Marc Shapiro: What Do Adon Olam and ס”ט Mean?

What Do Adon Olam and ס”ט Mean ? [1]
by
By Marc B. Shapiro ס”ט
1. People often refer to me as a Modern Orthodox intellectual. There are actually quite a number of us out there. If you hear someone using words like “ontological,” “existential,” “mimetic,” and now, “tergiversation”[2] you can assume he in in our club. Also, another telltale sign is that when we give divrei Torah you will hear us refer to Philo, the Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha (if we are confident that we can pronounce the word properly[3]), Shadal, or Cassutto.[4] Of course, we are careful to only say Midrash, and never Medrish, as the latter pronunciation is a sure sign of a Philistine.
It is no secret that Modern Orthodox intellectuals like to look down on Artscroll, and to let others know about this. So we must find places where Artscroll makes mistakes. It is not enough to point to the vastly different historical conceptions between us and Artscroll; we need to find places where Artscroll simply got it wrong (for one such example see here). This will show that even if they are conquering the world, they shouldn’t think that they are so brilliant. I am not speaking about the Artscroll Talmud (which we use when no one is looking) or the Artscroll “History” series, which is not popular with the Modern Orthodox.[5] I am referring to the Artscroll siddur and chumash which have taken over the Orthodox world. (The Modern Orthodox intellectuals must have been so busy these last twenty years producing articles read by each other that it never occurred to them to produce their own siddur and chumash.)[6]
But finding these errors is easier said than done. I am not referring to run-of the-mill errors, but the sort that will impress people at your Shabbat table. That way you can show them that you are a Modern Orthodox intellectual, and not afraid to stand up to Artscroll, this generation’s anti-Messiah. Artscroll is the Goliath, and if it can be felled, then Feldheim, Targum and certainly the minor leaguers at Aish Ha-Torah will be that much easier to take down. If the obscurantists are not yet shaking in their feet, once they see our ever-forthcoming translation of the Arukh ha-Shulhan, which will bring back the 1950’s and the “mimetic tradition”, this will put them in their place.
As I state, it is not so easy to find the perfect mistake. One could point out that in the Artscroll siddur, p. 320, it refers to a “responsa” of Maimonides, when the word they should have used is “responsum.” But this clearly won’t do the trick. After all, no one assumes that Artscroll is an expert in English; it is because Artscroll is expert in Jewish things that it has become so popular. For a while I thought that I could impress those ever-impressionable Shabbat guests by pointing out that contrary to what the Artscroll siddur, p. 870, states, R. Eleazar Kalir was not a tanna. But again, this is not something that most people care about. Besides, someone always ended up pointing out that no less than Tosafot claims that he was a tanna, and my protestations about what Shir proved were always met with blank stares, for what does a Prague song have to do with anything?
And what about when I showed people that in the chumashim printed until 1999, Lord Jakobovits, who died in that year, is referred to as Emeritus Chief Rabbi of the British Empire (see one of the first pages of the chumash where it lists the important people involved with Artscroll). On the title page of Hertz’s chumash he is referred to as “Late Chief Rabbi of the British Empire,” and the Jakobovits reference might be trying to parallel this. All my protestations that Jakobovits was never Chief Rabbi of an Empire (which had ceased to exist before he came into office) but of a Commonwealth have never found anyone showing much interest. (The technical title is Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth. The title is more grandiose than the office. At most, there are 300,000 Jews in the United Kingdom (as, at present, no one in Australia, Canada, Zambia, etc. looks to the British Chief Rabbi for religious guidance). Subtract the unaffiliated, Reform and Masorti from this, and then subtract the Haredim and the Sephardim and this will give you the number of Jews represented by the Chief Rabbi.)
There was actually a very big error I used to point out, and this was found in the Artscroll Shabbat Zemiros (it has since been corrected). At the beginning of the Shalosh Seudos section Artscroll wrote:
The three meals of the Sabbath symbolize the three Patriarchs, the three divisions of Scripture: Torah, Prophets and Hagiographa, and the three feasts through which Esther brought about Haman’s downfall. Many matters of awesome spiritual significance are dependent on the Third Meal as the Zohar discusses frequently (Aruch HaShulchan 291).

