In an earlier post I mentioned that I hoped to write about the nineteenth-century dispute about the historicity of the Hanukkah miracle of the oil. This dispute broke out after the publication of Hayyim Zelig Slonimski’s article claiming that Maimonides did not believe in the miracle. Fuel was added to the fire when R. Samuel Alexandrov publicly supported Slonimski and argued that the miracle of the oil was intended to be understood in a non-literal fashion, with the oil representing Torah. (He later retracted this view, presumably due to public pressure.) There is no longer a need for me to write in any detail about this matter after Zerachyah Licht’s recent comprehensive Seforim Blog post here, which also includes Slonimski’s original article.[1]
However, there are a few points I would like to add.
To give an example . . . of how [R. Samuel Moses] Rubenstein’s later thought broke with tradition, see his Ha-Rambam ve-ha-Aggadah (Kovno, 1937), p. 103, where he claims that the story of the miracle of Hanukkah is almost certainly a late aggadic creation, and like many other miracle stories in aggadic literature was not originally intended to be understood as historical reality:[2]
ספק הוא אם הנס של “פך השמן” הוא אפילו הגדה עממית קדומה, קרוב שהוא יצירה אגדית חדשה מבעל הברייתא עצמו או מאחד מבעלי האגדה, ונסים אגדיים כאלו רבים הם בברייתות וגמרא ומדרשים ע”ד ההפלגה כדרכה של האגדה. ולבסוף הובן נס זה למעשה שהיה. עיין שבת כ”ג א’. [טעם ברייתא זו הובא גם במגילת תענית (פ”ט) אבל כמו שנראה היא הוספה מאוחרת, ועיין (שם) ובפסיקתא רבתי (פיסקא דחנוכה) עוד טעם להדלקת נרות חנוכה[.
During the most recent Hanukkah I was using R. Joseph Hertz’s siddur, the Authorized Daily Prayer Book. Based upon how he describes the holiday and the lighting of the menorah, omitting any mention of the miracle of the lights (pp. 946-947), I assume that he also didn’t accept it literally. Note how he states that the lights were kindled during the eight-day Dedication festival, and this is the reason for the eight days of Hanukkah, rather than offering the traditional reason that the eight days of Hanukkah commemorate the eight days that the menorah miraculously burnt.
Three years to the day on which the Temple was profaned by the blaspheming foe, Kislev the 25th 165, Judah Maccabeus and his brethren triumphantly entered the Holy City. They purified the Temple, and their kindling of the lights during the eight-day festival of Dedication—Chanukah—is a telling reminder, year by year, of the rekindling of the Lamp of True Religion in their time.
Ad kan my words in the prior post. Some time ago I was asked if I know of any other traditional authors who deny the literalness of the Hanukkah miracle. It could be that R. Isidore Epstein should be added to the list, as in his classic work Judaism he describes Hanukkah and the kindling of lights, but mentions nothing about the miracle. However, unlike Hertz whose comments were in a siddur and directed to Jews, Epstein’s book is directed towards a general reader, and can still be used as a college text. Understandably, one would hesitate to include in such a book anything about a miracle. Yet I think it is telling that he does not even say something like, “according to tradition a cruse of oil with enough for one day burnt for eight.”
Another traditional author who must be mentioned in this regard is R. Zev Yavetz. Here is his picture.
And to remind people of what Slonimski looked like, here is his picture.[3]
And here is a picture of R. Alexandrov.
Yavetz was one of the leaders (and founders) of the Mizrachi movement, and Kfar Yavets, a religious moshav, is named after him. After his death, R. Kook wrote about how Yavetz was able to combine Torah and secular wisdom without being negatively affected and distorting religious values.[4] Yavetz is best known for his writings on Jewish history. His magnum opus is his 14 volume Toldot Yisrael. In volume 4, pp. 89-91, he discusses the Hanukkah story.
As you can see, there is no mention of the miracle of the oil. The eight day holiday is portrayed as a commemoration of the original eight day celebration that took place when the Temple was rededicated. I don’t think there is any other conclusion that can be drawn other than that Yavetz did not regard the miracle of the oil as an actual historical event.
In 1900 R. Aryeh Leib Feinstein published his Elef ha-Magen. On p. 35b he writes that whereas R. Judah (bar Ilai) believed in the Hanukkah miracle, R. Yose and R. Judah ha-Nasi did not, and that is the reason why R. Judah ha-Nasi did not include the laws of the Hanukkah lights in the Mishnah.
חיוב נר חנוכה עתה אינו בשביל המלוכה רק מפני הנס שנעשה בפך השמן שהדליקו בו שמונה ימים, ואף שגם טעם זה תלוי במחלוקת שבין ר’ יודא ור’ יוסי בהוריות [יא ע”ב] שלדעת ר’ יודא נסים רבים אירעו בשמן המשחה, ור’ יוסי חולק עליו שלא היה בו שום נס, ומטעם זה ג”כ השמיט רבי דיני נר חנוכה, ולא הזכירו בשום משנה, רק מזכירו לענין ניזקין בשם ר’ יודא שפוטר החנוני, לפי שר’ יודא לשיטתו סובר שנר חנוכה הוא מצוה לזכר הנס שאירע בפך שמן המשחה. אבל רבי פוסק כר’ יוסי לפי שנימוקו עמו. אך התלמוד אוחז בזה כר’ יודא לפי שהנס מהשמן כבר נתפרסם בהאומה.
On p. 36a Feinstein refers to the dispute between Slonimski and the rabbis, and says that many good Jews adopted Slonimski’s position. He tells us that he informed Slonimski that the dispute between him and the rabbis was actually an old dispute.
ואחריו נמשכו עוד רבים וכן שלמים שמהרו ויחליטו כדבריו . . . והראיתיו לדעת שבאמת ענין זה כבר דשו בו רבים, ונחלקו עליו משפחות משפחות, וביחוד ר’ יודא ור’ יוסי בהוריות. אך בכ”ז רבינו הקדוש אף שנטה למלכות בית דוד ולדעת ר’ יוסי, לא ערב לבו לנגוע במנהג ישן שקימו וקבלו עליהם הדורות שלפניו.
Not long ago I was listening to some recordings from R. David Bar-Hayim of Machon Shilo. One of them is entitled “The Story of the Macabees, part 2.” You can find it here. In this lecture, beginning at minute 27, R. Bar-Hayim explains that in his opinion there was no miracle of the oil, and it is simply a legend that developed in Babylonia, “because without that Hanukkah makes no sense for a Jew in galut.” Rather than attempt to summarize his perspective, it is preferable for readers to listen to his entire shiur.
Because of his originality, I would not have been surprised had R. Chaim Hirschensohn adopted the same sort of approach. Yet this is not the case, and R. Hirschensohn writes that the Hanukkah miracle was the final open miracle in Jewish history, by which he means that after this Jewish history is to be explained in a more naturalistic way, just like the history of other peoples. However, he adds that it must also be recognized that the very existence of the Jewish people over so many years in exile is itself a miracle.[5]
נר חנוכה הוא חותם הניסים בדברי ימי עמנו, כמלאכי חותם הנביאים.
אחרי נצחון החשמונאים החלו אצלנו דברי הימים כאשר לכל העמים, אם שאין ספק שגם מקודם היה לנו דברי הימים אבל המסופר לנו המה רק מעשה ניסים ובתוכם עלינו לבקש גרעיני דברי הימים, אבל המסופר לנו אחרי מלחמת החשמונאים כלו דברי הימים אבל הדברי הימים בעצמו הוא כלו מעשה נסים כי בארצות הגולה בנס אנו עומדים.
Since Slonimski claimed that Maimonides did not believe in the Hanukkah miracle, I think it is worth noting that although Maimonides could have stated that Hanukkah commemorates the military victory or the rededication of the Temple, he actually appears to say that the entire holiday is in commemoration of the lighting of the Menorah.[6] There are many sources[7] that state that the real miracle commemorated by Hanukkah is not the oil but the military victory, but this does not seem to be Maimonides’ perspective. Here is what he writes in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Hanukkah 3:2-3[8]:
ב. וכשגברו ישראל על אויביהם ואיבדום בחמישה ועשרים בחודש כסלו היה ונכנסו להיכל ולא מצאו שמן טהור אלא פך אחד ולא היה בו להדליק אלא יום אחד בלבד והדליקו ממנו נרות המערכה שמונה ימים עד שכתשו זיתים והוציאו שמן טהור.
ג. ומפני זה התקינו חכמים שבאותו הדור שיהיו שמונת הימים האלו שתחילתן מלילי חמישה ועשרים בכסלו ימי שמחה והלל ומדליקין בהן הנרות בערב על פתחי הבתים בכל לילה ולילה משמונת הלילות להראות ולגלות הנס וימים אלו הןן הנקראין חנוכה.
In fact, this is the talmudic perspective as well. Shabbat 21b asks what is the reason for the holiday of Hanukkah (מאי חנוכה), and rather than speak about the military victory or rededication of the Temple all it mentions is the miracle of the oil. Many will find this strange, since can this really be the reason for the holiday? It is one thing to say that this is the reason for the eight days of celebration, but can this be the reason for the holiday itself? The Sheiltot of R. Ahai Gaon[9] preserves another version of the talmudic text. Instead of מאי חנוכה it reads מאי נר חנוכה. With this as the question, the answer which explains about the miracle of the oil makes much more sense.[10]
Slonimski did not argue that Maimonides’ philosophy does not leave room for the Hanukkah miracle. He simply pointed out that when Maimonides records the talmudic story of the miracle he leaves out three words: נעשה בו נס. Here is the relevant section of the talmudic text in Shabbat 21b. I have underlined the crucial words:
וכשגברה מלכות בית חשמונאי ונצחום בדקו ולא מצאו אלא פך אחד של שמן שהיה מונח בחותמו של כהן גדול ולא היה בו אלא להדליק יום אחד נעשה בו נס והדליקו ממנו שמונה ימים לשנה אחרת קבעום ועשאום ימים טובים בהלל והודאה.
Here is what Maimonides writes in Hilkhot Hanukkah 3:2, and as you can see the underlined words do not appear.
וכשגברו ישראל על אויביהם ואיבדום בחמישה ועשרים בחודש כסלו היה ונכנסו להיכל ולא מצאו שמן טהור אלא פך אחד ולא היה בו להדליק אלא יום אחד בלבד והדליקו ממנו נרות המערכה שמונה ימים עד שכתשו זיתים והוציאו שמן טהור.
According to Slonimski, the omission of the words נעשה בו נס indicates that Maimonides does not believe that there was any miracle. Rather, Maimonides is telling us that since there was not enough oil to last for more than one day, they used a little of the oil on each of the eight days, until they were able to get more oil.
A weakness in Slonimski’s argument, which of course was pointed out, is that in the very next halakhah, 3:3, Maimonides appears to explicitly mention the miracle.
ומדליקין בהן הנרות בערב על פתחי הבתים בכל לילה ולילה משמונת הלילות להראות ולגלות הנס
It is hard to see the underlined words as referring to anything other than the miracle of the oil.
Needless to say, Slonimski would have been very happy to learn that these underlined words, although they appear in the standard printed editions of the Mishneh Torah going back to early printings, do not appear in manuscripts and are not authentic (and have thus been removed from the Frankel edition). Presumably, these words were added by someone to “correct” Maimonides’ omission of the miracle of the oil.[11] (Slonimski, who did not know that להראות ולגלות הנס was a later addition, was forced to claim that these words referred to the military victory.[12])
If this was all we had to go by, I might agree that Maimonides is hinting to us that he did not accept the historicity of the miracle of the oil. However, if we examine Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Hanukkah, chapter 4, we find that Maimonides mentions “the miracle,” and again, the miracle he refers to appears to be that of the oil.[13]
In 4:12 he writes:
מצות נר חנוכה מצוה חביבה היא עד מאוד וצריך אדם להיזהר בה כדי להודיע הנס ולהוסיף בשבח הא-ל והודיה לו על הנסים שעשה.
In 4:13 he writes
הרי שאין לו אלא פרוטה אחת ולפניו קידוש היום והדלקת נר חנוכה מקדים שמן להדליק נר חנוכה על היין לקידוש היום הואיל ושניהם מדברי סופרים מוטב להקדים נר חנוכה שיש בו זכרון הנס.
Isn’t the most likely understanding that these two halakhot refer to the miracle of the oil? In 4:12 he first mentions “the miracle,” which I believe refers to the miracle of the oil, and then mentions “the miracles” in plural, which would also include the military victory. I don’t believe that Maimonides generally leaves esoteric hints in the Mishneh Torah, so I don’t think leaving out the words נעשה בו נס are intended to hint to us that he rejects the historicity of the miracle. In fact, since Maimonides denies the historicity of some events recorded in the Bible, regarding them as dreams or visions, it would not have been a theological problem for him to do so with the miracle of the oil, the source of which is a talmudic aggadah. However, as we have seen, he seems to explicitly affirm this miracle in the Mishneh Torah. Therefore, one who wants to claim that Maimonides did not believe in the miracle (despite what he says in the Mishneh Torah), will have to base this claim on an interpretation of Maimonides’ approach to miracles as set out in the Guide.
As mentioned, Slonimski’s rejection of the miracle of the oil created a great controversy, but what appears to be unknown is that he was not the first of the Hebrew writers to bring this matter to the fore. The newspaper Ha-Magid published articles by both maskilim and traditional Torah scholars. On December 9, 1868[14] Nahum Bruell[15] published an article which states: “In truth, the story of this miracle is not accepted by all sages of the Talmud and Midrash.” He then cites Pesikta Rabbati, ch. 2, which asks why we light נרות on Hanukkah. Its answer is not the story of the miracle but that after the Jews entered the Temple they took eight spears and put נרות on them.
נכנסו לבית המקדש מצאו שם שמונה שפודין של ברזל וקבעו אותם והדליקו בתוכם נרות.
Bruell also cites the medieval tosafist R. Isaac ben Judah ha-Levi who in his Pa’neah Raza,[16] in explaining why the Hasmoneans decreed lighting of the נרות, mentions nothing about the miracle:
נסמכה פרשת נרות לחנוכת המזבח וע”ז סמכו בית חשמונאי לתקן נרות בחנוכה
Although Bruell cited this text to show that not everyone accepted the Hanukkah miracle, I find it impossible to believe that R. Isaac (or any other medieval Ashkenazic sage) did not accept the traditional story of the miraculous burning of the oil. If I am correct that R. Isaac’s explanation is not in place of the Hanukkah miracle but only to offer an additional explanation, then perhaps even a text like Pesikta Rabbati cites the explanation it does, not because it did not know or accept the story of the miraculous oil, but because it wanted to offer another explanation, perhaps one not as well known.
Bruell further suggests that the talmudic aggadah about the Hanukkah miracle was never meant to be taken literally:
ואפשר גם בתשובתם על השאלה מאי חנוכה רמזו לנו כעיון גדול ועמוק כי אין מעצר לד’ להושיע ברב או במעט ואם גם נמשכו כל כוכבי התקוה ורבים חללו את ברית קדש מ”מ מפך שמן טהור המונח בחותמו של כה”ג דהיינו משארית הצדיקים אשר יחזיקו במעזם ויבטחו בד’ נעשה נס, יבא עזרם מעם ד’ עשה שמים וארץ ועוד יזרח להם אור התשועה.
One more point worth noting is about the number 8. According to the traditional story of the miracle of the oil, what is special about the number 8? Most people have probably heard the reason, also accepted by Maimonides, Hilkhot Hanukkah 3:2, that in the days of the Hasmoneans this is how long it would take for those in Jerusalem to get new olive oil.[17] I never understood this explanation as why should getting new oil be a problem. It is not like olive trees are a rare thing in the Land of Israel. In any event, this explanation does not appear in the Talmud but is first found in a geonic responsum.[18]
למה אנו עושין שמונה ימי חנוכה מפני הנס שאירע שטמאו יונים וכו’. ומה טעם יש לשמנה לילות ולא הספיקו ממנו פחות או יותר.
מפני שהשמנים באים מחלקו של אשר כדכתיב (דברים לג, כד) וטובל בשמן רגלו ומקום היה לו שנקרא תקוע כדאמרינן תקוע אלפא לשמן שממנו השמנים יוצאים ומשם עד ירושלים היה מהלך שמנה ימים בין הליכה וחזרה והכי אמרינן במנחות ולפיכך המתין להם עד שיביאו משם שמן טהור וזה שנעשה להם נס לשמנת ימים.
There are a number of difficulties with this responsum. To begin with, we are told that olive oil came from the area of the tribe of Asher which is in the extreme north of the Land of Israel. This information is based on the fact that in Moses’ blessing for the tribe of Asher in Deuteronomy 33:24, he states, “let him dip his foot in oil.” This means that there would be lots of olive trees in Asher’s territory, but since there were plenty of olive trees closer to the Temple, why did they have to travel all the way to the land of Asher which, we are told, would require an eight day round trip. Even if one supposes (without any evidence) that normally they would go there since that was where the best olive oil was to be found, if they only had enough to light the menorah for one day, it is hard to imagine that they would not set out to find olive oil closer to the Temple.
The next point in the responsum is that there was a specific place in Asher’s territory called Tekoa, and that was where the oil came from. It cites Menahot 85b where the Mishnah states that “Tekoa ranks first for the quality of its oil.” Yet as I’m sure most people reading this know, Tekoa is near Jerusalem in the territory of Judah, not in the land of Asher. II Chronicles 11:5-6 states: “And Rehoboam dwelt in Jerusalem, and built cities for defense in Judah. He built even Bethlehem, and Etam, and Tekoa.”
As proof for the statement that it would take eight days to travel to the north and back in order to get the olive oil, we are told והכי אמרינן במנחות. Yet nowhere in Menahot is this information found. In Sefer Abudarham, Seder Hadlakat Ner Hanukkah, this geonic passage is quoted, but instead of referring to Menahot, we are told that the information is found in the Jerusalem Talmud. The same reference to the Jerusalem Talmud also appears in Hiddushei R. Yehonatan mi-Lunel, Shabbat 21b, and Sefer ha-Eshkol, ed. Auerbach, vol. 2, p. 20. For those who assume that Auerbach’s edition of Sefer ha-Eshkol is a forgery, this reference is just another example of the work incorporating passages from other writings.
I don’t have an answer as to why anyone assumed that the oil had to come from the land of Asher, but as for the city of Tekoa, it could be that there was another city also named Tekoa, in addition to the one we know about in the territory of Judah. The Soncino Talmud, Menahot 85b, informs us that both Graetz and Bacher think that the Tekoa mentioned there is in the Galilee, which could be said to include part of the territory of Asher.[19] Furthermore, Samuel Klein, the leading geographer of the Land of Israel, also argues that there was a city named Tekoa in the Galilee.[20]
What about the Tekoa that Amos came from? If you look at R. David Kimhi’s commentary to Amos 1:1, he tells us that Tekoa was a large city in the land of Asher (see also his commentary to Amos 7:10). In his commentary to II Samuel 14:2, he writes, quoting the Talmud in Menahot 85b (except for the first four words):
העיר בחלקו של אשר דכתיב ביה וטוב בשמן רגלי שמושך שמן כמעין
The biblical story Radak is commenting on is when Joab fetched a wise woman from Tekoa and told her to go to King David and pretend to be a mourner. I am surprised that Radak would assume that Joab was summoning a woman from all the way in the territory of Asher. In his response to Radak, R. Profiat Duran (Efodi[21]) states that it is obvious that the story is dealing with a city near Jerusalem.[22]
והשכל הישר ישפוט כי תקוע היה קרוב לירושלם כי איך ישלח לקרות אשה מארץ אשר היה רחוק מירושלם.
Again we have to ask, just because a city named Tekoa happened to be known for its olive oil, why should anyone assume that it is in the territory of Asher? The fact that the tribe of Asher was blessed with having a lot of olive trees in its territory does not mean that the other tribes did not also have a good supply. In fact, it appears to me that the peshat of Menahot 85b, where the Mishnah speaks of Tekoa as having good olive oil, is that it is speaking about the Tekoa near Jerusalem.[23] It is true that in the talmudic discussion Tekoa and the land of Asher are mentioned regarding olive oil, but their only connection would seem to be this, not that Tekoa has anything to do with Asher’s territory.[24]
Jeremiah 6:1 states: “Gather the sons of Benjamin from the midst of Jerusalem, and blow the horn in Tekoa.” Here Jeremiah is telling the tribe of Benjamin, who lived near Jerusalem, to blow the horn in Tekoa in order to warn the people about the danger from the approaching enemy. Malbim on this verse comments that Tekoa is part of Asher. I don’t understand how Malbim could view this as peshat. Why would the people of Benjamin travel to the territory of Asher to blow the shofar? This territory was occupied by foreign troops, the local inhabitants having been deported a long time before. Here are Malbim’s words:
העיזו אתה בני בנימין התאספו מקרב ירושלים, כי בני בנימין לא היו מבני העיר ורצו לחסות שם בירושלים, אומר כי יתרחקו משם, וגם בתקוע שהוא בחלק אשר, תקעו שופר.
Based on Jeremiah 6:1, Efodi states that Tekoa is actually in the territory of Benjamin and not, as I mentioned before, in Judah’s territory.[25]
Returning to our discussion of the Hanukkah miracle, R. Sharon Shalom recently published a very interesting book entitled Mi-Sinai le-Ethiopia (Tel Aviv, 2012). This book, which is a code of halakhah for Ethiopian Jews, has haskamot from R. Nachum Rabinovitch and R. Shabtai Rappaport. It is significant in that it takes into account that it is not so easy for the older generation of Ethiopian Jews to entirely reject their traditions in order to become modern rabbinic Jews. As such, R. Shalom permits certain things that would not make sense in the larger Jewish world but are part of what he terms “Ethiopian halakhah.” For example, R. Shalom permits Ethiopian Jews, especially of the older generation, to carry items regarded as muktzeh when this is related to holy matters, for example, bringing money to synagogue on the Sabbath for charity. This was not regarded as prohibited in Ethiopia and R. Shalom allows the practice to continue today (pp. 170-171).
This is a fascinating book as it attempts to slowly ease the Ethiopian community into the wider halakhic community rather than requiring an immediate abandonment of long-standing practices, something that would certainly be demanded by haredi poskim. You can see R. Shalom discuss his book here, and he is introduced by R. Rappaport.
While the book deserves detailed analysis, I only want to call attention to one additional point that is relevant to this post. Here is R. Shalom’s discussion of Hanukkah, from pp. 214-215 in the book. There is no mention of the Hanukkah miracle in explaining why we celebrate an eight day holiday.
I would like to call readers’ attention to a short essay by R. Nosson Fried on Megilat Antiochus.[26] Here is the title page.
R. Fried points out that in the version of Megilat Antiochus that he published in Kovetz Beit Aharon ve-Yisrael[27] there is no mention of the miracle of the oil. He is quite surprised by this for as he says, “this is the central miracle in commemoration of which they established the lighting on Hanukkah.” He adds that this miracle is not mentioned in Al ha-Nisim or in Pesikta Rabbati which has a good deal to say about Hanukkah. He then notes that all of the Eretz Yisrael paytanim, which includes Yanai and R. Eleazar ha-Kalir, and some of the European paytanim also do not mention the miracle. (Other European paytanim, such as R. Menahem ben Machir, do mention the miracle.) How can this be explained?
R. Fried’s answer is quite unexpected (p. 8): “The sages of the Land of Israel in the time of the Talmudim and Midrashim knew nothing about the miracle of the cruse of oil.” He explains that the story of the miracle is a Babylonian tradition and thus was not known in the Land of Israel, or even by some of the early European paytanim. He writes (p. 9):
שכל אותן המקורות הקודמים, החל מספרי החשמונאים וכלה בפייטני א”י ומקצת מפייטני אירופה הקדמונים, לא ידעו כלל שאמנם היה נס בשמן . . . [הנקודות במקור] לשיטתם נקבע חג החנוכה לזכר הנצחונות והנסים שאירעו לבני חשמונאי במלחמותיהם נגד היונים.
Coming from a haredi writer this is quite surprising, and let me explain why. All of the scholars who have argued against the historicity of the miracle of the oil have pointed out that none of the oldest texts dealing with Hanukkah mention this miracle. This includes 1 and 2 Maccabees, the earliest version of Megilat Ta’anit, tannaitic texts, and Josephus. Josephus even suggests a different explanation for why the holiday is called “Lights.” Those who defend the historicity of the miracle have to explain why these sources chose not to mention it.Before Fried, no traditional author had ever suggested that the miracle story was unknown to the tannaim and later rabbinic authors, and that is for an obvious reason. If you say that the tannaim did not know the miracle, to say nothing of the authors of the Book of Maccabees 1 and 2, the earliest version of Megilat Ta’anit, and Josephus, how is it possible that someone who lived a few hundred years later in Babylonia would know about the miracle? By saying that the people who lived in the Land of Israel close to the time of the events did not know the miracle, Fried is providing an argument that the miracle never happened and that the much later story recorded in the Babylonian Talmud is an aggadah which is not to be regarded as historical but rather teaches a lesson as many aggadot do. In other words, Fried’s argument leads to the same conclusion as Slonimski and R. Alexandrov, and for some reason he doesn’t see it.
R. Tuvyah Tavyomi has another approach to the matter.[28] He claims that since the miracle of the oil was only seen by a small group, the leaders of the generation were afraid that the masses, many of whom were hellenized, would not believe the story and thus not adopt the holiday. Therefore, they ordained the lighting of נרות without giving a reason, hiding the real reason from the people. The masses would believe that it was because of the military victory, while those who knew that holidays are only proclaimed for “out of the ordinary” miracles, they would find out about the story of the oil and would certainly believe it. According to R. Tavyomi, this explains why in the Al ha-Nissim prayer which is to be said by all people there is no mention of the miracle of the oil.
Finally, I was surprised that an article by Avraham Ohayon could be published in Shenaton Shaanan, the annual of Shaanan, a religious teachers college.[29] Ohayon’s article not only critically examines the story of the Hanukkah miracle, which he calls מיתוס נפ”ה (נס פך השמן) (p. 59), but concludes that that it is most likely that the miracle never happened and was invented by the Sages for religious reasons. On pp. 58-59 he writes:
שתיקתם של המקורות ההיסטוריים, ובמידה מסוימת גם של חז”ל ומקורות הלכתיים בעניין נפ”ה – מעוררת שאלות בקשר למשמעות העובדתית של נס זה: האם הנס התרחש, וכתוצאה ממנו קבעו חז”ל את סממניו ההלכתיים, או שכדי לקבוע הלכות לדורות היה צריך קודם לסמוך להם נס?
חלק הארי של המקורות דלעיל – מחזק יותר את קיומה של האפשרות השנייה. . . .
חז”ל החילו שני שינויים במהותו של החג, ושניהם קשורים זה בזה:
האחד – שינוי עיקרו של הנס, מסגידה לניצחון הצבאי – לנס על-טבעי שהוא נפ”ה.
השני – הענקת צביון דתי לחג על-ידי קביעת איסורים שונים, תפילות מיוחדות ומצוות הדלקת הנרות שמונה ימים – כזכר לנפ”ה.
In a note on this passage, Ohayon cites Gedaliah Alon who explains what would have led the Sages to invent the Hanukkah miracle:
[אלון] תומך בדעה השנייה מן הטעם, שחז”ל רצו להשכיח את שם החשמונאים וגבורתם מזיכרון האומה, ואולם לא יכלו לעקור את חג החנוכה גופו. לכן קבעו טעם אגדי ובדרך זו “קיפלו” בו את תקופת החשמונאים, שהרי סיפור נפ”ה התחיל ממקורות חז”ל בלבד. הוא מביא גם נימוקים ליחס זה של חז”ל לחשמונאים.
Nothing Ohayon writes would be surprising if it appeared in a general academic journal, but as mentioned, his article appeared in a religious journal and that is what I find significant.
Returning to R. Samuel Alexandrov, who as mentioned at first supported Slonimski, Geulah bat Yehudah has a nice article on him[30] as does Ehud Luz,[31] and there is a master’s dissertation on him by Tsachi Slater.[32] Yet I would like to call attention to a few things that these authors have not mentioned. To begin with, R. Alexandrov reports that after the death of R. Shemariah Noah Schneersohn he was asked to take the latter’s place as rav of Bobruisk (R. Alexandrov’s place of residence), yet he refused this offer.[33]
In Mikhtevei Mehkar u-Vikoret (1932), pp. 86-87, R. Alexandrov offers a provocative suggestion in explaining why Maimonides was so opposed to rabbis taking money from the community. He calls attention to Hullin 132b which states: “R. Simeon says. A priest who does not believe in the [Temple] service has no portion in the priesthood.” Rashi explains this to mean a priest who thinks the Temple service is nonsense and rather than having been commanded by God was invented by Moses. As for having no portion in the priesthood, Rashi explains that he does not receive a portion of the sacrificial meat.
Maimonides, Hilkhot Bikurim 1:1, codifies the law as follows:
וכל כהן שאינו מודה בהן אין לו חלק בכהנים ואין נותנין לו מתנה מהן.
According to R. Alexandrov, this is the key to understanding why Maimonides opposes rabbis taking money from the community. R. Alexandrov assumes based on what Maimonides writes in the Guide of the Perplexed that he did not really believe in the value of sacrifices. )R. Alexandrov himself did not believe that there would ever be a return to the sacrificial system.[34]) He further states that Maimonides realized that if he were a kohen he would have no portion in the priestly dues. Since the rabbinate, as the religious leadership of the community, replaces the old system of the kehunah, Maimonides reasoned that just as if he were a kohen he could not receive any priestly dues, so too as a rabbi he could take nothing from the community.
בספרו המורה הלא איננו מודה בקרבנות לפי המובן המורגל, ולכן חש בנפשו הנפש היפה שאין לו חלק במתנות כהונה . . . [הנקודות במקור] ובכן על פי טבעו ורוחו אוסר לקבל שכר רבנות, כי אמנם הרבנות הוא דמות זעיר אנפין של הכהונה בימים הקדמונים, כנודע.
