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There is No Bracha on an Eclipse

There is No Bracha on an Eclipse
By Rabbi Michael J. Broyde

Rabbi Michael Broyde is a law professor at Emory University School of Law and the Projects Director in its Center for the Study of Law and Religion.  His most recent Torah sefer is entitled “A Concise Code of Jewish Law For Converts”.  This letter was written to someone after a shiur in 2017 on why there is no bracha on seeing a solar eclipse.

1.     You are correct that I said that I thought there was no bracha on an eclipse.  I had not seen Rabbi Linzer’s teshuva at the time that told that to you this, as it was not circulating on the internet at the time that I prepared for my shiur and I did not see it until Sunday, the day after the shiur.  I try to cite as much as relevant in these classes and his thoughts are clearly relevant.  He is a stellar writer on interesting topics of halacha and I read his material consistently.  I had seen that Rabbi Eliezer Melamed in Peninei Halacha Laws of Brachot 15:6 and note 5 which does permit a bracha on an eclipse.
2. Having said that, I would not change my mind at all in light of Rabbi Linzer’s teshuva and remain opposed to reciting a bracha over an eclipse for many reasons explained below.
3.  First, as many have noted, the giants of halacha are quite divided over the question of whether the listing in the Shulchan Aruch is paradigmatic or particular.  Some make no blessings other that for matters listed in the codes and other treat them as examples.  That dispute alone inspires me to be cautious, although I could be persuaded that the paradigmatic approach is correct and one could then make a bracha on a waterfall.  I have yet to see a clear proof that such a view is correct, but it does seem more intuitive.[1]  Yet, safek brachot lehakel is present.
4.  Second, and more importantly, if you look closely in the classical achronim, you see not a single achron who actually endorses saying a bracha on an eclipse.  Not a single one.  It is true that there is a dispute about whether the list in the Mishna is all inclusive or not (as many note, see Shar HaAyin 7:6), but even those who are of the view that the Mishnah’s list is merely examples, not a single achron actually endorses making a bracha on an eclipse as opposed to a volcano or some other natural wonder, which some clearly do permit a bracha on.  The group that favors expansive brachot on natural wonders endorse stalagmite caves, waterfalls, water geysers, volcanoes and many more: but not eclipses.  If you look, for example in Shar HaAyin 7:6 (the classical work on this topic) one sees this most clearly: even those who endorse making brachot on waterfalls, or other amazing facets of creation are uncertain נסתפק)) if one make a bracha on an eclipse, and we all know that when a posek is נסתפק, that posek does not make a bracha.[2]
a.      This contrast is made clear in the context of Rabbi Shmuel Halevi Wosner — who is the most clear and direct articulator of the view that list of wondrous sightings in the Shulchan Aruch are just examples, and one makes the bracha of oseh maaseh bereshit even on other wonders.  In Shar HaAyin page 431 he states directly that one makes a blessing on many wondrous things unlisted in the codes and he explains that “Volcanos are not present in our lands and thus are unmentioned in the Shulchan Aruch” and that it is “obvious” that one makes a blessing on them.  However, on eclipses he states “solar eclipses are mentioned a few times in the Gemera, and thus on the question of whether one needs to make a bracha when one sees them, needs more thought.[3]”  He does NOT endorse making a bracha on an eclipse. In fact, I am unaware of anyone other than Rabbis Melamed and Linzer who actually endorse the view in favor of making a bracha on an eclipse, (rather than merely ponders the possibility of such a bracha).  Rabbi Wozner’s point is important: this is not a modern issue – eclipses were well known for a few millennium, and silence in the Jewish Law codes is telling.  To the best of my knowledge the dispute about the eclipses is between two views: (1) Absolutely Not and (2) Maybe.  There is no (3) Yes view in the classical rabbinic literature for eclipses.  (That is why the listing of reasons why an eclipse might be different from other wonders below is important.)

5.     Why is an eclipse different from a stalagmite cave or a volcano?  I could think of a few reasons from a halachic perspective, even to those who believe that the Mishna’s list is not inclusive.
a.   Many perceive them to be a siman raah – a bad sign, either because of superstitious reasons or because darkness in the middle of the day is practically bad – and there is no blessing on bad omens (as Rabbi Moshe Feinstein is quoted in Mesorat Moshe 2:51).
b.     Because one sees nothing in an eclipse (as it is an absence of light, rather than a presence) and we do not make brachot on absences.
c.      Because the bracha of oseh maaseh breseshit does not apply to things whose existence can be mathematically predicted, but are merely rare: eclipses are not anomalies, but a product of the universes’ cycle of life, and more under the berkat hachama rule.
d.     Because full eclipses are exceedingly rare and partial eclipses are almost impossible to “see” without modern eclipse glasses (a 75% eclipse hardly is noticed on a functional level) and are naturally invisible.
e.      For other reasons that are less obvious related to the fact that these have to be wonders from “creation” and these are not from creation.
f.     Because some thought that eclipses were punishments and thus no blessing was ordained.[4]
6.     Based on all this, one can say that eclipses could be different from all other created natural anomalies as a matter of Jewish law and are not covered by the general idea of a wonder such that a blessing should be made. To my surprise, even as the primary source of the view that one can make a bracha on wonders beyond the Mishna’s list is Rabbi Wozner and he explicitly notes that eclipses are different from volcanoes, waterfalls, geysers and many other rare natural phenomena, the secondary codifiers of the last generation have completely missed this distinction.  Instead both Shar HaAyin 7:6 and Penenia Halacha Laws of Bracha 15:5 link the dispute about volcanoes and waterfalls with eclipses and state that one who permits a bracha for volcanoes and waterfalls would do so for eclipses as well, when in fact that is incorrect.  Eclipses were known in Talmudic times and yet no bracha was noted: that bothers Rabbi Shmuel Wozner, who permit a bracha on an erupting volcano, not to permit a bracha to be recited on an eclipse, by noting that he is uncertain if a bracha is proper.[5]
7.     Additionally, let me add a thought of my own about modern times and bracha’s over wonders.  The Shulchan Aruch OC 228:3 limits even the mountains that one can make a bracha on to such mountains in which the hand of our Creator is clear and apparent. (ולא על כל הרים וגבעות מברך, אלא דווקא על הרים וגבעות המשונים וניכרת גבורת הבורא בהם.)  I think in our modern times, with modern science explaining all of these events, no mountains or valleys ever meet the criterial of make it clear (to normal people) that God is in charge of the universe.  Based on this, I would not make any extensions of this halacha beyond its minimums recorded in the Shuchan Aruch because I think that the test for determining whether we can add to this list is and make a bracha is וניכרת גבורת הבורא בהם.  Given the secular environment we live in, I think no natural astrological events meets that bill in modern times so I only – at most — make such brachot on the things that the halachic tradition directly directs me to do, like lighting or thunder or great mountains and certain rivers. I would not make such a bracha on an erupting volcano or a solar eclipse, as seeing such does not cause normal people in my society to experience God.  (There are two formulations of my claim, each slightly different.  The first is experiential, in that I think that most people in my society do not sense any awe of God at an eclipse.  Second, even if any particular person does (and I do not doubt that some do), they cannot make the bracha since most people in America do not so sense God through these events and that is the halachic test found in the Shulchan Aruch.  The sense of wonder has to be obvious to normal people and that is lacking in the world we live in.
8.     Finally, all attempts to actually endorse making a bracha on an eclipse run directly against the combined force of both (1) the minhag, which is not to make a bracha and (2) the rule of ספק ברכות להקל. These two together make it difficult for any moreh horah to argue convincingly that there is clear proof that bracha should be made.
9.     I have consciously not engaged with Rabbi Linzer’s very worthwhile point (which I more or less agree with) that “we strive to bring our religious lives and our halakhic lives in sync” exactly because (as he himself notes) this calculus is limited to cases where there is a dispute between poskim about what to do.  Here, to the best of my knowledge, there is no dispute and since there is no classical halachic authority who actually says “yes make a bracha on an eclipse” there is no grounds to examining very important meta issues used to resolve disputes (since there is no dispute).
10. Based on all of this, I would not make a bracha on an eclipse.
11. Having said that, I am happy to endorse other forms of religions veneration for one who feels such wonder.
a.     One can certainly say this bracha without שם ומלכות.
b.   I am also somewhat comfortable with someone making this blessing in Aramaic (see Shulchan Aruch OC 167:10, 187:1 and 219:4) although I am aware of the view of Iggrot Moshe OC 4:20:27, but find the view of the Aruch Hashulchan OC 202:3 more analytically compelling.
c.      Both the suggestions of Rabbi Chaim David Ha-Levi (Responsa Aseh Lecha Rav, 150) that one recited va-yevarech david (Chronicles. 1:29:10) and adding “who performs acts of creation” at the end and of Rabbi David Lau, current Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of Israel, to recite Tehillim 19 and 104 are completely reasonable as well.
d.     Other innovative non-bracha based solutions are also reasonable.
12. On the other hand, those who attended an eclipse – I myself traveled to Rabun, Georgia, an epicenter for the total eclipse and sat in total darkness at for three minutes in the middle of the day and did not feel any closer to the Almighty as Creator of the World during the eclipse than I did after or before — can feel free to engage in no innovative religious observance at all without feelings that they are deficient in any way.
13.  I welcome readers to direct me to a source written by an achron which directly discusses eclipses and permits a bracha.  (Please feel free to email me.) So far, I have only seen that the group that permits a bracha for an eclipse does so based on a putative ruling of Rabbi Wozner and others to permit such a bracha, which upon closer examination is not present.  I am willing to ponder the possibility that there is an achron who permits such a bracha even as others do not – that posek argues that all wonders deserve a bracha and the listing in paragraph 5 above about why eclipses are different from other wonders is incorrect – To the best of my knowledge, that is a theoretical position that is not actually adopted.

[1] I am inclined to the more expansive view because the formulation in the Beit Yosef in Tur OC 228.
[2] This is an important point.  Rabbi Wozner has the right as a morah horah to assert that he rules that the mishna’s list is not inclusive and that volcanoes get a bracha (which is exactly what he says, as does Rabbi Nissan Karletz in the same work on page 466).  When one asks him “how can he rule that a bracha needs to be recited, others disagree, and then the matter is in doubt”, Rabbi Wozner responds by stating that he sees no doubt and thus he feels a bracha should be recited.  When Rabbi Wozner states that he has doubt about this matter, he is being clear that this is exactly a case of doubt and no blessing should be recited.
[3] Let me add that eclipses are discussed in the rishonim and codifiers as well, with no mention of a bracha.  See Darchai Moshe on Tur OC 426 and the works cited by Rabbi Linzer in footnote 2 of his teshuva (see here).
[4] It is clear from the recounting of the Chafetz Chaim that he did not say a bracha on an eclipse.  See here.
[5] This is found both Shar HaAyin and Penine Halacha as well as Rabbi Linzer’ teshuva.  Shaar Haayin 7:6 is strict on the whole matter and does not permit a bracha practically on even volcanoes an water falls, so the mistake in that work – linking volcanoes and eclipses — is merely one of conceptual classification, but Peninia Halacha rules that המברך לא הפסיד (“one who makes the blessing is doing nothing wrong” for “volcanic eruptions, geyser, waterfalls and both lunar and solar eclipses” when it is clear to this writer that the source he is sighting – he cites Rabbi Wozner! – does not adopt that view.  (On page 466 of Shar HaAyin, Rabbi Nissan Karlitz is asked “Is the blessing oseh maaseh bereshit similar in that things that are wonders and not found in the Shulchan Aruch like an erupting volcano or a spouting geyser or other similar phenomena, also requiring a bracha” and Rabbi Karlitz answer “Logic indicates that such is the case also,” but no explicit discussion of eclipses, which could be different.




