Response to Criticism Part 4; Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and the Hazon Ish

Marc B. Shapiro

Continued from here.

1. In Limits,p. 14 n. 55, I write

I should call attention to a significant philosophical and halakhic point which appears to have gone unnoticed. The Vilna Gaon (R. Elijah b. Solomon Zalman (1720-97) apparently believed that the First and Second Principles are the only true Principles in Judaism. According to him, one who believes in God’s existence and unity, despite his other sins, is regarded as a Jew in good standing and he is thus able to be included in a minyan (quorum for public prayer). None of the numerous discussions regarding whether a Sabbath violator maybe in included in a minyan seems to have taken note of the Gaon’s comment, which appears in his commentary on Tikunei Zohar, 42a.

Grossman writes:

Apparently, concludes Shapiro, since the Gaon cites only idolatry as invalidating prayer and does not cite the rest of the Thirteen Principles, he is disputing Rambam’s classification of the others as binding fundamentals. However, this source has no bearing on the Principles. The Gaon’s comment refers to counting one for a minyan and to having one’s prayer accepted by God. He is clearly not referring to the Principles, since [in his commentary to Tikunei Zohar] he includes in the metaphor of the scorpion the sin of consorting with gentile women, which is unrelated to any Principle. (p. 48)

The first thing to note is that I never said that the Vilna Gaon disputed “the Rambam’s classification of the others [other Principles] as binding fundamentals.” Of course the Gaon held that people must believe that there is prophecy, that God gave the Torah, that there will be a Messiah, etc. But that is not what I am referring to when I say that for the Gaon the First and Second Principles are the only true Principles in Judaism. As I explain, for the Rambam the Thirteen Principles are special in that if you deny any of them you are to be regarded as having removed yourself from the Jewish people. When the Gaon makes the fascinating comment that belief in the First and Second Principles are enough to be regarded as part of the Jewish people, thus enabling one to be counted in a minyan, this means that as far as he is concerned (in this passage at least), only these beliefs qualify as Principles in the absolute sense that denial of them removes you halakhically from the Jewish people. If I were writing the book today, I would say that the Gaon focuses on three Principles, since he includes belief in the unity of God and an affirmation of God’s corporeality (Principle no. 3) certainly violates God’s unity.

I have to say, however, that while the Gaon’s comment is of great importance when it comes to the issue of Sabbath violation, I am no longer sure about the correctness of my larger point. It could just as well be that when the Gaon derives from the passage in Tikunei Zohar that if you believe in God and His unity, despite your other sins, you are still a Jew in good standing, it does not necessarily mean that these are the only true Principles. It could be that he is merely explicating the meaning of the passage in Tikunei Zohar, which relates to God, but that if it was a different passage he could have spoken about different principles, for example, as long as you believe in the Messiah and the resurrection even if you sin you are still a Jew in good standing. Here is some of what the Gaon writes:

כ”ז שמאמין באחדותו ית’ אפי’ עובר כמה עבירות אינו מומר לכל התורה ואעפ”י שחטא ישראל הוא ומצטרף למנין כמ”ש עבריין כו’ ונכלל תפלתו בכלל ישראל . . . אבל עקרב הוא המודה בעבודת כוכבים ומשתחוה לאל אחר וכן בבת אל נכר אז הקוץ ח”ו מסתלק מצדו וזהו פירוד הגמור וז”ש ואיהו פוסק וברח כו’ ר”ל יוסף במדרגתו ומסתלק הקב”ה ממנו כלל וכלל ואין תפלתו עולה כלל

In the Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam says that if you believe that God has a physical form you are a heretic, and Rabad famously defends those who did not know any better. According to Rabad, although these people are wrong they are certainly not heretics because of their mistake. Regarding this dispute there is R. Hayyim Soloveitchik’s famous statement in defense of the Rambam’s position that “one who is nebech an epikores is still an epikores.”[1]

In Limits I referred to the Hazon Ish’s opinion that the Rambam actually agrees with Rabad when dealing with a heretic who does not know any better. I further note, in agreement with R. Hayyim, that the Hazon Ish’s suggestion cannot be correct, and the Rambam, Guide 1:36, specifically rejects the Hazon Ish’s point. In fact, R. Kafih thinks that the Rambam saw Rabad’s criticism of what he wrote in the Mishneh Torah, and the end of Guide 1:36 was written in response to Rabad and is the Rambam’s defense of his position that faulty education or simply ignorance is no defense when it comes to belief in God’s corporeality.[2] In truth, even if we did not have this chapter of the Guide, the Hazon Ish’s position cannot be sustained, as it is in opposition to the Rambam’s entire conception of immortality which is a natural process. Thus, there is no room to raise questions about “fairness” or why does God not judge an ignorant person mercifully and grant him a share the World to Come if through no fault of his own he believes that God has a physical form.

Grossman, on the other hand (p. 49), claims that a close reading of the Guide supports the Hazon Ish’s position that someone who does not know any better, and who has no one to teach him, is not to be regarded as a heretic. Suffice it to say all scholars of the philosophy of the Rambam agree with R. Hayyim in this matter. Furthermore, the issue is not whether we regard someone as a heretic or not. There could be societal reasons that determine whether or not one is to be regarded as such. The dispute between the Rambam and Rabad is regarding someone who doesn’t know any better and denies a principle of faith, does such a person have a share in the World to Come? It is clear, as Rabad recognized, that according to the Rambam the answer is no. That is why I wrote that when the Hazon Ish explained the Rambam to really be agreeing with Rabad—that an unwitting heretic has a share in the World to Come—that this approach should be seen as in opposition to the Rambam’s position, even though the Hazon Ish was offering his approach as an interpretation of the Rambam.[3]

Grossman then writes (p. 49 n. 65): “In another example of the same hubris towards a giant of Torah scholarship, Shapiro, on p. 37, asserts that the Chazon Ish’s acceptance of Torah She-be’al Peh as having Divine authority (Iggeros 1:16 [should be 15]) is disputing Rambam. Chazon Ish there is merely emphasizing Rambam’s Eighth Principle, but Shapiro claims that Chazon Ish actually ‘added a new dogma.’”

The reader who turns to my book, p. 37, will find that contrary to what Grossman states, I do not mention anything about Torah she-be’al peh. The issue I was concerned with is the authority of Aggadah. In one of his most often quoted letters (Kovetz Iggerot Hazon Ish, 1:15), the Hazon Ish writes that all aggadot have their origin in the sages’ prophetic power, and one who denies this is a heretic.

משרשי האמונה שכל הנאמר בגמ’ בין במשנה ובין בגמ’ בין בהלכה ובין באגדה, הם הם הדברים שנתגלו לנו ע”י כח נבואי שהוא כח נשיקה של השכל הנאצל, עם השכל המורכב בגוף . . . נרתעים אנחנו לשמוע הטלת ספק בדברי חז”ל בין בהלכה בין באגדה, כשמועה של גידוף ר”ל, והנוטה מזה הוא לפי קבלתנו ככופר בדברי חז”ל, ושחיטתו נבילה, ופסול לעדות, ועוד, ולכן נגעו דבריך בלבי

Incidentally, in the published version of the letter it has

והנוטה מזה הוא לפי קבלתנו ככופר כדברי חז”ל

Here is the section of the actual letter of the Hazon Ish where you can see that it should read ככופר בדברי חז”ל.

Searching on Otzar haChochma, I see that almost everyone who cites this passage corrects the printing error.

It is with regard to this statement about aggadah, and this statement alone, that I spoke of a new dogma—which can perhaps already be seen in the Maharal if not earlier—that is not held by the Rambam who, together with the entire geonic and medieval Sephardic rabbinic tradition, did not have such a view about the binding nature of all aggadot. The reader of Grossman’s article who does not examine my book would think that I claimed that the Rambam did not believe that Torah she-be’al Peh has divine authority. Yet the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Hazon Ish is over a different matter, namely, what is included in Torah she-be’al Peh. In fact, this is not really a dispute between the Rambam and the Hazon Ish, but a dispute between two traditions regarding how to understand Aggadah.

Incidentally, in the Hazon Ish’s letter just mentioned, in discussing the difference between prophecy and ruah ha-kodesh, he says something directly in opposition to the Rambam’s view.

אבל יש הבדל יסודי בין נבואה לרוה”ק. נבואה, אין השכל המורכב של האדם משתתף בה, אלא אחרי התנאים הסגוליים שנתעלה בהם עד שזכה לזוהר נבואי, אפשר לו להיות לכלי קולט דעת. . . , מבלי עיון ועמל שכלי, אבל רוה”ק היא יגיעת העיון ברב עמל ובמשנה מרץ, עד שמתוסף בו דעת ותבונה בלתי טבעי

In the published version of the letter there are three periods after the word דעת which I have underlined in. Usually when there are three periods it means that something has been removed from the letter, but in this case nothing has been removed. In fact, in the original letter there are only two periods, followed by a comma, and I don’t know why the Hazon Ish used these periods.

Continuing with Grossman, he sees it as obvious that the Hazon Ish’s opinion regarding an unwitting heretic is exactly what the Rambam held, and in support of this he points to Hilkhot Mamrim 3:1-3. Here the Rambam states that Karaites, who were raised with heretical beliefs and don’t know any better, are not to be judged like the original Karaite heretics who consciously rejected the Oral Law. With those who don’t know any better the Rambam counsels “not to rush to kill them,” but to draw them close to Torah with words of peace. (The words “not to rush to kill them” were removed from some printings.)

Does this passage have any relevance to the Rambam’s view of unintentional heresy? The answer is no, as here the Rambam is only counseling tolerance when dealing with Karaites who don’t know any better. He is only concerned with how we should relate to them. Rather than hating them and hoping for their destruction, which is normally the case with regard to heretics, the Rambam tells us that we should relate to the Karaites in a positive way and attempt to convince them to abandon their mistaken path. However, from the theological perspective, a heretic has no share in the World to Come and cannot be exculpated based on the argument that he does not know any better. I make this argument in Limits, p. 12, and it is also affirmed by R. Chaim Rapoport.[4]

Not only is this the peshat in the Rambam, but no other understanding works within the context of his philosophical system. That is, the Rambam’s entire philosophical understanding of the World to Come does not work with the notion that an unwitting heretic can also have a share in the World to Come. Any interpretations that assume otherwise are simply not in line with the Rambam’s approach, an approach that was well understood by both his supporters and opponents who argued at great length about this matter. It was also recognized by R. Hayyim who knew the Guide of the Perplexed well. R. Velvel, in discussing the passage in Hilkhot Mamrim pointed to by Grossman, stated exactly what I have just explained. Here are his words as quoted by R. Moshe Sternbuch[5]:

.הרי מפורש בדבריו [הרמב”ם] דמה שהוא אנוס מועיל רק לענין שראוי להחזירם בתשובה ולמשכם לחזור לאיתן התורה, אבל כל זמן שלא חזרו הם מומרים באונס, ושמם מומרים ואפיקורסים

If I were to argue in the fashion of Grossman, I could say that by asserting that the Hazon Ish is simply following what the Rambam says in Hilkhot Mamrim, that Grossman shows disrespect to R. Hayyim and R. Velvel, by not even seeing their positions as worthy of discussion.

