Gelatin, Abraham Goldstein, R. Moses Isserles, and More

Marc B. Shapiro

Continued from here

Among the matters I discussed in the previous post were gelatin and consumption of the human body as part of a medical cure. Believe it or not, consumption of human parts not in the context of medicine is mentioned in a short responsum of R. Joseph Kafih. R. Kafih was asked if it permissible to drink various non-Jewish milk products and also gelatin produced from non-kosher animals. He is strict when it comes to milk—and apparently unaware of the widespread rabbinic approval in the United States for regular milk—but lenient regarding gelatin.[1] Incredibly, he assumes that some gelatin comes from human bones, and he believes that it is halakhically preferable to consume this instead of gelatin from animals (although the latter is kosher as well).

Here is an image of the letter sent to R. Kafih and his reply, followed by a transcription of the relevant sections.

האם מותר לאכול כיום:

חלב עכו“ם, אבקת חלב עכו“ם, חמאת עכו“ם, ג‘לטין המיוצר מנבלות וטרפות (במיוחד במוצרים המיובאים מחו“ל בהשגחת הרבנות הראשית)?

חלב גוים נאסר במנין, ואין להתירו. אמנם רבני אמעריקא התירו אבקת חלב בשעתו, והרבנות כאן סמכה על כך בזמנו, אך אין להתיר חלב גוי על סמך התר זה. חמאת גוים מותרת כמ“ש הרמב“ם מפני שכבר הלכו צחצוחי חלב שבה. ”ג”לטין‟ לדעתי אין להחמיר בו, בפרט העשוי מעצמות אדם. כי בשר האדם עצמו בעשה להרמב“ם, ולאחרים אפלו מצות ”פרוש‟ אין בו. וכל שכן עצמותיו.

In the comments to the last post, two people referred to the responsa of R. Nahum Zvi Kornmehl as a source regarding gelatin. In the first part of R. Kornmehl’s Tiferet Tzvi, vol. 1, there is a long discussion about gelatin, and it is here that R. Aharon Kotler’s responsum on the topic first appeared. R. Kotler’s letter and other letters found in the sefer also deal with a “kosher gelatin” that was produced by Barton’s candy. R. Kornmehl was the mashgiach of Barton’s so it makes sense that he would be involved in this halakhic issue. What many people might not realize is that R. Kornmehl’s brother-in-law was Stephen Klein, the owner of Barton’s. (Everyone over 50 can certainly remember Barton’s, especially on Passover. Many children, myself included, went house to house taking Barton’s Passover orders. Depending on how much you sold, there were all sorts of great prizes.)

While it was obviously perfectly acceptable for R. Kornmehl to involve himself in the halakhic research regarding Barton’s gelatin, would any of our rabbis today accept a situation where the mashgiach of a factory is a close relative of the owner? I think they would say that this defeats the entire purpose of a mashgiach, whose job is to ensure that kashrut standards are at the highest level, and he is therefore not supposed to have any close personal connections with the owner.

Here is a picture of R. Kornmehl at the Barton’s factory, from Rabbi A. Leib Scheinbaum, The World that Was America 1900-1945 (Brooklyn, 2004), p. 415.

Returning to Abraham Goldstein, one can imagine what he would have said had he been told about R. Moses Isserles’ responsum, no. 54. Here R. Isserles states that there is no halakhic problem consuming olive oil that was stored in containers in which they used pig lard to smooth the surface. (He later notes that there is even stronger support for this ruling if there is only a suspicion, but no certainty, that they used lard on a particular barrel). This ruling by R. Isserles is the exact sort of thing that today we would be told is absolutely forbidden, and Goldstein certainly would have attacked any hashgachah that followed the Rama in this matter.

Interestingly, R. Hanokh Henoch Meyer of Sassov could not accept that the Rama would allow us to eat something that might have pork residue, and he therefore adopted the old approach when confronted with “problematic” texts, namely, asserting that this responsum was not written by R. Isserles. Rather, some student must have been responsible for it, as it is impossible for R. Meyer to believe that R. Isserles would write something that in his mind is so obviously incorrect.[2] R. Judah Leib Landau, in his well-known work Yad Yehudah, Yoreh Deah 103:20 (Perush ha-Arokh), also has his doubts that R. Isserles could have written the responsum:

ובאמת הדבר הוא לפלא מאוד אם יצאו כלל דברים אלו מפי קדשו של הרמ“א ז“ל

This is the exact approach that was adopted by some in explaining another responsum of R. Isserles, where he justified those in his day who drank non-Jewish wine.[3] There is also another difficult and controversial responsum of R. Moses Isserles—see the discussion on the Seforim Blog here—and in this case R. Yitzhak Hutner also denies that the responsum was written by R. Isserles.[4]

R. Isserles’ opinion in responsum no. 54 is based on the fact that any pork residue would be less than 60, and also that the pork taste is to be regarded as something detrimental to the dish (noten ta’am lifgam). This is indeed a difficult point to understand, as why should pork be noten ta’am lifgam? You can look around and see that lots of people enjoy it. R. Shimon Grunfeld goes so far as to say that it was only because of R. Isserles’ great holiness, which caused him to view pork with such disgust, that he could make the error of seeing pork as noten ta’am lifgam.[5]

עוד דבר אחד חידוש פלא שכתב ששומן חזיר הוא פוגם בכל דבר כמו נבלה מוסרחת עיין שם, והיא תמיה גדולה שהרי אנו רואין כל העכו“ם וכל השרים אוכלים אותו והוא עולה על שלחן מלכים. הן אמת שנפש איש ישראל קצה באכילת חזיר אבל הוא רק משום איסורי של תוה“ק שאסרה אותו ולכן כל איש ישראל כשרואה חזיר הוא מואס אותו אבל בשביל זה לא חשוב נטלפ“ג דנטלפ“ג היינו שמצד עצם הדבר הוא פוגם . . . ופשוט דאין לסמוך בזה על התשו‘ הנ“ל, ובודאי שומן חזיר אוסר עד ס‘ או יותר כפי הרגשת הטעם, והרמ“א ז“ל ברוב קדושתו מחמת איסור התורה על בשר חזיר הי‘ קצה ממנו כ“כ עד שפלטה קולמסו לכתוב שאינו אוסר משום שהוא פוגם

In his discussion about how pork is noten ta’am lifgam, R. Isserles also says something which I found strange. He writes:

דשאני חזיר דדבר מאוס הוא ביותר מכל שרצים שבעולם, עד שאמרו לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי בבשר חזיר וכו‘ ולא אמרו שאר שרצים, ש“מ דזה גרע טפי

R. Isserles cites a passage from Sifra, Kedoshim 9:10, which is quoted in Rashi, Leviticus 20:26, that one should not say that he is repulsed by pork, and that is why he doesn’t eat it, but rather he doesn’t eat it because of the Torah’s command. (Rashi’s version is different than what is found in our versions of the Sifra, and also what is quoted by R. Isserles, but the point is the same.) R. Isserles sees it as significant that of all the non-kosher foods that could have been cited, it is pork that is used as an example, which he believes shows that it is the most repulsive of the non-kosher foods.

The reason I find R. Isserles’ point strange is that R. Isserles’ understanding is the exact opposite of how the passages in Sifra and Rashi are usually understood. The common way of understanding, and I don’t know of anyone who has a different approach, is that you should not say that you are disgusted by pork, and that is why you are not eating it. On the contrary, there is nothing wrong with pork and it is undoubtedly quite tasty. However, we do not eat it because God commanded us not to. This reading appears explicitly in both the Sifra and Rashi, Here is what Rashi states:

רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר מנין שלא יאמר אדם נפשי קצה בבשר חזיר, אי אפשי ללבוש כלאים, אבל יאמר אפשי, ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי

This is very different than R. Isserles’ understanding that the rabbinic teaching reinforces the point that we should have a natural aversion to pork, even though the reason for abstaining from it is due to God’s command.

After mentioning how we don’t eat pork, the passage continues in Rashi (and this is also how it is quoted in the Rambam, Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6, but not in our version of the Sifra) that the same lesson is applied to the wearing of sha’atnez. We shouldn’t say that we have no desire to wear it, but on the contrary, we should feel that it would be nice to wear it but we cannot because of the divine command. The Sifra also adds the same point about sexual relations, that we do not avoid it because we are repulsed. Rather, we would enjoy this but abstain because of the divine command. Since the passage cites both pork, sha’atnez, and forbidden sexual relations to teach the same lesson, and there is no natural aversion to sha’atnez and sexual relations, it is clear that just as we might wish to wear sha’atnez and have forbidden relations but avoid them because of the mitzvah, so too one should assume that eating pork would be enjoyable. However, we avoid it because of the mitzvah.

The Rambam elaborates on this point in Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6, and he specifically cites the rabbinic passage we have been discussing. He goes so far as to say “that a man needs to let his soul remain attracted to them [pork, sexual relations, etc.] and not place any obstacle before them other than the Law.” What this means in practice is next time you see lobster in the supermarket, don’t be repulsed by it and think it is disgusting. The Rambam, following the Sages, is telling us that we should say “wow, that looks good. I would really enjoy eating it but the Torah says I can’t.” Easier said than done, I realize, but that is what the Sages and the Rambam have told us.

Returning to R. Moses Isserles, the Taz, Yoreh Deah 108:4, quotes another ruling of his that today would not be regarded as acceptable. R. Isserles testifies that the practice was to buy certain food items cooked by non-Jews in their non-kosher pots (Torat ha-Hatat 35:1):[6]

המנהג להקל לקנות מן הגוים דברים המבושלים בכליהם שאין בהם משום בישול גוים (הוא) [הואיל] וסתם כליהם אינן בני יומן, ואע“פ דנותן טעם לפגם אסור לכתחלה, מכל מקום לא חשבינן הקנייה לכתחלה, לכן נוהגים היתר פה קראקא לקנות האגוזים של מים שמבשלים הגוים, או שאר דברים

Regarding other leniencies of R. Isserles, R. Zerach Eidlitz[7] is quoted as saying that it would have been OK for R. Isserles to have omitted all the humrot he records if he also omitted two particular kulot: non-glatt meat (Yoreh Deah 39:13) and that it is permitted to eat worms found in cheese (Yoreh Deah 84:16):

נוהגים בתולעים של גבינה לאכלן אע“פ שקופצין הנה והנה על הגבינה אבל אם פירשו לגמרי אוסרין אותן

Returning to Goldstein, he would have been outraged by other halakhic leniencies mentioned by outstanding poskim, but again, he approached matters using logic and intuitive feelings, while the halakhic rules do not always fall into line with this. For example, R. David Ibn Zimra, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, no. 1032, defends eating meat together with sugar that was cooked with milk. He states that this is permissible because the milk is batel. R. Hayyim Vital testifies that R. Isaac Luria would himself eat such sugar with meat.[8] Not only would Goldstein have protested against this leniency, but to my knowledge there is no kashrut agency today that would give a hashgachah to a meat product that includes sugar cooked with milk.

Another famous responsum which Goldstein would not have been able to accept—and I know that many Orthodox Jews today also would not be able to accept it—is Noda bi-Yehudah, Yoreh Deah, tinyana,[9] no. 56. Here R. Yehezkel Landau permits a drink produced by non-Jews that included a small amount of non-kosher meat (assuming the meat is 1/60 or less). The meat did not add a taste, and R. Landau ruled that it was batel, meaning that the drink was kosher. I could go on with other such examples but I think you get the point, which is that when it comes to kashrut, great halakhic authorities have come to conclusions that are far from what the average Orthodox Jew would regard as acceptable.

The phenomenon of the masses sometimes having stricter views than the rabbis is an old story. In fact, I once spoke to R. Aharon Felder about kitniyot. At the time, R. Felder was the halakhic authority for the KOF-K. As is well known, kitniyot is batel be-rov (see e.g., Mishnah Berurah 453:9), so I asked him why the KOF-K does not put a hashgachah on products with corn syrup since it is batel. He replied: “The people don’t want it.” In other words, the people will not accept that something with kitniyot can be kosher for Passover, even if it is batel be-rov.[10]

R. Felder also told me that if he was asked he would tell people that there is no problem eating a product with kitniyot if it is batel be-rov. According to this approach, one is permitted to drink regular Coke on Passover, and this is indeed the pesak of R. Yitzhak Abadi. (The other issue that comes up with regular Coke is whether kitniyot derivatives are forbidden on Passover.) I realize that if you extrapolate the “halakhot” of kitniyot from Yoreh Deah halakhic principles about when bitul can be applied, there are sources that would be strict in dealing with kitniyot (as the kitniyot is put in as part of production, rather than accidentally falling in). But what is interesting, I think, is that pretty much all the rabbis I have asked about this have replied in the same way. Rather than explain why we don’t follow the principle that kitniyot is batel be-rov, they have stated simply that when it comes to Passover we are extra strict. (R. Hershel Schachter is an exception, and he told me that kitniyot intentionally put in the product is not to be regarded as batel.)

This issue was raised by R. Alfred Cohen a number of years ago:

With this in mind, we should take another look at the furor which in the past few years has arisen concerning chocolate and candy manufactured in Israel under the supervision of the Rabbinate. Many candies contain corn syrup as the sweetener: Should this be considered a problem for Ashkenazic Jews? Based on the principle that if kitniyot are less than half of the total the food may be eaten, many people see no reason why such candy should be avoided.[11]

Returning to the gelatin issue, we saw in the previous post that R. Yehuda Gershuni was one of the rabbis who gave the hashgachah on Jello. This is noteworthy, as in 1952 he wrote a lengthy article in support of the position of his father-in-law, R. Eliezer Silver, that gelatin is forbidden.[12] Either he later changed his mind or perhaps he never really thought gelatin was forbidden, but it was only out of respect for his father-in-law that wrote his lengthy article. It seems that only after his father-in-law died in 1968 did R. Gershuni publicly express his lenient opinion about gelatin. In addition to his hashgachah on Jello, R. Gershuni also gave the hashgachah to Hormel gelatin.[13]

Incidentally, I found another example where R. Gershuni significantly changed his position. In Ha-Pardes, June and August, 1957, R. Gershuni discusses Yom ha-Atzmaut. Surprisingly, knowing how Zionist he was, in these articles he is not very positive about Yom ha-Atzmaut. He even says that according to Nahmanides establishing this holiday is a violation of bal tosif. As for saying Hallel on Yom ha-Atzmaut, R. Gershuni brings a variety of sources according to which this is improper. Yet in 1961 he published an article with the exact opposite perspective, in which he writes of the great significance of Yom ha-Atzmaut and that Hallel should be recited on this day.[14]

Those who wish to see a video of R. Gershuni can view it here. As far as I can tell, this is the only video of him available online. It is from the 1990 Yom Yerushalayim celebration at Merkaz ha-Rav. You can also see R. Shlomo Fisher in attendance.

In addition to gelatin, my previous post dealt with some of the history of hashgachot in America in the 1930s. In those days, no one could have imagined all the different hashgachot we currently have, as well as the various products that are under kosher supervision. In previous posts here I already mentioned how you can now get toilet bowl cleaner with a hashgachah. Here is an American hashgachah.

And for those who live in Israel, here is one with an Israeli hashgachah (thanks to Stanley Emerson for the picture).

I also noted how in Israel you can buy lettuce with no less than six different hashgachot. See here. But it gets even better, as Shimon Steinmetz sent me this image which shows that you can now get romaine lettuce with seven different hashgachot. Do I hear eight . . . ?

Yet I don’t think Israel has what we have, namely, ant and roach killer under hashgachah. (It is pareve.)

(For those who are wondering, the date on upper right of the OU letters is the date that you view the document, not when the contract was signed.)

You can even get enzyme replacement injections under OU supervision. See here.

According to the OU, when they are “approached by companies whose products would not inherently need a hechsher, the OU tells them that certification is not necessary. But some companies request kosher certification because that will make Orthodox Jews more likely to buy them.”[15]

Interestingly, since today we take it for granted that all sorts of unnecessary hashgachot are found on various non-food items, in previous years this was seen in a very different light. In 1896 the New York newspaper Ha-Ivri, in an attack on the rabbinical board headed by R. Bernard Drachman, noted how the board had given hashgachot to salt, soap for washing clothes, and stove polish.[16] This scandalous charge was denied by R. Drachman, who noted that these hashgachot were given by a private individual, not his organization. R. Drachman writes as follows, and look how he describes the unnecessary hashgachot:[17]

ההכשרים המוזרים והמעוררים שחוק אשר רמזת עליהם לא מעשי הועד המה כי אם מעשי ידי איש יחיד

While we are on the subject of hashgachot, I think readers will find it of interest that the OU did not accept all the products certified by R. Soloveitchik in Boston, as his hashgachah did not always meet OU standards which had been established by R. Alexander Rosenberg. R. Berel Wein, who succeeded R. Rosenberg as rabbinic administrator of OU Kashrut, reports that he was constantly criticized for this as people thought it very disrespectful to the Rav that the OU did not accept his hashgachah in all matters. R. Wein, however, explains as follow:

In all my meetings with the Rav. I never discussed this sensitive matter with him. However, he once said to me, “As the rabbi of Boston, it is my duty to grant kashrut certification to products that are kosher, even if they don’t necessarily reach the highest standards of kashrut. I know you have to operate under a different set of rules. Don’t be troubled that the OU doesn’t use certain products I certify. I’m not troubled by it.” I never revealed that conversation to the Kashrut Committee, nor did I change OU policy.[18]

However, my question would be, how is the role of OU kashrut different than what the Rav was trying to do? Isn’t the goal of the OU also to ensure kashrut for all types of Jews? How is the role of a communal rabbi in giving a hashgachah for his community different than that of the OU, which is a nonprofit organization that exists to serve the larger Jewish community?

Since part 1 of this post discussed the OK hashgachah, it should be noted that at one time there were actually two hashgachot identified with the OK symbol. Here is an early OK symbol used by R. Harold Sharfman’s Kosher Overseers Association of America. (A different looking OK symbol was actually first used by his father, R. Hyman Sharfman, in 1927.)[19]

It later developed into what was called the Half-Moon K, surrounded by a circle.

This led to a lawsuit by the OK in the 1990s, with the result that the Half Moon K had to appear without the circle.[20] (I don’t know why, as we have seen on other occasions as well, a dispute between Orthodox rabbis was decided in a secular court instead of in a beit din.) After Rabbi Sharfman’s death, the Half-Moon K was taken over by the OU and its symbol was retired.

Sharfman authored a few interesting works focusing on American Jewish history. He also wrote the book, Global Guide to Kosher Foods and Restaurants (Malibu, 1990), from which the above pictures of the OK symbol were taken. The book’s title is not going to interest many, although the subtitle is more intriguing: “An Illustrated History of Kashruth in 20^th Century United States.” This is a very rare book and I recently was able to acquire a copy. I was surprised to find that it is really a fascinating work with some great pictures. Because it is so rare I have made a PDF of the book which you can see here.