R. Alexandrov also says a few things that some haredi readers will appreciate. For example, he explains Avot 2:2: וכל תורה שאין עמה מלאכה סופה בטלה וגוררת עון in a very original fashion. He understands מלאכה to mean the work of creating Torah novellae! This passage in the Mishnah is always used against the Israeli haredi approach of shunning work in favor of study, and I have never seen a good justification offered as to why the Mishnah’s words can be so easily set aside. Yet with R. Alexandrov’s explanation, this is no longer a problem.[35]
ומה שאמר “כל תורה שאין עמה מלאכה סופה בטלה וגוררת עון”, יש לכוין על מלאכת החדוש והפלפול וההגיון בתורתנו, ואומר כי תורה שאין עמה מלאכה ר”ל מלאכת החדוש סופה בטלה כי באמת רק כח החדוש הנותן פנים להתורה הקדושה בכל דור ודור לפי הרוח השורר אז, הוא הוא המקיים את התורה הישנה בעם ישראל.
* * * * *
1. Dov Weinstein called my attention to the following very significant responsum by R. Ovadiah Yosef that appeared in the journal Beit Yosef, Iyar 5776, no. 169. Over a century ago, R. Shalom Mordechai Schwadron suggested a way of “cleansing” a mamzer by having the husband send his wife a get and then void it before it is delivered. According to the Talmud, in such a case the marriage is to be regarded as annulled despite the fact that the husband voided the get. The problem the Sages had to deal with was if the husband was allowed to void a get after having sent it, the woman who received it would not know that it was invalid and would remarry. Although it would not be her fault, such a situation would result in her future children being mamzerim. The way around this was to decree that in such a case her original marriage was to be regarded as never having been actualized, something which the rabbis have authority to do. R. Schwadron’s originality comes in suggesting that this mechanism could also be used to solve the problem of mamzerut even after the fact, since if the original marriage is annulled in this fashion, by sending a get and then cancelling it before delivery, there is no subsequent adultery. This proposal, which was never put into practice by R. Schwadron, is discussed by R. J. David Bleich in Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 1, pp. 162ff.
R. Ovadiah’s responsum is of great importance since his approach would solve the problem of mamzerut in many case. In earlier years, R. Isser Yehudah Unterman suggested that R. Schwadron’s approach be followed in a particular case,[36] and R. Zvi Pesach Frank actually did so in another case.[37]
2. Is it significant that a haredi website recently published an article from a woman in which she argues that women should be able to become halakhic authorities? Was the website just looking to stir up trouble or is this a sign of something afoot even in the haredi world?
3. There has recently been a problem with the commenting whereby many comments that have Hebrew in them are rejected as spam. One of the rejected comments was by R. Moshe Maimon and is very insightful. Responding to R. Hershel Schachter’s point, discussed here, that Daas Torah authorities must be poskim, R. Maimon wrote:
Here is the Rambam’s formulation of the ‘Daas Torah’ concept:
כן ראוי להמון שימסרו הנהגתם לנביאים בעלי העינים באמת, ויסמכו על מה שיודיעום שהדעת הפלונית אמתית והדעת הפלונית שקר. ואחר הנביאים – החכמים הדורשים יומם ולילה הדעות והאמונות, עד שידעו ויכירו האמת מן השקר.
I don’t recall seeing this passage from אגרת תימן (Sheilat ed. p. 149) quoted in the various articles on the subject, but at any rate it seems to serve as a clear repudiation of Rav Schachter’s view that only poskim can issue Daas Torah directives.
Regarding Daas Torah, someone challenged my statement in my post here that R. Kanievsky actually declared in a formal way that R. Steinman is to be regarded as the new leader. Readers can look at the actual words where R. Kanievsky indeed declares that everyone is “obligated” to follow what R. Steinman says. (An English translation is found here.) I don’t know of any other such declaration in Jewish history. The gedolim have always been “created” by the religious community at large, and the gadol ha-dor (when there has been such a figure) emerged from this group of gedolim based on public acknowledgment. Yet here we have a declaration from one gadol establishing who the gadol ha-dor is and obligating everyone to follow his guidance. Will this be the new model in the haredi world for how to determine who the gadol ha-dor is?
Thanks to the person who doubted what I wrote, I was motivated to find R. Kanievsky’s statement and I see that I did say something incorrect. I wrote that R. Kanievsky’s statement was made after R. Elyashiv’s death, but in fact it was made shortly before R. Elyashiv’s passing, when he was no longer in the position to serve as leader of the generation.
[1] One source not cited by Licht is a recent article by Yisrael Rozenson that focuses on R. Alexandrov and the miracle of the oil. “‘Asukh shel Shemen Ehad,’ Al Nes ve-Hukiyut be-Mishnato shel Shmuel Alexandrov,” Badad 30 (Elul 5775), pp. 103-116.
[2] There is a good deal of interesting material in R. Rubenstein’s Ha-Rambam ve-ha-Aggadah. Relevant to what I mentioned in the text is that R. Rubenstein claims that many aggadot are not intended to be viewed as historical, and he refers to a number of such examples. See e.g., p. 101, that when the Talmud states that Solomon came up with the idea of an eruv, this is not to be taken literally but only means that it is an old idea which was later attributed to Solomon.
והמצאת היתר זה נעשה בזמן מן הזמנים שלא נדעהו, ומפני שתקנה זו היא המצאה מחוכמת מאד מאנשים חכמים נתנו למיסדי התקנה שם שלמה ואמרו שבשעה שתקן שלמה ערובין וכו’ והוא מאמר אגדי.
He also mentions that some aggadot about biblical figures were created for their dramatic effect and that those who take them literally are missing the point. See p. 94:
אבל באמת ספורים כאלו אינם מעשיות שהיו לא בהקיץ ולא בחלום אלא הן יצירות דרמטיות במעלי האגדה כיד השירה הטובה עליהם. ויצירות כאלו הרבה הן בש”ס ובמדרשים וביחוד מהאנשים הקדמונים שנזכרו בתנ”ך. עיין לדוגמא האגדה ע”ד האבן שבקש עוג מלך הבשן לזרוק על ישראל (ברכות נ”ד א’ [צ”ל ב’]) [מחזה התולי משונאי ישראל המבקשים להמיט רעה על ראשי ישראל וחוזר על ראשיהם עצמם בעטים של ישראל]. והאגדה ע”ד מיתתו של דוד שבת ל’ א’ [צ”ל ב’]) [מחזה על יקרת ערך החיים]. והאגדה ע”ד מפלתו של המן (מגילה ט”ז א’) [מחזה נקמי]. והאגדה ע”ד דוד וישבי בנוב (סנהדרין צ”ה א’) [מחזה מרחמי האב על זרעיו . . .] כל אגדות כאלו אינן מעשיות שהיו אלא יצירות דרמטיות.
I know there are some people who treat aggadot as if they are historical, but when it comes to the sort of aggadot mentioned by R. Rubenstein, do any really disagree with his understanding?
[3] It is perhaps noteworthy that Slonimski’s two sons apostatized and it appears that Slonimski himself, despite being an observant Jew, deserves some blame for this. See Eliyanah Tzalah, “Tenuat ha-Hitbolelut be-Polin,” in Yisrael Bartal and Yisrael Guttman, eds., Kiyum ve-Shever: Yehudei Polin le-Doroteihem (Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 344-345. See also Avraham Aryeh Akaviah, “HaZaS, Hayyim Yehiel Bornstein, Pesah Shapira,” Areshet 5 (1972), p. 387.
[4] S. Arnst, Sefer Yavetz (Tel Aviv, 1934), pp. 34-35.
[5] Apiryon 2 (1925), pp. 99-100.
[6] He also leaves no doubt that the obligation to light the menorah dates from the Hasmonean period. I say this even though R. Moshe Sternbuch argues that Maimonides agrees with R. Sternbuch’s own view that the obligation for individuals to light the Menorah only dates from after the destruction of the Temple. See Moadim u-Zemanim, Hanukah, vol. 6, no. 89. For a rejection of R. Sternbuch’s position, see R. Simhah Lieberman, Bi-Shevilei ha-Nisim, p. 11. R. Lieberman’s many volumes encompass vast areas of Torah scholarship and show incredible erudition. Yet for some reason, I hardly ever see his works quoted, while other books which don’t approach his level of scholarship are quoted very often.
[7] See R. Simhah Lieberman, Bi-Shevilei ha-Nisim, pp. 52ff.; R. Menahem Kasher, Divrei Menahem, vol. 4, pp. 134ff.
[8] This point is made by R. Yaakov Koppel Schwartz, Likutei Diburim (Brooklyn, 2015), p. 159.
[9] Parashat Va-Yishlah, section 26 (p. 177 in the Mossad ha-Rav Kook edition with the commentary of R. Naphtali Zvi Judah Berlin). This source was noted by Nahum Bruell, “Mai Hanukkah,” Ha-Magid, Dec. 2, 1868, p. 373, and Jacob Reifman. See Reifman’s letter in Or ha-Mizrah 18 (Tishrei 5729), p. 95. Regarding this matter, R. Naphtali Zvi Judah Berlin mentions Bruell by name in Ha-Amek She’alah, vol. 1, p. 178. For some reason, the Netziv refers to Bruell as בעל המגי’ which is strange, as Bruell only contributed articles to Ha-Magid but was not the editor.
[10] The Sheiltot, vol. 1, p. 178, preserves another important alternate text of the Talmud. Our version of Shabbat 21b reads: ולא היה בו להלדיק אלא יום אחד
The Sheiltot reads: ולא היה בו להדליק אפילו יום אחד
The word I have underlined means that the oil they found was not even enough for one day. This means that the burning of the oil for the complete first day was also a miracle, and thus provides an answer to the famous question why there is an eighth day of Hanukkah if there was enough oil for one day, meaning that the miracle was only for seven days.
Of all the answers to this question, the strangest one has to be that of R. Yerahme’el Yisrael Yitzhak Danziger (1853-1910), the Rebbe of Alexander. He claims that the cruse of oil they found was completely empty, and this empty cruse produced enough oil for eight days. He says this even though the Talmud, Shabbat 21b, states explicitly that they found .פך אחד של שמן See R. Danziger, Yismah Yisrael (Bnei Brak, 2007), vol. 1, p. 98a (Hanukkah, no. 58).
[11] Another addition that is not found in manuscripts is in 3:2 where Maimonides writes:
ונכנסו להיכל ולא מצאו שמן טהור אלא פך אחד
The standard printed versions read: .ולא מצאו שמן טהור במקדש Even though the word במקדש is not found in manuscripts in this case for some unknown reason Frankel includes this mistaken word in his text and only in the textual note on the page informs the reader that it is not found in the manuscripts.
[12] Ha-Tzefirah, Nov. 28, 1892, p. 1069.
[13] R. Abraham Joel Abelson, the editor of the Torah journal Keneset Hakhmei Yisrael, which appeared from 1893-1900, polemicizes against those who deny the miracle of the oil. Yet interestingly enough, he accepts Slonimski’s point that Maimonides does not mention the miracle, and even explains why Maimonides omits it. Contrary to what I have written, he assumes that the miracle Maimonides refers to in Hilkhot Hanukah, ch. 4, is the military victory, as the lighting of the candles is a commemoration of this (Keneset Hakhmei Yisrael 6 [1896], p. 131.).
אין מקום כלל להקשות על הרמב”ם מה שלא הביא ביד החזקה מהנס של פך השמן, כי אין מדרכו לכתוב בכל הלכותיו טעמים עליהן כידוע, וגם נס פך השמן הלא רק כעין טעם על מה שקבעו הזקנים ימי החנכה לדורות . . . ועיקר הנס הלא הי’ במלחמות החשמונאים שע”ז קבעו להדליק נרות חנכה גם לדורות ולהודות ולהלל לשמו הגדול.
[14] “Mai Hanukkah,” p. 382.
[15] Bruell was the grandson of R. Nahum Trebitch, chief rabbi of Moravia and predecessor to R. Samson Raphael Hirsch in this position. Bruell himself became rabbi of the Reform community of Frankfurt in 1870, succeeding Abraham Geiger.
[16] Beginning of parashat Be-Ha’alotkha.
[17] As we know, the oil in the Temple was made impure by the Greeks, as the Talmud, Shabbat 21b, states: טמאו כל .השמנים שבהיכל
What does this mean? How could the oil have been made impure and what about the halakhic principle of טומאה הותרה בציבור which would have allowed them to light the menorah even with impure oil? Daniel Sperber argues that when the word “impure” is used it does not mean טמא in a technical ritual sense. Rather, it means that the oil was uses for idolatrous purposes and in a colloquial sense it was regarded as טמא. See Sperber, “Al ha-Mesorot be-Hanukat ha-Bayit,” Sinai 54 (1964), pp. 218-225.
[18] Otzar Geonim, Shabbat: Teshuvot, p. 23. See also Meiri, Beit ha-Behirah, Shabbat 21b; R. Nissim, Shabbat, p. 9b in the pages of the Rif, s.v. תנו רבנן.
[19] I haven’t found the reference in Bacher. For Graetz, see Geschichte der Juden (Leipzig, 1893), vol. 4, p. 183.
[20] Eretz ha-Galil (Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 20-21. R. Israel Horowitz also believes that there were two cities named Tekoa. See his Eretz Yisrael u-Shkenoteha (Vienna, 1923), index, s.v. Tekoa.
[21] Duran is known as Efodi because this is how his commentary on Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed was named by the first printer. Yet he actually referred to himself as Efod אפד, not Efodi. This is usually understood to be an acronym of אני פרופיאט דוראן. Yet Norman Roth sees this as unlikely. He assumes that the name Efod alludes to Arakhin 16a which states that the efod atones for idolatry, “i.e., he sought atonement for his own conversion and for others in his generation.” See Roth, Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain (Madison, 2002), p. 192. See also Maud Kozodoy, The Secret Faith of Maestre Honoratus: Profayt Duran and Jewish Identity in Late Medieval Iberia (Philadelphia, 2015), pp. 4-5, 20, 25-26.
[22] Ma’aseh Efod (Vienna, 1865), p. 199. See also Abarbanel, II Sam. 14:2, who cites Efodi.
[23] See R. Yehosef Schwartz, Divrei Yosef, vol. 3, pp. 14a-b.
[24] Regarding oil and the tribe of Asher, there is a theory that the Bene Israel of India, who for centuries were engaged in oil pressing, originated from the upper Galilee which was famous for its oil. See Shirley Berry Isenberg, India’s Bene Israel (Berkeley, 1988), p. 8.
[25] See Ma’aseh Efod, p. 199.
[26] Megilat Antiochus Murhevet (n.p., 1992).
[27] No. 38 (Kislev-Tevet 5752), pp. 111-121.
[28] Tal Orot vol. 1, pp. 91ff. This source is cited by Yaakov Rosenblum in Datche 17 (27 Kislev 5768), p. 11.
[30] “Rabbi Shmuel Alexandrov,” Sinai 100 (1987), pp. 195-221.
[31] “Spiritualism ve-Anarchism Dati be-Mishnato shel Shmuel Alexandrov,” Da’at 7 (1981), pp. 121-138.
[32] “Leumiut Universalit: Dat u-Leumiut be-Haguto shel Shmuel Alexandrov” (unpublished master’s dissertation, Ben Gurion University, 2014). See also Slater’s recent article, “Tziyonut Ruhanit Datit – Dat u-Leumiut be-Haguto shel Shmuel Alexandrov,” Daat 82 (2016), pp. 285-319.
[33] Mikhtevei Mehkar u-Vikoret (Jerusalem, 1932), p. 56.
[34] See Mikhtevei Mehkar u-Vikoret (Vilna, 1907), p. 12, where R. Alexandrov writes as follows to R. Kook:
ואמנם כן היא שהמוסריות המתפתחת מעצמה באה להחליט כדעת האומר שכל הקרבנות בטלים . . . גם אנכי הנני מסכים כי כל הקרבנות בטלים מפני שלא היו קדושים רק לשעתן.
In Mikhtevei Mehkar u-Vikoret (1932), p. 24, he speaks of the abolishment of sacrifices as a natural result of humanity’s developing sense of morality:
הנה נודעה היא למדי השקפת הרמב”ם ע”ד עבודת הקרבנות איך היתה מוכרחת בזמן הקדום ואיך היא נבטלת לאט לאט מעצמה ע”י התפתחות הרוח של האדם, ובאופן שמין האדם מבטל מעצמו את מצות הקרבנות וכל אבזרייהו מבלי הופעה דתיית משמי מרומים, והנה תקון דתיי כזה הוא תקון שהזמן עושה, כלומה זה נעשה על פי התפתחות המוסריית האנושיית התלויה בזמן, ובאופן שהכל נעשה יפה בעתו ובזמנו, ולו עמדו כעת מתקנים במין האדם הנאור שהיו חפצים להנהיג את עבודת הקרבנות מחדש אז היה החפץ הזה נדחה מפני המוסריות האנושיות המנגדת לעבודה דתיית כזאת בכל כחה, ואין כל ספק כי יד המוסרית תהיה על העליונה כי לכל זמן ועת לכל חפץ תחת השמים.
In another letter to R. Kook, Mikhtevei Mehkar u-Vikoret (1907), p. 15. Alexandrov explains that the reason why in their day so many of the Orthodox youth, including sons of rabbis, were “going of the derech,” is because they saw their fathers up close and this turned them off religion.
רואה אנכי כי הנסבה הראשית להרחקת בני הרבנים והחרדים מדרכי אבותיהם ואשר עפ”י הרוב הלכו למקום שלא ישובו עוד לנו הוא מפני שנסתכלו במעשי אבותיהם לפני ולפנים . . . כמובן מעצמו שישנם אבות ובנים יוצאים מן הכלל אבל הרוב הניכר הנראה לעינים ילמדנו דעת כי שחת ישראל דרכו מחטאת כהניו ונביאיו ודור לפי פרנסו.
[35] Tal Tehiyah (Vilna, 1897), p. 8a.
[36] Shevet mi-Yehudah, vol. 2, no. 12.
[37] Details of this will be provided in a future post.
Churches, Ronald McDonald, and More
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Churches, Ronald McDonald, and More
Marc B. Shapiro
1. In a recent post I mentioned R. Leon Modena, so let me note the following. In my article on entering churches,[1] available here, I mention that R. Modena entered churches to hear the sermons. I also quote R. Eliezer Waldenberg’s description of R. Modena as an איש הפכפך. Only after my article appeared did I find that R. Solomon Scheinfeld uses similar language in describing R. Modena[2]:
הוא היה גדול בתורה וחכמת העולם, היה גאון בטבעו, אבל כדרך הרבה גאונים שהם קרובים לפעמים אל השגעון, היה הפכפך, איש זר בכל דרכי חייו, איש שאין בו נכונה, אמונה וכפירה התרוצצו בו.
R. Scheinfeld’s point about some great Torah scholars (he actually says “many geonim”), that often they have, let’s call it “unusual” characteristics (R. Scheinfeld actually uses a different term), is certainly worthy of note. I first heard this almost thirty years ago from the late R. Herschel Cohen of West Orange, N.J., who in his youth had studied under R. Judah Leib Chasman. As a young man I used to visit him, and one day he showed me a certain sefer. He very much enjoyed the book, but also commented that the author was a “meshugena.” I replied: “But he is a gaon,” and R. Cohen shot back: “There is often a very fine line between a gaon and a meshugena.”[3] In this regard, I would add that R. Moshe Feinstein was wary of geniuses, commenting that אין לנו הרבה נחת מהעילוים.[4]
Regarding R. Modena, it is also worth noting that R. Mordechai Spielman, who knew exactly who R. Modena was, refers to him as הגאון ר’ יהודה ארי’ ממודינא ז”ל. This reference comes from R. Spielman’s Tiferet Tzvi, vol. 6, p. 99. I don’t know how many readers are aware of this significant work on the Zohar, and it is unfortunate that it is not found on either hebrewbooks.org or Otzar ha-Hokhmah. In fact, Tiferet Tzvi is one of the most important works of Torah scholarship not to be found on either of these two sites.
Regarding going into churches to hear sermons, it appears that this is mentioned by R. Isaac Arama. At the beginning of his introduction to Akedat Yitzhak, in speaking of Christian preachers speaking to the population, he writes:
ובני ישראל באו בתוך הבאים ושמעו אמריהם כי נעמו נתאוו להם להרים דגל כמותם. אומרים אמור היו יהיה חכמיהם ומביניהם שואלים ודורשים במדרשיהם ובבתי תפלתם ונתנם טעם לשבח על התורה ועל הנביאיםם ככל חכמי הגוים לאומותם.
In Hazut Kashah, beginning of sha’ar 4, he writes:
חכם אחד מחכמי הגוים בתוך דבריו אשר דבר במקהלות עם רב ובאזני קצת גוברין יהודאין אשר קרא לנו לשמוע מפיו דבר כמנהגם.
In the introduction to his edition of Akedat Yitzhak, note 6, R. Hayyim Joseph Pollak, suggests that R. Arama is referring to sermons that Jews were forced to attend, but in the first source this doesn’t seem to be what he is referring to.
Returning to my article on entering churches, I am honored that Rabbi J. David Bleich used some of the sources I collected and mentioned a couple of my comments in his own article on the topic that appeared in Tradition 44:2 (2011), pp. 73-101 (available here, and it has also just appeared in Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 7).[5] I now have some additional sources to add. With regard to R. Modena, in my article I neglected to refer to his autobiography where he also describes being present for a sermon in the San Geremia church in Venice, which is very close to the Jewish ghetto.[6]
In my listing of those rabbis known to have entered churches,[7] I referred to R. Jacob Meir, who served as Rishon le-Tziyon. Unfortunately, one word (בכנסיה) was mistakenly omitted from the quotation, and readers might therefore have wondered why I assumed that R. Meir entered the church. Here is the full quotation, with the crucial word underlined. It comes from Gad Frumkin, Derekh Shofet bi-Yerushalayim (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 294:
באותו זמן, נתתי דעתי בתחום אחר לגמרי, והוא למצוא ביטוי חגיגי ברוח לאומית לרגש אשר עטף אותנו לרגל שחרור ירושלים מעול העותומני, כצעד ראשון לגאולה השלימה. סיר רונלד סטורס, כמושל ירושלים, הנהיג לחוג ברוב פאר שנה שנה את יום כניסת צבאות אלנבי לירושלים, בתשיעי לדצמבר. בבוקר היו מתפללים לכבוד היום הזה בכנסית סט. ג’ורג’, ולאחר הצהריים היה מקבל אורחים בביתו. גם היהודים השתתפו בטכס בכנסיה ובין הבאים היה הרב יעקב מאיר בתלבושתו הרשמית ענוד אותות הכבוד שנתכבדד בהם על ידי השולטן ומלכי יוון ואנגליה.
In fact, the mistaken omission of the word בכנסיה created another problem. When I read over the article just before publication, I didn’t realize that the word בכנסיה had been mistakenly deleted. I therefore added a note that maybe the meaning of the passage is that R. Meir only went to the home of Ronald Storrs, who was the Jerusalem Military Governor. (R. Bleich quotes my mistaken assumption.[8]) I also changed my formulation prior to the quotation to say that R. Meir “appears” to have entered a church. However, as we can see from the passage, Frumkin is clear that R. Meir indeed entered the church for the event.
R. Immanuel Jakobovits was asked if he would go into a church. He replied: “Perhaps for a visit, but not during prayers or a religious ceremony.” He also recounted a time when while visiting Russia it seems that he got stuck in a church during a prayer service:
On Sunday I visited Zagorsk, the repository of the treasures of the Russian Orthodox Church, where there are wonderful cathedrals in which many choirs chant. They seated me at a pulpit, where it was difficult to leave in the middle of the service, apparently so I would cancel my visits to the refuseniks in Moscow later that afternoon.[9]
As mentioned in note 7, the British chief rabbis will enter churches for various official events. As R. Jakobovits wrote on another occasion, this policy has the approval of the London Beth Din.
Another relevant text is from R. Shlomo Riskin who wrote as follows[10]:
Question:
Am I allowed to attend my friend’s wedding in a church? Are Jews allowed to enter churches at all?
Answer:
Evangelical churches do not have icons or statues and it is certainly permissible to enter Evangelical churches.[11] Catholic and most Protestant churches do have icons as well as paintings and sculptures. If you enter the church in order to appreciate the art with an eye towards understanding Christianity and the differences between Judaism and Christianity so that you can hold your own in discussions with Christians, then it is permissible.[12] Participating[13] in a church religious service is forbidden unless it is for learning purposes or unless it would be a desecration of God’s name if you don’t attend, as in the case of Chief Rabbi Sacks’ attendance at Prince William’s wedding.
R. Asher Weiss here provides support, bediavad, for R. Haskel Lookstein’s attendance at a prayer service in a church which was part of the celebrations following President Obama’s inauguration.
In my article on entering churches I refer to R. Joseph Messas’ responsum in which he mentions going into a church. I subsequently found that in his Otzar ha-Mikhtavim, vol. 1, no. 280 (p. 133), he tells of a visit to Malaga, Spain, where he also entered a church. Earlier, while still in Spanish Morocco, he explained to some non-Jews that Jews do not hold a grudge against Spain and do not hate contemporary Spaniards because of what their forefathers did. He then said something very strange (p. 131), namely, that contemporary Jews have to be thankful to the earlier Spaniards for how they persecuted the Jews of their time, since this enables everyone to see how connected Jews are to God, that despite the persecution they did not give up their faith! Is there any other rabbinic text that lets murderers “off the hook” so easily?
לדעתי, ראוי להחזיק טובה לאבותיכם על כל הרדיפות וכו’, כי על ידם נודע, שאנחנו עבדים נאמנים לא-להינו, ואף כל מיני ענויים ומיתות משונות לא הפרידו בינינו ובין א-להינו.
R. Messas finds other ways to be “melamed zekhut” on those who persecuted and even killed Jews in Spain, and if I didn’t know that he was a truly great rabbinic authority,[14] I might think that what he writes comes from the pen of a Catholic apologist for the Spanish Inquisition.[15]
שכל הרדיפות היו מפני שנאת הדת, שהנוצרים היו אוהבים מאד את דתם, ולכן היו שונאים כל בעל דת אחרת, והיהודים מאהבתם ג”כ לדתם, לא ידעו [ל]כלכל את מעשיהם, והיו ההדיוטים שבהם אומרים בפה מלא, שדת יהודית היא האמת, וזולתה שוא ודבר כזב, וזה הוסיף אש ועצם על המדורה, ובפרט המומרים מאהבת הכבוד, או מאהבת נשים, אשר אחיהם היהודים הקילו בכבודם על תמורתם, הלשינו אותם ואת דתם בדברים שלא היו ולא נבראו, כדי לנקום מהם חלול כבודם, וא”כ הא למה זה דומה, למי שיש לו בן, הוא חביב עליו מאד, ודאי ישנא כל אשר ישנאהו וכל המדבר עליו תועה, ואם תמצא לאל ידו, יהרגהו, והנוצרים היתה לאל ידם, והרגו כל השונא את דתם שהיא חביבה עליהם כבן יחיד, ואף שאין זה שכל ישר, מ”מ דעת אנשי אותו הזמן היתה כך, ואין להאשימם.
Regarding entering churches, also of interest is the report of the sixteenth-century painter and writer, Giorgio Vasari, that Roman Jews would come on the Sabbath to the Church of San Pietro in Rome to stand before Michelangelo’s statue of Moses.[16]
A number of years ago, R. Dov Linzer gave a shiur on this very topic of entering churches. At the time, I called his attention to some responsa that do not deal with this matter, but which permitted Jews to donate money to assist in building a church. These responsa are R. Mordechai Horowitz, Mateh Levi, vol. 2, Yoreh Deah, no. 28, R. Isaac Unna, Shoalin ve-Dorshin, no. 35, R. Shalom Messas, Shemesh u-Magen, vol. 3, Orah Hayyim, nos. 30-31. When there is fear of enmity (and only in this circumstance), R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, Benei Vanim, vol. 3, no. 36, also permits donating money for the building of a church, as long as the building can be built without the Jew’s donation or his donation is merely symbolic. R. Henkin also suggests that the person donating the money make it a condition that the money go to building the parking lot or something not connected to worship. (He concludes that these suggestions will also allow one to donate to a Reform or Conservative synagogue if not doing so could arouse enmity.) In the interest of full disclosure I should mention that the first responsum of R. Messas as well as R. Henkin’s responsum were sent to me.
Some time after I showed R. Linzer these responsa, there was an attack on a church in Charleston where nine people were killed. The very next day there was an arson attack by a radical Jew (or perhaps more than one individual) against a church in the Galilee. This followed other acts of vandalism directed against churches in Israel in recent years. R. Linzer sent out the following email.
Rabbosai,
Given the recent horrific attack in Charleston and the terrible burnings of churches that has occurred in the last few days, I encourage all of you to show your support for those who have been attacked, and to act in a way of kiddush shem Shamayim to counteract these terrible hate crimes.
One way you can do this is by donating money to help in the rebuilding of these churches. While there are poskim who rule otherwise (see Melamed li’hoyil 188:2), a number of recent poskim have dealt with this issue on a halakhic basis and ruled that it is totally permissible and at times even obligatory.[17] This is based on the widely accepted ruling that Christianity is not avoda zara for non-Jews. Thus, helping non-Jews in their permissible worship of God can in no way be considered מסייע לדבר עבירה, a form of aiding transgressive behavior. Some of these teshuvot have pointed out that church buildings are often repurposed as synagogues, and this again points to the non-halakhically problematic status of these buildings. Relatedly, Rav Moshe (YD 1:68) ruled that an architect can draw up the plans for the construction of a church, and that mi’ikar ha’din it is permitted to actually participate in the building of a church (and this is even without the argument that it is not avoda zara for them!).
There are some halakhic issues when giving to avoda zara directly implicates the giver in the avoda itself (see YD 149:4 and 143), but that is not relevant to this case.
I am attaching 3 contemporary teshuvot, all thanks to Marc Shapiro, who is the shoel of the teshuva of Rav Meshash [!], and who make the argument as outlined above.