There is a parallel to what we have been discussing elsewhere in the Mishneh Torah. In Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 2:5 the Rambam states that the repentance of heretics (minim) is never accepted. Yet in Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:14 the Rambam states that heretics who repent have a share in the World to Come. The Rambam was asked about this apparent contradiction and he replied that indeed there is no contradiction.[6] In Hilkhot Avodah Zarah he is speaking about how the Jewish community is to relate to heretics. As far as the community is concerned, even if a heretic repents the community is not to accept him, as one can never be sure that his repentance is authentic. However, Hilkhot Teshuvah is referring to the heretic’s relationship with God. As far as God is concerned, a true repentance is always accepted. (I don’t know of anyone today who accepts the Rambam’s opinion in this matter. If, say, a leading atheist philosopher or Reform rabbi decided to become Orthodox, not only would the community accept him, but people would make a very big deal of this and he would become a sought-after speaker at Orthodox synagogues.)

Grossman writes:

In an attempt to list various authorities who took issue with Maimonides, Shapiro tells us that “[i]n Abarbanel’s mind, only limited attention . . . should be paid to Maimonides’ early formulation of dogma, and it would certainly be improper to make conclusions about his theological views on the basis of a text designed for beginners.” (p. 50)

My citing of Abarbanel on p. 7 of my book has nothing to do with authorities who took issue with Maimonides. The mention of Abarbanel is with reference to my discussion about how the Thirteen Principles do not appear as a unit in the Mishneh Torah or the Guide, and in this regard I cited Abarbanel who writes as follows in Rosh Amanah, ch. 23:

This explains why he did not list these principles in the Guide, in which he investigated deeply into the faith of the Torah, but mentioned them rather in his Commentary on the Mishnah, which he wrote in his youth. He postulated the principles for the masses, and for beginners in the study of Mishnah, but not for those individuals who plumbed the knowledge of truth for whom he wrote the Guide.

Following his misunderstanding of my point, Grossman spends the next page explaining that Abarbanel accepts the truth of the Rambam’s Principles, a fact that I never denied. However, Abarbanel also believes that for the most profound understanding of the Rambam’s theological views, one needs to turn to the Guide. As I mention in the book, pp. 32-33, Abarbanel also does not accept the Maimonidean concept of Principles of Faith.

Regarding the Rambam positing Thirteen Principles of Faith, which I claimed is a novelty of the Rambam, let me cite R. Moses Sofer who says exactly this.[7]

י”ג העיקרים המציא הרמב”ם שהוא היה הממציא הראשון בזה, ואשר לפנים לא ידענום

Grossman’s final comment in the first half of his review is as follows (p. 52):

Another example of Shapiro’s proofs that Rambam’s theology differs from one work to another is the following. In his Commentary on the Mishna, Rambam states that “lack of belief in any of the Principles makes one a heretic.” [Quotation from Limits, p. 8] Yet, in his Mishneh Torah, he writes (Shapiro’s translation): “Whoever permits the thought to enter his mind that there is another deity besides God violates a prohibition, as it is said: You shall have no other gods before me . . . and denies the essence of religion – this doctrine being the great principle on which everything depends.”

This proves, says Shapiro, that one is not considered a heretic for such thoughts since the Rambam does not say that one who holds these beliefs is a heretic. However, the very source he adduces clearly says the opposite. The words kofer be-ikar,[8] used by the Rambam in this quotation, are a synonym for “heretic,” even according to Shapiro’s rendition of the words as one who “denies the essence of religion.”

If the Rambam writes that recognition of God as the source of all existence is a Principle upon which all of Judaism stands, it is obviously a Principle of faith.

I don’t think that anyone who reads these paragraphs will have a clue as to what my point was. What I noted is that in the Commentary on the Mishnah, in discussing Principles of Faith, Maimonides speaks of belief (or knowledge, depending on how you translate). This is a mental state. However, in Hilkhot Teshuvah, in discussing what makes someone a heretic, Maimonides writes: “One who says”.[9] In other words, he speaks of verbalizing one’s heresy publicly, not simply belief. If all we had was Hilkhot Teshuvah, one could conclude that even one who has heretical ideas, but conducts himself as a good Jew publicly, does not lose his share in the World to Come.

In the book I then turned to Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 1:6 which speaks about one who imagines that there is another God, and by doing so denies the essence of Judaism. A similar comment can be found in Hilkhot Ishut 8:6 where the Rambam writes: “For the sin of idol worship is so great that even when a person thinks of serving [idols] in his heart [without acting upon it] he is considered wicked.” I noted that while a person who believes something heretical like this has, in his mind, denied the essence of Judaism, as long as his heresy is not publicly voiced he apparently is not to be regarded as a complete heretic with all the communal implications this implies. (For example, if you found someone’s private diary which revealed that he denied certain basic principles of faith, as far as the community is concerned he would apparently remain a Jew in good standing as he never publicized his heresy. But he would still have no share in the World to Come.)

It is clear that the Rambam believes that one who affirms a heretical doctrine loses his share in the World to Come, no matter what the reason he does so. But we need to ask why the Rambam specifically uses the formulation of “one who says”. The easiest answer is that he was simply adopting, and making wider use of, the language found in the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10:1, which also categorizes two types of heresy by using the expression “one who says.”

It makes sense to assume that only one who publicly verbalizes his heresy is to be treated as a heretic by the larger community, but despite the language in the Mishnah, I think many will still wonder why in Hilkhot Teshuvah, which speaks of losing one’s share in the World to Come, Maimonides also uses the language “One who says.” I don’t have an answer to this question. All I did in the book was note that the Rambam’s formulation in the Mishneh Torah is different than what he writes in the Commentary on the Mishnah. Although I have found some rabbinic discussions of this problem, I am surprised that none of the major commentaries take up the issue of why the Rambam uses the word האומר in defining heresy. It seems that they would agree with R. Uri Tieger[10] who writes:

לאו דוקא האומר אלא אפי’ חושב כן ולא מוציא בפיו

It is noteworthy, though, that immediately following these words R. Tieger offers an alternative approach which speaks to the very point I was discussing

וי”א דאף דכל הני שרשי איסורם הוא במחשבה מ”מ לא נחתם עונם עד כדי שיקראו מינים ואפיקורסים עד שיוציאו הדברים בפיהם

R. Avraham Gottesman also raises the issue, and he too sees the Rambam’s formulation in the Mishneh Torah as possibly significant.[11]

‘האומר . . . הרי שלא הזכיר גם שם ממחשבה. ואולי תנא ושייר או לא רצה להחזיקו לאפיקורס ע”י העדר אמונת מחשבה כי רבות מחשבות בלב איש שאין בהם ממש וגם רוב מחשבות אין הקב”ה מצרפן למעשה חוץ ממחשבות ע”ז כדאיתא בגמ

All this is important and worth exploring. But let us return to Grossman, who again attempts to make me look like a fool. He states: “This proves, says Shapiro, that one is not considered a heretic for such thoughts since the Rambam does not say that one who holds these beliefs is a heretic.” Grossman makes this false statement based on my discussion on pp. 8-9. Yet if he had only turned to page 13, at the end of my discussion of this matter, he would have found that I write as follows:

We must therefore conclude that Maimonides’ use of the words “one who says” in describing a heretic is only in imitation of Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1 where the same formulation is found, and not too much should be read into this. One who believes in a corporeal God or in the existence of many gods, even without saying so publicly, is indeed a heretic as far as Maimonidean theology is concerned. Such a one will not face any penalties from an earthly court, but he is certainly denied a share in the world to come.

In other words, my conclusion is the exact opposite of what Grossman attacks me for (and is indeed in line with Grossman’s own opinion).

As for the word האומר as opposed to המאמין, R. Nissim of Marseilles writes as follows with reference to the usage of the term האומר in Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10:1.[12]

והאומר אין תורה מן השמים, ולא אמר “המאמין” כי באמירה לבד הוא מזיק לרבים וכופר בתורה ואף אם יאמין כמונו שהיא רבת התועלת כי הוא מחטיא הכונה והופך קערה על פיה . . . ועל זה אמרו ז”ל: “האומר” כי אף אם יפרש ויתקן דבורו באיזה צד מן התקון ‘והפירוש, לא יועיל לו שלא יקרא כופר. כי הוא מביא אחרים להחליש תקותם בתורה, ומחטיא כונת השם ית

This is a very original approach that some might wish to use to explain the Rambam as well. According to R. Nissim, what is important is the public declaration as this has the result of leading others to heresy. In fact, even if you really don’t believe what you are saying, since you are publicly stating a heretical position this is enough for you to be regarded as a heretic.

I have now responded to every comment of Grossman in the first half of his review, where he discusses broad themes. The second half of the review, which we turn to next, discusses specific points about the Principles. For those who have asked why I am taking the trouble to respond to every single point of Grossman, the answer is that it gives me a chance to revisit texts that I spent so much time on years ago. Secondly, it gives me the opportunity to share much new material that I think will be of interest to readers.