When it comes to kashrut supervision in the United States, Roger Horowitz mentions an interesting point that in the 1950s there were rabbis who opposed supermarkets selling kosher meat as they claimed that it was forbidden for the meat to be sold on Shabbat.[21] The real reason for the opposition was presumably to protect the kosher butchers from competition, but the argument was not framed in this fashion. I think most will be surprised by such a stringent approach. After all, we don’t want Sabbath violators to also consume non-kosher meat, so why prevent them from buying kosher if they are in the supermarket on Saturday? Yet when asked by R. Yitzhak Zilberstein, R. Elyashiv ruled that if people are going on a trip on Shabbat, and want to order kosher food from a caterer for the trip, that the caterer should not provide them with the food even though this means they will eat non-kosher.[22]

Another surprising development in the kashrut world is that the OU has recently refused to give a hashgachah to a vegetarian product called Impossible Pork. See the Yeshiva World article here, and see also the Wall Street Journal article here. As the Yeshiva World reports, “[Rabbi Menachem] Genack clarified that although [the] OU certifies items related to pork such as Trader Joe’s ‘spicy porkless plant-based snack rinds,’ the agency decided that certifying a product called ‘pork’ was a red line they aren’t willing to cross right now.” 

In the Wall Street Journal article Rabbi Genack is quoted as follows: “The decision was based on the emotional reaction some kosher eaters have had to kosher-certified pork-related products in the past that also had no actual pork in them.” So now company kashrut decisions are based on people’s emotional reactions? Sounds crazy to me. The article continues: “Rabbi Genack of OU Kosher says he suspects that doubters might one day come around and allow faux pork to be certified as kosher.” I don’t understand this at all. Since when does the OU have to get approval from “doubters” to put a hashgachah on a product? Furthermore, I must note, there are already OU certified products that have the name “bacon” in them and are said to taste like the real thing. This includes Bacos (see here), Bacon Flavored Bits (see here), and even a product called Bacon Bits Milk Chocolate (see here). And of course, the Talmud, Hullin 109b, talks about the shibuta fish whose brain tastes like pork.[23]

Since we have been speaking about kashrut in America, let me make one final point about this. Many people are under the impression that it was Jewish emigration to America that led people to give up kashrut, I must therefore call attention to a fascinating article by Asaf Kaniel that shows that in the years 1937-1939 only one third of the Jews of Warsaw bought kosher meat. Granted, this was a very difficult period for the Jews of Warsaw, and had economic circumstances been different I have no doubt that most of these people would have been buying kosher. However, from the large number who abandoned kashrut, we can get a sense as to how tenuous their attachment to this mitzvah was, as it is always the case that during difficult times the ones who are not so attached to something are the first to give it up.[24] (Kaniel also has another valuable article that shows the growth of irreligiosity in Vilna in the early twentieth century.[25])

I know people will be shocked by hearing this, about Warsaw of all places. So let me note that in a 1937 interview given when he was in the United States, R. Elhanan Wasserman stated that religious life in Poland was worse than in America.[26]

2. In my last post I cited something from R. Shmaryahu Shulman who unfortunately recently passed away. In 1951 R. Shulman published his Be’er Sarim which contains hiddushim on the Talmud.

In R. Yitzhak Ruderman’s approbation he states that this is the first book of hiddushim on Shas published by an American-born author. Is this true? I am not aware of anything earlier. As far as I know, the first traditional rabbinic sefer (not hiddushim on Shas) published by an American-born author is R. Eliezer Zvi Revel’s Otzar ha-Sotah (New York, 1941).

R. Eliezer Zvi was the son of R. Bernard Revel.

Is there an even earlier sefer published by an American-born author? There is another sefer that I am aware of, but as it is not an original sefer, I gave Revel the honors. The other sefer was published by R. Bernard Drachman, who was born in New York in 1861. In 1907 he published an edition of Divrei ha-Rivot by R. Zerahiah ha-Levi and R. Abraham ben David, together with his commentary.

Who was the first American-born author to publish a book in Hebrew? This would appear to be Reuven Grossman (1905-1974; he later took the last name Avinoam). Born in Chicago, Grossman spoke Hebrew as his first language. His first book, Mi-Pi Olel (New York, 1915), containing essays, poetry, and the beginnings of a commentary on the Torah, appeared when he was ten years old. As far as I know, this makes him the youngest published Jewish author in history. One of the essays in the book was earlier published in a newspaper when Grossman was only eight years old. (I wonder how much help he had from his father who was a Hebraist.) You can find Mi-Pi Olel here.

The book contains a picture of the young author .

His next book, Ibim (New York, 1918), appeared when Grossman was thirteen years old. You can find it here.

Ibim also includes a picture of Grossman.

You can learn more about Grossman here and here, and in Yosef Goldman, Hebrew Printing in America (Brooklyn, 2006), p. 325.

3. In my last post, I gave a link to my Torah in Motion classes on Saul Lieberman. I also did a 53-part series on the sefer I published, Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan. You can see it here. My four-part series on the escape of the Mir Yeshiva can be viewed here. My class on Torah study on Christmas eve is here; my class on kitniyot is here; my discussion of the Hazon Ish and R. Zvi Yehuda is here.

4. I can’t end the post without calling attention to an important new publication by Seforim Blog contributor, R. Bezalel Naor. Navigating Worlds is a collection of Naor’s essays that appeared from 2006-2020, including those that appeared on the Seforim Blog. As is to be expected, there are essays on R. Kook, further solidifying Naor’s standing as the leading expositor of R. Kook’s thought in English. There are also essays on a wide range of other topics including Maimonides, Kabbalah, and Hasidism, as well as discussions of passages in the Torah and Talmud, and book reviews.

In addition to the broad themes discussed, Navigating Worlds is full of individual items of historical and bibliographical interest. To mention just one of the many things I learned from the book, on p. 554 Naor cites a report from R. Uri Moinester in the name of R. Joseph Alexander, that R. Hayyim Soloveitchik told the latter that it had taken him two years to study Maimonides’ Guide.[27] This source should be added to what I mentioned in a previous post  here about R. Hayyim’s study of the Guide.[28]

* * * * * *

[1] In reply to a question from Tamir Ratzon, R. Kafih said that one should only eat a product with gelatin if there was no non-gelatin alternative. See Teshuvot ha-Rav Yosef Kafih le-Talmido Tamir Ratzon, ed. Itamar Cohen (Kiryat Ono, 2019) p. 306. This reply is more stringent than R. Kafih’s letter published in this post.
[2] Yad Hanokh, no. 23.
[3] See my Changing the Immutable, pp. 80ff., 95.
[4] See Sefer ha-Zikaron le-Maran Ba’al “Pahad Yitzhak,” p. 334.
[5] She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharshag, vol. 1, Yoreh Deah, no. 68. This source and the two prior sources I mentioned, Yad Hanokh and Yad Yehudah, are noted by R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, Zikhron Moshe, vol. 3, no. 38.
[6] See R. Hayyim Oberlander’s article in Or Yisrael 56 (Tamuz 5769), pp. 58-59.
[7] See Literaturblatt des Orients, August 12, 1848 (no. 33), p. 525.
[8] Sha’ar ha-Mitzvot, parashat Mishpatim (end).
[9] In this context, where it means “second,” the word תנינא is pronounced tinyana. See Daniel 7:5 where the word appears. In the Talmud, the word appears as תניינא so the pronunciation is obvious. Onkelos, Gen. 1:8, has תנין, and all the editions I checked vocalize it correctly as tinyan. Yet if you google “Orah Hayyim Tanina” or “Yoreh Deah Tanina” you will find lots of examples where the word תנינא is written as “tanina”. Yet this is an error as tanina is a completely different word and means serpent or sea monster.
[10] I heard a shiur from R. Asher Weiss, and in explaining why things became so strict with kitniyot, he quoted R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who once gave a heter that the people did not want to accept. R. Auerbach joked that it was a kula she-ein ha-tzibbur yakhol la’amod bah. In speaking about the standards of the Triangle K hashgachah, Timothy D. Lytton quotes one kashrut professional as follows: “It’s permissible under Jewish law, but it’s a standard that many people are not willing to accept.” Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial Food (Cambridge, MA, 2013), p. 83. In speaking of how the Jewish masses will not listen to the greatest rabbis if they tell them to stop observing even a small custom, R. Reuven Katz refers to the German expression that the rabbi is a rabbi, but the regular Jew is a chief rabbi (Oberrabbiner, lit. “above the rabbi”). “Der Rabbiner ist ein Rabbiner, aber der Jude ist ein Oberrabbiner.” Dudaei Reuven, vol. 1, p. 32a, and see also R. Katz’s letter published in R. Avraham Yudelevitz, Hiddushei Beit Av (New York-Jerusalem, 2012), pp. 18-19.
[11] “Kitniyot,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 6 (Fall 1983), p. 71.
[12] See his article in Kerem, Tishrei 5713, pp. 9ff.
[13] In my prior post I published a responsum on gelatin by R. David Telsner. As Menachem pointed out in his comment to the post, this responsum (with some changes at the end) was mistakenly included in R. Gershuni’s Hokhmat Gershon, pp. 405ff., as if it were written by R. Gershuni. As the editor notes in the preface, because of R. Gershuni’s ill health he was not able to review the book before publication, and this explains how the Telsner responsum could end up in the book (a phenomenon we also know from other books of responsa).
[14] “She’elat Yom ha-Atzmaut,” in R. Shimon Federbush, ed., Torah u-Melukhah (Jerusalem, 1961), pp. 180-192.
[15] Kenneth Lasson, Sacred Cows, Holy Wars (Durham, 2017), pp. 135-136. Lasson also writes (p. 113): “The OU requires that at a minimum all of its mashgichim have Orthodox ordination (semicha) from a recognized rabbinic individual or institution and pray only in Orthodox synagogues.” Yet I know of people in out of the way places who have checked on factories for the OU and they are not rabbis.
[16] See Ha-Ivri, Sep. 11, 1896, p. 1; Harold Gastwirt, Fraud, Corruption and Holiness (Port Washington, N.Y., 1974), pp. 82-83. I once had a rebbetzin insist to me that laundry detergent requires a hashgachah as we put tablecloths in the wash.
[17] Ha-Ivri, Oct. 23, 1896, p. 1.
[18] Wein, Teach Them Dilgently (New Milford, CT, 2014), pp. 97-98. R. Wein also mentions that R. Moshe Feinstein sometimes favored the immigrant rabbis who offered private hashgachot—which was an important source of income for them—over the OU’s more “practical and progressive directions in kashrut” (p. 99).

In earlier years, there were Agudas ha-Rabbonim rabbis who criticized the OU’s hashgachah because there were many synagogues in the OU that did not have mehitzot. These rabbis claimed that you cannot trust an organization that allows non-mehitzah shuls to be part of it. In the 1930s the Agudas ha-Rabbonim rejected the kashrut reliability of the OU after it agreed to work with representatives of the Conservative movement in establishing reliable kashrut in America. See Gastwirt, Fraud, Corruption, and Holiness, pp. 166-167. As for Agudas ha-Rabbonim rabbis, there were those who gave hashgachot—this was how they made a living— but they personally did not eat from all the food under their hashgachah. (Growing up there was a rabbi in my town who told my father not to buy from a certain butcher, even though this butcher was under his hashgachah. The rabbi’s attitude was that the butcher was good enough for non-Orthodox Jews, but Orthodox Jews should not shop there, as he was not able to visit the store as much as he would have liked.) R. Nachum Eliezer Rabinovitch, Siah Nahum, p. 171, completely rejects such an approach.

ברור שאם הרב אינו אוכל מן המאכלים שהוא אמור להשגיח עליהם, דבר זה יגרום לזלזול וחילול השם ח“ו

[19] See Harold Sharfman, Global Guide to Kosher Foods and Restaurants (Malibu, 1990), p. 68.
[20] For the lawsuit, see here. Another example of the OK involved in controversy was when it put in a bid to control the proposed “dot-kosher” suffix for Web addresses. The OU, Star K, CRC, and KOF-K opposed the OK’s bid, with the OU stating: “We think that if the term kosher, which has important meaning in the Jewish religion, is commercialized, it will do a disservice to how religion in general should be treated and will harm the kosher public specifically.” See here, and Lasson, Sacred Cows, Holy Wars, pp. 146-147.
[21] Kosher USA (New York, 2016), pp. 190-191.
[22] Zilberstein, Avnei Esh, pp. 892-893.
[23] See here for Ari Zivotofsky and Zohar Amar’s attempt to identify this fish.
[24] Kaniel, “Bein Hilonim Mesorati’im ve-Ortodoksim: Shemirat Mitzvot bi-Re’i ha-Hitmodedut im Gezerat ha-Kashrut,” Gal Ed 22 (2010), pp. 75-106.
[25] “Al Milhamah u-Shemirat ha-Mitzvot: Vilna 1914-1922,” Gal Ed 24 (2015), pp. 37-74. Regarding Kashrut in Vilna, Kaniel notes that due to the difficult economic circumstances, there were occasions when the rabbis permitted butchers to sell non-kosher meat to non-Jews, as long as they were careful to keep the kosher meat separate from that which was non-kosher. See ibid., p. 61.
[26] See R. Wasserman’s Morgen Zhurnal interview included in Mi-Pihem shel Rabbotenu (Bnei Brak, 2008), p. 345.
[27] Moinster, Karnei Re’em (New York, 1951), p. 104 n. 1.
[28] Another source that should be added is Shulamith Soloveitchik Meiselman, The Soloveitchik Heritage: A Daughter’s Memoir (Hoboken, 1995), pp. 109-110, where in addition to discussing R. Hayyim’s interest in the Guide, she also mentions that he had R. Moses Soloveitchik promise never to read this work. “Even years later, when his children were attending the university and the book was part of the family library, Father never touched it. Father always kept a promise” (p. 110).

Gelatin, Supposed Retractions, and Abraham Goldstein, Part 1

Marc B. Shapiro

In my last post I quoted something from Mesorat Moshe and wondered whether R. Moshe Feinstein could have actually said that which is attributed to him. While the Mesorat Moshe series is quite valuable, whenever one deals with “table talk” there is always going to be the issue of how much authority do you give to such reports, especially compared with written texts of R. Moshe. Here is an example of what I am talking about.

In the new Mesorat Moshe, vol. 4, p. 191-192, R. Moshe Feinstein is asked why gelatin is forbidden, and he replies that it is because gelatin tastes good. Unfortunately, R. Moshe was given false information, as gelatin has no taste whatsoever. If this was all we had, then I think we could assume that R. Moshe should not be regarded as strict in this matter (since the strict ruling was based on an error). Yet in R. Moshe’s responsum forbidding gelatin, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2, no. 23, there is no mention of gelatin having a taste, so clearly this was not an important consideration for him in coming to a stringent decision. In other words, one whose only source of information in this matter comes from Mesorat Moshe will be misled. (In Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2, no. 27, we see that R. Moshe did not know if gelatin has a taste.)

The gelatin issue has long been an interest of mine, both the halakhic and also the sociological angles. Those interested in how the gelatin controversy played out in the United States should examine Roger Horowitz’s wonderful book, Kosher USA. Chapter 3 is titled “The Great Jell-O Controversy”. The hashgachah on Jell-O was first given by Rabbis Samuel Baskin and Shimon Winograd. They later removed the hashgachah after being pressured by R. Eliezer Silver and other members of Agudas ha-Rabbonim. See R. Baskin and R. Winograd’s public statement here.

By the 1960s R. David Telsner was giving the hashgachah, and he was later joined by R. Yehuda Gershuni. (Incidentally, R. Telsner was the one who translated R. Soloveitchik’s Hamesh Derashot into Hebrew.) Here is a letter from 1975 in which these rabbis affirm that Jell-O is kosher.

Here is R. Telsner’s responsum permitting gelatin. This was printed by R. Telsner and distributed to those who wanted to know the basis for his permission. As far as I know, this responsum never appeared in any publication and it is not found on the internet.

When it comes to gelatin, there were great rabbis on both sides of the issue, and those who permitted it were able to point to the lenient position of R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzenski. Even among those rabbis who were lenient, there were disputes as to whether all gelatin is OK, including from pigskins, or only gelatin made from bones or hides of kosher animals. Not so well known is the report that R. Kook permitted gelatin.[1] Also of note is that in 1952 R. Simhah Elberg testified to the wide acceptance of gelatin in the Orthodox community:[2]

שכבר נתפשט היתר והותר ע”י גדולי וגאוני ארץ

R. Noah Sheinkopf has prepared the following list of poskim who permitted bovine gelatin. (I have not checked the sources.)

1) Rabbi Dovid Tzvi Hoffmann, Melamed L’Hoil, Y.D., #24 and #35 (By Inference)

2) Rabbi Mordechai Leib Winkler, Levushei Mordechai, Yoreh Deah Tineyna, #60

3) Rabbi Yehuda Leib Tzirelson, Lev Yehuda #39

4) Rabbi Ze’ev Bidnovitz, Divrei Ze’ev, vol. 18. #12

5) Rabbi Y.L. Graubart, Chavalim Baneimim, vol. 4. #23; (See also HaPardes, Aug. 1942, p. 19)

6) Rabbi Shmuel Pardes, Avnei Shmuel, Berurei Halacha, #19

7) Rabbi Yosef Konvitz, Divrei Yosef, vol. 1, p. 172

8) Rabbi Hayyim Ozer Grodzenski, Achiezer, vol. 3, #33, sec. 5; see also Avnei Shmuel, pp. 10-11

9) Rabbi Simcha Zelig Regeur (Brisker Dayan), printed in Kovetz Moriah, issue 400-402, p. 76-77

10) Rabbi Yitzchak Burstein, Mataamei Yitzchak, vol. 2, chap. 24-25

11) Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, HaPardes, July 1952; Edus L’Yisrael, p. 177

12) Rabbi Yehuda Leib Seltzer, HaPardes, July 1952; Vezos L’Yehuda, O.C. #26

13) Rabbi Simcha Elberg, HaPardes, July 1952; HaPardes, October 1952 

14) Rabbi Nissen Telushkin (Chabad), Taharas HaMayim, vol. 1, chap. 54

15) Rabbi Nachum Weidenfeld, Chazon Nachum, #61

16) Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, Y.D., #83

17) Rabbi Yechezkel Abramsky, introduction to Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 4; Chazon Yechezkel, Zevachim, Sh“ut #6

18) Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, introduction to Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 4; Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 20, #33

19) Rabbi Koppel Kahana, Teshuva B’Inyan Gelatin, 1966 (By Inference)

20) Rabbi Moshe Nosson Nota Lemberger, Ateres Moshe, vol. 1, Y.D., # 42-43

21) Rabbi Yitzchak Glickman, Kol Torah, Shana 13, Choveret 4

22) Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, Kovetz Teshuvos, #73, sec. 3 (In terms of practical halakhah, for R. Elyashiv the crucial point is if some taste remains, but as long as it is rendered completely tasteless, then he identifies with the R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzenski’s lenient decision.)

23) Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, Yabia Omer, vol. 8, Y.D., #11

24) Rabbi Ben Tzion Abba Shaul, Ohr L’Tzion, vol. 5, #32, sec. 6 (By Inference)

25) Rabbi Shlomo Amar, Shema Shlomo, vol. 5, Y.D., #12

26) Rabbi Yechezkel Roth, Emek HaTeshuva, vol. 3, #67 (By Inference)

27) Rabbi Yisroel Yaakov Fisher, Even Yisroel, vol. 8, #56

28) Rabbi Yirmiyahu Menachem Kohen, V’Heirim Kohen, vol. 2, Y.D., #31; vol. 4, Y.D., #40

29) Rabbi Moshe Levi, Tefilla L“Moshe, Y.D., #4

30) Rabbi Almog Levi, Avnay Levi, Y.D., #1

31) Rabbi Yitzchak Mekayis and Rabbi Yaakov Mekayis, Ohr HaHalacha, Kuntres #3

32) Rabbi Amit Chadad, Pri Eitz Chaim, p. 529

33) Rabbi Moshe Dan Sheinkopf, a Vice President of the Agudas HaRabbonim, who certified Kojel until the late 1970s.