I would like to quote in particular from the teshuva of the Mateh Levi, both the question and a section from the beginning and end of the answer:
ביום א’ של שבוע זה נאספו פה אנשים אשר לא בני בריתנו המה (קאטהאליקים) ובאסיפה זאת נגמר בדעתם לבנות להם בית תפילה בעירנו. ובאשר הם מתי מספר מעט מזעיר זאת העצה היעוצה להם לשאול מאת היהודים אשר פה נדבות אחדות לבנינם ובטח גם אלי יפנו בימים הבאים. לכן הנני בבקשתי שייטיב ידידי להודיעני אם מותר לתת נדבה לדבר זה כי קדוש ה’ הוא אחרי אשר הכהן הקאטהאלי מלא פיו שבח והודיה לנדבת לב בני ישראל לסמוך ידי אחיהם בדברים של קדושה. אמנם ללמוד אני צריך וכדבריו כן אעשה… דן בנרש
תשובה: ידעת גם ידעת ידידי נ”י כי רבים וכן שלמים מגדולי הקדמונים התירו והקילו בענינים האלה משום דרכי שלום ומשום איבה וע”י כך נעשו בין האחרונים שתי דרכים נפרדות שאף אותם הגדולים שכתבו להחמיר לא כתבו רק להלכה ולא למעשה… ואני כל ימי ראיתי שאין אמת אלא אחת ומה שאינו עולה יפה למעשה גם להלכה אינו. על כן אני אומר אין אני זז מן האמת לא משום דרכי שלום ולא משום איבה. אבל לאחר העיון נראה שהדין דין אמת וכל דרכי התורה לאמתה דרכי נועם וכל נתיבות הדין שלום…
ועל כל הדרכים האלה נגיע לתכלית הדבר ופשוט אצלנו שאין כאן שום איסור כלל וכיון שאיסורא ליכא ממילא הדין עם ידידי נ”י שמצוה נמי איכא היינו מצות קדוש שמו הגדול [וידוע כי שר הגדול בישראל אשר לא ישכח שמו במחנה העברים כש”ת מוה’ משה מנטפיורע ז”ל קדש ש”ש ע”י זה שבנה להם בית תפלה ברמסגט] על ידי עמו ישראל ויראו כל עמי הארץ שאנחנו יהודים נאמנים עתידים בכל שעה למסור את נפשנו באהבה בעד קידוש השם שהוא ד’ אחד ושמו אחד ולהשליך את כל יהבנו ואת כל כבודנו בעולם הזה בעבור אמונתנו הקדושה…וכלנו מודים שכל מי שאינו ישראל יכול להיות אחד מחסידי וגדולי עולם ובני עולם הבא…
R. Linzer was attacked after this email was sent out, and some people made it seem as if he had come up with a crazy idea. Yet the truth is that what he suggested – donating to a church – had already been approved by a couple of recognized gedolei Yisrael. Even his point about making a kiddush ha-shem has a precedent in R. Mordechai Horowitz, the Matteh Levi, who said exactly this in discussing Moses Montefiore’s donation to a church, and this is quoted in R. Linzer’s email.
Regarding kiddush ha-shem, even if we don’t go as far as R. Linzer, I think that one can make a good case that donating to a church can be a sanctification of God’s name if, as happened in Israel, the church was set on fire by a radical Jew (or Jews). We cannot have the spectacle of Jews burning down churches in Israel, and the damage this can do to Jews worldwide is immense. Would it be out of line to argue that if Jews burn down a church, that at least to prevent enmity Jews should also help rebuild it? It is easy to see how such an action can be regarded as a kiddush ha-shem, even if most poskim would see it as technically forbidden. (I wonder, can something be both a kiddush ha-shem and a violation of halakhah?) In fact, after the church was burnt in Israel, a number of rabbis, including the great R. Nachum Rabinovitch, helped raise money to repair it.[18] What this shows is that the matter is not as clear-cut as might appear at first glance.
Speaking of Jewish donations to churches, it is of interest that Mordechai Maisel (1528-1601), the leader of the Prague Jewish community, donated to the St. Salvator Church, which is very close to the Jewish Quarter. Rachel L. Greenblatt writes that this was “an alliance-seeking neighborly act not as unusual as it might sound.”[19] Yet I do not know of any other case like this in the sixteenth century or prior, so it certainly sounds unusual to me. Unfortunately, it is not known if any of the Prague rabbis approved of Maisel’s donation, which Maisel must have assumed would create a lot of good will with the non-Jewish population, good will that might later save the community from an expulsion or even a pogrom. Two hundred years later, Meyer Amschel Rothschild (1744-1812) donated money to build a church in Kassel. The local ruler required this in order for Rothschild to be regarded as a “protected Jew” in Kassel, where he often stayed while conducting business.[20]
I have a lot I would like to say about Christianity and its impact on Judaism, in particular when it comes to seforim. For now, here is something that I very recently found and I am not sure if it is a conscious distortion. In R. Moses Hayyim Luzzatto’s Tikunim Hadashim (Jerusalem, 1958), p. 10, as part of his messianic vision he states as follows:
כלא יתקשר ברישא דברך יחידאה מלכא משיחא לשלטאה ביה על כל עלמא ולאתגלאה נהורך עד סופא דכלא. וכל רע יתעבר מעלמא ויתהדר כלא לאשתעבדא קמך.
R. Mordechai Chriqui has edited numerous works of Ramhal. In 1986 he published Yesod Olam, which a short book on Ramhal’s life and thought. On p. 43 he provides the following Hebrew translation of part of the Aramaic text just cited:
והכל יתקשר בראש דבריך. המיוחד מלך המשיח שלוט על כל העולם.
Yet this translation is completely mistaken. I wonder if this is an innocent mistake or was intentional so that the reader not see a text that sounds Christian (although Ramhal was not referring to Jesus). What the Aramaic text really means, and I have underlined the crucial part, is that all will align themselves with your only son, the Messiah. I am curious to hear what readers think about this (and maybe someone will even want to defend Chriqui’s rendering).[21]
Further on the subject of Christianity, R. Chaim Rapoport published an interesting responsum by R. Hayyim Galipapa (fourteenth century) of Spain.[22] In this responsum, R. Galipapa states that the Trinity is not to be regarded as avodah zarah. (R. Rapoport claims that he only means that it is not avodah zarah for non-Jews, who are not obligated to have an absolutely pure conception of God, but is indeed to be regarded as avodah zarah as far as Jews are concerned.) Here are R. Galipapa’s words:
וענין השלוש לאו ע”ז היא, אלא שהא-להות אינו מקובל עליהם כראוי, ולדעת חז”ל נקראים הם וכיוצא בהם “קוצצים בנטיעות”, וזה ברור. וכן פי’ קצת המפרשים ע”ז [= על זה], ר”ל על השלוש, הכתוב בדניאל (י”א ל”ו): “ועל א-ל אלים ידבר נפלאות”, כלו'[מר] שמדברים ומאמינים הם בא-ל אלים, רק שמדברים בו נפלאות ונמנעות והוא השלוש.
Finally, in my article on entering churches I noted that R. Jacob Meir, the Rishon le-Tziyon, wore a ceremonial medallion in the shape of a cross (I am not sure which government awarded this to him).
You can see it here.
Here is an Israeli stamp with R. Meir on it, and you can see the medallion.
Yehudah Mirsky called my attention to this picture of R. Kook that is found in Mar’eh Kohen (Jerusalem, 2002), p. 52. The British medallion, awarded by King George V, is not completely showing.[23] I would assume, and Mirsky agrees,[24] that this was intentional.
2. In his post here, Eliezer Brodt mentioned the new book Ha-Gedolim (availablehere). My article in the volume is on the Steipler. As you can see from the table of contents posted by Brodt, they wanted to give each article a catchy title. One of the editors suggested Ha-Tamim for the title of my article, and I thought that this was a good suggestion. In traditional rabbinic literature תמים has the connotation of pure and unblemished, and this is how one can describe someone who has a simple, unquestioning faith. This, I thought, was a great description of the Steipler who was opposed to philosophical investigation of Judaism and even opposed polemicizing with the non-Orthodox for fear that this might expose readers to non-Orthodox ideas. (Chabad yeshiva students are also referred to as tamim.)
However, the word tamim can also have the connotation of “unsophisticated”. Even though this is clearly not what I had in mind, since at least a few people wondered about the word, I clarified it in a comment to Brodt’s post. I also asked if anywhere in rabbinic literature does the word tamim mean anything other than what I have written. From the responses I received, I have to say that the answer is no. While the word tam is used to mean “unsophisticated,” the word tamim only has a positive connotation. At least that is the opinion of everyone I have discussed the matter with. I also searched Otzar ha-Hokhmah where I found references to rabbis referred to as הגאון התמים. Otzar ha-Hokhmah also reminded me of how R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg described his deceased student, R. Saul Weingort[25]:
בהנהגתו, באופני מחשבתו ובהילוכו עם הבריות הי’ טיפוס נעלה של יהודי תמים ונאמן לאלוקיו ולתורתו.
The Maharal writes[26]:
והתמים הוא שהולך בדרך הישר מעצמו בלי שום התבוננות, רק הולך בדרכו בתמימות.
One of the Seforim Blog readers was helpful in sending a number of relevant texts, illustrating the original meaning of tamim. Among these texts is one from the 1980s by R. Shlomo Tzadok who actually laments how the word tamim, which is supposed to have a positive connotation, has been turned into a negative term.[27]
ומדהים לראות שאף המלה תמים שנקטה תורה כאן סולפה משמעותה האמיתית בפי ההמון, וכשרוצים לקרוא למי שהוא לאיזה אמונה בלי דעת וחכמה ובלי הבנה, אומרים לו תמים תהיה! (אולי בעקבות השמוש השלילי בלשון חז”ל באגדה, תם, היפך חכם).
2. Seth Rogovoy published an article in the Forward titled “The Secret Jewish History of McDonald’s.” What precipitated the article was the recent appearance of the movie “The Founder” about Ray Croc of McDonald’s fame. Rogovoy focuses on Harry Sonneborn, the first President of McDonald’s, who came up with the idea of turning McDonald’s into a real estate empire, by owning the land under the restaurants and leasing it to the franchisees.
There is another “secret” Jewish history of McDonald’s, one which I think is of much greater interest. Ronald McDonald is the world’s most widely recognized commercial mascot, and he has “a recognition factor among children equaled only by Santa Claus.”[28] How many people know that it was a Jewish man, Oscar Goldstein, who was responsible for Ronald McDonald? The story is told in a number of places, most comprehensively in John F. Love’s McDonald’s: Behind the Arches from which I am taking the following description.
The most successful McDonald’s operation in the company’s history is that of Goldstein and his partner John Gibson. In 1956 they made a deal with Kroc for an exclusive franchise for the Washington, D.C. area. Gibson was behind the scenes focusing on financial and real estate matters, while Goldstein was running the actual restaurants which eventually reached 53. (Love says that there were 43 restaurants, but I was given other information.) As part of Goldstein’s advertising campaign, he sponsored a television show in the Washington market called Bozo’s Circus. The person who played Bozo was none other than Willard Scott, who would later find fame on the Today show.
When Bozo’s Circus went off the air, Goldstein decided that he needed another clown to appeal to the children. His ad agency came up with a clown which it proposed to call Archie McDonald. Willard Scott suggested the name Ronald McDonald, which was chosen, and Scott played the first Ronald McDonald. (Scott has often claimed that he invented Ronald McDonald, while in truth all he did – significant in and of itself – is to come up with the name.)
By the mid-1960s, the McDonald’s franchise in Washington was spending $500,000 a year on advertising – most of it on Ronald McDonald. It was more than any other local or national fast-food chain was spending on advertising, more than even McDonald’s Corporation itself. Goldstein also used Ronald McDonald to open each new store it built, and his personal appearances never failed to create traffic jams.
By 1965, Goldstein was convinced that he had discovered in Ronald McDonald the perfect national spokesman for the chain, and he offered the clown free of charge to Max Cooper, the publicist who by then had been hired as McDonald’s first director of marketing. Surprisingly, Cooper turned him down. “I told him the outfit was too corny and not up to our standards,” Cooper recalls. “Goldstein reminded me that his was the most successful market in the system.” After reflecting on that, Cooper decided not to argue, and he proposed a national Ronald McDonald to Harry Sonneborn.[29]
Here is a picture from Love’s book. Goldstein is second from the right. Harry Sonneborn is on the far right. Ray Kroc is standing in the middle.
I am certain that other than members of my family and old friends, all other readers are wondering why I have such an interest in McDonald’s. The answer is that Oscar Goldstein was my grandfather, my mother’s father. Jews are well known for being responsible for so much in American culture, but for some reason, Ronald McDonald as a Jewish creation has slipped through the cracks. Hopefully that will now change.
One final point: Why do I say that my grandfather owned 53 stores when Love puts the number at 43? Because that is what I heard from my grandmother, Gwendolyn Goldstein Freishtat, who passed away in January 2015 at the age of 99. When I questioned if she was sure it was 53, she insisted that there was no doubt. “I knew every one of those stores,” she said.
3. In my recent interview in the fascinating Der Veker, available here, I mention that I have a forthcoming article dealing with Modern Orthodoxy and modern biblical scholarship. Once the article appears I will have more to say about it on the blog. For now, let me just note that in the article I try to show how in some segments of liberal Modern Orthodoxy there has been a reinterpretation of the core theological principle of Torah mi-Sinai so as to align it with modern scholarship. I see this as a major theological development. There is no need to speak more about this now, as once the article appears readers can evaluate the evidence and see whether they think I am on to something.
One significant publication that appeared too late to be mentioned in the article is a new book by Jerome Yehuda Gellman, This Was From God: A Contemporary Theology of Torah and History. This book is precisely the sort of evidence I cite in the article to illustrate the changes that have taken place in recent years. Rather than summarize the book, let me just quote the first two paragraphs.
Increasingly, well-informed traditional Jews may find themselves distrustful of the reliability of Torah as history because of the conclusions of scholarly research from natural science, history, linguistics, Bible criticism and archaeology. And, they may not be swayed by attempts to restore their trust. If they do not have a fitting theology for their new predicament, they may well give up on Judaism altogether or else give up on their traditional Judaism. Or, they may simply repress their difficulty because they see no way of dealing with it that will allow them to retain their traditional religious loyalty. They will carry on as if they believed in the historical veracity of the Torah, when in fact they do not.
As one who has lived with this problem, I want to now propose that a person with prior emunah, belief and faith/loyalty in God and in the holiness of the Torah remain faithful to keeping God and the holiness of the Torah at the center of his or her life. What is needed is a theology that appreciates the force of the challenge to Torah as history and preserves one’s traditional religious loyalty. That is the task of the present book.
Gellman’s arguments are original and he even makes use of hasidic texts. Particularly interesting is his critique of the so-called Kuzari Argument that is sometimes used in support of the revelation at Sinai.
I mentioned Gellman’s book to someone and expressed the opinion that even if another ten theologians were to write similar books, I don’t see this as having any real impact on the ground – although it will be appealing for certain intellectuals – because at the end of the day traditional Judaism is a religion of halakhah and its leaders are talmudists and halakhic authorities. If a new theological approach does not have the imprimatur of even one outstanding religious authority – gadol for lack of a better term – I don’t see how it can gain traction in the community at large. In previous years I have made the same point about changes in women’s roles and so-called partnership minyanim. These phenomena are also having trouble making headway because they too are lacking the necessary imprimatur. Interestingly, years ago someone responded to me that my point was not valid because I was operating under an outdated “paradigm” in assuming that changes in religious life, and now we can say in theology as well, needed the imprimatur of a gadol. Yet I would like to see one example of a significant change in theology or religious life that reached wide acceptance without such an imprimatur.
4. Among other new books worth mentioning is R. Yonason Rosman’s Petihat ha-Iggerot available here. This book goes through R. Moshe Feinstein’s Iggerot Moshe and records discussions and criticisms of R. Feinstein’s points. It is like the Likutei Hearot on the Hatam Sofer’s responsa with one crucial difference: R. Rosman does not limit himself to citing traditional rabbinic works, but he also refers to English language halakhic writings and even academic works. The Seforim Blog is also mentioned a number of times.
[1] Milin Havivin 4 (2008-2011), pp. 43-50.
[2] Olam ha-Sheker (Milwaukee, 1936), p. 44. R. Solomon Judah Rapoport thought very highly of R. Modena. See Iggerot Shir (Przemysl, 1885), p. 71. As a result of this, he was worried that if R. Modena’s autobiography was published, which showed that he was addicted to gambling, it would destroy his reputation. See ibid., p. 120, where he writes to Samuel David Luzzatto:
עוד הכני לבי פן תגלה ח”ו חרפת הבונה בקהל רב, על דבר תאותו אל השחוק, ותתן מקום לשחוק וללעוג באדם יקר אחד מאלף, ולבזות את הנכבד כפי נטות לבך. ואולי תשלחהו ח”ו לבעלי ציון לבנות ציון תמרור על חרבות גבר מצויין, ותתן קברו את רשעים השמחים אלי גיל ישישו כי ימצאו קבר לגבר אשר דרכו נסתרה עד כה בענין אחד, ויסך אלוקי בעדו, ותשפוך דם נקי בקרב ישראל.
Every summer for the last five years I have led groups to Venice where I tell the story of R. Modena. I tell part of the story when standing in front of his tombstone (his actual burial place is unknown). Rather than losing respect for R. Modena because of his gambling addiction, I think people learn to appreciate that even very learned rabbis can have weaknesses.
[3] When he used the term “meshugena,” he did not mean “insane” in a clinical sense. I mention this because there is some recent research supporting the notion that there is indeed a thin line between genius and mental illness. See here.
[4] R. Michel Shurkin, Meged Giv’ot Olam ( Jerusalem, 2005), vol. 2, p. 23. R. Shurkin also quotes R. Leib Malin as saying that it is not good to be an illui. See Mesorat Moshe, vol. 2, p. 404, where R. Moshe notes another problem with iluyim.
[5] In his article, p. 74, in speaking of shituf and the famous Tosafot concerning it, R. Bleich states that “in historical context, it is obvious that the doctrine which the Tosafot seek to legitimize for non-Jews is Trinitarianism.” I don’t know how R. Bleich can say “it is obvious” when not only do many halakhic authorities not interpret Tosafot in this fashion, but great scholars such as Jacob Katz, Louis Jacobs, and David Berger have also stated that they do not think that Tosafot is in any way legitimizing Trinitarianism for non-Jews, but only permitting a non-Jew to take an oath in which he associates another being, such as Jesus, with God. On p. 74 R. Bleich himself notes that R. Ezekiel Landau, Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadurah Tinyana, Yoreh Deah, no. 148, has the same view as Katz, Jacobs, and Berger. I would only add that the responsum in Noda bi-Yehudah that R. Bleich refers to was not written by R. Ezekiel Landau but by his son, R. Samuel Landau. For Katz, see his Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), p. 163. For Jacobs, see his A Tree of Life (London, 2000), p. 82 n. 12. Berger has expressed his opinion orally on a number of occasions, and see also his “How, When, and To What Degree was the Jewish-Christian Debate Transformed in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries?” in Elisheva Baumgarten and Judah D. Galinsky, eds., Jews and Christians in Thirteenth-Century France (New York, 2015), p. 135 n. 31.
On pp. 80-81, R. Bleich states that R. Isaac Herzog’s acceptance of the Meiri’s view of the halakhic status of non-Jews was only a “hypothetical acceptance,” and he criticizes Itamar Warhaftig for assuming otherwise. In this matter, I see no way to read R. Herzog as R. Bleich has interpreted him, and thus agree with the understanding of Warhaftig that R. Herzog indeed accepted the Meiri’s view. On p. 81, R. Bleich interprets the words of R. Eliezer Waldenberg so that he also is not really accepting the Meiri. Here too, I see no way of reading R. Waldenberg as R. Bleich advocates, and I agree with David Berger’s understanding (Berger is mentioned by R. Bleich.) See Berger, “Jews, Gentiles, and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos: Some Tentative Thoughts,” in Marc D. Stern, ed., Formulating Responses in an Egalitarian Age (Lanham, MD, 2005), p. 100.
[6] Hayyei Yehudah, ed. Carpi (Tel Aviv, 1985), p. 63.
[7] R. Bleich, p. 98, writes: “Omitted from Shapiro’s list of rabbinic figures who have entered Christian houses of worship are the British Chief Rabbis who have done so on state occasions.” I did not mention the British Chief Rabbis as this is well known, and as I wrote I wanted to call attention to lesser known examples.
[8] Bleich mistakenly refers to Storrs as the High Commissioner of Palestine.
[9] Michael Shashar, Lord Jakobovits in Conversation (London, 2000) pp. 83, 103.
[11] If we assume that an Evangelical church is a place of avodah zarah, I do not see why the absence of icons or statues has any significance.
[12] Lots of people want to enter churches in order to appreciate the art or to understand Christianity. I have never heard of anyone doing so in order to be able to “hold his own” in discussions with Christians. If R. Riskin’s heter depends on this element being present, then according to him pretty much no one would be permitted to enter a church with icons or statues.
[13] I have no doubt that what R. Riskin meant to say is “Attendance at a church religious service,” since there is no possible way that a Jew is ever permitted to “participate” in a church religious service.
[14] R. Hayyim Amsalem’s just published book is titled Tokpo shel Yosef Messas. R. Amsalem sees R. Messas’ importance as providing a stellar example of the old Sephardic tradition, one that stands in opposition to the haredi ethos which has recently also taken root in some parts of the Sephardic world. For an example of what R. Amsalem is fighting against, here is a proclamation that appeared before Purim, signed by a number of Sephardic rabbis including a member of the Shas Council of Torah Sages. In addition to declaring that children cannot dress up as soldiers or policemen, it also states that “all the gedolei Yisrael” have forbid yeshiva students from enlisting in the army or in any program of national service.
This prohibition is not directed towards women but men. Can anyone imagine a Sephardic sage from earlier years declaring that it is forbidden for yeshiva students to enlist in the army or to do national service? It is this type of extremism, so far from the traditional Sephardic mentality, that has enabled R. Meir Mazuz to develop the largest following among the Sephardic masses. When R. Mazuz explains how important it is to bless the soldiers, as he did again the same week that the anti-army declaration came out, it is this sort of attitude that resonates with Israel’s Sephardic community, all of whom have family members who have served in the army. For the video of R. Mazuz’s most recent statement, see here.
[15] When reading what R. Messas wrote, I was reminded of R. Abraham Reggio’s strange claim that Christians should love Jews because according to them, the Jews’ killing of Jesus is what allowed Original Sin to be forgiven. See his letter to R. Mordechai Samuel Ghirondi published in Asupot 14 (2002), p. 306:
שיחוייבו לאהוב אותנו, יען כי בגללינו, לפי דעתם, נסלח עון אדה”ר [אדם הראשון] אחר פטרת משיחם, שאם לא היה נמצא אז בעולם מי שימיתהו, עדיין עונם על ראשם.
Just as strange are the reasons he gives why Jews must love non-Jews:
וגם אנחנו צריכים לאהוב אותם, שאילולי הם היינו חולים ומתים בשבתות ימי הקור, וגם ע”י שאוכלים כמה בעלי חיים האסורים ואילולי הם לא היתה הארץ יכולה להכיל כמה בהמות טמאות שרבו מארבה.
[16] Hermann Vogelstein, Rome, trans. Moses Hadas (Philadelphia, 1940), p. 263; Cecil Roth, The History of the Jews of Italy (Philadelphia, 1946), p. 195. R. Shlomo Goren recalled that on Tisha be-Av he used to pray on the roof of a church on Mt. Zion so that he could see the Temple Mount. He then began to have doubts about the appropriateness of using a church in this fashion so he moved to another place. See his autobiography, Be-Oz u-ve-Ta’atzumot, ed. Avi Rath (Tel Aviv, 2013), p. 217. (This book has recently appeared in English.) Regarding whether a synagogue can share the same building with a church, see R. Abraham Moses Fingerhut, She’elot u-Teshuvot (Jerusalem, 1964), no. 2.
[17] I don’t see where any of the teshuvot that permit donating to churches regard this as obligatory at times, unless we assume that when R. Horovitz writes that it is a mitzvah because of kiddush ha-shem that he means that it is obligatory. The only circumstance I can imagine where such a donation could be obligatory would be if Jews themselves had damaged a church and posekim thought that to prevent enmity it was vital that Jews therefore help repair it.
[19] To Tell Their Children: Jewish Communal Memory in Early Modern Prague (Stanford, 2014), p. 25.
[20] See Amos Elon, Founder: A Portrait of the First Rothschild and His Time (New York, 1996), pp. 119-120.
[21] While on the topic of R. Moses Hayyim Luzzatto, R. Jeremy Rosten recently showed me page 14 n. 14 from the 1992 Bnei Brak edition of KalahPithei Hokhmah.
As you can see, material has been removed from the work on the advice of certain unnamed gedolim.
R. Rosten also showed me that a famous comment of Sforno to Lev. 13:47 has been censored.
In this passage Sforno states that most Jews, and all (!) non-Jews, are not subject to individual divine providence, but are only under general providence, just like the animal kingdom. These words were removed from the older Mikraot Gedolot.
At first glance, I thought that this censorship was because of the description of non-Jews. Rosten, however, believes that this is a theologically based censorship. In other words, Sforno’s view that most people are not subject to individual providence was viewed as religious objectionable and was thus deleted. My only problem with this suggestion is that even the censored version refers to the נרדמים, i.e., people who are not subject to individual providence, so the theological problem is not “solved” by what was removed.
[22] Se Or Yisrael 56 (Tamuz 5769), pp. 6ff.
[23] For details on R. Kook being awarded the medallion, see Natan Ophir’s note here (called to my attention by Mirsky).
[24] Rav Kook (New Haven, 2014), p. 172.
[25] Yad Shaul (Tel Aviv, 1953), p. 18.
[26] Netivot Olam, ed. Pardes (Jerusalem, 1988), p. 508.
[27] Shulhan Shlomo (Jerusalem, n.d.), p. 249.
[28] John F. Love, McDonald’s: Behind the Arches (Toronto, 1986), p. 224.
[29] Love, McDonald’s, p. 223.
R. Hershel Schachter, Gedolim, Rachel Morpurgo, and More
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R. Hershel Schachter, Gedolim, Rachel Morpurgo, and More
By Marc B. Shapiro
1. In listening to a recent shiur[1] on Daas Torah by R. Hershel Schachter, I found a number of noteworthy comments. In this shiur, which has been heard thousands of times, R. Schachter states, “If you have an outlook, if you have what I would consider a crooked, a krum outlook on Yom ha-Atzmaut, then your outlook on eruvin is also crooked. I can’t rely on anything that you say.” I find this difficult to accept, since can’t someone be regarded as a great posek, one that can be relied on, even if one disagrees with important ideological positions he holds? In Eastern Europe, the people all relied on their local rav to decide halakhic questions for them. It didn’t matter to them whether the rav supported Agudah or Mizrachi. He was the halakhic authority of the town.I agree, however, that there are limits. What sense does it make to rely on a Satmar posek for a ruling if one wouldn’t accept anything he said in non-halakhic matters? (It is known that when men want a ruling that they don’t have to give their wives a get, they go to a posek in Monsey whom they wouldn’t ask any other questions of.) I think it is important for R. Schachter to explain what his definition of a “crooked” outlook on Yom ha-Atzmaut is? Does he mean someone who says tahanun on that day, or only someone who thinks it is a day akin to avodah zarah?[2]
Among other interesting comments in R. Schachter’s shiur is that he states that a posek can give you a binding pesak concerning whom you must marry.[3] This too I find difficult, since where does a posek get the authority to tell someone whom he must marry? An individual can certainly consult with a posek for his advice in this matter, but since this consultation is done voluntarily by the potential groom, how do we go from there to a situation of pesak which binds the person asking the question?
[Subsequent to writing these words I saw R. Schachter and asked him about this matter. He reaffirmed his position, stating that whom one marries is a halakhic matter and therefore a posek can indeed tell you whom you must marry. He added that this is almost always theoretical since in order to make such a ruling the posek would need to know both the bride and groom for many years so as to be sure that what he is saying is correct. But he also insisted that if the posek does have the requisite knowledge he can indeed give a binding pesak about whom one must marry.]
In discussing the matter of Israel giving back land for peace, as far as I understand (and this is also the understanding of everyone I have seen who has written on the topic), R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik held that this is not a halakhic matter and therefore there is no place for rabbinic involvement. The political and military leaders should make a decision based on their knowledge of what is in the best interest of the country. However, R. Schachter has a different perspective. He states that according to R. Soloveitchik, first the politicians and military leaders should be consulted, and following this the rabbis need to make a halakhic judgment about what is permissible.[4] Yet the following are R. Soloveitchik’s words from 1967, as transcribed by Arnold Lustiger here:
I give praise and thanks to the RBSO for liberating the Kotel Hamaarovi and for liberating and for removing all Eretz Yisrael from the Arabs, so that it now belongs to us. But I don’t need to rule whether we should give the West Bank back to the Arabs or not to give the West Bank to the Arabs: we rabbis should not be involved in decisions regarding the safety and security of the population. . . . We have to negotiate with common sense as the security of the yishuv requires. What specifically these security requirements are, I don’t know, I don’t understand these things. These decisions require a military perspective which one must research assiduously. The borders that must be established should be based upon which will provide more security. It is not a topic appropriate for which rabbis should release statements or for rabbinical conferences.
Also of interest in this shiur is that R. Schachter rejects the legitimacy of Daas Torah proclamations by roshei yeshiva who do not deal with practical halakhic questions.[5] In his halakhic-centric approach, there is no room for such proclamations by figures who are talmudically learned but are not poskim. This means that R. Aharon Leib Steinman, for instance, who is not a posek, is not to be regarded as one who transmits Daas Torah. As R. Schachter says, one who does not decide practical halakhic questions dealing with Shabbat, kashrut, and taharat ha-mishpahah is not able to rule on matters that are not explicit in earlier texts, and are often categorized as being in the realm of Daas Torah. He specifically states that the Steipler and R. Shakh, who were not known as poskim, were not the ones people should have been turning to for Daas Torah.[6]
It is hard to imagine a stronger repudiation of the haredi notion of Daas Torah, for while R. Elyashiv was of course a great posek, there has never been an expectation among haredim that the transmitters of Daas Torah must be involved in pesak. Daas Torah depends on the Torah scholar being immersed in Torah and righteousness, but this does not mean that he has to be involved with halakhah le-ma’aseh questions. R. Schachter’s point is obviously in contradiction to the hasidic approach in which the rebbe is the leader, and the job qualifications of a rebbe have nothing to do with deciding halakhic questions.[7]
It is true, however, that R. Schachter’s description of who should be the religious leaders of the Torah community is what historically was the case before the rise of hasidut in the 18th century, the creation of the great yeshivot in the 19th century, and the rise of haredism in the 20th century. But even in previous centuries matters were not absolute. For example, what about R. Moses Hayyim Luzzatto? He was not a posek, yet would anyone today deny that he could speak with Torah authority on matters that fall into the category of Daas Torah? What about R. Nosson Zvi Finkel and many of the other mussar greats, or R. Zvi Yehudah Kook? Using R. Schachter’s halakhic-centric yardstick, they too would have to be excluded from what is today referred to as Daas Torah.