Before ending I would like to add a few more points. Earlier I mentioned that R. Hayyim knew the Guide of the Perplexed well. Some might be wondering what the basis for this statement is, because unlike the Rogochover, R. Hayyim does not discuss the Guide in his works. I am relying on R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik who testified that R. Hayyim wanted to write a commentary on the Guide (as well as on the Minhat Hinnukh), but he never had the time.[13] Here is how he is quoted in R. Zvi Yosef Reichman, Reshimot Shiurim: Sukkah, p. 258:

ואמנם כלל גדול אצלנו שאין להקשות על סתירה שבין ספר היד לספר מורה הנבוכים, כי כן קבל רבינו שליט”א מפי זקנו מו”ר הגר”ח זצוק”ל, וזקנו זצ”ל קבע כך כמופלג גדול בספר מורה נבוכים שרצה לכתוב עליו פירוש. גם חשב לכתוב הערות על הספר מנחת חינוך. ברם שתי המחשבות לא יצאו לפועל מפני טרדות בזמן; וחבל

R. Hayyim’s knowledge of the Guide is noteworthy since, as R. Aharon Rakeffet has commented many times, R. Moshe Soloveichik “never held the book in his hands.” While this might be an exaggeration, the underlying point is that R. Moshe had no interest in, or knowledge of, the Guide. I can’t say whether there is any influence of the Guide on R. Hayyim’s commentary on the Mishneh Torah. R. Eliyahu Soloveitchik actually cites the Guide as standing in opposition to R. Hayyim’s famous explanation of the two types of kavanah, found in Hiddushei Rabbenu Hayyim Halevi, Hilkhot Tefillah 4:1.[14]

Another noteworthy difference between R. Hayyim and the Guide is the following: The Rambam in Guide 2:45 explains that the books of the Prophets were produced from a higher level of divine inspiration than the books of the Hagiographa. However, R. Hayyim held that the difference between the Prophets and the Hagiographa is that the divine inspiration in the Prophets was originally intended to be spoken, and only later was written down. On the other hand, the divinely inspired books of the Hagiographa were originally intended to be written down. Thus, the difference between the Prophets and the Hagiographa has nothing to do with levels of prophetic inspiration.

This view of R. Hayyim is recorded in a number of different places, including by his son, R. Velvel.[15] R. Hershel Schachter also quotes this opinion from the Rav, who was passing on what his father, R. Moses, reported. Here is the passage in R. Schachter’s Nefesh ha-Rav, p. 240.

This entire passage is copied, word for word, in R. Gershon Eisenberger’s Otzar ha-Yediot Asifat Gershon, p. 411. But following a “tradition” that has now become somewhat popular in certain circles, Nefesh ha-Rav is not mentioned by name. Instead it is referred to as  ספר אחד [16]

Returning to the passage from R. Soloveitchik quoted by R. Reichman, it is also of interest that R. Hayyim is quoted as saying that there is no point in calling attention to contradictions between the Mishneh Torah and the Guide. No reason is given for this, but no doubt it is because the works had different purposes, and this can explain different, even contradictory, formulations.

Regarding the Hazon Ish, in my book I assumed that he, and a number of other scholars who explained Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7 similar to him (including R. Ahron Soloveichik, Parah Mateh Aharon, Sefer Mada, p. 194[17]), never saw what Maimonides wrote in Guide 1:36 where he explains why an honest error in matters relating to principles of faith does not change one’s fate. As mentioned already, R. Kafih states that these words were written in response to Rabad’s criticism in Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, where he states: “Why has he [Maimonides] called such a person a heretic? There are many people greater than and superior to him who adhere to such a belief on the basis of what they have seen in verses of Scripture and even more in the words of those aggadot which corrupt right opinion about religious matters.”[18]

I now believe that while it is certainly likely that some of the others I mention in my book had not seen the Guide, I would not say this about the Hazon Ish. Benjamin Brown has reasonably claimed that formulations in the Hazon Ish’s writings show that he was influenced by the Guide.[19] R. Yehoshua Enbal has harshly criticized Brown’s assertion that there was significant influence of the Guide on the Hazon Ish, but Enbal does not deny that the Hazon Ish knew the Guide.[20] It is reported that th Hazon Ish cited R. Moses Alashkar that Maimonides expressed regret about having “published” the Guide, and that if the work hadn’t already been spread so far, he would have removed it from circulation.[21] (This statement is not found in R. Alashkar’s works.) It seems to me that only one who had at least some idea of Maimonides’ philosophy, and why it could be viewed as problematic, would feel it necessary to identify with such an idea.

Can we point to any specific examples of influence of the Guide on the Hazon Ish? This is something that needs to be investigated and I am not prepared to offer an opinion on the matter. I would just note that R. Moshe Zuriel claims that a passage in the Hazon Ish about Divine Providence has its origin in Maimonides words in the Guide.[22]

2. Earlier in the post I discuss the Hazon Ish’s letter,Kovetz Iggerot1:15, which may be the most famous of all of the Hazon Ish’s letters. I also provide an image from the actual handwritten letter. For this I thank Mrs. Hassia Yehuda who graciously allowed me to take pictures of this and the other letters I will discuss.

Mrs. Yehuda is the widow of Rabbi Dr. Zvi Yehuda (1926-2014). Yehuda was a very close student of the Hazon Ish from 1941 until the early 1950s. During some periods he learned with him almost every day for 2-3 hours, and the Hazon Ish became a father-like figure to him. The letter in Kovetz Iggerot 1:15 was sent to Yehuda, and this is what Yehuda himself wrote about this letter (published here for the first time).

As with another close student of the Hazon Ish, Chaim Grade, Yehuda chose a different path than what his teacher would have preferred: He enlisted in the IDF, attended university, and became part of the Religious Zionist world.

Here is a picture that you can find on the internet.

From the Hebrew Wikipedia page for the Hazon Ish we learn the picture was taken in Ramat ha-Sharon when the Hazon Ish was visting a yeshiva ketanah there and testing the students. The man to the right of the Hazon Ish is R. Elijah Dessler. The young man to the right of R. Dessler is Yehuda. The man on the far left is R. Shmuel Rozovsky. Here is another picture from the same event where you can see R. Rozovsky clearly.

Here is a picture of Yehuda from much later in life.

The letters of the Hazon Ish to Yehuda are important as they present us with his responses to a curious young man who started to question things. We are not dealing with someone like Chaim Grade who would throw out traditional Judaism entirely. Rather, Yehuda was beginning to open himself to a more liberal type of Orthodoxy, one which valued academic studies and engaging with the outside world. Yehuda later taught Mishnah on Israel Radio and collaborated with Pinhas Kehati in writing the famous Mishnah booklets. In these booklets Yehuda’s role was acknowledged, but when the booklets were later incorporated into Kehati’s published volumes unfortunately there was no longer any acknowledgment. After coming to the United States, Yehuda completed his doctorate at Yeshiva University and his dissertation is titled “The Two Mekhiltot on the Hebrew Slave”.[23]

In Brown’s book on the Hazon Ish, he quotes from a lengthy interview with Yehuda which was included as an appendix to Brown’s doctoral dissertation. With the approval of Brown, I have uploaded Yehuda’s very interesting interview here. You can also listen to Yehuda being interviewed about the Hazon Ish at Torah in Motion here. Yehuda also published two articles about the Hazon Ish in Tradition.[24]

Because the published version of the Hazon Ish’s letters does not reveal who they were sent to, people have no idea that Yehuda was the recipient of a number of important letters that are often cited. The earliest of the letters from the Hazon Ish to Yehuda is 1:41. According to Yehuda (in unpublished comments on the Hazon Ish’s letters to him), this letter is from 1944. Here we get a glimpse of the strong connection between the Hazon Ish and Yehuda, as the Hazon Ish ends the letter with הדו”ש הדבוק באהבתך. The content of the letter is also of interest as the Hazon Ish writes:

רב שלומים, מאד הנני מתענין לדעת משלומך, וחידה סתומה היא בעיני, שלא התראית עמדי טרם עזבך עירנו, ומה קרה אשר הכאיב לבבך הטוב, אשר מנעך משפיכת רוחך? ואשר מהרת לברוח. לא אוכל להאמין שתעזוב את התורה, כי נפשך קשורה בה בחביון נשמתך ואצילות נפשך העדינה, נא אל תכחד ממני דבר, והודיעני הכל

The Hazon Ish had apparently heard that Yehuda was going to abandon full-time Torah study. He was disappointed with this information and asked Yehuda to explain what was going on.

Yehuda replied to the Hazon Ish and this led to the Hazon Ish’s next letter to Yehuda, which is found in Kovetz Iggerot 1:42. In this letter the Hazon Ish offers guidance to Yehuda, designed to keep him on what today we would call the haredi path:

הריני מאחל לך שתהא דעתך נוחה מחכמתך בתורה, ואל יוסף כח מנגד להדריך מנוחתך, ולנדנד איתן מושבך, שים בסלע קנך, ושמה בסתר המדרגה, הוי שקוד ללמוד תורה, וראה חיים שתחת השמש אין לו יתרון אך למעלה מן השמש יש לו יתרון

Kovetz Iggerot 1:19 was also sent to Yehuda, and it was written after the letters already mentioned. In this letter the Hazon Ish deals with Yehuda’s choice to leave the yeshiva world:

באמת לא מצאתי את המסקנא כדרך הנכונה, אך בידעי שאי אפשר לאכף עליך לעשות נגד רצונך הטבעי . . . לא הרהבתי בנפשי להרבות דברים בשבח הישיבה . . . ואולי תבוא שעה מוצלחת ועבר עליך רוח ממרום בבחינת יעבור עלי מה! ותכיר ישיבתך בישיבה להיותר מתאימה לנפשך ולמשאה בחזות הכל

Kovetz Iggerot 1:14 is the last of the fourteen letters the Hazon Ish sent to Yehuda. This was written when Yehuda’s life choice had been made and the Hazon Ish recognized that his pleas to Yehuda to remain in the yeshiva world had gone unanswered. We see in this letter the Hazon Ish’s great love for Yehuda together with his great disappointment that his dear student had chosen a different path for his life. I don’t think there is another published letter from the Hazon Ish where he writes with such emotion. It is a tribute to Yehuda’s memory that the world can see how the Hazon Ish loved him, and I am happy to be able to reveal who the addressee of this letter is, as over the years many people have wondered about this, and sections of this letter have often been reprinted.

Here is some of what the Hazon Ish wrote to Yehuda:

רב הרגלי לערוך את החיים בודאות גמורה של י”ג העיקרים שעם ישראל עליהם נטעו הקנו לי אהבת התורה בלי מצרים. עשיר אני גם באהבת זולתי, וביחוד לצעיר מצוין בכשרונות, ולב מבין. צעיר השוקד על התורה מלבב אותי וצודד את נפשי, וזכרונו ממלא את כל עולמי, ונפשי קשורה בו בעבותות אהבה בל ינתקו

בראותי בך מפנה פתאומי, אשר כפי שתארתיו, מובנו לבכר החיים של השוק על החיים של התורה אשר בישרון מלך, נפגשתי במאורע רציני בלתי רגיל, והייתי צריך להבליג יום יום על גודל הכאב, ולא יכולתי להשתחרר מרב היגון, הבלתי נשכח כל היום. מצד אחד הייתי מתפלל על תשובתך ומצד השני היה מתגבר עלי היאוש, ובאהבת האדם את עצמו הייתי מסתפק אולי צריך להשתדל להשכיח את כל העבר, ולומר וי לי חסרון כיס, ומצד שלישי אהבתי אליך לא נתנני מנוחה. אבל אורך הזמן שעזבתני עזיבה גמורה ואין לך שום חפץ בי, הכריע הכף לפנות אל השכחה שתעמוד בי בעת צוקה, ומה כבד עלי שבאת לעורר אהבה ישנה, אשר תאלצני להאמין בתקוות משעשעות, אבל כח היאוש אינו רוצה להרפות ידו, ועוד נשאר בלבי, כמובן . . . [הנקודות במקור] אבל בערך אולי תבין מצבי. הכותב בכאב לב חפץ באשרו

The letters of the Hazon Ish to Yehuda have recently been donated to the National Library of Israel. See here.