Reflecting on When the Arukh haShulhan on Orach Chaim was Actually Written

Reflecting on When the Arukh haShulhan on Orach Chaim was Actually Written: Citations of the Mishnah Berurah in the Arukh haShulhan

Michael J. Broyde & Shlomo C. Pill

Rabbi Michael Broyde is a Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law and the Projects Director at the Emory University Center for the Study of Law and Religion.  Rabbi Dr. Shlomo Pill is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Jewish, Islamic, and American Law and Religion at Emory University’s Candler School of Theology and a Senior Fellow at the Emory University Center for the Study of Law and Religion.  They are writing a work titled “Setting the Table: An Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Rabbi Yechiel Mikhel Epstein’s Arukh Hashulchan” (Academic Studies Press, forthcoming 2020).

We post this now to note our celebration of the publication of תערוך לפני שלחן: חייו, זמנו ומפעלו של הרי”מ עפשטיין בעל ערוך השלחן (“Set a Table Before Me: The Life, Time, and Work of Rabbi Yehiel Mikhel Epstein, Author of the Arukh HaShulchan” (see here) (Maggid Press, 2019), by Rabbi Eitam Henkin, הי”ד.  Like many others, we were deeply saddened by his and his wife Naamah’s murder on October 1, 2015.  We draw some small comfort in seeing that the fruits of his labors still are appearing.

According to Rabbi Eitam Henkin הי”ד in his recently published book on the life and works of Rabbi Yechiel Mikhel Epstein, the first volume of the Arukh Hashulchan on Orach Chaim covering chapters 1-241 was published in 1903; the second volume addressing chapters 242-428 was published in 1907; and the third volume covering chapters 429-697 was published right after Rabbi Epstein’s death in 1909.[1] Others confirm these publication dates.[2]

The Mishnah Berurah, Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan’s commentary on the Orach Chaim section of the Shulchan Arukh was published in six parts, with each appearing at different times over twenty-three-year period.  Volume one was published in 1884, volume three in 1891, volume two appeared in 1895, volume four in 1898, volume five was published in 1902, and volume six in 1907.

We suspect that while the first volume of the Arukh Hashulchan on Orach Chaim did not appear until 1903, Rabbi Epstein wrote this work some time before this, and its publication and was delayed for economic and government censorship reasons. Rabbi Eitam Henkin notes (in the above biography) that Rabbi Epstein made mention of the very difficult time he had finding the funds to publish his work. Rabbi Epstein himself wrote in an 1886 letter, “to my great distress, I am unable to publish [the next installment of the Arukh Hashulchan] due to the lack of funding . . . publishing is exceedingly expensive.”[3] The high cost of publishing and limited funding actually led to Rabbi Epstein’s initially publishing the Arukh Hashulchan in numerous short pamphlets, each covering just a few of the Shulchan Arukh’s topic headings, rather than in larger volumes.  Eventually, as funds became available, these pamphlets were combined into larger volumes, organized around the “four-pillars” framework of halakhah used by other rabbinic jurists since Rabbi Karo.[4] Likewise, Rabbi Henkin uncovered correspondence in which Rabbi Epstein bemoaned that long-before completed manuscripts of the Arukh Hashulchan were languishing in St. Petersburg awaiting review and approval by Russian government censors.[5]

Appreciating the realities of the funding- and censorship-related delays with which Rabbi Epstein had to contend helps rectify what Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan described as Rabbi Epstein’s furiously productive writing schedule with the nearly four decade span between when he began writing the Arukh Hashulchan in 1870 and the publication of the final volume of Arukh Hashulchan: Orach Chaim in 1909 (and other volumes considerably after his death by his daughter[6]). Rabbi Meir Bar Ilan described his grandfather’s process as follows:

My grandfather sat each day in the room designated as the local rabbinic courtroom together with his two rabbinic judge colleagues from morning until night, save for two hours in the afternoons . . . He sat at his table with a chair next to him upon which he kept four books related to the topic he was currently dealing with: a volume of Maimonides’ Mishnah Torah, a volume of the Arbah Turim, the Shulchan Arukh, and a small edition of the Talmud.  And thus, looking here and there, he wrote his book, Arukh Hashulchan, page after page.  Occasionally, he would get up and take out another book to look at . . . This book, the Arukh Hashulchan, which is foremost in its genre, was printed directly from the first draft manuscripts, exactly as they were initially produced by the author . . . without edits, erasures, or rewrites.[7]

Even if somewhat hyperbolic in its recollection, the pace of work described by Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan certainly does not suggest that the writing of the Arukh Hashulchan would have taken more than thirty years. It is likely that the text of Rabbi Epstein’s monumental restatement of halakhah was written and prepared long before it finally appeared in print.[8]

So, when was the Arukh Hashulchan on Orach Chaim actually written? We suspect it was written after 1891 and before 1895.

As noted, the first volume of the Mishnah Berurah was published in 1884, and the Arukh Hashulchan cites it thirteen times.  Mishnah Berurah volume three was published seven years’ later in 1891 and is also cited by the Arukh Hashulchan—in this case, twelve times.  The Arukh Hashulchan cites none of the other four volumes of the Mishnah Berurah, however, which indicates that Rabbi Epstein did not have them.  That would indicate that Rabbi Epstein had completed his manuscript of Arukh Hashulchan on Orach Chaim before the 1895 when the next installment of the Mishnah Berurah appeared. We see in Rabbi Eitam Henkin’s work (p. 312) that he proposes a similar observation, and we are gratified that he shares this inference. While over a decade would pass before the Arukh Hashulchan on Orach Chaim was fully published, and while by this time the Mishnah Berurah, too, was in print in its entirety, Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan’s account of Rabbi Epstein’s writing process suggests that once written, the Arukh Hashulchan manuscripts were not significantly revisited or edited by Rabbi Epstein. It is not surprising, then, that the Arukh Hashulchan on Orach Chaim does not include references to sections of the Mishnah Berurah that appeared only after 1895.

We are aware of 36 (or 37, if one counts the double reference in number 5, below) references to the Mishnah Berurah in the Arukh Hashulchan[9] none of which are particularly important to the work, and only in one of them (319:22) does the Arukh Hashulchan seem to be actually reacting to something that the Mishnah Berurah directly cited in his own name.  The citations to the Mishnah Berurah in the Arukh Hashulchan themselves generally look like (to quote Rabbi Bar-Ilan) “another book to look at.”  Furthermore, it only looks like he did so in certain areas deeply and other areas much less.  There are six quoted in hilkhot tzitizit, one in hilkhot tefillin, two in hilkhot shema, four citations over three simanim in hilkhot tefilla, and then occasional references scattered throughout hilkhot Shabbat.  This sparse citing suggests that the Arukh Hashulchan neither studied the Mishnah Berurah, nor is responding to it systemically.  So to, the only explanation for the lack of citation to volumes two, four, five and six is that Rabbi Epstein did not have them at the time he was producing his manuscript of the Arukh Hashulchan on Orach Chaim. (We see that Rabbi Eitam Henkin, in his work makes a similar observation on pages 311-313.)

Below is a list of all the cases we are aware of in which the Arukh Hashulchan actually has and cites and quotes this Mishnah Berurah.

  1. Arukh HaShulchan 10:4 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 10 s.v. veyesh lah.
  2. Arukh HaShulchan 10:7 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 10 s.v. ela im ken.
  3. Arukh HaShulchan 10:8 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 10 s.v. veain lah kenafot.
  4. Arukh HaShulchan 11:8 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 11 s.v. vehu.
  5. Arukh HaShulchan 11:22 contains a reference to both Mishnah Berurah 11:27 and 11:29 and the Biur Halakhah, which explains this.
  6. Arukh HaShulchan 12:4 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 12 s.v. im nepseku.
  7. Arukh HaShulchan 14:5 contains two references to Biur Halakhah 14 s.v. hetil yisrael.
  8. Arukh HaShulchan 25:23 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 25 s.v. vehakhi nohug.
  9. Arukh HaShulchan 25:26 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 44.
  10. Arukh HaShulchan 62:3 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 62 s.v. yachol lekrotah bekhol lashon.
  11. Arukh HaShulchan 76:21 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah s.v. kara bemakom.
  12. Arukh HaShulchan 76:4 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 77:8.
  13. Arukh HaShulchan 79:11 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 5.
  14. Arukh HaShulchan 79:17 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 79:29 or Biur Halakhah s.v. aval chalul.
  15. Arukh HaShulchan 87:7 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 9.
  16. Arukh HaShulchan 89:23 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 89:22.
  17. Arukh HaShulchan 89:24 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 89:24 and Biur Halakhah s.v. vekhen okhlin umashkin.
  18. Arukh HaShulchan 91:3 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 91 s.v. hoyil vekhisah.
  19. Arukh HaShulchan 91:4 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 91 s.v. yatza.
  20. Arukh HaShulchan 245:8 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 245:23.
  21. Arukh HaShulchan 247:13 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 247:18.
  22. Arukh HaShulchan 262:4 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 262:12.
  23. Arukh HaShulchan 263:19 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 263:49.
  24. Arukh HaShulchan 268:6 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 268 s.v. veshelo bekavanah.
  25. Arukh HaShulchan 271:30 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah s.v. vehu rubo.
  26. Arukh HaShulchan 275:2 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 275 s.v. leor haner.
  27. Arukh HaShulchan 301:122 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 301:176–177.
  28. Arukh HaShulchan 302:32 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 303:87-88.
  29. Arukh HaShulchan 302:9 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 301:2, 10, 11 and Biur Halakhah s.v. shaveh aleha.
  30. Arukh HaShulchan 306:22 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 306:16 and Biur Halakhah s.v. beketav shelahem.
  31. Arukh HaShulchan 319:19 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 319 s.v. le’ekhol meyad.
  32. Arukh HaShulchan 319:22 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 319:21 and Biur Halakhah s.v. beshinui.
  33. Arukh HaShulchan 321:10 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 321:37–38.
  34. Arukh HaShulchan 328:39 contains a reference to Mishnah Berurah 328:145.
  35. Arukh HaShulchan 330:7 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah s.v. kol sheloshah yamim.
  36. Arukh HaShulchan 336:21 contains a reference to Biur Halakhah 336 s.v. mutar lelakh.

A question that can only be speculated about is whether the Arukh HaShulchan is ever responding without citation to the Mishnah Berurah (for example, in the case of married women and hair covering in the synagogue in Orach Chayim 75).  Rabbi Eitam Henkin (p. 314) quotes the famous observation of this father, Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin in Shut Benai Banim 2:18 that there are countless times where the Aruch HaShulchan is responding, without citing, the Mishnah Berurah.  Rabbi Eitam Henkin then provides a list of such possible cases.

[1] See Rabbi Eitam Henkin, Ta’arokh Lifanai Shulchan: Chayo Zemano U’mepa’alo Shel Harav Yechiel Mikhel Epstein Baal Arukh Hashulchan, pp. 245-246.

[2] See as well the following article by Rabbi Eitam Henkin where he makes this claim as well:

 ‘ספרי ערוך השלחן – סדר כתיבתם והדפסתם’, חצי גבורים – פליטת סופרים, ז (תשע”ד), עמ’ תקטו-תקלו

Copies of the first editions can be found in the Hebrew University Library.

[3] Kitvei Ha-Arukh Hashulchan, no. 104.

[4] See Rabbi Eitam Henkin’s book at pages 234–235.

[5] See Kitvei Ha-Arukh Hashulchan, no. 56.

[6] See Printing of the Arukh HaShulhan: The Missing Line About Rabbi Epstein’s Daughter for more on the posthumous publication of volumes.

[7] Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan, From Volozhin to Jerusalem 269-271 (1939-1940) [Hebrew].