To this list from R. Sheinkopf, we can add R. Yaakov Ariel, Be-Oholah shel Torah, vol. 5, pp. 76-77, R. Eliezer Melamed, Peninei Halakhah: Likutim 3, pp. 352-353, R. Shlomo Aviner (see here) and R. Yitzhak Abadi (as seen on learn.oheltorah.com and prior to this on the old site, kashrut.org). R. Abadi’s view is particularly interesting as his teacher, R. Aharon Kotler, was one of the major forces behind the general rejection of gelatin in the United States. It is also noteworthy that for a short time in the 1950s the OU also approved of gelatin.[3] R. Avraham Vilner, in an earlier post at the Seforim Blog here, provides evidence that the Hazon Ish felt that one could rely on R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzenski’s heter for gelatin.

כשאמרתי למו”ר [הרב שמריה שולמאן] שראיתי הרבה חולקים על פסקו של רבי חיים עוזר בענין הג’אלאטין, וגם אלו שבדרך כלל לא היו פוסקים נגדו כמו הרב אליעזר סיבלר, בזה פסקו אחרית ממנו, אמר לי שהראש ישיבה הרב רודערמאן זצ”ל אמר לו, שהחזון איש אמר שעל כל פסקי רבי חיים עוזר אפשר לסמוך בלי שום פקפוק, חוץ ממה שהתיר לשמש במוך היכא שהסיבה לשימוש במוך הוא מצד האיש, שבזה א”א לסמוך

Ironically, it was Conservative Rabbi Louis Ginzberg who was mahmir, writing with great certainty:

I am convinced that no rabbinical scholar who is in a position to comprehend a problem in chemistry would ever permit the use of gelatin. . . . The late Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski was well known to me personally; as a matter of fact, his wife was a close relation to me, and I would certainly attach great weight to any decision by him on Jewish Law, but not in a case for which some knowledge of chemistry or physiology is necessary.[4]

On the other hand, Conservative Rabbi Isaac Klein, who was one of only three people to receive private semikhah from Ginzberg—the other two being Louis Finkelstein and Boaz Cohen—permitted gelatin.[5]

Returning to Mesorat Moshe and the problems with oral reports, I saw something relevant in R. Yehuda Spitz’s comprehensive new book, Food: A Halachic Analysis. The matter under discussion is whether one can use the same dishwasher for meat and milk utensils. R. Moshe has a number of responsa where he says that this is permissible as long as you have separate dish racks. His first responsum on the topic appears in Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim 1, no. 104, and is from early 1957. It is the second part of one of his famous responsa on bat mitzvah, and was sent to R. Baruch Aharon Poupka of Pittsburgh. (For some reason, the heading of the responsum only mentions bat mitzvah, not the dishwasher question). R. Moshe’s answer is short and to the point:

ובדבר הכלי החדשה [!] לרחץ את הכלים שנקרא בשם “דיש וואשער” אם יכולין לרחוץ שם כלי בשר וכלי חלב זה אחר זה. הנה צריך שמה שבתוכו שהוא על מה שמניחין הכלים, שיהיה לכלי בשר אחרים ולכלי חלב אחרים, ועצם הדיש וואשער שמשימין בתוכו הדבר שמניחין עליו הכלים שהוא רק הדפנות שסביבותם יכולין להשתמש בו לשניהם בזה אחר זה

This is a very simple reply, and it is not possible to misunderstand what R. Moshe is saying. R. Moshe later sent two other responsa where he explains his reason for requiring separate dish racks (Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2, nos. 28, 29). In the latter responsum, he mentions that different water should be used for the milk and meat washings. (In the earliest dishwashers you could use the same water more than once.) He states that he did not mention this point in the original responsum because in any event those who have a dishwasher change the water between cycles. He specifically tells us that he is referring to householders, not that anyone would have any doubt about this.

ובפרט שזמן גדול בהרבה שעות יש לכל בעה“ב מרחיצת כלי חלב עד רחיצת כלי בשר ולא ישאירו שם המים סרוחין זמן כזה

In this responsum, R. Moshe also recommends running an empty rinse cycle between milk and meat dishes. R. Moshe repeats his basic position in a couple of other responsa,[6] and a simple internet source will reveal that lots of people have discussed R. Moshe’s view and there is no room for misunderstanding.

R. Spitz, Food: A Halachic Analysis, p. 70, quotes someone who spoke to R. Moshe about his “dishwasher leniency.” According to this person, R. Moshe explained that everyone misunderstood what he wrote, and his view that one can use the same dishwasher with separate racks was only stated regardingcommercial dishwashers. However, when it comes to the home, one cannot use the same dishwasher, even with separate racks. Based on this report, R. Spitz writes, “If so, there is ample reason to be stringent, certainly lechatchilla, regarding using the same dishwasher for both milk and meat dishes.”

I have to say that testimony such as this has absolutely no halakhic significance. There is indeed reason to be stringent, based on the views of other poskim (and most people do not seem to follow R. Moshe’s heter of two dish racks). However, if all we had was this report, it would not lead us to ignore R. Moshe’s explicit position in his responsa.

We have many examples of such statements, where a posek supposedly said something privately that completely contradicts what he said in print. In such cases, one cannot rely on these supposed retractions or statements of clarification, except in very rare cases where the author makes his opinion widely known or the person reporting the retraction is a universally recognized Torah scholar[7] (although even in the latter case we cannot always rely on the scholar reporting the supposed retraction).[8] I have no way of knowing what the man R. Spitz quotes was told by R. Moshe. It could be that he completely misunderstood what R. Moshe said. It could also be that R. Moshe had a reason for telling this person what he did, as perhaps R. Moshe thought that this man should hold to a higher level. But it is simply incorrect to suggest that R. Moshe was not referring to a home dishwasher when all can see that he certainly was. R. Spitz himself, p. 71 n. 23, recognizes that R. Moshe was referring to home dishwashers. He also cites R. Baruch Moskowitz, Ve-Dibarta Bam, vol. 2, no. 244, that R. Dovid Feinstein also explained his father’s position as referring to home dishwashers. You can also listen to R. Shmuel Fuerst, a leading student of R. Moshe, explain the matter here.

Quite apart from my point just mentioned, that reports of private conversations that contradict a posek’s written opinion do not have halakhic significance, I must again stress the larger problem raised by books like Mesorat Moshe which is how much significance we should give to works that report oral teachings of great rabbis. Since we have so many examples of contradictory reports and incorrect statements in such texts, I think it is obvious that even such a wonderful work as Mesorat Moshe has to be used carefully, and in no way can it be seen as rising to the level of authority of what R. Moshe himself wrote.

Returning to the gelatin issue, Horowitz tells the story of Abraham Goldstein (1861-1944), who really should be given the title of originator of industrial hashgachot in the United States. Here is his picture.[9]

It was Goldstein who was behind the OU’s kosher certification program and who established the agreements with the early companies. He was also the OU’s “chemical expert,” yet as Horowitz notes, he has been completely erased from the OU’s institutional memory.[10]

In 1935 he broke with the OU and founded the OK Laboratories. This would be sold in 1969 to Rabbi Berel Levy, and would then become a universally recognized hashgachah. However, this was not the case when Goldstein was in charge, and it is when Goldstein founded the OK that the controversial period of his life begins. This was because Goldstein, who was not a rabbi and had no expertise in Jewish law, set out to determine what was kosher and what was not. He made it clear that in determining what was kosher, chemists (such as himself) were a more reliable source than rabbis, as the latter did not understand food technology and were mistakenly giving approval to non-kosher food items. Goldstein had a very simple approach to the matter: If a product had any non-kosher element in it, it was treif and forbidden to be eaten. The notions of bitul or that the non-kosher food had so changed its form were not considerations he paid any attention to.[11] He also did not rely on rabbis whom he felt were not careful in such matters. Thus, he refused to accept the hashgachot issued on Coke by R. Samuel Pardes, editor of Ha-Pardes, and later by R. Tuvia Geffen.[12]

As Horowitz notes, R. Geffen was not happy with R. Pardes’ hashgachah on Coke because the drink included 0.09 percent glycerin from a non-kosher source. This is a very tiny amount—less than 1 in 1000—which according to halakhah is batel, and thus of no halakhic significance. Yet there are some fundamental questions involved here. One is if the tiny amount of non-kosher is put in as part of production, rather than accidentally falling in, do we still say that it is batel? Most authorities assume yes, so from this angle R. Pardes would have been on firm ground to declare the drink kosher. However, there is another issue, and that is can you officially give a hashgachah to an item relying on bitul, especially when the company will then be advertising the product as kosher? This can certainly be seen as distasteful and perhaps even bringing us to a situation of ein mevatelin issur lekhathilah (as the kashrut organization is now involved with the company).

R. Geffen believed that Coke should not be given a hashgachah as long as the non-kosher glycerin was not replaced with a kosher alternative. In fact, as far as I can see, R. Pardes himself never argued that it is acceptable to rely on bitul in issuing a hashgachah, since he flatly declared—mistakenly it turns out—that there were no non-kosher ingredients in Coke (that is, he was not saying that the non-kosher ingredients were of no halakhic significance).[13]

Goldstein had nothing but contempt for the way the old-time rabbis went about issuing hashgachot, and R. Pardes’ hashgachah on Coke was just another illustration of this. In speaking of R. Pardes, Goldstein wrote that “such men undermine the very foundation of our religion” and “there is no room for such scoundrels in decent company.” To reiterate, this was not a dispute between two rabbis but rather a layperson with no yeshiva training declaring that a learned rabbi did not understand the basic laws of kashrut. As far as the rabbis were concerned, the chutzpah here was unbelievable, and this was doubled by the fact that Goldstein’s Kosher Food Guide, which included all sorts of important information about kosher food together with Goldstein’s attacks on various rabbis, had a circulation of 150,000.[14] Significantly, Goldstein refused the OU’s demand that his publication be reviewed by rabbinic scholars.[15] Goldstein believed that when it came to modern food technology, he should be the one telling the rabbis what was kosher, not the reverse.

As Horowitz describes, Goldstein ratcheted up his attacks on R. Pardes after the latter gave a hashgachah to Junket, a product that was used to make a custardlike desert but which contained rennet that came from calves that were not ritually slaughtered. R. Pardes also received the backing of the OU for both his Junket hashgachah and his hashgachah on gelatin. (In 1952, after R. Eliezer Silver’s expressed a stringent opinion regarding gelatin, the OU removed its endorsement.[16])

Here is an ad from Ha-Pardes, April 1938, for Junket, with R. Pardes’ hashgachah.

Here is an ad from Ha-Pardes, April 1943, for Carmel gelatin, with R. Pardes’ hashgachah.

Here is an ad from Ha-Pardes, April 1943, for Kojel gelatin, with R. Judah Leib Seltzer’s hashgachah.

In Goldstein’s opinion, the fact that the OU would support R. Pardes when it came to Junket—he was no longer alive when the OU approved of gelatin—only showed how low his former organization had fallen and how little it understood of food technology. For Goldstein, it was not only a sign of ignorance on the part of R. Pardes and the OU, as he also wondered if there was financial corruption involved. Addressing R. Pardes, Goldstein asked, “How much money has been paid for this false Hekhsher.” Turning to the OU, he asked if any them “participated in the division of this money.”[17] When it came to the issue of gelatin—which had great rabbis on both sides of the issue—Goldstein expressed his ire over Jello-O advertisements in the Jewish press, stating that these advertisements “are not only deplorable from a Jewish religious standpoint,” but were “an outrageous attempt to smuggle an absolutely trefa article into Jewish homes.”[18] He later repeated his warning regarding other brands of gelatin: “Neither Carmel, Emes, or Kojel gelatines can be used in Orthodox homes. They are trefa gelatines, despite the Rabbinical Heckshers.”[19] So here we have a layperson declaring that a product endorsed by leading American rabbis was “absolutely trefa.”

It was one thing for a rabbi who opposed the kashrut of gelatin to say such a thing, but to have a halakhically unlearned layperson setting himself up as the arbiter of what is, and is not, kosher was too much for the rabbinic leadership in the United States. Now it was no longer a question about the kashrut of Junket and gelatin—both of which R. Eliezer Silver himself would later reject—but respect due to talmidei hakhamim. As far as the rabbis were concerned, it simply was unacceptable for a layperson to establish himself as an authority when it came to kashrut. The most that he could do was supply information to the rabbis so they could make the proper halakhic decisions, but to publicly challenge the rabbis about their scientific facts and halakhic interpretations went over the line, and it was time for the rabbis to put Goldstein in his place. Here is the public statement issued by Agudas ha-Rabbonim and the Rabbinical Board of Greater N.Y.[20]

This is the English translation of the following Hebrew proclamation that appeared in Ha-Pardes, August 1939, p. 16.[21]

Almost ten years later it was Goldstein’s son, George, who was running the OK after the death of his father. He too was causing problems for R. Pardes. In Ha-Pardes, January 1948, p. 21, R. Pardes attacked the younger Goldstein, referring to him as הנער החצוף.

Despite the virtual herem on Abraham Goldstein, I agree with Horowitz[22] that at least to some extent Goldstein was posthumously vindicated. While the notion that a layperson could challenge learned rabbis in halakhic matters was never countenanced (and this is presumably the reason why Goldstein is completely absent from the OU’s institutional memory), Goldstein’s other point, that knowledge of chemistry and food technology is vital for kosher supervisors, has been accepted by all the mainstream hashgachot. Furthermore, despite the opposition of the rabbis to Goldstein’s OK, it remained a popular hashgachah with a wide following. In fact, until the mid-1950s, the OK supervised more products than the OU.[23]

One can only imagine Goldstein’s reaction had he heard of a pesak of the famed R. Ishmael ha-Kohen of Modena (1723-1811) in his Zera Emet, vol. 2, no. 48. The question is as follows:

נשאלתי מהו ליתן רפואה לחולה שאין בו סכנה חתיכות עגולים קטנים שקורין בוקונ”י בלע”ז מרוקחים בהרבה מינים ובכללם יש ג”כ עצם גולגלות אדם שרוף וכתות

R. Ishmael was asked about using a medicine for someone who was sick but not in serious danger. The issue was that the medicine contained pieces of a ground up human skull. This is what has been called “powdered skull,” and was a common medicine in the eighteenth century.[24] R. Ishmael permits one to consume this “medicine”.

A few centuries earlier, R. David Ibn Zimra was also asked about medicine that was made from flesh of non-Jewish dead bodies (מומ”יא — mummies).[25] R. Ibn Zimra focuses his responsum on the issue of benefiting from a dead body, since when it comes to eating the flesh, he sees no problem at all in this, as its form has been entirely changed:

איסור אכילה לא הוצרכת לשאול דודאי מותר באכילה שהרי נשתנה צורתו וחזר להיות עפר בעלמא וכ”ש ע”י סמים שהרי המומי”א היא בשר החנוטין שחונטין אותם בכמה מיני סמים כדי להעמיד צורתו וגופו וחזר להיות כעין זפת ואין בו איסור אכילה

For those interested in learning more about the subject of “corpse medicine”—which included much more than the skull—and if your stomach can handle it, I recommend Richard Sugg, Mummies, Cannibals and Vampires: The History of Corpse Medicine from the Renaissance to the Victorians (London and New York, 2016). What passed for medical cures in pre-modern times is shocking, and often downright disgusting.

As late as 1907, the Adeni Rabbi Samuel Yeshuah[26] discusses sick people who consume “mummy medicine,” what he refers to as

 רפואת ההבל שנתפשט בין העם . . . באמת המומיא הזו לא יועיל ולא יציל והיה כלא היה

I assume many readers will be shocked to learn that great poskim permitted what I have just described. Today, of course, it would turn our stomachs to even think about consuming part of a corpse, much like Goldstein was outraged that anyone could think that it is permissible to consume something from a non-kosher animal, even from a pig no less. Yet this revulsion does not arise from halakhah. Speaking personally, I can’t imagine that anyone I know would eat a piece of meat from a pile if he knew that a non-kosher piece had fallen into the group of kosher pieces, despite what the halakhah says; all the more so if a piece of pork fell into a kosher dish even if it was nullified by 60. Again, our revulsion has its origin in feelings that have little to do with pure halakhah. In fact, some authorities feel that to be strict in such cases is akin to heresy, as it is in practice (but not in theory) a denial of the halakhic principle of bitul.[27]

If I could have spoken to Goldstein, I would have tried to explain to him that the halakhic system does not work in accord with what has been called “da’at baalei batim,” and those who forbid gelatin also acknowledge that not everything from a non-kosher animal is forbidden. The gelatin dispute concerns the role of gelatin in the finished food product, not with the existence of non-kosher per se. Thus, even one who is strict in the matter of gelatin would not start screaming if he saw his son standing in right field chewing on his non-shechted leather baseball mitt.

To be continued

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My Torah in Motion trips are starting again. I am leading a group to Morocco in January, and there is a full line-up for next summer. You can see details here.

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I am currently doing a series of classes for Torah in Motion on R. Saul Lieberman. You can see them here on YouTube. Here are some pictures that were taken at the Jewish Theological Seminary minyan in Unterberg Auditorium on Hoshana Rabba 1971. (At this minyan there was separate seating but no mechitzah.) The pictures were taken by Joel Mandelbaum, son of R. Bernard Mandelbaum who held many positions at the Seminary, including serving as president from 1966-1973 under Chancellor Louis Finkelstein.

Here is Lieberman.

Here is Lieberman and Louis Finkelstein. Abraham Joshua Heschel is standing between them and Bernard Mandelbaum is on the far right.

In front of Lieberman, leading the procession, is Moshe Zucker. Behind Lieberman is Simon Greenberg.

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[1] See Ha-Pardes, August 1942, p. 19. It also states here that R. Shlomo Natan Kotler permitted gelatin.

[2] Ha-Pardes, October 1952, p. 31.

[3] See Horowitz, Kosher USA (New York, 2016), pp. 59-60.

[4] The Responsa of Professor Louis Ginzberg, ed. David Golinkin (New York and Jerusalem, 1996), p. 152.

[5] Responsa and Halakhic Studies (n.p., 1975), ch. 7.

[6] Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 3, nos. 10, 11.

[7] For example, the Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 201:75, famously forbids heated mikvaot. (R. Karo cites the stringent view as יש מי שאוסר and he does not offer a lenient alternative). However, R. Eliezer ben Arha of Hebron (died 1691) reported that R. Karo abandoned this stringency and permitted the heating of a mikveh.

ואפילו בזמן הרב מוהרי”ק זלה”ה עשה מעשה נגד מה שפסק שחשש וכתב סברת האוסר, כי רבים מבני עליה הם המתירין, ועלייהו קא סמכינן

See She’elot u-Teshuvot Rabbenu Eliezer ben Arha (Jerusalem, 1978), no. 18, and see note 1 for the impact of this reported change in R. Karo’s position.