3. In previous posts I discussed how letters from the Rabbi Isaac Unna archive formerly kept at Bar-Ilan University were being sold at auction. The final shoe has now dropped as what appears to be the remaining items in the archive are now up for auction. The lot is described as follows: “Large Archive Of C. 350 Documents And Letters To, And Accumulated By, RABBI ISAK UNNA Concerning The Campaign To Protect Kosher Slaughter (Shechitah) In Germany.” You can see it here. Thus ends this disgraceful saga in which the family donated numerous historically important documents to Bar-Ilan to be preserved in an archive for scholars to use, and instead these items ended up being sold to the highest bidder.

4. For a while I have been fascinated by the over-the-top language in various charity appeals. It is not enough to stress the importance of the cause, but people feel that they need to speak about how the giver will benefit as well. Furthermore, all sorts of phony stories about “yeshuos” are included in these appeals. However, I don’t recall ever seeing such a blatant falsehood as what appeared right before Purim here in an appeal from the Vaad Harabanim fund. This is the text of the appeal.

Group Of Frum Men Travelling To Dangerous Arab Territory

Thursday 25th of February 2021 07:01:23 AM

A hand-selected group of talmidei chachamim arrived in Iran from Israel this morning, sent on an important mission by Rav Chaim Kanievsky himself. Rav Kanievsky sent the emissaries to pray at the tombs of Mordechai & Esther on behalf of all those who donate to Vaad HaRabbanim’s matanos l’evyonim campaign.

The tomb has been preserved against all odds by Iranian Jews for centuries, despite attempts and even threats by the government to destroy it. The group of travellers runs considerable safety risk appearing externally Jewish and carrying Israeli passports through the hostile Arab country. They do it all for the sake of the hundreds of widows, orphans, and talmidei chachamim who are turning to Vaad HaRabbanim for help.

Funds collected will be distributed to poor people on the day of Purim, in keeping with the observance of the mitzvah of matanos l’evyonim.

Names are being accepted for the prayer list at the tomb for the next few days only.

Where to begin? First of all, Iran is not an Arab country. Second, Israeli passport holders are not allowed into Iran. Quite apart from this, think about the idiocy of this appeal. They expect the reader to believe that in the midst of Covid, with Ben Gurion Airport closed, a group of Israeli talmidei chachamim flew to Iran of all places. And we are also expected to believe that R. Chaim Kanievsky sent these talmidei chachamim to Iran. Anyone who did a little research would have also learned that the tomb was closed because of Covid and even Iranian Jews could not go there.

The story is so obviously phony that I wonder how anyone could so brazenly actually post it. And yet, as with all these ridiculous stories, some people appear to have fallen for it. On the page that you donate here it tells us that $7799 was raised for this idiotic appeal. On this page the appeal begins dramatically: “Right now, a plane full of talmidei chachamim is headed to Iran on a special mission from Rav Chaim Kanievsky himself.” It would have been bad enough had the appeal said that one or two people are going to Iran, but a “plane full”! Of course, if there was actually a group of talmidei chachamim traveling to Iran then the cost of this junket would be more than the $7799 raised, so the snake oil salesman who prepares the next phony appeal might consider the fact that people donating to charity would prefer that it actually go to the poor, not to fund a group of people going on a trip.

* * * * * * * *

[1] R. Elhanan Wasserman, Kovetz Ma’amarim (Jerusalem, 2006), p. 11. R. Shimshon Pinkus, Nefesh Shimshon: Be-Inyanei Emunah, p. 99, notes that there are those who have claimed that R. Hayyim’s statement is not to be taken literally, and that he too agrees that one who does not know any better is not to be regarded as a heretic. R. Pinkus responds as follows to this distortion of R. Hayyim’s view:

כפי שקיבלתי את הדברים מבית בריסק – הגר”ח התכוון כפשוטו ממש! יהודי החסר את ידיעת עיקרי האמונה – אף שלא באשמתו – אינו מחובר לאמונת ישראל. וכשאין דבר המחבר אותו לנצחיות הרוחנית, מציאותו מנותקת ואין לו חלק לעולם הבא.

[2] See his edition of the Guide of the Perplexed, 1:36, n. 37.

[3] R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik discusses the unwitting heretic in Shiurei Ha-Grid: Tefillin, ST”M Tzitzit, p. 84 and ibid., note 7:

בשחיטה, שדין פסול מומר מיוסד על ההשוואה לעכו”ם, אין אנו פוסלים את כל אלו שמומרותם לא בקעה ועלתה מתוך מעשה איסור מיוחד. ובנוגע לאיסורים מסוימים הגורמים למומרות, אנו יודעים כי רק שבת, עבודה זרה ואפיקורסות מחדשים פסול כזה. ברם בסת”ם, שלגביהם גם אפיקורס בשוגג פסול משום שאיננו מאמין, אף על פי שלא חטא, מכל מקום אין הפסול תלוי בחטא, כי אם במצב הגברא ובחלות שמו. מאמין בקדושת התורה כשר, ואילו אינו מאמין פסול . . . אמנם, באפיקורס בשוגג לא חל שם רשע כל כך, שהרי איננו כופר במזיד, ומכל מקום נקרא אפיקורס, ומהווה חלות מיוחדת בגברא, אף על פי שאינה מושרשת במעשה עברה זדוני

[4] See his letter in my Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan, pp. 286-287.
[5] Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 4, p. 452.
[6] Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. Blau, vol. 2, no. 264. R. Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 2:5 and Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:14, did not have Maimonides’ responsum and thus offered a different suggestion.
[7] She’elot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer, no. 148.
[8] The proper transliteration is kofer ba-ikar (or ikkar) as there is a kamatz under the ב not a sheva.
[9] In his commentary to Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, R. Kafih writes:

כל “האומר” שהזכיר רבנו בהלכות הללו אינה סתם אמירה ודבור, אלא מי שהוא בדעה וסברא שכך הוא הדבר

[10] Le-Dofkei Teshuvah, p. 168.
[11] Emunah Shelemah, p. 158. Others who deal with the issue include R. Yitzhak Hecht, Sha’arei Kodesh, vol. 3, pp. 212-213, and R. Mordechai Movshovitz, Shalmei Mordechai, vol. 1, p. 4. R. Movshovitz writes:

וצריך לומר דלאו בדווקא נקט אומר אז חשוב מין, אלא כל שאומר רק במחשבה, הרי הוא עובר דהרי הוא כופר בעיקר

[12] Ma’aseh Nissim, ed Kreisel (Jerusalem, 2000), p. 160.
[13] See also R. Shimon Herschler, Gishmei Berakhah p. 495 (included in Herschler, Seh la-Bayit: Hiddushim u-Derushim al ha-Moadim [London, n.d.], who quotes Zalman Levine, the son of R. Hayyim Avraham Dov Ber Levine, the famous Malach, that his father studied the Guide of the Perplexed with R. Hayyim. Despite his father’s extremism, Zalman attended RIETS and shaved his beard. See Chaim Dalfin, Chabad and Gedolim II (Brooklyn, 2021), p. 155 n. 61. Although it is generally assumed that the title “Malach” was given to the elder R. Levine because of his piety, Dalfin quotes a report that the term was coined “to humiliate those individuals who joined Rabbi Haim Dovber Levine. The sentiment was that they put themselves on a pedestal making themselves ‘holier than thou'”. Habad Portraits (Brooklyn, 2015), vol. 3, p. 54 n. 89.
[14] “Ha-Tefillah be-Aspaklaryat ha-Rambam,” Yeshurun 9 (2001), p. 658. See similarly R. Moshe Yitzhak Roberts in his edition of R. Moses Trani, Beit Elokim: Sha’ar ha-Tefilah (Lakewood, 2008), section Kiryat Moshe, p. 269.
[15] Hiddushei Rabbenu ha-Griz ha-Levi, Menahot 30a.
[16] In the past I have referred to this phenomenon, and another example was recently mentioned by R. Yaacov Sasson in the Seforim Blog here.
[17] On this page R. Soloveichik also points to what he sees as a contradiction between how the Rambam regards unwitting heretics in Hilkhot Teshuvah and his position in Hilkhot Mamrim regarding people brought up in Karaite society, a matter already discussed in this post. He writes

אבל לכאורה זה סותר מה שכתב הרמב”ם בפ”ג מהל’ ממרים ה”ג שהצדוקים והקראים שנתגדלו וחונכו ע”י הוריהם להיות כופרים בתורה שבעל פה יש להם דין של תינוקות שנשבו ויש להם חלק לעולם הבא

In the copy of Parah Mateh Aharon on Otzar haChochma the words I have underlined are also underlined, and the following comment has been added:

פרי המצאת המחבר, ובר”מ שם ליתא (!) ולפי”ז אזדא כל תמיהת הרהמ”ח

The unknown author correctly notes that in Hilkhot Mamrim the Rambam never says that people brought up in Karaite society, who are unwitting heretics, have a share in the World to Come.
[18] Translation in Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières (Cambridge, MA, 1962), p. 282.
[19] Ha-Hazon Ish (Jerusalem, 2010), pp. 171-172.
[20] Yeshurun 29 (2013), p. 938.
[21] Pe’er ha-Dor, vol. 4, p. 150.
[22] Le-Sha’ah u-le-Dorot, vol. 1, p. 283.
[23] The word מכילתא means “a measure”, yet why should the halakhic midrash be given this title? Isaac Baer Levinsohn, Beit Yehudah (Vilna, 1858), vol. 2, p. 48, suggests that the work was actually called מגילתא, but in the popular pronunciation came to be called מכילתא as ג without a dagesh sounded a lot like כ without a dagesh. This pronunciation of ג without a dagesh can still be heard among Middle Eastern Jews. Levinsohn, ibid., who is discussing halakhic midrash, also points out that Wolf Heidenheim, in his machzor for Shavuot in Yetziv Pitgam, vocalizes the words ספרא וספרין as Safra ve-Safrin, instead of Sifra ve-Sifrin. The words are also vocalized this way in Shlomo Tal’s Rinat Yisrael machzor.