This is a very strange passage, since what does Esther have to do with the Three Sabbath meals? Furthermore, since when did Esther organize three feasts? Everyone who attends synagogue on Purim knows that there were only two feasts. This is what the Arukh ha-Shulhan states:
ויהא זהיר מאד לקיים סעודה שלישית ואמרו חז”ל דכל המקיים סעודה ג’ ניצל משלש פורעניות . . . ואם אפשר שאינן ממש מן התורה מ”מ ודאי מתקנת משה רבינו הם שכן קיבל מסיני והם מרמזים נגד ג’ אבות, נגד תורה נביאים וכתובים, ובשעה שניתן להם המן ניתן להם על ג’ סעודות
What happened was that whoever wrote the commentary to the Zemiros understood the word המן (the manna) to mean Haman, and that he was given into the Jews’ hands because of three feasts![7]
Artscroll did what everyone should do when an error is brought to their attention, namely, correct it in a future edition.. (In another post I plan on noting a couple of corrections to my own writings.) In fact, this is a good lesson to all of us, because if Artscroll, whose writers are big talmidei hakhamim, could make such a simple mistake, then all of us should realize that we too can make simple errors.
The important thing is that they corrected the error. If only the same could be said about Mossad ha-Rav Kook. There has already been discussion on this blog about some problems with the Chavel edition of Ramban. In fact, although both the Commentary on the Torah and Kitvei Ramban have been reprinted about twenty times, many obvious errors have still not been corrected. I was planning on giving one example, but I wasn’t sure which one to use. About five minutes before writing this I received a call from the owner of www.publishyoursefer.com, which will soon be reprinting Kitvei R. Weinberg. He informed me that there are many students at the Ner Israel yeshiva who follow the Seforim Blog, pleasant news indeed. In their honor, since unlike myself, they spend most of their day involved in the intricacies of the Talmud and its commentators, my example will be from the introduction of Ramban to his Dina de-Garmei, a work which only a real talmid hakham would try to tackle. The text is found in Kitvei Ramban, vol. 1, p. 417. Ramban writes
אבל יש אשר קולמוס הראשונים סתמן
ועתה נעלם טעמן מעיני תלמידי הזמן
וחכמי הצרפתים אספו רובן אל עמן
הם המורים, הם המלמדים, הם המגלים לנו נטמן
Chavel explains the third line to mean
חכמי הצרפתים אספו רובן של הטעמים הללו לתוך ספריהם להיות לעינים של תלמידי הזמן
Yet this is incorrect. What the Ramban means is that most of the French sages have left this world and gone on to their eternal reward.
Getting back to Artscroll, I was pleased when I found the perfect example of an Arscroll error, and this in a prayer that we all know well, Adon Olam. What do these words mean? To answer this, most people will open their Arscroll siddur.[8] Artscroll translates, “Master of the Universe”. This, or similar translations (e.g., Lord of the Universe, Master of the World) seem to be standard. Yet for a while I was convinced that the proper translation was “Eternal Lord.” After looking at the song as a whole, and seeing how it speaks of God’s eternity, it appeared clear to me that this is what the first two words mean.
I was happy to find that both Birnbaum and De Sola Pool (both of which are now almost impossible to find in any synagogue) understood the first two words this way as well. So happy was I with my idea that I made sure to tell lots of people about it, all of whom were very impressed, since here was a bona fide correction to Artscroll. I was in London a couple of months ago and was davening with the new siddur published by Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. Lo and behold, I found that he too translated the words as did Artscroll. After davening the rabbi of the shul asked me if I liked the new siddur and I told him yes. I also used the opportunity to point out that even this wonderful siddur mistakenly translates the first words of Adon Olam. It seemed that he too was impressed. I certainly thought that for the rest of my life I would be able to pull this out of my back pocket whenever I needed to show that even Artscroll, the veritable Urim ve-Tumim, can make a mistake.
But alas, all good things come to an end. The very next morning after speaking to the London rabbi, I went to a hashkamah minyan and the siddur I chose to use was Ha-Siddur ha-Meduyak. This siddur is produced by the Kise Rahamim Yeshiva in Bnei Brak. This is a Tunisian yeshiva under the leadership of R. Meir Mazuz, who is known by the acronym נאמן ס”ט. In addition to the siddur, they have also produced a variety of other books with the title “Meduyak.” This is because every line has been carefully examined by R. Mazuz, who does not hesitate to make corrections, even if the version he is correcting has been in use for many hundreds of years.[10] This has been very controversial and R. Dovid Yitzchaki, in various articles, has harshly polemicized against R. Mazuz. As we have come to expect, Yated Ne’eman quoted the condemnation issued by maranan verabonon gedolei Yisroel, in which these books were described as terrible breaches in Judaism. The implication to be drawn from the attack is that R. Mazuz and his students are dangerous reformers.[11]
R. Mazuz did not rest, and the 2005 edition of the siddur (which I purchased from mysefer.com) contains letters of support for R. Mazuz from R. Ovadiah Yosef, R. Shlomo Amar, R. Shmuel Wosner, and R. Shimon Alouf of the Brooklyn Syrian community. There is also a letter from “Ha-Gaon he-Hasid” R. Dov Kook, the son-in-law of R. Yitzhak Zilberstein, who is himself the son-in-law of R. Eliashiv. This is significant since R. Elyashiv was at the forefront of the condemnation. As the Yated article states:
Woe to a generation in which every man does as he sees fit. And the matter should be publicized to prevent others from being drawn in by their ways,” write maranan verabonon gedolei Yisroel headed by Maran HaRav Yosef Sholom Eliashiv shlita, in a letter opposing the publication of “precise” (“meduyak”) editions of Chumoshim and Tehillim as well as new siddurim and machzorim that contain grave breaches and changes from the accepted tradition handed down to us.
Yet R. Dov Kook writes to R. Mazuz about how much he benefited from using the Siddur Ha-Meduyak!
R. Mazuz is a very interesting personality. To begin with, he had a close connection to Habad for many decades, having taught in a Habad school in Tunis in the 1960’s. Yet when he saw the Messianic fever and other problems in Habad, he publicly condemned what was going on and wrote a long letter detailing his objections.[12] In addition, he was very vocal in support of the Gaza settlers.[13] He is also the only one of our gedolim who is an expert in arcane areas such as grammar,[14] Masorah, and medieval Hebrew poetry.
In fact, since he is an expert in this latter field, I knew that I could ask him a question about which most other gedolim would probably have no clue what I was talking about. One doesn’t need to have read Steve Greenberg’s book, or have listened to some of the gay advocates speaking around the time of the recent Jerusalem parade, to know that man-boy love is a theme in a number of medieval Hebrew poems.[15] I raised this issue with R. Mazuz, and was pretty sure that he would answer the way he did:
חס וחלילה להאמין שחכמי ספרד כתבו שירים מענין משכב זכור. וראה בסוף ס’ תחכמוני שהביא עשרה שירים לקלל ולארר נבל אחד שכתב “לו שר בנו עמרם פני דודי” וכו’. צבי חן הוא כינוי לעלם יפה ואין בו כל דופי. חוקרי זמננו מהרהורי לבם ותעתועי רוחם כותבים מה שכותבים
(The reference to the Tahkemoni can be found in the Warsaw, 1899 edition, ed. Kaminka, pp. 430ff.)
R. Mazuz is also the final halakhic authority for the Tunisian community. With the death of R. Shalom Messas, chief rabbi of Jerusalem, I think that after R. Ovadiah, R. Mordechai Eliyahu and R. Shlomo Amar, R. Mazuz is the most important of the Sephardic rabbis in Israel. He is also very close to R. Ovadiah, who has had a long attachment to Kise Rahamim. The yeshiva is unique in that it focuses on the old Tunisian approach to the study of Talmud (the Tunisian iyyun), and from very young the students are taught to master the art of Hebrew writing [16] and to acquire wide-ranging knowledge of Tanach. We are clearly dealing with an unusual man and an unusal yeshiva. Returning again to the Chavel edition of the Ramban, I should mention that R. Mazuz is pretty harsh in his evaluation of it, and he lists a number of errors.[17]
When I first starting looking into the Thirteen Principles, I wondered how, in the Eighth Principle, Maimonides could insist on complete Mosaic authorship, and assert that denial of this equals heresy. After all, there is a view mentioned in the Talmud, and quoted by Rashi on chumash, that the last eight verses were written by Joshua. And yet, people were saying that since kelal Yisrael accepted the Ikkarim, this view must now be regarded as kefirah. I asked R. Mazuz about this and he replied:
ולענין שמנה פסוקים אחרונים ודאי האומר שכתבן יהושע אינו נחשב אפיקורוס ח”ו
I was also curious to know what he would say about study of the Ralbag’s Milhamot ha-Shem, which differs with Maimonides’ principles when it comes to creation ex nihilo and God’s knowledge of particulars.[18] He wrote to me as follows:
ודברי רלב”ג במלחמות ה’ ידועים. וזו היתה צרת הפילוסופיא היונית שלכדה ברשתה רבים וכן שלמים (כמו שלכד יצה”ר דע”ז בזמנו את מנשה בן חזקיה וחבירו ואפ”ה למדים מהם הלכה למעשה ע’ סנהדרין דף קב ע”ב). בס’ מלחמות ה’ אסור ללמוד רק מי שמילא כריסו ש”ס ופוסקים וצריך לעיין בו משהו לפי שעה. וכבר כינוהו הרב אברבנאל והיעב”ץ “מלחמותיו עם ה'” (ח”ו). אבל בפירושו על התנ”ך מותר ללמוד ויש בהם דברים נפלאים וחכמה עמוקה, אם כי לפעמים נטה מדרך היושר. וה’ הטוב יכפר בעדו
Throughout R. Mazuz’s writings, one finds interesting comments about the great medieval Jewish philosophers. Let me offer one such example.
In Guide 2:32 Maimonides speaks about the nature of prophecy and the prophet. One of the qualifications for a prophet is that he be intellectually advanced. Maimonides writes:
But with regard to one of the ignorant among the common people, this is not possible according to us – I mean, that He should turn one of them into a prophet – except as it is possible that He should turn an ass or a frog into a prophet.
Both Efodi and Shem Tov understand the last words as an allusion to Balaam’s ass and the fish that swallowed Jonah (and to whom God spoke), and understand both stories to have happened in dreams. Maimonides is, of course, explicit about the Balaam episode, and Efodi and Shem Tov see no difference between this and the Jonah story. Interestingly, Efodi says this elsewhere as well, but as Lawrence Kaplan has pointed out it was censored from the 19th century edition of the Guide that remains the standard edition (full details will be found in my forthcoming book). But the reason why that passage was censored was not because of the Jonah reference. After all, no less a figure than the Vilna Gaon saw the Jonah story as an allegory. The problem with the censored passage, and the reason it had to be taken out, was because there Efodi writes that according to the Rambam the Akedah also only happened in a dream.
According to R. Mazuz, Efodi and Shem Tov misunderstood Maimonides here, and if he was alluding to what they claim, he would have written fish, not frog. The key to understanding Maimonides are his words earlier in the chapter:
It is not possible that an ignoramus should turn into a prophet; nor can a man not be a prophet on a certain evening and be a prophet on the following morning, as though he had made some find.
In R. Mazuz’s opinion, this is a clear allusion to Muhammad, who according to Muslims was an illiterate man to whom Gabriel appeared and commanded “Read” (or “Proclaim”), and he was thus turned into a prophet. R. Mazuz concludes, “It is this sort of ‘prophet’ that Maimonides refers to as an ass or frog.”[19]
What does any of this have to do with Adon Olam? When I was using the siddur I began to study R. Mazuz’s notes (pp. 660ff.) to R. Yehudah ha-Levi’s piyyut Mi Kamokha, which Sephardim recite on Shabbat Zakhor. (For those who are Haim Sabato fans, this piyyut makes an appearance in ch. 10 of his recent book, Ke-Afapei Shahar) The first stanza of the alphabetical piyyut begins with the word אדון. On this word, R. Mazuz explains why the first letter has a kametz under it, and he contrasts that with אדון עולם אשר מלך, in which the aleph has a hataf patah since it is a construct, and means אדון של עולם.
When I saw this I was quite surprised, and upset, because here was R. Mazuz, whose knowledge of the ins and outs of the Hebrew language is perhaps unmatched except by a few specialists who spend their lives on this (while R. Mazuz’s forays into Hayyuj, Ibn Janach, and Radak’s Shorashim are as rakahot ve-tabahot to the study of Talmud and halakhah). Yet here he was explaining Adon Olam as Master of the World. I wrote to him asking why he assumed this is what it meant, especially as the piyyut as a whole seems to be speaking of Eternal Lord, the one who was here before the world and who will be here when the world ceases.
Although Adon Olam is a post-biblical prayer, as a side point I also noted that as far as I knew, the word עולם in Tanakh never means “world” (for which תבל is used) but always means ancient, eternal, eternity, or something along those lines. In fact, I was actually certain of this, and I had first heard this point twenty years ago when I was spent my junior year at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew Studies. I was fortunate to be able to study Biblical Hebrew, one-on-one, for an entire year with Professor Jeremy Hughes, author of Secrets of the Times: Myth and History in Biblical Chronology. Hughes was a strange combination of hippie and Bible scholar, and I learnt a great deal from him. I still remember my surprise at being told, when I used the word חזר in one of my exercises, that this is not a biblical Hebrew word, and I must use שב. He also pointed out the error in Weingreen’s Practical Grammar for Classical Hebrew, p. 110, which gives “world” as one of the translations of עולם. I wasn’t sure that he was correct, but a glance at the BDB confirmed his point.
A few weeks ago I received a letter from R. Mazuz, and well, let’s just say that I won’t be trying to impress people any more by pointing out that Artscroll has mistranslated Adon Olam. To begin with, R. Mazuz insists that Adon Olam is identical with Ribbono shel Olam. As for my point about “olam” never meaning “world” in the Bible, he writes:
זו דעת החוקרים האחרונים שעולם בתנ”ך פירושו נצח, אבל חז”ל לא הבינו כן
As proof for this he refers to Berakhot 54a
כל חותמי ברכות שבמקדש היו אומרים: עד העולם. משקלקלו הצדוקין ואמרו אין עולם אלא אחד התקינו שיהו אומרים מן העולם ועד העולם
At the conclusion of the benedictions said in the Temple they used at first to say simply, “forever.” When the Sadducees perverted their ways and asserted that there was only one world, it was ordained that the response should be “from world to world” [i.e., two worlds].
He also called attention to a passage in Sanhedrin 58b where the verse in Ps. 89:3, עולם חסד יבנה, is understood not as “forever is mercy built,” but as “the world shall be built up by grace.”
As I said, I am forced to conclude that in this case Artscroll gets a pass. What then is a Modern Orthodox intellectual to do? Anyone want to hear about Kalir?
Since everything with me seems to come back to the Thirteen Principles let me make one more point about Adon Olam. This time, I refer to the appearance of these words in Yigdal, and here there is no question that the words mean “Master of the Universe”. The passage reads
הנו אדון עולם לכל נוצר יורה גדולתו ומלכותו
Artscroll translates: “Behold! He is Master of the universe to every creature, He demonstrates His greatness and His sovereignty.” The translation is correct, but the problem is that this has nothing to do with the Fifth Principle. The Principle says that one cannot worship any other being but God (or use these beings as intermediaries to reach God). Because of this Birnbaum has the following in his siddur:
הנו אדון עולם וכל נוצר יורה גדולתו ומלכותו
By changing one letter, the stanza now agrees with the Principle. The problem here is that Birmbaum’s emendation, while it makes sense, is not actually a “version”. That is, there is no manuscript that reads as such. It is a speculative emendation. Abraham Berliner,[20] on the other hand, cites an actual variant text:
הנו אדון עולם וכל יוצר יודה גדולתו ומלכותו
The word יוצר is presumably a mistake for נוצר, although יודה makes sense. In fact, the Siddur ha-Meduyak offers וכל נוצר יודה as an alternate version for those who prefer that Yigdal actually correspond to the Principles.
2. Since I mentioned the Gaon נאמן ס”ט now is as good a time as ever to explain what the acronym ס”ט means. I am sure that even after what I write people will continue to err, but at least the yehidei segulah who make up the Seforim blog readership will know the truth, and will be ready offer a correction next time they hear someone refer to a ספרדי טהור.
Contrary to widespread belief ס”ט does not mean ספרדי טהור!! To be sure, you can find people today, even Sephardim, who will assert that this is what it means. But historically, it never meant this, and today, among the talmidei hakhamim who use it, this is not what it means.
How, you might be thinking, do I know this? The easiest answer is that the Hakham Zvi and R. Yaakov Emden both use the abbreviation, and neither of them were Sephardi. What it does show, however, is that the Hakham Zvi, who studied in Sephardic yeshivot and served as hakham to the Sephardic community in Sarajevo, adopted an abbreviation common in the Sephardic world. Those who study Sephardic works know that this is hardly the only example of an abbreviation which is not found in Ashkenazic works.
Furthermore, we have to ask what could the very expression ספרדי טהור mean? Presumably, it would refer to those who are not descended from Marranos. Yet we find that the abbreviation was used in an era before there was religious persecution in Spain. For example, R. David Abudarham, in the introduction to his work, attaches ס”ט to his name. Also, in Teshuvot R. Yehudah ben ha-Rosh, no. 75, two people sign with the abbreviation. What possible sense could ספרדי טהור have in early fourteenth century Spain, before the religious persecutions, not to mention in a place where everyone was Sephardic and there was no need to differentiate oneself from the uncultured Ashkenazim?
So what does ס”ט mean? Some have suggested that it stands for סין טין which is the Aramaic for רפש וטיט (Isaiah 57:20) and means mire and dirt. This would be like many other rabbinic expressions that show the author’s humility. H. J. Zimmels has correctly noted that “this explanation is not convincing as one would expect SvT = Sin ve-Tin (mire and dirt).[21] I would also add that while authors often use similar expressions – e.g., עפר ואפר – when referring to themselves, who ever heard of referring a great rabbi in such a way? It would be the height of disrespect, and yet we do find people writing to sages and attaching ס”ט to their names, showing that they didn’t have this explanation in mind.
Zimmels notes that Zunz already pointed out that the abbreviation stands for סופו טוב, which means, “may his end be good.”[22] It is also possible that the Aramaic סיפיה טב was intended.[23] This is parallel to the Ashkenazic שליט”א, the difference being that, unlike with ס”ט, no one adds שליט”א to his own name. R. Mazuz sums up the matter as follows (Or Torah [Tamuz 5733], no. 110):
ומכלל האמור תבין, שמה שכותבים כמה מאחינו האשכנזים (כגון בספר שם הגדולים וואלדען) על רבנים ספרדים ס”ט לאחר פטירתם, ויש אפילו הכותבים רב פלוני ס”ט זצ”ל, הכל טעות, ויסודו בפירוש המשובש הנ”ל ספרדי טהור, כאילו ישנה התנשאות הגזע לספרדים על אחיהם האשכנזים. ולפי הבאור הנכון “סיפי טב”, נמצא הכותב ס”ט זצ”ל ככותב שליט”א זצ”ל בנשימה אחת. ופשוט שגם “אשכנזי טהור” יכול לחתום ס”ט בלי שום פקפוק, כמו שחתמו הגאונים חכם צבי והיעב”ץ הנ”ל. ותשקוט הארש
(The last words are a play on the expression ותשקוט הארץ that appears a number of times in Tanakh. Its meaning here is that all speech or utterance will cease, i.e., there is no need for any more discussion or argument about the issue.[24])
If there are still any who have doubts, let me also quote the words of the great R. Shalom Messas, late Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem and unquestioned leader of the Moroccan community until his death a few years ago. In 2007 the fourth volume of his Shemesh u-Magen appeared. On p. 193 he writes:
הדבר פשוט וגם ברור אצלינו שהכוונה היא סיפיה טב, ר”ל שאחריתו יהיה טוב, ומעולם לא נתכוונו על ספרדי טהור כלל . . . ורק פירוש זה יצא מהמקנטרים שרוצים לעשות פירוד בין הספרדים לאשכנזים, ובאמת כל ישראל קדושים וטהורים הם בני אברהם יצחק ויעקב, אין ביניהם כמלא נימא
Now if only Yated Ne’eman and the haredi school systems in Israel would take these last words to heart![25]
Appendix 1
In my post responding to Rabbi Leff I elaborated on the fact that according to the Rambam the mezuzah does not provide any physical protection. Most Jews throughout history have disagreed with Maimonides, and a good example of this can be seen in the song my children learned in nursery school. The lyrics are as follows, and in the song each line is repeated twice.
I have a mezuzah
On my door
Now I will tell you
What it’s for
To protect us
Day and night
Kiss it when you enter
It’s on your right
This summer my three year-old came home from camp with the same song, but with different lyrics.
I have a mezuzah
On my door
Now I will tell you
What it’s for
To kiss it
That’s our aim
For on it is written
Hashem’s name
While the original manuscript of the song appears to be lost, I have no doubt that the first version is the original. The words in the second version are clumsy, and don’t fit the song very well. I therefore assume that the second version contains theologically-based textual emendations of the sort Geiger describes in his Urschrift. A critical edition of Jewish children’s songs remains a scholarly desideratum.
Appendix 2
When I asked R. Mazuz about his abbreviation ,נאמ”ן ס”ט he told me that in the book Rosh Mashbir by R. Berdugo one can find a number of examples of rabbis using such abbreviations. I haven’t yet looked through the book, but I did glance at the introduction by R. Yosef Messas. Messas was Chief Rabbi of Haifa, pride of the Moroccan rabbinate, and a great defender of R. Kook, yet unfortunately fate has destined him to be only remembered as the posek who permitted marrried women to go with uncovered hair and who permitted the use of electric hanukkah menoras. He ends his introduction to Rosh Mashbir with following words
עבד אל דוק וחוג אשש יוסף משאש ס”ט
This is a very unusual expression. I recalled that I had seen his cousin R. Shalom Messas also use it. In fact, I did a search on the various databases and other than these two, no one else signs his name this way, so it obviously was a family tradition..But what does it mean? In the search I turned up a comment by Shalom Albeck, in his edition of the Eshkol (the authentic Eshkol), p. 11 n. 9, who notes a piyyut by R. Yitzhak Ibn Ghiyat that begins
ברוך אשר אשש דוק וחוג בעשרה מאמרות
This piyyut was recited on Yom Kippur morning in North Africa, and we now know that the author was actually R. Joseph Ibn Avitur. But the question still remains, what do these words mean? Fortunately, R. Simeon ben Zemah Duran (the Tashbetz) wrote a commentary on this piyyut, and it has been published in a wonderful edition by Raphael Kohen (Jerusalem, 2002). Citing the relevant biblical texts upon which the words are based, Tashbetz explains the line as follow: “Blessed be he who established heaven and earth with ten utterances.”[26]
Thus, the Messas expression means “Servant of God, who established heaven and earth.”
Incidentally, Kohen, the editor of the Tashbetz’s commentary, is also the editor of R. Solomon ben Samuel’s Pithei Olam (Jerusalem, 2004). Kohen adds his own lengthy essay to this volume and it is of bibliographical interest in that it is probably the most vicious and insane attack of other scholars in the last hundred years (much worse than anything R. Shemariah Menasheh Adler wrote). When Kohen hates you, he says so openly. Thanks to him, we can even add two new acronyms to the Hebrew language. He adds the following after the names of all the distinguished scholars he despises (and it’s the final two acronyms that appear to be original to him).
שר”י ישו”ז תו”ע אל”ב
This means:
שם רשעים ירקב ימח שמו וזכרו תימקנה ותשחקנה עצמותיו אסור לעסוק בקבורתו

 

Notes:
[1] I had intended my next post to be part 2 of my discussion of Auerbach’s Eshkol. However, I still need a couple of books to complete it, so instead I decided to post this.

 