Another interesting phenomenon, which I will not discuss in this post, is when a posek refuses to put a leniency into writing. How authoritative is this posek’s oral ruling? A classic example of this is R. Moshe Feinstein’s opinion about turning off the flame of a gas stove on Yom Tov. In Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim I, no. 128, R. Moshe writes that he doesn’t wish to put his opinion in writing, but it is known that he permitted this.

[8] See e.g., here where I discuss the false claim that R. Ezekiel Landau retracted his view that sturgeon is kosher. For the claim that R. Joseph Hayyim retracted his permission to ride a bicycle on Shabbat where there is an eruv (Rav Pealim, vol. 1, Orah Hayyim, no. 25), see R. Ovadiah Hadaya, Yaskil Avdi, vol. 3, Orah Hayim, no. 12:5:4, vol. 5, Orah Hayyim, no. 40. For a rejection of this claim, see R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yabia Omer, vol. 9, Orah Hayyim, no. 108:189. See also here where R. Doniel Neustadt writes: “Several sources report that the Chafetz Chayim eventually changed his ruling and exempted cooked fruits served for dessert from a blessing; see Orchos Rabbeinu 66 and Vezos ha-Berachah, pg. 78. Others dispute that the Chafetz Chayim changed his ruling.” The forger Chaim Bloch, Ha-Maor, Dec. 1951, p. 7, who was himself opposed to the gelatin heter, claims to have discussed the matter with R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzenski. Not surprisingly, Bloch records that R. Grodzenski told him that he never actually gave a ruling on the question of gelatin. Rather, he was only stating that his opinion inclined in this direction. For a rejection of Bloch’s false testimony, see R. Samuel Baskin and R. Shimon Winograd in Ha-Maor, Aug. 1952, pp. 7-8. Here is some of what they write:

אם הגאון רח”ע באמת חזר מתשובתו ומהיתרו על תוצרת הנ”ל, איך לא הודיע זאת ברבים, כדי שלא יכשלו ח”ו ויסמכו על פסקו ותשובתו בשו”ת אחיעזר, ויעשו מעשה לכתחילה בדבר שלא נתן הגאון הנ”ל היתר מוחלט, ועוד אם הגאון רח”ע ז”ל דיבר עם הרב ח”ב בשנת תרצ”ה כאשר כותב בהירחון “המאור”, איך כתב הרב הגאון רח”ע ז”ל להרב הגאון ר’ יוסף קאנוויץ ז”ל בחודש אייר שנת תרצ”ו שנה או יותר לאחר שיחתו עם הרב ח”ב, שמסכים עמו על היתרו בדבר הכשר הז’לטין

[9] The picture is found here and comes from the Ezra and Monica Friedman collection.

[10] Kosher USA, p. 26.

[11] See Spitz, Food: A Halachic Analysis, p. 459: “Dr. Goldstein . . . publicly maintained that any food item whose origins lie in a non-kosher source may not be considered kosher, no matter how “changed” it may currently appear.”

[12] Horowitz, Kosher USA, pp. 33ff.

[13] See Adam Mintz, “Is Coca-Cola Kosher?” in Rafael Medoff, ed., Rav Chesed: Essays in Honor of Rabbi Dr. Haskel Lookstein (Jersey City, 2009), vol. 2, p. 80; Horowitz, Kosher USA, p. 36.

[14] Horowitz, Kosher USA, pp. 29, 37.

[15] Horowitz, Kosher USA, p. 41.

[16] Horowitz, Kosher USA, p. 64.

[17] Horowitz, Kosher USA, pp. 38, 41.

[18] Horowitz, Kosher USA, p. 50.

[19] Horowitz, Kosher USA, pp. 54-55. Kojel is no longer is made with problematic gelatin and is currently under the OU hashgachah.

[20] Document provided courtesy of the Israel Rosenberg Archive, The Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York, NY, ARC 98, Box 6, Folder 23.

[21] This proclamation was reprinted in Ha-Pardes, October 1939, p. 29. For other attacks on Goldstein see Ha-Pardes, August 1942, p. 17; Ha-Mesilah, Adar 5702, p. 20, sections ב, ה.

[22] Horowitz, Kosher USA, p. 42.

[23] See here.

[24] See here.

[25] She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, vol. 3, no. 548.

[26] Nahalat Yosef (Jerusalem, 1907), pp. 15a-b.

[27] For one discussion, see here.

The Palestinian setting of the book is also fictional, and, in the main, has no basis in fact. The Zohar relies on geographical and topographical ideas about Palestine taken from older literature. Sometimes the author did not understand his sources, and created places which never existed, e.g., Kapotkeya, as the name of a village near Sepphoris, on the basis of a statement in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shev. 9:5), which he combined with another statement in the Tosefta, Yevamot 4. He produces a village in Galilee by the name of Kefar Tarshi, which he identifies with Mata Meḥasya, and tells in this connection of the rite of circumcision which is based on material quoted in geonic literature with regard to Mata Meḥasya in Babylonia. Occasionally a place-name is based on a corrupt text in a medieval manuscript of the Talmud, e.g., Migdal Ẓor at the beginning of Sava de-Mishpatim. In the matter of scene and characters there are very close links between the main body of the Zohar and the stratum of the Midrash ha-Ne’lam, which follows the same path of mentioning places which do not actually exist. In this section Simeon b. Yoḥai and his companions already constitute a most important community of mystics, but other groups are mentioned as well, and particularly later amoraim or scholars with fictitious names who do not reappear in the Zohar. In recent times, several attempts have been made to explain the geographical difficulties, and to give a non-literal interpretation of statements in the Talmud and the Midrashim in order to make them fit the Zohar, but they have not been convincing.

Shlomo Yosef Zevin and Yeshiva Students being Drafted to the Army, Views of Women, and More

Marc B. Shapiro

1. In an earlier post I wrote about R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin and the famous essay about how yeshiva students need to serve in the army, an essay which is widely attributed to him. See here. In the post I cited important information uncovered by David Eisen that complicates the issue (as we see the Zevin family itself is of two minds on the matter), and we were left with no absolute proof that R. Zevin wrote the essay. I encourage all readers interested in the topic to read the six emails from Eisen quoted in my post, as they became the primary source material for all who wish to explore this matter.

One of the points that Eisen’s sources disagree about is when the essay was attributed to R. Zevin. R. Nachum Zevin, R. Zevin’s grandson, claims that it was only attributed to him after R. Zevin’s passing in 1978, but R. Menachem Hacohen states that already in the early 1970s he had seen the essay and it was believed that R. Zevin wrote it. As Eisen reports, one of the chief librarians at the National Library told him that he believes that already in the 1960s the essay was attributed to R. Zevin.

I am now able to put the matter to rest and establish beyond any doubt that R. Zevin is indeed the author of the essay. One of R. Zevin’s close friends was the author R. Zvi Harkavy, who served as an army chaplain. Harkavy regarded R. Zevin as his teacher, referring to him as מו”ר. In 1959 it was announced that Harkavy would publish a bibliography of all of R. Zevin’s writings, which were estimated to be over 1000 items, including material written under a pseudonym.[1] As far as I can tell, this never appeared. In Harkavy’s Ma’amrei Tzvi, p. 26, he includes a 1969 letter he received from R. Zevin is which Harkavy is addressed as ידידי הדגול. I mention all this only to show that when Harkavy speaks about R. Zevin you rely on what he says.

It has often been said that the identification of R. Zevin with the essay on yeshiva students and the army was only made years after its 1948 appearance, and this casts doubt on it having been being written by R. Zevin. I can now say that this is incorrect. In 1951 (Iyar 5711) Harkavy published an article in the Jerusalem Torah periodical Ha-Hed, which was a journal that R. Zevin himself often published in. (Unfortunately, very few issues from this periodical can be found on Otzar haChochma.) In Harkavy’s article he identifies R. Zevin as the author of the essay. Not only was Harkavy, because of his close friendship with R. Zevin, in a position to know that he wrote it, but R. Zevin never denied authorship in subsequent issues of Ha-Hed.

This shows without any doubt that R. Zevin is the author of the essay, and from this point on no one—including members of the family—should deny his authorship. Here is Harkavy’s article.

R. Nochum Shmaryohu Zajac called my attention to the recently published memorial volume for R. Yehoshua Mondshine,Sefer, Sofer, ve-Sipur. On p. 327 R. Mondshine wonders why R. Zevin—whom he seems to believe was indeed the author of the essay—would have felt it necessary to keep his authorship secret. R. David Zvi Hillman suggests that R. Zevin felt that if it was known that he wrote it, he would not have been welcome at the Brisker Rav’s home. He adds that it could have also created problems with the Habad synagogue he attended, as well as with his good friend R. Yehezkel Abramsky.

In going through the various issues of Ha-Hed, I discovered a picture of great interest in the Shevat 5711 issue.

Kitvei Ha-Rav Dr. Yosef Seliger (Jerusalem, 1930). The woman in the middle is R. Kook’s wife, Raize Rivka. Until recently I knew of only one other published picture of her, and this appears at the beginning of Pinchas Grayevski, Benot Tziyon vi-Yerushalayim, vol. 7 (Jerusalem, 1929; I think Dr. Yehudah Mirsky called my attention to this picture). The woman on the left is Miriam Berlin, the widow of R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin. I do not know of any other published pictures of her.

Shimon Steinmetz called my attention to this additional picture of R. Kook’s wife that can be found here.

2. In my post here I discussed these words from Exodus 15:16:

בִּגְדֹל זְרוֹעֲךָ יִדְּמוּ כָּאָבֶן

However, I neglected to mention one additional point. How come there is a dagesh in the כ when according to the grammatical rules it should not be there? R. Aaron of Lunel in his Orhot Hayyim offers an explanation. He states that if there was a dagesh people would read the last two words as יִדְּמוּךׇ אָבֶן, “stones are similar to you,” which is not a respectful thing to say to God.[2]

3. In my last post here I discussed the Hazon Ish’s opinion on the dispute between Maimonides and Rabad about an unwitting heretic, and the Hazon Ish’s assumption that Maimonides actually agreed with Rabad in this matter. It must be clarified that the Hazon Ish is not certain about his suggestion that there was no disagreement between Maimonides and Rabad when it came to someone who was completely “innocent” in his heresy. The Hazon Ish4. A couple of years ago in my post here I mentioned that in part two of the post I would have an excursus on the nature of women. For some reason I forgot to include this excursus in all the subsequent posts, so here it is.[4]

On the matter of the creation of women, and whether they are created “better” or “worse” than men, Shaul Regev calls attention to a strange comment by R. Jacob Matalon, Toldot Yaakov (Salonika, 1597), p. 7d (printed together with his She’erit Yaakov).[5] There are many comments in rabbinic texts that have a negative view of women, and most of these comments are based on a belief that women are inherently inferior to men. Yet not many texts are as explicit as R. Matalon in regarding women as almost a different species, standing between apes and men.

ובין החי למדבר הקוף ובין הקוף םמדבר [צ”ל למדבר] ומשכיל הם הנשים והאנדרוגינוס

Women obviously speak, so מדבר must mean speak with intelligence.

A passage similar to what R. Matalon says, but without mention of an ape, is found in Gersonides’ comment to Genesis ch. 3 (p. 110 in the Ma’aliyot edition).

והנה קראה האדם שם אשתו ‘חוה’, כאשר השיג בחולשת שכלה, רוצה לומר שלא עלתה מדרגתה על שאר הבעלי חיים עילוי רב, ואם היא בעלת שכל, כי רוב השתמשותה אמנם הוכן לה בדברים הגופיים, לחולשת שכלה ולהיותה לעבודת האדם. ולזה הוא רחוק שיגיע לה שלמות השכל, אלא שעל כל פנים היא יותר נכבדת מהם, וכולם הם לעבודתה

Gersonides is known for his negative view of women, and this reputation comes from passages like this. Here Gersonides states that women are on a higher level than animals, but not by much. Furthermore, just like the animals are at the service of women, so women’s role is to serve men. In discussing this passage, Menachem Kellner writes: “Gersonides apparently found Darwin’s missing link: woman!”[6]

For another explanation which Modern Orthodox women will probably regard as insulting, but more traditional women will probably see as a compliment, see R. Meir Mazuz, Bayit Ne’eman, no. 52 (parashat Terumah 5777), p. 1, who quotes R. Nissim Gaon as follows: The verse in Proverbs 1:8 states: אל תטוש תורת אמך – “Forsake not the teaching of thy mother”. Yet since women don’t have Torah knowledge, תורת אמך cannot mean this. Rather, it means the special holiday foods that the mother makes.

Readers can correct me if I’m wrong, but I do not believe that R. Mazuz’s understanding is correct, and I think R. Mazuz was citing R. Nissim from memory. That is, R. Nissim’s comment has nothing to do with women lacking Torah knowledge and identifying their cooking as תורת אמך. Rather, he cites the verse simply as a general statement about the importance of tradition. Here is the passage of R. Nissim Gaon as cited by R. Maimon the father of Maimonides.[7]

וכתב רבינו נסים במגילת סתרים כי כל מנהגי האומה באלו המנהגות כמו זה. והראש בראש השנה, החלב בפורים ובמוצאי פסח, והפולים ביום הושענא רבה. ואותם המנהגות אין לנו לבזותם ומי שהנהיגם זריז ומשתדל הוא כי הם מעיקרים נעשים ולא יבוזו במנהגי האומה וכבר אמר הנביא ע”ה ואל תטוש תורת אמך, דת אומתך אל תעזוב

Regarding the role and responsibilities of women, R. Mazuz has another interesting comment.[8] As part of his argument that women are not obligated in hearing parashat Zakhor, he says that this commandment is connected to the commandment of destroying Amalek, and women are not able to do this. How do we know that women cannot destroy Amalek and therefore are not commanded in it? “Because if she sees blood and even if she sees a mouse she becomes afraid, so how could she kill Amalek?” While many will not appreciate what they see as R. Mazuz’s flippant tone (which is obviously a joke, as he is well aware that there are women soldiers and doctors), do even feminists wish to claim that killing comes as easy to women as to men? Do they really want to be “equal” with men in this matter? I, for one, have always assumed that if women were running the world, there would be many fewer wars, as only someone who is blind to reality cannot see that men are naturally more inclined to violence than women.

Here is another interesting point relevant to the subject of women: Rashi, Menahot 43b s.v. היינו, in explaining the talmudic passage dealing with the blessings that a man recites in the morning, states that a woman is to regarded as a maidservant to her husband (i.e., to do his wishes), much like a slave is to his master: דאשה נמי שפחה לבעלה כעבד לרבו

Rashi’s comment is not surprising and has often been quoted. Indeed, although it will trouble modern readers, lots of similar comments can be found in rishonim and aharonim.[9] Furthermore, in at least three places the Talmud refers to a wife with the term shifhah.[10] Yet for a reason I can’t explain, R. Moshe Feinstein was very troubled by this comment of Rashi, and this led him to write something quite problematic.[11] See Dibrot Moshe, Gittin p. 511 (also in Iggerot Moshe, vol. 9, Orah Hayyim no. 2):

ולולי דמסתפינא הייתי אומר שצריך למחקו דח”ו לרש”י לומר דברי הבל כזה, דמן התורה הא ליכא שום שעבוד על האשה לבעלה חוץ מתשמיש ולענין תשמיש הוא משועבד לה יותר דהא עליו איכא גם איסור לאו . . . ואינה מחוייבת לעשות רק עניני הבית ולא עבודת שדה ומעט עשיה בצמר שהיא מלאכה קלה ממלאכות שדרכן של בנות העיר בזה

R. Moshe states that in no way can a woman be generally regarded as under her husband’s authority as only in a few areas does she have obligations to him (much like he has to her). He continues to expound on the way a husband is obligated to treat his wife in order to show that she is far removed from being a maidservant.[12] This is all true, and it would be easy to quote authorities who write similarly. Yet they did not see this as in any way contradicting Rashi’s statement. Understandably, some have expressed great surprise upon seeing how R. Moshe refers Rashi’s comment as הבל (as they do not accept R. Moshe’s point that Rashi could never have said דאשה נמי שפחה לבעלה כעבד לרבו).

R. Shlomo Aharon Gans goes so far as to say that if thegadol ha-dorhad not been the one to say this, it would be forbidden to write such a thing. He adds the following, bringing support for the notion expressed in Rashi that a wife is like a maidservant (not that she is a maidservant, but she is like one)[13]:

ולא הבנתי דהא הויא קנין כספו, ועי’ תורא”ש קידושין ה’ דהוא מושל עליה ומשעובדת לו וכדכתיב והוא ימשל בך, וא”כ מאי קשיא ליה כ”כ בדברי רש”י אלו

This conception, that a wife is like a maidservant, was actually criticized by R. Hayyim Hirschensohn who called attention to the “barbaric” way Jews treated their wives in the small towns of Galicia, where the wives did not even eat at the same table with their husbands.[14]

וה’ יסלח לו כי ההרגל הרע של בני מדינתו להתגאה על נשותיהן אשר לוקחים אותן רק לרקחות וטבחות ואין מסיבות בשלחן עם בעליהן וחושבים אותם כחמת כו’ [מ”ש: ראה שבת קנב ע”א] ואלמלי עלמא צריכי להו היו בעי רחמי דלבטלי מן העולם ח”ו, ההרגל הפראי הזה אשר בעירות הקטנות בגאליציא ובקצת ערי פולין גרם להרב הנז’ לבלי להרגיש את העלבון אשר עלב לבנות האבות והאמהות אשר קמו גם הן לאם לבנות את בית ישראל

As a curiosity, it is worth noting the opinion of R. Menasheh Klein that a husband should not help his wife with household tasks such as cleaning the dishes, as that is “women’s work”, while the husband works outside the home. (And what about when the wife also works outside the home?) Instead, the husband should use that time for learning Torah and other spiritual pursuits.[15]

כי לכן נתן לו הקב”ה אשה לאדם שיהי’ לו לעזר שתעשה לו צרכי הבית והוא יהיה פנוי בזמן שיש לו ללמוד תורה ולעבודת השם ולא לכבס ולהדיח הכלים אחרי האכילה ולסדר את המטות החיוב על הבעל לפרנס את אשתו ובניו ושאר הזמן כל רגע ורגע ינצל ללימוד התורה ולעבודת השי”ת שמו. ובעונ”ה נשתנה הוסת שהבעלי בתים הצעירים נעשים בעלת בתים מבשלים ומדיחים הכלים והולכים לחניות לקנות צרכי הבית איינקויפען בלע”ז בקיצור עושים כל מלאכת הנשים והנשים עושים מלאכת האנשים

I can only imagine what the reaction of a newlywed wife would be if her husband would tell her that no, he has no plans to help clean the table and do the dishes because that is women’s work.

Related to this is the following story told by R. Yosef Wineberg, the grandson of the Slonimer Rebbe. It is obviously designed to make the “Litvish” look bad.[16]

A newly married Litvishe couple was once sitting together. The wife asked her husband to please make her a cup of tea. He immediately jumps up, puts on his hat and jacket and walks out the door. About an hour later, the husband returns home, removes his hat and jacket and makes her a cup of tea. Puzzled by his strange behavior, she asks for an explanation.

He explains: when you first asked me to make you a cup of tea, I was upset. I am a Talmid Chacham, a scholar, and you are meant to “serve” me, not the opposite. Not wishing to get into an argument, I went to my Rav to ask him what I should do.