[8] See Rabbi Eitam Henkin’s work תערוך לפני שלחן at pages 229–257 for a detailed discussion of the publication difficulties and schedule of the Arukh HaShulchan.

[9] Twice Arukh Hashulchan refers to the work by its formal name, Mishnah Berurah, and all the remaining times by an acronym מ”ב or המ”ב.




There is No Bracha on an Eclipse

There is No Bracha on an Eclipse
By Rabbi Michael J. Broyde
Rabbi Michael Broyde is a law
professor at Emory University School of Law and the Projects Director in its
Center for the Study of Law and Religion.  His most recent Torah sefer is
entitled “A Concise Code of Jewish Law For Converts”.  This letter was written to someone after a
shiur on why there is no bracha on seeing a solar eclipse.
1.      You are correct that I said that I thought there was no bracha on an eclipse.  I had not seen Rabbi Linzer’s teshuva at the time that told that to you this, as it was not circulating on the internet at the time that I prepared for my shiur and I did not see it until Sunday, the day after the shiur.  I try to cite as much as relevant in these classes and his thoughts are clearly relevant.  He is a stellar writer on interesting topics of halacha and I read his material consistently.  I had seen that Rabbi Eliezer Melamed in Peneni Halacha Laws of Brachot 15:6 and note 5 which does permit a bracha on an eclipse.
2.      Having said that, I would not change my mind at all in light of Rabbi Linzer’s teshuva and remain opposed to reciting a bracha over an eclipse for many reasons explained below.
3.      First, as many have noted, the giants of halacha are quite divided over the question of whether the listing in the Shulchan Aruch is paradigmatic or particular.  Some make no blessings other that for matters listed in the codes and other treat them as examples.  That dispute alone inspires me to be cautious, although I could be persuaded that the paradigmatic approach is correct and one could then make a bracha on a waterfall.  I have yet to see a clear proof that such a view is correct, but it does seem more intuitive.[1]  Yet, safek brachot lehakel is present.
4.      Second, and more importantly, if you look closely in the classical achronim, you see not a single achron who actually endorses saying a bracha on an eclipse.  Not a single one.  It is true that there is a dispute about whether the list in the Mishna is all inclusive or not (as many note, see Shar HaAyin 7:6), but even those who are of the view that the Mishnah’s list is merely examples, not a single achron actually endorses making a bracha on an eclipse as opposed to a volcano or some other natural wonder, which some clearly do permit a bracha on.  The group that favors expansive brachot on natural wonders endorse stalagmite caves, waterfalls, water geysers, volcanoes and many more: but not eclipses.  If you look, for example in Shar HaAyin 7:6 (the classical work on this topic) one sees this most clearly: even those who endorse making brachot on waterfalls, or other amazing facets of creation are uncertain נסתפק)) if one make a bracha on an eclipse, and we all know that when a posek is נסתפק, that posek does not make a bracha.[2]
a.       This contrast is made clear in the context of Rabbi Shmuel Halevi Wosner — who is the most clear and direct articulator of the view that list of wondrous sightings in the Shulchan Aruch are just examples, and one makes the bracha of oseh maaseh bereshit even on other wonders.  In Shar HaAyin page 431 he states directly that one makes a blessing on many wondrous things unlisted in the codes and he explains that “Volcanos are not present in our lands and thus are unmentioned in the Shulchan Aruch” and that it is “obvious” that one makes a blessing on them.  However, on eclipses he states “solar eclipses are mentioned a few times in the Gemera, and thus on the question of whether one needs to make a bracha when one sees them, needs more thought.[3]”  He does NOT endorse making a bracha on an eclipse. In fact, I am unaware of anyone other than Rabbis Melamed and Linzer who actually endorse the view in favor of making a bracha on an eclipse, (rather than merely ponders the possibility of such a bracha).  Rabbi Wozner’s point is important: this is not a modern issue – eclipses were well known for a few millennium, and silence in the Jewish Law codes is telling.  To the best of my knowledge the dispute about the eclipses is between two views: (1) Absolutely Not and (2) Maybe.  There is no (3) Yes view in the classical rabbinic literature for eclipses.  (That is why the listing of reasons why an eclipse might be different from other wonders below is important.)

5.      Why is an eclipse different from a stalagmite cave or a volcano?  I could think of a few reasons from a halachic perspective, even to those who believe that the Mishna’s list is not inclusive.

a.       Many perceive them to be a siman raah – a bad sign, either because of superstitious reasons or because darkness in the middle of the day is practically bad – and there is no blessing on bad omens (as Rabbi Moshe Feinstein is quoted in Mesorat Moshe 2:51).
b.      Because one sees nothing in an eclipse (as it is an absence of light, rather than a presence) and we do not make brachot on absences.
c.       Because the bracha of oseh maaseh breseshit does not apply to things whose existence can be mathematically predicted, but are merely rare: eclipses are not anomalies, but a product of the universes’ cycle of life, and more under the berkat hachama rule.
d.      Because full eclipses are exceedingly rare and partial eclipses are almost impossible to “see” without modern eclipse glasses (a 75% eclipse hardly is noticed on a functional level) and are naturally invisible.
e.       For other reasons that are less obvious related to the fact that these have to be wonders from “creation” and these are not from creation.
f.       Because some thought that eclipses were punishments and thus no blessing was ordained.[4]
6.      Based on all this, one can say that eclipses could be different from all other created natural anomalies as a matter of Jewish law and are not covered by the general idea of a wonder such that a blessing should be made. To my surprise, even as the primary source of the view that one can make a bracha on wonders beyond the Mishna’s list is Rabbi Wozner and he explicitly notes that eclipses are different from volcanoes, waterfalls, geysers and many other rare natural phenomena, the secondary codifiers of the last generation have completely missed this distinction.  Instead both Shar HaAyin 7:6 and Penenia Halacha Laws of Bracha 15:5 link the dispute about volcanoes and waterfalls with eclipses and state that one who permits a bracha for volcanoes and waterfalls would do so for eclipses as well, when in fact that is incorrect.  Eclipses were known in Talmudic times and yet no bracha was noted: that bothers Rabbi Shmuel Wozner, who permit a bracha on an erupting volcano, not to permit a bracha to be recited on an eclipse, by noting that he is uncertain if a bracha is proper.[5]
7.      Additionally, let me add a thought of my own about modern times and bracha’s over wonders.  The Shulchan Aruch OC 228:3 limits even the mountains that one can make a bracha on to such mountains in which the hand of our Creator is clear and apparent. (ולא על כל הרים וגבעות מברך, אלא דווקא על הרים וגבעות המשונים וניכרת גבורת הבורא בהם.)  I think in our modern times, with modern science explaining all of these events, no mountains or valleys ever meet the criterial of make it clear (to normal people) that God is in charge of the universe.  Based on this, I would not make any extensions of this halacha beyond its minimums recorded in the Shuchan Aruch because I think that the test for determining whether we can add to this list is and make a bracha is וניכרת גבורת הבורא בהם.  Given the secular environment we live in, I think no natural astrological events meets that bill in modern times so I only – at most — make such brachot on the things that the halachic tradition directly directs me to do, like lighting or thunder or great mountains and certain rivers. I would not make such a bracha on an erupting volcano or a solar eclipse, as seeing such does not cause normal people in my society to experience God.  (There are two formulations of my claim, each slightly different.  The first is experiential, in that I think that most people in my society do not sense any awe of God at an eclipse.  Second, even if any particular person does (and I do not doubt that some do), they cannot make the bracha since most people in America do not so sense God through these events and that is the halachic test found in the Shulchan Aruch.  The sense of wonder has to be obvious to normal people and that is lacking in the world we live in.
8.      Finally, all attempts to actually endorse making a bracha on an eclipse run directly against the combined force of both (1) the minhag, which is not to make a bracha and (2) the rule of ספק ברכות להקל. These two together make it difficult for any moreh horah to argue convincingly that there is clear proof that bracha should be made.
9.      I have consciously not engaged with Rabbi Linzer’s very worthwhile point (which I more or less agree with) that “we strive to bring our religious lives and our halakhic lives in sync” exactly because (as he himself notes) this calculus is limited to cases where there is a dispute between poskim about what to do.  Here, to the best of my knowledge, there is no dispute and since there is no classical halachic authority who actually says “yes make a bracha on an eclipse” there is no grounds to examining very important meta issues used to resolve disputes (since there is no dispute).
10.  Based on all of this, I would not make a bracha on an eclipse.
11.  Having said that, I am happy to endorse other forms of religions veneration for one who feels such wonder.
a.       One can certainly say this bracha without שם ומלכות.
b.      I am also somewhat comfortable with someone making this blessing in Aramaic (see Shulchan Aruch OC 167:10, 187:1 and 219:4) although I am aware of the view of Iggrot Moshe OC 4:20:27, but find the view of the Aruch Hashulchan OC 202:3 more analytically compelling.
c.       Both the suggestions of Rabbi Chaim David Ha-Levi (Responsa Aseh Lecha Rav, 150) that one recited va-yevarech david (Chronicles. 1:29:10) and adding “who performs acts of creation” at the end and of Rabbi David Lau, current Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of Israel, to recite Tehillim 19 and 104 are completely reasonable as well.
d.      Other innovative non-bracha based solutions are also reasonable.
12.  On the other hand, those who attended an eclipse – I myself traveled to Rabun Georgia, an epicenter for the total eclipse and sat in total darkness at for three minutes in the middle of the day and did not feel any closer to the Almighty as Creator of the World during the eclipse than I did after or before — can feel free to engage in no innovative religious observance at all without feelings that they are deficient in any way.
13.  I welcome readers to direct me to a source written by an achron which directly discusses eclipses and permits a bracha.  (Please feel free to email me.) So far, I have only seen that the group that permits a bracha for an eclipse does so based on a putative ruling of Rabbi Wozner and others to permit such a bracha, which upon closer examination is not present.  I am willing to ponder the possibility that there is an achron who permits such a bracha even as others do not – that posek argues that all wonders deserve a bracha and the listing in paragraph 5 above about why eclipses are different from other wonders is incorrect – To the best of my knowledge, that is a theoretical position that is not actually adopted.

[1] I am inclined to the more expansive view because the formulation in the Beit Yosef in Tur OC 228.
[2] This is an important point.  Rabbi Wozner has the right as a morah horah to assert that he rules that the mishna’s list is not inclusive and that volcanoes get a bracha (which is exactly what he says, as does Rabbi Nissan Karletz in the same work on page 466).  When one asks him “how can he rule that a bracha needs to be recited, others disagree, and then the matter is in doubt”, Rabbi Wozner responds by stating that he sees no doubt and thus he feels a bracha should be recited.  When Rabbi Wozner states that he has doubt about this matter, he is being clear that this is exactly a case of doubt and no blessing should be recited.
[3] Let me add that eclipses are discussed in the rishonim and codifiers as well, with no mention of a bracha.  See Darchai Moshe on Tur OC 426 and the works cited by Rabbi Linzer in footnote 2 of his teshuva (see here).
[4] It is clear from the recounting of the Chafetz Chaim that he did not say a bracha on an eclipse.  See here.
[5] This is found both Shar HaAyin and Penine Halacha as well as Rabbi Linzer’ teshuva.  Shaar Haayin 7:6 is strict on the whole matter and does not permit a bracha practically on even volcanoes an water falls, so the mistake in that work – linking volcanoes and eclipses — is merely one of conceptual classification, but Peninia Halacha rules that המברך לא הפסיד (“one who makes the blessing is doing nothing wrong” for “volcanic eruptions, geyser, waterfalls and both lunar and solar eclipses” when it is clear to this writer that the source he is sighting – he cites Rabbi Wozner! – does not adopt that view.  (On page 466 of Shar HaAyin, Rabbi Nissan Karlitz is asked “Is the blessing oseh maaseh bereshit similar in that things that are wonders and not found in the Shulchan Aruch like an erupting volcano or a spouting geyser or other similar phenomena, also requiring a bracha” and Rabbi Karlitz answer “Logic indicates that such is the case also,” but no explicit discussion of eclipses, which could be different.