All this of course relates to the subject of gedolim, a topic that has recently seen a lot of discussion at the new website Lehrhaus. Professor Chaim Saiman’s essay, “The Market for Gedolim: A Tale of Supply and Demand,” was followed up by a number of insightful responses from people who represent the Centrist and Liberal Orthodox community, and by Rabbi Ethan Tucker who can be termed a leader of the halakhically committed egalitarian community.[8]
I have made the point a number of times that the twentieth century saw the creation of a new model in the haredi world. It is not just gedolim who are important, but the gadol ha-dor (technically: gedol ha-dor), that is, the gadol who stands above other gedolim. Although you had such figures in earlier times, such as the Hatam Sofer and R. Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor, in the twentieth century the notion of “the gadol ha-dor” has become institutionalized and is a basic feature of haredi society. Gedolim are not enough, but there also needs to be a supreme gadol. Thus, on the passing of the gadol ha-dor, the new gadol ha-dor emerges, (or he can actually be proclaimed, such as what happened when, after R. Elyashiv’s passing, R. Chaim Kanievsky declared that R. Steinman was the new leader). This is now an expectation of laypeople in the haredi world,[9] and obviously satisfies a psychological need, so inexorably one gadol ha-dor will be followed by another.[10]
This can lead to disputes as we see now in the haredi world between the majority who follow R. Steinman and the more extreme elements who have lined up behind R. Shmuel Auerbach. A noteworthy point, which is hardly mentioned in the “mainstream” haredi press, is that the opponents of R. Steinman have been very harsh in their evaluation of him, and a steady stream of publications has appeared designed to show that his views are not in line with the haredi Daas Torah going back to the Chazon Ish and continuing through R. Elyashiv’s leadership. These publications have also attempted to show that he does not have the level of Torah scholarship required to lead the haredi world. Yet R. Chaim Kanievsky, who throughout the controversy has been the most vocal in attacking R. Auerbach and his followers, has, as far as I know, never been subject to written criticism. All of the many attacks on R. Steinman simply omit mention of R. Kanievsky even though R. Kanievsky stands together with R. Steinman. One who claims that R. Steinman’s views are not in line with “correct” haredi thinking must assume that R. Kanievsky has also departed from the “proper” haredi path, which is a difficult position for most haredim to adopt. At the end of the day, R. Kanievsky is the most highly regarded Torah scholar in the haredi world, and if he has subordinated himself to R. Steinman, that will be enough for almost all haredim even if they do have questions about some of R. Steinman’s liberal positions.[11]
There is a lot more to say about this, but I would like to make just one more point about the term gadol ha-dor which is now so important and means the most prominent Torah leader of the generation. I think it is the equivalent of the term manhig ha-dor and is parallel to the other term that has popped up in recent decades, posek ha-dor. Regarding posek ha-dor, since the passing of R. Elyashiv, and then R. Wosner, I haven’t seen the term used for anyone in the Ashkenazic haredi world, and there is no one towering halakhic figure (although one is bound to emerge). In the Sephardic world, after the passing of R. Ovadiah Yosef, both R. Yitzhak Yosef and R. Meir Mazuz have emerged as posek ha-dor as well as gadol ha-dor. When it comes to gadol ha-dor in the Ashkenazic haredi world, both R. Steinman and R. Auerbach are regarded as such, and my sense is that many also regard R. Kanievsky as the gadol ha-dor even though he himself claims that R. Steinman holds this position.
Contrary to what some think, the term gadol ha-dor is not a recent term. Tosafot,[12] and many other rishonim, use it in the sense of a great Torah scholar, but as far as I know, there is no implication in the rishonim that the term means the preeminent Torah leader, as it is used today when people say that X is thegadol ha-dor. (I perhaps should write “scholar-leader”, since one cannot be the gadol ha-dor without being both a scholar and a leader.) When the rishonim use the term it means that X is a gadol ha-dor, i.e., a great sage. Even today, when “the gadol ha-dor” means the preeminent Torah leader, it need not mean that this individual is also the greatest Torah scholar, although sometimes times it does (e.g., when R. Elyashiv or R. Ovadiah Yosef were described as such, I think people assumed that they were the greatest Torah scholars.)
At another time I can discuss different uses of the term gadol ha-dor among rishonim. For now, I want to call attention to a passage in Pesahim 49b: “Let a man always sell all he has and marry the daughter of a scholar. If he does not find the daughter of a scholar, let him marry the daughter of [one of] the gedolei ha-dor.” It is obvious that in this passage the term gedolei ha-dor does not mean great Torah scholars. Rashi explains it to mean: אנשי מעשה וצדיקים. Even in the 16th century R. Moses Isserles uses the term gadol ha-dor to mean communal leader, and puts gadol ha-dor together with am ha’aretz.[13]
ואין איסור לקרות ע”ה נכבד עשיר וגדול הדור לפני ת”ח כי אין זה בזיון לת”ח רק כבוד לתורה שמתכבדת באנשים גדולים.
Yet elsewhere, Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 244:10 (based on Terumat ha-Deshen: Teshuvot, no. 138), R. Isserles does use gadol ha-dor to mean an outstanding Torah sage.Returning to the articles at Lehrhaus, I would like to call attention to a couple of passages that relate to gedolim in rabbinic literature (there are obviously many more). R. Hayyim Palache states that there is a tradition that every gadol be-Torah has opponents who persecute him.[14] Historically, I think this is the case, as I cannot recall a gadol who did not have enemies who tried to tear him down.
Most people assume that dayanim will know halakhah well, and that the elite and small group of dayanim on Israel’s Beit Din ha-Gadol will certainly be experts in all areas of halakhah. I recently picked up R. Yitzhak Yosef’s new volume of responsa, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rishon le-Tziyon, and he wants to disabuse readers of the understandable notion that dayanim are experts in the breadth of halakhah.[15] He goes so far as to say that there are dayanim on the Beit Din ha-Gadol, men he knows personally, who while knowledgeable in Even ha-Ezer and Hoshen Mishpat, when it comes to Orah Hayyim and Yoreh Deah:
אינם בקיאים כלל וכלל, יודעים קצת מספרי קיצורים, כמו בן איש חי וכף החיים וכדומה. אך אינם בקיאים בב”י ומפרשי השלחן ערוך והשותי”ם.
Being that the Beit Din ha-Gadol is a very small group of dayanim, I am sure people have been trying to figure out who R. Yosef is including in this negative judgment.
Finally, in terms of a definition of a gadol, R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira actually offers us one:[16]
מפורסם בהרבה מדינות ובחיבוריו יורו המורים ולקולו יחתו וכיוצא.
By saying that a gadol is known in many lands, and his works are widely used, it is clear that we are dealing with a definition for the modern era where there is easy international communication. In pre-modern times there was no expectation that a gadol in say Morocco would be known outside this land. But I think that for the modern era R. Shapira’s definition is an excellent one as it captures the fact that the term “gadol” represents a sociological category. I would also add that the status of “gadol” is significant in that it is a lifetime appointment, as it were. It is almost impossible for one to be removed from “gadol” status once he has been elevated to this level. I think we can be very proud that in the long history of gedolim there are no examples – at least I am not aware of any – where gedolim lost their status because of immoral behavior. (We can be less proud of the language some gedolim have used in denigrating their opponents.[17])
2. In recent posts I discussed the idea of love before marriage in traditional Jewish communities. It is worth noting in this regard Rachel Morpurgo’s book of poetry, Ugav Rahel (Cracow, 1890). Here is the title page.
Rachel Morpurgo was a cousin of Samuel David Luzzatto, and a fascinating and learned figure in her own right. In the introduction to the book, p. 6, R. Isaac Castiglione tells us that Rachel’s parents wanted her to marry a certain man, but she refused as she was in love with Jacob Morpurgo. If she could not marry him, she preferred to remain single. (In the end, they did marry.)
Her cousin Luzzatto sent her a poem, trying to change her mind, and she replied also in a poem, expertly using many of the same words that Luzzatto had used. In her poem she says that if she can’t marry the man she wants, she will never marry, not even if given the possibility to marry the Messiah. Here are both of their poems, from Ugav Rahel, pp. 50-51, and Rachel’s poem in honor of her marriage, p. 52.
Here is another interesting poem from p. 71. We see that Morpurgo wanted to join Moses Montefiore on his journey to the Land of Israel.
On p. 73 she has a poem of joy after an evil Catholic priest died and was buried on Purim.
She was also able to write riddle poems, which was a popular genre among the Hebraists. Here is one from pp. 76-77
3. In the archive of R. Isaac Herzog there are a number of letters from R. Herzog relevant to the issue of science and Torah.[18] He was writing to scientists and historians asking them how certain it is that the world is billions of years old and that humanity has been in existence for more than 6000 years. One of the people he wrote to was Professor George F. Carter. Carter was a believing Catholic, and in his letters to R. Herzog you see that he could not understand why there should be any conflict between Torah and science. It astounded him that R. Herzog seemed to feel that the scientific and historical information in the Torah must be accepted as factual, when from his Catholic perspective the point of the Bible is not to provide facts of this nature. In his letter of November 23, 1953, R. Herzog wrote to Carter.
[L]et me recapitulate my problem. Not that we have as a dogma a certain chronology but the chronology automatically results from the plain text of the Book of Genesis, as you undoubtedly know yourself, that troubled the minds of some great rabbis nearly a century ago with the rise of the science of Geology. Most ignore the data of science altogether. Some, however, replied that the world was created enormous [missing word] of time ago, but that at certain points mankind was recurrently blotted out and the present world is a certain phase in that recurrent process of creation and destruction. Hence they explained the fossils which bear evidence of such high antiquity etc. They based their explanation upon an old saying in a pre-mediaeval Rabbinic collection: “The Holy One Best be His Name kept on building up worlds and destroying them.” Note that the meaning of “destroying” in that connection is not total annihilation as you will easily understand. Now the problem as it presents itself to me is whether the short period of less than six thousand years or (counting from the deluge when according to Genesis only a few persons survived) some 5000 years is sufficient to account for the numbers of mankind, for its distribution all over the globe, for the advance and progress of mankind, which in the natural course require considerable time, say the art of recording or writing etc., etc. If you assume divine interposition, the progress could be achieved in much less time. Think of the time according to science it took wood to be turned into coal, and of the time it takes for that process at the kitchen fire-side! Yet the question remains: Is it possible to speak of such constant divine interposition within say the first 2000 years of the past 6 or 5 thousand years since the beginning of the Biblical chronology to promote civilisation, the distribution of mankind and to multiply mankind to such an extent? I may add that our great teacher Maimonides from whom your Catholic great thinker Thomas Aquinas drew so much, was in his time confronted with Aristotle’s eternity of the universe which contradicted Jewish belief. He started out with the premise that if Aristotle’s point was absolutely proved, he would explain bara in Genesis not in the sense of created but in another sense, and would thus reconcile the divine Towah [!] with scientific truth, but he found that Aristotle had not proved his point and he therefore left bara in its plain sense.[19] I say something similar. If men of science prompted by absolute truth definitely and unanimously decide that the above chronology is not only unlikely but is actually impossible and therefore absurd, I would reinterpret the Biblical text in a different sense, but before doing that, I must be perfectly certain. Remember that the divine truth of every word in the Pentateuch is a dogma of orthodox Judaism, is believed to be the word of G-d through Moses. Yet orthodox Judaism is not a slave to the literal sense. It teaches that G-d is beyond all human thought and imagination and therefore it regards the anthropomorphisms as mere figures of speech: it also lays down that the Torah speaks in the language of humans. But there is of course a difference between understanding the Eyes of G-d as meaning divine Providence and interpreting the chronology of six thousand years as standing for aeons!
In this letter, and in other letters in his archive, the issue R. Herzog is most troubled with is not the creation of the world and the evidence that this took place billions of years ago. Rather, his concern is with the length of time of humanity on earth, for if there is indisputable evidence of humanity for tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years, then what is one to do with the chronology that “results from the plain text of the book of Genesis,” by which he means the record of generations beginning with Adam? As far as R. Herzog is concerned, this matter is not so much a religious question but a historical question, and that explains why he inquired from experts in this matter.[20] For if we are dealing with a fact, undisputed and recognized by all experts, that humanity has existed for longer than the biblical account would have it, then following Maimonides R. Herzog believes that is no choice but to read the Torah’s account in a non-literal fashion.
Readers can correct me if I am wrong, but I think that in the Modern Orthodox world the matter that R. Herzog was so exercised about has been settled. In other words, I don’t see any evidence that people in these communities are concerned that in Modern Orthodox schools, in classes on ancient history, students are taught things such as that around 10,000 BCE farming communities existed in the Middle East and North Africa. I know from personal experience that textbooks used in Modern Orthodox schools offer precisely this sort of information that assumes that human civilization predates the traditional Jewish reckoning. From what I have seen, this is presented to the students without, however, taking the step that R. Herzog mentioned, namely, explaining what then becomes of the biblical chronology when it is no longer viewed as historical.[21]
4. Following up on this post, here is a picture of a group of Slobodka students.[22]
R. Hutner is sitting in the middle.
Here is another picture of R. Hutner.
Standing next to him is R. Harold Leiman who was principal of general studies at Yeshivat Chaim Berlin’s high school from 1936-1948. Prof. Shnayer Leiman informs me that this picture of his father has to be from 1940 or earlier..
5. In my post here, in discussing the newly published Ha-Mashbir, volume 2, I wrote that one of the articles is by R. Pinhas Zebihi who discusses the practice in Gibraltar that men in mourning do not wear a tallit on Shabbat. I added that this is only the case for the first month of mourning. Mr. Mesod Belilo of Gibraltar has informed me to me that the Gibraltar minhag is that those in mourning do not wear a tallit at all during sheloshim, whether it be Shabbat or during the week. (They do put one on if given an aliyah.) It is Shabbat that makes this minhag halakhically problematic as not wearing a tallit would appear to be an example of “public mourning,” and that is what R. Zebihi deals with. In fact, his conclusion is that the practice should be abolished, but I can’t imagine that the Jews of Gibraltar, even if they knew of R. Zebihi’s position, would give up a minhag that is hundreds of years old and was not abolished by any of the community rabbis. (R. Zebihi’s article is actually a responsum addressed to the rabbi of the small Gibraltar minyan in London.)
One of the editors of Ha-Mashbir isR. Yissachar Dov Hoffman who recently published another book, Avodat Ovadiah, volume 1. It focuses on practices of R. Ovadiah Yosef and deals with the first part of Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim (tzitzit, prayer, blessings, etc.). R. Hoffman’s learned notes include citations from a wide range of contemporary rabbinic works.
6. Here is a quote from the late Robert Liberles that I find quite interesting, and I think readers will as well.
Historians, imbued with curiosity and a fascination with the dark side, can easily be drawn toward the negative, the hostile, the antinomian side of human behavior. In addition, deviant behavior has much to teach about a society under study. There is also the endless fallacy of being drawn by sources deep into the abyss of misrepresentation. Records in the public archives relate strife and despair more often than happiness and love. Rabbinic responsa pertaining to family life also tend to deal with discord. Abuses in Jewish family life can be abundantly documented, and they should be. These sources have been ignored too often, partly because they were not known, partly because they were at times consciously overlooked. Research based on prescriptive sources has depicted a portrait that is quite distant from the harsher reality that emerges from primary descriptive sources.[23]
7. In my post here I mention that in medieval rabbinic literature the words צעירים and דורשים mean Franciscans and Dominicans. David S. Zinberg called my attention to R. Joseph Ibn Caspi, Mishneh Kesef, vol. 2, p. 257. In commenting on how Moses was not celibate and even took a second wife, he writes:
כי אינו צעיר ודורש, או אגוסטי וכרמלי
“For he was not a Franciscan or a Dominican or an Augustinian or a Carmelite.”
Zinberg also called my attention to Mishneh Kesef, vol. 1, p. 106, where he writes about כת הצעירים מארצנו זאת
I also found that R. Israel Moses Hazan, Nahalah le-Yisrael, p. 84, refers to the Dominicans as כת הדרשנים
8. I know readers will be happy to learn of a significant event in the world of Torah and academic Jewish scholarship: A previously unknown responsum by Maimonides has just been published in Divre Hefetz 7 (Tishrei 5777). You can see it here.
9. The newest book in my series, Studies in Orthodox Judaism, has appeared. It is Darren Kleinberg, Hybrid Judaism: Irving Greenberg, Encounter, and the Changing Nature of American Jewish Identity. Anyone interested in a discount copy of the book should be in touch with me.A few other books recently appeared that I would like to bring to readers’ attention. R. Moshe Zuriel published the following works by Naftali Hertz Wessely: Gan Naul, Sefer ha-Midot, Migdal ha-Levanon, and Hikur Din. The first two books have been published before, but Zuriel has included unpublished material. Migdal ha-Levanon appears in print for the first time. All scholars who deal with Wessely will have to examine these works.
Another recent publication is R. David ben Judah he-Hasid, Sefer ha-Gevul, edited by Bentsion Cohen. This is a kabbalistic work published from manuscript. The author, R. David, is none other than the grandson of Nahmanides. Here is how the book is described on the cover: “This book is one of the first attempts by a contemporary of the Zohar discovery to give a lucid and graphical interpretation to the mysterious complex issues of divinity as discussed in the Idra Rabbah of the Zohar. His approach is one of the earliest to present an interpretation of the Sephirot in the image of a person.” The book also includes the numerous illustrations that appear in the manuscript.
10. Readers sometimes ask me about upcoming lectures, so I would like to inform people that on the Shabbat of Dec. 16-17, 2016 (including Saturday night) I will be speaking at Ner Yisrael in London. On Sunday night, Dec. 18, I will be speaking at the Hampstead Synagogue at 8:15pm. The topic is “Some Strange Jewish Christmas Eve Practices.” On Wednesday, Dec. 21, I will be speaking at the London School of Jewish Studies at 8pm on the topic of “Touching God: What Are the Limits of Orthodox Theology?” On Thursday, Dec. 22, I will be speaking at Shomrei Hadath at 8pm on the topic of “Sense and Censorship: Is Historical Truth an Orthodox Value?” On the Shabbat of Dec. 24-25 (including Saturday night) I will be speaking at Kehillat Ohev Shalom.
On the Shabbat of Jan. 6-7, 2017, I will be in Flatbush. During services on Friday night at Bnei Yitzhak, I will give a short talk on R. Elijah Benamozegh. After an early tefillah at the Sephardic Institute, I will be speaking at 8:45am on “The Philosophy of Rav Kook: Is It Still Relevant?” On Shabbat afternoon at 3pm I will be speaking at Beth Torah on “Judaism and Islam: Some Historical and Halakhic Perspectives.” On Saturday night at 8pm I will be speaking at the Sephardic Institute on “Did the Sages Always Tell the Truth (and Should We)?”
[1] “Da’as Torah – What are Its Parameters in non-Halachic Issues”, available here at 26:40.
[2] Usually it is Hungarian extremist rabbis who use terms like avodah zarah with reference to Yom ha-Atzmaut, but I found that R. Yehezkel Levenstein also uses this language. See Or Yehezkel, vol. 3, p. 118:
וברצוני לעורר כי הנה היום היה [!] יום העצמאות, ומה הוא מהותו של יום העצמאות. יום של עבודה זרה, יום שבו מראים הכל כוחי עוצם ידי.
I agree with a friend who wrote to me regarding this passage:
יש הבדל בין השימוש בשם ‘עבודה זרה’ בהקשר של “כוחי ועוצם ידי”, זה שווה למי שאומר שהרדיפה אחר הכסף הוא עבודה זרה “אלהי כסף ואלהי זהב לא תעשה לכם”, ובין השימוש שסטמר משתמש בו שעובדים “העגל הציוני”.
[3] At 1:14:30. The Lubavitcher Rebbe had a different perspective. See Joseph Telushkin, Rebbe: The Life and Teachings of Menachem M. Schneerson, the Most Influential Rabbi in Modern History (New York, 2014), p. 189, who quotes what the Rebbe told R. Leibel Groner: “When it comes to a marriage, not I can help you, not your father can help you, not your mother can help you, not your seichel [your intellectual faculties] can help you. The only thing that can help you is your heart. If you feel for her, go ahead. If you don’t do not.”
[4] At 1:11:00. Because R. Schachter is citing from memory, his misremembered one point. At minute 59 he describes a case dealt with by R. Chaim Berlin that took place under communist rule. Yet R. Berlin died in 1912, before the Soviet Revolution. The responsum referred to by R. Schachter can be found in Nishmat Hayyim, Even ha-Ezer, no. 3, and is from 1911. As R. Schachter notes, it contains the following fascinating words, addressed to someone who was considering whether a certain woman was an appropriate marriage partner:
ויוכל לקיים בה מצות פו”ר להוליד לו בן ובת ויצא ידי חובתו. ובזה”ז דלא אכשור דרי אין להדר להיות לו בנים מרובים, שמי יודע אם ילכו בדרך התורה והמצוה, אך לקיים מצות פו”ר חובה עלינו למלאות חובתינו.
I don’t know of any other rabbinic figure who urged people not to have many children because of a fear that they would not remain religious. The standard rabbinic approach in such matters was to declare בהדי כבשי דרחמנא למה לך. This expression comes from Berakhot 10a where it deals with the exact matter discussed by R. Berlin.
In those days was Hezekiah sick unto death. And Isaiah the prophet, son of Amoz, came to him and said unto him, Thus saith the Lord, Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die and not live etc. (Is. 38:1) What is the meaning of ‘thou shalt die and not live’? Thou shalt die in this world and not live in the world to come. He said to him: Why so bad? He replied: Because you did not try to have children. He said: The reason was because I saw by the holy spirit that the children issuing from me would not be virtuous. He said to him: What have you to do with the secrets of the All-Merciful? You should have done what you were commanded, and let the Holy One, blessed be He, do that which pleases Him
According to R. Berlin, Hezekiah was mistaken in that he chose not have any children. R. Berlin states that one must indeed fulfill the minimal obligation of peru u-revu, but there is no need to have more children than this when there is a strong possibility that the children will not remain on the religious path.
[5] Ibid at 1:01:00.
[6] Hearing this reminded me of R. Avraham Shapiro’s point that certain “Daas Torah” personalities have published Torah works, and in these works they state that what they write is not halakhah le-ma’aseh. “It is as if they are saying that they don’t have the ‘Din Torah,” but they do have the Daas Torah.” See Aharon Eizental, “Ha-Kohen ha-Gadol me-Ehav,” Tzohar 32 (2008), p. 16. A number of times R. Shapiro commented that there is no precedent for the current phenomenon in which Torah scholars who won’t give halakhic rulings on commonplace Shabbat questions feel that they can issue rulings on life and death matters affecting the entire nation. As with R. Schachter, he saw this as a distortion of true Daas Torah.
[7] See R. Israel Berger, Eser Orot (Petrokov, 1907), pp. 13-14, who explains the hasidic perspective that one can be the gadol ha-dor without being an expert in Talmud and halakhah.
[8] None of the responses referred to the following important passage in Aviad Hakohen, “Zot Torat ha-Adam,” in Reuven Ziegler and Reuven Gafni, eds. Le-Ovdekha be-Emet (Jerusalem, 2011), p. 367. It shows that R. Yehuda Amital thought that there is a more important thing to hope for than that one’s sons or students become gedolim, namely, that they should be good Jews.
כמה פעמים סיפר לנו על בר המצווה של בנו היחיד, ר’ יואל, שאליה הגיעו הרבה אורחים שנמנו עם משפחת האצולה הלמדנית של הרבנית מרים, משפחתו של הסבא ר’ איסר זלמן מלצר. בזה אחר זה קמו האורחים, וכמנהג גוברין יהודאין בירכו את חתן בר המצווה שיהיה גדול בתורה, חריף ובקי, סיני ועוקר הרים, רב לאלפים, יודע ש”ס ופוסקים, עמוד החזק ופטיש הימיני. לאחר שסיימו, ניעור רבנו ממקומו ואמר בצורה אופיינית: “אני מודה לכם על דבריכם הטובים, אבל איני מסכים עמם. אבא שלי לא היה גדול בתורה. גם סבא שלי לא היה גדול בתורה. לא אכפת לי שבני יהיה חייט או סנדלר. העיקר שיהיה יהודי טוב.”
[9] Brisk is an exception. A friend writes:
בבית בריסק אומרים מפורש, מאן לימא שיש גדול הדור?
[10] I am referring to the non-hasidic segment of the haredi world. In the hasidic world the followers of a rebbe generally viewed him as the gadol ha-dor, and he was thought to be chosen for this role from Heaven. See Mendel Piekarz, Ha-Hanhagah ha-Hasidit (Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 22ff.; David Assaf, Ne’ehaz ba-Sevakh (Jerusalem, 2006), p. 240. The Steipler actually said that R. Shakh was chosen by Heaven to be the manhig ha-dor. See Avraham Yeshayahu Kanievsky, Toldot Yaakov (Bnei Brak, 1995), p. 263. The Hatam Sofer said that in every generation God establishes one person as the premier posek. Because of his central halakhic position, the Hatam Sofer understandably understood that he was this person. See Maoz Kahana, “Ha-Hatam Sofer: Ha-Posek be-Einei Atzmo,” Zion 76 (2007), pp. 545-546.
[11] In a future post I will discuss R. Steinman in more detail. After examining his writings and public statements, I have to say that I understand well why there is opposition to R. Steinman, and I think that without the support of R. Kanievsky he never would have been regarded as the gadol ha-dor. It appears to me that R. Steinman has indeed attempted to move haredi society in a different direction, and as such has diverged from some of the previous haredi Daas Torah. Furthermore, there is evidence of his “out of the box” thinking for many decades. As far as I know, there is not even one scholarly article about R. Steinman, which is surprising, to say the least, since he is the single most important haredi rabbinic leader.
[12] Berakhot 31b s.v. מורה. Cf. Rashbam, Pesahim 100a, s.v. ברבי which I also don’t think means the preeminent Torah leader or scholar. See also Or Zarua, Hilkhot Rosh ha-Shanah, no. 276, for the story of R. Amnon of Mainz who is referred to as gadol ha-dor. But again, I don’t think the meaning is that he was the greatest scholar of the generation. He certainly was not the greatest leader of his generation (and indeed, he was not even a real person).
[13] Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 282:3.
[14] Nefesh Kol Hai, ma’arekhet ת, no. 80. R. Palache also cites R. Nahman of Bratzlav, Sefer ha-Midot, s.v. צדיק no. 136:
אין לך צדיק שאין עליו מחלוקת ומחקרים.
[15] Vol. 2, p. 159. See also ibid., p. 249.
[16] Minhat Eleazar, vol. 3, no. 64 (p. 54a).
[17] There is a long list of negative things rabbis have said about their opponents, and I have cited some in prior posts. Perhaps the worst I have found was stated by R. Sason Elijah Halevi Samoha, the former hakham bashi of Baghdad. He accused R. Elisha Dangoor, his successor as hakham bashi, of murdering his own brother. See Yaron Harel, Intrigue and Revolution: Chief Rabbis in Aleppo, Baghdad, and Damascus 1744-1914, trans. Y. Chipman (Oxford, 2015), p. 98.
[18] The letters I refer to come from the Israel State Archives, R. Isaac Herzog file 4243/6-פ.
[19] For my understanding of Maimonides, which diverges from that of R. Herzog, see here.
[20] In the file that contains the letter to Carter is also found a November 2, 1954 letter to Arnold Toynbee in which R. Herzog writes:
I have been struck by the point that you narrate the history of 5000 years of civilisation. Does that mean that in your view recorded history is not older?
I have been trying recently to explain the Hebrew Bible chronology according to which the creation of man took place only about 5700 years ago. This of course is rejected by anthropologists but may it not mean that man, truly civilised man, man properly called, is only of that age? Or do you begin the history of civilisation with the rise of agriculture?
Another letter in the file is from R. Herzog to Abraham Cressy Morrison, author of the book Man Does Not Stand Alone. R. Herzog’s letter is from December 19, 1951, and here is the section relevant to our discussion:
While not necessarily subscribing to all of its statements, I wish to compliment you on your very interesting and inspiring little book, “Man Does Not Stand Alone.” It is calculated to help many spiritually.
However, permit me the following observations. Whilst you accept the belief in G-D and in providence in as far as the generalities of nature are concerned, you recognise the dates fixed by science as axiomatic. Let me call your attention to the consideration that the ages of the rocks and the like, are computed in the absence of the premise of the Rock of the Ages. Once you grant the agency of a super nature power and intelligence, it does not follow at all that because with the laws and forces working now in nature after the creational work has ended, this or that kind of operation must take so much time, it has been so during the creational process and hence it is not at all certain that G-D tool [!] milliards of years to perform his work as Creator.
The difficulty is great, I admit, when it comes to historic Biblical chronology. Literally taken, the Biblical chronology allows only 5712 years for the period since the creation of Man and the present day. Yet I have the impression that even Wells allotted only a space of about 12,000 years for civilisation. This of course is a different matter. If we take agriculture as marking the emergence from the savage state, some 6000 years would, I feel, be sufficient. We may have to reinterpret the narrative portions of the Pentateuch, but not necessarily to allegorise them.
The same file also contains most of the Herzog-Immanuel Velikovsky correspondence published and analyzed by Raphael Shuchat in The Torah u-Madda Journal 15 (2008-2009), pp. 143-171.
[21] In the Israel State Archives, R. Isaac Herzog file 4253/6-פ there are other letters from R. Herzog focusing on the matter we have been discussing, namely, the short time given to humanity on earth if one reads the Torah literally. On 10 Av 5712, he wrote as follows to Dr. Yitzhak Etzion:
אפשר לפרש את תוה”ק בצורה אליגורית ושהשמות שבפרשיות הראשונות שבספר בראשית, הן של גזעים ואומות רבים, לא של יחידים, ושהשנים הן לא שנים רגילות אלא תקופות, אבל זהו כבר ענין אחר, ודורש קביעת כללים עד היכן ומהיכן
On 22 Adar 5712 he wrote to Dr. Samuel Belkin.