The Rav explained to me that “ishto k’gufo”, that the Halacha considers us like one person. Therefore, making tea for you is identical to making tea for me. As I feel no compunctions with serving myself, I returned home to fulfill your request.

In order to show that the husband is the boss of the household, R. David Kimhi states that while the husband calls his wife by her name, the wife does not call her husband by his name, but by some title which shows his superior status.[17]

כי האיש הוא הקורא לאשתו בשמה ולא האשה לאישה, אלא דרך כבוד בלשון אדנות קוראה לו ולא בשמו, כי כל מי שיש לו מעלה אל אחר אין ראוי לאשר למטה ממנו לקרוא אותו בשמו, כמו אביו או רבו או אדניו . . . וכן האשה לבעלה כי אדניה הוא כמו שאמר: והוא ימשוך בך

One of the proofs he offers for this idea is that in Genesis 17:17 Abraham refers to Sarah by her name, but in Genesis 18:13 Sarah refers to Abraham as “my lord” (אדני). Another proof he mentions is that when God changes the names of Abraham and Sarah he says to Abraham (Gen. 17:15): “Thou shalt not call her name Sarai.” From this we see that Abraham called his wife by her name. However, when Abraham’s name was changed the Torah states (Gen. 17:5): “Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram.” Sarah was not told this, Radak states, as she didn’t refer to her husband by his name. This was rather a general statement, that among those people who call Abraham by his name, they no longer would do so.

Although Radak states that a husband calls his wife by her name, we know that this was not always the case. Thus, we are told that R. Jacob Moellin in speaking to his wife would not call her by her name. When he referred to her in conversation with others, he would call her mein hausfrau (my housewife).[18] The text that records this information notes that already in the Talmud, Shabbat 118b, we find that R. Yose referred to his wife as “my house,” and I think most assume that this was done as a term of respect.[19] The text further notes that the general practice was that both husband and wife did not refer to each other by their first name. Such a practice was also found in the Sephardic world.[20] What this shows us is that contrary to what Radak records, the practice need not have anything to do with the husband being regarded as “superior” to his wife.

With all the discussions in rabbinic literature that show the essential differences between men and woman, let me mention another curiosity that, if you want to be cute, you can say that in one place the Talmud actually refers to women as men. I have in mind Zevahim 67b which, in discussing the burnt offerings brought by two women after childbirth, states:

חטאת לזו ועולה לזו עשה שתיהן למעלה . . . אימור דא”ר יהושע בחד גברא בתרי גברי מי אמר

In this passage, the word גברי, which means “men”, refers to the case of the two women (although the principle enunciated applies to all people).[21]

While on the male-female topic, let me mention something else that is relevant. We all know that the name Avi (short for Avraham) is quite popular. Yet how many know that this is already a biblical name, but used for a woman (2 Kings 18:2)?

I want to return to the notion already mentioned in this note, and found in a number of earlier works, that an ape stands between animals and humans. The Sefat Emet, Genesis 18:1, expands on this as follows:

ובין חי למדבר קוף. ואנו נאמר כי אחר מדבר אדם, שעל זה נאמר “אדם” אתם קרוין אדם ולא האומות. וישמעאל הוא הממוצע לכן נקרא פרא אדם, ולכן יד כל בו וידו בכל, כי על ידו יש התקשרות בין מדריגות מדבר למדריגת אדם

When he writes כי אחר מדבר אדם it means that after the level of מדבר, which means “humanity”, there is the level of אדם, which is the level of the Jewish people. He then adds that the Arabs stand between מדבר and אדם which is why they are called פרא אדם. Often פרא אדם is used to show that the Arabs are on a lower level than other nations. However, here we see that the Arabs are on a higher level, and closer to the Jews than the other nations, as among the nations of the world only the Arabs are also called אדם—no doubt because of their monotheism, see Yevamot 61a—even if this word is placed together with the negative term פרא.

The Sefat Emet’s comment is derived from the Zohar,[22] which explains פרא אדם as meaning one who possesses the “beginnings of אדם”. The Zohar also places the descendants of Ishmael on a higher level than the other nations because they are circumcised. Circumcision was widely practiced even in pagan Arabia, so the reference to circumcision alone would not be enough to date this passage of the Zohar to the post-Islamic period.

R. Jacob Emden, however, cites a different passage in the Zohar that assumes the existence of the Islamic world, meaning that it could not have been written by R. Shimon ben Yohai.[23] He writes:

הנה לפניך שבימי בעל ספר הזוהר כבר היתה אמונת מחמד הישמעאלי בעולם (שנתחדשה בימי אמוראים האחרונים על”ב) כי קודם זמן זה היו כל הישמעאלים עובדי אלילים גמורים, ככל יתר גוי הארצות.

R. Emden also cites another Zoharic passage that assumes Islamic rule in the Land of Israel. He comments:[24]

הרי כי בימי בעל ספר הזוהר היתה אומת ישמעאל שולטת בארץ הקדושה, ודבר ידוע הוא ומפורסם, שלא הגיעו הישמעאלים לממשלה כללית עד שנת שע”ד לאלף החמישי . . . נמצא עכ”פ יותר מחמש מאות שנה אחר רשב”י חובר ספר הזוהר, ואולי מאוחר עוד הרבה מזה, ואיך אפשר להסכים זה עם שמות האומרים אותם הדברים, והמה חבריו או תלמידיו של רשב”י, לפי המובן בלשונו של בעל ספר הזוהר, הלא זה כדבר שאין לו שחר

He cites a third such example and writes:[25]

מלכות ישמעאל לא נתפרסמה ולא נתפשטה בימי תנאים ואמוראים. כי היו אז ממלכה שפלה קטנה וירודה

Returning to the matter of how women have been viewed, R. Joseph Solomon Delmedigo mentions that jokers—ליצני הדור—come up with all sorts of gematrias. When it comes to women not all of them are negative. For example, the gematria of אשה is דבש, and אשה יפה = שמחה גדולה. However he also cites a gematria which is not very complimentary to women. זכר=ברכה and נקיבה=בקללה. R. Delmedigo sees this as a big joke, but it is actually mentioned by R. Hayyim the brother of the Maharal in his Iggeret ha-Tiyul, section ז, and it is also found in Ba’al ha-Turim, Gen. 1:27 (with some differences as to which letters are actually included in the gematria).

In 1807 R. Jacob Samson Shabbetai Senigallia[26] published his talmudic commentary Shabbat shel Mi. Here is the title page of the Livorno first edition. (It has been reprinted a number of times).

Here is what appears in the book on p. 89b. He is trying to explain why chapters 5 and 6 in tractate Shabbat are next to each other. Chapter 5 begins במה בהמה and chapter 6 begins במה אשה, and according to R. Senigallia this is because “birds of a feather flock together.”

If he was trying to make a joke, I can understand what he wrote. But who ever heard of making a joke in the middle of a talmudic commentary? Presumably, he was being serious, which leaves us with a very offensive comment.

There is, to be sure, humor in the Talmud, but I don’t know of any examples in talmudic commentaries. Yeshayahu Leibowitz quipped that the Sages must have had a good sense of humor, since they included the following text in the Talmud [27]: תלמידי חכמים מרבים שלום בעולם. In all seriousness, however, there are indeed humorous passages in the Talmud, as pointed out by R. Moses Salmon.[28] Here is one example he gives (Bava Batra 14a):

The Rabbis said to R. Hamnuna: R. Ammi wrote four hundred scrolls of the Law. He said to them: Perhaps he copied out the verse תורה צוה לנו משה

R. Salmon claims that anyone with a bit of sense can see that R. Hamnuna’s reply is a wisecrack made in response to the obvious exaggeration about R. Ammi.

Nehemiah Samuel Libowitz states that even in the Zohar we have passages that show a humorous side.[29] One of the many examples he points to is Zohar, Bereshit, p. 27a:

וימררו את חייהם בעבודה קשה בקושיא. בחומר קל וחומר. ובלבנים בלבון הלכתא. ובכל עבודה בשדה דא ברייתא. את כל עבודתם וגו’ דא משנה

I have no idea what to make of the following comment from R. Oury Cherki, dealing with humor, which does not sound like something that would be said by a leading kiruv figure (De’ah Tzelula: Olam ve-Adam be-Mishnat ha-Rav Kook [Jerusalem, 2015], p. 246). Rather, it sounds like something one of the maskilim of old would say.

התורה שבעל-פה אינה מובנה ללא שותפות רוח האומה. לכן כשלומדים הלכה רצוי להצטייד בחוש הומור, שכן לפעמים הדברים נראים משונים למדי. למשל, הכנת כוס תה בשבת. התלמוד אומר שאסור לשפוך מים קרים לתוך החמים אבל מים חמים לתוך הקרים מותר, כי יש כלל ש”תתאה גבר”, התחתון גובר. כששופכים מים חמים לתוך הקרים המים הקרים מתחממים ומתבשלים מה שאין כן ההפך – המים החמים מתקררים. יש כאן בהחלט סוג של הומור

I also found the following interesting comment by Moshe Meisels, the editor of Ha-Doar, in a letter to Chaim Bloch.[30] He suggests that the talmudic prohibition against a non-Jew observing the Sabbath is an example of rabbinic wit, and is not to be understood literally.

ואגב, לא אהא בבחינת מורה הלכה לפני רבו אם אינני מתאפק מלהביא מעין חידוש שנתחדש לי הקטן באחד המאמרים התמוהים בתלמוד מן הסוג הנ”ל, והוא אמרם: עכו”ם ששבת חייב מיתה, שנאמר יום ולילה לא ישבותו וכו’. ואין צורך להרבות דברים על הזרות שבדבר: מה איכפת למי אם שבת או לא שבת, ומה היא הראיה מאותו פסוק, המוסב על קיץ וחורף וכו’, ומה ענינו לכאן ולעכו”ם דוקא? ונראה לי שכל המאמר בא בדרך חידוד, וזה מובנו: עכו”ם ששבת מן הדין שיהא חייב מיתה בדיניהם. מדוע? ישראל שלא שבת חייב מיתה, משום שעל א-לוהיו נאמר וישבות ביום השביעי וכו’, אבל עובד כוכבים ומזלות, שעליהם נאמר יום ולילה לא ישבותו, מן הדין שעובדיהם יהיו חייבים מיתה אם שינו מדרך אלהיהם ושבתו

On the matter of non-Jews observing the Sabbath, R. Yaakov Koppel Schwartz makes a fascinating suggestion, which he acknowledges has no support in the rishonim and therefore he has doubts whether it is correct.[31] The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is in remembrance of the fact that we were slaves and God redeemed us. Therefore, it is understandable why non-Jews are forbidden to commemorate the Sabbath by abstaining from work, as this has no connection to them. However, there is another reason given for the Sabbath and that is so that we remember the creation of the world. Non-Jews are also supposed to acknowledge this and therefore there should be nothing wrong with non-Jews having some sort of celebration in honor of the Sabbath.

אבל הכיבוד והקידוש של יום השבת, שהוא משום אמונת חידוש העולם, שייך שגם הגויים יהיו בהם ואינם מנועים מלכבד ולענג את השבת

If we follow R. Schwartz’s approach, this is something that could be suggested for Noahides whose “religion” is lacking any rituals, which for most people is an essential component of their religion.

* * * * * * * *

[1] Ha-Tzofeh, June 16, 1959, p. 2.

[2] Orhot Hayyim, Or Etzion ed. (Merkaz Shapira, 2017), p. 106, quoted by R. Joseph Karo, Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 51 (end). Regarding negative expressions directed against God, there is an interesting passage in R. Yedidiah Solomon Raphael Norzi, Minhat Shai, Deut. 8:3. To understand it one must know that the old French word “fi” expressed disdain or disgust. See here. The issue Norzi discusses is that the verse reads:

‘כִּי עַל-כָּל-מוֹצָא פִי-ה

Norzi cites a view that in this case there should be a dagesh in the word פי even though that is not in accord with the general rule, because without the dagesh, reading it as “fi” would be disrespectful to God:

כי לשון גנאי הוא בלשון צרפת וחלילה לשם יתברך

Norzi completely rejects this and states that the rules of biblical grammar are not to be changed because of how words sound in languages other than Hebrew (and there are indeed examples where biblical Hebrew words sound like profanity in other languages).

ואין לנו לחוש ללשון צרפת שאין מבטלין דרכי לשון הקדש מפני שאר לשונות

See also Samuel David Luzzatto, Prolegomena to a Grammar of the Hebrew Language, trans. Aaron D. Rubin (Piscataway, N.J., 2005), pp. 133-134.

Regarding the pronunciation of פ, R. Meir Mazuz points out that the Vilna Gaon, Commentary to Tikunei Zohar, section 19, p. 38d (p. 166 in R. Zuriel’s edition), mistakenly believed that Sephardim pronounce פ with and without a dagesh the same way (just as they pronounce ת with and without a dagesh the same way). R. Mazuz notes that the Vilna Gaon’s point is repeated by R. Baruch Epstein, Mekor Barukh, vol. 1, p. 397b (without mentioning the Gaon). See Mazuz, Bayit Ne’eman (Humash), vol. 1, p. 13 (first pagination).

[3] Hazon Ish, Yoreh Deah 62:21.

[4] In my earlier post I cited R. Samson Raphael Hirsch as adopting the notion that women are created on a higher spiritual level than men. I neglected to note that Shaye J. D. Cohen earlier discussed Hirsch’s approach. See Cohen, Why Aren’t Jewish Women Circumcised (Berkeley, 2005), pp. 165ff.

[5] “Eshet Hayil: Kavim li-Demutah u-le-Ma’amadah shel ha-Ishah be-Hagut ha-Yehudit ha-Shesh Esreh,” in Ephraim Hazan and Shmuel Refael, eds. Mahbarot li-Yehudit (Ramat-Gan, 2012), p. 286.

[6] Torah in The Observatory (Boston, 2010), p. 287. I earlier discussed Ralbag here.

[7] See R. Yaakov Moshe Toledano, Sarid u-Falit (Tel Aviv, [1945]), p. 8.

[8] Bayit Ne’eman no. 153 (parashat Vayikra 5779), p. 2.

[9] See e.g., R. Israel Ibn Al Nakawa, Menorat ha-Maor, ed. Enelow, vol. 4, pp. 32-33, who instructs a wife as follows (using the word שפחה that so troubled R. Moshe):

ועושה צרכיו בעצמה ולא על ידי אחרים. ואפי’ היו לה כמה עבדים וכמה שפחות, תעמוד היא ותשרתנו, ותקראנו אדוני . . .ויהיו עיניה תלויין לו, כעיני שפחה אל יד גבירתה

For a translation of this passage, see here. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ishut 15:20, says that a wife should regard her husband כמו שר או מלך.

Radak, Gen. 3:16, writes:

והוא ימשול בך: לצוות עליך מה שירצה כאדון על עבד

Ramban, Gen. 3:16, explains that as a result of Eve’s sin, the relationship of man and woman was changed. From that point on:

 והוא יחזיק בה כשפחה ואין המנהג להיות העבד משתוקק לקנות אדון לעצמו אבל יברח ממנו ברצונו

R. Bahya ben Asher, Gen. 3:16, writes:

ואל אישך תשוקתך: שאע”פ שהאשה משועבדת ברשות הבעל ומנהג העבד לברוח מן האדון כדי שלא ישתעבד, גזר בזאת שתהיה משתוקקת לבעל ושתרצה להשתעבד לו בהפך מן המנהג

See also R. Chaim Rapoport’s letter in my Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan, p. 172.

R. Avraham Blumenkrantz, Gefen Poriah, p. 352, quotes approvingly another rabbi who states as follows (emphasis added):

Her tears are ever ready to flow at the most miniscule suggestion of being dealt with as a maidservant. She will concede you the service of והוא ימשל בך. She will consent to call you בעלי, but don’t accent the דגש in the בית too heavily. She must constantly be reassured that there is honor and dignity in her subservience. Honor her more than you honor yourself. She must be compensated for her subjugation, and be made to feel that she has a genuine share in the dignity of the throne.

Do haredi women really feel that they are subservient or subjugated? Do haredi men feel this way about their wives? Hasn’t haredi society accepted the notion of separate but equal when it comes to men and women?

[10] Sanhedrin 39a, Yevamot 113a, Nedarim 38b.

[11] As is well known, and I have written about previously, R. Moshe often rejected the authenticity of texts that he found problematic. Another example of this with regard to Rashi on the Talmud is found in Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer, vol. 4, no. 64:1. Here R. Moshe says to delete words in Rashi even though, as he notes, these words are found in “Rashi” on the Rif and in R. Nissim. See the strong responses to R. Moshe quoted in R. Yonason Rosman, Petihat ha-Iggerot, pp. 605-606. One of these responses is from R. Menasheh Klein in his notes to R. Eyal Shraga, Minhat Ish, vol. 1, pp. 302-303. R. Klein writes:

וח”ו ואטו עד כמה נילך ונמחוק בדברי רבותינו ז”ל שנאמרו ברוה”ק, ולולי דמספינא הייתי אומר דאיזה תלמיד טועה כתבו, אבל פשוט דדברי רש”י נכונים וליכא כאן טעות כלל

When R. Klein suggests—לולי דמספינא—that a “mistaken student” is responsible for the problematic passage in Iggerot Moshe, he does not mean it seriously. This is just his respectful way of saying that R. Moshe’s position is completely without basis. He uses the same language in Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 12, Yoreh Deah no. 214. There he responds to R. Moshe’s statement that he doesn’t know who R. Menahem Tziyoni is, but since he quotes a heretical—in R. Moshe’s opinion—passage from R. Judah he-Hasid’s commentary on the Torah, therefore R. Tziyoni’s work must be banned together with R. Judah he-Hasid’s commentary.

[12] R. Moshe also famously states that women do not have any less holiness than men. See Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim vol. 4, no. 49 (p. 81). See also the new Mesorat Moshe, vol. 4, p. 476. This position is at odds with many earlier writers who saw men as holier because they are commanded in more mitzvot. This is also Maimonides’ position in his commentary to Horayot 3:7. See R. Chaim Rapoport’s discussion in Kovetz Hearot u-Veurim, no. 908 (2006), pp. 138ff. Yet see R. Dov Halbertal, Erekh ha-Hayyim be-Halakhah (Jerusalem, 2004), vol. 2, p. 399, who has a different approach and makes the point that just because a Kohen and Levi are to be saved before an Israel, no one would say that the Kohen and Levi have more holiness. See also R. Yitzhak Barda, Yitzhak Yeranen, vol. 11, p. 249, that women are holier than men. He offers an original explanation of this notion.

שהאשה שהקב”ה הפריש ממנו, מהצלע שלו, הוא מופרש, וממילא כל מופרש קדוש, ואז האשה יותר קדושה מהאיש. ובזה מובן למה האיש מקדש את האשה, לא אומר לה הרי את אשתי, או כל סממן לשון של נישואין, חברה או שותפה וכו’, זולתי: הרי את מקודשת לי! לפי שהקב”ה קבע כל מופרש קדוש

[13] Kinyan Shlomo, Yevamot, p. 89. See also R. Natan Einfeld, Minhat Natan: Kiddushin, pp. 139-140, who cites other sources in rejecting R. Moshe’s point.