A Note Regarding Dayan Simcha Zelig Rieger’s View of Opening a Refrigerator Door on Shabbat

A Note Regarding Dayan Simcha Zelig Rieger’s View
of Opening a Refrigerator Door on Shabbat
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde
Introduction

Thank you to Rabbi Yaacov Sasson for his comments on
footnote 59 of the article “The Use of
Electricity on Shabbat and Yom Tov” found in the Journal of Halacha and
Contemporary Society, 21:4-47 (Spring 1991) co-written by Rabbi Jachter and
myself.  It is always nice to have people
commenting on articles written more than 25 years ago.[1]
Before delving into the halacha, it is worth clarifying some preliminary
facts – in particular, whether refrigerators even had automatic lights during
the first half of the 1930s.  Some
commenters have suggested that such lights were not yet present, or that they
were limited to rare and expensive refrigerators.  This is not correct.  I reproduce below a wide variety of newspaper
ads from the early 1930s that show that a range of refrigerator models by many
manufacturers at various price points featured automatic interior lights (see attachments here). These
include a Frigidaire priced at $157.50, a GE priced at $99.50, a Majestic model
with no price, a Frigidaire priced at $119.50, a Leonard priced at $114.75 and
many more.[2]  And while some of the publications appear
targeted to the upper class, many others are clearly meant for wider audiences
– particularly those available on installment plans (“$5 down, 15¢ a day”;
“Nothing down! 20¢ a day!”; “$7 Initial Payment – enables you to enjoy any of
these refrigerators immediately. Investigate our convenient budget payment
plans.”).[3] Thus, even in the early 1930s, interior
lights were a readily available feature in the refrigerators that were becoming
increasingly common in American households.[4] Claims that “normal” or “typical”
refrigerators did not have lights are belied by the many ads taken from diverse
periodicals that are reproduced here.[5]
A Summary of the Original Article

The relevant section of the article is
about using refrigerators on Shabbat, and states in part:
A. Refrigerators
The opening of a
refrigerator door on Shabbat has been the topic of vigorous debate in past
decades. Opening the refrigerator door allows warm air to enter, thus causing a
drop in temperature which causes the motor to go on sooner. If one accepts that
turning the motor on during Shabbat is prohibited, then it would appear that
opening the refrigerator door on Shabbat when the motor is not already56 running
is prohibited. Indeed, many prominent rabbinic decisors have adopted this
position.57 However, many authorities58 assert that
one is permitted to open a refrigerator even when the motor is off.59
The footnotes to the above-quoted text observe:
56. Opening
the door when the motor is already running is permissible because all that is
done then is causing the motor to stay on for a longer period of time; see also
section V. 
57. See Har Zvi 1:151; Mishnat Rabbi Aharon, 1:4; Minchat
Yitzchak
 3:24; and Chelkat Yaakov, 1:54. Rabbi
Ovadia Yosef, Yabia Omer 1:21 and Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Edut Leyisrael p. 152, recommend that one be
stringent in this regard, although they both accept that it is permissible to
open a refrigerator even when the motor is off. 
58. Rabbi
Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s argument can be found in his Minchat Shlomo pp. 77-91. Others who are lenient
include Rabbi Waldenberg,Tzitz Eliezer 8:12
and 12:92, Rabbi Uziel, Piskei
Uziel
 no. 15. Rabbi Aharon
Lichtenstein reports that Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik subscribes to the
lenient position in this regard. 
59. Almost
all authorities accept that it is forbidden to open a refrigerator when the
light inside will go on. Notwithstanding one’s lack of intent to turn on the
light when opening the refrigerator, this action is forbidden, since the light
will inevitably go on (pesik resha). 
However, Rabbi S.Z.
Rieger (the Dayan of Brisk) rules leniently in this regard (Hapardes 1934, volume three). His lenient
ruling is based on two assumptions. First, he states that when the forbidden
act has no benefit to the one who performs it, and it is only incidental (psik
resha d’lo nicha leh
), no prohibition exists.
Rabbi Rieger assumes that the lenient ruling of the Aruch (see Aruch defining the word “sever“)
is accepted. Second, Rabbi Rieger states that the light in the refrigerator
provides no benefit to the one opening the door.
His first assumption is disputed by most authorities (see Yabia Omer 1:21,5; Minchat Shlomo p. 87). The consensus appears not to
accept theAruch’s ruling
as normative. The second assertion appears to be entirely incorrect. The light
serves as a convenience to locate items in the refrigerator and cannot be
described as having no benefit to one who opens the door.
Most authorities, however, maintain that it is acceptable
to ask a Gentile to open the door of the refrigerator even if the light will go
on: see Iggerot Moshe, Orach
Chaim
 2:68; and Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah pp. 100-101.So too, it would appear to
these authors that one could allow a fellow Jew to open the door when he does
not know the light will go on, as that is only in the category of mitasek (unknowing) and thus permitted; see e.g.,Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik, Shiurim
Lezeicher Avi Mori
, p.30 n. 58; but see Teshuvot
R. Akiva Eiger
 #9. 
(bold emphasis added)
Rabbi Sasson’s Criticism

Rabbi Sasson is commenting on the words in
the second paragraph of footnote 59 (the bold sentences above).  He proposes that the article is wrong in its
understanding of the view of Dayan Simcha Zelig Rieger who did not, he claims,
permit the turning on of the light in the refrigerator, but only the
motor.  Rabbi Sasson states:
Lo hayu dvarim me-olam. Rav Simcha Zelig did not permit opening a refrigerator when the
light inside will go on. Rav Simcha Zelig wrote (Hapardes 1934, num. 3, page 6)
that it is permitted to open the refrigerator since the intention is to remove
an item, “v’aino mechavein lehadlik et ha-elektri.” The authors misinterpreted this
statement to be a reference to an electric light in the refrigerator.
And his argument is:
However, it is clear from a simple
reading of the articles to which Rav Simcha Zelig was responding that the topic
under discussion at the time was triggering the motor by opening the door and allowing warm
air to enter; lights and light bulbs are not mentioned at all. In the first of
those articles (Hapardes 1931, num. 2, page 3), the language of “hadlaka
is used in reference to the refrigerator motor, and Rav Simcha Zelig’s language
of “lehadlik et ha-elektri” appears to parallel the language
used there.
As an additional proof, he notes:
In the second of those articles
(Hapardes 1931, num. 3 page 6), the act of triggering the motor is referred to
as “havara” and “havara b’zerem ha-chashmali“,
and Rav Simcha Zelig used a similar nomenclature, “lehadlik et
ha-elektri
” to refer to triggering the motor.
Based on this Rabbi Sasson concludes:
Rav Simcha Zelig’s position was that it
is permitted to open a refrigerator when the motor
will then go on, as triggering the motor is classified as a psik resha d’lo ichpat lei,
which is equivalent to lo
nicha lei. 
Rav Simcha Zelig
never addressed opening a refrigerator when the light will go on. 
(footnotes omitted)
A Review of the Teshuva and
a Defense of the Second Paragraph of Footnote Fifty Nine

The relevant paragraph of the teshuva by
Dayan Rieger reads simply:

ובדבר התבת קרח מלאכותי נראה כיון דכשפותח
את דלת התיבה הוא כדי לקבל משם איזו דבר ואינו מכיון להדליק את העלעקטרי הוי פסיק
רישיה דלא איכפת ליה אפילו להדליק אם הוא באופן שהוא פסיק רישיה.

And in the matter of the artificial
[electric] icebox it appears that since when one opens the door of the box to
get something from there and does not intend to ignite (light) the electricity
it is a psik resha that he does not care about, even to light in way
that is a psik resha.
The rest of the teshuva by Dayan Rieger
presents his view of the halacha in cases in which there is a psik resha d’lo
ichpat lei
, which is that this is a dispute between Tosaphot and the
Aruch.  Furthermore, Rav Chaim M’brisk
maintains that the Rambam is in agreement with the Aruch, and the custom is
like the Aruch; therefore, it is completely proper to rely on the Aruch in
cases in which there is a psik resha d’lo nicha lei.[6]