[2] For example see here.
[3] A number of years ago I attended a session at the American Academy of Religion annual conference. I am not ashamed to admit that I didn’t understand what they were talking about. I understood the words, but the sentences didn’t make any sense to me. It was a different language. Yet there was a woman sitting near me who kept making comments and referring to gnosis, but the problem was that she kept pronouncing the “g”. I didn’t hold that against her. You can certainly know what you are talking about and mispronounce a word, since if you have never heard it spoken, how are you supposed to know? And there are certainly many examples of people who pronounce a word perfectly, but don’t know what it means. I struggled with myself as to whether I should put a note in front of her, pointing out that the “g” is silent.. I decided not to, figuring that since she didn’t know she was mispronouncing it, she was not embarrassed, and over time she would learn. This is different than the case of the speaker some years ago who kept referring, in his talk on Hasidism, to the Zaddik, pronouncing the “z” as a “z”, not a “tz”.
[4] I was at an event where one such intellectual even referred to the Tao!
[5] The one quality history book – and it is a really fine piece of work – published by Artscroll is Eliyahu Klugman’s biography of Hirsch. But unfortunately, even he couldn’t be totally honest. Thus, we find the following on page 66: “Reb Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz, the first great Torah educator in America . . .” Is it possible that Klugman has never heard of Rabbi Bernard Revel and Yeshivas R. Yitzchak Elchanan? Regarding Mendlowitz, and the great respect he gets from the haredim, I have always assumed that they are unaware of his great love for the teachings of R. Kook. Listen to Menachem Mendlowitz, “The Complexity of Greatness: My Grandfather, Rav Shrage Feivel Mendlowitz” at Torah In Motion here.
R. Shraga also planned to open, together with R. Hutner, the American Hebrew Theological University. This is discussed in Helmreich’s World of the Yeshiva. This institution would have been just like Lander College. For a relevant source which, as far as I know, has gone unnoticed, see Otzrot Yerushalayim (5741), no. 601. Here we find that Mendlowitz wanted the Mir Yeshiva in New York to institute secular studies. (The author of this report, R. Moshe Yehudah Blau, was the world’s greatest editor of rishonim from manuscript, long before this became fashionable.)
[6] It is easy to see why the Artscroll siddur replaced the Birnbaum. It is simply better, i.e., much more complete (although I wonder who gave them the crazy idea to put the English in italics). But I am not sure what makes the Artscroll chumash “better” than Hertz. It is different, to be sure, but I think that a typical Modern Orthodox congregation would still be well-served by Hertz, if not exclusively, certainly in addition to Artscroll. I don’t understand why all the Hertz chumashim were carted away, never to be seen again. The RCA chose to make the Artscroll siddur its siddur (adding in the prayers for the government, the State of Israel, and the IDF). The fact that the first RCA siddur, edited by De Sola Pool and published in 1960, never achieved lasting popularity, and Artscroll was willing to put aside its anti-Zionist ideology when presented with the possibility of selling hundreds of thousands of siddurim, no doubt influenced the RCA to go with a tried and true product. (I understand Arscroll leaving out the prayer for Israel, but how did the haredi community come to the view that the prayer for the government is not “frum”.and thus is neither recited nor included in the siddur?). The RCA’s reluctance to actually produce a new siddur on their own was probably influenced by the controversy that ensued when their first siddur was released. This siddur was banned by Agudas ha-Rabbanim. One of the reasons was that the Song of Songs appeared with a literal translation, and this no doubt helps explain Artscroll’s method of translation of this text. For details on the ban, see see Ha-Pardes, Feb. 1961.
Let me also note that in his 1987 introduction to the RCA Artscroll siddur, RCA president Rabbi Milton Polin wrote about the original De Sola Pool RCA Siddur, that it “has been reprinted many times since its original publication and continues in use in most large Orthodox congregations.” I don’t believe the last part of this sentence is correct. In fact, even if there were some large congregations that used the original RCA siddur as the “official” shul siddur, Birnbaum certainly outnumbered De Sola Pool 10-1 in this respect.
[7] See R. Menashe Klein, Shanu Hakhamim bi-Leshon ha-Mishnah (Brooklyn, 1994), p. 108.
[8] No one has yet written about the great influence of Artscroll in influencing prayer in the English-speaking world. Let me offer an example that everyone can observe during the coming holidays. When I was growing up, during Hallel everyone sung Hodu, Yomar Na, etc. together with the chazan. That was the minhag although I don’t know if it was a minhag of long standing. The Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 422:3 says that with regard to how these verses are recited – and he assumes that they will be done responsively – כל מקום כפי מנהגו. The fact that the Mishneh Berurah points out that they are supposed to be recited responsively was ignored, much like on Rosh Hashanah there are piyyutim which the machzor says should be recited responsively but are sung together, or like Yigdal or Anim Zemirot which are sometimes recited together rather than responsively. Yet today this practice of singing Hodu, etc. together with the chazan has almost completely disappeared from the American scene, and if you do try to sing along, you will often be the only one doing so and will probably get dirty looks. In the last twenty years, what has happened is that the chazan recites the verse, and the congregation is quiet and responds Hodu and then reads the next verse. Sometimes the congregation sings the Hodu response and sometimes not, but they never sing the other verses. How did the practice change? It was a direct result of the Artscroll siddur which tells people that only the chazan recites the verse and the congregation responds.
Minhagim have a funny way of starting. In my shul, for some reason, the chazan does not recite Mussaf from the middle bimah, but from the front of the shul. I am told that this is a Hungarian practice. No one I have asked seems to know how this started, and the synagogue is less than 10 years old. Currently, I am watching a minhag develop before my eyes. A couple of years ago I noticed that people were reading the Haftorah from the side of the bimah. If I’m not mistaken this is a hasidic practice. In any event, when this first started it was only one or two people who did so, Now, virtually everyone who comes up does so, no doubt thinking that this is the halakhah and they don’t want to do something incorrect. In another year, it might even be possible to declare that the minhag of the shul is to read from the side. There are many more examples of this I can give. Let me conclude with a story of one shul that refused to be run over by Artscroll. The year was 2001 and on Shabbat morning I was davening at the Rydniker Shtiebl on the Upper West Side which was across the street from my apartment. The late Rabbi Orenstein, who had studied in Kamenitz before the war, was the rav. It was one of those Shabboses where there is some confusion as to which Haftorah is read. Rabbi Orenstein told the reader what he should do, and someone called out that Artscroll says that we should read a different haftorah. Dr. David Diamond stood up, banged his hand on the bimah, and very sternly declared: “In this shul we have a rav, and we follow what he tells us to do. Artscroll is not the rav and Artscroll does not tell us which Haftorah to read!” With that he sat down, and never again did anyone dare ask a “kasha” on the Rav from Artscroll.
[9] R. Mazuz told me that the acronym stands for נאם מאיר נסים. He also informed me that he was following in the path of Moroccan sages who signed with acronyms, such as
המרבי”ץ (מרדכי בן יוסף [בירדוגו]), יעב”ץ (יעקב בן צור), משבי”ר – משה בירדוגו
[10] Unfortunately, the newest editions of the siddur do not include his lengthy essay in which he justifies his emendations.
[11] See here.
[12] See the volume Ve-Al Titosh Torat Imekha (n.p., n.d).
[13] See here.
[14] He has a number of notes in the new edition of R. Elijah Bahur’s Tishbi. Dan Rabinowitz wrote about this edition here. After seeing what R. Mazuz wrote about the proper way to pronounce the Kaddish (see Or Torah (5750), pp. 747, 875), I abandoned my practice of Yitgadel and returned to the the time-honored Yitgadal. See Dan Rabinowitz’ review of the evidence, here.
[15] Unless I missed something, I didn’t see any of the gay advocates mention that R. Hayyim Vital recorded the accusation of a dybbuk that when drunk, R. Israel Najara would engage in homosexual behavior. This passage was censored in a recent publication, as noted by Dan Rabinowitz. See here.
[16] Recently, one of the students, R. Ovadiah Hen, published the book Ha-Ketav ve-ha-Mikhtav which attempts to bring this to the Torah world. One interesting thing he notes is that one should not write עיין ברמב”ם. Instead, one should write
עיין להרמב”ם
[17] See his introduction to R. Hayyim Amsellem, Minhat Hayyim, (Sharsheret, 1986), vol. 2. Chavel’s error cited above was first noted by R. Mazuz here.
[18] Regarding Ralbag, this comment is addressed to the few guys I was speaking to in Teaneck a few weeks ago (whose names I can’t recall and who are probably reading this). I mentioned that in my next posting I would give another example of Ralbag differing with the Thirteen Principles that I only recently found. I was referring to prophets equalling Moses during the Messianic era. However, I misspoke. Ralbag’s oppositon to Maimonides, in that he thinks the Messiah will be a superior prophet to Moses, is mentioned in my book. What I meant to say was not Ralbag, but Radak. In his commentary to Joel 3:1, in speaking of the great spirit of prophecy that will come upon people in Messianic days, Radak writes of the possibility that among these people (including women!) there may be some who will equal Moses.
והבנים והבנות יתנבאו בנערותם כמו שמואל הנביא והנבואה תהיה להם במראה החלום כמו שאמר חלומות חזיונות, וכן היתה נבואת רוב הנביאים, כמו שאמר אם יהיה נביאכם ה’ במראה אליו אתודע בחלום אדבר בו, וכן יהיו בהם מעלות זה למעלה מזה כמו שהיו בנביאים שעברו עד שאולי יהיה בהם כמשה רבינו ע”ה
[19] Kovetz Ma’amarim (Bnei Brak, 2003), p. 270. This example is not noted by Yehuda Shamir, “Allusions to Muhammad in Maimonides’ Theory of Prophecy in His Guide of the Perplexed,” JQR 64 (1975), pp. 212-224.
[20] Ketavim Nivharim (Jerusalem, 1969), vol. 1, p. 20.
[21] Ashkenazim and Sephardim (London, 1976), additional note to p. 286.
[22] Ibid., p. 287.
[23] For those who want more information on this topic, R. Shlomo Yitzchaki has written the most detailed study to date. See “Be-Inyan Roshei Tevot S”T,” Or ha-Ma’arav (Adar-Nisan, 5750), pp. 39-56.
[24] In a few weeks, in shaharit of Yom Kippur, we will recite the piyyut אדר יקר, the first line of which reads: אחוה בארש מלולי
[25] Lest people think that when it comes to Sephardi-Ashkenazi relations it is only the latter who have behaved in an improper manner, let me quote some interesting historical tidbits from Zimmels, Ashkenazim and Sephardim, p. 62:
In the year 1766 the Sephardi congrgation in London passed a law forbidding a Sephardi to marry an Ashkenazith and stipulated that the wife or widow could not obtain any relief from the ‘Zedakah’ (charity). Moreover, in the year 1772 a Sephardi asked the permission of the ‘Maamad’ to marry a “Tudesca’ but was refused, and in the Sephardi Synagogues in Amsterdam and London the Ashkenazim were prevented by wooden barriers from proceeding beyond the place permitted to them.
However, I have not yet found any sources in which Sephardim claim that Ashkenazim smell (Yated’s latest outrage, this time said about the Yemenites). It appears to me that the greatest social achievement of the religious Zionist movement in Israel has been the complete breakdown of the Ashkenazi-Sephardic divide.
[26] See also R. Abraham Ibn Ezra, Diwan, ed. Egers (Berlin 1886), p. 109: דוק וחוג התרועעו ממזרח ומים



Marc B. Shapiro – Forgery and the Halakhic Process

Forgery and the Halakhic Process
by Marc B. Shapiro


What is the role of academic learning in the determination of halakhah? In particular, I am referring to knowledge which is not available to the posek and which would affect his halakhic decision. This is, of course, a wide-ranging issue of which I will only discuss one aspect here, that relating to forgery. However, since the issue of the Mosaic text and R. Moshe Feinstein is relevant here, and I mentioned both of them in my last posting, let me make a few brief preliminary comments on this.


In The Limits of Orthodox Theology I quoted the following comment of R. Bezalel Naor, who was quoting his teacher, the Gaon R. Shlomo Fisher of Jerusalem: “The truth, known to Torah scholars, is that Maimonides’ formulation of the tenets of Jewish belief is far from universally accepted.” For those who don’t know, R. Fisher is one of the gedolim of our time, and you can see many of his shiurim on yeshiva.org.il. Many of these shiurim focus on Talmud (and he has published the great rabbinic work, Beit Yishai), but R. Fisher is also the only one of our gedolim who is an expert in Jewish philosophy. This explains why his Derashot Beit Yishai are very different than other collections of derashot. Professor Zev Harvey told me that from R. Fisher’s edition of Crescas’ Or ha-Shem, it is clear that he used Wolfson’s Hebrew text found in Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle.[1]

Someone I know currently attends R. Fisher’s weekly shiur on Avnei Miluim, the last half-hour of which is devoted to issues of hashkafah. Interestingly enough, he reported to me that a few weeks ago R. Fisher declared that he believes the Rambam abandoned his system of 13 Principles, the proof being that they are never mentioned as a unit in the Mishneh Torah.[2] In my book, I noted that R. Shlomo Goren held the same view. R. Goren also makes another interesting point, that while in the Commentary on the Mishnah Maimonides requires one to actually believe in certain principles, in the Mishneh Torah he only requires you not to deny any principles. One who has never heard of a principle obviously does not believe in it, which makes him a heretic according to the Commentary on the Mishnah. But according to the Mishneh Torah, since this person does not actually deny the principle, he is not regarded as a heretic.


Getting back to R. Moshe, as is well known, he ruled that the Commentary of R. Yehudah he-Hasid was a forgery, as he could not imagine that a rishon would acknowledge that there were some post-Mosaic passages in the Torah.[3] Only after my book appeared did Rabbi Naor tell me that the comment I quoted above in the name of R. Fisher was stated precisely with reference to R. Moshe’s positon on this issue. After R. Moshe banned R. Yehudah he-Hasid’s Commentary, R. Fisher commented that R. Moshe assumes that R. Yehudah he-Hasid has to accept the Rambam’s Principles, but in truth there were many disagreements with the Rambam, and R. Yehudah he-Hasid’s position on Mosaic authorship is one of them.

Along these lines, I read a recent shiur by R. Moshe Zuriel, a well-known baal machashavah in which he affirmed that all must accept the Thirteen Principles. I wrote to him asking what he would say about those who accepted the views of sages who disagreed with the Rambam, and I specifically referred to Ibn Ezra’s (exoteric) position that the last twelve verses were written by Joshua, which is a rejection of Maimonides’ insistence in the Eighth Principle that the entire Torah is Mosaic. He replied (emphasis added):

ודאי אני מודה שהסומך על ראב”ע (או אברבנאל וכיו”ב) ביחס לפסוקים הנוספים, איננו
נחשב לכופר, והוא נחשב ישראל . . . וכן כל דבר שיש מחלוקת ראשונים
In fact, in addition to the sources I cited in my book, Ralbag also says something interesting in this regard. Joshua 24:6 states:
ויכתב יהושע את הדברים האלה בספר תורת א-להים
Regarding this verse, the Talmud records a view that the reference is to the last eight verses of the Torah. But Ralbag explains it as referring to different verses:

ויכרת יהושע ברית לעם: על זה להיותם עובדים את ה’ ולהשאיר זכר לזה המעשה למען יבושו ישראל אם יסורו מאחרי ה’ כתב יהושע את הדברים האלה בספר תורת הא-להים

Another relevant source, which I also recently found, is R. Solomon David Sassoon, who wrote as follows (Natan Hokhmah li-Shelomo, p. 106; emphasis in original):

הדגש הוא על מה שאומר כי משה אמר זה מפי עצמו, אבל אם יאמר פסוקים אלה נביא אחר כתב אותם מפי הגבורה ומודה שקטע זה הוא מן השמים ומפי הגבורה, אדם שאומר כך אינו נקרא אפיקורוס, מה שהגדיר אותו כאפיקורוס אינו זה שאמר שלא משה כתב את הקטע אלא בזה שהוא אומר שדבר שזה מדעתו ומפי עצמו אמרו ושאין זה מן השמים

According to R. Sassoon, one who believes that parts of the Torah were written by a post-Mosaic prophet is not a heretic. (In another post I might speak more about the great R. Sassoon and his unique family.)

One of the strange passages in R. Yehudah he-Hasid’s Commentary is his assertion that the Hallel ha-Gadol (Psalm 136) was originally part of the Pentateuch and was later removed by David and placed in the Book of Psalms. In my book I note that this idea is also found in both R. Avigdor Katz (a rishon) and R. Menahem Zioni. I wrote: “Apparently, there was some tradition regarding this verse, the source and nature of which is unknown.” After my book appeared, R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer published his Hadar Yaakov, vol. 1. On page 39, he notes that in two works of R. Eleazer ben Judah of Worms (the Rokeah), he mentions that Hallel ha-Gadol was recited by the Israelites at the Red Sea, a notion that is not found in extant rabbinic literature. (In Pesahim 117a it states that they recited the regular Hallel.) In R. Eleazar’s Siddur, p. 214, he cites Seder Olam as the source for this tradition. The editors refer the reader to Seder Olam Rabbah, yet nothing relevant appears there. Either R. Eleazar had a different version or he was referring to another book with this title. What is important for our purposes is that this tradition ties in with what is quoted by R. Yehudah he-Hasid and R. Avigdor Katz, even though the Rokeah doesn’t mention anything about this section being removed by David. Hopefully, more research into the writings of Ashkenazic rishonim will further illuminate matters.