[14] Malki ba-Kodesh, vol. 4, p. 50a. See R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 12, no. 351, for a defense of the practice of husbands and wives eating separately.

[15] Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 7 no. 155 (called to my attention by R. Aviad Stollman).

[16] The story is recorded by R. Chaim Dalfin, Faces and Places Boro Park (Brooklyn, 2017), p. 149.

[17] Commentary to Gen. 17:15. See the rejection of Radak’s opinion in R. Betzalel Stern, Be-Tzel ha-Hokhmah, vol. 1, no. 70.

[18] Maharil, Likutim (p. 610 in the Makhon Yerushalayim edition).

[19] On the other hand, R. Meir Schiff (Maharam Schiff), Gittin 52a, explains that R. Yose referred to his wife this way because she was a bad wife: אשה רעה. Yet the proof he brings for this is actually from a different R. Yose. See R. Judah Leib Maimon, ed., Sefer ha-Gra, vol. 1, p. 110 in the note. Regarding “bad wives”, R. Elazar of Worms is quoted as follows in R. Alexander Suslin, Sefer ha-Agudah, ed. Brizel, Yevamot, no. 78 (p. 41):

מי שיש לו אשה רעה יסבול יקבל ברצון ויקבל בשמחה ולא יראה פני גהינם

What does R. Elazar mean that if you suffer under a bad wife you will not see gehinnom? R. Moses Guedemann explains that with a bad wife you already saw gehinnom in your lifetime, so there is no need to see if after death. See Ha-Torah ve-ha-Hayyim, trans. Friedberg (Warsaw, 1897), vol. 1, p. 194:

כי פני הגיהנם כבר ראה בחייו

Regarding “good wives” see R. Shlomo Hoss, Kerem Shlomo, no. 43, who writes:

אין לך כשרה בנשים אלא אשה שעושה רצון בעלה: אהע”ז ס”ס ס”ט (אך אשת חיל כזאת מי ימצא)

R. Solomon Zvi Schueck was shocked at R. Hoss’ final comment, that one cannot find a wife who does the wishes of her husband. R. Schueck writes that based on this passage he assumed that R. Hoss must not have had a good wife.

נראה לי שהי’ לו אשה רעה, וממנה דן על כל הנשים שבישראל

See She’elot u-Teshuvot Rashban, Even ha-Ezer, no. 99 (p. 88b). He further tells us that he asked one of R. Hoss’ students who confirmed that this was indeed the case.

[20] See Tuvia Preschel, Ma’amrei Tuvyah, vol. 5, p. 142.

[21] See Or Torah, Shevat 5780, p. 460.

[22] Exodus 86a, 87a.

[23] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (at the beginning; p. 20 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition). In R. Reuven Rapoport’s edition of Mitpahat Sefarim, with his commentary Itur Soferim, p. 13, R. Rapoport sees it as obvious that this passage in the Zohar is a later interpolation much like there are Savoraic additions in the Talmud.

[24] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (p. 27 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition).

[25] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (p. 54 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition). Regarding the larger issue that R. Emden points to, see Ronald C. Kiener, “The Image of Islam in the Zohar,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 8 (1989), pp. 43-65.

[26] See the recent discussion of R. Senigallia by R. Moshe Maimon in the Seforim Blog here.

[27] Sihot al Pirkei Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot (Jerusalem, 2003), p. 289.

[28] Netiv Moshe (Vienna, 1897), pp. 45-46.

[29] “Halatzot ve-Divrei Bikoret be-Sefer ha-Zohar,” Ha-Tzofeh le-Hokhmat Yisrael 11 (1927), pp. 33-45. For more on humor in the Talmud, see Yehoshua Ovsay, Ma’amarim u-Reshimot (New York, 1946), ch. 1; Meyer Heller, “Humor in the Talmud” (unpublished masters dissertation, Hebrew Union College, 1950), available here; R. Mordechai Hacohen, “Humor, Satirah, u-Vedihah be-Fi Hazal,” Mahanayim 67 (5722), pp. 8-19; and Ezra Brand’s post here. From Brand I learned that David Lifshitz wrote an entire doctorate on the subject. See also my posts here and here where I discuss Siftei Hakhamim’s comment that Moses thought God was joking with him, and how this has been censored in a recent edition. See also J. Chotzner, Hebrew Humor and Other Essays (London, 1905); Nehemiah Samuel Libowitz, Ha-Shomea Yitzhak (New York, 1907).

[30] See here (Chaim Bloch Collection, Leo Baeck Institute, 7155-7156, 1/13).

[31] Likutei Diburim, vol. 4, pp. 24-25.

 Response to Criticism Part 4; Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and the Hazon Ish

Marc B. Shapiro

Continued from here.

1. In Limits,p. 14 n. 55, I write

I should call attention to a significant philosophical and halakhic point which appears to have gone unnoticed. The Vilna Gaon (R. Elijah b. Solomon Zalman (1720-97) apparently believed that the First and Second Principles are the only true Principles in Judaism. According to him, one who believes in God’s existence and unity, despite his other sins, is regarded as a Jew in good standing and he is thus able to be included in a minyan (quorum for public prayer). None of the numerous discussions regarding whether a Sabbath violator maybe in included in a minyan seems to have taken note of the Gaon’s comment, which appears in his commentary on Tikunei Zohar, 42a.

Grossman writes:

Apparently, concludes Shapiro, since the Gaon cites only idolatry as invalidating prayer and does not cite the rest of the Thirteen Principles, he is disputing Rambam’s classification of the others as binding fundamentals. However, this source has no bearing on the Principles. The Gaon’s comment refers to counting one for a minyan and to having one’s prayer accepted by God. He is clearly not referring to the Principles, since [in his commentary to Tikunei Zohar] he includes in the metaphor of the scorpion the sin of consorting with gentile women, which is unrelated to any Principle. (p. 48)

The first thing to note is that I never said that the Vilna Gaon disputed “the Rambam’s classification of the others [other Principles] as binding fundamentals.” Of course the Gaon held that people must believe that there is prophecy, that God gave the Torah, that there will be a Messiah, etc. But that is not what I am referring to when I say that for the Gaon the First and Second Principles are the only true Principles in Judaism. As I explain, for the Rambam the Thirteen Principles are special in that if you deny any of them you are to be regarded as having removed yourself from the Jewish people. When the Gaon makes the fascinating comment that belief in the First and Second Principles are enough to be regarded as part of the Jewish people, thus enabling one to be counted in a minyan, this means that as far as he is concerned (in this passage at least), only these beliefs qualify as Principles in the absolute sense that denial of them removes you halakhically from the Jewish people. If I were writing the book today, I would say that the Gaon focuses on three Principles, since he includes belief in the unity of God and an affirmation of God’s corporeality (Principle no. 3) certainly violates God’s unity.

I have to say, however, that while the Gaon’s comment is of great importance when it comes to the issue of Sabbath violation, I am no longer sure about the correctness of my larger point. It could just as well be that when the Gaon derives from the passage in Tikunei Zohar that if you believe in God and His unity, despite your other sins, you are still a Jew in good standing, it does not necessarily mean that these are the only true Principles. It could be that he is merely explicating the meaning of the passage in Tikunei Zohar, which relates to God, but that if it was a different passage he could have spoken about different principles, for example, as long as you believe in the Messiah and the resurrection even if you sin you are still a Jew in good standing. Here is some of what the Gaon writes:

כ”ז שמאמין באחדותו ית’ אפי’ עובר כמה עבירות אינו מומר לכל התורה ואעפ”י שחטא ישראל הוא ומצטרף למנין כמ”ש עבריין כו’ ונכלל תפלתו בכלל ישראל . . . אבל עקרב הוא המודה בעבודת כוכבים ומשתחוה לאל אחר וכן בבת אל נכר אז הקוץ ח”ו מסתלק מצדו וזהו פירוד הגמור וז”ש ואיהו פוסק וברח כו’ ר”ל יוסף במדרגתו ומסתלק הקב”ה ממנו כלל וכלל ואין תפלתו עולה כלל

In the Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam says that if you believe that God has a physical form you are a heretic, and Rabad famously defends those who did not know any better. According to Rabad, although these people are wrong they are certainly not heretics because of their mistake. Regarding this dispute there is R. Hayyim Soloveitchik’s famous statement in defense of the Rambam’s position that “one who is nebech an epikores is still an epikores.”[1]

In Limits I referred to the Hazon Ish’s opinion that the Rambam actually agrees with Rabad when dealing with a heretic who does not know any better. I further note, in agreement with R. Hayyim, that the Hazon Ish’s suggestion cannot be correct, and the Rambam, Guide 1:36, specifically rejects the Hazon Ish’s point. In fact, R. Kafih thinks that the Rambam saw Rabad’s criticism of what he wrote in the Mishneh Torah, and the end of Guide 1:36 was written in response to Rabad and is the Rambam’s defense of his position that faulty education or simply ignorance is no defense when it comes to belief in God’s corporeality.[2] In truth, even if we did not have this chapter of the Guide, the Hazon Ish’s position cannot be sustained, as it is in opposition to the Rambam’s entire conception of immortality which is a natural process. Thus, there is no room to raise questions about “fairness” or why does God not judge an ignorant person mercifully and grant him a share the World to Come if through no fault of his own he believes that God has a physical form.

Grossman, on the other hand (p. 49), claims that a close reading of the Guide supports the Hazon Ish’s position that someone who does not know any better, and who has no one to teach him, is not to be regarded as a heretic. Suffice it to say all scholars of the philosophy of the Rambam agree with R. Hayyim in this matter. Furthermore, the issue is not whether we regard someone as a heretic or not. There could be societal reasons that determine whether or not one is to be regarded as such. The dispute between the Rambam and Rabad is regarding someone who doesn’t know any better and denies a principle of faith, does such a person have a share in the World to Come? It is clear, as Rabad recognized, that according to the Rambam the answer is no. That is why I wrote that when the Hazon Ish explained the Rambam to really be agreeing with Rabad—that an unwitting heretic has a share in the World to Come—that this approach should be seen as in opposition to the Rambam’s position, even though the Hazon Ish was offering his approach as an interpretation of the Rambam.[3]

Grossman then writes (p. 49 n. 65): “In another example of the same hubris towards a giant of Torah scholarship, Shapiro, on p. 37, asserts that the Chazon Ish’s acceptance of Torah She-be’al Peh as having Divine authority (Iggeros 1:16 [should be 15]) is disputing Rambam. Chazon Ish there is merely emphasizing Rambam’s Eighth Principle, but Shapiro claims that Chazon Ish actually ‘added a new dogma.’”

The reader who turns to my book, p. 37, will find that contrary to what Grossman states, I do not mention anything about Torah she-be’al peh. The issue I was concerned with is the authority of Aggadah. In one of his most often quoted letters (Kovetz Iggerot Hazon Ish, 1:15), the Hazon Ish writes that all aggadot have their origin in the sages’ prophetic power, and one who denies this is a heretic.

משרשי האמונה שכל הנאמר בגמ’ בין במשנה ובין בגמ’ בין בהלכה ובין באגדה, הם הם הדברים שנתגלו לנו ע”י כח נבואי שהוא כח נשיקה של השכל הנאצל, עם השכל המורכב בגוף . . . נרתעים אנחנו לשמוע הטלת ספק בדברי חז”ל בין בהלכה בין באגדה, כשמועה של גידוף ר”ל, והנוטה מזה הוא לפי קבלתנו ככופר בדברי חז”ל, ושחיטתו נבילה, ופסול לעדות, ועוד, ולכן נגעו דבריך בלבי

Incidentally, in the published version of the letter it has

והנוטה מזה הוא לפי קבלתנו ככופר כדברי חז”ל

Here is the section of the actual letter of the Hazon Ish where you can see that it should read ככופר בדברי חז”ל.

Searching on Otzar haChochma, I see that almost everyone who cites this passage corrects the printing error.

It is with regard to this statement about aggadah, and this statement alone, that I spoke of a new dogma—which can perhaps already be seen in the Maharal if not earlier—that is not held by the Rambam who, together with the entire geonic and medieval Sephardic rabbinic tradition, did not have such a view about the binding nature of all aggadot. The reader of Grossman’s article who does not examine my book would think that I claimed that the Rambam did not believe that Torah she-be’al Peh has divine authority. Yet the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Hazon Ish is over a different matter, namely, what is included in Torah she-be’al Peh. In fact, this is not really a dispute between the Rambam and the Hazon Ish, but a dispute between two traditions regarding how to understand Aggadah.

Incidentally, in the Hazon Ish’s letter just mentioned, in discussing the difference between prophecy and ruah ha-kodesh, he says something directly in opposition to the Rambam’s view.

אבל יש הבדל יסודי בין נבואה לרוה”ק. נבואה, אין השכל המורכב של האדם משתתף בה, אלא אחרי התנאים הסגוליים שנתעלה בהם עד שזכה לזוהר נבואי, אפשר לו להיות לכלי קולט דעת. . . , מבלי עיון ועמל שכלי, אבל רוה”ק היא יגיעת העיון ברב עמל ובמשנה מרץ, עד שמתוסף בו דעת ותבונה בלתי טבעי

In the published version of the letter there are three periods after the word דעת which I have underlined in. Usually when there are three periods it means that something has been removed from the letter, but in this case nothing has been removed. In fact, in the original letter there are only two periods, followed by a comma, and I don’t know why the Hazon Ish used these periods.

Continuing with Grossman, he sees it as obvious that the Hazon Ish’s opinion regarding an unwitting heretic is exactly what the Rambam held, and in support of this he points to Hilkhot Mamrim 3:1-3. Here the Rambam states that Karaites, who were raised with heretical beliefs and don’t know any better, are not to be judged like the original Karaite heretics who consciously rejected the Oral Law. With those who don’t know any better the Rambam counsels “not to rush to kill them,” but to draw them close to Torah with words of peace. (The words “not to rush to kill them” were removed from some printings.)

Does this passage have any relevance to the Rambam’s view of unintentional heresy? The answer is no, as here the Rambam is only counseling tolerance when dealing with Karaites who don’t know any better. He is only concerned with how we should relate to them. Rather than hating them and hoping for their destruction, which is normally the case with regard to heretics, the Rambam tells us that we should relate to the Karaites in a positive way and attempt to convince them to abandon their mistaken path. However, from the theological perspective, a heretic has no share in the World to Come and cannot be exculpated based on the argument that he does not know any better. I make this argument in Limits, p. 12, and it is also affirmed by R. Chaim Rapoport.[4]

Not only is this the peshat in the Rambam, but no other understanding works within the context of his philosophical system. That is, the Rambam’s entire philosophical understanding of the World to Come does not work with the notion that an unwitting heretic can also have a share in the World to Come. Any interpretations that assume otherwise are simply not in line with the Rambam’s approach, an approach that was well understood by both his supporters and opponents who argued at great length about this matter. It was also recognized by R. Hayyim who knew the Guide of the Perplexed well. R. Velvel, in discussing the passage in Hilkhot Mamrim pointed to by Grossman, stated exactly what I have just explained. Here are his words as quoted by R. Moshe Sternbuch[5]:

.הרי מפורש בדבריו [הרמב”ם] דמה שהוא אנוס מועיל רק לענין שראוי להחזירם בתשובה ולמשכם לחזור לאיתן התורה, אבל כל זמן שלא חזרו הם מומרים באונס, ושמם מומרים ואפיקורסים

If I were to argue in the fashion of Grossman, I could say that by asserting that the Hazon Ish is simply following what the Rambam says in Hilkhot Mamrim, that Grossman shows disrespect to R. Hayyim and R. Velvel, by not even seeing their positions as worthy of discussion.

There is a parallel to what we have been discussing elsewhere in the Mishneh Torah. In Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 2:5 the Rambam states that the repentance of heretics (minim) is never accepted. Yet in Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:14 the Rambam states that heretics who repent have a share in the World to Come. The Rambam was asked about this apparent contradiction and he replied that indeed there is no contradiction.[6] In Hilkhot Avodah Zarah he is speaking about how the Jewish community is to relate to heretics. As far as the community is concerned, even if a heretic repents the community is not to accept him, as one can never be sure that his repentance is authentic. However, Hilkhot Teshuvah is referring to the heretic’s relationship with God. As far as God is concerned, a true repentance is always accepted. (I don’t know of anyone today who accepts the Rambam’s opinion in this matter. If, say, a leading atheist philosopher or Reform rabbi decided to become Orthodox, not only would the community accept him, but people would make a very big deal of this and he would become a sought-after speaker at Orthodox synagogues.)

Grossman writes:

In an attempt to list various authorities who took issue with Maimonides, Shapiro tells us that “[i]n Abarbanel’s mind, only limited attention . . . should be paid to Maimonides’ early formulation of dogma, and it would certainly be improper to make conclusions about his theological views on the basis of a text designed for beginners.” (p. 50)

My citing of Abarbanel on p. 7 of my book has nothing to do with authorities who took issue with Maimonides. The mention of Abarbanel is with reference to my discussion about how the Thirteen Principles do not appear as a unit in the Mishneh Torah or the Guide, and in this regard I cited Abarbanel who writes as follows in Rosh Amanah, ch. 23:

This explains why he did not list these principles in the Guide, in which he investigated deeply into the faith of the Torah, but mentioned them rather in his Commentary on the Mishnah, which he wrote in his youth. He postulated the principles for the masses, and for beginners in the study of Mishnah, but not for those individuals who plumbed the knowledge of truth for whom he wrote the Guide.

Following his misunderstanding of my point, Grossman spends the next page explaining that Abarbanel accepts the truth of the Rambam’s Principles, a fact that I never denied. However, Abarbanel also believes that for the most profound understanding of the Rambam’s theological views, one needs to turn to the Guide. As I mention in the book, pp. 32-33, Abarbanel also does not accept the Maimonidean concept of Principles of Faith.

Regarding the Rambam positing Thirteen Principles of Faith, which I claimed is a novelty of the Rambam, let me cite R. Moses Sofer who says exactly this.[7]

י”ג העיקרים המציא הרמב”ם שהוא היה הממציא הראשון בזה, ואשר לפנים לא ידענום

Grossman’s final comment in the first half of his review is as follows (p. 52):

Another example of Shapiro’s proofs that Rambam’s theology differs from one work to another is the following. In his Commentary on the Mishna, Rambam states that “lack of belief in any of the Principles makes one a heretic.” [Quotation from Limits, p. 8] Yet, in his Mishneh Torah, he writes (Shapiro’s translation): “Whoever permits the thought to enter his mind that there is another deity besides God violates a prohibition, as it is said: You shall have no other gods before me . . . and denies the essence of religion – this doctrine being the great principle on which everything depends.”

This proves, says Shapiro, that one is not considered a heretic for such thoughts since the Rambam does not say that one who holds these beliefs is a heretic. However, the very source he adduces clearly says the opposite. The words kofer be-ikar,[8] used by the Rambam in this quotation, are a synonym for “heretic,” even according to Shapiro’s rendition of the words as one who “denies the essence of religion.”

If the Rambam writes that recognition of God as the source of all existence is a Principle upon which all of Judaism stands, it is obviously a Principle of faith.