A careful reader of the first sentence,
and indeed of the entire teshuva, can sense that there is some ambiguity here
about the electrical object referred to, since Dayan Rieger does not specify
the source or consequence of igniting the electricity. I am inclined to
reinforce the original explanation that it was the light based on the following
three observations.
First, the many articles in Hapardes do not
necessarily use as interchangeable the terms zerem chashmali or chut
chashmali
or chut elektriki with
the term hidlik et haelektrik – which
seems to have a different connotation. 
Particularly in the Yiddish spoken culture of that time, the term
“electric” seems to have meant “lights” and not electricity or motor.  Rabbi Sasson’s claim that the phrase “havara
b’zerem ha-chashmali
” and Rav Simcha Zelig phrase “lehadlik et
ha-elektri
” are identical is, I think, not indubitably correct.  Elektriki, according to my colleague
at Emory, Professor Nick Block, more likely means the light than anything else
in 1930s Yiddish.  This is particularly true in my
opinion, when added to the word “le’hadlik,” a word of ignition.
Second, and much more importantly, the halachic
analysis presented by Dayan Rieger addresses a direct action, while everyone
else who discusses the motor speaks about an indirect action.  This is very important to grasp.  The light in the refrigerator immediately
turns on when the door is opened, as the opening of the door also opens the
switch that controls the incandescent light. 
Not so the motor, which is controlled by a thermostat; opening the door
usually leads to an increase of air temperature inside the refrigerator, which
eventually directs the motor to go on.
As the editor of Hapardes notes (in
volume 5), there are persuasive grounds to permit the opening of the
refrigerator door based on two distinct principles of enormous halachic
importance that are deeply grounded in factual reality: davar she’eno
mitkaven
and grama; it is based on this that many poskim to this day
permit a refrigerator door to be opened, as our article from 25 years ago
notes.
Simply put, many times when the
refrigerator is opened, the motor does not go on at all, since for the motor to
go on immediately, the refrigerator must be at just a certain temperature such
that the warm air immediately causes the thermostat to turn the motor on.  Sometimes the motor is already on, sometimes
the motor is not hastened, and sometimes there is a very long time delay.  This reality gives rise to important halachic
grounds discussed in our article and quoted by many poskim, including many
before and after the great Dayan Rieger.
But Dayan Rieger makes no mention of
this: he does not discuss grama, or davar she’eno mitkaven or any
of these other factors that apply to indirect action.  Instead, he assumes that when the
refrigerator door is opened, the electrical object under discussion is always ignited, and it does so
immediately and directly, thus causing a melacha. This is the
formulation of pesik resha, which
inexorably causes melacha each and every time — in contrast to grama,
davar she’eno mitkaven or any other principles of indirect or delayed or
uncertain causation.
Dayan Rieger is not speaking about acts
caused indirectly, uncertainly or after a delay – he is speaking about an
action that directly and immediately occurs and is fully and directly caused by
my opening the door.  As he writes in his
first paragraph:
ובדבר התבת קרח מלאכותי נראה כיון דכשפותח
את דלת התיבה הוא כדי לקבל משם איזו דבר ואינו מכיון להדליק את העלעקטרי הוי פסיק
רישיה דלא איכפת ליה אפילו להדליק אם הוא באופן שהוא פסיק רישיה.
No intermediary (like a thermostat) and
no indirect or delayed causation is present in the case Dayan Rieger is
discussing – the prohibited action is caused by the door opening.  The act of opening the door turns on the elektri
according to Dayan Rieger.  His
halachic insight is that even when such causation is direct, it is of no value
to the opener of the door, who just wants to take some food out; it is a psik
resha
of no benefit.  Factually,
this is not an accurate description of the motor at all, which frequently does
not turn on immediately, but it does correctly describe the mechanism of the refrigerator
light
.  Dayan Rieger implicitly
concedes that if one were to open the door with the intent to turn on the light
(or motor), that would be assur min ha-torah, since he sees no indirect
causation in the process, something that most poskim think is not at all true
for the motor.
Professor Sara Reguer noted by email to
me that “my grandfather conferred with scientists and specialists in
electricity before giving his response,” and given this fact it is extremely
unlikely that he missed such a basic point that anyone who repeatedly opened
and closed a refrigerator would have observed. 
This was simply not true about refrigerator motors as the original
question notes explicitly in Hapardes Volume 2. This technological assumption
about the refrigerator is true about the light, which always turns on when the
door is opened, but not about the motor.
I would also note two additional factors
for consideration. First, the other substantive halachic logic employed by
Dayan Rieger which analogizes elektriki to sparks seems to me to be a
closer analogy to a light than to a motor which is hardly fire at all; sparks,
like incandescent lights, are fire according to halacha.  Secondly, there has been a regular subset of
poskim (as shown by Rabbi Abadi’s most recent teshuva, Ohr Yitzchak 2:166) who
adopt the exact analysis and view of Dayan Rieger and view the light as lo
ichpat
since one does not want it and a light is on already.  If Dayan Rieger is speaking about the motor,
he has gotten the facts terribly wrong as well as provided a halachic chiddush
that is totally unneeded, whereas if he is speaking about the light, he has
adopted a halachic view that has some company, and gotten the facts correct.
Furthermore, his halachic analysis is needed to reach the desired result.
Given these factors – the linguistic
ambiguity, the presence of logic that is discussing a psik resha and not
a grama or a davar she’eno mitkaven, the analogy to sparks and
the parallel teshuva by Rabbi Abadi reaching the same conclusion and employing
the same logic for lights – I am still inclined to think (as the original
article notes) that this teshuva is speaking about the light and not the motor.
On the other hand, there is a good and natural
impulse to read halachic literature conservatively and to press for
interpretations that align gedolim with one other and not leave outliers
with halachic novelty.[7]  Furthermore, I do recognize that many
halachic authorities who have cited Dayan Rieger’s teshuva have quoted it in
the context of the motor and not the light,, as Rabbi Sasson claims
is the proper reading.[8]  But, I think these citations are less than
dispositive for the following important reason: Those who quote Dayan Rieger’s
view as something to consider about the motor note that his analysis is
halachically wrong (see for example, both Yabia Omer OC 1:21 [paragraphs 7-11
are explicitly directly at explaining why Dayan Riegler’s halachic explanation
for motors is wrong] and Minchat Shlomo 1:10 [section 7 calls this logic אולם לענ”ד צ”ע הרבה] who both note deep
problems with Dayan Reigler’s analysis as applied to the motor).[9]  Poskim generally spend less time and ink
explicating the views of authorities whom they believe to have reached inapt or
incorrect conclusions of fact or law compared with those whom they cite in
whole or in part to bolster their own analysis. Simply put, the precedential
value of how one posek cites another when they centrally disagree is not
as great.  
Thus, when given two choices of how to
understand what an eminent posek wrote, I prefer an approach that is both
halachically plausible and factually correct rather than one what is
halachically unneeded and factually wrong.[10]
Conclusion

In sum, while there is some ambiguity in
Dayan Rieger’s teshuva, the recent (ca. 1930) introduction of lights in
refrigerators, the fact that Dayan Rieger makes no mention of grama, davar
she’eno mitkaven
or any of the other classical grounds for discussing the
motor, and from the fact that he uses the Yiddish word for light, all incline
me to think that he is speaking about the light, although I understand the
ambiguity.  Let me add, lehalacha,
as the original article notes, that I think such a view is not halachically
normative in that we do not follow the view of the Aruch as a general matter.
Having said all that, in hindsight I
would have worded footnote 59 a bit differently to reflect more of the nuance
that is present in this post (and may in fact do so if the article is ever
republished).
Postscript

Allow me to
note my general agreement with Rabbi Sasson’s conclusion when he writes:
I would add two endnotes – when surveying Halachot with significant practical
implications, such as in the realm of Hilchot
Shabbat
, it is an author’s responsibility to ensure that all sources are
cited accurately, lest a reader rely on an incorrect citation with the result
of Chillul Shabbat.
Secondly, when confronted with a Halachic position of a Gadol B’Yisrael that seems to
be entirely erroneous, the possibility that the Gadol’s position is being misunderstood must
be explored.
This is true even when the citation is
in a footnote and even when it is noted as not normative.  More generally, readers of blog posts about
nuanced textual disputes should, whenever they can, go back to the original
sources and check for themselves. (The editors of the Seforim Blog should be
commended for helping their contributors include images of such texts for the
benefit of the readership.)
Let me also add a final endnote of my
own: While vigorous debate
has always been a fundamental part of Torah study within the confines of the
beit midrash, and while online forums have brought intelligent Torah
conversations to a much wider group of participants (and observers), the tone
and tenor of these conversations often take on the harsh, acerbic voice of the
internet at large. I generally find that the sharper the rhetorical tone, the
less value the substance has. Orthodox Judaism today would benefit greatly from
deep, substantive conversations on a whole host of halachic and hashkafic
matters that are conducted in a respectful manner. We certainly could use more
light and less heat.
[1] Located here
.
[2] In 2015
dollars, these range from about $1400 to $2200; see CPI Inflation Calculator here.  They are not inexpensive, but seem to
be attainable for middle-class consumers.
[3] See attached
advertisements here.
[4] Indeed, the
number of household refrigerators increased dramatically during the Depression
years, as increased longevity and reduced spoilage helped stretch family food
budgets.
[5] Nor are these
refrigerators more expensive than any other as the ads show.  The reason for this is obvious, upon
reflection.  The compressor was the
expensive, high-tech component at that time, whereas the spring switch light
connected to the door had been invented many years earlier and was very low
cost.
[6] The final
section addresses ice making and it is not under discussion in this article.
[7] For more on
this, see the concluding chapter of my ‘Innovation in Jewish Law: A Case Study
of Chiddush in Havineinu” (Urim Publiscations 2010).
[8] Added to this is the
voice of Dayan Reiger’s granddaughter, Professor Sara Reuger, who tells me that
she is certain that this teshuva is referring to the thermostat or motor and
not the light.   However, I was not
persuaded by her recollection since she had no direct conversation with her
grandfather about this and is only recalling conversations with her own father
and (as explained above) this view places Dayan Reiger’s teshuva in a weak
halachic light analytically (as well as other reasons).
[9]   For another example of this, see Hapardes
volume 11:2 at page 8-10. 
[10] Another possibility was suggested to me
by Professor Miriam Udel of Emory who noted that the Hebrew term “התבת קרח מלאכותי” corresponds well to the Yiddish
term ayz-kastn which is really a very early refrigerator (ice chest).  Ice chests were pre-modern refrigerators that
had no electricity at all, but were cooled by ice; see here and here  By 1925 companies were selling add-on kits to
these ice chests that contained an external motor which cooled a coil insert.  See the article in the Washington Post,
August 9, 1925 entitled “Modern
Electric Plant Displaces Need For Ice Man: Its Refrigeration” at page F7.  See also Display Ad 18 — No Title Chicago
Daily Tribune (1923-1963); Jun 14, 1925 (attached) which notes simply “If you
have a good refrigerator in your home, you can convert it into a Frigidaire easily
and inexpensively.  The Frigidaire “frost
coil” is placed in the ice compartment; the simple mechanism is the basement or
other convenient location.  Small copper tubes
connect the frost coil and compressor and a connection is made to your electric
wiring.”  This converted ice box, to the
best of my knowledge, had no mechanism related to the door being open at all.
(The interior ice compartment would have remained closed.)  Dayan Reiger could not have been speaking
about this, as he is addressing a door mechanism and not a hot-air-entering-the-refrigerator
problem.



The Rav as a Mechadesh Halacha: One Small Example From Shabbat Rosh Chodesh

The Rav as a Mechadesh
Halacha:
One Small Example From Shabbat Rosh
Chodesh
Michael J. Broyde
In the Koren Rav siddur, in the minhagim of the Rav, in the
section dealing with the halachic rules of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, זצ”ל it
is written:
The Rav
posited that if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo on Rosh Hodesh
during Shaharit, one should not repeat the Amida, but should rather rely upon
the reference to the holiday that will be made in the Musaf prayer. The Gemara
in Shabbat (24a) states that one who forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo must
indeed repeat the Amida and include Ya’aleh VeYavo in that second
recital; but the Gemara in Berakhot (30b) qualifies this ruling,
teaching that it is not necessary if one intends to recite Musaf subsequently,
since the required reference to the special status of the day will take place
during Musaf. Even though Rashi there (s.v. betzibbur) cites those who
maintain that this dispensation applies only to the Leader in order to avoid
any unnecessary delay to the start of the Repetition of the Amida, the Rav felt
that we should follow the opinion of the Magan Avraham (Orah Hayyim 126:3)
that even an individual should not repeat the Amida of Shaharit and should rely
on his subsequent recitation of Musaf.
The
rationale behind this view is as follows: When one forgets to recite Ya’aleh
VeYavo,
the need to repeat the Amida is only in order to be able to make
reference to the special day within the context of the prayer. The obligation
to recite the Amida per se, however, has in fact already been fulfilled. This
second Amida therefore has the status of a tefillat nedava – a voluntary
prayer, as it is recited not to fulfill any obligation to pray, but rather only
to provide the needed context for the reference to the special day made through
Ya’aleh VeYavo. Since it has become the practice to refrain from
offering this form of voluntary prayer nowadays, Rav Hayyim Soloveitchik ruled
that it is preferable not to repeat the Amida, but to rely upon the recitation
of Musaf, if it will be done at the proper time. In light of this
understanding, the Rav suggested that when Rosh Hodesh falls out on Shabbat, it
would actually be prohibited to repeat the Amida if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh
VeYavo
, since it is prohibited to offer a tefillat nedava on
Shabbat. [Eretz HaTzvi, pp. 43-44.]
(Emphasis added)
And one is not surprised to find that
this exact recitation is found in R. Tzvi (Hershel) Schachter, Eretz HaTzvi
(Yeshiva University Press: New York, 1991).
While at first glance this note is
not surprising – it appears that the Rav and his grandfather are adopting the
ruling of the Magen Avraham over his peers — upon further examination it is
clear that this is an exceptionally innovative ruling, in fact.  Furthermore, the expansion of this ruling by
the Rav himself (“the Rav suggested that when Rosh Hodesh falls out on Shabbat,
it would actually be prohibited to repeat the Amida if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh
VeYavo”)
is unprecedented, but logically compelling.
A review of the sources is needed.
The Talmudic Sources, the Rishonim
and the Codes.