זה מזמן שאני הוגה רעיון גדול בלבי והוא להוציא ספר גדול בכמות ובאיכות, מעין מורה נבוכים חדש שיכיל תשובותיה של היהדות הנאמנה לכל מתקיפיה, מצד המדע המודרני, האנטרופולוגיה, הגיאולוגיה, הזואולוגיה וכו’, הפילוסופיה, בקורת המקרא, והדתות האחרות, וכן מצד בעלי הכתות שבקרבנו של העבר ושל היום, הצדוקים הקראים והריפורמים
אני קבעתי לי ליסוד את דברי רבינו הגדול הרמב”ם ז”ל, שאם אריסטו היה מוכיח בהחלט את קדמות החומר היה הוא מפרש את פרשיות בראשית בהתאם לה, וד”ל, אך צריך שהחולקים על קבלתנו יוכיחו תחלה את השערותיהם, וכן צריך לקבוע כללים פרשנייים, עד היכן ואימתי מותר להוציא הדברים מפשוטם. זהו מקצוע בתורה שעובד אך מעט מאד
On 11 Shevat 5713, R. Herzog wrote to Professor Ben Zion Dinur, who was then serving as Minster of Education.
ימצא נא בזה סיכום של פעולות שבתכניתי לשם יצירת תנועה רוחנית להגנה על מורשת סיני
בדעתי להתחיל מיד בעריכת ספר גדול על יסוד היסודות של היהדות הנאמנה המאמינה, “תורה מן השמים”. בספר ההוא תופענה הגנות כתובות מאנשי מדע ואנשי אמונה כאחד, מיד כל אחד מנקודת השקפת מקצועו: אנתרופוליגיה, גיאולוגיה, תכונה, זואולוגיה וכו’ וכו’ . . . כללים הם בידינו מאז מעולם: “דברה תורה בלשון בני אדם”, “שבעים פנים לתורה”, “התורה נדרשת בפרדס” וכו’ וכו’, ומאידך גיסא יש לנו כלל גדול “אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו”. הספר הזה יקבע גבולות על הפרשיות שבתורה שאינן ענין של הלכה למעשה, עד כמה ובאילו תנאים יש להוציא הדברים מפשטותם. לפנינו יהיו למורה דרך דברי המורה הידועים, שאם אריסטו היה מוכיח בהחלט את קדמות החומרeternity of matter היה הוא ז”ל מוצא דרך לפרש את פרשיות בראשית בהתאם לה.
בהכרח שהיהדות הנאמנה המאמינה תמצא לה פרקליט בתקופה המודרנית הזאת, אך מפני התקדמות המדע בצעדי ענק אי אפשר לעבודה כזאת להעשות באיש אחד. אפילו הרמב”ם, אילו היה חי בדורנו, לא היה יכול להאבק יחידי בכל הזרמים המרובים ההם
In his 29 Shevat 5714 letter to Dr. Aharon Barth, R. Herzog speculates about a possible solution to the problem we have been discussing, and also a solution for other matters in which the Torah’s description does not correspond to what is accepted by modern scientists and historians. He suggests that the Torah’s description need not be factually correct, as it was in line with the conceptions of the generation of the giving of the Torah.
תאמר, שהיא דברה לא רק בלשון בני אדם, כי גם בלשון המסורת של העברים שבאותו הדור שקיבל את התורה, אעפ”י שבעצם הדברים לא מדויקים. נוסיף ללכת ונאמר כדברי רבינו הקדוש הרמב”ן ז”ל שהתורה כולה שמותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא, ויש בה בכל אות ובכל תג סודות וסודי סודות, למעלה למעלה מהשכל הרגיל, רזי רזין שרק יחידי סגולה זוכים בהם, ואין חיצוניותה בפנימיותה כלל, והצורה החיצונה נתחברה בהתאמה לדרגת המסורת העברית של הימים ההים – הרבה צריך עוד לדון עד שנקבל תיאוריה כזאת
As can be seen from the last sentence, he was not ready to adopt this approach.
See also the letter from R. Herzog that I published in my “Ha-Im Yesh Hiyuv le-Ha’amin she-ha-Zohar Nikhtav al Yedei Rabbi Shimon Ben Yohai,” Milin Havivin 5 (2010-2011), p. 19.
In his reply to R. Herzog, Dr. Etzion makes the following interesting point which stands in opposition to the approach of some in the Kiruv world (and, truth be told, it is also in opposition to Maimonides’ approach)..
כבודם של כל חכמי ישראל שהשתדלו להוכיח את האמונה ע”י השכל במקומם מונח, אבל האמונה בה’ ובתורה היא אחת ממצוות התורה ולו היה אפשרות להוכיח את האמונה הזאת, היינו לו אפשר היה להכריח את שכל האדם להאמין, הרי אין מקום למצוה, כמו שאין מקום למצוה ולשכר ועונש אם אין בחירה חפשית בחופש הרצון
[22] The picture can be found here where four of the five young men are identified. It was brought to my attention by Elchanan Burton.
[23] Robert Liberles, “On the Threshold of Modernity: 1618-1780,” in Marion Kaplan, ed., Jewish Daily Life in Germany, 1618-1945 (Oxford, 2005), p. 24.
Altering of Rabbinic Texts?, Shlomo Rechnitz and the Eighth Principle of Faith, R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, the Ridbaz and “Chemistry,” and R. Yitzhak Barda
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Altering of Rabbinic Texts?, Shlomo Rechnitz and the Eighth Principle of Faith, R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, the Ridbaz and “Chemistry,” and R. Yitzhak Barda
Marc B. Shapiro
1. People continue to send me examples of censorship and altering of texts. If I would discuss all of them, I would have no time for other matters, but I do intend to get to some of these examples. Let me also share an “updating” of a classic rabbinic text that I discovered on my own in the old fashioned way. This is one of those examples that I wish I knew about when I wrote my book. It is not a case of someone in the Orthodox world altering a text, as this example goes back many centuries. Bereshit Rabbah 36:1 states:
ויהיו בני נח היוצאים וגו’: והוא ישקיט ומי ירשיע וגו’ (איוב לד, כט) דרש ר’ מאיר “והוא ישקיט” מעולמו “יסתר פנים” לעולמו כדיין שמותחין כילה על פניו ואין יודע מה נעשה מבחוץ ]כך אמרו דור המבול (שם כב) “עבים סתר לו ולא יראה [“.א”ל דייך מאיר. אמר להון ומה הוא דכתיב “והוא ישקיט ומי ירשיע” וגו’. אמרו נתן שלוה לדור המבול ומי בא וחייבן.
And the Sons of Noah, that went forth: It is written, When he giveth quietness, who then can condemn, etc. (Job 34:29)? R. Meir interpreted it: He quieteneth Himself from His world, And He hideth His face (ibid.) from His world, like a judge before whom a curtain is spread, so that he does not know what is happening without. [So said the generation of the flood, Thick clouds are a covering to Him, that he seeth not (Job 22:14)] Let that suffice thee, Meir, said they to him. [Soncino: You have said more than enough – heaven forfend that this teaching should be true!] Then what is meant by, When He giveth quietness, who can condemn? he demanded. They replied: Was not ease given to the generation of the flood; who then can condemn them?
The words that I have included in the first brackets are not found in most manuscripts of Bereshit Rabbah consulted by J. Theodor for his critical edition. However, they do appear in Va-Yikra Rabbah 5:1. The words “So said the generation of the flood” are problematic, since if they said the prior sentence, why is Rabbi Meir being rebuked? If you remove those words then the text makes perfect sense, as we see that R. Meir is saying (or is attributing to Job[1]) the notion that God chooses to remove himself from knowledge of and guidance of the world.[2] This is a very radical statement and it is understandable why a later copyist would prefer to attribute such a statement to the generation of the flood, rather than R. Meir. In other words, it appears that the original text of the midrash was altered for theological reasons.
In its note on the Bereshit Rabbah text, the Soncino translation explains:
He [God] is unconcerned by what is done in the world and is not incensed by the deeds of the wicked – a remarkable teaching of God’s trancendence. Cur. edd. alter the meaning by adding: so said that generation of the Flood (according to this R. Meir merely puts these words into the mouth of the wicked), Thick clouds are a covering to Him, that He seeth not (Job xxii, 14). But in that case it is difficult to see why his colleagues so sharply rejected this interpretation.
Louis Finkelstein takes note of this midrashic passage and writes:
Even in the school of R. Akiba, we find R. Meir, the sage who so frequently expresses patrician ideas, denying Providence in individual human life. “God,” he says, “is like a judge who spreads a curtain before him and knows not what proceeds without.” The earnest protest of R. Meir’s colleagues against this heresy shows that it was meant seriously, and that R. Meir, in the second century of the Common Era, actually held views akin to those defended by the patricians for six centuries before him.[3]
It is also worth noting that the medieval R. Asher ben Gershom, as part of his defense of the medieval followers of Maimonides, refers to the Bereshit Rabbah passage and his text did not have any reference to the Generation of the Flood. He therefore understands the passage to mean that R. Meir indeed denied God’s providence. He also adds that it appears that R. Meir later rejected this view, although he doesn’t provide any evidence for this assertion. R. Asher contrasts the vehemence of the attacks on the followers of Maimonides with the calmer way the talmudic sages reacted when their colleagues put forth radical views.[4]
ראו מה בין רבותינו וביניכם. הנה להלל באמרו אין משיח לישראל. לא אמרו עליו אלא מריה שרא ליה [!]. ולר’ מאיר בדרשו בבראשית רבה הוא ישקיט בעולמו ויסתר פנים מעולמו כדיין וכו’. והוא דבר גדול בענין השגחת הבורא ית’ עד שנראה שחזר בו. לא אמרו חבריו אלא דייך מאיר.
2. In a previous post I referred to R. Menahem Navarra’s book Issur Kedushah. This book was published together with another book by R. Navarra called Kero Mikra which deals with grammatical points in the liturgy. On pp. 24a-24b he quotes Maimonides’ Eighth Principle of Faith and a passage by Abarbanel in order to reject the notion that the text of the Torah was ever in a confused state and that Ezra corrected the Torah in any way. He understands Maimonides’ principle to be teaching that the Torah text we have today is the exact same that was given to Moses.
שיחוייב כל בעל דת להאמין והוא שהתורה שבידינו היום היא הנתונ’ למשה בהר סיני מבלי חלוף ושנוי כלל . . . ומלתא אגב אורחין קמ”לן כמה יש להחמיר בענין הספרי’ וקריאתם.
The assumption of R. Navarra is also found in, of all places, Shlomo Rechnitz’s famous (or infamous, depending your perspective) speech on the Lakewood school situation.
In this incredibly courageous speech, delivered, as it were, in the lion’s den itself, Rechnitz strongly attacked the phenomenon whereby, he claims, many children in Lakewood are not allowed into the schools that their parents would like them to attend, as their families are not of the right sort. Since he is a major philanthropist, in general Rechnitz is given some leeway in what he says, but in this speech he went over the line and the powers that be responded very strongly, forcing Rechnitz to issue an apology and declare that he will no longer speak about this matter. It was interesting to see all the comments on the different haredi news sites that reported on the Rechnitz speech. The people were overwhelmingly in favor of what Rechnitz said. However, this creates an enormous problem for haredi society, since laypeople, even important wealthy philanthropists, are not the ones to be making communal policy, and certainly not to be criticizing this policy in public. By the leadership’s strong response, and seeing how quickly Rechnitz folded, it sent a clear signal who the bosses really are.
The entire video is of great interest in terms of the sociology of the American haredi community, but I want to call attention to a tangential point made by Rechnitz. At minute 21 he says that he has a difficulty with a formulation of Maimonides in his eighth principle of faith. He also states that he never saw anyone who discusses this difficulty (which I assume means he never read The Limits of Orthodox Theology).
He begins by saying that Maimonides’ principles of faith are eternal, applying for all time. Thus, the principle that God created the world or that the Messiah will come are things that one must believe in all times. He then says that the eighth principle of faith is difficult since it requires belief that our Torah scrolls are the exact same as the one given to Moses. Rechnitz asks, how can this be a principle of faith? How can there be a guarantee that the text never changed? This is not a question of theology but of historical reality, and how could Maimonides know what would happen in the future? Maybe after recording his principle there would be confusion in the Jewish people, and it would lead to a mistake in the text. Rechnitz quotes the Ani Ma’amin version of the eighth principle and wonders, “How could Chazal [!] possibly make such a statement?” He then says that in the “last few thousand [!] years since that Ani Ma’amin was written” much has happened with the Jewish people, wars, pogroms, ghettoes, etc. So how can we know that there haven’t been any changes in the text? “How can we say with a straight face that the Torah we have in our hands today is letter by letter the exact Torah we received at Har Sinai. And more importantly, how did Chazal know that the Torah would never even slightly deviate ad sof kol ha-doros?” He then says that this is based on a promise from God that the Torah would never be forgotten.[5]
All this is of course incorrect, and I don’t mean to criticize Rechnitz on this account. He is not a scholar and isn’t expected to know these things. Yet what he says is illustrative of the common view of many who have no idea about masoretic matters, and it was precisely this sort of perception that Maimonides created with his formulation of the eighth principle. (In TheLimits of Orthodox Theology I offer a suggestion as to why Maimonides put forth a formulation that he knew was inaccurate.)
In response to Rechnitz, and I hope someone shows him this post, let me go over what I wrote here where I cited R. Yosef Reinman who has the same basic misconception as Rechnitz (although unlike Rechnitz, he knows that Yemenite Torah scrolls are not identical to Ashkenazic and Sephardic Torah scrolls).
Reinman writes as follows in One People, Two Worlds, p. 119:
[A]n examination of Torah scrolls from all over the world, from Ireland to Siberia to isolated Yemen, all handwritten by scribes, yielded just nine instances of one-letter spelling discrepancies. Nine! And none of them affect the meaning of the text. Why is this so? Because every week we take out the scrolls and read them in public. The people follow the reading closely and if something is wrong, they are quick to point it out.
Unfortunately, Reinman [and Rechnitz] doesn’t realize that it was the invention of printing that unified Torah texts by creating a standard version that soferim could have access to and be guided from (and those who review the parashah each week with Rashi will know that Rashi’s Torah text was not identical to the one we currently have[6]). Printed humashim also enabled people listening to the reading to point out errors. Yet let us not forget that most of the differences in Torah scrolls have concerned male and haser. Contrary to Reinman’s implication in his last sentence, there is no way for the people following the reading to catch such an error.
I must also point out that Reinman’s first sentence is an egregious error, and one doesn’t need to go to Ireland or Siberia to prove this (and contrary to what he states no one has ever performed such an examination). If one simply takes fifty Torah scrolls from Lakewood one will find all sorts of discrepancies. I know this because the people who check sifrei Torah by computer claim that the overwhelming majority of scrolls they check, including those that have been in use for decades, have contained at least one error.[7] In other words, contrary to what Reinman has stated, the truth of Torah does not rise or fall because of scribal errors. If it did, then we would be in big trouble because as I just mentioned, almost every Torah scroll in the world has discrepancies. What Reinman doesn’t seem to get is that while contemporary halakhic authorities are in dispute about only nine letters, this has nothing to do with the quality of actual Torah scrolls, which are obviously subject to human errors by scribes.
3. In my post here I discussed a possibly fictional responsum by the fascinating figure R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach.[8] There is so much of interest in his responsa, but I want to offer one further example. In Havot Yair, no. 136, he mentions that some wicked Jews have become accustomed to bribing non-Jewish judges when they have a case before them, and even brag about this. He also mentions that his brother-in-law, R. Isaac, the rav of Mannheim, had a discussion about this issue with Karl Ludwig I, the Elector Palatine. R. Bacharach actually puts ז”ל after Karl Ludwig’s name. ז”ל is almost never added to the name of a non-Jew and thus shows the positive feelings R. Bacharach had for Karl Ludwig.[9]
והיה הדוכס קאריל לודוויג ז”ל המופלג בחכמה משתעשע לפרקים בגיסי הנזכר בדברי שכליים.
R. Bacharach records that Karl Ludwig once told R. Isaac that has a complaint about the Jews whose cases often come to the government courts. He says that they bribe the judges, an action “which is against all religion, and certainly against what is written in your Torah.” He also told R. Isaac that it was his responsibility to fix this problem.
R. Isaac agreed with Karl Ludwig that bribery of judges is a terrible thing, and he doesn’t deny that Jews have been guilty of this. He adds that even if there is no Torah prohibition to bribe a (non-Jewish) judge, it still needs to be forbidden in order for there to be a properly functioning society.
דאפילו לא נאמר איסורו בתורה ראוי לאסרו מצד השכל וישוב העולם ותיקון המדינה כמו רציחה וגזילה וגניבה ואונאה וזנות ועול מידות, וכלם דברים שהשכל מחייב, ודין ודת חק ומשפט עולה על כלנה שאם יקולקל המשפט איש הישר בעיניו יעזה.
R. Bacharach was not in the room when R. Isaac spoke to Karl Ludwig. It is possible that he is recording the gist of what R. Isaac told him he said, but is it also possible that what are seeing is R. Bacharch’s invention of a conversation, and that R. Bacharach is using the opportunity to put forth his own ideas about the matter?
R. Bacharach then records that R. Isaac told Karl Ludwig that if a Jew is owed money by a non-Jew and the non-Jew denies this, while there can be no permission for the Jew to offer the judge a bribe, from God’s perspective if a bribe was given it is not wrong since the Jew is entitled to the money and the only way he can get it was by bribing the judge. He also said that perhaps the bribe can be seen as evening the scales, since the Jew is afraid that his adversary has also bribed the judge. This argument is intended to show that the Jews of R. Bacharach’s time who bribed non-Jewish judges were really not doing something so bad.
R. Bacharach then says the following (again, supposedly in the name of his brother-in-law), which is just as true today as when he said it: והנה ידוע שאין שנאה כשנאת הדת. He explains that when the Jew and non-Jew come before the judge, the judge naturally inclines to favor his co-religionist. The Jew therefore assumes that the only way he can get a fair trial is by bribing the judge. In other words, he is not bribing him to have the case thrown his way, but only to get a fair trial. R. Bacharach concludes that what he has said should not be seen as a justification of bribery, but as a limud zekhut which explains the circumstances that lead Torah observant people to behave this way.
R. Bacharach tells us that Karl Ludwig liked what R. Isaac said but asked him what about when two Jews are having a court case and they still bribe the judge. In that circumstance there is no reason to think that the judge will favor one side, as neither side shares his religion. R. Bacharach reports how R. Isaac was able to respond properly to this question, but again, is it possible that this is an invention of R. Bacharach in order to enable him to get his ideas across?
After recording the supposed conversation between R. Isaac and Karl Ludwig, R. Bacharach elaborates on the matter of bribery and why there is no explicit Torah prohibition on giving a bribe, only on taking a bribe (Deut. 16:19). In this discussion he notes that he does not think that there is a prohibition to bribe a non-Jewish judge if do not know that you are in the wrong, and thus you are not asking the judge to award you something that doesn’t belong to you by right. He also says that one who offers such a bribe does not make it a quid pro quo that he gives the money and the judge rules in his favor. All he intends by the money is that the judge look carefully at his case and listen to his claims, and then render a just decision. In his description of R. Isaac’s conversation with Karl Ludwig, Bacharach reports that R. Isaac said that he was only offering a limud zekhut for those who bribe judges, but “halilah” to say that this is proper behavior. Here, however, R. Bacharach is saying that there is no prohibition. In other words, in the very same responsum R. Bacharach is showing the difference between an answer motivated by apologetics and one that needn’t be concerned with this.
ולכן בשוחד לשופטיהם אין בו חשש דלפני עיור אם הוא מדיני ממונות, שלא נתברר לבעלי דבר עצמן שחבירו עושה עול רק כל אחד סובר שהדין עמו, וגם השופט דעתו לשפוט צדק, וגם נותן השוחד אינו מתנה שיזכהו רק שיחפש זכותו וישים דברי טענתו אל לבו.
Examining what halakhic authorities say about the matter of bribing non-Jewish judges shows very clearly how at least some Jews regarded themselves as living in a parallel universe from non-Jewish society, and did not feel bound by the rules of the latter society, only by internal Jewish rules. Even though most halakhic authorities assume that it is forbidden to bribe non-Jewish judges,[10] the fact that some think it is permitted is also of great significance in showing that this was not regarded as an obvious matter. Thus, R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz[11] raises the question if one can bribe a non-Jewish judge. He refers to R. Bacharach’s responsum and tells us that R. Bacharach did not come to a conclusion in this matter. He then adds that the “world” has long been accustomed to be lenient in this matter, and R. Eybeschuetz provides a halakhic justification for the bribery, which would only be in a case when the Jew was in the right.
והעולם נוהגין היתר משנים קדמוניות . . . וצ”ל דס”ל דכל הטעם של שוחד דהוא חד דמקרביה דעתיה גביה וזהו בישראל דקרובים אסורים לדון אבל בבן נח שכל הקרובים מותרים לדון אין לך קירוב יותר מזה והכל יודעין שדעת האב קרוב לבן יותר מאדם אחר שנותנים לו אלף דינרים ומכל מקום האב כשר לדון בנו הבן נח, אף ליתן שוחד להצדיק הצדיק וכו’ מותר דמ”ש מקרובים.
I think it is very likely that despite the halakhic justification provided, the real motivation for any Jewish bribery of non-Jewish judges was the assumption that the judge would not be fair when dealing with Jews as well as a fear that the non-Jewish litigant was also bribing the judge.
R. Abraham Zvi Eisenstadt, Pithei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 151:1, states that any bribery is only permissible באופן שאין בו חשש גזל, and even for this permissible bribery, it is only OK if the money is not given directly to the judge but to one of his assistants who will then give it to the judge. See also Pithei Teshuvah, Hoshen Mishpat 9:2, who after citing authorities who disagree with R. Eybeschuetz nevertheless justifies offering bribes when it is obvious that the non-Jewish judge is not going to render a just verdict.
R. Simeon Anolik, in a book published in 1907, states that there is no prohibition of lifnei iver if one bribes a non-Jewish judge, as the non-Jewish legal system is not in accord with Torah law. However, this is only permitted if the intent of the bribe is to arrive at the correct, Torah mandated result .[12]
לא שייך בזה לפני עור מה שנותן שוחד לזכות את הזכאי ולחייב את החייב אם דנו עפ”י חק שלהם. ומש”כ רמב”ן בפ’ וישלח בשם הירושלמי דב”נ מוזהר בלא תקח שוחד היינו בדין שהוא כדיננו. או דמרא דירושלמי הוא ר’ יוחנן ולדידיה מבואר ברמ”א שם [שו”ת הרמ”א סי’ י] דב”נ מחוייב בדינים שחקקו להם כרצונם. אבל לדידן דקי”ל דמצווים על הדינים היינו דינים שלנו שפיר פשט ההיתר מטעם זה.
The words that I have underlined would appear to show that Anolik’s position was widely accepted.
Regarding bribery, in Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy, p. 35 n. 93, I mention a forthcoming article which will deal with paying off community leaders in order for someone to be given a town rabbinate. After completing the just-mentioned book, my interests moved in different directions, but I do still hope to write that article which will have a lot of material that has never been discussed in scholarly literature. Here is one interesting source from R. Elhanan Wasserman that I only recently found. In Kovetz Shiurim: Bava Batra no. 71, R. Elhanan suggests that if you are the most qualified to serve as a dayan in the community, then there is no prohibition to pay the community leaders to appoint you to the position, and no prohibition for the community leaders to accept this money. I don’t know of anyone else who holds this position which, needless to say, would open up a can of worms, since lots of people think that they are the most qualified. We obviously can’t have a situation where all such people feel that they can pay off the community leaders in order to be appointed to a position. Furthermore, the Rambam makes no distinction of the sort R. Elhanan does, but states flatly that it forbidden for a dayan to give money in order to be appointed. See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 3:9
כל דיין שנתן ממון כדי שיתמנה אסור לעמוד מפניו וציוו חכמים להקל אותו ולזלזל בו. ואמרו חכמים שהטלית שמתעטף בה תהי בעיניך כמרדעת של חמור.
The Ridbaz’s attack on the Brisker method is well known. In the introduction to his responsa, Beit Ridbaz (Jerusalem, 1908), Ridbaz writes as follows:
A certain rabbi invented the “chemical” method of study. Those in the know now refer to it as “chemistry,” but many speak of it as “logic.” This proved to be of great harm to us for it is a foreign spirit from without that they have brought in to the Oral Torah. This is not the Torah delivered to us by Moses from the mouth of the Omnipresent. This method of study has spread among the yeshivah students who still hold a gemara in their hands. In no way does this type of Torah study bring men to purity. From the day this method spread abroad this kind of Torah has had no power to protect its students. . . . It is better to have no rosh yeshivah than to have one who studies with the “chemical” method.
In his ethical will, printed at the end of his responsa, Ridbaz returns to this criticism and directs his sons: “Be careful, and keep far away from the new method of study that has in recent years spread through Lithuania and Zamut. Those knowledgeable in Torah refer to it as ‘chemistry.'” (Just before this post appeared, R. Eliezer Katzman sent word that in his opinion, Ridbaz is not referring to R. Hayyim and the Brisker approach, but rather to Telz and its method of talmudic analysis. I don’t believe this is correct, and hope to return to this subject in a future post.)
In the first edition of Shaul Stampfer’s Ha-Yeshivah ha-Lita’it be-Hithavutah, p. 113 n. 29, he quotes Saul Lieberman’s opinion that Ridbaz’ words were directed against R. Isaac Jacob Reines. This is clearly incorrect. Reines’ method had no influence whatsoever, and Ridbaz is speaking about a method of study that was widespread in the yeshivot. It is obvious that he can only be referring to the method of R. Hayyim. Lieberman’s incorrect speculation was removed in the second edition of Stampfer’s book. . . .[13]
Needless to say, because of his attacks on R. Hayyim, Ridbaz did not endear himself to the Soloveitchik family. Once when a student referred to Ridbaz, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik became very angry and told the student never to mention his name again. He also said that some gedolim are always right, some are sometimes right, and some are never right, and the Ridbaz falls into the latter category![14]
Thus far what I wrote in my prior post. It is worth noting that Benjamin Brown defends Lieberman’s suggestion that the Ridbaz’s words were directed against Reines.[15] However, as I have written, I see no justification for this. Daniel Price called my attention to Shai Akiva Wosner’s recently published a book on R. Shimon Shkop, Hashivah Mishpatit bi-Yeshivot Lita: Iyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rav Shimon Shkop. On p. 32 he refers to my post and rejects my assumption that the Ridbaz was referring to R. Hayyim Soloveitchik. He claims that his negative comments were directed against Telz and its method, a view that as mentioned is also shared by Katzman.
I don’t deny that the Ridbaz could also have had Telz in mind, but this doesn’t change my assumption that the main target of his words was R. Hayyim Soloveitchik. Is there a source that can settle this argument conclusively? I believe there is, but I was not aware of it when I wrote my previous post. In 1935 Moshe Aharon Perlman published his Mi-Pi Dodi. Here is the title page.
This volume records things he heard from his uncle, R. Moses Kliers, the rav of Tiberias. R. Kliers knew the Ridbaz personally, and the information that appears on p. 35 is obviously of great importance to what we have been discussing:
מסדר למוד הבריסקאי לא היתה דעתו נוחה וקרא לו חימיא
In other words, R. Kliers told Pearlman that the Ridbaz opposed the Brisker approach and referred to it as “chemistry”. This source is more significant than any speculation by contemporary scholars.
There is a good deal in Mi-Pi Dodi that I think readers will find of interest, but for now I will just mention one example.
P. 25. R. Kliers said that all manner of dress worn by the Slobodka students can be justified, but what can’t be justified is the forelock of hair that the students had.
(In Changing the Immutable, p. 268 n. 156, I cited a fascinating passage from Mi-Pi Dodi, pp. 9-10, showing that R. Kliers thought that it was better for people to carry on a particular Shabbat and violate a rabbinic commandment rather than learning that a rabbi had made a mistake in setting up the eruv, and thus come to lose respect for him which would violate a Torah commandment. The eruv could be fixed after Shabbat, but the negative effect on the rabbi’s reputation would remain.[16])
5. In my last post I referred to R. Yitzhak Barda and his book Kinyan Torah which argues that Maimonides’ view is binding, even if this means rejecting the Shulhan Arukh. Here is the title page of Kinyan Torah, vol. 3.
At least one reader was wondering if R. Barda is Yemenite. He is not, and his view granting final authority to the Mishneh Torah is unique among Sephardic authorities. R. Barda is in charge of a group of Torah institutions in Ashkelon called Yitzhak Yeranen. He is also the brother-in-law of R. Meir Mazuz and often appears together with him at events. Here is a picture of them during the last Israeli elections.
Halakhic authorities have had different perspectives on how to relate to newly discovered manuscripts that contain halakhic rulings. The Hazon Ish did not pay these texts much mind, not regarding them as having been part of the halakhic tradition. Most halakhic authorities, on the other hand, had a more positive opinion of such newly published texts. However, even those who welcomed the newly published texts and integrated them into the halakhic system generally agreed that halakhot that that were recorded in the Shulhan Arukh and were thus generally accepted could not be rejected based on a newly published text.[17] That is one reason why the 2014 appearance of R. Yitzhak Barda’s tenth volume of responsa Yitzhak Yeranen is of interest, as in this volume one finds that the author indeed rejects a universally accepted halakhah.[18]
The question R. Barda deals with is whether one can bake or cook on the first day of Yom Tov for the second day (and his conclusion would apply to other relevant matters, such as setting the table on one day for the next). This would appear to be an easy question to answer, as the Talmud, Betzah 17a, states: “Our Rabbis taught: One may not bake on the first day of a festival for the second.” This halakhah is recorded in Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 503:1. One might think that this would be the end of the matter, and for centuries it was. However, R. Barda has reopened the discussion. According to him, it is permitted to bake or cook on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day. How does he arrive at such a decision, one at odds with the Shulhan Arukh?