Yet as Levinsohn points out, this would mean “writer and writers” –סופר וסופרים. Heidenheim was, of course, a great scholar (and Tal was also quite learned), so it doesn’t make sense that this is simply a mistake. Does anyone know of a source that ספרא should be read as Safra and not Sifra?
[24] “Hazon Ish on the Future of the State of Israel,” Tradition 18 (Summer 1979), pp. 111-117, “Hazon Ish on Textual Criticism and Halakhah,” ibid. (Summer 1980), pp. 172-180.

Book Announcement: Volume Five of Amudim beToldot haSefer haIvri

By Eliezer Brodt

I am very happy to announce the recent publication (and Sale) of an important work, which will be of great interest to readers of the Seforim Blog, the fifth volume of, Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri by Professor Yaakov Shmuel Spiegel, of Bar-Ilan University’s Talmud department.

As I have written in the past, Professor Spiegel is one of the most prolific writers in the Jewish academic scene, authoring of over 160 articles and 18 books (16 of those are publications for the first time of works which remained in manuscript). Many suspect that he knows the secrets of Hashbot Hakulmos (automatic writing) (about which see here).

His articles cover an incredibly wide range of subjects related to many areas of Jewish Studies, including history of Rishonim, piyutim authored by Rishonim, bibliography and minhaghim, to name but a few. His uniqueness lies not only in the topics but also that his work has appeared in all types of publications running the gamut from academic journals such as Kiryat Sefer, Tarbiz, Sidra, Alei Sefer, Assufot, Teudah, Kovetz Al Yad and also in many prominent Charedi rabbinic journals such a Yeshurun, Yerushasenu, Chitzei Giborim, Moriah, Sinai and Or Yisroel. It is hard to define his area of expertise, as in every area he writes about he appears to be an expert!

Worth noting that recently thanks to the hard work of a dear friend of mine, all of his published articles are available for free download here.

He has edited and printed from manuscript many works of Rishonim and Achronim on Massekhes Avos and the Haggadah Shel Pesach (and IYH some more are on the way). He is of the opinion, contrary to that of some other academics, that there is nothing non-academic about printing critical editions of important manuscript texts. Although there is a known “belief” in the academic world, “publish or perish,” which some claim is the cause of weak articles and books, at times, Spiegel’s prolific output does nothing to damper the quality of his works.

Another point unique to Speigel’s writings, besides his familiarity with all the academic sources, he shows great familiarity with all the classic sources from Chazal, Geonim, Rishonim and Achronim, to even the most recent discussions in Charedi literature – this bekius (breadth) was apparent well before the advent of search engines of Hebrew books and Otzar Ha-hochmah. Alongside all this is his penetrating analysis and ability to raise interesting points.

Another point of interest is although he is an Academic and from the Mizrachi world, he is on very good terms with various Charedei scholars. In his first few volumes, he thanks R’ Yehoshua Mondshine and Rabbi Dovid Tzvi Hillman for their useful comments. In other volumes he thanks R’ Yaakov Stahl. In his two most recent volumes he thanks Rabbi Shaul Alter, Rosh Yeshiva of Ger who has started reading and commenting about his material.

Some of his articles were collected into a volume called Pischei Tefilah u-Mo’ad, which was reviewed a few years back here on the Seforim Blog. This volume is currently out of print.

One of Professor Spiegel’s main areas of interest has been the History of the Jewish Book. He has written numerous articles on the subject and published four books on this topic in a series called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri. 

Volume one was first printed in 1996 and is called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri: Haghot u-Maghim. It was reprinted with many important additions in 2005 (copies are still available). It was reviewed by Dan Rabinowitz and myself, a few years back here on the Seforim Blog.

The second volume is called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri; Kesivah Vehatakah. This volume is currently out of print and will hopeful be the subject of a book review by Dan Rabinowitz and myself in the near future.

The third volume is called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri;Bisharei Hadefus and is out of print. (See here).

The fourth volume is called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri:Hadar Hamechaber (copies are still available).

I think that anyone who has an interest in the Jewish Book will enjoy this work immensely.

In the near future I hope to review this work in depth.

I am selling copies of this work; part of the proceeds helps the efforts of the Seforim Blog.

For more information about purchasing this work, feel free to contact me at Eliezerbrodt@gmail.com

To get a sense of what exactly this new book is about, here are the beginning of the Table of Contents (or view the entire Table of Contents as a PDF):

Shlomo Yosef Zevin and Yeshiva Students being Drafted to the Army, Views of Women, and More

Marc B. Shapiro

1. In an earlier post I wrote about R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin and the famous essay about how yeshiva students need to serve in the army, an essay which is widely attributed to him. See here. In the post I cited important information uncovered by David Eisen that complicates the issue (as we see the Zevin family itself is of two minds on the matter), and we were left with no absolute proof that R. Zevin wrote the essay. I encourage all readers interested in the topic to read the six emails from Eisen quoted in my post, as they became the primary source material for all who wish to explore this matter.

One of the points that Eisen’s sources disagree about is when the essay was attributed to R. Zevin. R. Nachum Zevin, R. Zevin’s grandson, claims that it was only attributed to him after R. Zevin’s passing in 1978, but R. Menachem Hacohen states that already in the early 1970s he had seen the essay and it was believed that R. Zevin wrote it. As Eisen reports, one of the chief librarians at the National Library told him that he believes that already in the 1960s the essay was attributed to R. Zevin.

I am now able to put the matter to rest and establish beyond any doubt that R. Zevin is indeed the author of the essay. One of R. Zevin’s close friends was the author R. Zvi Harkavy, who served as an army chaplain. Harkavy regarded R. Zevin as his teacher, referring to him as מו”ר. In 1959 it was announced that Harkavy would publish a bibliography of all of R. Zevin’s writings, which were estimated to be over 1000 items, including material written under a pseudonym.[1] As far as I can tell, this never appeared. In Harkavy’s Ma’amrei Tzvi, p. 26, he includes a 1969 letter he received from R. Zevin is which Harkavy is addressed as ידידי הדגול. I mention all this only to show that when Harkavy speaks about R. Zevin you rely on what he says.

It has often been said that the identification of R. Zevin with the essay on yeshiva students and the army was only made years after its 1948 appearance, and this casts doubt on it having been being written by R. Zevin. I can now say that this is incorrect. In 1951 (Iyar 5711) Harkavy published an article in the Jerusalem Torah periodical Ha-Hed, which was a journal that R. Zevin himself often published in. (Unfortunately, very few issues from this periodical can be found on Otzar haChochma.) In Harkavy’s article he identifies R. Zevin as the author of the essay. Not only was Harkavy, because of his close friendship with R. Zevin, in a position to know that he wrote it, but R. Zevin never denied authorship in subsequent issues of Ha-Hed.

This shows without any doubt that R. Zevin is the author of the essay, and from this point on no one—including members of the family—should deny his authorship. Here is Harkavy’s article.

R. Nochum Shmaryohu Zajac called my attention to the recently published memorial volume for R. Yehoshua Mondshine,Sefer, Sofer, ve-Sipur. On p. 327 R. Mondshine wonders why R. Zevin—whom he seems to believe was indeed the author of the essay—would have felt it necessary to keep his authorship secret. R. David Zvi Hillman suggests that R. Zevin felt that if it was known that he wrote it, he would not have been welcome at the Brisker Rav’s home. He adds that it could have also created problems with the Habad synagogue he attended, as well as with his good friend R. Yehezkel Abramsky.

In going through the various issues of Ha-Hed, I discovered a picture of great interest in the Shevat 5711 issue.

Kitvei Ha-Rav Dr. Yosef Seliger (Jerusalem, 1930). The woman in the middle is R. Kook’s wife, Raize Rivka. Until recently I knew of only one other published picture of her, and this appears at the beginning of Pinchas Grayevski, Benot Tziyon vi-Yerushalayim, vol. 7 (Jerusalem, 1929; I think Dr. Yehudah Mirsky called my attention to this picture). The woman on the left is Miriam Berlin, the widow of R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin. I do not know of any other published pictures of her.

Shimon Steinmetz called my attention to this additional picture of R. Kook’s wife that can be found here.

2. In my post here I discussed these words from Exodus 15:16:

בִּגְדֹל זְרוֹעֲךָ יִדְּמוּ כָּאָבֶן

However, I neglected to mention one additional point. How come there is a dagesh in the כ when according to the grammatical rules it should not be there? R. Aaron of Lunel in his Orhot Hayyim offers an explanation. He states that if there was a dagesh people would read the last two words as יִדְּמוּךׇ אָבֶן, “stones are similar to you,” which is not a respectful thing to say to God.[2]

3. In my last post here I discussed the Hazon Ish’s opinion on the dispute between Maimonides and Rabad about an unwitting heretic, and the Hazon Ish’s assumption that Maimonides actually agreed with Rabad in this matter. It must be clarified that the Hazon Ish is not certain about his suggestion that there was no disagreement between Maimonides and Rabad when it came to someone who was completely “innocent” in his heresy. The Hazon Ish4. A couple of years ago in my post here I mentioned that in part two of the post I would have an excursus on the nature of women. For some reason I forgot to include this excursus in all the subsequent posts, so here it is.[4]

On the matter of the creation of women, and whether they are created “better” or “worse” than men, Shaul Regev calls attention to a strange comment by R. Jacob Matalon, Toldot Yaakov (Salonika, 1597), p. 7d (printed together with his She’erit Yaakov).[5] There are many comments in rabbinic texts that have a negative view of women, and most of these comments are based on a belief that women are inherently inferior to men. Yet not many texts are as explicit as R. Matalon in regarding women as almost a different species, standing between apes and men.

ובין החי למדבר הקוף ובין הקוף םמדבר [צ”ל למדבר] ומשכיל הם הנשים והאנדרוגינוס

Women obviously speak, so מדבר must mean speak with intelligence.

A passage similar to what R. Matalon says, but without mention of an ape, is found in Gersonides’ comment to Genesis ch. 3 (p. 110 in the Ma’aliyot edition).