The Gemera in Shabbat 24a recounts
rather directly:
דתני רבי אושעיא: ימים שיש בהן קרבן
מוסף, כגון ראש חודש וחולו של מועד – ערבית ושחרית ומנחה מתפלל שמונה עשרה, ואומר
מעין המאורע בעבודה, ואם לא אמר – מחזירין אותו
R. Oshaia taught: On
those days when there is a mussaf, such as Rosh Chodesh and Chol Hamoed
at the Evening, Morning and Afternoon services, the shemona esrai is
recited, and the nature of the day is inserted in the avoda blessing [ya’aleh
veyavo
] and if one does not insert it, one repeats the Shemona Esrai.
And the gemera in Brachot 30b recounts
rather directly what appears to be a slightly different rule.
והתניא: טעה ולא הזכיר של ראש חודש
בשחרית[1]
– אין מחזירין אותו מפני שיכול לאומרה במוספין, במוספין – אין מחזירין אותו מפני
שיכול לאומרה במנחה! – אמר ליה: לאו איתמר עלה, אמר רבי יוחנן, – בצבור שנו.
If one forgot and did
not recite yaaleh veyavo in the morning [tefillah], he is not made to repeat
[the prayer], because he can say it in mussaf if he forgot it in musaf, he is
not made to repeat, because he can say it in mincha? — He said to him: Did you not
leave out the rule of Rabbi Yochanan: This applies only to prayer said in a
congregation?
Rashi (aware of the possible
contradiction between these two sources) seeks a simple resolution with his two
sided comments. Rashi in Brachot 30 b states:
בצבור שנו – דאין
מחזירין, משום דשמע ליה משליח ציבור, ואיכא מקצת הזכרה, אבל ביחיד צריך לחזור,
ובהלכות גדולות מפרש לה בשליח ציבור משום טירחא דצבורא, אבל יחיד הדר.
In a
Congregation:
One does not repeat davening, since one can hear it from the
chazzan, and that is some partial recitation, but an individual must repeat;
The Bahag explains that the chazzan is different since otherwise the community
will be delayed, but other than the chazzan, one must repeat.
And one of these two resolutions of the contradiction (or both) is
– as far as I can see – accepted by every single rishon who comments on
the gemera.  Rambam (Tefillah 10:10-12)
states directly:
טעה ולא הזכיר יעלה ויבא אם נזכר קודם שישלים תפלתו חוזר לעבודה
ומזכיר, ואם נזכר אחר שהשלים תפלתו חוזר לראש,* * * *. במה דברים אמורים בחולו של מועד או
בשחרית ובמנחה של ראשי חדשים, אבל ערבית של ראש חדש אם לא הזכיר אינו חוזר.כל מקום שהיחיד חוזר ומתפלל ש”ץ
חוזר ומתפלל אם טעה כמותו בעת שמתפלל בקול רם, חוץ משחרית של ראש חדש שאם שכח
ש”ץ ולא הזכיר יעלה ויבא עד שהשלים תפלתו אין מחזירין אותו מפני טורח ציבור,
שהרי תפלת המוספין לפניו שהוא מזכיר בה ראש חדש.
Rambam Tefillah 10:10-12

If
one errs and forgets to mention Ya’aleh veyavo — if one remembers
before one has finished one’s amidah, one should return to retzey, and
recite it. If one remembers after one has concluded one’s amidah, one must
repeat the amidah from the beginning.  *
* *When does this rule apply? On Chol Hamo’ed or in the morning or Mincha
amidah of Rosh Chodesh. However, in the evening service of Rosh Chodesh, if one
failed to mention it one need not repeat one’s prayers. In every case in which
an individual is required to repeat his prayers, the chazzan is also required
to repeat his prayers if he made that mistake while praying out loud, with the
exception of the morning service of Rosh Chodesh, where if the chazzan failed
to mention Ya’aleh v’yavo before completing the amidah, he is not
required to repeat the amidah because of the delay this would cause the
congregation, since the Musaf service is still to be recited and Rosh
Chodesh will be mentioned there.
And the same rule is codified in the Shulchan Aruch, with the
addition that one can also adopt the approach of the Bahag as quoted by Rashi
and instead of praying again, one can hear the prayers from the chazzan.  Shulchan Aruch OC 124:10 codifies the rule
in Shabbat 24a and Shulchan Aruch OC 126:3 codifies the exception in Brachot
30b.
שולחן ערוך
אורח חיים הלכות תפלה סימן קכד סעיף י
מי ששכח ולא אמר יעלה ויבא בר”ח או בחולו של מועד או בכל דבר
שצריך לחזור בשבילו, יכוין דעתו וישמע מש”צ כל י”ח ברכות מראש ועד סוף כאדם
שמתפלל לעצמו; ולא יפסיק ולא ישיח
Shulchan Aruch OC 124:10
One for
forgets and does not recite yaaleh veyavo on Rosh Chodesh or chol Hamoed or any
other cases where one must repeat the amidah due to the omission, he can focus
himself during the repetition and hear the words from the chazzan of all
Eighteen blessings, from beginning to end, like a person who is himself praying
without interruption or digression.
שולחן ערוך
אורח חיים הלכות תפלה סימן קכו סעיף ג
כל מקום שהיחיד חוזר ומתפלל, ש”צ חוזר ומתפלל, אם טעה כמותו
כשמתפלל בקול רם, חוץ משחרית של ר”ח, שאם שכח ש”צ ולא הזכיר יעלה ויבא
עד שהשלים תפלתו, אין מחזירין אותו, מפני טורח הצבור, שהרי תפלת המוספין לפניו
שהוא מזכיר בה ר”ח.
Shulchan Aruch OC 126:3
In every case in which an individual is required
to repeat his prayers, the chazzan is required to repeat his prayers if he made
that same mistake while praying out loud, with the exception of the morning
service of Rosh Chodesh, where if the chazzan failed to mention Ya’aleh
v’yavo
before completing the amidah, he is not required to repeat the
amidah because of the delay this would cause the congregation, since the Musaf
service is still to be recited and Rosh Chodesh will be mentioned there.
So far, the halacha is clear and simple.  One must repeat the amidah if one forgets yaaleh veyavo (either
by actually repeating it or through listening to it recited by another) except
for the rare situation of the Shacharit chazzan who forgets during his
repetition.
The Alternative of the Rama MePano: A Different Rule
Rama MePano 25:5 understands the basic flow of the sources in a
different way and adds something quite new to the codification of the
halacha.  He states:
יחיד ששכח ולא הזכיר קדושת היום בתפלת שחרית ואחר שהתפלל מוסף חזר
והתפלל שחרית, ודאי אינו צריך לחזור ולהתפלל מוסף, שאפי’ בקרבנות גופייהו אם הקדים
את שאינו תדיר מה שעשה עשוי. ואי לאו דמסתפינא אמינא דלא אמרו בגמרא להחזיר את
היחיד שטעה אף על פי שיש לפניו תפלת המוספין אלא קודם שהתפלל מוסף כיון שבידו לתקן
יתקן לגמרי, הא אם התפלל מוסף הרי הזכיר קדושת היום ואין צורך לחזור ולהתפלל
שחרית, דלא גרע דיעבד ליחיד ממאי דשרינן לכתחלה לרבים, ודברים של טעם הם להלכה
מהתם, הגע עצמך שש”צ יהא נזקק להוציא עשרה שאינן בקיאין ידי חובתן ושכח ולא
הזכיר שחרית מעין ר”ח ועם תפלת מוסף פוטר עצמו וחבריו לכתחלה ולא אחד בהם
חוזר ומתפלל שחרית, לא יהא יחיד הבקי בדיעבד אלא כעשרה שאינן בקיאין ולכתחלה.
An
individual, who forgets and does not recite the mention of the day in the
Shacharit amidah and then he recites musaf, returns to recite Shacharit.  Certain he does not have to return to recite
musaf again, since even with the Bet Hamikdash sacrifices themselves, if one
did them out of order, and sacrificed the infrequent first, that which was
done, was done.  If I were not
uncertain, I would say that that the gemera does not direct an individual who
errors to repeat the amidah, only before he has recited musaf, since he can fix
this matter, he should do so completely. 
But, if he already recited musaf, he has already recited the proper
sanctification of the day and he does not have to recite Shacharit again, since
the after the fact rule for a single prayer is no worse than that which we
permit ideally for the many.  This seems
logical and normative as a matter of halacha: Consider for yourself that the
chazzan who is connected to the obligation to fulfill the obligation for ten
who cannot pray when they are not experts, and yet when he forgets to recite yaalah
veyavo
in Shacharit, he can fulfill his and others obligations in musaf
perfectly. And not of them have to go back and recite Shacharit again.  A single person who can pray for himself
after the fact, is no worse than ten who are not experts ideally.
The Rama mePano understand the sources in a new and novel way:
really according to the formulation in Brachot 30b (which the halacha follows)
one can rule that if one already prayed the proper mussaf before one realized
that one forgot to recite ya’aleh vehavo in Shacharit, one need not pray
again, since one can be no worse that the chazzan mentioned in the gemera
above. And this view is adopted by the Magen Avraham (OC 126:3) as well, who
states:
כל מקום – כ’ מ”ע סי’ כ”ה אי לאו דמסתפינא הייתי אומר יחיד
שלא הזכיר ר”ח בשחרית והתפלל מוסף אין צריך שוב להתפלל שחרית דלא גרע דיעבד
ליחיד מלכתחלה לרבים ודברים של טעם הם להלכה ע”כ, ול”נ דנכון למעשה שלא
יתפלל דלא יהא אלא ספק [כ”ה סימן תכ”ב]:
3            Any
place.  It is written in the Rama Mepano
25 that if he were not so uncertain he would say that a person who forgets to
recite yaaleh veyavo in Shacharit and then recites musaf he does not
have to again go back and recite shacharit another time, since the after the
fact rule for a single person is not worse that the ideal rule for the
many.  This approach has much merit as
normative halacha.  In my view, it is
proper lemaseh that one should not recite shacharit again, since the
matter is in doubt.
Magen Avraham seems to agree with the tentative rule of the Rama
mePano and thus decides that if one already recited musaf, then one does
not have to say shacharit again.  Magen
Avraham, however, does not claim that one can decide not to recite Shacharit
again and intend it rely on this subsequent recitation of musaf.
An Explanation of the Rav’s View
As quoted above, this was not the Rav’s view.  Rather (as the Koren siddur notes) “the Rav
posited that if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo on Rosh Hodesh
during Shaharit, one should not repeat the Amida, but should rather rely upon
the reference to the holiday that will be made in the Musaf prayer.” Notice the incredible chiddish
the Rav puts forward.  He expands the
Rama mePano and Magen Avraham to include the case where one is eventually
going to recite musaf
, but has not yet done so, and he adds to this that on
Shabbat one must adopt this rule, since a teffilat nedava is
prohibited.  This chiddish
which to the best of my knowledge is completely unfound in any Rishon at all —
is I think built on a totally different approach to the two Talmudic sources
from any Rishon and even quite distinct from the Magen Avraham and Rama mePano,
although related and derived from it.
Consider
how to explain the three basic views adopted:
All Rishonim: Either Brachot 30b is addressing the
unique situation of the chazzan or is because one can hear it correctly from
the chazzan, but it never applies in the case of a person who is davening alone
without a minyan present.  Shabbat
24a is the rule – one who leaves out Ya’aleh
VeYavo
has to repeat the amida. 
No distinction is made between weekday and Shabbat.