Let me now speak of another issue, not of falsely ascribing forgery where there is none, but accepting as authentic that which is actually a forgery. The classic example is, of course, Besamim Rosh. There is no doubt that the volume is a forgery. There are those who have believed that at least some of the responsa are authentic, but it is more likely that the non-controversial material is a smokescreen for the controversial responsa. I plan to write an article about Besamim Rosh so I will not now reveal an internal proof, arrived at by use of a computer, that the book is a forgery. In an earlier article, I called attention to the fact that the Besamim Rosh assumes that a suicide has no share in the world to come, which is a popular 18th century conception, but not found among Ashkenazic or Sephardic rishonim.[4]

There is a talmid hakham, Rabbi Reuven Amar, who republished the Besamim Rosh and argues in his introduction that Saul Berlin was one of the gedolim. For all of his talmudic learning, Amar is very ignorant in this matter. He knows nothing about the history of Berlin and his haskalah ties. If he did, he would not have wanted to defend him. Yet Amar did know that many halakhic authorities quoted the Besamim Rosh, and he therefore wanted to turn it into a kosher book.

The problem Amar was faced with is what concerns me. What is one supposed to do with pesakim that rely on the Besamim Rosh? Fortunately, there can’t be many. In fact, offhand, I don’t know of any responsum in which a decision is based entirely, or even heavily, on Besamim Rosh, so that if you took this work away the decision would fall.

However, this is not the case with another forgery, as here the forgery is cited by all halakhic authorities of the last 140 years. I am referring to the Sefer ha-Eshkol, attributed to Rabbi Abraham ben Isaac. It was published by Rabbi Zvi Benjamin Auerbach (1808-1878), one of the leading German rabbis of his time. He was also the most prominent member of the famous Auerbach rabbinic family, which together with the Bamberger and Carlebach families (the ABCs, as they were known) were the most prominent rabbinic families in Germany.

According to Auerbach, his Sefer ha-Eshkol came from a Spanish manuscript. The work quickly became popular among scholars and was adorned with Auerbach’s commentary Nahal Eshkol, which is a mine of rabbinic knowledge. It came as quite a shock when in 1909, many years after Auerbach had died, the great scholar R. Shalom Albeck accused him of having invented the story of the Spanish manuscript in order to enable him to forge the work. This accusation aroused a great storm and four of the leading Orthodox scholars – David Zvi Hoffmann, Abraham Berliner, Jacob Schor, and Hanokh Ehrentreau – rushed to defend Auerbach, publishing the booklet Tzidkat ha-Tzadik (Berlin, 1910).

It is obvious that Auerbach’s defenders never gave Albeck’s charge any serious consideration. In their eyes, the fact that Auerbach was universally regarded as a tzadik, as well as one of the gedolim of Germany, rendered the accusation invalid from the start. There was no way they could impartially consider the evidence. In their mind they knew that for a pious Jew, some things are just impossible. Albeck responded to Tzidkat ha-Tzadik with the booklet Kofer ha-Eshkol (Warsaw, 1911), which explains how Albeck knew that the work is a forgery. In discussing the dispute between the four scholars on one side, and Albeck on the other, R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin[5] showed which side he was on.


אחד מול ארבעה – וההרגשה היא, שהנצחון לצדו של האחד

As far as I know, every academic scholar who has examined the evidence has concluded that Albeck is correct, and Auerbach’s Sefer ha-Eshkol is a forgery. This is so despite the defense of Auerbach by Issachar Dov (Bernard) Bergman in his essay in the Joshua Finkel Festschrift (New York, 1974;[6] it also appears in Sefer ha-Eshkol, vol. 4 [Jerusalem, 1986]).[7]

Needless to say, the supposed Spanish manuscript has never been found. In the words of Prof. Haym Soloveitchik, “Auerbach’s Eshkol appears as a clear forgery, incorporating arguments found in sixteenth, seventeenth, and even eightennth-century writings. . . . [The work] should not be used for historical purposes.[8] For this reason, I criticized Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar for citing Auerbach’s Eshkol in their Giyur u-Zehut Yehudit.[9] R. Bezalel Naor writes:
I was told the following anecdote by Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein. Licthenstein’s father-in-law, Rabbi Joseph Baer Soloveitchik (of Boston) expressed to Rabbi [Hayyim] Heller his amazement that the same obscure opinion of Mordecai in Niddah was to be found in the Eshkol, to which his mentor Hayyim Heller responded: “That is all?! You can find in Auerbach’s Eshkol a peckel Peri Megadims.” (Yiddish, a pack of Peri Megadim). . . . Prof. S.Z. Leiman informs me he found other irregularities in Auerbach’s historical works.”[10]
The late Prof. Israel M. Ta-Shma assumed that Auerbach’s Eshkol is a fourteenth-century forgery that he innocently published.[11] In discussing the issue, Ta-Shma makes the following incredible statement:

לדעתי עשה זאת משה די ליאון, וכך שמעתי גם מפי חברי פרופ’ י. זוסמן

De Leon is commonly said to have died in 1305, so unless the forgery was done at the very end of his life, we would be dealing with a 13th century forgery. In his Ha-Nigleh she-ba-Nistar, p. 144 n. 203, Ta Shma indeed writes

ויש רגליים לדבר כי זיופו, במגמה לקרבו לספר הזהר ותכניו, נעשה כבר במאה הי”ג

Yet Ta-Shma’s assumption doesn’t take into account that Auerbach’s Eshkol almost certainly contains material from later centuries. Furthermore, Ta-Shma ignored the well-founded assumption Auerbach forged other documents. According to Moshe Samet, some of Auerbach’s forgeries were actually designed to further a Neo-Orthodox agenda.[12] (It is well known that people who forge rarely do so once. Rather, seeing that they got away with it, they continue in this path, getting some sort of perverse pleasure from fooling the world.)

In Mordechai Breuer’s Modernity Within Tradition, p. 202, in discussing Orthodox scholarship and how it was often not rated highly by others because of its binding preconceptions, he writes:

One such example was the attempt of some scholars, especially R. Kirchheim in Frankfurt and Schalom Albeck in Poland, to expose the chief scholarly work of the late Rabbi B.H. Auerbach of Halberstadt (Ha-Eshkol, with commentary and notes, Nahal Eshkol, Halberstadt, 1861), as a plagiarism and a forgery. In spite of certain discrepancies in Auerbach’s work, this attempt failed after his defenders could prove that the attacks had not been free of prejudice.

In Between The Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy, p. 77 n. 8, I responded to this as follows:

Breuer seems to be mistaken in pointing to the dispute over the authenticity of B. H. Auerbach’s edition of the Eshkol as an example of this phenomenon [i.e., Orthodox scholarship being looked down on]. To begin with, the main assault on Auerbach was led by Shalom Albeck (1858-1920), himself an Orthodox Jew. Secondly, this dispute had nothing to do with dogma interfering with scholarship, but was simply a question of whether Auerbach had forged the text. Finally, it is not so clear that Albeck’s attempt failed, as Breuer would have it. On the contrary, the authenticity of Auerbach’s edition is still highly questionable.
When I wrote this paragraph I didn’t want to appear disrespectful to Prof. Breuer, which is why I used soft language. In truth, as far as scholars of medieval halakhic literature are concerned, Albeck was entirely successful. As I note above, the attack of Albeck on Auerbach had nothing to do with the sort of “Orthodox scholarship” Breuer was referrring to, and which was subject to criticism by non-Orthodox scholars. Albeck wasn’t attacking Auerbach because of his supposed Orthodox close-mindedness.

Yet the point Breuer makes actually has relevance to another aspect of this dispute, and here I refer to the defense of Auerbach by the four scholars. Here we do find dogma of a sort, since they make it clear in their defense that the whole accusation is ipso facto invalid, and they even cite the Rambam, Commentary to Avot 1:6, that if you see a tzaddik do something that looks like a sin, you must assume that there is a reasonable explanation, even if it is very far-fetched.

Albeck’s response to this is that the Rambam is referring to a tzaddik who commits a sin between him and God, but not someone who


מתעה את לבות גדולי ישראל מורי ההלכה ודורשי החכמה, ודאי מצוה וחובה על כל איש המכיר בו, להוציא את בלעו מפיו, למען יהיה לאות לבני מרי, ולא יוסיפו לחלל ש”ש ולזייף את התורה

The issue mentioned by Albeck, that of the poskim being misled by a forgery, is what I would now like to raise. What is one to do if one sees that a posek has decided a halakhah based on the forged Eshkol? Is this person obligated to reject the pesak, or can he rely on the authority of the posek, even though the posek himself was misled. This obviously has implications for the use of the Zohar in pesak as well, as the poskim regard it as a tannaitic work. Yet I think everyone outside of the haredi community who has studied the issue assumes that it is a medieval work.

Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg raised a similar concern with regard to the Shulhan Arukh. There are certain halakhot which are based on false readings. He wondered if in a case like this we have to establish a new halakhah, or since we have accepted the Shulhan Arukh’s ruling we don’t change the halakhah but rather find a different justification for it.

Some might also see some connection with another position of R. Weinberg. As I noted in my book. R. Tam’s states that sex with a Gentile does not cause a woman to become forbidden to her husband. R. Weinberg had ethical problems with the reason R. Tam gives, and I don’t think it goes too far to say that he thought that, from our modern perspective, R. Tam’s justification is to be regarded as immoral.[13] Yet I also note that in seeking to find a heter for a woman who committed adultery with a non-Jew to return to her husband he is prepared to make use of R. Tam’s position.[14] I don’t think this raises any problems, since at the end of the day, R. Tam’s position is part of the halakhic tradition. If it can be used to to reach a lenient decision, then it serves a purpose, even if the contemporary posek doesn’t agree with the underlying assumptions of R. Tam’s pesak (Parallel to this is the widely accepted view that there is nothing wrong with using information derived from Nazi experiments on humans if it can help people. Obviously, everyone agrees that the experiments should never have been carried out, but once they were, the information can be used) As I said, I don’t see this as problematic, but I mention it since some might see it as an inconsistency in R. Weinberg.

An example which is more directly relevant is the following. In June of this year Prof. David Berger gave a presentation at Yeshivat Chovevei Torah on Jewish views of Christianity (as well as how to relate to Chabad). In his discussion of Christianity he explained the concept of shittuf, first mentioned by the Tosafists, and how in its original meaning it did not mean that non-Jews are permitted to believe in one God divided into different parts. Those who want the details on this can see Katz’ discussion in Exclusiveness and Tolerance. Katz was the first academic scholar to point to what he regarded as the common misinterpretation of the Tosafot. In addition, a number of poskim have concluded similarly, most notably the son of the Noda bi-Yehudah, whose responsum was published in his father’s work.

In my response to Berger I asked the following question (addressing myself to him):

You are certain that the common understanding of Tosafot is mistaken. Yet this understanding became the standard for poskim in Western Europe. It is also shared by the Rama. Do you feel that there is anything wrong with someone who agrees with you as to the historical truth nevertheless relying on those poskim who misinterpreted the Tosafot? In other words, do the decisions of the poskim based on Tosafot have independent validity even if their interpretation of Tosafot is incorrect?[15a]
Prof. Berger replied that he did not regard as illegitimate to rely on a pesak even if from the standpoint of historical scholarship, the pesak is incorrect. In the case we were discussing, one could legitimately rely on heterim which are based on the notion that according to Tosafot Gentiles are not obligated in shittuf, even though from a historical, i.e., factual perspective, Tosafot never said this. Historical truth and halakhic pesak thus occupy different realms.

While I understand Berger’s point, I think some reading this might be very uncomfortable with such a notion, namely, that one can have a historical truth and a halakhic truth, with the two being at odds with each other; or to put it another way, that a halakhic truth can be based on a historical error and yet still have validity. This brings us dangerously close to the old Latin Averroist notion of “double truth.” [15b]


Returning to Auerbach’s Eshkol, I am aware of only one posek who has refused to grant it any validity, and I daresay that the overwhelming majority of poskim are not even aware that it has been subject to controversy. The posek I am referring to is Rabbi Yitzhak Ratsaby. For those who don’t know, R. Ratsaby is one of the leading – if not the leadiing – Yemenite posek in Israel. He is an incredible scholar whose many works are particularly valuable as he records a variety of Yemenite practices and quotes from relatively unknown Yemenite writings, including from manuscript. He comes from the Kabbalah-friendly Yemenites, as uses the appellation of אחר in referring to R. Joseph Kafih. [16] Reflecting the typical haredi outlook, when he needs to refer to R. Kook, he writes “הרא”ק.” Doing so denies R. Kook the rabbinic titles given other great rabbis, and also spares haredi eyes from even seeing the name “Kook” in print.[17] Most haredi readers won’t even recognize who he is referring to. This is particularly unfortunate as it was R. Kook who stood together with many of the great Yemenite rabbis in opposing R. Yihye Kafih’s anti-Kabbalah stand. In Emunat ha-Shem, the volume published against R. Yihye Kafih, R. Kook’s two letters appear at the beginning. R. Kook is referred to as

רבנו הכהן הגדול נר ישראל וקדושו גדול הדור ונזרו מרן

R. Ratsaby is an example of how Ashkenazic haredi extremism and close-mindedness has also influenced those who do not come from this tradition.

Despite this flaw, there are many very interesting things in his works. Because my last post dealt with issues of dogma, let me refer to what R. Ratsaby states in Olat Yitzhak vol. 2 no. 259. He refers to the list of 24 heretics with no share in the world to come, enumerated by Rambam in Hilkhot Teshuvah, ch. 3. Among those are people who say there is no God, or there is more than one god – in other words, classic heretics. But according to R. Ratsaby, even though these people are heretics with no share in the world to come, that doesn’t mean that they can’t fulfill someone else’s religious obligation. As R. Ratsaby puts it

אפילו אותן עשרים וארבעה והנוספים עליהם שברור ומוסכם שאין להן חלק לעוה”ב, לא שמענו שאינן מוציאין אחרים ידי חובתן בברכות וכיוצא בזה, דסוף סוף הוא מחוייב בדבר וכל המחוייב מוציא יד”ח

R. Ratsaby is not referring to allowing such a person to daven for the amud, for which someone must be a proper Jew. Rather, he is speaking of the halakhah per se, i.e., if a heretic can be motzi someone else. I think the instinctive response of people would be that, of course, someone who is a heretic cannot be motzi someone else, and R. Moshe Feinstein states so explicitly. R. Ratsaby removes the issue from one of belief, and instead focuses on the obligation.which all Jews share.

In this same teshuvah, R. Ratsaby also points out something else quite interesting. Following the list of the twenty four who have no share in the world to come, Rambam gives a list of another group who, if they persist in certain evil actions (e.g., embarrassing someone in public, shaming scholars, etc.) also have no share in the world to come. He quotes R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam (hiddushim at the beginning of Ma’aseh Rakah) who cites his father as explaining that the way this works is that someone who is accustomed to do such bad things things will, almost of necessity, not be inclined to do what needs to be done to achieve immortality. In fact, it is much more likely that he will be led to those sins that really do deprive you of the world to come. But one should not take what Rambam writes literally, namely, that these sins by themselves cause one to lose his share in the world to come.