והנה קראה האדם שם אשתו ‘חוה’, כאשר השיג בחולשת שכלה, רוצה לומר שלא עלתה מדרגתה על שאר הבעלי חיים עילוי רב, ואם היא בעלת שכל, כי רוב השתמשותה אמנם הוכן לה בדברים הגופיים, לחולשת שכלה ולהיותה לעבודת האדם. ולזה הוא רחוק שיגיע לה שלמות השכל, אלא שעל כל פנים היא יותר נכבדת מהם, וכולם הם לעבודתה

Gersonides is known for his negative view of women, and this reputation comes from passages like this. Here Gersonides states that women are on a higher level than animals, but not by much. Furthermore, just like the animals are at the service of women, so women’s role is to serve men. In discussing this passage, Menachem Kellner writes: “Gersonides apparently found Darwin’s missing link: woman!”[6]

For another explanation which Modern Orthodox women will probably regard as insulting, but more traditional women will probably see as a compliment, see R. Meir Mazuz, Bayit Ne’eman, no. 52 (parashat Terumah 5777), p. 1, who quotes R. Nissim Gaon as follows: The verse in Proverbs 1:8 states: אל תטוש תורת אמך – “Forsake not the teaching of thy mother”. Yet since women don’t have Torah knowledge, תורת אמך cannot mean this. Rather, it means the special holiday foods that the mother makes.

Readers can correct me if I’m wrong, but I do not believe that R. Mazuz’s understanding is correct, and I think R. Mazuz was citing R. Nissim from memory. That is, R. Nissim’s comment has nothing to do with women lacking Torah knowledge and identifying their cooking as תורת אמך. Rather, he cites the verse simply as a general statement about the importance of tradition. Here is the passage of R. Nissim Gaon as cited by R. Maimon the father of Maimonides.[7]

וכתב רבינו נסים במגילת סתרים כי כל מנהגי האומה באלו המנהגות כמו זה. והראש בראש השנה, החלב בפורים ובמוצאי פסח, והפולים ביום הושענא רבה. ואותם המנהגות אין לנו לבזותם ומי שהנהיגם זריז ומשתדל הוא כי הם מעיקרים נעשים ולא יבוזו במנהגי האומה וכבר אמר הנביא ע”ה ואל תטוש תורת אמך, דת אומתך אל תעזוב

Regarding the role and responsibilities of women, R. Mazuz has another interesting comment.[8] As part of his argument that women are not obligated in hearing parashat Zakhor, he says that this commandment is connected to the commandment of destroying Amalek, and women are not able to do this. How do we know that women cannot destroy Amalek and therefore are not commanded in it? “Because if she sees blood and even if she sees a mouse she becomes afraid, so how could she kill Amalek?” While many will not appreciate what they see as R. Mazuz’s flippant tone (which is obviously a joke, as he is well aware that there are women soldiers and doctors), do even feminists wish to claim that killing comes as easy to women as to men? Do they really want to be “equal” with men in this matter? I, for one, have always assumed that if women were running the world, there would be many fewer wars, as only someone who is blind to reality cannot see that men are naturally more inclined to violence than women.

Here is another interesting point relevant to the subject of women: Rashi, Menahot 43b s.v. היינו, in explaining the talmudic passage dealing with the blessings that a man recites in the morning, states that a woman is to regarded as a maidservant to her husband (i.e., to do his wishes), much like a slave is to his master: דאשה נמי שפחה לבעלה כעבד לרבו

Rashi’s comment is not surprising and has often been quoted. Indeed, although it will trouble modern readers, lots of similar comments can be found in rishonim and aharonim.[9] Furthermore, in at least three places the Talmud refers to a wife with the term shifhah.[10] Yet for a reason I can’t explain, R. Moshe Feinstein was very troubled by this comment of Rashi, and this led him to write something quite problematic.[11] See Dibrot Moshe, Gittin p. 511 (also in Iggerot Moshe, vol. 9, Orah Hayyim no. 2):

ולולי דמסתפינא הייתי אומר שצריך למחקו דח”ו לרש”י לומר דברי הבל כזה, דמן התורה הא ליכא שום שעבוד על האשה לבעלה חוץ מתשמיש ולענין תשמיש הוא משועבד לה יותר דהא עליו איכא גם איסור לאו . . . ואינה מחוייבת לעשות רק עניני הבית ולא עבודת שדה ומעט עשיה בצמר שהיא מלאכה קלה ממלאכות שדרכן של בנות העיר בזה

R. Moshe states that in no way can a woman be generally regarded as under her husband’s authority as only in a few areas does she have obligations to him (much like he has to her). He continues to expound on the way a husband is obligated to treat his wife in order to show that she is far removed from being a maidservant.[12] This is all true, and it would be easy to quote authorities who write similarly. Yet they did not see this as in any way contradicting Rashi’s statement. Understandably, some have expressed great surprise upon seeing how R. Moshe refers Rashi’s comment as הבל (as they do not accept R. Moshe’s point that Rashi could never have said דאשה נמי שפחה לבעלה כעבד לרבו).

R. Shlomo Aharon Gans goes so far as to say that if thegadol ha-dorhad not been the one to say this, it would be forbidden to write such a thing. He adds the following, bringing support for the notion expressed in Rashi that a wife is like a maidservant (not that she is a maidservant, but she is like one)[13]:

ולא הבנתי דהא הויא קנין כספו, ועי’ תורא”ש קידושין ה’ דהוא מושל עליה ומשעובדת לו וכדכתיב והוא ימשל בך, וא”כ מאי קשיא ליה כ”כ בדברי רש”י אלו

This conception, that a wife is like a maidservant, was actually criticized by R. Hayyim Hirschensohn who called attention to the “barbaric” way Jews treated their wives in the small towns of Galicia, where the wives did not even eat at the same table with their husbands.[14]

וה’ יסלח לו כי ההרגל הרע של בני מדינתו להתגאה על נשותיהן אשר לוקחים אותן רק לרקחות וטבחות ואין מסיבות בשלחן עם בעליהן וחושבים אותם כחמת כו’ [מ”ש: ראה שבת קנב ע”א] ואלמלי עלמא צריכי להו היו בעי רחמי דלבטלי מן העולם ח”ו, ההרגל הפראי הזה אשר בעירות הקטנות בגאליציא ובקצת ערי פולין גרם להרב הנז’ לבלי להרגיש את העלבון אשר עלב לבנות האבות והאמהות אשר קמו גם הן לאם לבנות את בית ישראל

As a curiosity, it is worth noting the opinion of R. Menasheh Klein that a husband should not help his wife with household tasks such as cleaning the dishes, as that is “women’s work”, while the husband works outside the home. (And what about when the wife also works outside the home?) Instead, the husband should use that time for learning Torah and other spiritual pursuits.[15]

כי לכן נתן לו הקב”ה אשה לאדם שיהי’ לו לעזר שתעשה לו צרכי הבית והוא יהיה פנוי בזמן שיש לו ללמוד תורה ולעבודת השם ולא לכבס ולהדיח הכלים אחרי האכילה ולסדר את המטות החיוב על הבעל לפרנס את אשתו ובניו ושאר הזמן כל רגע ורגע ינצל ללימוד התורה ולעבודת השי”ת שמו. ובעונ”ה נשתנה הוסת שהבעלי בתים הצעירים נעשים בעלת בתים מבשלים ומדיחים הכלים והולכים לחניות לקנות צרכי הבית איינקויפען בלע”ז בקיצור עושים כל מלאכת הנשים והנשים עושים מלאכת האנשים

I can only imagine what the reaction of a newlywed wife would be if her husband would tell her that no, he has no plans to help clean the table and do the dishes because that is women’s work.

Related to this is the following story told by R. Yosef Wineberg, the grandson of the Slonimer Rebbe. It is obviously designed to make the “Litvish” look bad.[16]

A newly married Litvishe couple was once sitting together. The wife asked her husband to please make her a cup of tea. He immediately jumps up, puts on his hat and jacket and walks out the door. About an hour later, the husband returns home, removes his hat and jacket and makes her a cup of tea. Puzzled by his strange behavior, she asks for an explanation.

He explains: when you first asked me to make you a cup of tea, I was upset. I am a Talmid Chacham, a scholar, and you are meant to “serve” me, not the opposite. Not wishing to get into an argument, I went to my Rav to ask him what I should do.

The Rav explained to me that “ishto k’gufo”, that the Halacha considers us like one person. Therefore, making tea for you is identical to making tea for me. As I feel no compunctions with serving myself, I returned home to fulfill your request.

In order to show that the husband is the boss of the household, R. David Kimhi states that while the husband calls his wife by her name, the wife does not call her husband by his name, but by some title which shows his superior status.[17]

כי האיש הוא הקורא לאשתו בשמה ולא האשה לאישה, אלא דרך כבוד בלשון אדנות קוראה לו ולא בשמו, כי כל מי שיש לו מעלה אל אחר אין ראוי לאשר למטה ממנו לקרוא אותו בשמו, כמו אביו או רבו או אדניו . . . וכן האשה לבעלה כי אדניה הוא כמו שאמר: והוא ימשוך בך

One of the proofs he offers for this idea is that in Genesis 17:17 Abraham refers to Sarah by her name, but in Genesis 18:13 Sarah refers to Abraham as “my lord” (אדני). Another proof he mentions is that when God changes the names of Abraham and Sarah he says to Abraham (Gen. 17:15): “Thou shalt not call her name Sarai.” From this we see that Abraham called his wife by her name. However, when Abraham’s name was changed the Torah states (Gen. 17:5): “Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram.” Sarah was not told this, Radak states, as she didn’t refer to her husband by his name. This was rather a general statement, that among those people who call Abraham by his name, they no longer would do so.

Although Radak states that a husband calls his wife by her name, we know that this was not always the case. Thus, we are told that R. Jacob Moellin in speaking to his wife would not call her by her name. When he referred to her in conversation with others, he would call her mein hausfrau (my housewife).[18] The text that records this information notes that already in the Talmud, Shabbat 118b, we find that R. Yose referred to his wife as “my house,” and I think most assume that this was done as a term of respect.[19] The text further notes that the general practice was that both husband and wife did not refer to each other by their first name. Such a practice was also found in the Sephardic world.[20] What this shows us is that contrary to what Radak records, the practice need not have anything to do with the husband being regarded as “superior” to his wife.

With all the discussions in rabbinic literature that show the essential differences between men and woman, let me mention another curiosity that, if you want to be cute, you can say that in one place the Talmud actually refers to women as men. I have in mind Zevahim 67b which, in discussing the burnt offerings brought by two women after childbirth, states:

חטאת לזו ועולה לזו עשה שתיהן למעלה . . . אימור דא”ר יהושע בחד גברא בתרי גברי מי אמר

In this passage, the word גברי, which means “men”, refers to the case of the two women (although the principle enunciated applies to all people).[21]

While on the male-female topic, let me mention something else that is relevant. We all know that the name Avi (short for Avraham) is quite popular. Yet how many know that this is already a biblical name, but used for a woman (2 Kings 18:2)?