Rama MePano and Magen Avraham: Shabbat 24a is the rule,
but Brachot 30b is the exceptional rule for the chazzan in order to not delay
the community.
  One who is not the chazzan cannot rely on
Brachot 30b.  If one has already prayed
mussaf, then one has no choice but to follow the Brachot 30b rules, since he
has already after the fact fulfilled his obligation.  Again, no distinction is made between the weekday and Shabbat.
Rabbi Yosef Dov Halevi Soloveitchik: Brachot 30b and Shabbat
24a are in tension since one directs one to repeat amida and one directs one
not to.  The halacha follows the rule
of Brachot 30b in that one who skips Ya’aleh
VeYavo
in Shacharit never really has to repeat the amida
, except
as a voluntary prayer, and when voluntary prayer is prohibited (such as on
Shabbat), such a repetition is prohibited too. 
This is based on the insight of the Rama MePenao, but is quite an
expansion of it.
Allow me to suggest, as a proof to Rabbi
Soloveitchik’s understands of the basic Talmudic sources, that one can focus on
three basic aspects of the two sugyot to support this chiddish.  First is the fact that that the gemera in
Shabbat can reasonably be limited to weekdays (chol) cases where 18
blessings is said, which is why it used the language of shemonah esrai
and on such days, a tefillat nedavah is possible.[2]  Second, the Brachot sugya can
reasonably be limited to Shabbat, since it discusses forgetting that it is Rosh
Chodesh but yet reciting musaf: when can one forget that it is Rosh Chodesh and
yet still recite musaf?  Almost never
during the weekdays (since if one did not remember it was Rosh Chodesh, one
would not say musaf as a factual matter) but only on Shabbat, when no tefillat
nedavah
is possible, and yet musaf is recited, even if it is not
Rosh Chodesh![3]  Parsing the two sources in their context
allows one to see that Shabbat 24a directive is the suggestion for a tefillat
nedava
and the Brachot 30b rule is actually the rule – no repetition is
permitted when no tefillat nedavah is possible.[4]
Finally, it is not difficult to divide the
Brachot sugya into two thoughts along a line similar to the Rama MePano (but
not identical). The first is the general rule that no repetition for ya’aleh
veyavo
is needed when one says a subsequent amidah (musaf), and the
second view is that of Rav Yochanan that in a tzibbur is different, since one
does not actually have to wait until the next amidah to fulfill one’s
obligation, but one can fulfill it by listening to the chazzan repeat this
davening (as per the main view of Rashi). 
Of course, this view concedes, according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, that
when one cannot hear it from the chazzan, one still does not repeat the amidah,
except when a teffilat nedavah is acceptable (which nowadays is
never).  In fact, the Rav must have
ruled that whether or not the halacha adopts Rav Yochanan’s view, the rest of
the Brachot sugya is correct. 
This also makes the Brachot sugya (the “on topic” gemera)
normative (lehacha), and the Shabbat sugya (the “off topic”
gemera) not normative (shelo lehalacha) – a more compelling read of the sugyot.
It is worth noting that if this explanation of
the Rav’s view is correct, another chiddish seems also to be
correct.  On Shabbat Rosh Chodesh, when
one is davening by oneself without a minyan, and one forgets that it is Rosh
Chodesh for both Shacharit and Musaf, and remembers after mincha, one does not
repeat musaf again, since one can follow the formulation of Brachot 30b thatבמוספין – אין מחזירין אותו מפני שיכול
לאומרה במנחה! and a tefillat nedava is not possible.  The same is true if one forgets it is Rosh
Chodesh on Shabbat mincha, but had previously remembered at shacharit and
mussaf.


[1] I have deleted the
words “בערבית – אין מחזירין אותו מפני
שיכול לאומרה בשחרית” since nearly all the rishonim do not have them in their
gemera and this makes more sense given the flow of the sugya.
[2] The Gemera in Shabbat 24a states מתפלל שמונה
עשרה,
ואומר מעין המאורע בעבודה.
[3] Of course, one could
also read the Gemera in Brachot as speaking about a case during the weekday
when one forgot ya’aleh veyavo in shacharit but recited musaf – but then
the sugyot are in flat out conflict. 
The approach, which also notes that the term shemona esrai (the
weekday amidah) is in Shabbat 24a and not is Brachot 30b, eliminates the ccore
onflict between the two sugyot.
[4] This approach has the
additional advantage of making the Brachot Talmudic source superior to the
Shabbat one, which is more reasonable and in line with the general rule, in
that the Brachot source is directly on the topic of ya’aleh veyavo and
the Shabbat source is off topic and incidental, following the general Talmudic
rule that when Talmudic sources conflict, we prefer to follow the one that is
central and not the one that is incidental.



What is Bothering the Aruch Hashulchan? Women Wearing Tefillin

What is Bothering the Aruch
Hashulchan
?
Women Wearing Tefillin
Michael J. Broyde
mbroyde@emory.edu
Please note that this piece isn’t meant to be construed one way or another as the view of the Seforim Blog.
Introduction
In our previous article,[1]
we focused on the view of the Mishnah Berurah concerning women wearing
tefillin.  In this article, we focus on
the Aruch Hashulchan, whose approach is also complex, reflecting the complexity
of the area.
The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 38:6) states:
נשים ועבדים פטורים מתפילין מפני שהיא מצות עשה
שהזמן גרמא דשבת ויו”ט פטור מתפילין ואם רוצין להחמיר על עצמן מוחין בידן ולא
דמי לסוכה ולולב שפטורות ועכ”ז מברכות עליהן דכיון דתפילין צריך זהירות יתירה
מגוף נקי כדאמרינן בשבת [מ”ט.] תפילין צריכין גוף נקי כאלישע בעל כנפים
ובירושלמי ברכות שם אמרו תמן אמרין כל שאינו כאלישע בעל כנפים אל יניח תפילין אך
אנשים שמחויבים בהכרח שיזהרו בהם בשעת ק”ש ותפלה ולכן אין מניחין כל היום
כמ”ש בסי’ הקודם וא”כ נשים שפטורות למה יכניסו עצמן בחשש גדול כזה ואצלן
בשעת ק”ש ותפלה כלאנשים כל היום לפיכך אין מניחין אותן להניח תפילין ואף על
גב דתניא בעירובין [צ”ו.] דמיכל בת שאול היתה מנחת תפילין ולא מיחו בה חכמים
אין למידין מזה דמסתמא ידעו שהיא צדקת גמורה וידעה להזהר וכן עבדים כה”ג
[עמג”א סק”ג וב”י ולפמ”ש א”ש[:
Women and slaves are
exempt from the mitzvah of tefillin since it is a positive commandment
that is time bound since tefillin are not worn on Shabbat and Yom Tov.  If they wish to adopt this as a stringency,
we should protest.  This is not
comparable to sukkah and lulav from which they are exempt, but nonetheless
recite a blessing. This is because tefillin require extra diligence
regarding cleanliness, as it states in Shabbat (49a) that tefillin need
a clean body like Elisha .In the Jerusalem Talmud (Berachot) it says that
anyone who is not clean like Elisha should not wear tefillin.  Even men must be careful [with cleanliness]
when reciting the Shema and Amida which is why they do not wear them all day,
as I noted in the previous paragraph. 
If this is so, then why should women — who are exempt [from the mitzva
of tefillin] — place themselves under this great risk, since for them,
[wearing tefillin] when the Shema and the Amida are recited is comparable to
men [wearing tefillin] the entire day. 
Therefore, we do not permit them to put on tefillin.  Even though it recounts in Eruvin (96a) that
Michal bat Shaul did don tefillin, and the rabbis did not rebuke her, we
should not extrapolate from this, since they knew that she was very righteous
and could be careful.  Slaves are in the
same situation. [See the Magen Avraham 38:3 and the Bet Yosef; according to
what I have written all makes sense.]
There are a few problems with the Aruch
Hashulchan that are immediately clear. Four come to mind as requiring
resolution in order to understand the Aruch HaShulchan:
·       
Why
does he not cite the primary source for the halacha of rebuking women, which is
the Pesikta?
·       
What
are the characteristics of women who can put on tefillin according to
the Aruch Hashulchan or does he mean that Michal bat Shaul is unique?
·       
Can
all slaves put on tefillin?  Can
any?
·       
What
is the problem with the Magen Avraham and the Bet Yosef that he is seeking to
answer?
In short to understand the Aruch Hashulchan’s
approach, one must first comprehend what is bothering him about other
approaches.  In this case, he tells the
reader what is bother him when he notes in his final parenthetical note [[עמג”א סק”ג
וב”י ולפמ”ש א”ש
in which each word is abbreviate, but crucial to understanding, so we spell it
out:
[עיין
מגן אברהם סעיף קטן ג ובית יוסף ולפי מה שכתב אתיא שפיר[:
[See
the Magen Avraham call note 3, and the Bet Yoesef, and according to what I have
written all is 
logical.]
In this note, Aruch Hashulchan is claiming that
neither the Magen Avraham nor the Bet Yosef have properly solved the problem,
and he thus doing so.  This paper is an
explanation of that.
The
Approach of the Bet Yosef:

Bet
Yosef (OC 38) quotes Tosafot, as well as the Pesikta to explain the reasoning
behind Chazal’s recorded disapproval of Michal bat Shaul wearing tefillin.  Bet Yosef states and elaborates:
כתב הכל בו (סי’ כא) בשם הר”ם שאם רצו הנשים
להניח תפילין אין שומעין להן מפני שאינן יודעות לשמור עצמן בנקיות עכ”ל ובספר
ארחות חיים (הל’ תפילין סי’ ג) הקשה עליו מדאמרינן בריש פרק המוצא תפילין (שם)
דמיכל בת כושי (פירוש בת שאול) היתה מנחת תפילין ולא מיחו בה חכמים. ולי נראה שטעם
הר”ם כמו שכתבו התוספות (ד”ה מיכל) דאיתא בפסיקתא (רבתי פרק כב) שמיחו
בה חכמים ופירשו הם דטעמא משום דתפילין צריכין גוף נקי ונשים אינן זריזות ליזהר
והר”מ רצה לחוש לדברי הפסיקתא:
The Kol Bo (21) writes
in the name of the Maharam that if women wish to wear tefillin, we do
not listen to them, since they do not know how to keep themselves clean.  The Orchot Chaim (Tefillin 3) questioned
this based on the Talmud in Eruvin 96a that Michal bat Kushi (daughter of Saul)
did don tefillin and the rabbis did not rebuke her.  To me, it appears that the view of the
Maharam is like that quoted by Tosafot (sv michal) as it appears in the
Pesikta that the Sages did rebuke her. They explained the reason to be that tefillin
need a clean body and women are not careful about such matters.  Maharam was concerned for the view of the
Pesikta.
The Bet Yosef is clear and simple.  He thinks that there is a dispute between
rabbinic sources about whether any women can ever wear tefillin.  The Babylonian Talmud rules that Michal bat
Shaul can wear tefillin, and she is a model for all other women; the
Pesikta states that such is prohibited to all women, even to women like Michal
bat Shaul.  Some, the Bet Yosef claims,
are concerned with the view of the Pesikta, which they think is normative.
Following his rules to resolve disputes, Rabbi
Karo in the Shulchan Aruch rules against the Peskita and like the Bavli, as
such is the resolution favored by Rambam, Rif and Rosh. Rabbi Karo states
simply:
נשים ועבדים פטורים מתפילין, מפני שהוא מצות עשה
שהזמן גרמא.
Women and slaves are
exempt from the mitzvah of tefillin since it is a positive time bound
commandment.
Nothing is codified to discourage this conduct;
only an exemption is noted.  The view of
our Talmud is codified and nothing else is cited.  According to Rabbi Karo, tefillin are like lulav, sukkah
and shofar, which women need not, but may do, and is a mitzvah for them
to do.  The Peskta is rejected.
The Approach of the Magen Avraham
The Rema, however, adds the alternative:
 הגה: ואם הנשים רוצין להחמיר על עצמן, מוחין
בידם.
If the women wish to be
strict for themselves, we protest.
The Rema seems to be adopting the view of the
Pesikta that we ought to protest such conduct, essentially prohibiting it. Much
is unclear about the Rama, including why and does he mean all women (although
logic inclines one to think that he means all women.)
To explain the position of the Rama, Magen
Avraham (38:3) write:
מוחין כו’ – מפני שצריכין גוף נקי ונשים אינם
זריזות להזהר אבל אם היו חייבים לא היו פטורין מה”ט דהוי רמי אנפשייהו
ומזדהרי כנ”ל דלא כע”ת:
We protest: Since they
need a clean body and women are not particularly careful with cleanliness; but
if they were obligated, they would not be exempt for that reason since they
would accept the mitzvah upon themselves and they would thus be
conscientious.  Such appears to me to be
the rule, and not like the Olat Tamid.
The whole thrust of the Magen Avraham is to
explain the view of the Pesikta in contrast to the Bavli.  The Magen Avraham explains that the Pesikta
rules once one is not obligated in donning tefillin, one is not careful
to be clean and only those obligated are considered careful enough to wear tefillin.  The Magen Avraham’s view is simple and
central.  The halacha follows the
Pesikta’s view which is that the Rabbis made a decree that no one may don tefillin
other than those who are obligated.  Even
Michal bat Shaul may not. The Magan Avraham explains the Rama as clearly
residing in the camp which rules that the halacha follows the Pesikta against
the Bavli.  The whole thrust of the
reasoning of the Magen Avraham is to reject the view of the Olat Tamid who
argues that Rama is codifying only the rule that women who are not clean should
be rebuked.[2]
Understanding the Aruch Hashulchan