Returning to the Eshkol, many years ago I was studying R. Ratsaby’s Olat Yitzhak, vol. 1, and on page 410 I came across the following:

לענ”ד אין לחוש לדברים מחודשים שבספר זה שהוא בחשש גדול של זיוף, ואין להכחיש מה שהלב מרגיש

I found this quite amazing, since I knew of no other posek that recognized what modern scholars had determined. I was curious if he came to this on his own or had read Albeck’s pamphlet. He replied to me on 13 Iyar 5750


חשד הזיוף אצלי הוא מתוך העיון בדברים החדשים שם בקרב הראשונים ולקוחים מדברי אחרים (מה שראיתי דר”כ [=דרך כלל] היה לקוח מהבית יוסף) וגם הסגנון, שחנני השי”ת להכיר כזאת בטביעות-עין והלואי שאני טועה, אבל רחוק בעיניי מלצרפו עכ”פ לענין הלכה. ספר כופר האשכול לא בא לידי


I wrote back to him asking why, if he regards Auerbach as a forger, does he cite the Nahal Eshkol. He replied

נחל אשכול שאני מביא על אף החשד שלי נגד ספר האשכול גופו משום שאין לפסול גוף הדברים אם הם ניתנים להאמר מצד עצמם, רק לא לסמוך על ספר האשכול כמשקל בהכרעה בהלכה

R. Ovadiah Yosef offers the same justification in his haskamah to Amar’s 1983 edition of Besamim Rosh

חרף הביקורת שנמתחה על הספר “בשמים ראש”, במילי מעלייתא דאית ביה דרשינן

The last words come from Sanhedrin 100b, where R. Joseph says about the book of Ben Sira, “we may expound the good things it contains.” It would seem that using this logic, there can be no objection to studying the talmudic commentaries and halakhic writings of non-Orthodox rabbis, since one might find there a good argument or explanation of the sources. After all, Saul Berlin, the forger of Besamim Rosh, was a subversive, trying to destroy traditional Judaism from within. This makes him much worse than the typical Reform rabbi who has nothing to do with the Orthodox.


The summer is fast coming to an end, and with it, my free time to write things like this. But I have a number of other examples of forgery which I might post here, if people are interested (I am saving my examples of censorship for the book which I am hard at work on). Many people have told me that they like my “derekh agavs,” so I threw a lot of them in here, and I apologize to those who don’t like the many tangents.


Appendix


Since I don’t know when I will have a chance to write a new introduction to my book, and it is once again in the news with Rabbi Leff’s review, let me quote the following passages from R. Kook’s Shemonah Kevatzim 1:30-31 (I hope that R. Kook is still an acceptable authority for Jewish Action). Two important things stand out. First, while not condoning orthopraxy, R. Kook states that one who is observant, despite the fact that he denies ikkarim, is to be regarded as an erring Jew, not as a heretic. R. Kook’s position is a complete rejection of the idea that people who are shomrei Torah u-mitzvot can be read out of the fold and be regarded as heretics because of their incorrect beliefs. The second important point is that he rejects the Rambam’s entire theological conception of Principles of Faith and alligns himself with the Ra’avad, showing once again that the Rambam’s position has not attained unanimity.

אף על פי שהטעות בדברים האלהיים הוא דבר מזיק עד מאוד, מכל מקום אין עיקר ההיזק הנמשך מהמושגים המשובשים יוצא אל הפועל, עד כדי להמית את בעליו מיתת נשמה, רק כשהוא מתגלם במעשים, או לפחות כשהוא יורד לתוך דעות ורגשות כאלה שסופן מוכרח להתגלות במעשים. אבל כל זמן שהדבר עומד בצורתו המופשטת, אין כאן עקירה עקרית
ובזה הננו קרובים לסברת הראב”ד, שהשיג על הרמב”ם במה שקרא למי שמאמין ההגשמה באלהות מין. ונוכל להסכים, שכל זמן שאותו המגשם לא יעשה לו פסל ותמונה, הרי לא גמר את מחשבתו, ונשארה היא עדיין בחוג הרוח שלא תוכל להיות נכללת בשם עקירה ויציאה מן הדת

In a wide-ranging article which deals among other things with R. Kook’s view of heresy, the important scholar R Yoel Bin Nun[19] explains why R. Kook rejected the Rambam’s approach to heresy. R. Bin Nun also states that if you take what the Rambam says seriously, the Rambam himself, if he were alive today and saw how Aristotelian science has been overthrown, would not regard people who disagreed with his principles as heretics. In R. Bin Nun’s words (emphasis added):[19]

שיטת הרמב”ם ברורה: יסוד שתלוי באמונה, ואין בו הוכחה שכלית, וכל החכמים מתווכים עליו, אי אפשר להגדיר את מי שאינו מאמין בו כ”כופר” או כ”מין”. עצם העובדה שהדבר נתון בוויכוח שכלי בין החכמים מאפשר ומחייב לבנות על עולם האמונה, אך אינו מאפשר לשפוט ולדון את הכופרים. רק ודאות שכלית מוחלטת מאפשרת לדון אדם כמזיד בשאלות של אמונה וידיעה

In other words, according to R. Bin Nun there is no justification today for calling people heretics because they reject one (or more) of the Thirteen Principles.[20] (when he refers to hakhamim disputing matters, he is not referring to Torah scholars, but the general scientific-intellectual world). Whether R. Bin Nun is correct in his analysis of Rambam is not my purpose at present; I only wish to show that this outstanding rabbinic figure has a very tolerant view, one which rejects the Thriteen Principles as determining who is a heretic.

Notes:
A future post will deal with other issues of this controversy, and at that time S. Z. Havlin’s article on the issue in Yeshurun vol. 13 will be discussed.

[1] Professor Isadore Twersky once mentioned in class that although this book’s title should have mentioned Maimonides, in 1929 Harvard University Press would not publish a book with such a title. In this regard, he also called attention to the title of Sarah Heller Wilensky’s doctoral dissertation, “The Teaching of Issac Arama in the Framework of Philonic Philosophy.” This, too, is a false title, and the subject of the dissertation is seen more clearly by the title of the Hebrew book: R. Yitzhak Arama u-Mishnato. As Twersky explained, Harvard’s Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations did not want a dissertation on a Spanish Jewish thinker unless it was given a more universal theme, hence the “Philonic Philosophy,” an allusion to Wolfson’s theory of philosophy, but this was put in just for show. Incidentally, Fisher’s edition of Or ha-Shem is responsible for my taking credit as being the only student ever to have made Prof. Twersky laugh in class. It was the 1990-1991 year and we were studying Crescas in his seminar. Twersky would often ask me to read, during the course of which he would often correct my pronounciation. When Fisher’s edition of Crescas appeared I immediately bought it and brought it to class. When Twersky called upon me to read, I replied that this time he wa not going to be able to correct my pronounciation. He asked, “why not?” to which I replied, holding up my new book, that I just purchased a new edition of Or ha-Shem, and it is “menikid.” This was too much for even the eternally staid Twersky, and he too was brought to a chuckle. (From inyana de-yoma, someone asked me if Noah Feldman studied with Prof. Twersky. He was not in any of Twersky’s seminars that year. He was, however, in Prof. Septimus’ seminar as well as that of Prof. Leiman, who was at Harvard in fall 1989 as a visiting scholar. In those years, long before he became famous [now, notorious] I would often tell people that one of my fellow students, an undergraduate taking graduate classes, was perhaps the most brilliant person I knew – a much better head than mine – and I have known many intellectual heavyweights. Yet I have read some people, who certainly don’t know him, describing Feldman as an expert in Shas and poskim. This is laughable. He has a great mind, and can grasp a Tosafot quicker than almost anyone, but he never spent any serious time in limudei kodesh after high school. I think my father best summed matters up after reading his article. He said: “Feldman may be very smart, but he isn’t very wise.”).

[2] R. Fisher has also expressed his support for the position of those rishonim – in opposition to the Rambam and R. Chaim Soloveitchik – who believe that one who, through no fault of his own, holds a heretical view is not to be regarded as a heretic.

[3] R. Moshe also detected a forgery in that R. Yehudah he-Hasid asks why homosexuality is forbidden, and then explains that the prohibition is to ensure that men procreate. According to R. Moshe, even asking such a question, and offering such a weak explanation, is a sign that the passage was not written by R. Yehudah he-Hasid but by a gay-friendly subversive. Yet as R. Chaim Rapoport points out, R. Yehudah he-Hasid is also quoted saying the same thing in the medieval Moshav Zekeinim al ha-Torah. Furthermore, the explanation he offers is also found in Ramban, Sefer ha-Hinnukh and Radbaz. See Rapoport, Judaism and Homosexuality: An Authentic Orthodox View (London, 2004), pp. 155-156.

[4] See my “Suicide and the World to Come,” AJS Review 18.2 (1993): 257 n. 54. Perhaps Prof. Shlomo Zalman Havlin will also use a computer to prove the forgery, much like he used a computer to show that R. Joseph Hayyim also wrote the book Torah li-Shma (link).

[5] Soferim u-Sefarim (Tel Aviv, 1959), p. 107.

[6] See also D. Simonsen, “Ueber die Vorlage des Sefer ha-Eshkol,” in Studies in Jewish Bibliography and Related Subjects in Memory of Abraham Solomon Freidus (New York, 1929), pp. 290-291.

[7] Israel M. Ta-Shma writes, concerning this defense (falsely attributing it to the editors of Sefer ha-Eshkol, vol. 4, rather than Bergman):

אולם לא מפיהם אנו חיים, ואילו זקוק היה הרב אויערבך להגנתם זו היה לוקה בכפלים

See Rabbi Zerahyah ha-Levi Ba’al ha-Meor u-Venei Hugo (Jerusalem, 1992), p. 40 n. 27.

[8] Haym Soloveitchik, “Review of Olam ke-Minhago Noheg, by Yishaq (Eric) Zimmer,” AJS Review 23.2 (1998): 227-228.

[9] See my “Review of Circles of Jewish Identity: A Study in Halakhic Literature by Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar,” AJS Review 27.1 (2003): 120-122.

[10] Post-Sabbatian Sabbatianism (Spring Valley, 1999), p. 209.

[11] Rabbi Zerahyah ha-Levi Ba’al ha-Meor u-Venei Hugo, pp. 40-41.

[12] He-Hadash Asur min ha-Torah (Jersualem, 2005), pp. 69-70, 152 n. 255.

[13] Regarding judging positions of rishonim as immoral, R. Shlomo Aviner writes (Am ve-Arzto (Jerusalem, 2002), vol. 2 pp. 436-437):

וברור שבהלכה פנים לכאן ולכאן. לכן כיוון שנתיבים אלה הם נתיבים מוסריים יותר, עלינו להכריע על פיהם. לפעמים ההלכה מוכרעת, בגלל שעת הדחק, ולפעמים ההלכה מוכרעת כי כך המנהג. אם כן, בימינו ‘המנהג’ הוא להיות מוסרי . . . שאלה: האם ראשונים אחרים, שלא סוברים כרש”י הם מוסריים פחות? תשובה: כולם מוסריים בתכלית המוסריות, אך יש גם מושגים מוסריים המשתנים על פי המציאות. אב הסוטר לבנו הקטן, אינו דומה לאב הסוטר לבנו בן השמונה עשרה. האם סטירת לחי לבנו היא מעשה מוסרי או לא מוסרי? תלוי בנסיבות. לא כל הכרעות הפוסקים הן הכרעות נצחיות. לכן מזכירים במשנה גם דעת יחיד כדי לסמוך עליה בעתיד (עדויות א, ה). במצבנו כיום ישנם שיקולים מוסריים שמצטרפים להכרעותינו ההלכתיות דוד המלך היה מודד אנשים בחבל, ובוודאי הוא ראה כורח מוסרי לנהוג כן. מרן הרב קוק מסביר, שלא היתה אז דרך אחרת להרתיע את הרשעים (איגרות א, ק). יתכן שבנסיבות שלנו, דוד לא היה נוהג כן

[14] Kitvei R. Weinberg, vol. 1, p. 58.

[15a] One should not assume that this is a verbatim transcription of my remarks, as they were not written out at the time.

[15b] Prof. Berger recently noted to Menachem Butler the following point: “At the same time, those realms [i.e., history and halakhah] are not so distinct that someone weighing the question of which position to adopt must, or even should, ignore his judgment about historical truth. Thus, I personally do not regard the pesak that Christianity is not avodah zarah for Gentiles as one I should adopt, even though it has desirable consequences. I do, however, grant legitimacy to an opinion affirmed by major authorities and do not quarrel with those who rely on it.”

[16] Olat Yitzhak, vol. 2, p. 51.

[17] See ibid., p. 440.

[18] See his biography at http://www.ykd.co.il/hebrew/hebrew.htm.

[19] “’Kahal Shogeg’ Hiloniyim ve-Hiloniyut be-Halakhah,” Akdamut 10 (2000), p. 263.

[20] For those who don’t have access to the article, I should note that when he refers to hakhamim disputing matters, he is not referring to Torah scholars, but the general scientific-intellectual world.




Prof. Marc B. Shapiro response to Rabbi Chaim Rapoport

In response to Rabbi Chaim Rapoport’s recent response to Prof. Marc B. Shapiro’s response to Rabbi Zev Leff (see original review), Prof. Marc B. Shapiro has shared with the Seforim blog his original response to Rabbi Chaim Rapoport from several years ago.

ועש”ק פרשת בא תשס”ד

לכבוד ידידי אהובי הרה”ג החסיד המפואר, איש חמודות ונדיב לב, אוצר בלום לתורה ולחכמה, מוה”ר חיים ראפפורט שליט”א, אב”ד דק”ק אילפורד יע”א
אחדשה”ט באהבה נאמנה

תחילה אני מודה למע”כ על טירחתו לכתוב לי ולהעיר על דבריי הפעוטים . . . וכעת אבא לעיקר הנידן במכתבו, וטרם אתייחס לטענתו במישרין, הנני מצהיר שדבריי בזה הם כיהודה ועוד לקרא, שהרי רבנו הגר”א, אשר כל רז לא אניס ליה, כתב בפירוש שהרמב”ם מכחיש את הקמיעות והשמות, ואנן מה נענה אבתריה. וכל הנידון אינו אלא האם אפשר למצוא את זה במפורש בדברי הרמב”ם. ויאמין לי ידידי, כי אני זהיר מאד בכל לשונותי, ולפני שאני כותב דבר בשם הנשר הגדול יושב אני שבעה נקיים, ורק אח”כ הנני מעלה את הדיו על הנייר. וכמובן, מוכן אני להודות שטעיתי, כי אין אדם תחת השמש שיכול לומר שלא שגה, ולא אפונה כי יש בספרי דברים הצריכים תיקון, ושגיאות מי יבין, כל קבל דנא מחזיקנא טיבותא לך אם יעמידני על האמת, ואת הצריך תיקון אשוב ואתקן, אבל בנידון דידן, אינני חושב שטעיתי.