I don’t think that anyone who reads these paragraphs will have a clue as to what my point was. What I noted is that in the Commentary on the Mishnah, in discussing Principles of Faith, Maimonides speaks of belief (or knowledge, depending on how you translate). This is a mental state. However, in Hilkhot Teshuvah, in discussing what makes someone a heretic, Maimonides writes: “One who says”.[9] In other words, he speaks of verbalizing one’s heresy publicly, not simply belief. If all we had was Hilkhot Teshuvah, one could conclude that even one who has heretical ideas, but conducts himself as a good Jew publicly, does not lose his share in the World to Come.

In the book I then turned to Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 1:6 which speaks about one who imagines that there is another God, and by doing so denies the essence of Judaism. A similar comment can be found in Hilkhot Ishut 8:6 where the Rambam writes: “For the sin of idol worship is so great that even when a person thinks of serving [idols] in his heart [without acting upon it] he is considered wicked.” I noted that while a person who believes something heretical like this has, in his mind, denied the essence of Judaism, as long as his heresy is not publicly voiced he apparently is not to be regarded as a complete heretic with all the communal implications this implies. (For example, if you found someone’s private diary which revealed that he denied certain basic principles of faith, as far as the community is concerned he would apparently remain a Jew in good standing as he never publicized his heresy. But he would still have no share in the World to Come.)

It is clear that the Rambam believes that one who affirms a heretical doctrine loses his share in the World to Come, no matter what the reason he does so. But we need to ask why the Rambam specifically uses the formulation of “one who says”. The easiest answer is that he was simply adopting, and making wider use of, the language found in the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10:1, which also categorizes two types of heresy by using the expression “one who says.”

It makes sense to assume that only one who publicly verbalizes his heresy is to be treated as a heretic by the larger community, but despite the language in the Mishnah, I think many will still wonder why in Hilkhot Teshuvah, which speaks of losing one’s share in the World to Come, Maimonides also uses the language “One who says.” I don’t have an answer to this question. All I did in the book was note that the Rambam’s formulation in the Mishneh Torah is different than what he writes in the Commentary on the Mishnah. Although I have found some rabbinic discussions of this problem, I am surprised that none of the major commentaries take up the issue of why the Rambam uses the word האומר in defining heresy. It seems that they would agree with R. Uri Tieger[10] who writes:

לאו דוקא האומר אלא אפי’ חושב כן ולא מוציא בפיו

It is noteworthy, though, that immediately following these words R. Tieger offers an alternative approach which speaks to the very point I was discussing

וי”א דאף דכל הני שרשי איסורם הוא במחשבה מ”מ לא נחתם עונם עד כדי שיקראו מינים ואפיקורסים עד שיוציאו הדברים בפיהם

R. Avraham Gottesman also raises the issue, and he too sees the Rambam’s formulation in the Mishneh Torah as possibly significant.[11]

‘האומר . . . הרי שלא הזכיר גם שם ממחשבה. ואולי תנא ושייר או לא רצה להחזיקו לאפיקורס ע”י העדר אמונת מחשבה כי רבות מחשבות בלב איש שאין בהם ממש וגם רוב מחשבות אין הקב”ה מצרפן למעשה חוץ ממחשבות ע”ז כדאיתא בגמ

All this is important and worth exploring. But let us return to Grossman, who again attempts to make me look like a fool. He states: “This proves, says Shapiro, that one is not considered a heretic for such thoughts since the Rambam does not say that one who holds these beliefs is a heretic.” Grossman makes this false statement based on my discussion on pp. 8-9. Yet if he had only turned to page 13, at the end of my discussion of this matter, he would have found that I write as follows:

We must therefore conclude that Maimonides’ use of the words “one who says” in describing a heretic is only in imitation of Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1 where the same formulation is found, and not too much should be read into this. One who believes in a corporeal God or in the existence of many gods, even without saying so publicly, is indeed a heretic as far as Maimonidean theology is concerned. Such a one will not face any penalties from an earthly court, but he is certainly denied a share in the world to come.

In other words, my conclusion is the exact opposite of what Grossman attacks me for (and is indeed in line with Grossman’s own opinion).

As for the word האומר as opposed to המאמין, R. Nissim of Marseilles writes as follows with reference to the usage of the term האומר in Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10:1.[12]

והאומר אין תורה מן השמים, ולא אמר “המאמין” כי באמירה לבד הוא מזיק לרבים וכופר בתורה ואף אם יאמין כמונו שהיא רבת התועלת כי הוא מחטיא הכונה והופך קערה על פיה . . . ועל זה אמרו ז”ל: “האומר” כי אף אם יפרש ויתקן דבורו באיזה צד מן התקון ‘והפירוש, לא יועיל לו שלא יקרא כופר. כי הוא מביא אחרים להחליש תקותם בתורה, ומחטיא כונת השם ית

This is a very original approach that some might wish to use to explain the Rambam as well. According to R. Nissim, what is important is the public declaration as this has the result of leading others to heresy. In fact, even if you really don’t believe what you are saying, since you are publicly stating a heretical position this is enough for you to be regarded as a heretic.

I have now responded to every comment of Grossman in the first half of his review, where he discusses broad themes. The second half of the review, which we turn to next, discusses specific points about the Principles. For those who have asked why I am taking the trouble to respond to every single point of Grossman, the answer is that it gives me a chance to revisit texts that I spent so much time on years ago. Secondly, it gives me the opportunity to share much new material that I think will be of interest to readers.

Before ending I would like to add a few more points. Earlier I mentioned that R. Hayyim knew the Guide of the Perplexed well. Some might be wondering what the basis for this statement is, because unlike the Rogochover, R. Hayyim does not discuss the Guide in his works. I am relying on R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik who testified that R. Hayyim wanted to write a commentary on the Guide (as well as on the Minhat Hinnukh), but he never had the time.[13] Here is how he is quoted in R. Zvi Yosef Reichman, Reshimot Shiurim: Sukkah, p. 258:

ואמנם כלל גדול אצלנו שאין להקשות על סתירה שבין ספר היד לספר מורה הנבוכים, כי כן קבל רבינו שליט”א מפי זקנו מו”ר הגר”ח זצוק”ל, וזקנו זצ”ל קבע כך כמופלג גדול בספר מורה נבוכים שרצה לכתוב עליו פירוש. גם חשב לכתוב הערות על הספר מנחת חינוך. ברם שתי המחשבות לא יצאו לפועל מפני טרדות בזמן; וחבל

R. Hayyim’s knowledge of the Guide is noteworthy since, as R. Aharon Rakeffet has commented many times, R. Moshe Soloveichik “never held the book in his hands.” While this might be an exaggeration, the underlying point is that R. Moshe had no interest in, or knowledge of, the Guide. I can’t say whether there is any influence of the Guide on R. Hayyim’s commentary on the Mishneh Torah. R. Eliyahu Soloveitchik actually cites the Guide as standing in opposition to R. Hayyim’s famous explanation of the two types of kavanah, found in Hiddushei Rabbenu Hayyim Halevi, Hilkhot Tefillah 4:1.[14]

Another noteworthy difference between R. Hayyim and the Guide is the following: The Rambam in Guide 2:45 explains that the books of the Prophets were produced from a higher level of divine inspiration than the books of the Hagiographa. However, R. Hayyim held that the difference between the Prophets and the Hagiographa is that the divine inspiration in the Prophets was originally intended to be spoken, and only later was written down. On the other hand, the divinely inspired books of the Hagiographa were originally intended to be written down. Thus, the difference between the Prophets and the Hagiographa has nothing to do with levels of prophetic inspiration.

This view of R. Hayyim is recorded in a number of different places, including by his son, R. Velvel.[15] R. Hershel Schachter also quotes this opinion from the Rav, who was passing on what his father, R. Moses, reported. Here is the passage in R. Schachter’s Nefesh ha-Rav, p. 240.

This entire passage is copied, word for word, in R. Gershon Eisenberger’s Otzar ha-Yediot Asifat Gershon, p. 411. But following a “tradition” that has now become somewhat popular in certain circles, Nefesh ha-Rav is not mentioned by name. Instead it is referred to as  ספר אחד [16]

Returning to the passage from R. Soloveitchik quoted by R. Reichman, it is also of interest that R. Hayyim is quoted as saying that there is no point in calling attention to contradictions between the Mishneh Torah and the Guide. No reason is given for this, but no doubt it is because the works had different purposes, and this can explain different, even contradictory, formulations.

Regarding the Hazon Ish, in my book I assumed that he, and a number of other scholars who explained Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7 similar to him (including R. Ahron Soloveichik, Parah Mateh Aharon, Sefer Mada, p. 194[17]), never saw what Maimonides wrote in Guide 1:36 where he explains why an honest error in matters relating to principles of faith does not change one’s fate. As mentioned already, R. Kafih states that these words were written in response to Rabad’s criticism in Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, where he states: “Why has he [Maimonides] called such a person a heretic? There are many people greater than and superior to him who adhere to such a belief on the basis of what they have seen in verses of Scripture and even more in the words of those aggadot which corrupt right opinion about religious matters.”[18]

I now believe that while it is certainly likely that some of the others I mention in my book had not seen the Guide, I would not say this about the Hazon Ish. Benjamin Brown has reasonably claimed that formulations in the Hazon Ish’s writings show that he was influenced by the Guide.[19] R. Yehoshua Enbal has harshly criticized Brown’s assertion that there was significant influence of the Guide on the Hazon Ish, but Enbal does not deny that the Hazon Ish knew the Guide.[20] It is reported that th Hazon Ish cited R. Moses Alashkar that Maimonides expressed regret about having “published” the Guide, and that if the work hadn’t already been spread so far, he would have removed it from circulation.[21] (This statement is not found in R. Alashkar’s works.) It seems to me that only one who had at least some idea of Maimonides’ philosophy, and why it could be viewed as problematic, would feel it necessary to identify with such an idea.

Can we point to any specific examples of influence of the Guide on the Hazon Ish? This is something that needs to be investigated and I am not prepared to offer an opinion on the matter. I would just note that R. Moshe Zuriel claims that a passage in the Hazon Ish about Divine Providence has its origin in Maimonides words in the Guide.[22]

2. Earlier in the post I discuss the Hazon Ish’s letter,Kovetz Iggerot1:15, which may be the most famous of all of the Hazon Ish’s letters. I also provide an image from the actual handwritten letter. For this I thank Mrs. Hassia Yehuda who graciously allowed me to take pictures of this and the other letters I will discuss.

Mrs. Yehuda is the widow of Rabbi Dr. Zvi Yehuda (1926-2014). Yehuda was a very close student of the Hazon Ish from 1941 until the early 1950s. During some periods he learned with him almost every day for 2-3 hours, and the Hazon Ish became a father-like figure to him. The letter in Kovetz Iggerot 1:15 was sent to Yehuda, and this is what Yehuda himself wrote about this letter (published here for the first time).

As with another close student of the Hazon Ish, Chaim Grade, Yehuda chose a different path than what his teacher would have preferred: He enlisted in the IDF, attended university, and became part of the Religious Zionist world.

Here is a picture that you can find on the internet.

From the Hebrew Wikipedia page for the Hazon Ish we learn the picture was taken in Ramat ha-Sharon when the Hazon Ish was visting a yeshiva ketanah there and testing the students. The man to the right of the Hazon Ish is R. Elijah Dessler. The young man to the right of R. Dessler is Yehuda. The man on the far left is R. Shmuel Rozovsky. Here is another picture from the same event where you can see R. Rozovsky clearly.

Here is a picture of Yehuda from much later in life.

The letters of the Hazon Ish to Yehuda are important as they present us with his responses to a curious young man who started to question things. We are not dealing with someone like Chaim Grade who would throw out traditional Judaism entirely. Rather, Yehuda was beginning to open himself to a more liberal type of Orthodoxy, one which valued academic studies and engaging with the outside world. Yehuda later taught Mishnah on Israel Radio and collaborated with Pinhas Kehati in writing the famous Mishnah booklets. In these booklets Yehuda’s role was acknowledged, but when the booklets were later incorporated into Kehati’s published volumes unfortunately there was no longer any acknowledgment. After coming to the United States, Yehuda completed his doctorate at Yeshiva University and his dissertation is titled “The Two Mekhiltot on the Hebrew Slave”.[23]

In Brown’s book on the Hazon Ish, he quotes from a lengthy interview with Yehuda which was included as an appendix to Brown’s doctoral dissertation. With the approval of Brown, I have uploaded Yehuda’s very interesting interview here. You can also listen to Yehuda being interviewed about the Hazon Ish at Torah in Motion here. Yehuda also published two articles about the Hazon Ish in Tradition.[24]

Because the published version of the Hazon Ish’s letters does not reveal who they were sent to, people have no idea that Yehuda was the recipient of a number of important letters that are often cited. The earliest of the letters from the Hazon Ish to Yehuda is 1:41. According to Yehuda (in unpublished comments on the Hazon Ish’s letters to him), this letter is from 1944. Here we get a glimpse of the strong connection between the Hazon Ish and Yehuda, as the Hazon Ish ends the letter with הדו”ש הדבוק באהבתך. The content of the letter is also of interest as the Hazon Ish writes:

רב שלומים, מאד הנני מתענין לדעת משלומך, וחידה סתומה היא בעיני, שלא התראית עמדי טרם עזבך עירנו, ומה קרה אשר הכאיב לבבך הטוב, אשר מנעך משפיכת רוחך? ואשר מהרת לברוח. לא אוכל להאמין שתעזוב את התורה, כי נפשך קשורה בה בחביון נשמתך ואצילות נפשך העדינה, נא אל תכחד ממני דבר, והודיעני הכל

The Hazon Ish had apparently heard that Yehuda was going to abandon full-time Torah study. He was disappointed with this information and asked Yehuda to explain what was going on.

Yehuda replied to the Hazon Ish and this led to the Hazon Ish’s next letter to Yehuda, which is found in Kovetz Iggerot 1:42. In this letter the Hazon Ish offers guidance to Yehuda, designed to keep him on what today we would call the haredi path:

הריני מאחל לך שתהא דעתך נוחה מחכמתך בתורה, ואל יוסף כח מנגד להדריך מנוחתך, ולנדנד איתן מושבך, שים בסלע קנך, ושמה בסתר המדרגה, הוי שקוד ללמוד תורה, וראה חיים שתחת השמש אין לו יתרון אך למעלה מן השמש יש לו יתרון

Kovetz Iggerot 1:19 was also sent to Yehuda, and it was written after the letters already mentioned. In this letter the Hazon Ish deals with Yehuda’s choice to leave the yeshiva world:

באמת לא מצאתי את המסקנא כדרך הנכונה, אך בידעי שאי אפשר לאכף עליך לעשות נגד רצונך הטבעי . . . לא הרהבתי בנפשי להרבות דברים בשבח הישיבה . . . ואולי תבוא שעה מוצלחת ועבר עליך רוח ממרום בבחינת יעבור עלי מה! ותכיר ישיבתך בישיבה להיותר מתאימה לנפשך ולמשאה בחזות הכל

Kovetz Iggerot 1:14 is the last of the fourteen letters the Hazon Ish sent to Yehuda. This was written when Yehuda’s life choice had been made and the Hazon Ish recognized that his pleas to Yehuda to remain in the yeshiva world had gone unanswered. We see in this letter the Hazon Ish’s great love for Yehuda together with his great disappointment that his dear student had chosen a different path for his life. I don’t think there is another published letter from the Hazon Ish where he writes with such emotion. It is a tribute to Yehuda’s memory that the world can see how the Hazon Ish loved him, and I am happy to be able to reveal who the addressee of this letter is, as over the years many people have wondered about this, and sections of this letter have often been reprinted.

Here is some of what the Hazon Ish wrote to Yehuda:

רב הרגלי לערוך את החיים בודאות גמורה של י”ג העיקרים שעם ישראל עליהם נטעו הקנו לי אהבת התורה בלי מצרים. עשיר אני גם באהבת זולתי, וביחוד לצעיר מצוין בכשרונות, ולב מבין. צעיר השוקד על התורה מלבב אותי וצודד את נפשי, וזכרונו ממלא את כל עולמי, ונפשי קשורה בו בעבותות אהבה בל ינתקו

בראותי בך מפנה פתאומי, אשר כפי שתארתיו, מובנו לבכר החיים של השוק על החיים של התורה אשר בישרון מלך, נפגשתי במאורע רציני בלתי רגיל, והייתי צריך להבליג יום יום על גודל הכאב, ולא יכולתי להשתחרר מרב היגון, הבלתי נשכח כל היום. מצד אחד הייתי מתפלל על תשובתך ומצד השני היה מתגבר עלי היאוש, ובאהבת האדם את עצמו הייתי מסתפק אולי צריך להשתדל להשכיח את כל העבר, ולומר וי לי חסרון כיס, ומצד שלישי אהבתי אליך לא נתנני מנוחה. אבל אורך הזמן שעזבתני עזיבה גמורה ואין לך שום חפץ בי, הכריע הכף לפנות אל השכחה שתעמוד בי בעת צוקה, ומה כבד עלי שבאת לעורר אהבה ישנה, אשר תאלצני להאמין בתקוות משעשעות, אבל כח היאוש אינו רוצה להרפות ידו, ועוד נשאר בלבי, כמובן . . . [הנקודות במקור] אבל בערך אולי תבין מצבי. הכותב בכאב לב חפץ באשרו

The letters of the Hazon Ish to Yehuda have recently been donated to the National Library of Israel. See here.

3. In previous posts I discussed how letters from the Rabbi Isaac Unna archive formerly kept at Bar-Ilan University were being sold at auction. The final shoe has now dropped as what appears to be the remaining items in the archive are now up for auction. The lot is described as follows: “Large Archive Of C. 350 Documents And Letters To, And Accumulated By, RABBI ISAK UNNA Concerning The Campaign To Protect Kosher Slaughter (Shechitah) In Germany.” You can see it here. Thus ends this disgraceful saga in which the family donated numerous historically important documents to Bar-Ilan to be preserved in an archive for scholars to use, and instead these items ended up being sold to the highest bidder.

4. For a while I have been fascinated by the over-the-top language in various charity appeals. It is not enough to stress the importance of the cause, but people feel that they need to speak about how the giver will benefit as well. Furthermore, all sorts of phony stories about “yeshuos” are included in these appeals. However, I don’t recall ever seeing such a blatant falsehood as what appeared right before Purim here in an appeal from the Vaad Harabanim fund. This is the text of the appeal.

Group Of Frum Men Travelling To Dangerous Arab Territory

Thursday 25th of February 2021 07:01:23 AM

A hand-selected group of talmidei chachamim arrived in Iran from Israel this morning, sent on an important mission by Rav Chaim Kanievsky himself. Rav Kanievsky sent the emissaries to pray at the tombs of Mordechai & Esther on behalf of all those who donate to Vaad HaRabbanim’s matanos l’evyonim campaign.

The tomb has been preserved against all odds by Iranian Jews for centuries, despite attempts and even threats by the government to destroy it. The group of travellers runs considerable safety risk appearing externally Jewish and carrying Israeli passports through the hostile Arab country. They do it all for the sake of the hundreds of widows, orphans, and talmidei chachamim who are turning to Vaad HaRabbanim for help.

Funds collected will be distributed to poor people on the day of Purim, in keeping with the observance of the mitzvah of matanos l’evyonim.

Names are being accepted for the prayer list at the tomb for the next few days only.