R. Barda begins by pointing out that R. Hananel records a different version of the talmudic text. In his version, the Talmud states that it is forbidden to bake on Yom Tov for Shabbat or for after the holiday, but it says nothing about baking from the first day of Yom Tov for the next next day. R. Isaac Alfasi, R. Asher ben Jehiel, and other geonic and medieval sources also have the version recorded by R. Hananel.[19] Not noted by R. Barda, but certainly a support for his position, is that the Tosefta and Jerusalem Talmud also have nothing about baking on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day.[20]
R. Barda further points out that Maimonides must also not have had our version of the talmudic text, since in the Mishneh Torah all he says is that on Yom Tov one may not bake or cook anything that will be eaten after the holiday.[21] He says nothing about not baking or cooking on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day. Also important for R. Barda’s case is that Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shevitat Yom Tov 6:14, states that the observance of the second day of Yom Tov is not on account of doubt, but is a minhag. What this means is that it is not a question of maybe the second day not really being a Yom Tov, in which case one could understand the prohibition of baking or cooking on the first day for the second. I would only add that R. Barda’s point also works if you adopt Maimonides’ other formulation that Yom Tov Sheni is an actual decree of the Sages.[22] In either case, the second day is treated like Yom Tov no different than the first day, and thus R. Barda states that there is no reason why one cannot bake or cook on the first day for the second. As for Rosh ha-Shanah, he tells us that the two days of this holiday are regarded by the Talmud as one long day,[23] and therefore there is even more reason for it to be permitted to bake on the first day for the second.
R. Joseph Karo, in the introduction to the Beit Yosef of which the Shulhan Arukh is an abridgment, tells us that he is going to decide the halakhah based on the three central authorities, R. Isaac Alfasi, Maimonides, and R. Asher ben Jehiel. As R. Barda points out, in the case we have been discussing, none of these three authorities state that it is forbidden to bake or cook from one day of Yom Tov to the next, and yet the Shulhan Arukhdoes forbid this.
R. Barda notes that there are medieval authorities who record the prohibition, most prominently R. Jacob ben Asher, Tur, Orah Hayyim 503. Prior to this, Halakhot Pesukot[24] and Halakhot Gedolot[25] also record this prohibition, even though according to R. Barda their version of the Talmud did not state that it is forbidden to bake on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day, only that it is forbidden to bake on Yom Tov for after the holiday. In other words, even though baking or cooking on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day is forbidden by Halakhot Pesukot and Halakhot Gedolot, this is an original deduction made by these authorities, not a recording of earlier talmudic halakhah. (Actually, it would have made more sense for R. Barda to say that the rulings in Halakhot Pesukot and Halakhot Gedolot originated in an earlier source.) Yet the stringent position codified by these two sources and later by R. Jacob ben Asher and other rishonim is not determinative for R. Barda, since as mentioned this halakhah does not appear in the more important sources, namely, R. Isaac Alfasi, Maimonides, and R. Asher ben Jehiel (R. Jacob ben Asher’s father).
Readers might be convinced by R. Barda’s argument that R. Isaac Alfasi, Maimonides, and R. Asher ben Jehiel did not view it as forbidden to bake or cook on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day. But this still does not mean that it should be permitted today, for as we have seen the Shulhan Arukh forbids this action. R. Barda’s assumption is that R. Joseph Karo’s text of the Talmud was not pristine, but as with our version had incorporated the addition of the Halakhot Pesukot and Halakhot Gedolot, forbidding baking on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day. Since the Shulhan Arukh’s ruling is based on an error, namely, R. Karo’s false assumption that the Talmud forbids baking or cooking on the first day of Tom Tov for the next day, R. Barda declares that one need not accept the Shulhan Arukh’s ruling. (This statement is directed towards the Sephardic community as a whole, which follows the Shulhan Arukh. R. Barda personally follows Rambam, and since the Rambam does not record the prohibition, that alone is enough for him to permit baking and cooking on the first day of Yom Tov for the second day.)
R. Barda further states that had R. Joseph Karo known what has been mentioned so far, he, too, would have decided differently. He adds that to refrain from baking or cooking on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day takes away from some of the joy of Yom Tov, as it makes it more difficult to prepare food for the second day of the holiday.[26] He also calls attention to a responsum of R. Isaac Bar Sheshet from which we see that there were people who indeed baked and cooked on the first day of Yom Tov for the second day. (R. Isaac Bar Sheshet himself states that this is forbidden.[27])
After many pages of justification of his ruling, R. Barda publishes two letters he received from R. Serayah Deblitzky in which the latter takes issue with what R. Barda wrote. R. Deblitzky begins by stating that it is an absolute principle that a halakhah that has been accepted among all of Jewry cannot be overturned due to the discovery of new manuscripts or based on the fact that important earlier authorities did not record this particular halakhah. He further notes that R. Jacob ben Asher did forbid baking and cooking on the first day of Yom Tov for the next day, even though his father, R. Asher ben Jehiel, did not mention this prohibition. R. Deblitzsky does not think it is reasonable that R. Judah would disagree with his father in this matter, and assumes that R. Asher ben Jehiel’s omission of the halakhah does not imply that he had a more liberal perspective.
[1] See Mordechai Margaliyot’s note in his edition of Va-Yikra Rabbah, ad loc.
[2] Malbim, Deut. 13:7 (p. 87a) cites the Midrash without the words כך אמרו דור המבול. Yet as far as I can determine, every printed edition of the Midrash has these words. Does this mean that the Malbim independently concluded that the words should be deleted?
[3] The Pharisees (Philadelphia, 1938), p. 260.
[4] The text is published in Joseph Shatzmiller, “Les tossafistes et la premiere controverse maïmonidienne: le témoignage du rabbin Asher ben Gershom,” in Gilbert Dahan, et al., eds., Rashi et la culture juive en France du Nord au moyen âge (Paris, 1997), p. 67.
[5] Rechnitz also says that the Torah cannot be changed, “no Reform, no Modern Orthodoxy.” Does Rechnitz really feel that Modern Orthodoxy is akin to Reform? Or was this comment strategic? In other words, since he is attacking a widespread practice in Lakewood, he has to show them that despite the attack he is still on the “right” side, and the way to do this is by slandering Modern Orthodoxy.
[6] See Rashi to Ex. 25:22. Even the ArtScroll-Sapirstein Rashi translation is forced to admit: “Rashi’s Sefer Torah evidently had a ו where ours does not.” Siftei Hakhamim writes:
אע”פ שאין כתיב ואת בוא”ו בס”ת של רש”י היה כתוב בוא”ו.
See also Rashi to Gen. 25:6. Artscroll writes: “Rashi’s text of the Torah had the spelling פילגשים, without the letter י of the ים suffix which indicates the plural.”
[7] For the information on errors in Torah scrolls, including eye-opening pictures, see Kolmos, Elul 5748. Here is part of R. Shmuel Wosner’s letter quoted on p. 7:
עכשיו שנכנס עבודת הקאמפיוטער בזה למסלולו, ונתברר על ידו לתמהון לבב כולנו, שמבערך ששים ספרים, ס”ת שהיו בחזקת בדוקים יצאו רק תשע ספרים נקיים מכל שגיאה וברובא דמינכר מאד נמצאו שגיאות פוסלות לרוב. וכן בדידן הוי עובדא בס”ת שנכתב ע”ש תלמידים גדולים וצדיקים שנספו בעו”ה, נמצאו ה’ טעיות ממש בחסר ויתר.
[8] I am inclined to see the responsum’s description of a storybook romance as fictional, and I think there might be other fictional responsa in Havot Yair. None of this can be proven, and it is just a sense I have that some of the questions were created by R. Bacharach in order to establish halakhic principles. I think this might be the case with no. 183 where he discusses a man confronted with a choice to drink non-kosher wine or have his ear cut off. See also no. 79 regarding a convert to Judaism, if he needs to return money he stole from Jews and non-Jews before he converted.
[9] In no. 139 R. Bacharach mentions the hillul ha-shem that results when a Jew is a thief, as the non-Jews blame the entire Jewish community for his actions. Yet R. Bacharach adds that it is only the masses who have this feeling, while the wise people and the government leaders don’t engage in such stereotyping.
ואף כי יש חילול השם באשר הגוים מרשיעים על כלל יהדות בשביל כך, אין אלו רק דברי המון עם ולא חכמים שבהם ושלטונים.
[10] See R. Asher Weiss, Minhat Asher, vol. 1, no. 92.
[11] Urim ve-Tumim, Hilkhot Dayanim 9:1.
[12] Orah Mishpat (Petrokov, 1907), p. 17a.
[13] [See p. 124, n. 30, where Stampfer quotes Prof. Chimen Abramsky, a descendant of the Ridbaz, that in the family it is accepted that the Ridbaz was referring to R. Hayyim.]
[14] I heard this from an eyewitness. The event took place in the 1950s.
[15] Ha-Hazon Ish (Jerusalem, 2011), p. 321 n. 44.
[16] See also Shabbetai Dov Rosenthal, Geon ha-Hora’ah (Jerusalem, 2011), vol. 2, pp. 186-187, for two similar cases with R. Samuel Salant and R. Zvi Pesah Frank.
[17] However, what should a posek do if it is clear that a halakhah in the Shulhan Arukh is based on a mistaken text? R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg was unsure. See Kitvei ha-Gaon Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg, vol. 2, p. 433:
הוכחתי שהב”י השתמש בכת”י מקולקלים וע”י נדחק לפרש ולהסיק הלכה מנוסחאות של ספרי ראשונים שהי’ בהם השמטות בשגיאת סופרים – השאלה היא אם להניח הכל כמו שהוא ורק להסביר ולנסח בלשון ובהגיון מתקבלים על הלב, או לשוב למקורות הראשונים ולחקור ולבדוק הכל מחדש.
[18] We will be focusing on nos. 20-24, where R. Barda explains his position and defends it against criticism. Here is the title page of Yitzhak Yeranen, vol. 11, R. Barda’s most recent volume of responsa.
[19] R. Barda mistakenly states that the Munich manuscript of the Talmud is also missing the words מיו”ט לחברו. This error does not affect his argument, as the Munich manuscript is from the 14th century and R. Barda acknowledges, p. 262, that there were medieval texts of the Talmud that had מיו”ט לחברו. Yet he believes that these words are not original but were inserted based on what appears in the Halakhot Gedolot (which I will soon discuss).
[20] See Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-Feshutah, Beitzah, p. 947.
[21] See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shevitat Yom Tov, ch. 6.
[22] See my Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters (Scranton, 2008), p. 59.
[23] See Beitzah 4b-5a.
[24] Halakhot Pesukot (Versailles, 1886), p. 8. Since I am sure some will be skeptical that a sefer was ever printed in Versailles, here is the title page.
[27] She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rivash, no. 254. See also ibid., no. 16.
Hitzei Giborim, Tzitzit, and R. Meir Mazuz
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Hitzei Giborim, Tzitzit, and R. Meir Mazuz
Marc B. Shapiro
1. In 1969 the journal Moriah appeared, published by Makhon Yerushalayim. From its beginning, this journal published manuscript material from geonim, rishonim, and aharonim, together with Torah articles by contemporary scholars. This created a model that was later followed by a number of other journals. It also became a model for how to publish memorial volumes, as these generally also contain a section of material published from manuscript. Together with the interest in manuscripts, there has developed what can only be described as an Orthodox academic approach, and one can often find articles of this sort that meet a very high scholarly standard. A well-known representative of this genre is Yeshurun, a volume that appears twice a year and includes material from manuscript as well as halakhic and scholarly articles. What is most impressive about Yeshurun is not only its massive size, but the fact that the editors can fill it with so much quality material.
A competitor to Yeshurun has recently appeared on the scene and its title is Hitzei Giborim. Its model is exactly what I have described, with a section devoted to publishing material from manuscript, followed by Torah essays and Orthodox academic articles, many of which are really fantastic. The editor of Hitzei Giborim is R. Yaakov Yitzhak Miller, whose own articles show impressive erudition. Volume 9 recently appeared, but since I haven’t yet had a chance to examine it, let me speak about volume 8 which appeared last year. Volume 8 contains 1030 pages which I think makes it the largest volume of its kind. I wonder if the point of having so many pages was precisely in order to exceed even the largest Yeshurun.
Among the articles that I think will be of particular interest to Seforim Blog readers are R. Eliyahu Nahum Waldman’s ninety page study of Maimonides’ responsa to the sages of Lunel, designed to show that R. Kafih was mistaken in thinking that these are forgeries. I only wonder if such an effort was required on R. Waldman’s part, since it is hard to believe that anyone who examines the matter without preconceptions can agree with R. Kafih.[1]
R. Yehoshua Assaf deals with Rashbam’s commentary to the beginning of Genesis, the portion that ArtScroll censored and which I dealt with in prior posts here and here.[2] In this article Assaf cites R. Hillel Novetsky’s important comments here. Novetsky discovered another manuscript that not only contains the words of Rashbam in his commentary to Gen. 1:31, words that ArtScroll censored, but also the continuation of the passage that was missing until now. In fact, ArtScroll should be happy with this discovery as we now see that Rashbam affirmed that even if “day” started in the morning for the first six days of creation, the Shabbat of creation indeed began at sunset on Friday.[3] Unfortunately, I think that even if ten other Torah scholars would write articles along the lines of R. Novetsky’s and R. Assaf’s it won’t have any effect on ArtScroll.
R. Avraham Yissachar Konig’s article on the international dateline and the dispute between the Hazon Ish and other rabbis is full of interesting points and discoveries (including new material from manuscript) that significantly advances our understanding of this episode. Unfortunately, the language Konig uses about certain rabbis, in particular R. Yehiel Michel Tukatzinsky, is completely improper. Just because Konig’s point is to defend the Hazon Ish does not give him the right to belittle people who were greater than he. Interestingly, this article by Konig was removed from the volume when it was placed on Otzar ha-Hokhmah.Here is the table of contents that is also missing the article.
Here is the uncensored table of contents.
Otzar ha-Hokhmah has become the library for so many of us, and it is thus completely unacceptable for books to be altered no matter what the reason. The editor of Hitzei Giborim insisted that the book be shown in its entirety or taken down, and it no longer appears on Otzar ha-Hokhmah.
In Changing the Immutable, pp. 191 n. 16, 224 n. 46, I noted other examples of censorship on Otzar ha-Hokhmah. I found an additional instance in the Otzar ha-Hokhmah version of TheRabbi Leo Jung Jubilee Volume (New York, 1962). Two articles are deleted, and here is how the table of contents appears on Otzar ha-Hokhmah.
Here is the uncensored table of contents.
I understand why Otzar ha-Hokhmah would want to delete an article by Heschel, but what possible reason could there be to delete R. Isidore Epstein’s article? I can only assume that the person responsible for this mistakenly thought that Epstein was not Orthodox.
Here is a page from Otzar ha-Hokhmah’s version of Peninei Rabbenu ha-Avi Ezri, p. 266.
Here is how the uncensored page looks.
Returning to Konig’s article, on p. 770 he prints from manuscript a letter from a Sephardic rabbi to R. Ben Zion Uziel, but the name of the rabbi has been deleted. Konig tells us that he removed the rabbi’s name in order to protect his honor, because his letter shows that had no understanding of the dateline issue. It is indeed true that the rabbi did not understand the matter but that is no reason to delete his name. If we are going to start deleting names of rabbis every time we are convinced that they made a basic error, there would be no end to it. In this case the editor should have insisted that the letter appear in full. After all, everyone makes mistakes and there is no problem is seeing that even a learned rabbi did not understand this complicated issue.
Among the articles in Hitzei Giborim focusing on contemporary issues, R. Eliyahu Levine deals with dina de-malchuta dina.On p. 1012 he notes that the government requires homeowners to keep their property looking nice, and this includes cutting the lawn. R. Levine asks if this is also included in dina de-malchuta dina. He concludes that it is not, and writes the following.
וגם נראה שיסוד חוקים אלו הם מעוגנים בתרבות הגויים, שהעיקר אצלם הוא היופי החיצוני, וכל עמלם ויגיעם הוא ליפות את המראה החיצוני של רכושם, ולכן הם מעונינים שחצירו הפרטית של כל אחד מהם תשלים את מראה המקום כנאה ומטופח, וא”כ דבר זה כלול בדברי הרשב”א והש”ך שחוקים שביסודם הם כשל תוה”ק, אין נוהג בהם דדמ”ד, משום שבשעה שיגיעתו של הגוי היא לצחצח את רכושו, יגיעתו של הישראלי היא להקפיד על דברים אחרים, והמאמץ לעצמו את חוקי וגינוני המלכות, ודאי שמקפיד להיות מתאים להופעת הגוי, ממילא ההרגל בכך מזניח את ההקפדה והטיפוח של הישרליות שבישראל.
גם הרבה מחוקי הבניה והדיור כנראה מקורם בתרבות אמריקאית זו, ומשפחות יהודיות גדולות שעיקר תשוקתם אינה בדוקא בריבוי נכסים, החוקים הנ”ל אינם תואמים להשקפת עולמם, וזוהי עוד סיבה שבמסגרת חוקי הגויים לא נוהג דדמ”ד.
For those who don’t read Hebrew, he claims that zoning laws, and the whole idea of having a beautiful environment, originate in non-Jewish cultural norms, and therefore Jews are not obligated to follow these laws. I guess this means that in a “Jewish” environment, people won’t need to cut their lawns, their property can fall apart etc., since Jews look at what is on the inside and are not concerned with outer appearances. It is no secret that in some segments of the haredi world people assume that zoning laws (and sometimes even fire codes) are not Jewish concepts and thus don’t need to be followed, but to see this sort of approach in print will probably be a surprise for many.[4]
On p. 1121 we find something quite uncommon, an apology that in the previous volume an article appeared that is plagiarized from two other writers. I can’t think of another Torah publication that has ever had such a notice, and it shows both the honesty and the courage of the editor.
Beginning on p. 362, R. Yaakov Yitzhak Miller publishes from manuscript Torah letters concerning shaving one’s beard when the Czarist authority required this. The question that obviously needed to be considered was if this decree was to be regarded as a she’at ha-shemad in which case Jews would be required to martyr themselves rather than obey. Not surprisingly, the rabbis whose letters are published by R. Miller did not go this far. These rabbis are R. Judah Bacharach, R. Jacob Zvi Mecklenburg, and R. Hayyim Wassertzug (also known as R. Hayyim Filipover, from one of the Lithuanian towns he was rabbi in). These letters come from an unpublished volume by R. Wassertzug which hopefully will soon appear in print as it has the potential to be a very significant publication.
Although R. Wassertzug is today unknown, this was not the case in the 19th century, and R. Miller provides a nice introduction which shows some of R. Wassertzug’s originality. In addition to a reputation for being very pious as well as a great scholar, he was also known as a lenient posek who did not feel bound by certain practices which while generally accepted, did not, in his opinion, have a firm halakhic basis. Not surprisingly, this led to conflict with some other rabbis.
Here are two responsa from R. Wassertzug that appeared in Ha-Melitz, 14 Sivan 5629, pp. 225-226. The first permits one to drink non-Jewish milk (especially travelers), and the second permits a married woman to show some of her hair.
Not mentioned by R. Miller is that one of the opponents of R. Wassertzug was R. Isaac Haver. It is reported that he and some other rabbis went to R. Leibel Shapiro, the rav of Kovno, to complain about R. Wassertzug and to gain his support in order to have R. Wassertzug removed from his rabbinic position. Yet they were rebuffed as R. Leibel told them how great R. Wassertzug was and sent them away.[5]
In 2015 R. Mordechai Gifter’s Milei de-Iggerot appeared. This is quite a significant work and anyone interested in the history of American Orthodoxy will want to consult it. On p. 213 he deals with R. Eliezer Berkovits’ liberal halakhic approach. R. Gifter comments that unfortunately R. Berkovits did not follow the path of his teacher, R Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, who was much more conservative in how he approached halakhah.
The person R. Gifter was writing to had asked why R. Gifter was so critical of R. Berkovits’ approach when R. Wassertzug also had a liberal approach. In R. Gifter’s reply he reveals a hitherto unknown piece of information that he received from an elderly Lithuanian rabbi, namely, that one of the responsa of R. Akiva Eger in which there is no addressee given was actually sent to R. Wassertzug. R. Gifter also states that when R. Berkovits reaches R. Wassertzug’s level of piety, then he will be able to forgive him for much of what he has written.
ומה שיביא לי ראי’ מהגאון ר’ חיים פיליפובר זצ”ל, ידע נא ידידי שכשיגיע דר. ברקוביץ לדרגת חסידותו ופרישותו של אותו גאון וצדיק אוכל למחול לו על הרבה מדבריו, אבל באיש של דורנו לא אוכל לתלות דבריו בחסידותו של גאון מדור קדום.
והאמת שמיחס גאוני הדור להגר”ח פיליפובר ז”ל יש לנו ללמוד איך להתיחס לכל דרישה לחלוק על הלכות קבועות אפי’ כשיצאו מפי גאון וצדיק. ועיין תשובת מרן הגרעק”א ז”ל סי’ נ”ה – שקבלתי מפי רב גדול וישיש בליטא שהתשובה מכוונת להגר”ח פיליפובר ז”ל.
Here is the responsum of R. Akiva Eger, vol. 1, no. 55, referred to by R. Gifter.
As you can see, while the addressee is referred to as המופלא, his name and town are not given. R. Eger criticizes R. Wassertzug for his liberal approach in which he disagreed with rishonim and in the case discussed diverged from the Shulhan Arukh. In his conclusion, R. Eger refers to himself as one who is rebuking from hidden love.
While on the topic of criticism of R. Berkovits, here are some other relevant documents that I found in the archive of Chief Rabbi Isaac Nissim at Yad ha-Rav Nissim in Jerusalem. The first is a New York Times article from June 23, 1969. (I have no doubt that the second quote attributed to R. Berkovits in the article – where he mentions reconsidering the “traditional laws” – was taken out of context.)
In response to this story the following two documents were sent out to various Orthodox figures. Since the Hebrew document is not always easy to read, I have provided a transcript and also added paragraph breaks.
בהתרגשות ורגש חרפה קראנו בזמן האחרון בעתון “הניורק טיימס” על דר. אליעזר ברקוביץ, פרופסור בבית מדרש לתורה בשיקגו, שהוא השתתף עם איזה וועידת מתבוללים בקאנאדה: שמתיימרים הם להתחבר שלשת הזרמים של יהדות (אורטודוקס) (קונסורביטיב) (ריפורם). בנאום לפני העתונעיים [!] הגיבו המשתתפים שאין האיסור לאכול חזיר עוד מותאם לנסיבות הזמן: ובשלובי זרע עמהם הגיב דר. ברקוביץ שמצות שמיטה הנוהגת באה”ק היא שערוריה סקנדלית, ולא יתכן שמירת השביעית ב”דת מודרנית”: והיא בכלל יהדות מזוייפת: ולמותר הבהיר דר. ברקוביץ שהוא: “דובר של יהדות אורטודוקסית”, למרות שאין לו שום בסיס להיקרא אורטודוקסי, אחרי שהוא מפורסם כמלעיג עד”ת, שכל דעותיו הן שהאורטודוקסיה “משרשת ומפיגה את היהדות מן ההמונים לרגלי העצמת האיסורים.” והנה אין בעצתו מן החדוש וההפתעה, שכבר שמענוה אצל הקונסוב[ר]טיבים והריפורם כמותו – אמנם איך שהוא מצהיר ומצייר את עצמו בתור חובב ואדוק ביהדות האורטודוקסית הוא תמהון – מאין שאף דר. ברקוביץ שהרומס ברגל גאוה וגסה את עיקרי התורה והמתחבר עם הלצים והמתבוללים יכונה “דובר אורטודוקס”?
ומאידך – הרב אהרן סולביצ’יק, הראש ישיבה של ב”מ לתורה, המראה עצמו כצדיק וחסיד, המחמיר על פרטי התורה – איך הוא לא נרתע ונזדעזע מדברי הפרופסור, ולא שת לבו להסכנה החבויה בתוך הישיבה, דר. אליעזקר ברקוביץ? התירוץ: נחזה לר”א סולביצ’יק בעצמו, שלמשתה השנתי של היוניון אף אורטודוקס קאנג., שהמתחברים ברובם הם קונסורביטיב ומחללי שבת, וכל הגדולי תורה הצהירו בפומבי איסור מוחלט ללכת שמה – ראינו איך שר”א סולביצ’יק הואיל לנסוע להשתתף בועידתם, והם [ושם?] הוא נשא נאום להוכיח בעזרת “פסוקים” שאפשר להתחבר לצורך שעה עם הסטרא דשמאלא! – ומי זה שהיה יכול להעלות על הדעת שהר”מ ר”א סולביצ’יק יואיל להיות מהאורחים נואמים בארגון שכולו טריפה! אמנם היות וקראנו תגובותיו של דר. ברקוביץ הסכמות לנאומי ר”א סולביצ’יק, שמצוה גדולה להתחבר עם הרשעים, מוכרח שבאישורו הבהיר דר. בורקוביץ להעתונעיים, היות ואחרת לא היה מרשה הר”ם להפרופסור להישאר בישיבה, ובפרט בתפקיד מורה דרך על חניכיו בני הישיבה.
כעת לדאבוננו הוסרה [!] הצעיף החופף הדו-פרצוף שלר”א סולביצ’יק, מראה לזולת שהוא צדיק וחסיד, אך אינו מן הנמנע אישורו כ”דובר אורטודוקס” פרופסור המבהיר מינות וכפירה בתורה שבכתב, ובעצמו להתחבר עם המתבוללים, לעומת פסק איסור של כל גדולי התורה.
אדישות של הרמי”ם והרבנים בשיקגו להמצב קטסטרופילי הלזה היא כאובה, והחלה לשכנענו ששתיקתם כהודאתם, וכבר הגיע העת שתיפקחנה העינים והוקיע [!] בפרהסיא בעמוד הקלון את מפירי התורה בב”מ לתורה ולמחות בנזיפה לזבובי מות ושפעת דברים של הראש ישיבה המתבטא לתלמידיו דעות [כפרניות?] תחת החפשת צדקות: המחנף רשעים ומכבד פעלי עוול.
In addition to what it is said about R. Berkovits, R. Ahron Soloveichik is also attacked in these documents for not firing R. Berkovits (he actually didn’t have the authority to do so), and for attending an OU convention, an organization that in the 1960s had many mixed seating congregations which are referred to as “Conservative” synagogues. There is nothing about the latter episode in the book about R. Soloveichik, Ha-Rav Aharon Yeled Sha’ashuim (Jerusalem, 2011), published by his son, R. Yosef Soloveichik. In fact, R. Berkovits is only mentioned on two pages in the book. On p. 244, it is pointed out that R. Soloveichik opposed R. Berkovits’ approach, which is described as advocating “that halacha should be allowed to develop freely to accommodate people’s needs.” On p. 243 we see that R. Berkovits joined with other faculty members in opposition to R. Soloveichik being given any administrative power at Hebrew Theological College.[6]
Let me make one final point about all the journals and memorial volumes, Yeshurun, Hitzei Giborim, and the rest. Numerous selections from commentaries on talmudic tractates have appeared in these publications. The problem is that when it comes to talmudic commentaries, all these publications are basically useless. For example, let’s say Moriah published a portion of an anonymous medieval commentary on a few pages of Tractate Nedarim twenty years ago. Only someone who was “in the sugya” would have been able to appreciate what the commentary was saying when it first appeared. Therefore, 99 percent of the readers twenty years ago skipped over it, and they continue to skip over all of the continuously published selections of commentaries that scholars spend so long deciphering and adding learned notes to. Since almost no one reads these published commentaries, I sometimes wonder if it is a waste of the scholars’ time to work on them. If I finally decide to learn Nedarim this year, is there any chance that I will remember that a few pages of a medieval commentary appeared in Moriah over two decades ago.
Fortunately, there is a solution, and that is to follow the approach of Otzar ha-Geonim. The project I have in mind would take a good deal of effort, but it would be very valuable. What we need is for an individual, or group of people, to go through all the various journals, memorial volumes, etc., and pull out all of the commentaries on the different tractates in order create a compendium. It can be called Otzar Mefarshim or something like that, and it would be divided into tractates, just like Otzar ha-Geonim. With such a work, when someone, for example, is studying Nedarim, he will easily find the 3 page section of the anonymous medieval commentary published years ago in Moriah. This is the only way to rescue so many scattered texts from oblivion.
3. In Changing the Immutable and in earlier posts I have discussed how in previous years in some communities wearing a kippah was not standard as it is today. (I think the only exception is the Syrian community.) R. Ovadiah Yosef even says that unlike in previous years, wearing a kippah today is more than just “midat hasidut,” as it has become a sign of a religious Jew, while going bareheaded is a sign of an irreligious Jews.[7]
I was asked if the same point can be made about tzitzit and it indeed can. It is now pretty standard in the Orthodox world for men to wear tzitzit. We even start little boys wearing them in school at age 3. Yet the practice of wearing tzitzit, i.e., a tallit katan,[8] was unknown in talmudic days and is not mentioned by the geonim or Maimonides.[9] It appears to have begun with the Hasidei Ashkenaz,[10] and eventually became a regular practice in the Ashkenazic world.[11] Yet even in the twentieth century throughout the Sephardic world tzitzit were not generally worn. In these places they regarded tzitzit as a holy item, not something to be given to a child who can easily soil his garment. Even among adults, tzitzit were reserved for the especially pious. (I hope to expand on this in the future, where I will provide sources documenting what I have just mentioned.) In the past half century much has changed, and just as the kippah is now a sign of a religious Jew, so too is tzitzit. As R. Meir Mazuz puts it in a recent issue of Bayit Ne’eman, his new weekly “parashah sheet”[12]:
היום זה סימן היכר בין אדם שומר תורה ומצוות לבין מי שלא כזה, ואפילו שמן הדין אפשר להיפטר מטלית קטן . . . מ”מ מצוה מן המובחר שאדם ילבש טלית עם ארבע כנפות כדי לקיים את המצוה.
Interestingly, R. Joel Sirkes writes that while a father is obligated to provide his minor son with tefillin so that he can learn how to use them, he is not obligated to provide his son with tzitzit, “since even he [the father] is not obligated to buy a four cornered garment.”[13] This view is in opposition to the Tur who writes that a father does have to provide his minor son with tzitzit if the latter is of the age to wear it.[14]
Since I just mentioned R. Sirkes, let me share another interesting view of his. Avodah Zarah 70a quotes Rava as saying: רובא גנבי ישראל נינהו. In context, what this almost certainly means is that the majority of the thieves in Pumbeditha were Jewish.[15] Yet R. Sirkes shockingly understands it to mean that most Jews are thieves! It would be shocking enough if he understood it to mean that most thieves are Jewish (and not just most thieves in Pumbeditha), but explaining the passage to mean that most Jews are thieves sounds like something one would find in the writings of an anti-Semite, not in a work authored by one of the outstanding halakhists. It is true that one can find other negative judgments of the Jewish people in rabbinic literature. For example, the Maharal speaks of Israel’s inclination to sin as something unique to them and not found among non-Jews. He writes:[16]
כי ישראל מסוגלים היו לחטא מה שלא תמצא בכל האומות.