I want to return to the notion already mentioned in this note, and found in a number of earlier works, that an ape stands between animals and humans. The Sefat Emet, Genesis 18:1, expands on this as follows:

ובין חי למדבר קוף. ואנו נאמר כי אחר מדבר אדם, שעל זה נאמר “אדם” אתם קרוין אדם ולא האומות. וישמעאל הוא הממוצע לכן נקרא פרא אדם, ולכן יד כל בו וידו בכל, כי על ידו יש התקשרות בין מדריגות מדבר למדריגת אדם

When he writes כי אחר מדבר אדם it means that after the level of מדבר, which means “humanity”, there is the level of אדם, which is the level of the Jewish people. He then adds that the Arabs stand between מדבר and אדם which is why they are called פרא אדם. Often פרא אדם is used to show that the Arabs are on a lower level than other nations. However, here we see that the Arabs are on a higher level, and closer to the Jews than the other nations, as among the nations of the world only the Arabs are also called אדם—no doubt because of their monotheism, see Yevamot 61a—even if this word is placed together with the negative term פרא.

The Sefat Emet’s comment is derived from the Zohar,[22] which explains פרא אדם as meaning one who possesses the “beginnings of אדם”. The Zohar also places the descendants of Ishmael on a higher level than the other nations because they are circumcised. Circumcision was widely practiced even in pagan Arabia, so the reference to circumcision alone would not be enough to date this passage of the Zohar to the post-Islamic period.

R. Jacob Emden, however, cites a different passage in the Zohar that assumes the existence of the Islamic world, meaning that it could not have been written by R. Shimon ben Yohai.[23] He writes:

הנה לפניך שבימי בעל ספר הזוהר כבר היתה אמונת מחמד הישמעאלי בעולם (שנתחדשה בימי אמוראים האחרונים על”ב) כי קודם זמן זה היו כל הישמעאלים עובדי אלילים גמורים, ככל יתר גוי הארצות.

R. Emden also cites another Zoharic passage that assumes Islamic rule in the Land of Israel. He comments:[24]

הרי כי בימי בעל ספר הזוהר היתה אומת ישמעאל שולטת בארץ הקדושה, ודבר ידוע הוא ומפורסם, שלא הגיעו הישמעאלים לממשלה כללית עד שנת שע”ד לאלף החמישי . . . נמצא עכ”פ יותר מחמש מאות שנה אחר רשב”י חובר ספר הזוהר, ואולי מאוחר עוד הרבה מזה, ואיך אפשר להסכים זה עם שמות האומרים אותם הדברים, והמה חבריו או תלמידיו של רשב”י, לפי המובן בלשונו של בעל ספר הזוהר, הלא זה כדבר שאין לו שחר

He cites a third such example and writes:[25]

מלכות ישמעאל לא נתפרסמה ולא נתפשטה בימי תנאים ואמוראים. כי היו אז ממלכה שפלה קטנה וירודה

Returning to the matter of how women have been viewed, R. Joseph Solomon Delmedigo mentions that jokers—ליצני הדור—come up with all sorts of gematrias. When it comes to women not all of them are negative. For example, the gematria of אשה is דבש, and אשה יפה = שמחה גדולה. However he also cites a gematria which is not very complimentary to women. זכר=ברכה and נקיבה=בקללה. R. Delmedigo sees this as a big joke, but it is actually mentioned by R. Hayyim the brother of the Maharal in his Iggeret ha-Tiyul, section ז, and it is also found in Ba’al ha-Turim, Gen. 1:27 (with some differences as to which letters are actually included in the gematria).

In 1807 R. Jacob Samson Shabbetai Senigallia[26] published his talmudic commentary Shabbat shel Mi. Here is the title page of the Livorno first edition. (It has been reprinted a number of times).

Here is what appears in the book on p. 89b. He is trying to explain why chapters 5 and 6 in tractate Shabbat are next to each other. Chapter 5 begins במה בהמה and chapter 6 begins במה אשה, and according to R. Senigallia this is because “birds of a feather flock together.”

If he was trying to make a joke, I can understand what he wrote. But who ever heard of making a joke in the middle of a talmudic commentary? Presumably, he was being serious, which leaves us with a very offensive comment.

There is, to be sure, humor in the Talmud, but I don’t know of any examples in talmudic commentaries. Yeshayahu Leibowitz quipped that the Sages must have had a good sense of humor, since they included the following text in the Talmud [27]: תלמידי חכמים מרבים שלום בעולם. In all seriousness, however, there are indeed humorous passages in the Talmud, as pointed out by R. Moses Salmon.[28] Here is one example he gives (Bava Batra 14a):

The Rabbis said to R. Hamnuna: R. Ammi wrote four hundred scrolls of the Law. He said to them: Perhaps he copied out the verse תורה צוה לנו משה

R. Salmon claims that anyone with a bit of sense can see that R. Hamnuna’s reply is a wisecrack made in response to the obvious exaggeration about R. Ammi.

Nehemiah Samuel Libowitz states that even in the Zohar we have passages that show a humorous side.[29] One of the many examples he points to is Zohar, Bereshit, p. 27a:

וימררו את חייהם בעבודה קשה בקושיא. בחומר קל וחומר. ובלבנים בלבון הלכתא. ובכל עבודה בשדה דא ברייתא. את כל עבודתם וגו’ דא משנה

I have no idea what to make of the following comment from R. Oury Cherki, dealing with humor, which does not sound like something that would be said by a leading kiruv figure (De’ah Tzelula: Olam ve-Adam be-Mishnat ha-Rav Kook [Jerusalem, 2015], p. 246). Rather, it sounds like something one of the maskilim of old would say.

התורה שבעל-פה אינה מובנה ללא שותפות רוח האומה. לכן כשלומדים הלכה רצוי להצטייד בחוש הומור, שכן לפעמים הדברים נראים משונים למדי. למשל, הכנת כוס תה בשבת. התלמוד אומר שאסור לשפוך מים קרים לתוך החמים אבל מים חמים לתוך הקרים מותר, כי יש כלל ש”תתאה גבר”, התחתון גובר. כששופכים מים חמים לתוך הקרים המים הקרים מתחממים ומתבשלים מה שאין כן ההפך – המים החמים מתקררים. יש כאן בהחלט סוג של הומור

I also found the following interesting comment by Moshe Meisels, the editor of Ha-Doar, in a letter to Chaim Bloch.[30] He suggests that the talmudic prohibition against a non-Jew observing the Sabbath is an example of rabbinic wit, and is not to be understood literally.

ואגב, לא אהא בבחינת מורה הלכה לפני רבו אם אינני מתאפק מלהביא מעין חידוש שנתחדש לי הקטן באחד המאמרים התמוהים בתלמוד מן הסוג הנ”ל, והוא אמרם: עכו”ם ששבת חייב מיתה, שנאמר יום ולילה לא ישבותו וכו’. ואין צורך להרבות דברים על הזרות שבדבר: מה איכפת למי אם שבת או לא שבת, ומה היא הראיה מאותו פסוק, המוסב על קיץ וחורף וכו’, ומה ענינו לכאן ולעכו”ם דוקא? ונראה לי שכל המאמר בא בדרך חידוד, וזה מובנו: עכו”ם ששבת מן הדין שיהא חייב מיתה בדיניהם. מדוע? ישראל שלא שבת חייב מיתה, משום שעל א-לוהיו נאמר וישבות ביום השביעי וכו’, אבל עובד כוכבים ומזלות, שעליהם נאמר יום ולילה לא ישבותו, מן הדין שעובדיהם יהיו חייבים מיתה אם שינו מדרך אלהיהם ושבתו

On the matter of non-Jews observing the Sabbath, R. Yaakov Koppel Schwartz makes a fascinating suggestion, which he acknowledges has no support in the rishonim and therefore he has doubts whether it is correct.[31] The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is in remembrance of the fact that we were slaves and God redeemed us. Therefore, it is understandable why non-Jews are forbidden to commemorate the Sabbath by abstaining from work, as this has no connection to them. However, there is another reason given for the Sabbath and that is so that we remember the creation of the world. Non-Jews are also supposed to acknowledge this and therefore there should be nothing wrong with non-Jews having some sort of celebration in honor of the Sabbath.

אבל הכיבוד והקידוש של יום השבת, שהוא משום אמונת חידוש העולם, שייך שגם הגויים יהיו בהם ואינם מנועים מלכבד ולענג את השבת

If we follow R. Schwartz’s approach, this is something that could be suggested for Noahides whose “religion” is lacking any rituals, which for most people is an essential component of their religion.

* * * * * * * *

[1] Ha-Tzofeh, June 16, 1959, p. 2.

[2] Orhot Hayyim, Or Etzion ed. (Merkaz Shapira, 2017), p. 106, quoted by R. Joseph Karo, Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 51 (end). Regarding negative expressions directed against God, there is an interesting passage in R. Yedidiah Solomon Raphael Norzi, Minhat Shai, Deut. 8:3. To understand it one must know that the old French word “fi” expressed disdain or disgust. See here. The issue Norzi discusses is that the verse reads:

‘כִּי עַל-כָּל-מוֹצָא פִי-ה

Norzi cites a view that in this case there should be a dagesh in the word פי even though that is not in accord with the general rule, because without the dagesh, reading it as “fi” would be disrespectful to God:

כי לשון גנאי הוא בלשון צרפת וחלילה לשם יתברך

Norzi completely rejects this and states that the rules of biblical grammar are not to be changed because of how words sound in languages other than Hebrew (and there are indeed examples where biblical Hebrew words sound like profanity in other languages).

ואין לנו לחוש ללשון צרפת שאין מבטלין דרכי לשון הקדש מפני שאר לשונות

See also Samuel David Luzzatto, Prolegomena to a Grammar of the Hebrew Language, trans. Aaron D. Rubin (Piscataway, N.J., 2005), pp. 133-134.

Regarding the pronunciation of פ, R. Meir Mazuz points out that the Vilna Gaon, Commentary to Tikunei Zohar, section 19, p. 38d (p. 166 in R. Zuriel’s edition), mistakenly believed that Sephardim pronounce פ with and without a dagesh the same way (just as they pronounce ת with and without a dagesh the same way). R. Mazuz notes that the Vilna Gaon’s point is repeated by R. Baruch Epstein, Mekor Barukh, vol. 1, p. 397b (without mentioning the Gaon). See Mazuz, Bayit Ne’eman (Humash), vol. 1, p. 13 (first pagination).

[3] Hazon Ish, Yoreh Deah 62:21.