כתב האג”מ שהרמב”ם מודה שאיכא שמירה בשמות מלאכים ושמות קדושים ופסוקים, ובפירושו לסוטה ז, ד כתב הרמב”ם נגד אלה הטפשים שכותבים קמיעות ושמים בתוכם שמות קדושים ושמותיהם של מלאכים. זה פירושו של קמיע. וכשהאג”מ כותב “שמות קדושים” כוונתו לאלו השמות שנזכרים ע”י גדולי אשכנז, ולפי דעת הרמב”ם הכל הבל ואלו הכותבים קמיעות טפשים הם כי בדו מלבם כל השמות הללו, שמות ה’ ושמות מלאכים, ורבים הם וא”א לפורטן. ובספרי כתבתי שהרמב”ם שלל את כחם של שמות המלאכים ושמות קדושים (או “קדושים”) ואכן בפיהמ”ש ובמו”נ ברור מללו, וראה גם בפירושו של הרב קאפח להלכות מזוזה פרק ה אות יד.

נכון, כמו שכתב כת”ר, שהרמב”ם אינו שולל בפירוש את סגולת השמירה של שם המפורש או א’ משמות ה’ הנמצאים בתורה. אולם. כל מי שמכיר את דרכו של הרמב”ם יודע שמושג זה ממנו והלאה, וע”כ במבט לשעבר הנני מודה שכדאי היה לי להאריך קצת ולכתוב שאע”פ שהרמב”ם אינו שולל בפירוש את כח השמירה של שם המפורש, בכ”ז לפי הפילוסופיה שלו והשקפת עולמו אין מקום לרעיונות כאלו, כמו שהבין הגר”א ובעל שומר אמונים (א, יג) וכל אלו שהעמיקו בדברי הרמב”ם בלי יוצא מן הכלל, וע”כ תמהתי על האג”מ.

והנני בזה ידידו מוקירו דושה”ט באהבה, מודה ומכיר טובה על ענותנותו וטוב לבו לעיין ולהעיר בדברי.

מלך שפירא




Rabbi Chaim Rapoport on Prof. Marc B. Shapiro and Rabbi Zev Leff

In response to Prof. Marc B. Shapiro’s recent response to Rabbi Zev Leff (see original review), Rabbi Chaim Rapoport has submitted the following letter exclusively posted at the Seforim blog.

בס”ד. שלהי חודש תמוז ה’תשס”ז
לכבוד הרבנים מנהלי ‘בלוג הספרים’, וכל העוסקים במלחמתה של תורה לשם שמים, ה’ עליהם יחיו ויחיינו מיומים

בקשר להמחלוקת שפרצה מחדש בין המשפתים, בענין שיטת הרמב”ם ע”ד פעולת השמות הקדושים והטהורים, אף שאינני רוצה להכניס ראשי בין הרים גדולים[1], אבל הנני בזה כמעיר ובא לפני חכמים, להביא לכללות שיטת פרופ. שפירא סמוכין, מדברי הגאון יעב”ץ בספרו ‘לחם שמים’.
בפירושו ‘לחם שמים’ עמ”ס סוטה פרק שביעי כתב היעב”ץ על דברי הרמב”ם בפיהמ”ש שם משנה ד[2] בזה”ל: “לכאורה יראה מלשונו זה, שהי’ [הרמב”ם] מהביל כתיבת קמיעות לגמרי, ואם כן נגע ח”ו בכבוד חכמי התלמוד. ועיין מה שכתבתי ב’עקיצת עקרב’, משם תראה קצת התנצלות על מה שכתב גם בספר מורה נבוכים מענין זה כדומה לזה. אך מה שהפריז על המדה בענין באור שם המפורש, עם שהאמת אתו בזה שכן קורין חז”ל לשם הוי”ה ב”ה, אבל ניקודו ודאי צריך למסורת עכ”פ כמו שנראה בבירור בכמה מקומות בתלמוד, ביחוד ביומא ובפ”ד דקידושין וזולת. דוק ותשכח . . . וכמדומה שהי’ חושב גם כן משתגע למי שעוסק בידיעת צרופי שמות וכן שם בן ע”ב וכ”ב (והמה מוזכרים בתלמוד שהפליגו חז”ל בשבח היודעם וזהיר בהם) והדומים הידועים ומקובלים ליחידי סגולה, והנם אצלו נחשבים מהבילים ומשוגעים חלילה. אבל מחשבה כזאת היא חסרון ידיעה מסתרי תורה ודאי והעדר קבלה שלא זכה אלי’, היא שגרמה לו לשום במלאכי ה’ תהלה, שרי לי’ מרי’ וימציא לו מחילה. ופעולת השמות אמנם מפורש במקרא [3] מאז בעלי המגדל ידעו מזה כמ”ש (פ’ נח יא, ד) ‘ונעשה לנו שם’ (אלא שרצו להשתמש בו לפנייה חיצונית, לכן לא עלתה בידם, ע”י בלבול שפתם נתבטלה, לולי זאת היתה מחשבתם מתקיימת, כי חכמים גדולים היו כמ”ש בס”ה) בסוד ‘ויעש דוד שם’ (שמואל-ב ח, יג), המ”י [=המשכיל יבין]”. עכ”ל היעב”ץ.
מלשון היעב”ץ וסגנונו נראה בעליל, שהרמב”ם לא האמין בכח השמות וביטלו כליל, וזאת בגלל שהי’ לו חסרון מסורה, העדר הידיעה בחכמת האמת וסודות התורה.

[על דבר “העדר הקבלה” של הרמב”ם – ראה גם מ”ש היעב”ץ בספרו ‘מטפחת ספרים’ פי”ד המדבר “במעשיו הגדולים של הר”מ ז”ל ומדותיו האלקיות, כן הודיע גם בספר צדה לדרך בהקדמתו. גם האר”י ז”ל גלה עמוקות בסוד אחיזת נשמתו כי גבהה מאד, יעוין ספר הגלגולים. לכן חובה ודאי להפך בזכותו, ולא לתלות בי’ בוקי סריקי דספר מורה נבוכים[4], כי אמנם זולת זה כל חבוריו בתורה ובאמונה, ממנו יתד ממנו פנה. כולם נכונים למבין וישרים ליודעי בינה. חוץ איזה פרטים ומעטים, שלא יפלא אם שגה בהם מחסרון קבלה[5], ושכל אנושי עלול לחטוא, גם מבחר מין האנושי טעה איזה פעמים, לכן לא יחסר ממעלתו דבר. בפרט דרחמנא לבא בעי, וכל כוונתו ז”ל היתה לטובה, וכל מגמתו לחזק מוסדי הדת”].
בכבוד ובברכה לכל העוסקים בפרפראות לחכמה, יישר חילכם לאורייתא – הן הן גופי תורה, עלי ה’בלוג’ לא יבולו, ותורה יבקשו מפיהו
הרב חיים רפופורט
לונדון, אנגלי’.
נ. ב. לתועלת הרבים הנני בזה להעתיק קטע ממכתבי ששלחתי בשעתו לפרופ. שפירא כצורתו וכצלמו:
ב”ה. ג’ שבט ה’תשס”ד
שלום לרחוק בגשם וקרוב ברוח,
ידידי ורעי, ברכה על ראשו תנוח,
חוקר חריף ובקי, משנתו קב ונקי,
מפענח צפונות ופותר תעלומות,
קנה לו חבר, עט סופר מהיר,
הרב דר. מלך שפירא שליט”א
. . . ספרך על קצה הגבול של התיאלוגיה (האורטדוקסית), בו הבקיאות והחריפות משמשים בעירבוביא, קנה שביתה על שולחני, באמת – אוצר בלום של תורה ומחקר מדעי. וכבר הודעתי לחברים מקשיבים לעצתי, שעליהם לקנות את הספר היסודי, – גם זקנים שכבר קנו חכמה, גם מתחילים שיודעים לדבר בדברי תורה. ובעז”ה אם ירשה הזמן אכתוב דברי סקירה וביקורת כפי מסת ידי, אבל עכשיו באתי לפרש שיחתי, לבאר ביתר פירוט את שאלתי. ובהקדם:
בשו”ת אגרות משה (יו”ד ח”ב סימן קמא, ענף ג, עמוד רלט) כתב לאמר “שגם הרמב”ם מודה שאיכא שמירה בשמות מלאכים ושמות קדושים ופסוקים, ולכן פשוט שגם פרשיות דמזוזה לא גריעי משאר פסוקים ושמות ששייך לכותבם בקמיע לשמירה, ורק מה שסוברין שהנחת המזוזה בפתח הבית היא לשמירה גשמית דהנאת עצמן הוא בטול המצוה, ולכן שלא במקום המצוה אף ששם נכתבו לשמירה דקמיע אין בזה גרעון וחסרון לכתיבת הפרשיות והנחתן בפתח הבית למצוה, כדחזינן דפסוקים ושמות הם דברים שיש בהן ענין שמירה אף להרמב”ם ממה שכותבין בצד השני, שא”כ יש להבין מזה שגם הפרשיות יש בהו ענין שמירה אף שלא מצד המצוה, ומ”מ מודה הרמב”ם שאין בזה בטול וגריעותא להמצוה דאף דאיכא בה גם שמירה עכ”פ הוא מניחן בפתח למצוה ולא לקמיע, א”כ גם כשכותב אחד את הפרשיות לקמיע מה בכך הא כן הוא האמת שאיכא בהו ענין שמירה. ולכן אין למילף שהרמב”ם יאסור שם לכתוב פסוקי הפרשיות לקמיע כשמניחים במקום שלא שייך ענין מצות מזוזה, דאין ראי’ שסובר דאסור להאמין שכתיבת פסוקים ושמות יועילו לשמירה בכלל ואף לא שפסוקי הפרשיות יועילו, היפוך מה שמפורש בגמרא בשבת דף סא שהיו כותבין קמיעין מענינות הרבה ויש בהן משום קדושה ואיפסק כן ברמב”ם פ”י מס”ת ה”ה [הקמיעין שיש בהם ענינים של כתבי הקודש אין נכנסין בהן לבית הכסא אלא אם כן היו מחופות עור], וגם בכאן אינו כותב שהן טפשין שמאמינים בדבר שאין להאמין, אלא כתב שהן טפשין במה שמבטלין המצוה שעושין מצוה גדולה שהיא יחוד השם כאילו הוא קמיע שזהו הטפשות וגם איסור גדול לדעתו”.

ובספרך אשר כתבת (עמוד 157 בשולי הגליון) ציינת, לדברי האג”מ הנ”ל כ”דוגמא מדהימה”, לאי-ידיעתו של הגרמ”פ זצ”ל בספרי החקירה, של הנשר הגדול בעל משנה תורה. כתבת שהרמב”ם שולל בפירוש את כוחן של השמות הקדושים, לשמור מפגעים רעים ושאר מרעין בישין. (1) בפיהמ”ש סוטה פ”ז מ”ב ו(2)במו”נ ח”א פס”א.
והנה, כפי שכבר אמרתי: לית דין צריך בושש, שאם באנו להביא ראיות ואותות, לאשר דברנו ולקבעם במסמרות, מוכרחים אנו לתוקף של יתד בל תמוט. אמת נכון הדבר, שלפי השקפת עולמו ה’רציונליסטית’ של הרב המורה, קשה למצוא ‘מקום’ בהגיון, לפעולה על-טבעית של שמות העליון. גם מצינו בספריו דברי ביקורת חריפים, דברים כדרבונות כחיצים יורים, כנגד בעלי הקמיעות למיניהם, ביד החזקה הל’ מזוזה ובספריו הנ”ל שציינת אליהם.
אבל הנידון עלי’ עמדתי היתה, האם שלל הרמב”ם בפירוש את השיטה, המייחסת כח שמירה נסי לשמות ופסוקים, וע”ז טענתי שבמקומות שהזכרת אין הדברים מפורשים. ניתי ספר ונחזי:
בפיהמ”ש שם קאי על מה ששנינו בסוטה, “במקדש אומרים את השם ככתבו”, וע”ז כתב: “וכתבו [=השם ככתבו] הוא מה שנהגה מן יוד הא ואו הא, וזהו שם המפורש המרומם, דע זה, ואל תטריד את מחשבתך במה שהוזים כותבי הקמיעות וטפשי בני אדם”. וכוונתו במ”ש [“ואל תטריד את מחשבתך וכו'”] פשוטה, דכנגד הטפשים דיבר המורה, כלפי שאמרו בעלי הקמיעות, שהשם המפורש מרובה באותיות. לפי דבריהם שם בן ד’ קדושתו פחותה, משמות המרובים באותיות שחיברו לשמירה, “השם ככתבו” הינו שם ארוך בכמות, ולא שם הוי’ שאין בו אלא ארבע אותיות. וע”ז כתב הרמב”ם – להד”ם, אל תשגיחו בדברים חסירי טעם, את שם המפורש המירו הטפשים, בשמות שבדו להם הוזים בכוכבים. גם הרמב”ם מודה שישנן שמות קדושים לבורא, וכמ”ש בהלכות יסודי התורה; “השם ככתבו” דהיינו שם בן ארבע המורה על עצמו, בנוסף לשאר שמות ותוארים המורים על פעלו, שבעה שמות הם הקדושים במעלה, ושם המפורש העולה על כולנה.
איפה מצאת בדברי הרמב”ם בפירוש המשנה, ביטול דעת האומרים שהשמות האמיתיים כחן יפה, לשמור את האדם בשמירה מעולה, הלא מזה לא דיבר הרמב”ם מאומה?!
שמא תאמר הלא קרא לכותבי הקמיעות “טפשים”, ועל כרחך שלל מכל וכל את ערכן של הקמיעות והמחברים, לזה אני אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה, וכבר אמרו דברי תורה עניים במקום זה ועשירים במקום אחר. הלא עוד יצא כברק חצו במורה הנבוכים, לתקן הדיעות וליישר המעקשים, לא חס על הקמיעות וה’מכשפים’, הטועים ומתעים את העם בדברים מסולפים. שם (פס”א) נטה ידו לבאר החילוק בין שאר שמותיו שהם “שמות הנגזרים מן הפעולות . . . שהם כולם שמות הונחו לפי הפעולות הנמצאות בעולם” לשם המפורש המתייחס להבורא עצמו, “לא יהיה לו שם נגזר בשום פנים, אבל שם אחד מיוחד להורות על עצמו, ואין אצלנו שם בלתי נגזר אלא זה והוא יו”ד ה”א וא”ו ה”א אשר הוא שם המפורש גמור, לא תחשוב זולת זה”. ובהמשך לזה כתב: “ולא יעלה במחשבתך שגעון כותבי הקמיעות, ומה שתשמעהו מהם או תמצאהו בספריהם המשונים, ומשמות חברום, לא יורו על ענין בשום פנים, ויקראו אותן שמות, ויחשבו שהם צריכים קדושה וטהרה, ושהם יעשו נפלאות, כל אלה הדברים לא יאות לאדם שלם לשמעם, כל שכן שיאמינם, ואינו נקרא שם המפורש כלל זולת זה השם בן ארבע אותיות הנכתב אשר לא יקרא כפי אותיותיו”. עוד מתח עליהם את שבט הביקורת בסוף פרק סב: “וכאשר מצאו האנשים הרעים הפתאים אלו הדברים התרחב להם הכזב, והמאמר שיקבצו אי זה אותיות שירצו ויאמר שזה הוא שם יעשה ויפעל כשיכתב או כשיאמר על תאר כך, ואחר כך נכתבו הכזבים ההם אשר בדאום הפתאים הראשונים, ונעתקו הספרים ההם לידי הטובים רכי הלב הסכלים אשר אין אצלם מאזנים ידעו בהם האמת מן השקר, והסתירום ונמצאו בעזבונותם ונחשב בהם שהם אמת”.