The Aruch Hashulchan does not adopt either of
these views.  He thinks that the halacha
is balanced between two textual imperatives, and he thinks that neither the
Magen Avraham nor the Bet Yosef has balanced them correctly, since one accepts
that the Bavli is completely correct and one that the Pesikta is the rule.  Not so the Aruch Hashulchan: he accepts the
ruling of the Pesikta as codified by the Rama that one needs to rebuke women
who don tefillin, but he has to harmonize that ruling with the binding
holding of the Babylonia Talmud, which is the center of his (and our) halachic
universe that Michal Bat Shaul was not rebuked.
How does he do that?  The answer is clear.  He
quotes the Rama’s ruling (twice!) that one rebukes women and then he explains
the rule of the Rama consistent with the Talmud.  He never quotes the view of the Pesikta and explains the
halacha exclusively on the basis of the Bavli.
 His logic is simple and it can be laid out in almost mathematical
form.
1.     
We
are very concerned about physical cleanliness and thus no men wear tefillin other
than during morning prayer time when they are obligated to.
2.     
Men
are obligated and women are not.
3.    Thus,
just like we discourage men from wearing tefillin all day long, we
discourage women from wearing tefillin even during prayer, since they
are not obligated.
4.     But
(just like it is not prohibited for a man who is careful to wear his tefillin
all day long[3]), it is not
prohibited for a woman to wear tefillin if she is careful.  Only exceptional and rare women are careful
in that way.
5.     The
Babylonian Talmudic discussion about Michal bat Shaul is not – as the Bet Yosef
claims – about all women, but only about special and unique women.  The Pesikta claim that the Bavli is wrong
even about these special and unique women has to be rejected as the Bavli is
controlling when directly on point. 
But, in all other cases, we follow the Pesikta, since the Bavli can be
read as only speaking about special cases.
Thus, while he quotes the Rama’s view that we
must object to women donning tefillin, he modifies it in his last
sentence of analysis — exactly because it goes quite clearly and directly
against our Talmud (the touchstone of Jewish law).  Aruch Hashulchan wants to make it clear that we do rule exactly
like the Bavli, but as understood though the lenses of the Pesikta.  When the Peskita and the Bavli directly
conflict or seem to conflict, then we have to adopt the rule of Bavli: when
they do not, we adopt an explanation of the Bavli consistent with that of the
Pesikta.  That explanation focuses on
the rule of cleanliness, and rules that people who might be unclean and who are
not obligated ought to be rebuked when they don tefillin.  In short, the Aruch Hashulchan rules that as
a general rule women are rebuked (as the Pesikta states) but exceptional women
are not, as the Bavli rules, but even the Bavli agrees that women generally
should not don tefillin.[4]
The following things are then apparent from the
Aruch Hashulchan.
·      He
rejects the view of the Magen Avraham that all women and slaves are
categorically prohibited from donning tefillin.
·       
The
Aruch Hashulchan does not cite the Pesikta because he thinks that the ultimate
holding of the Pesikta is wrong, in that Michal bat Shaul is allowed to wear
tefillin without rebuke.  But, he does
not reject the rule of rebuke generally, as he is concerned that women will
cavalierly don tefillin when they are not clean, and that should be
discouraged and rebuked.
·       
The
Aruch Hashulchan thinks that, as a matter of theory, a slave and a cheresh
(who are also not obligated in tefillin) are also allowed to wear tefillin
when concerns of cleanliness are not present. 
It is unclear from his formulation if he adopts the view of the Olat
Tamid that all slaves can wear tefillin, or he adopts the view of the
Tosaphot Yerushalayim that only slaves who are rare and special like Tevi are
allowed to wear tefillin.  But, it is
clear from the Aruch Hashulchan’s formulation with regard to a cheresh
that one who is not obligated but clean may wear tefillin.[5]  (For reasons explained in the previous
article on the Mishnah Berurah, in terms of tefillin law, both slaves
and chereshim are harder cases than women.[6])
In Sum: The Aruch HaShulchan preserves the Talmudic
rule of non-rebuke in a subset of case, as that is the rule codified in the
Talmud.  This is consistent with a
proper methodological understanding of the Aruch Hashulchan, who would be very
hesitant to rule like a Pesikta against a clear Bavli.  He argues with the Magen Avraham and those
many others who codify the rule that rebukes even Michal bat Shaul.  So too, he argues with the Bet Yosef who
simply ignores the Pesikta completely. 
The Aruch Hashulchan codifies both rules while giving priority to the
Bavli when the two sources conflict. 
This approach of the Aruch Hashulchan explains
why he is also comfortable arguing with the inclination of the Magen Avraham
that even men should not wear tefillin other than during the times of
prayer.[7]
 Magen Araham is inclined to rule that
once a man has fulfilled the tefillin obligation, he should not put them
on again, since a man who has already donned tefillin is like a woman
who has not, and neither may don again, (based on the rules of the Pesikta).  Aruch Hashulchab rejects the rule of the
Pesikta as applicable to all women, treating it only as good advice and permits
both very pious and unique men and women to violate it when it is clear that
fears about cleanliness do not apply to them. 
Such men he calls יחידי סגולה and such women he calls צדקת גמורה.
There is one important thing still unclear in
the Aruch Hashulchan.  We do not know
who else fits into the Michal bat Shaul rule besides her?  He classifies women who should not be
rebuked under the heading of צדקת גמורה וידעה להזהר which literally means that “she was a
completely righteous woman who knew to be careful [about cleanliness]”[8]
What is clear, however, is a few things.
1.     
The
Aruch HaShulchan rejects without citing[9]
the view of the Olat Tamid 38:3 that the proper classification of women who may
put on tefillin is as elderly, since the Aruch Hashulchan does not
connect cleanliness to menstruation (other than in some factual way, as he does
in OC 88:4).
2.     
Furthermore,
the Aruch Hashulchan does not limit to the rule of Michal bat Shaul to a
functional null set, like other authorities, who nominally rule like the Bavli
in the case of Michal bat Shaul and the Pesikta in all other cases, but insist
that the Michal bat Shaul case is limited to daughters of kings who are also
wives of kings, as the Levush does (OC 17:2) or various kabbalists (cited by
the Klaf Hachaim 38:9) who limit it to women who cannot have children and do
not menstruate.  These halachic
authorities are trying to solve the problem of the Bavli being in conflict with
the Pesikta as limiting the Bavli to a functional null set and the Aruch
Hashulchan will have none of that.  To
the Aruch Hashulchan, Michal bat Shaul is a functional case, as if he just
sought nominal fidelity to the rule of the Bavli, he would have adopted some
other rule that totally minimizes the Bavli.
3.   The
Aruch HaShulchan, like the Mishnah Berurah before him, rejects without citing
the view of the Gra (38:3) who rules that the Bavli and the Pesikta both agree
that women ought to be rebuked for donning tefillin.
4.     
The
Aruch Hashulchan, like the Mishnah Berurah before him, rejects the rule of the
Magen Avraham that all those who are not obligated in tefillin may not
wear them.
Rather, the Aruch Hashulchan codifies two simple
rules: (1) Women generally should not wear tefillin out of concerns of
cleanliness; (2) special women who are righteous and clean may do so.
Of course, to what extent this has practical
halakhic application is for a different discussion.  For example, there might be other rationales outside of tefillin
law prohibiting such conduct,[10]
or one could look to the view of the Magen Avraham and Pri Megadim and object
to women wearing tefilin due simply
to their lack of obligation.  But, the
Aruch Hahsulchan standing alone as a matter of tefillin law does not
flatly prohibit clean righteous women from wearing tefillin.


[2] As the Pre Megadim
notes in his explanation of the Magen Avraham, the Ashel Avraham 3, Magen
Avraham rules that all those exempt may not put on tefillin.  This is in direct contrast with the Olat
Tamid (38:4) who writes:מהא דאמרנן דלא מיחו בה חכמים משמע
דאם האשה זקנה וידעינן בה שיודעת לשמור את עצמה דאין למחות בה ובה”ג מיירי
התם:
Nevertheless, the source
that says the Rabbis did not rebuke Michal does imply that if a woman is
elderly [i.e., post-menopausal] and we know that she is capable of watching
herself [to stay clean], one should not rebuke her.  And it is such a case that the Talmud has in mind there [i.e. in
me shemeto
, where women are said
to be exempt from wearing tefilin, not categorically forbidden
from doing so].
[3] As Aruch Hashulchan OC
37:3 explicitly notes that uniquely rare men (“יחידי
סגולה“) wear tefillin
all day even nowadays.
[4] Much more can be said
about how the Aruch HaShulchan address tensions between the Bavli and other
Talmudic sources, which needs a much longer essay.   See generally
http://www.torahmusings.com/2011/05/the-yerushalmi-as-a-source-of-halacha/.
[5]Aruch  Hashulchan 37:12 states simply:
וחרש ושוטה ודאי דאין ליתן להם תפילין דבודאי לא
יזהרו בקדושתם:
A cheresh and an insane
person should not be given tefillin since certainly they will not be
careful with their holiness.
Implying that such a person who can be
careful is not prohibited.
[6] See the Mishnah Berurah
article cited in note 1.
[7] See Aruch Hashulchan OC
37:3:
ויש שמשמע מדבריהם שמי שירצה עתה להניחם כל היום
בבטחו שלא יפיח ולא יסיח דעת ומ”מ לא יניחם כל היום [עמג”א סק”ב]
ולענ”ד לא נראה כן וכן שמענו שיש יחידי סגולה ומה גם בדורות שלפנינו שהיו
נושאים כל היום ועכשיו נהגו ג”כ היחידים השרידים ללמוד מעט בהם אחר התפלה
There are those who wish
to derive from their words that one who wishes to don tefillin all day, certain
that he will neither pass gas nor lose focus, still should not do so [Magen
Avraham 37:2] and inmy opinion this does not appear correct, and we have heard
that there are unique special people even in the generations before us who
donned tefillin all day, and even now it is the custom of a few to keep them on
a bit after morning prayers.
[8] As I explain above, I
think it roughly correspondent to the way he understands men who can wear tefillin
all day, who he calls יחידי סגולה (unique and
special people) — special cases which actually do exist, but were not common.
[9] Unlike many of his
contemporaries – including the Mishnah Berurah who cites the Olat Tamid more
than 400 times — the Aruch Hashulchan did not cite the Olat Tamid more than 15
times and even then only when he is cited by others (most commonly, the Aliyah
Rabba).  I suspect that the Aruch Hashulchan
did not actually have the Olat Tamid in his library as it was already a rare
work.
[10] See for example, Piskai
Teshuva 38:3 who provide one such reason or the recent teshuva of Rabbi
Hershel Schachter who provides another.