[4] In my earlier post I cited R. Samson Raphael Hirsch as adopting the notion that women are created on a higher spiritual level than men. I neglected to note that Shaye J. D. Cohen earlier discussed Hirsch’s approach. See Cohen, Why Aren’t Jewish Women Circumcised (Berkeley, 2005), pp. 165ff.

[5] “Eshet Hayil: Kavim li-Demutah u-le-Ma’amadah shel ha-Ishah be-Hagut ha-Yehudit ha-Shesh Esreh,” in Ephraim Hazan and Shmuel Refael, eds. Mahbarot li-Yehudit (Ramat-Gan, 2012), p. 286.

[6] Torah in The Observatory (Boston, 2010), p. 287. I earlier discussed Ralbag here.

[7] See R. Yaakov Moshe Toledano, Sarid u-Falit (Tel Aviv, [1945]), p. 8.

[8] Bayit Ne’eman no. 153 (parashat Vayikra 5779), p. 2.

[9] See e.g., R. Israel Ibn Al Nakawa, Menorat ha-Maor, ed. Enelow, vol. 4, pp. 32-33, who instructs a wife as follows (using the word שפחה that so troubled R. Moshe):

ועושה צרכיו בעצמה ולא על ידי אחרים. ואפי’ היו לה כמה עבדים וכמה שפחות, תעמוד היא ותשרתנו, ותקראנו אדוני . . .ויהיו עיניה תלויין לו, כעיני שפחה אל יד גבירתה

For a translation of this passage, see here. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ishut 15:20, says that a wife should regard her husband כמו שר או מלך.

Radak, Gen. 3:16, writes:

והוא ימשול בך: לצוות עליך מה שירצה כאדון על עבד

Ramban, Gen. 3:16, explains that as a result of Eve’s sin, the relationship of man and woman was changed. From that point on:

 והוא יחזיק בה כשפחה ואין המנהג להיות העבד משתוקק לקנות אדון לעצמו אבל יברח ממנו ברצונו

R. Bahya ben Asher, Gen. 3:16, writes:

ואל אישך תשוקתך: שאע”פ שהאשה משועבדת ברשות הבעל ומנהג העבד לברוח מן האדון כדי שלא ישתעבד, גזר בזאת שתהיה משתוקקת לבעל ושתרצה להשתעבד לו בהפך מן המנהג

See also R. Chaim Rapoport’s letter in my Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan, p. 172.

R. Avraham Blumenkrantz, Gefen Poriah, p. 352, quotes approvingly another rabbi who states as follows (emphasis added):

Her tears are ever ready to flow at the most miniscule suggestion of being dealt with as a maidservant. She will concede you the service of והוא ימשל בך. She will consent to call you בעלי, but don’t accent the דגש in the בית too heavily. She must constantly be reassured that there is honor and dignity in her subservience. Honor her more than you honor yourself. She must be compensated for her subjugation, and be made to feel that she has a genuine share in the dignity of the throne.

Do haredi women really feel that they are subservient or subjugated? Do haredi men feel this way about their wives? Hasn’t haredi society accepted the notion of separate but equal when it comes to men and women?

[10] Sanhedrin 39a, Yevamot 113a, Nedarim 38b.

[11] As is well known, and I have written about previously, R. Moshe often rejected the authenticity of texts that he found problematic. Another example of this with regard to Rashi on the Talmud is found in Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer, vol. 4, no. 64:1. Here R. Moshe says to delete words in Rashi even though, as he notes, these words are found in “Rashi” on the Rif and in R. Nissim. See the strong responses to R. Moshe quoted in R. Yonason Rosman, Petihat ha-Iggerot, pp. 605-606. One of these responses is from R. Menasheh Klein in his notes to R. Eyal Shraga, Minhat Ish, vol. 1, pp. 302-303. R. Klein writes:

וח”ו ואטו עד כמה נילך ונמחוק בדברי רבותינו ז”ל שנאמרו ברוה”ק, ולולי דמספינא הייתי אומר דאיזה תלמיד טועה כתבו, אבל פשוט דדברי רש”י נכונים וליכא כאן טעות כלל

When R. Klein suggests—לולי דמספינא—that a “mistaken student” is responsible for the problematic passage in Iggerot Moshe, he does not mean it seriously. This is just his respectful way of saying that R. Moshe’s position is completely without basis. He uses the same language in Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 12, Yoreh Deah no. 214. There he responds to R. Moshe’s statement that he doesn’t know who R. Menahem Tziyoni is, but since he quotes a heretical—in R. Moshe’s opinion—passage from R. Judah he-Hasid’s commentary on the Torah, therefore R. Tziyoni’s work must be banned together with R. Judah he-Hasid’s commentary.

[12] R. Moshe also famously states that women do not have any less holiness than men. See Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim vol. 4, no. 49 (p. 81). See also the new Mesorat Moshe, vol. 4, p. 476. This position is at odds with many earlier writers who saw men as holier because they are commanded in more mitzvot. This is also Maimonides’ position in his commentary to Horayot 3:7. See R. Chaim Rapoport’s discussion in Kovetz Hearot u-Veurim, no. 908 (2006), pp. 138ff. Yet see R. Dov Halbertal, Erekh ha-Hayyim be-Halakhah (Jerusalem, 2004), vol. 2, p. 399, who has a different approach and makes the point that just because a Kohen and Levi are to be saved before an Israel, no one would say that the Kohen and Levi have more holiness. See also R. Yitzhak Barda, Yitzhak Yeranen, vol. 11, p. 249, that women are holier than men. He offers an original explanation of this notion.

שהאשה שהקב”ה הפריש ממנו, מהצלע שלו, הוא מופרש, וממילא כל מופרש קדוש, ואז האשה יותר קדושה מהאיש. ובזה מובן למה האיש מקדש את האשה, לא אומר לה הרי את אשתי, או כל סממן לשון של נישואין, חברה או שותפה וכו’, זולתי: הרי את מקודשת לי! לפי שהקב”ה קבע כל מופרש קדוש

[13] Kinyan Shlomo, Yevamot, p. 89. See also R. Natan Einfeld, Minhat Natan: Kiddushin, pp. 139-140, who cites other sources in rejecting R. Moshe’s point.

[14] Malki ba-Kodesh, vol. 4, p. 50a. See R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 12, no. 351, for a defense of the practice of husbands and wives eating separately.

[15] Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 7 no. 155 (called to my attention by R. Aviad Stollman).

[16] The story is recorded by R. Chaim Dalfin, Faces and Places Boro Park (Brooklyn, 2017), p. 149.

[17] Commentary to Gen. 17:15. See the rejection of Radak’s opinion in R. Betzalel Stern, Be-Tzel ha-Hokhmah, vol. 1, no. 70.

[18] Maharil, Likutim (p. 610 in the Makhon Yerushalayim edition).

[19] On the other hand, R. Meir Schiff (Maharam Schiff), Gittin 52a, explains that R. Yose referred to his wife this way because she was a bad wife: אשה רעה. Yet the proof he brings for this is actually from a different R. Yose. See R. Judah Leib Maimon, ed., Sefer ha-Gra, vol. 1, p. 110 in the note. Regarding “bad wives”, R. Elazar of Worms is quoted as follows in R. Alexander Suslin, Sefer ha-Agudah, ed. Brizel, Yevamot, no. 78 (p. 41):

מי שיש לו אשה רעה יסבול יקבל ברצון ויקבל בשמחה ולא יראה פני גהינם

What does R. Elazar mean that if you suffer under a bad wife you will not see gehinnom? R. Moses Guedemann explains that with a bad wife you already saw gehinnom in your lifetime, so there is no need to see if after death. See Ha-Torah ve-ha-Hayyim, trans. Friedberg (Warsaw, 1897), vol. 1, p. 194:

כי פני הגיהנם כבר ראה בחייו

Regarding “good wives” see R. Shlomo Hoss, Kerem Shlomo, no. 43, who writes:

אין לך כשרה בנשים אלא אשה שעושה רצון בעלה: אהע”ז ס”ס ס”ט (אך אשת חיל כזאת מי ימצא)

R. Solomon Zvi Schueck was shocked at R. Hoss’ final comment, that one cannot find a wife who does the wishes of her husband. R. Schueck writes that based on this passage he assumed that R. Hoss must not have had a good wife.

נראה לי שהי’ לו אשה רעה, וממנה דן על כל הנשים שבישראל

See She’elot u-Teshuvot Rashban, Even ha-Ezer, no. 99 (p. 88b). He further tells us that he asked one of R. Hoss’ students who confirmed that this was indeed the case.

[20] See Tuvia Preschel, Ma’amrei Tuvyah, vol. 5, p. 142.

[21] See Or Torah, Shevat 5780, p. 460.

[22] Exodus 86a, 87a.

[23] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (at the beginning; p. 20 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition). In R. Reuven Rapoport’s edition of Mitpahat Sefarim, with his commentary Itur Soferim, p. 13, R. Rapoport sees it as obvious that this passage in the Zohar is a later interpolation much like there are Savoraic additions in the Talmud.

[24] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (p. 27 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition).

[25] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (p. 54 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition). Regarding the larger issue that R. Emden points to, see Ronald C. Kiener, “The Image of Islam in the Zohar,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 8 (1989), pp. 43-65.

[26] See the recent discussion of R. Senigallia by R. Moshe Maimon in the Seforim Blog here.

[27] Sihot al Pirkei Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot (Jerusalem, 2003), p. 289.

[28] Netiv Moshe (Vienna, 1897), pp. 45-46.

[29] “Halatzot ve-Divrei Bikoret be-Sefer ha-Zohar,” Ha-Tzofeh le-Hokhmat Yisrael 11 (1927), pp. 33-45. For more on humor in the Talmud, see Yehoshua Ovsay, Ma’amarim u-Reshimot (New York, 1946), ch. 1; Meyer Heller, “Humor in the Talmud” (unpublished masters dissertation, Hebrew Union College, 1950), available here; R. Mordechai Hacohen, “Humor, Satirah, u-Vedihah be-Fi Hazal,” Mahanayim 67 (5722), pp. 8-19; and Ezra Brand’s post here. From Brand I learned that David Lifshitz wrote an entire doctorate on the subject. See also my posts here and here where I discuss Siftei Hakhamim’s comment that Moses thought God was joking with him, and how this has been censored in a recent edition. See also J. Chotzner, Hebrew Humor and Other Essays (London, 1905); Nehemiah Samuel Libowitz, Ha-Shomea Yitzhak (New York, 1907).

[30] See here (Chaim Bloch Collection, Leo Baeck Institute, 7155-7156, 1/13).

[31] Likutei Diburim, vol. 4, pp. 24-25.