שתים רעות עשו אלו, בעלי הקמיעות – במעלם אשר מעלו, על כן בצדק קרא להם הרמב”ם טפשים, גם לפי דעת האג”מ שאינו חולק על כחן של השמות הקדושים. (א) בדו להם שמות אשר “לא יורו על ענין בשום פנים”, והטעו את “רכי הלב הסכלים אשר אין אצלם מאזנים”, (ב) את השם המפורש המירו ברעתם, באותיות פורחות באוויר לעומתם.
ועוד בה שלישיה, מ”ש הרמב”ם בהלכות מזוזה, שהכותב שמות בפנים המזוזה עבודתו פסולה, ואם קבעה בדלת ביטל את המצוה. ואת רובע עשו האוילים, מוכרי הקמיעות והאלילים, במקום מצוות לאו ליהנות, החליפו ועשו ונתנו ‘סגולות’.
מקום הניח להגרמ”פ לבא ולטעון, שהרמב”ם לא חלק על הנסיון, וכפי שהעיד לנו בעצמו, בהלכות שבת אשר כתב ידו בחיבורו: “יוצאין בקמיע מומחה, ואי זה הוא קמיע מומחה זה שריפא לשלשה בני אדם או שעשהו אדם שריפא שלשה בני אדם בקמיעין אחרים, ואם יצא בקמיע שאינו מומחה פטור, מפני שהוציאו דרך מלבוש” (הלכות שבת פי”ט הי”ד).
הלא הוא הדבר אשר דברתי בתחלה, שאני הקטן לא מצאתי להדיא, בפירוש המשנה או במורה, ביד החזקה – משנה תורה, שלילת הדברים שכתב הגאון רבי משה. כולי עלמא מודים, ששמות בדויים אינם עוזרים, פיסול המזוזה ה”ה עון פלילי, הלא הגמרא (שבת לב, ב) אומרת שע”י ביטול מזוזה ימות ערירי.
הרואה באג”ם יווכח לדעת, שלא הצדיק ר’ משה את כותבי הקמיעות, במעלם אשר מעלו להמיר ולהחליף, ולעשות ככל העולה על דעתם הכוזב. אלו השמות לא יועילו, ואת כח השמירה לא יכילו, לא דיבר הגרמ”פ אלא מפסוקים הכתובים בתורה, ומשמות שנכתבו בקדושה ובטהרה.

בוודאי לא יקפיד כת”ר על המעורר, הלא כך הוא הדרך – זה בונה וזה סותר, נא אל תשיבני ריקם מלפניך, תורה היא וללמוד אני צריך ממך.
אסיים מעין הפתיחה, בכבוד ובברכה לכת”ר ולכל המשפחה, המקום ירחם עליהם ועל כל הנמצאים מאמיתת המצאו, ברוך עדי עד שם תהלתו
ידידו דושה”ט בלונ”ח תכה”י
חיים רפופורט.

Notes:
[1]
ה”ה הרה”ג ר’ זאב לעפ שליט”א ממושב מתתיהו באה”ק תובב”א והרב פרופ. מלך שפירא שליט”א מארה”ב יצ”ו.
[2]
וזה לשונו שם (לפי מהדורת קאפח): “. . . ואל תטריד את מחשבתך במה שהוזים כותבי הקמיעות וטפשי בני אדם”.
[3]
ראה גם מ”ש היעב”ץ – ע”ד פעולת השמות – בספרו ‘בירת מגדל עוז’ חלק ‘אוצר הטוב’ אות יו”ד: “. . . ההוא יקרא מעשה בראשית כשיושג ענין היצירה בעצם ובסבותיו, באופן שיגיע האדם לתכליתו ויוכל להמציא ג”כ יצירה חדשה מעיקרה, כענין ר”ח ור”א דעסקי בס’ יצירה ומיברי להו עיגלא, להורות יכות וחכמת הממציא העליון אשר חלק מחכמתו ליראיו, וגלה להם סודו לפרסם כח שמותיו הקדושים, ולידע שחולק לאוהביו מכבודו להשתמש בשרביטו שיתדמו לבוראם להוציא הוייות חדשות, ונתן כח בידם לברוא עולמות בכח צירוף השמות המתבאר בספר יצירה למי שיודעו, זוהי חכמת עצמת מעשה בראשית שהפליגו חז”ל בשבחה והעלימוה מאד, (כי אמנם עוונותינו הבדילו בינינו לבין אלקינו, וחטאתינו מנעו הטוב הגמור ממנו עד שאין אתנו יודע עד מה, ולא אחד בדור שראוי וכדאי להבין אותה חכמה), ועלי’ צוו חכמים במשנה (חגיגה רפ”ב) ‘אין דורשין במעשה בראשית בשנים’, לא על ידיעת שמות חומר וצורה ולידע שכל הגופים השפלים מורכבים מארבע יסודות ארמ”ע ושחומר הגלגל הוא גשם חמישי בלתי מושג ומנין גלגלים המדומה שבזה נכללו שני פרקים גדולים מהלכות יסוד התורה באריכות גדול ואין בהם עומק כלל ורובן סברות קלות והשערות מבני אדם חכמי העכו”ם אשר חכמת מה להם, אינן מקנות שלמות לא באמונה ולא בשכל ולא אפילו חידוד”.
[4]
השווה מ”ש על דבר הרמב”ם ב’אגרת בקורת’ ו, רע”ב: “חלילה לתלות בוקי סריקי ברבן של ישראל [!] ולהעמיס בלשונו הצך מה שאין במשמעו ושלא עלה על דעתו ז”ל”.
[5]
להעיר ממ”ש היעב”ץ בספרו ‘בירת מגדל עוז’ (הנ”ל הערה 3) על דברי הרמב”ם בהל’ יסוה”ת פ”ג ע”ד הגלגלים, וז”ל היעב”ץ שם: “כל הגלגלים אינן לא קלים ולא כבדים כו’, לא אוכל לדעת מניין לו דברים הללו, מי עלה שמים וירד ויגידה לנו גבהי שמים, מי ידע מה טבעם . . . אכן באמת הוא נטוי’ מדעת התורה ששמה מים מעל לרקיע, ואין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו, ואיני יודע מה בא הרב ללמדנו בכך, וכי כבוד הבורא תלוי בכך אם הגלגלים כבדים או קלים”.
ועל דבר מי שמאמין בפירוש הרמב”ם להמושגים מעשה מרכבה ומעשה בראשית –פשוטו כמשמעו, כתב היעב”ץ בספר ‘מטפחת ספרים’: “תכלית הדברים, כל המעלה בדעתו שהבלי הפלוסופים הם מעשה בראשית ומעשה מרכבה, הוא ודאי אפיקורוס. כופר לא לבד בדברי חכמים, כי גם בתורת משה, שריבוי השמות והכינויים, ופעולות הנראות גשמיות ומסורות יתרות וחסרות, ותיבות ולשונות זרות, ואותיות מלופפות ונזורות ונוספות, ונקודות ותגים ופרשיות, ומאמרים המתנכרים ומשקלות מורכבות והנקראים אצל בעלי הפשט זרים, הלא כל אלה צווחות ואומרות, דע כי לא דבר רק הוא, ואם הוא, מכם הוא. ואולם ודאי שחכמת הטבע תתכן להקרא מעשה בראשית ביחס אל מדרגת פשט המקרא. וכמו שלא יכול הפשטנים לתת טעם וסבה לזרים הנמצאים בו לרוב, וככה בטבע ימצאו זרים למהלך הטבעי, לא ידעו הטבעי, לא ידעו הטבעיים עלתם. אמנם חכמת הטבע של אנשי העולם, היא מלבוש הגס העב למעשה בראשית, שהוא הפרי הגנוז ועצם הענין במהותו, וחכמת מה היא הטבעית של פלוסופים, שעוסקים בקליפות החיצונות הנזרקות, שאינן למאכל ולא נחמדים להשכיל, כי אין להם השגה רק במקרים, ככל מעשה החושים החיצונים”. ואכ”מ להאריך בכ”ז.



Marc B. Shapiro — Response to Rabbi Zev Leff

Response to Rabbi Zev Leff
by Marc B. Shapiro

Rabbi Zev Leff (of Moshav Matityahu) reviewed my book, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised, in the most recent issue of Jewish Action [see review]. I don’t feel that he gave the readers a correct sense of what the book is about. To rectify that, I can only ask people to read for themselves and determine if his portrayal is accurate. For now, I would like to challenge him on the specific points he makes.

1. He writes “The Chatam Sofer in his responsa (Yoreh Deah 356) cites a source even older than Rambam who refers to Thirteen Principles of Faith.” As I noted in the book (p. 36 n. 176) the Hatam Sofer was mistaken about this. The source he refers to was actually composed by R. Yom Tov Lipmann Muelhausen (14th-15th cent.) and has recently been published. (I also point out that in another responsum, Even ha-Ezer II, no. 148, Hatam Sofer himself realizes that the source we are talking about has nothing to do with the Thirteen Principles which, he acknowledges, originate with Rambam.) The fact that R. Leff could include such a sentence, even though I showed it to be incorrect, leaves me with some doubts as to how closely he read my book.

2. He writes: “Today the [Thirteen] Principles are universally accepted.” I do not believe this to be the case, and whenever I hear prayers or selihot directed towards angels (a violation of the fifth principle), I am reassured of the correctness of my belief. If one is simply using the Thirteen Principles as a loose term to define traditional Jewish belief, then yes, R. Leff is correct. The purpose of my book was to show that, despite the widespread acceptance, there has nevertheless been a great deal of dispute regarding the Principles throughout Jewish history.

3. He writes: “One who denies any of them is outside the pale of the faith community of Torah Judaism.” Yet this sentence is followed by another sentence which contradicts it: “The Sages [1] do not agree whether to deem one a heretic for harboring this belief.” Which is it? Is one who believes in a corporeal God a heretic or simply an ignorant person who must be enlightened? As I discuss in my book, our sages have disputed this very point, with no less a figure than R. Arele Roth rejecting the Rambam’s view that such a belief turns a person into a heretic.

4. R. Leff then says that I misunderstand “so many Torah sources.” The first one he refers to Rashbam to Numbers 22:1. I referred to Rashbam as an example of one who believed that certain small parts of the Torah are post-Mosaic. Rabbi Leff writes that Rashbam “does not even intimate when this section was written. Rather, Rashbam simply explains that ‘beyond the Jordan’ was written to reflect what would be in the future.” Here are Rashbam’s exact words, as found in Martin Lockshin’s translation:

“The phrase ‘across the Jordan’ is appropriately written after they [i.e. the Israelites] had crossed [to the west side of] the Jordan. From their point of view the plains of Moab [on the east side of the Jordan] are called ‘across the Jordan’”

I assume that R. Leff’s understanding of Rashbam is based on David Rosin’s text (or one of the other editions or CD-Roms that use this text). Rosin’s edition removes anything radical from Rashbam. But as Lockshin has written, Rosin’s “reading is based on a conjectural emendation… I am convinced that Rosin’s emendation is based on his desire to make Rashbam’s comment here seem less heterodox.”

In my book, I also noted that according to a medieval Tosafist collection of Torah commentaries, Rashbam also identified Gen. 36:31-39 as post-Mosaic; yet R. Leff does not mention this.

5. I quoted sources that indicate that the notion of tikkun soferim is to be taken literally. Among these sources are Midrash Tanhuma and Yalkut ha-Makhiri (as well as the Arukh and a number of other texts which R. Leff does not mention, leaving the reader with the wrong impression).

He writes: “What Dr. Shapiro fails to mention is that those portions of the Tanchuma and Yalkut are not found in most early editions.” Let’s assume that this is correct (although to prove this one would need to actually examine the manuscripts, not simply refer to two apologetic comments found in the standard rabbinic commentary to Tanhuma). This would make perfect sense, as later copyists would be inclined to leave out that which they regarded as controversial or even heretical. What then does this prove?

Furthermore, the sources R. Leff mentions are only referring to Tanhuma. Neither of them mention anything about Yalkut ha-Makhiri. Of course, I am sure that he will also assert that this text is a forgery, or was written by a “mistaken student,” and will do the same with any other text that presents an alternate understanding of tikkun soferim.

6. The next section of his review concerns how to understand a passage in R. Nissim and the Midrash. In presenting this, I wrote that it was hard to see how the approach of these sources can be brought into line with Rambam’s understanding of revelation of the entire 5 books of Moses. Nothing that R. Leff writes has changed my mind in this respect. The reader should note, however, that before discussing this I stated that these views “seem to contradict Maimonides’ Principle” (emphasis added). I was well aware that the matter was not completely certain, for exactly the reasons that Rabbi Leff sets out.

7. R. Leff completely misunderstands my view about Principles of Faith and halakhah, so let me try to clear it up. I have said, and I repeat now, that no rishonim that I am aware of, and certainly not Rambam, believed that Principles of Faith can be decided in a halakhic fashion. Hatam Sofer says that they can. According to the Hatam Sofer, Principles of Faith can change in accordance with the halakhic decisions of the times; what used to be an obligatory belief can cease being so, and what is now an obligatory belief need not have been so in the past.

Yet nothing could be more at odds with the Rambam’s understanding. According to the Rambam, Principles of Faith are eternal truths. They define the essence of what Judaism was, is, and forever will be. If the majority of poskim determine that God has a body, this will not change the fact that it is still a basic principle of the Jewish faith to assert the opposite. For the Rambam, Principles of Faith don’t depend on the majority, be they right or wrong, for they are part of the essence of Torah. Principles of Faith have not, and indeed can never, change. Unlike the Hatam Sofer’s pan-halakhic approach, in the Rambam’s conception, one doesn’t need a halakhic decision for the Principles to be binding. As Menachem Kellner has put it, “Dogmas, it must be recalled, are beliefs taught as true by the Torah; is the truth taught by the Torah historically conditioned?”[2]

We can see that the rishonim held this view by how they dispute with the Rambam. When they want to show that one of his Principles is mistaken, they cite a talmudic passage to show that one of the tannaim or amoraim disagreed with him. Thus, to give an example which I only saw after my book was completed, R. Isaiah ben Elijah of Trani’s proof that belief in God’s incorporeality is not a Principle, denial of which is heresy, is that there were sages of the Talmud who held this belief![3]

אבל אם יחשוב אדם שהקדוש ברוך הוא בעל תמונה, לא הקפידה תורה בכך, וכמה היו מחכמי התלמוד הקדושים, שמהם תצא תורה לישראל, שלא נתנו לבם להתבונן בענין האלהות, אלא הבינו המקראות כפשוטם, ולפי תומם חשבו כי הקדוש ברוך הוא בעל גוף והתמונה, וחלילה שנקראו מינים לאשר נאמר עליהם לקדושים אשר בארץ המה

R. Isaiah doesn’t assume, or even raise as a possibility, that it used to be permitted to believe this, but now, since the halakhah has been decided, it is forbidden. On the contrary, he asserts, based on the fact that some talmudic sages believed in a physical God and they are not, Heaven forbid, to be regarded as heretics, that God’s incorporeality cannot be a Principle. This, to him, is the greatest proof that the Rambam is wrong in declaring that all who deny his third Principle are heretics. In other words, R. Isaiah also believes that for something to be a Principle of Faith, it has to be eternally true.