Where to begin? First of all, Iran is not an Arab country. Second, Israeli passport holders are not allowed into Iran. Quite apart from this, think about the idiocy of this appeal. They expect the reader to believe that in the midst of Covid, with Ben Gurion Airport closed, a group of Israeli talmidei chachamim flew to Iran of all places. And we are also expected to believe that R. Chaim Kanievsky sent these talmidei chachamim to Iran. Anyone who did a little research would have also learned that the tomb was closed because of Covid and even Iranian Jews could not go there.

The story is so obviously phony that I wonder how anyone could so brazenly actually post it. And yet, as with all these ridiculous stories, some people appear to have fallen for it. On the page that you donate here it tells us that $7799 was raised for this idiotic appeal. On this page the appeal begins dramatically: “Right now, a plane full of talmidei chachamim is headed to Iran on a special mission from Rav Chaim Kanievsky himself.” It would have been bad enough had the appeal said that one or two people are going to Iran, but a “plane full”! Of course, if there was actually a group of talmidei chachamim traveling to Iran then the cost of this junket would be more than the $7799 raised, so the snake oil salesman who prepares the next phony appeal might consider the fact that people donating to charity would prefer that it actually go to the poor, not to fund a group of people going on a trip.

* * * * * * * *

[1] R. Elhanan Wasserman, Kovetz Ma’amarim (Jerusalem, 2006), p. 11. R. Shimshon Pinkus, Nefesh Shimshon: Be-Inyanei Emunah, p. 99, notes that there are those who have claimed that R. Hayyim’s statement is not to be taken literally, and that he too agrees that one who does not know any better is not to be regarded as a heretic. R. Pinkus responds as follows to this distortion of R. Hayyim’s view:

כפי שקיבלתי את הדברים מבית בריסק – הגר”ח התכוון כפשוטו ממש! יהודי החסר את ידיעת עיקרי האמונה – אף שלא באשמתו – אינו מחובר לאמונת ישראל. וכשאין דבר המחבר אותו לנצחיות הרוחנית, מציאותו מנותקת ואין לו חלק לעולם הבא.

[2] See his edition of the Guide of the Perplexed, 1:36, n. 37.

[3] R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik discusses the unwitting heretic in Shiurei Ha-Grid: Tefillin, ST”M Tzitzit, p. 84 and ibid., note 7:

בשחיטה, שדין פסול מומר מיוסד על ההשוואה לעכו”ם, אין אנו פוסלים את כל אלו שמומרותם לא בקעה ועלתה מתוך מעשה איסור מיוחד. ובנוגע לאיסורים מסוימים הגורמים למומרות, אנו יודעים כי רק שבת, עבודה זרה ואפיקורסות מחדשים פסול כזה. ברם בסת”ם, שלגביהם גם אפיקורס בשוגג פסול משום שאיננו מאמין, אף על פי שלא חטא, מכל מקום אין הפסול תלוי בחטא, כי אם במצב הגברא ובחלות שמו. מאמין בקדושת התורה כשר, ואילו אינו מאמין פסול . . . אמנם, באפיקורס בשוגג לא חל שם רשע כל כך, שהרי איננו כופר במזיד, ומכל מקום נקרא אפיקורס, ומהווה חלות מיוחדת בגברא, אף על פי שאינה מושרשת במעשה עברה זדוני

[4] See his letter in my Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan, pp. 286-287.
[5] Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 4, p. 452.
[6] Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. Blau, vol. 2, no. 264. R. Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 2:5 and Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:14, did not have Maimonides’ responsum and thus offered a different suggestion.
[7] She’elot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer, no. 148.
[8] The proper transliteration is kofer ba-ikar (or ikkar) as there is a kamatz under the ב not a sheva.
[9] In his commentary to Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, R. Kafih writes:

כל “האומר” שהזכיר רבנו בהלכות הללו אינה סתם אמירה ודבור, אלא מי שהוא בדעה וסברא שכך הוא הדבר

[10] Le-Dofkei Teshuvah, p. 168.
[11] Emunah Shelemah, p. 158. Others who deal with the issue include R. Yitzhak Hecht, Sha’arei Kodesh, vol. 3, pp. 212-213, and R. Mordechai Movshovitz, Shalmei Mordechai, vol. 1, p. 4. R. Movshovitz writes:

וצריך לומר דלאו בדווקא נקט אומר אז חשוב מין, אלא כל שאומר רק במחשבה, הרי הוא עובר דהרי הוא כופר בעיקר

[12] Ma’aseh Nissim, ed Kreisel (Jerusalem, 2000), p. 160.
[13] See also R. Shimon Herschler, Gishmei Berakhah p. 495 (included in Herschler, Seh la-Bayit: Hiddushim u-Derushim al ha-Moadim [London, n.d.], who quotes Zalman Levine, the son of R. Hayyim Avraham Dov Ber Levine, the famous Malach, that his father studied the Guide of the Perplexed with R. Hayyim. Despite his father’s extremism, Zalman attended RIETS and shaved his beard. See Chaim Dalfin, Chabad and Gedolim II (Brooklyn, 2021), p. 155 n. 61. Although it is generally assumed that the title “Malach” was given to the elder R. Levine because of his piety, Dalfin quotes a report that the term was coined “to humiliate those individuals who joined Rabbi Haim Dovber Levine. The sentiment was that they put themselves on a pedestal making themselves ‘holier than thou'”. Habad Portraits (Brooklyn, 2015), vol. 3, p. 54 n. 89.
[14] “Ha-Tefillah be-Aspaklaryat ha-Rambam,” Yeshurun 9 (2001), p. 658. See similarly R. Moshe Yitzhak Roberts in his edition of R. Moses Trani, Beit Elokim: Sha’ar ha-Tefilah (Lakewood, 2008), section Kiryat Moshe, p. 269.
[15] Hiddushei Rabbenu ha-Griz ha-Levi, Menahot 30a.
[16] In the past I have referred to this phenomenon, and another example was recently mentioned by R. Yaacov Sasson in the Seforim Blog here.
[17] On this page R. Soloveichik also points to what he sees as a contradiction between how the Rambam regards unwitting heretics in Hilkhot Teshuvah and his position in Hilkhot Mamrim regarding people brought up in Karaite society, a matter already discussed in this post. He writes

אבל לכאורה זה סותר מה שכתב הרמב”ם בפ”ג מהל’ ממרים ה”ג שהצדוקים והקראים שנתגדלו וחונכו ע”י הוריהם להיות כופרים בתורה שבעל פה יש להם דין של תינוקות שנשבו ויש להם חלק לעולם הבא

In the copy of Parah Mateh Aharon on Otzar haChochma the words I have underlined are also underlined, and the following comment has been added:

פרי המצאת המחבר, ובר”מ שם ליתא (!) ולפי”ז אזדא כל תמיהת הרהמ”ח

The unknown author correctly notes that in Hilkhot Mamrim the Rambam never says that people brought up in Karaite society, who are unwitting heretics, have a share in the World to Come.
[18] Translation in Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières (Cambridge, MA, 1962), p. 282.
[19] Ha-Hazon Ish (Jerusalem, 2010), pp. 171-172.
[20] Yeshurun 29 (2013), p. 938.
[21] Pe’er ha-Dor, vol. 4, p. 150.
[22] Le-Sha’ah u-le-Dorot, vol. 1, p. 283.
[23] The word מכילתא means “a measure”, yet why should the halakhic midrash be given this title? Isaac Baer Levinsohn, Beit Yehudah (Vilna, 1858), vol. 2, p. 48, suggests that the work was actually called מגילתא, but in the popular pronunciation came to be called מכילתא as ג without a dagesh sounded a lot like כ without a dagesh. This pronunciation of ג without a dagesh can still be heard among Middle Eastern Jews. Levinsohn, ibid., who is discussing halakhic midrash, also points out that Wolf Heidenheim, in his machzor for Shavuot in Yetziv Pitgam, vocalizes the words ספרא וספרין as Safra ve-Safrin, instead of Sifra ve-Sifrin. The words are also vocalized this way in Shlomo Tal’s Rinat Yisrael machzor.

Yet as Levinsohn points out, this would mean “writer and writers” –סופר וסופרים. Heidenheim was, of course, a great scholar (and Tal was also quite learned), so it doesn’t make sense that this is simply a mistake. Does anyone know of a source that ספרא should be read as Safra and not Sifra?
[24] “Hazon Ish on the Future of the State of Israel,” Tradition 18 (Summer 1979), pp. 111-117, “Hazon Ish on Textual Criticism and Halakhah,” ibid. (Summer 1980), pp. 172-180.

An Unpublished 1966 Memorandum
from Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan Answers Questions on Jewish Theology

Marc B. Shapiro and Menachem Butler

Professor Marc B. Shapiro holds the Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Chair in Judaic Studies at the University of Scranton, and is the author of many books on Jewish history and theology. He is a frequent contributor at the Seforim blog.

Mr. Menachem Butler is Program Fellow for Jewish Legal Studies at The Julis-Rabinowitz Program on Jewish and Israeli Law at Harvard Law School. He is an Editor at Tablet Magazine and a Co-Editor at the Seforim Blog.

Over the last ten years Professor Alan Brill has written a series of blogposts, as well as a recent scholarly article on the perennially interesting, yet historically mysterious, rabbinic theologian, Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan (1934-1983).[1] It was from these posts that many have learned about what Kaplan was doing before he burst onto the wider Jewish literary scene in the early 1970s through his writings and public lectures. He passed away in 1983 at the age of 48.[2]

Rabbi Aryeh (Leonard M.) Kaplan was born in the Bronx in 1934, and studied at Mesivta Torah Vodaath in New York, and at the Mirrer Yeshiva in New York and in Jerusalem. In 1953, 20-year-old Aryeh Kaplan joined the group of students assembled by Rabbi Simcha Wasserman under the guidance of Rabbi Shmuel Kamenetsky to establish a yeshiva in Los Angeles,[3] and three years later in 1956 received his rabbinic ordination (Yoreh Yoreh, Yadin Yadin) from Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Finkel of the Mirrer Yeshiva of Jerusalem, and from the Chief Rabbinate of the State of Israel. After receiving his ordination, Aryeh Kaplan began his undergraduate studies and, in 1961, earned a B.A. in physics from the University of Louisville, and two years later, an M.S. degree in Physics from the University of Maryland, in 1963. While studying towards his undergraduate degree, Aryeh Kaplan taught elementary school at the pluralistic Eliahu Academy in Louisville, and corresponded with Rabbi Moshe Feinstein about some of the challenges that he encountered.[4] He then worked for four years as a Nuclear Physicist at the National Bureau of Statistics in Washington DC.

In February 1965, Rabbi Kaplan and his wife and their two small children moved to Mason City, Iowa, where he was invited to serve as a pulpit rabbi at Adas Israel Synagogue, a non-Orthodox congregation with forty member families. It would be his first pulpit. He remained at that pulpit until July 1966. During his time in Mason City, Rabbi Kaplan and his wife were very active in all aspects of their synagogue activities. Rabbi Kaplan led services and delivered a sermon each week at the Friday Night Service at Adas Israel Synagogue, hosted a Talmud Torah and taught about Jewish tradition to the youth in the community. He was a member of the National Conference on Christians and Jews, and regularly hosted visiting religious groups to the synagogue and participated in interfaith meetings and on panels alongside religious leaders of other faiths. In all of his delivered remarks, Rabbi Kaplan would type out each sermon prior to its delivery and maintain copies of these addresses within his personal archives; to date, these sermons have not yet been published.

It was during Rabbi Kaplan’s time in Mason City that he authored a fascinating eleven-page-typescript memorandum, dated February 22, 1966, that, thanks to the research discovery of Menachem Butler, we are privileged to share with the readers of The Seforim Blog in the Appendix to this essay.[5]

Kaplan was responding to questions sent out by the B’nai B’rith Adult Jewish Education bureau in Washington DC on matters of basic Jewish theology.[6] We see from the letter that like many other rabbis who were serving in frontier communities, Kaplan maintained a camaraderie with those among the non-Jewish clergy. He was even a member of the “Ministerial Association,” and together with his wife was “founder and chairman of the local chapter of Ministerial Wives.” As one who often hosted non-Jewish groups at the synagogue, Kaplan was well equipped to place Jewish concepts and practices within a context that would make sense for Christians, and this is clearly seen in how he formulates his answers in the letter.

Although Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan’s memorandum is self-explanatory, there are a few points of theological interest that are worth calling attention to:

1. Right at the beginning, Kaplan notes that Jews have no official dogmas, and that in many cases Jewish opinions vary widely.

2. Kaplan states unequivocally that Maimonides does not believe in a literal resurrection. In support of this statement he cites Guide 2:27. If all we had were the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Guide, it would make sense to assume that when Maimonides refers to the Resurrection of the Dead that he intends immortality, not literal resurrection. Even the Mishneh Torah can be read this way, and Rabad, in his note on Hilkhot Teshuvah 8:2, criticizes Maimonides in this regard: “The words of this man appear to me to be similar to one who says that there is no resurrection for bodies, but only for souls.” Furthermore, in Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:6, in speaking of the heretics who have no share in the World to Come, Maimonides writes: והכופרים בתחית המתים וביאת הגואל, “Those who deny the Resurrection and the coming of the [messianic] redeemer.” Throughout his works Maimonides is clear that the ultimate reward is the spiritual World to Come. So how could he not mention among the heretics those who deny the World to Come, and only mention those who deny the Resurrection? It appeared obvious to many that when Maimonides wrote “resurrection of the dead” what he really meant is the spiritual “World to Come.”

As noted, if the works mentioned in the previous paragraph were all we had, then one would have good reason to conclude that for Maimonides resurrection of the dead means nothing other than the World to Come. Yet it is precisely because people came to this interpretation that Maimonides wrote his famous Letter on Resurrection in which he states emphatically that he indeed believes in a literal resurrection of the dead, after which the dead will die again and enjoy the spiritual World to Come. It is true that some have not been convinced by the Letter on Resurrection and see it as an work letter that does not give us Maimonides’ true view, but such an approach means that one is accepting a significant level of esotericism in interpreting Maimonides, as we are not now concerned with a passage here or there but with an entire letter that one must assume was only written for the masses. Since Kaplan ignores what Maimonides says in his Letter on Resurrection, I think we must conclude that, at least when he wrote this letter, he did not regard it as reflecting Maimonides’ authentic view.[7] In Kaplan’s later works, there is no hint of such an approach to Maimonides.[8]

3. In discussing Jesus, Kaplan writes: “In this light, we can even regard the miracles ascribed to Jesus to be true, without undermining our own faith, since his message was not to the Jews at all.”[9]

APPENDIX:

Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan: Response to “Questions Christians Ask Jews” (1966)

[INSERT IMAGES 1-13]

Notes:

[1] See Alan Brill, “Aryeh Kaplan’s Quest for the Lost Jewish Traditions of Science, Psychology and Prophecy,” in Brian Ogren, ed., Kabbalah in America: Ancient Lore in the New World (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 211-232, available here. See also Tzvi Langermann, “‘Sefer Yesira,’ the Story of a Text in Search of Commentary,” Tablet Magazine (18 October 2017), available here.

[2] A complete biographical portrait of Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan remains a scholarly desideratum.

For appreciations of his writings, see “Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan: A Tribute,” in The Aryeh Kaplan Reader: The Gift He Left Behind (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 1983), 13-17; Pinchas Stolper, “Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan z”l: An Appreciation,” Ten Da’at, vol. 1, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 8-9; Baruch Rabinowitz, “Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of Aryeh Kaplan, Part 1,” Ten Da’at, vol. 1, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 9-10; Baruch Rabinowitz, “Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of Aryeh Kaplan, Part 2,” Ten Da’at, vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1987): 21-22; and Pinchas Stolper, “Preface,” in Aryeh Kaplan, Immortality, Resurrection, and the Age of the Universe: A Kabbalistic View (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1993), ix-xi, among other writings.

[3] See Nosson Scherman, “Rabbi Mendel Weinbach zt”l and The Malbim,” in A Memorial Tribute to Rabbi Mendel Weinbach, zt”l (Jerusalem: Ohr Sameyach, 2014), 13-14, available here; as well as Nissan Wolpin, “The Yeshiva Comes to Melrose,” The Jewish Horizon (March 1954): 16-17.

[4] See responsum by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein as published in Shu”t Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim, vol. 1 (New York: Noble Book Press, 1959), 159 (no. 98), dated 13 July 1955.

Discovery of additional correspondences between Rabbi Moshe Feinstein and Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan during those years would be of great scholarly interest and of immense historical value.

[5] Menachem Butler is also preparing for publication the typescript text of a sermon (“If This Springs From G*D…”) that Rabbi Kaplan delivered the previous month in January 1966, and where he reveals details about a conversation that he had with Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos Project and father of the Atom Bomb.

[6] Menachem Butler writes two interesting details that, though beyond the narrow scope of this essay, are nonetheless of historical worthiness to consider when reading this memorandum:

Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan’s memorandum of February 1966 was written several months *prior* to the famous symposium of “The State of Jewish Belief:” hosted by Commentary in August 1966, and republished shortly-thereafter under the different title The Condition of Jewish Belief: A Symposium Compiled by the Editors of Commentary Magazine (New York: Macmillan, 1966), and reprinted more than two decades later in The Condition of Jewish Belief (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1988). One wonders how Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan might have responded to the five questions sent by Commentary to 38 rabbis and scholars from around North America.

Returning to questions submitted by B’nai B’rith, it should be noted that the 21 questions were composed by Rabbi Morris Adler on behalf of the B’nai B’rith Adult Jewish Education bureau, a commission that he chaired from 1963-1966, and that he was murdered several weeks after the memorandum was submitted by Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan. It is for this reason that I believe that these responses had not been published.

The circumstances of Rabbi Adler’s assassination are that a gunman shot him multiple times during Shabbat morning services in front of hundreds of his congregants at his synagogue in Michigan. Rabbi Adler passed away from his wounds sustained in the attack nearly a month later. For a brief bibliographical portrait, see Pamela S. Nadell, Conservative Judaism in America: A Biographical Dictionary and Sourcebook (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 31-32; and for a full book-length account of the episode, see T.V. LoCicero, Murder in the Synagogue (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), as well as his followup volume in T.V. LoCicero, Squelched: The Suppression of Murder in the Synagogue (New York: TLC Media, 2012), available to be ordered here.

[7] For brief discussion, see Isaiah Sonne, “A Scrutiny of the Charges of Forgery against Maimonides’ ‘Letter on Resurrection’,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, vol. 21 (1952): 101-117; see also Jacob I. Dienstag, “Maimonides’ ‘Treatise on Resurrection’ – A Bibliography of Editions, Translations, and Studies, Revised Edition,” in Jacob I. Dienstag, ed., Eschatology in Maimonidean Thought: Messianism, Resurrection, and the World to Come (New York: Ktav, 1983), 226-241, available here.

[8] See Aryeh Kaplan, Maimonides’ Principles: Fundamentals of Jewish Faith (New York: National Conference of Synagogue Youth, 1984), Aryeh Kaplan, Immortality, Resurrection, and the Age of the Universe: A Kabbalistic View (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1993), among other publications.

[9] The notion that in the past non-Jews have performed miracles much like the Jewish prophets needs further analysis, which Marc B. Shapiro will attempt in his forthcoming book on Rav Kook. As well, in Toledot Yeshu Jesus is described as performing miracles, but this is explained by Jesus having made use of God’s holy name.