat pedagogical comment. The Beit Yosef, of R. Yosef Caro in Yoreh Deah
242 writes:

It is forbidden for a hacham to give a ruling permitting
something which looks strange, for the masses will see this as permitting the
forbidden.

He bases himself
on Hagahot Maimoniyot to Rambam Hilchot Talmud Torah chapter 5 sect.6.  Now almost all innovations look strange, and
can easily be understood as permitting the forbidden . And indeed this is the
ruling in Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:10. (And see Beur ha-Gra ibid. sect. 21
for Talmudic sources.) But the Shach (Siftei-Chen) ad loc. sect.17 modifies
this statement as follows:

It would appear that this [refers to a case] where he permitted
[something] without any explanation [for his ruling] – setam – and
indeed so it appears from the proofs he brings from Hagahot Maimoniyot and B.
Sanhedrin 5ab… and B. Nidah 20a…, and the beginning of B. Berachot (3 b)…  But if he tells the questioner the reason
for his ruling, and explains to him his arguments (ומראה
לו פנים), or if he brings
evidence from the book, it is permitted.

And the Beer
Heiteiv brings this in abbreviated form. (See also note 8, ad loc. in Otzar
Mefarshim in the Machon Yerushalayim [Friedman] ed. of the Shulhan Aruch.)

This indicates to
us very clearly that all the changes that we are advocating must not only be
firmly based in our canonic sources, but also clearly presented to the general
public.