Yet this is part of a theoretical discussion, and although Israel has this negative characteristic, the flip side is that Israel is at a much higher spiritual level than the non-Jews. R. Sirkes’ opinion, on the other hand, is about the real world, here and now, and is said in a halakhic context. See Bayit Hadash, Yoreh Deah 2:6 (kuntres aharon):
ולפי עניות דעתי נראה דבכל שאר עבירות יש להחמיר . . . מה שאין כן בגונב דבר מאכל . . . דאפילו במוחזק בכך הרבה פעמים אין לו דין משומד ותדע שהרי אמרו רוב גנבים ישראל ואם כן לא יהיה סתם ישראל כשר לשחיטה אלא בידוע שאינו גנב וזה לא שמענו לעולם.
When we come across strange passages like this, it is often the case that someone will say that the author never wrote it. Rather, it was inserted by an erring student or someone seeking to undermine traditional Judaism. In this case, we get the next best thing, as R. Shabbetai Cohen, Shakh, Yoreh Deah 2:18, writes that R. Sirkes retracted what he wrote and asked for it to be deleted.
ומה שכתב הב”ח בזה בקונטרס אחרון [ד”ה מומר] כבר צוה הוא ז”ל בעצמו למחקו.
Nevertheless, I wonder if this is actually the case. Is it possible that R. Shabbetai wrote this not because R. Sirkes actually said what he attributes to him, but because R. Shabbetai wanted the embarrassing passage of R Sirkes removed from the public eye? The best way to do this would be to say that R. Sirkes regretted writing it, and this hopefully would lead to it being deleted by future printers.Those who have read Changing the Immutable, especially the last chapter, know that there is plenty of precedent for what I am suggesting. The reason that I think this might be the case is that nowhere else do we have evidence of R. Sirkes saying that what he wrote here should be deleted. Furthermore, in a later work, SeferHa-Arokh, Yoreh Deah 2, R. Shabbetai does not mention anything about R. Sirkes giving instructions to delete what he wrote. Rather, R. Shabbetai simply criticizes R. Sirkes for what he regards as his error. If R. Sirkes really said what R. Shabbetai attributes to him in his commentary to the Shulhan Arukh, why doesn’t he mention it in SeferHa-Arokh? What sense is there in criticizing R. Sirkes if R. Sirkes himself regretted what he wrote? In SeferHa-Arokh R. Shabbetai writes very sharply, accusing R. Sirkes of an error that even an amateur wouldn’t be caught making:
אבל בב”ח (סעיף ו בקונטרס אחרון) כתב דברים בלא טעם ומחלק בין עבירה לעבירה עיין שם ומה שכתב ותדע שאמרו רוב גנבים ישראל וכו’ כאן טעות נזדקר לפניו אפילו בר דבי רב לא יטעו בזה דמה שכתב רוב גנבים ישראל הוא דלא אמרינן דמותר אלא כשיש גנבים בעיר ורוב מהגנבים הם ישראל אבל שיהיה רוב ישראל גנבים חלילה לא תהא כזאת בישראל ועתה ישראל אשר בך אתפאר תקיצנה בבית זה שלא כדעת דברו.
R. Shneur Zalman Hirschowitz also calls attention to what he regards as R. Sirkes’ error. R. Hirschowitz is best known as a student of R. Israel Salanter, and it was he who published R. Salanter’s Even Yisrael, which became a basic text of the Mussar movement.[17] Here is the title page.
R. Hirschowitz’s talmudic notes were included in the Romm Talmud and are now included in the new Talmud editions. His comment about R. Sirkes is found in his note to Hullin 12a:
מצוה לפרסם להסיר חרפה מעל ישראל דהנה אויבי עמינו אומרים כי חז”ל בעצמם העידו עלינו כי רוב גנבי ישראל ומה לה לעיסה שהנחתום מעיד עליה, ובאמת העולם טעה כי חז”ל אמרו זה על כל ישראל אשר בכל כדור הארץ ובכל זמן כי רוב הגנבים ישראל הם, וחלילה לומר זאת וטעות גדולה היא. וכבר טעה בזה אדם גדול הוא ניהו אדונינו רוח אפינו בעל הב”ח זצוק”ל בקונטרס אחרון ליו”ד סי’ א. ולא עוד אלא שנתחלף להב”ח ז”ל במחכ”ת גאון קדשו ועצמותיו הקדושים בין רוב גנבי ישראל ורוב ישראל גנבי . . . וכל הרואה יחרד וישתומם על זה שמשים לכל ישראל בחזקת גנבים . . . אבל לא יאונה לצדיק כל און, כי הב”ח בעצמו צוה בחייו למוחקו כמ”ש הש”ך ביו”ד סי’ ב.
4. Earlier in this post I mentioned R. Meir Mazuz’s parashah sheet, Bayit Ne’eman. You can see recent issues here and you can sign up to receive it here. Each issue is a transcript of his Saturday night shiur, broadcast live all over Israel. Fortunately, the transcript is complete, by which I mean that the people putting it out have not censored it in any way, thus preserving R. Mazuz’s spoken style and his numerous off-hand comments. It is pretty unique which is why I recommend that readers check it out. The people who publish the shiur even claim that it is the most popular shiur in the world, a claim that is supported by a recent media report here that R. Mazuz’s Saturday night shiur has almost twice as many listeners (around 30,000) as R. Yitzhak Yosef’s competing Saturday night shiur.
Readers should be prepared for a good dose of what can only be termed “Sephardic supremacy.” It is with regard to this that I have to correct a point that R. Mazuz has often made, but which is really misleading. R. Mazuz has compared the kelal yisrael sense found in the Sephardic world with the extremism in the Ashkenazic haredi world, an extremism that leads to never-ending disputes and delegitimization of others. It is true that a basic feature of Ashkenazic haredi society is the tendency to delegitimize those who don’t carry the “party line.” This of course does not mean that all haredi individuals have this tendency; however, it is found in haredi society as a whole. In the last decade or so we have seen how, when there are not many opponents outside the haredi world to focus on, the society turns on itself and creates internal battles.
As mentioned, R. Mazuz has contrasted this with the Sephardic approach which has always welcomed people of different outlooks and levels of religiosity, always looking to bring close and not separate one Jew from the other. In contrast to the Ashkenazic world which has used the herem again and again, R. Mazuz states that other than the battle against Spinoza, the Sephardim have never gone for this approach. For R. Mazuz, the upshot of all this is that Sephardic society is a much better reflection of what Judaism and Jewish life are supposed to be.
Before the great split between R. Mazuz and the Shas party, R. Mazuz commented that ש”ס is supposed to stand for שחורה and סרוגה, meaning that the party should include both black kippot and knitted kippot, since the wearers of both were faithful Jews. As many readers know, the head of the Shas Council of Torah Sages, R. Shalom Cohen, instead saw fit to refer to the religious Zionists as Amalek (among other choice comments). This in turn led R. Mazuz to increase his attacks against the leadership of the Shas party which he saw as abandoning the Sephardic tradition and adopting the worst aspects of Ashkenazic haredi culture. Those who follow the Israeli religious scene know that at present there is a battle taking place for leadership of the Sephardic religious world between the two most important Sephardic rabbis. One is R. Yitzhak Yosef, who sees himself as the rightful inheritor of his father’s position and protector of his legacy.[18] The other is R. Mazuz. Among R. Mazuz’s supporters is former chief rabbi R. Shlomo Amar. R. Amar is himself quite popular, but since the passing of R. Ovadiah has subordinated himself to R. Mazuz. Seeing R. Mazuz’s great popularity today, I am proud to recall that the very first English article to deal with him appeared in 2007 on the Seforim Blog here. This post was the first introduction of most readers to R. Mazuz, and since that time I have quoted from his voluminous writings in almost every one of my subsequent posts.
There is a good deal more to discuss regarding the dispute over leadership of the Sephardic world, the strategy of the Yachad party and why it didn’t succeed, and the growing attacks on R. Mazuz from small-minded people who object to his independent mind. (He has even been attacked for quoting poems by Yehudah Alharizi and Hayyim Nachman Bialik in a shiur.) But for now, let me just make a couple of points:
A. Contrary to what R. Mazuz has said, it is not true that the only time Sephardic sages have used the herem is against Spinoza. The scholars of Aleppo, who could be quite extreme, banned the Torah commentary of R. Elijah Benamozegh, a figure whose works are quoted by R. Mazuz.
B. R. Mazuz’s description, while correct in its major points, is offered without any context and therefore leads to a distortion of the historical record. Nothing R. Mazuz describes makes sense without remembering that unlike in the Sephardic world, the Ashkenazic sages were confronted with the Reform movement and later with the East European Haskalah. It is in the context of these battles that the Ashkenazic rabbinic leadership felt forced to resort to bans and other types of exclusionary behavior and language, and this led to the creation of an extremism that is with us until today. Lacking Reform and Haskalah, the Sephardic world could develop in an entirely different fashion, but had the Sephardic world confronted such anti-traditional movements, it is likely that its rabbinic leadership would have reacted exactly as the Ashkenazic rabbis did. In other words, we are dealing with apples and oranges, and it doesn’t make sense to point to characteristics of the Ashkenazic world and contrast them negatively with the Sephardic world without explaining why it is that the Ashkenazic world developed its extremist tendencies.I must, however, point out that R. Mazuz assumes that there is something in the Sephardic spiritual makeup that itself prevents the development of anti-traditional forces. You see this from various comments that he throws out. For example, in a recent shiur, published in Bayit Ne’eman, no. 32 (6 Tishrei 5777), p. 1, in speaking about R. Abraham Ibn Ezra’s piyut Lekha Eli Teshukati, he states: “If only the Ashkenazim had this piyut; I would guarantee them that if they would have recited this piyut, they would not have had maskilim, Reformers, or assimilationists.”
This particular shiur has a number of other interesting points. For example, on p. 2 he discusses the verbal attacks upon haredi soldiers. (So far there have only been verbal attacks, but no one will be surprised when an actual physical attack occurs.) As far as I know, almost none of the Ashkenazic haredi leaders have spoken publicly about this unfortunate development (and if they have, it has not been covered in the Ashkenazic haredi press). The Ashkenazic haredi leadership in both Israel and America has a policy of not criticizing bad behavior on “its side” (unless they are dealing with really bad behavior such as allying with Iran). This is a pattern that has been going on for almost a hundred years. I say this since the leaders of Agudat Israel in Palestine never criticized or took any real action against the extremists who were defaming R. Kook. In fact, when the authentic history of Agudat Israel is written, the question of the culpability of the World Agudat Israel in this entire affair will have to be dealt with, for despite all of its private outrage with what was taking place under the auspices of its branch in Eretz Yisrael, the extremists and their enablers were never distanced from the organization. It seems that it is always much easier to criticize those to your left than to your right.
Thus, had a typical anti-Israel group staged an event in which kids were taught to throw eggs at a car said to be carrying the prime minister of Israel, you can be sure that Agudat Israel would have been at the forefront of attacking this event. So how come when this exact thing happens in the Satmar community there is only silence from the Agudah?
Agudat Israel readily attacks the BDS groups and others who try to delegitimize the State of Israel. Yet how come Satmar can have a rally attacking the State of Israel in a way that gives cover to BDS and all the rest who want to destroy Israel, and we don’t hear a word from the Agudah? If you listen to the propaganda of Satmar, it also gives cover to the anti-Semites, as it uses anti-Semitic imagery in speaking about the all-powerful Zionists who control the media and who through their devious means are able to pull the wool over the world’s eyes.[19] If such imagery is rightfully condemned as anti-Semitic when “outsiders” use it, how is it that Satmar gets a pass when it uses anti-Semitic imagery?
Returning to R. Mazuz’s comments about the haredi soldiers, he says simply: “These soldiers who come to pray are not sinners but are tzadikim! How can we call them sinners? They defend Israel with their bodies!”
3. I am happy to see that a number of new books and articles refer to posts that have appeared on the Seforim Blog. The most recent example of this is that I have know of is Chaim Dalfin’s just-published book, Rav and Rebbe, which deals with the relationship between R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik and the Lubavitcher Rebbe.4. God willing, I will once again be leading Torah in Motion trips to Europe in Summer 2017. You can see the details here.
[1] I say this even though R. Yitzhak Barda, Kinyan Torah (Ashkelon, 2014), vol. 3, p. 87, states that R. Kafih is correct. R. Barda’s volume is itself of interest, as he argues that when it comes to Jewish law, Maimonides’ opinion is absolutely binding, even if the Shulhan Arukh disagrees.
[2] Based on conversations and emails, I think that my posts on ArtScroll’s censorship of Rashbam have had a wider impact than any other posts. In fact, not long ago someone in my town who knew that I wrote a book on censorship shared with me that she had heard that ArtScroll censored Rashbam. This person does not read the Seforim Blog, and indeed had never heard of it. She thus had no idea that her knowledge of ArtScroll censoring Rashbam had its ultimate origin in my posts, which I think shows the great reach of this blog.
[3] This idea was earlier suggested by Aharon Marcus. See the note in his edition of She’elot u-Teshuvot min ha-Shamayim (Tel Aviv, 1979), p. 34. R. Yoel Bin Nun was unaware of R. Novetsky’s discovery and because of this offers a mistaken interpretation of Rashbam. See his recently published Zakhor ve-Shamor (Alon Shvut, 2015), pp. 229ff. (called to my attention by Zachary Grodzinski).
In my post here on Artscroll’s censorship of Rashbam, I cite a number of authorities who claim that before the giving of the Torah night came after day. Subsequently, I found that the Malbim says the same thing and cites an interesting proof for this position. See his commentary to Exodus, chapter 12 note 50:
גם הלילה שאחריו שייך ליום ארבעה עשר, כי קודם מ”ת היה הלילה הולך אחר היום, כמ”ש בארבעה עשר יום לחדש בערב תאכלו מצות.
See also R. Meir Mazuz, Bayit Ne’eman, no. 17 (19 Sivan 5776), p. 3 n. 17; R. Moshe Zuriel, Otzrot Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir (Bnei Brak, 2016), pp. 35ff.
[4] In Israel, the mainstream haredi rabbinic opinion is that one can build illegally and ignore the various zoning laws which are not thought to reflect haredi values. (The mainstream hardali rabbinic opinion is that one can build illegally in Judea and Samaria.) One exception to this generalization is R. Asher Weiss who insists that “the world is not lawless” and even haredim must follow zoning laws. See the discussion of his view, and the opposing views of R. Israel Grossman and R. Shmuel Wosner, in Ron S. Kleinman, “The Halakhic Validity of Israel’s Judicial System among Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Halakhic Decisors,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 18 (2015), p. 227-259. On pp. 250-251, Kleinman reports on a meeting that R. Weiss had with a group of Israeli lawyers. R. Weiss’s important remarks were later published and Kleinman summarizes as follows:
Rabbi Weiss maintains in the meeting that “it is a great challenge, a great and holy undertaking” for Orthodox Jews to engage in all professions, including the practice of law, despite the fact that practicing as a lawyer raises halakhic questions. In his words, “we need lawyers who are punctilious in their observance of the commandments . . . [as well as] judges who are punctilious in their observance of the commandments and who attempt as far as possible to render judgments according to . . . Jewish law.” These judges are important for ensuring that Israel’s judicial system “is not totally alienated from the spirit of the Torah.” He states that “a[n] [Orthodox] judge [in a civil court of law] provides a vital service to the nation” because there are many matter in which the rabbinical courts are not equipped to rule. Furthermore in his opinion, the prohibition against resorting to Gentile courts applies only to litigants and not to judges or lawyers.
As Kleinman notes, one of the points R. Weiss relied on for this last statement (which I have underlined) is the fact that the Hazon Ish was friends with Yitzhak Kister who was a judge. (Kister would later be appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court, and is the only such justice who identified with the haredi community.) Yet as far as I know, the sentence that I have underlined is unprecedented among rabbinic decisors, even among the Religious Zionist poskim.
A Hebrew version of Kleinman’s article appears in Tehumin 36 (2016), pp. 346-358. The articles are not identical so anyone interested in the topic is advised to consult both the English and Hebrew versions.
[5] David Matityahu Lippmann, Le-Toledot ha-Yehudim be-Kovna u-Slobodka (Keidan, 1930), pp. 226-227. A different version of the story, with the same conclusion, is told by Hayyim Karlinsky, “Ha-Gaon Rabbi Aryeh Leib Shapiro,” Moriah 76 (Sivan 5744), pp. 95-96. The earliest version of the story, and perhaps the original source, is found in Asher Margulies, “Sheloshah Matmonot Hitmin Yosef,” Ha-Melitz, 25 Tevet 5687, col. 76 (called to my attention by R. Yaakov Yitzhak Miller).
[6] While it could not have been easy for R. Yosef Soloveichik to revisit the painful history he discusses, the documents he reproduces are important for the history of American Orthodoxy. The book I have referred to is not the same thing as the 2016 book on R. Ahron Soloveichk, Yeled Sha’ashuim
[7] Yehaveh Da’at, vol. 4, no. 1 (pp. 7-8). Regarding removing the kippah (but still leaving one’s head covered) before entering the bathroom, the following appears in R. Simhah Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot, Orah Hayyim 21 n. 58.
וכן מובא בשם מוהר”א מבעלזא זי”ע שהיה פושט מעליו המלבוש עליון והכובע והגארטל לפני הכנסו לביהכ”ס, ואא”ז זצ”ל היה מקפיד גם על הכיפה והיה מניח במקומו איזה מטלית על ראשו.
Has anyone else heard of such a practice?
[8] Why isn’t this called טלית קטנה? R. Meir Mazuz explains that in the period of the rishonim, when the expression טלית קטן first began, they were not concerned with the grammatical point that a word ending with ת is feminine. See Bayit Ne’eman 29 (14 Elul 5776), p. 4.
[9] See R. Yitzhak Ratsaby, Olat Yitzhak, vol. 2, no. 11 (p. 28).
[10] See R. Yehiel Goldhaber, Minhagei ha-Kehilot, vol. 1, pp. 93ff.
[11] Here is one source that shows that in 12th century Ashkenaz tzitzit were not generally worn: R. Eliezer ben Nathan of Mainz, Sefer Ra’avan, ed. Deblitzky, vol. 1, no. 40:
שאלני חתני רבי אורי. מצוה חמורה כמו ציצית שהיא שקולה כנגד כל המצות, מאי שנא דמקילין בה רוב ישראל שאין מתעטפין בכל יום. והשבתי לו לפי שאין ציצית חובת גברא. מי כת’ לבוש ציצית, ציצית חובת טלית הוא דכת’ ועשו להם ציצית על כנפי בגדיהם, אם יש לך טלית של ד’ כנפים עשה לו ציצית ואם אין לך טלית אינו חייב בציצית. דומיא דמזוזה ומעקה דאם יש לו בית חייב במזוזה ומעקה ואם אין לו בית אינו חייב.
[12] Bayit Ne’eman 18 (26 Sivan 5776), p. 1.
[13] Bah, Orah Hayyim 17.
[14] Orah Hayyim 17: קטן היודע להתעטף אביו צריך ליקח לו ציצית לחנכו
[15] See Tosafot, Bava Batra 55b s.v. Rabbi Eliezer, and the discussion in R. Zev Wolf Zicherman, Otzar Pelaot ha-Torah, vol. 3, pp. 759ff. (R. Zicherman refers to the Shakh and R. Hirschowitz that I mention.) See also Beitzah 15a: רוב ליסטים ישראל נינהו. The note in the Soncino Talmud to this passage reads: “The Rabbis were broad-minded enough to realize that in a town containing an overwhelming Jewish population the majority of thieves would be Jewish.”
[16] Netzah Yisrael, ed. Hartman (Jerusalem, 1997), vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 20. For R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg’s negative comments about the Jewish people, see my Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy, p. 183.
[18] In this video R. Yosef explains why he has spoken out against R. Mazuz and his followers. I have no doubt that there are also political factors involved. The various “religious” attacks on R. Mazuz, especially during the last Israeli election, remind me of the following memorable passage in Solomon Schechter, Studies in Judaism (Philadelphia, 1896), p. 3: “[U]nfortunately religious struggles are usually conducted on the most irreligious principles.”
[19] This anti-Semitic imagery is already present in R. Joel Teitelbaum, Al ha-Geulah ve-al ha-Temurah, chapters 46, 79.
1. Regarding engaged couples having physical contact, this is actually the subject of a section of the book Penei Yitzhak by R. Hezekiah Mordechai Bassan. Here is the title page.
This book was published in Mantua in 1744 by Menahem Navarra who was a descendant of R. Bassan. Navarra, who was at this time a doctor, not a rabbi, was nevertheless very learned in Torah matters. (He would later be appointed rabbi of Verona.[1]) Navarra included three essays of his own in the volume, the second of which is called Issur Kedushah. In this work he criticizes members of the Jewish community for allowing engaged couples to have physical contact before marriage. Here are the first two pages of the work.
Navarra and the others I have referred to are only dealing with an engaged couple touching before marriage, but not with actual sexual relations. Yet this too is mentioned many centuries before Navarra. Ezra 2:43 and Nehemiah 7:46 refer to בני טבעות. A commentary attributed to R. Saadiah Gaon[2] explains this as follows:
בני טבעות: שקלקלו אבותם גם [צ”ל עם] ארוסותיהם קודם שיכניסו אותם לחופה והיו סומכין על קדושי טבעות ומקלקלין עם ארוסותיהן.
What this means is that after kiddushin, which was effected by aטבעת (ring), but before actual marriage (the two used to be separated, sometimes for many months), the engaged couple would have sexual relations. The children who resulted from this were referred to negatively as בני טבעות. As S. H. Kook points out,[3] R. Saadiah’s explanation is also mentioned by R. Hai Gaon.[4]
R. Hayyim Benveniste, in seventeeth century Turkey, also speaks about how engaged couples would have physical contact. This shows again that there was a divergence between what the halakhah requires and what the people were actually doing (much like you find in a large section of Modern Orthodox society today). Here are R. Benveniste’s words:[5]
להתייחד שניהם כמו שנוהגים פה תירייא ואיזמיר, שאחר השדוכין אחר עבור קצת ימים מתייחדין החתן והכלה ומכניסים אותה לחדר וסוגרין אותן הסגר מוחלט כמו שמסגרין הנשואה אחר ז’ ברכות, מנהג כזה רע ומר הוא, ואיכא איסורא מכמה פנים . . . ועוד שנכשלים באיסור נדה, וברוב הפעמים תצא כלה לחופתה וכריסה בין שיניה, וכמה מהם הודו ולא בושו שבאים עליה שלא כדרכה. אלא א-להים הוא יודע שטרחתי הרבה לבטל מנהג זה פה תיריא ועלה בידי, ועשיתי הסכמה בחרמות ונדויים על זה, ולסבת בעלי זרוע בעלי אגרופין אשר אין פחד א-להים לנגד עיניהם חזר המנהג לסורו רע.
There are a few different points that are of interest in what R. Benveniste writes. The first is that he says that in the majority of cases the bride arrives at the huppah וכריסה בין שיניה. This means that she is pregnant. Even if there is some exaggeration here, R. Benveniste is telling us that many Jewish women were getting pregnant before marriage. Readers might recall my post here where I mentioned R. Ovadiah Bertinoro’s assertion that most Jewish brides in Palermo were pregnant at the time of their wedding.
R. Benveniste mentions how he was able to improve matters by using the power of the herem to keep people in line, but that his success was short-lived as powerful members of the community were able to undermine his authority. This shows us, just as we saw in the text I quoted from R. Eleazar Kalir, that parents were often happy when their children had physical contact before marriage, and they opposed what they regarded as the overly puritanical approach of the rabbis. When R. Benveniste refers to those who באים עליה שלא כדרכה, this means that some of the couples had a sexual relationship, but wanted the woman to be a virgin at the wedding.
R. Jonah Landsofer (Bohemia, died 1712) also testified to the problem we have been discussing:[6]
בבית ישראל ראיתי שערוריה איכה נהיית’ כזאת שאין איש שם לבו להוכיח בשער בת רבים על התקלה וקלקלת שוטי’ שקלקלו והרגלו הרגל דבר עד שנעשה טבע קיים לבלתי הרגיש ברעה אשר ימצאם באחרית הימים והוא אשר נעשה בכל יום ערוך השלחן וצפה הצפית מיום שגומרין שידוכין בין בחור ובתולה מושבים אותם יחד ומוסרי’ הבתולה לזנות בית אביה בחיבוקים ונשוקים ומעשה חידודי’ וכל הקרואים והמסובי’ מחזיקי’ בידו.
Because the masses had no interest in what the rabbis had to say about this matter, R. Landsofer concludes that one need not even rebuke them, as they won’t listen anyway. Not long ago I heard a rabbi going on about the holy communities of Europe of a few hundred years ago, about their support of Torah, the respect they gave to the rabbis, and their commitment to halakhah. All of this is true, but if you look a little closer you find that these communities were actually very much like contemporary Modern Orthodox communities, in that together with a commitment to halakhah, many people also felt that they could determine which halakhot could be ignored. Or perhaps they didn’t even think they were violating halakhah. Maybe they assumed that the rabbis were making their lives difficult with extreme humrot. Either way you look at it, it is very obvious that there were many in traditional Jewish societies who created their own standards of practice which did not always correspond to what the rabbis insisted on, and they had no interest in changing their ways because of what the rabbis were saying.[7]
While the standard rabbinic view has always been that bride and groom are not to have any physical contact until after the wedding ceremony, the rabbis in Germany were a little more lenient. Sefer Maharil records that the practice was for the bride and groom to touch before marriage, but only on the morning of the wedding, a time that also included celebration.[8]
בעלות השחר ביום הששי היה קורא השמש לבא לבה”כ . . . ומביאים הכלה וחברותיה. וכאשר תבא עד פתח חצר בה”כ הלך הרב והחשובים והיו מוליכין את החתן לקראת הכלה. והחתן תופש אותה בידו ובחיבורן יחד זורקין כל העם על גבי ראשן חטין ואומרים פרו ורבו ג”פ. והולכין יחד עד אצל פתח בה”כ ויושבין שם מעט ומוליכין הכלה לביתה.
This detail, that the groom held the bride’s hand prior to the wedding, is found in a number of other German sources.[9] I don’t know how this practice of holding the bride’s hand before the wedding ceremony can be reconciled with what appears in Tractate Kallah, ch. 1:
כלה בלא ברכה אסורה לבעלה כנדה.
The word כלה here means a woman who is betrothed but not yet married.
R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, Kisei Rahamim, Kallah, ch. 1, comments on this passage:
כלה בלא ברכה אסורה כלומר אפי’ לחבק או ליגע בה כנדה.
I also find it noteworthy, and strange from our perspective, that Sefer Maharil tells us that for the wedding ceremony the rabbi would bring the bride to the groom, holding her by her robe:[10]
והרב היה תופס אותה בבגדיה והוליכה והעמידה לימין החתן.
R. Israel David Margulies (19th century) cites this text from Sefer Maharil and correctly notes that in medieval times the brides were much younger than in his day. He assumes that the typical bride was under 12 and a half years old, and therefore there was no problem of impure thoughts with such brides.[11]
ואיזה הירהור יהי’ בכלה קטנה או נערה כזאת, ולכן לקח אותה הרב בעצמו אצל מפתן הבית מן יד הנשים, והביאה אל החתן ושארי הנשים נשארו ולא היה להם שום עסק בבהכ”נ ולא היה חשש הרהור במקום קדשו.
2. Recently I heard a shiur where the rabbi said that if there is a Torah or rabbinic commandment to do something, only the talmudic sages can, as an emergency measure, forbid the action. The classic example is the Sages telling us not to blow the shofar if Rosh ha-Shanah falls out on Shabbat. There is nothing controversial in what the rabbi said, and I think most would agree, even if there some exceptions to this general rule. The rabbi further noted that post-talmudic authorities cannot make gezerot as this power is also reserved for the talmudic sages. This viewpoint is shared by many, yet there are important authorities who disagree, and perhaps more significantly there is evidence of post-talmudic gezerot.
I mention this now, after Passover [this post was written a few weeks ago], since those who reviewed the laws of Pesach would have seen Shulhan Arukh 453:5 which states:
האידנא אסור ללתות בין חטים בין שעורים.
“Nowadays, it is forbidden to moisten either wheat or barley [for grinding].”
If you look at the Mishnah Berurah he explains that while the Sages forbid moistening barley because it will easily leaven, according to the Talmud it is permitted to moisten wheat. In fact, according to the Talmud, Pesahim 40a, Rava held that it is an obligation to wash the grains of wheat: מצוה ללתות.
The Mishnah Berurah explains that it is the geonim who forbid moistening wheat since we are not expert at doing it properly, and it might come to be leavened, or we might delay removing the wheat after the moistening (before grinding) and this might lead to leavening. If the geonim forbid something that the Talmud permitted (or even required), isn’t this to be regarded as a gezerah?
3. Let me now mention something relating to Sukkot, which I had hoped to post closer to the holiday, but as the rabbinic saying goes, מה שהלב חושק הזמן עושק.
Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 649:4 states:
גנות הצעירים של עובדי כוכבים וכיוצא בהם מבתי שמשיהם מותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינים למצוה.
[Regarding what has grown in] the gardens of the צעירים of idolators and similar [gardens] of the houses [or: buildings] of their attendants, one is permitted to take from there a lulav or the other minim for the mitzvah.
Who are the צעירים of the idolators? The Taz states that he does not know:
איני יודע פירושו, אבל הוא ענין ממשרתי עבודת אלילים.
It is not just the Taz who doesn’t know, as none of the traditional commentaries have a clue. The Feldheim English translation of the Shulhan Arukh with Mishnah Berurah (which I make use of when I provide translations) doesn’t translate the word הצעירים, and instead simply transliterates it.[12]
In fact, I am sure that R. Joseph Karo, living in the Muslim world, did not know what the צעירים are either. You might find this a strange assertion. After all, if R. Karo recorded the halakhah, how could he not know what he was writing? However, in this case R. Karo was just recording what appears in R. Aaron Hakohen of Lunel’s Orhot Hayyim (Florence, 1750), Hilkhot Lulav, no. 8, in the name of the Ritva:
כתב הר’ יום טוב אשבילי ז”ל בשם רבו ז”ל הוי יודע שגנות הצעירים והדורסים וכיוצא בהם מבתי הכומרים אינם משמשי ע”ז ולא נויי ע”ז ופירותיהם וכל אשר בהן מותרין בהנאה ומותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינין למצוה עכ”ל.
From a halakhic standpoint the importance of the halakhah is that it tells us that one can take a lulav and other other minim from the garden of an idolator, and it is not important exactly what type of idolator the צעירים are.
As mentioned, the halakhah in the Shulhan Arukh is taken from the Orhot Hayyim. It is first quoted in the Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 649, where it cited more exactly from the Orhot Hayyim than what appears in the Shulhan Arukh:
כתוב בארחות חיים ]הל’ לולב סי’ ח[ נגות הצעירים והדורסים וכיוצא בהם מבתי הכומרים מותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינים למצוה.
In the Beit Yosef (and also in Orhot Hayyim) it says הצעירים והדורסים. Furthermore, instead of מבתי שמשיהם that appears in the Shulhan Arukh, we have מבתי הכומרים, which means the houses (or buildings) of the priests. I have no doubt that the the word שמשיהם is a censor’s replacement of the original הכומרים. In the first printing of the Beit Yosef, Venice 1550, the sentence quoted above appears in its entirety. Yet when the Beit Yosef was next printed, Venice 1564, the entire sentence was deleted, obviously a requirement of the censor. The Shulhan Arukh was first printed in Venice, also in 1564. It thus makes sense that the deletion of the word הכומרים is due to censorship, and it could be that it was this alteration that prevented the entire halakhah from being deleted.
Before we get to הצעירים, what is the meaning of הדורסים that appears in Orhot Hayyim and is copied in the Beit Yosef? If you look at the Ritva that the Orhot Hayyim is citing, he states:[13]
והוי יודע שגנות השעירים והדוכסים וכיוצא בהם מבתי הכומרים, אינם משמשי ע”ז ולא נויי ע”ז, ופירותיהם וכל אשר בהם מותרים בהנאה, ומותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינין למצוה וכן קבלנו מרבותינו ז”ל הלכה למעשה.
The first thing to notice is that instead of הצעירים we have the word השעירים. This is a clear mistake, and the editor notes that the word הצעירים appears when the passage is cited in Orhot Hayyim. Unfortunately, the editor doesn’t note that are also least two other places where in speaking about benefit from avodah zarah the Ritva refers to גנת הצעירים.[14]The text from Ritva quoted above also has, instead of הדורסים which appears in Orhot Hayyim, another strange word, הדוכסים. This means “dukes” (or noblemen, princes, rulers, etc.) and makes no sense here since the context is avodah zarah which has nothing to do with a duke’s garden.
So we now have to explain not just what צעירים means but also דורסים or דוכסים. R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai[15] suggests that צעירים is derived from Zechariah 13:7: והשבתי ידי על הצוערים, “And I will turn my hand upon the little ones.” It is hard to see how telling us that צוערים is related to צעירים helps us to understand the point of the Shulhan Arukh. R. Azulai also refers the reader to Rashi’s commentary on Zech. 13:7:
על הצוערים: על השלטונים הצעירים מן המלכים.
Perhaps I am missing something, but I don’t see what this passage adds other than showing us thatצוערים and צעירים mean the same thing. Why does R. Azulai have to tell us this? The wordצעיר is found elsewhere in the Bible, so we already know what it means.
R. Azulai’s short note also refers the reader to Abarbanel’s comment to Zech. 13:7. It is Abarbanel who will help us to understand what is going on with the word צעירים. (As R. Azulai was commenting on the Shulhan Arukh, he did not attempt to explain דורסים/דוכסים which is only found in the Beit Yosef. We shall return to this word soon.)
Abarbanel writes:
והשיבותי ידי על הצוערים שראוי שיפורש כפי זה הדרך על כומרי אדום הדורשים להם אמונתם וכזביהם והם עצמם נקראים אצלם צעירים להורות על ענוותנותם ושפלותם כי בעבור שאלה חטאו והחטיאו את אחרים בלמודם ודרושותיהם [!] אמר השם שישיב ידו ומכותם עליהם.
While this passage has nothing to do with the Shulhan Arukh, R. Azulai saw the relevance of it as Abarbanel makes the connection between צוערים and צעירים as we saw already with Rashi. Abarbanel also specifically connects this to Catholic priests, telling us that these priests would call themselves צעירים as a sign of modesty.
From this we can understand that when the Shulhan Arukh refers to gardens of the צעירים he means gardens belonging to Catholic priests. But who in particular are the צעירים? To answer this question let’s return to the Beit Yosef which referred to both צעירים and דורסים/דוכסים. As already noted, this entire passage is taken from the Orhot Hayyim.
In 1902 R. Moses Schlesinger published the second volume of the Orhot Hayyim. In the introduction he included a helpful list of all the times that the Beit Yosef cites the Orhot Hayyim. When he comes to our example, p. xv, he has a note in which he cites the great Abraham Berliner[16] that the proper reading is גנות הצעירים והדורשים. In other words, instead of דורסים/דוכסים, which appears in the Ritva and the Orhot Hayyim, it should say דורשים. When he wrote the Beit Yosef, R. Joseph Karo probably just copied the word דורסים that was in his copy of the Orhot Hayyim without knowing exactly what it meant (as its exact meaning, while of interest to historians and Seforim Blog readers, is not relevant to the underlying halakhah).[17]
So what does הצעירים והדורשים mean? Berliner explains this as well (and it was actually earlier explained by Leopold Zunz[18]). The two most important medieval Catholic orders were the Franciscans and the Dominicans. The actual name of the Franciscans is the “Order of Friars Minor.” They were often called “Little Brothers” or “Minorites.” Thus, when the Ritva and Orhot Hayyim refer to the צעירים this is just the Hebrew translation of “Minorites”, i.e., the Franciscans. As Abarbanel correctly pointed out, this term was adopted as a sign of humility.[19]As for the דורשים, the meaning of this is obvious (after Berliner and Zunz have enlightened us). The actual name of the Dominicans is the “Order of Preachers,” so דורשים (preachers)=Dominicans. What the Ritva and Orhot Hayyim are telling us is that when it comes to the mitzvah of lulav, one can use that which grows in the gardens of the Franciscans and the Dominicans (and the same halakhah would apply to other Catholic orders. The monasteries would often have gardens and Jews would be able to purchase things from there.)
In Nahmanides’ Disputation[20] he too refers to theצעירים and the דורשים.
והיו שם ההגמון וכל הגלחים וחכמי הצעירים והדורשים.
In his note, R. Hayyim Dov Chavel identifies the צעירים as the Franciscans. However, he doesn’t know that the דורשים are the Dominicans, and he therefore explains that the word means הנואמים. In his English translation, Chavel writes, “Among them were the bishop [of Barcelona] and all the priests, Franciscan scholars, and preachers.”[21]
It is noteworthy that the fifteenth-century R. Solomon ben Simeon Duran, who lived in North Africa, was apparently also unaware of the meaning of צעירים, and therefore applied it to all young Catholic religious figures, not merely Franciscans. )At least, that is what I think he means, as opposed to understanding his use ofצעיריהם to refer to young men as a whole.) After contrasting the sexual purity of the Jews with what occurs in surrounding society, he writes, in very strong words:[22]
וצעיריהם הם כולם מטונפים בעריות מנאפים עם נשי רעיהם ובאים על הזכור והטוב שבהם מוציא שכבת זרע לבטלה בידו וזה מפורסם אצלם.
4. Since in a prior post I discussed Jacob’s love of Rachel and Leah, let me share a strange interpretation I recently found, involving love and Jacob’s brother, Esau. The general understanding is that Esau loved Isaac. Indeed, it is very difficult to read the Torah and conclude differently. Therefore, I was quite surprised to find that the medieval R. Abraham Bedersi is of the opinion that, after Isaac gave Jacob the blessing intended for Esau, not only did Esau not love Isaac, but he was ready to cause his death! This would be accomplished by killing Jacob, since Isaac’s great sorrow would bring on his end. To arrive at this interpretation, Bedersi offers a novel understanding of Gen. 27:41: יקרבו ימי אבל אבי ואהרגה את יעקב אחי. The standard understanding of these words is that when the days of mourning for his father arrive, then Esau will kill Jacob. As he didn’t want to cause his father pain, he decided to wait until he was dead to kill Jacob. However, Bedersi understands ואהרגה to mean, “when I will kill Jacob” this will cause my father to die.
Here are his words from his Hotem Tokhnit:[23]
ועשו הרשע ידוע שלא היה אוהב יצחק אביו כמו שתראה שאמר יקרבו ימי אבל אבי ואהרגה את יעקב אחי וביאור נכון בו אהרגה את יעקב אחי ובאמת יקרבו ימי אבל אבי שהוא יצטער על בנו וימות.
As mentioned, this is a strange interpretation so I Iooked around to see if I could find a similar approach. I didn’t see anything in Torah Shelemah. I looked in the ArtScroll extended commentary to Genesis (not the Stone Chumash) and it does not bring any interpretations that suggest that Esau intended to cause Isaac’s death. However, the commentary states as follows:
Ralbag interprets similarly:[24] Even if it accelerates my father’s death [lit. brings near the days of mourning for my father] I nevertheless will kill my brother Jacob (cited by Tur).
I don’t know where they got this from, as Ralbag does not say what is attributed to him. All Ralbag says is that Esau wished to kill Jacob after Isaac’s death. The Tur, who was a contemporary of Ralbag, does not cite him.
R. Abraham Bedersi’s Hotem Tokhnit focuses on Hebrew synonyms and in an era before concordances and computers would have required an enormous amount of work. It found on hebrewbooks.org, but it is not on Otzar ha-Hokhmah.
Among the many interesting things you will find in Hotem Tokhnit is that he says that unlike the word יהודי, the word עברי is only used in the Bible in the context of slavery, and he provides examples of this (p. 152). With this in mind, I can see why some people would prefer the term Mishpat Yehudi instead of Mishpat Ivri.
On p. 202 he quotes an otherwise unknown comment of Ibn Ezra that the meaning of the word סלה is “truth”.
כי ענין סלה אמת ונכונה ועל זה אמר אשרי יושבי ביתך עוד יהללוך סלה (תהלים פ”ד ה’) באמת וביושר.
Beginning on p. 1 in the second section, there is a long letter from Samuel David Luzzatto. He refers to an unnamed scholar who could not accept that Rabad, in his comment to Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, would say that people greater than Maimonides thought that God had a physical form. He therefore suggested changing גדולים וטובים ממנו to גדולים וטובים מעמֵנו (tzeirei under the mem).
Luzzatto completely rejects this point, arguing that גדולים וטובים מעמנו means people greater than our nation, i.e., non-Jews. Furthermore, he adds, where do we find Rabad, Rashi, etc. using the word עמנו to refer to the Jewish people.
On p. 2 Luzzatto records the following lines from one of Bedersi’s poems, in which one word summarizes each of Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles:
נמצא כיִחודו והֶבדלו קדמות עבודתו נבואתו
משה ותורתו אֲנצחַ ידע גמול גואל בהחיותו
Luzzatto also publishes a long poem from Bedersi together with Luzzatto’s commentary, without which it would be very difficult to understand much of what Bedersi was saying. One of my favorite lines is found on p. 13:
ולא תבין שפת כל-עם בשירים לבד טרחם, כפז על גב בעירי
What this means is that poems are difficult for the masses, of every nation and language, to understand. They regard them as a burden, much like an animal, if you place gold on its back, won’t appreciate what it is carrying. It will only feel the burden of the weight.
5. Since I mentioned Mendelssohn in the last post, let me note the following. I recently saw that Eliezer Segal, in his wonderful book, Introducing Judaism (London and New York, 2009), p. 110, uses a picture of Mendelssohn. You can see it here. (Copyright prevents me from posting the picture.) We are told that the image is from the 18th century, yet there is no doubt that this is not a picture of Mendelssohn. You can look at authentic pictures of Mendelssohn here and they look nothing like this image. Incidentally, in a student’s description of Mendelssohn’s 1777 meeting with Kant, he is described as having a goatee.[25]
6. In a comment to my last post, Maimon wrote: “On the subject of R. Bachrach’s responsum – it bears noting that the pre-reform homogeneous [should be: heterogeneous] Jewish society (especially in Germany) contained people of varying levels of observance from across the spectrum and as such many behavioral patterns that would be unthinkable in contemporary Orthodox society are detailed in the Halakhic writings from that era.” Maimon is correct, and it is not only in recent centuries or in Germany that one finds communities with people of different levels of religious observance. This is how Jewish societies have always been, in every era and place, at least until the second half of the twentieth century and the creation of haredi societies. I have already cited numerous examples that justify this statement, but let offer one more that shows how even in medieval times young men and women would socialize in a way that Maimon might say “would be unthinkable in contemporary Orthodox society.” I would only add that instead of “contemporary Orthodox society,” I prefer to say “contemporary haredi society,” since as mentioned already, Modern Orthodox society still has significant variations in level of observance. (When I speak of variations in level of observance, I have in mind bein adam la-Makom halakhot. I am not referring to halakhot having to do with monetary issues and dina de-malchuta dina, regarding which I believe the Modern Orthodox community is superior to what we find in the haredi world.)
R. Meir of Rothenburg was asked about young Jewish men and women who were drinking together. As a joke, one of the young women asked one of the men if he would betroth her. He took a ring and threw it to her, and recited the text of kiddushin. (At a future time I can discuss the halakhic arguments that R. Meir used to free the woman from having to receive a get.) One cannot overlook the fact that the way the young men and women were socializing together, much like you would find among kids at Modern Orthodox high schools, shows that there was no strict separation between the sexes. Here is the question, as it appears in Irving Agus, ed., Teshuvot Ba’alei ha-Tosafot, no. 85.
R. Meir of Rothenburg’s answer is found in She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharam mi-Rothenburg, Prague ed., no. 993.7. Two people have asked me to comment on Rabbis Yitzchok Adlerstein’s and Michael Broyde’s article here arguing that hasidic schools shouldn’t be forced to offer secular education. While the Seforim Blog is not the place for commenting on these sorts of matters, after reading the article I felt I had to make one point. Adlerstein and Broyde cite the famous Supreme Court case which allowed the Amish to opt out of secular education and they apply this logic to the hasidic communities. While it is true that if it went to court the hasidic communities would probably prevail, there is a big difference between the Amish and the hasidic communities. The Amish do not take welfare, food stamps, and other forms of government assistance. Thus, they make choices and live with the consequences. However, the hasidic communities refuse to provide their children with the basic skills needed to function in the modern economy, and as a result rely heavily on the welfare state. No one who believes in limited government and is opposed to the welfare state can support a situation where kids are allowed to grow up almost guaranteed to be in need of public assistance.[26]
[1] Regarding Navarra, see Cecil Roth, “Rabbi Menahem Navarra: His Life and Times. 1717-1777,” Jewish Quarterly Review 15 (1925), pp. 427-466.
[2] Perush al Ezra ve-Nehemiah (Oxford, 1882), p. 30.
[3] Iyunim u-Mehkarim (Jerusalem, 1959), vol. 1, p. 259.
[4] Ginzei Kedem 4 (1930), p. 52. While there is no historical evidence for this explanation, it does show that the practice of using a ring for kiddushin existed already in the geonic period. For other sources from this era, see Mordechai Margaliot, ed., Ha-Hilukim bein Anshei Mizrah u-Venei Eretz Yisrael (Jerusalem, 1938), no. 25. For a very detailed discussion of use of a ring for kiddushin, see Pardes Eliezer: Erusin ve-Nisuin (Brooklyn, 2010), vol. 4, ch. 30.
Only in Yemen did the practice of using a ring not become widely accepted (though even there it was used in some places). See R. Yitzhak Ratsaby, Shulhan Arukh ha-Mekutzar, vol. 7, pp. 27-28. There is no mention of using a ring for kiddushin in the Talmud. It does, however, appear in Tikunei Zohar, nos. 5, 10 (as pointed out by R. Moses Isserles, Shulhan Arukh Even ha-Ezer 27:1), but Tikunei Zohar does not date from the tannaitic or amoraic period. The Sefer ha-Hinukh, no. 539, says that the reason we use a ring for kiddushin is so that every time the woman looks at her hand she remembers the following things (which apply to all means of kiddushin, but wearing a ring allows her to remember them).
שהיא קנויה לאותו האיש ולא תזנה תחתיו ולא תמרוד בו ותתן לו יקר והוד לעולם כעבד לאדוניו.
Regarding what I have underlined, even if today some men like being treated like that, going into a contemporary marriage expecting to get this sort of treatment is a recipe for marital disaster.
The ring for kiddushin has nothing to do with the engagement ring. I always wondered why the practice of giving a diamond engagement ring was not condemned as hukkot ha-goyim, especially by those who have an expansive understanding of this halakhah. Even if it is not halakhically forbidden, it is clearly a practice that came from non-Jewish society. How is it that people who refuse to have anything to do with things like Mother’s Day or Thanksgiving have no problem giving a diamond ring as an engagement present? R. Chaim Rapoport pointed out to me that R. Zvi Hersh Ferber of London (d. 1966) condemned the giving of engagement rings as hukkot ha-goyim. See Kerem Tzvi: Bereishit, vol. 1, p. 132.
As for wedding rings for men, R. Meir Mazuz states that there is absolutely no problem with a man wearing a ring. See Asaf ha-Mazkir, p. 194, Bayit Ne’eman, pp. 441ff. He calls attention to Shabbat 62a, וחילופיהן באיש, from which we see that this was not regarded as a problem. He also quotes Kaf ha-Hayyim 161:31 who writes (summarizing an earlier source):
דת”ח שתורתם אומנתם וכן בעלי בתים שעוסקים במו”מ ואין להם מלאכה גרועה א”צ להסיר הטבעות בשעת נט”י אע”ג דמהדקי טובא.
R. Mazuz states that on his wedding day his father, the great R. Matzliach Mazuz, gave him a ring to wear, and that in Tunisia this was the general practice, that a groom received a ring and wore it for the rest of his life. However, upon coming to Israel R. Mazuz saw that it is not accepted for talmidei hakhamim and “fearers of heaven” to wear a ring so he stopped wearing it. (This is his language in Asaf ha-Mazkir. In Bayit Ne’eman he writes that the haredim do not wear rings.) R. Mazuz adds that he does wear the ring on the night of Passover to commemorate the words of Genesis 15:14: “Afterward shall they come out with great substance.” (“Great substance” includes jewelry.)
R. Mazuz notes that in a picture of the Moroccan sage, R. Isaac Bengualid (1777-1870), author of the responsa work Va-Yomer Yitzhak, he is wearing a ring. Here is the picture.
He also mentions a picture of R. Elijah Hazan (1848-1908) of Alexandria, author of the responsa work Ta’alumot Lev, where he is wearing a ring. I have not been able to find this picture. See also here where S. has a picture of R. Bernard Illowy wearing a ring as well as a picture of R. Samson Wertheimer’s wedding ring.
R. Hayyim Amselem, here (from May 5, 2105), writes very strongly against those who oppose wedding rings on religious grounds, using the opportunity to once again blast the Ashkenazic haredim.
איפה ההגיון הבריא?
הבוקר בעתון ישראל היום ובערוץ 7 מפרסמים בהבלטה ובהתפעלות פסק הלכה “חדש” המתיר ואפילו ממליץ בעידן המודרני לגברים נשואין לענוד טבעת נישואין, בעולם הדתי והחרדי, שוללים זאת כי זה “מנהג גוים”, לדעתם וכו’ וכו’ .
מה שהם אינם יודעים שאין כאן כל חדש ובעדות הספרדים היה זה מנהג פשוט שרבים מאוד מהגברים ענדו על ידם טבעת נשואין, או טבעת בכלל ולא היה פוצה פה ומצפצף, ידועות כמה תמונות של גדולי תורה והלכה שבאצבעם טבעת כגון תמונתו של הגאון רבי יצחק בן וואליד רב ודיין בעיר תיטואן במרוקו, וכן עוד רבנים, שכך עשו מעשה, עיין בספר אסף המזכיר עמוד קצ”ד.
מה הבעיה? הבעיה היא שהרבנים האשכנזים ובעיקר החרדים, מה שהם חושבים בדעתם שזה אסור, ובמיוחד אם זה דומה להנהגה לא “חרדית” אז זה כבר אסור וחילול השם וכו’ והם לא מסוגלים להכיל בסובלנות דעה אחרת, מה גם שהם בטוחים לגמרי שהתורה היא רק שלהם ואין לאחרים זולתם כלום, וכמובן ההמון הפשוט שומע ונוהה אחריהם בעינים עוורות.
גם אם תוכיח להם שאפילו בתלמוד כך משמע [עיין מסכת שבת (דף ס”ב ע”א)] לא יעזור כלום, ואם תעיז גם להביע את דעתך, אוי ואבוי אתה חולק על גדולי ישראל? אתה נגד “ההשקופע” החרדית, דמך בראשך.
איי איי איי איפה היהדות השפויה והמתונה נעלמה?
[5] Keneset ha-Gedolah, Even ha-Ezer 66, Tur no. 1.
[6] Meil Tzedakah, no. 19.
[7] In the prior post I gave examples of takanot forbidding an engaged man to enter the house of his fiancée. For another example from 1594 in Italy, see R. Solomon ha-Levi, Divrei Shlomo (Venice, 1594), p. 299a. R. Hayyim Palache mentions that in nineteenth-century Izmir they also proclaimed such a takanah. See Hayyim ve-Shalom, vol. 2, no. 89, Masa Hayyim, ma’arekhet shin, no. 124 (p. 27a). R. Elijah ha-Levi (16th century) of Constantinople, Zekan Aharon, no. 117, discusses the matter as well. He states that in his community there is no “evil practice” of having the engaged couple spend time together at her home, which leads to all the problems that have been mentioned.However, he notes that this was an old practice in some places in the Ottoman Empire, and therefore in order to prevent serious sins the rabbis instituted that at the engagement the wedding blessings were recited and the woman would also go to the mikveh at this time.
Regarding the engaged couple before the wedding, it is also worth noting that among some hasidic groups from the Chernobyl line, there is a festive meal, called a חתן מאהל, the evening before the wedding. At this time, the future bride and groom dance together using a long handkerchief or gartel. At the wedding itself, the practice in a number of hasidic groups (and not only among the Hasidim) is that the bride and groom dance together actually holding hands. See Pardes Eliezer: Erusin ve-Nisuin, vol. 5, p. 538; Ohel Moshe 7 (Kislev 5750), p. 67. Here are two examples of this from Youtube.
Regarding dancing while holding hands, I found something quite interesting in R. Joseph Hahn (d. 1637), Yosif Ometz (Frankfurt, 1928), p. 344:
המספר מעות לאשה כדי להסתכל בה אף על פי שמלא תורה ומעשים לא ינקה מדינה של גיהנם וכל שכן הנוגע בידה ממש, ובמחול של מצוה המדקדקים כורכים סביבות ידיהם בגד שקורין וטשינלן, ואם יודע בעצמו בודאות שלא יבא לידי הרהור שרי.
R. Hahn tells us that during a Mitzvah dance, when there are men and women dancing together, those who are careful about halakhah would wear a type of glove. This means that even if they held hands with a woman they would not touch her skin. R. Hahn says that one who knows that he will not be driven to sexual thoughts is permitted to do this.
R. Ezekiel Feivel, Toldot Adam (Jerusalem, 1987), ch. 15 (p. 215), says that R. Shlomo Zalman of Vilna (the brother of R. Hayyim of Volozhin) used to dance with brides holding their hand. A handkerchief or something other covering ensured that he didn’t touch their skin::
אחז ביד החתן ודבר עמו דברי תורה אשר זורו במזור האמת והאמונה . . . אחר כן רקד עם הכלה אחוזי יד על ידי מטפחת בנועם לב ופנים מאירות ובסדר מתוקן ונעים מאד.
R. Abraham Hayyim Schorr, Torat Hayyim: Avodah Zarah 17a, was very opposed to this practice of holding the bride’s hand, even if separated by something like a handkerchief, which he says was done by some talmidei hakhamim. (He means actually holding hands with the handkerchief ensuring that skin does not touch. He is not referring to when the man and woman each hold a different end of the handkerchief. See R. Yosef Rapoport’s letter in Or Yisrael 24 [Tamuz 5761], p. 245.)
ונר’ דאסו’ ללכת במחול עם הכלה בשבעת ימי המשתה אפי’ אינו אוחז בידה ממש אלא בהפסק מטפחת כדרך שנוהגין מקצת ת”ח שבדור הזה אפ”ה לאו שפיר עבדי.
I will deal with the larger issue of mixed dancing, and the rabbinic responses, in a future post.Regarding R. Shlomo Zalman covering his hands, we are told that he never touched the pages of a sefer with his bare hands. He always turned the pages while wearing gloves or with a handkerchief. One time he didn’t have either with him, and he turned the pages with his lips. See Toldot Adam, p. 214.
We are also told that when he slept he wore gloves in order that his bare hands not touch his body. This way when he woke up he could start studying Torah immediately without washing his hands, so careful was he not to waste even a moment away from Torah study. See Toldot Adam, p. 218. This approach of R. Shlomo Zalman ignores the main reason offered for washing in the morning, namely, that it is to remove the ruah ra’ah. Therefore, R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira could not believe that the story of R. Shlomo Zalman wearing gloves was true. See Nimukei Orah Hayyim, 4:1
על כן אין להאמין על אותו צדיק טעות ומעשה כזה
.
See also R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yabia Omer, vol. 4, Orah Hayyim no. 2:8-9; and R. Moshe Yehudah Leib Rabinovich’s letter at the beginning of R. Zev Zicherman, Otzar Pelaot ha-Torah, vol. 1 (Brooklyn, 2014)..
[8] Ed. Spitzer (Jerusalem, 1989), p. 464.
[9] See Yaakov Yisrael Stall’s note in R. Judah he-Hasid, Sefer ha-Gematriot (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 309 n. 71. (R. Judah he-Hasid states that the groom would lift up his future bride.)
[10] Sefer Maharil, p. 465.
[11] Har Tavor (Pressburg, 1861), p. 33b. Regarding the age of Jewish brides in medieval times, See Avraham Grossman, Hasidot u-Mordot (Jerusalem, 2001), ch. 2. He makes the following interesting point (Pious and Rebellious, trans. Jonathan Chipman [Waltham, 2004], pp. 47-48):
The phenomenon of beating wives may also have been exacerbated by marriage of girls at an early age. The fact that at times the wife was extremely young led the husband to relate to her as he would to his own daughter. This was particularly true in those places where young girls were married to husbands significantly older than themselves, which was, as we have seen, a common phenomenon in Jewish society, and particularly in Muslim countries. Moreover, it may well be that the beating of the wife, which was a part of the life of the young couple, also continued thereafter.
[12] R. Yihye Moses Abudi, Magen Ba’adi (Jerusalem, 1904), vol. 2, p. 30b, also doesn’t know what the word means. What he thinks is the obvious meaning is, as we will soon see, mistaken.
ול”נ פשוט כיון שהם קורין לה גנות הגדולים אנו מכנים להם שם לגנאי לקרות להם גנות הצעירים.
[15] Birkei Yosef, Orah Hayyim 649:3. R. Moses Sofer also refers to Zech. 13:7. See the Makhon Yerushalayim ed. of Shulhan Arukh, ad loc.
[16] Abraham Berliner was an outstanding representative of German Orthodoxy. He was a member of R. Azriel Hildesheimer’s separatist Orthodox community, and he taught for many years at the Rabbinical Seminary of Berlin. Nevertheless, the annual Yerushatenu, which is devoted to the study of all aspects of German rabbinic history, prayers, customs, etc., saw fit to publish a letter which attacks Berliner and places him in what the letter-writer regards as the “anti-Torah” camp. See Yerushatenu 3 (2009), p. 396. This was an unfortunate lapse in judgment by the editors of what is otherwise a fabulous publication. The editors intended to show their open-mindedness by publishing even the nonsense of an extremist, but the job of the editors is to ensure the high quality of their publication, and this means that they have to reject that which is unsuitable.
[17] Unfortunately, the Makhon Yerushalayim edition of the Beit Yosef simply points out that instead of דורסים the text should perhaps read דוכסים. In other words, the editors were unaware that דורשים is the correct reading. Hopefully, in the next printing they will correct this matter. If they do so, based on this post, it will be my second “contribution” to this magnificent edition. Here is the Makhon Yerushalayim Tur, Even ha-Ezer 173, p. 539.
In note 3 at the bottom of the page it refers to a קושיא גדולה printed in the journal Or Torah in 1992 (Heshvan 5753, no. 23). This was a question I asked R. Meir Mazuz and he replied that instead of ונשא בתו the text should apparently read ונשא בת אשתו .
[18] Zur Geschichte und Literatur (Berlin, 1845), p. 181.
[19] In his defense of R. Moses Hayyim Luzzatto and his circle, R. Jacob Hazak uses the phrase גנות הצעירים to make a nice melitzah. See Iggerot Ramhal u-Venei Doro, ed., Shriki (Jerusalem, 2008), p. 357:
ואל יחשבו אותנו כמורדים וכפושעים ח”ו, וכל מי שתורת אלקיו בקרבו, ואהבתו ית’ גברה בו, ילבש בגדי קנאה ולא ישמע גנ”ות הצעירים.
[20] Kitvei Rabbenu Moshe ben Nahman, ed. Chavel, vol. 1, p. 308.
[21] Ramban: Writings and Discourses (New York, 1978), vol. 2, p. 668.
[22] Milhemet Mitzvah (Leipzig, 1855), p. 14.
[23] (Amsterdam, 1865), p. 16.
[24] The word “similarly” makes no sense here, as the commentary does not previously cite an interpretation similar to the one given by “Ralbag.”
[25] See Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., The Jew in the Modern World (Oxford, 1995), p. 61.
[26] According to the last census, Kiryas Joel has a higher percentage of residents receiving food stamps than any other city or town in the entire country. See here. The taxpayer should never be required to subsidize communities when the poverty is self-imposed.