Thus, R. Leff is incorrect (with regard to the Rambam and other rishonim) when he writes that “faith and belief are mitzvot like all other mitzvot. Hence, the halakhic decision-making process applies to matters of faith in the way it does to other mitzvot.” In my book I acknowledge that this was the Hatam Sofer’s opinion, but it was not the Rambam’s view. In fact, the Rambam could not be more opposed to Rabbi Leff’s statement, as it means that his own Principles of Faith can be “voted out.” I can only wonder, after explaining my position, why Rabbi Leff sees this as “yet another example of Dr. Shapiro’s misunderstanding of Torah sources.”

Incidentally, R. Leff quotes from my book (p. 142 n. 15) that R. Abraham Isaac Kook also held the Hatam Sofer’s opinion. But in that note, I also call attention to other sources from R. Kook that have a different approach. Why does Rabbi Leff ignore them?

6. Finally, R. Leff claims that I “make a brazen attack on Rabbi Moshe Feinstein.” I am not sure why a valid criticism of R. Moshe qualifies as a brazen attack, but let’s move onto substance. (Anyone who has heard my lectures on R. Moshe at TorahInMotion.org, can have no doubt as to my great esteem for him.)

R. Moshe stated that the Rambam believed in the protective power of holy names and the names of angels, as used in amulets. R. Leff, in his criticism of me, states that in Hilkhot Mezuzah 5:4 “Rambam rules that God’s name ‘Shakai’ should be placed on the outside of the mezuzah, indicating his belief that the Shem does have protective powers.”

Yet the Rambam never says that the name of God “should be placed” there; rather, he permits people, in accordance with the widespread custom, to do so if they want to, as this action has no relevance to the mitzvah per se and does not violate any halakhic prohibition. But to say, as R. Leff does, that the Rambam believes that a name of God can protect you (and R. Moshe even says this about names of angels) is a complete distortion of Rambam’s philosophy. Relevant in this regard are R. Kafih’s short remarks in his commentary to Mezuzah 5:4, which could also be seen as a reply to R. Leff.

והדברים תמוהים מי זוטר תפקידה של המזוזה דתנטריה לבעל הבית בצאתו לרה”ר מלשגות בהרהורים, מי זוטר מה שמזכירה לאדם בצאתו למרחב את יחוד ה’ ואהבתו ולא יבוא לידי חטא אפילו במחשבה

In his commentary to Mezuzah 6:13 he writes:

ואין כוונת חז”ל לדעת רבנו שהמזוזה מהנה בעניני העולם הזה, אלא שבזהירות במזוזה ישווה ה’ לנגדו תמיד, ובכך תהיה השגחת ה’ עליו גדולה

Two hundred years ago, the great R. Wolf Boskowitz wrote:[4]

אלא ודאי מוכח מזה דרבינו ז”ל סובר דמצות מזוזה אין בו תועלת השמירה כלל בטבעה ובסגולתה, רק כי היא כמו אחת מכל מצוות ה’ אשר צוה אשר אין בהם תועלת לעניני עולם הזה רק לעשות רצון קונו יתברך אשר צוה על כך וקבלת פרס בעולם הבא, שתי אלה הם תכלית כל המצוות, ותכלית תכליתן היא קרבת אלקים כי זה חפצו יתברך וזה הוא גם כן תכלית מצות המזוזה ואפס זולתו

In his Commentary to Sotah 7:4, the Rambam speaks strongly against those who write amulets. These people put various holy names and names of angels in the amulets. In fact, this is the definition of a Jewish amulet. When R. Moshe speaks of holy names he is referring to the names of God that are mentioned in medieval works (such as כוזו במוכסז כוזו ). Yet according to the Rambam, this is all nonsense.

The Vilna Gaon recognized this.[5] Although he notes that the Talmud has stories of special powers associated with holy names, he also states that according to the Rambam .הכל הוא שקר R. Joseph Ergas wrote:[6]

הרמב”ם ז”ל, כיחש בזה, ולגלג הרבה על המאמין שיש כח בשמות לעשות שום פעולה

In my book, I assumed that R. Moshe’s position could be explained by the fact that he, like so many other poskim, did not immerse himself in philosophy. The fact that R. Leff could also assert this leaves me speechless. What is at issue is not the meaning of a citation of the Rambam from here or there, but a proper understanding of his entire philosophical worldview.

Sources:
[1] According to the scholarly convention, the word “sages” is only capitalized when referring to the Sages of the Talmud.
[2] See his review of my book (“Returning the Crown to its Ancient Glory: Marc Shapiro’s The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised”) in The Edah Journal 4:1 (2004): 6.
[3] Sanhedrei Gedolah le-Masekhet Sanhedrin (Jerusalem, 1972), volume 5, section 2, p. 118. On the previous page, in direct contradiction to Rambam, he writes:

מי שיטעה בכך ולא ירד לעמקו של דבר, ומבין המקראות כפשוטן וסבור שהקדוש ברוך הוא בעל תמונה, לא נקרא מין, שאם כן הוא הדבר, איך לא פרסמה תורה על דבר זה ולא גילו חכמי התלמוד להודיע דבר זה בגלוי, ולהזהיר נשים ועמי הארץ שלא יהוא מינים ויאבדו עולמן. הלא כמה איסורים קלים כגון איסור מוקצה וכיוצא בו, חיברו חכמים כמה הלכות והרבו כמה דקדוקין להעמיד כל דבר על מכונו, ועל דבר זה שכל האמונה תלויה בו ויש בו כרת בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא, איך לא הורו חכמים על דבר זה בגלוי. אלא ודאי לא הקפידו לכך, אלא יאמין אדם [את] הייחוד כפי שכלו, ואפילו הנשים כפי מיעוט שכלן . . . שלא צותה תורה להורות על אלה הדברים

[4] Seder Mishneh, ad loc. (p. 197).
[5] See Beur ha-Gra, Yoreh Deah 179:13.
[6] Shomer Emunim 1:13.




Marc B. Shapiro: Obituary for Prof. Mordechai Breuer zt”l

Obituary: Professor Mordechai Breuer zt”l
By Marc B. Shapiro
Professsor Mordechai Breuer passed away on the twelfth of Sivan, 5767. It is a great loss for the world of Jewish scholarship as well as that of Orthodox Jewry. Breuer, born in Frankfurt in 1918, was the great-grandson of R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, the grandson of R. Shlomo Zalman Breuer, who succeeded Hirsch as Rav of the Frankfurt separatist community, and the son of Dr. Isaac Breuer, the leading theoretician of the Agudah (although the latter’s philosophy would later diverge from what came to be known as the Agudah Daas Torah).

Breuer came to the world of academic Jewish studies rather late, earning his PhD in 1967 for a study of the Ashkenazic yeshiva in the late Middle Ages. (He had previously earned an MA at the Hebrew University, writing on David Gans.) At that time, he was principal of the Horeb school in Jerusalem. He later became professor of Jewish history at Bar Ilan. It is more than a little ironic that a great-grandson of Hirsch would devote himself academic Jewish studies.[1]

Returning to Prof. Breuer, it is hard to do justice to such a productive scholar in a short post. One can be sure that the next issue of Ha-Maayan, with which Breuer was associated since its founding, will have an important obituary.

As one who has worked a great deal in the field of German Orthodoxy, I can state that my work would be much the poorer if not for Breuer’s many writings. His classic Modernity Within Tradition is a marvelous study of the German Orthodox community and a model for how to write the history of American Orthodoxy. For those who read German, I recommend the original version, published by the Leo Baeck Institute. While containing the same text as the English, the German version has additional information in the footnotes.

For those interested in the full range of his scholarship (up until eight years ago) the volume Asif (Jerusalem, 1999) contains a number of his best articles, including his classic study of Hirsch’s Torah im Derekh Eretz principle. (This article was translated into English and published as a booklet, but has been out of print for many years.) The volume also contains a bibliography of his many writings.[2]

Of particular interest to readers of this blog is his final work, Oholei Torah, on the history of the yeshivot.[3] The only criticism I can give of this work is that it tries to do too much, and throws too much information at the reader. Yet it is an enormously helpful volume. I leave aside for now his contributions in a number of other areas of Jewish studies, as well as in general German Jewish history.

As I was in touch with him for many years, allow me to offer some personal comments, and excerpts from letters and e-mails I received, as I think they will be of interest to the readers.

My first contact with Breuer was actually not the most pleasant for me. I was a graduate student and had just published an article in Ha-Maayan (Tishrei, 5754), in which I included a strong attack on R. Esriel Hildesheimer’s Eisenstadt yeshiva by an anonymous nineteenth-century critic.[4] Breuer wrote to me expressing his unhappiness that I had chosen to publicize what, in his mind, were the ignorant ravings of a benighted yeshiva bachur. I thought then, and still think, that — to paraphrase someone else — while ignorant ravings remain ignorant ravings, the history they illuminate is scholarship. The editor, the late, lamented Yonah Emanuel, took my side in this dispute, and I was happy to have his support when confronted by the man who had become one of my idols in scholarship. (Emanuel actually censored my article, taking out a reference to an attack on the Ketav Sofer, an attack that was already in print and which I found helpful in illuminating the dispute taking place in Hungary. The Ketav Sofer was actually a great friend of Hildesheimer, and even invited him to come to Pressburg to serve with him in the rabbinate.)

Following this, our relationship improved, and I often turned to him with my questions. This became much easier when he too acquired e-mail access. Two months ago, in what was one of my last e-mails to him, I wrote:

I take this opportunity to encourage you to think about writing your autobiography. Your great father did so, and all of kelal Yisrael benefited from it. The same would apply to you.

Unfortunately, this was not to be. Already I feel a great loss at not having someone to turn to with all my questions. He was a veritable Urim ve-Tumim when it came to anything dealing with the lost, wonderful world of German Orthodoxy.

A couple of months ago, someone contacted me and wanted information about Hirsch’s visits to the opera. I looked around the internet a bit, and apparently it is “common knowledge” that Hirsch attended the opera. There have even been online discussions about what the halakhic justification of this was. Despite my extensive reading in German Orthodox literature, I had never heard that Hirsch went to the opera. Therefore, I was very skeptical of this piece of “common knowledge.” I was also aware that very often “common knowledge” turns out to be incorrect. But rather than offer my opinion, I did what I always did at times like this. I turned to Professor Breuer, the man who had read everything written by and about Hirsch, and who had painstakingly gone through every page of the German Orthodox newspapers and magazines of the nineteenth century. I also asked him about the general German Orthodox practice of going to the opera.

He replied:

Here and there you can find hints in German printed sermons disapproving going to the opera. When I went to the opera as a boy of 13-14 years my father did not express his dissatisfaction. I don’t know if Hirsch was an opera lover, but I know that he went to concerts when he was at a holiday resort.

All I can say is that if Breuer had never heard that Hirsch went to the opera, how is it that others seem to know this as a fact, and if asked for a source, will reply that it is “common knowledge”?

In another e-mail he wrote similarly:

I know of no Orthodox rabbi in Germany who regularly visited the opera. This applies also to Rav S.R. Hirsch. Very musical as he was, he sometimes visited a concert, especially while on holidays, but never, to the best of my knowledge, the opera.

I also asked Breuer, who attended the Hirschian school in Frankfurt, what the situation was with regard to boys covering their heads (we all know the teshuvah of R. David Zvi Hoffmann testifying as to how they did not do so in the nineteenth century). He replied:

None of the pupils covered their heads all day. I know there were nominally orthodox homes where heads were covered only for prayers and the like. One such case is documented not in Frankfurt, but in Munich. See Adolph Fraenkel’s biography of his father Sigmund Fraenkel, one of the leading members of Bavarian Orthodoxy.

He also pointed out to me that when Hirsch was Chief Rabbi of Moravia, he protested against a rule that Jewish children were forbidden to cover their heads during class. In other words, only in Germany, where that was the common practice, did children sit with uncovered heads. It was not a “shitah” of Hirsch that they do so.

I told Breuer that some people understand Hoffmann’s teshuvah as referring to him taking off his hat when he went into Hirsch’s office, but still having a kippah underneath. He replied that Hoffmann

is obviously dealing with cases which, when the hat was removed, left the head without any cover. Carrying a kippah underneath the hat was very unusual in Germany. If that had been the case, Hoffmann would certainly have mentioned it. By the way, I remember that the principal of the school had his head always covered with a kippah, as did other teachers who carried the title of rabbi.

In another e-mail he wrote:

I left the Hirsch school in Frankfurt in 1934. The rule of uncovered heads while studying “secular” subjects (a concept which should not have actually been used at a school adhering to the principle of Torah im Derech Eretz) was enforced without exception (it was not enforced upon teachers who served as rabbis in one of the local synagogues). However, during the last years of the school’s functioning, when the impact of the Nazi regime became increasingly palpable, pupils and teachers reacted by covering their heads in “secular” subjects as well.

I wrote to Breuer:

In Binyamin Shlomo Hamburger’s new biography of Rabbi Merzbach, pp. 17-18,[5] he says that German rabbis were obligated by law to receive a university degree. As a blanket statement this is false. Yet I believe that there were some times and places when the government did require this. Do you know any particulars about this, i.e., where and when this was required? Also, was Hirsch’s school co-educational (i.e., boys and girls). If so, were the classes mixed or only the school?

He replied:

There was certainly no German law requiring rabbis to have a university degree. In mattters of religion the many German states (“Laender”) were autonomous. At the beginning of emancipation there were states which passed administrative rules concerning the qualifications of rabbis. There were no such regulations anywhere in the Weimar period.There were no mixed classes in S.R. Hirsch’s school except in the very first years when enrol which is present [!] and also in the very last years when students and teachers were continually disappearing. However, throughout its existence the girls’ school (“Lyceum”) and the boys’ school were in separate wings under one roof and one principal and adminstration. Co-education was very rare in Germany before WWI.

I asked him about congregational singing in Germany. He replied:

There was some congregational singing in Orthodox synagogues, but usually the choir sang those portions, with the congregation singing or humming with the choir.

I asked him if his great father was a rabbi (since he is usually referred to as Dr.). He replied:

My father z.l. had two semichot morenu. In Germany no one was titled “Rabbi” unless he was an officiating rabbi, which my father was not. Here in Israel the title of rabbi, gaon, etc. has undergone a process of inflation and my father is regularly referred to as rabbi, which in his case is more justified than in many others.

On another occasion he wrote a bit more about the Hirschian school in Frankfurt and the relationship between his grandfather and Rabbi Marcus Horovitz:

I cannot vouch that my grandfather never accidentally found himself in the presence of Rabbi Horovitz. He certainly tried hard to avoid this. The social rift in Frankfurt between the two orthodox congregations was proverbial. It existed even between different branches of the same family. There were quite a few members of the IRG, even such that were not also members of the other community, who transgressed the tabu [against entering the Gemeinde synagogue] and their number probably increased after World War I. There was no Austritt indoctrination in the IRG school, probably out of consideration for the students whose parents were non-members. There were also members of the faculty who were less than enthusiastic Austritt fanatics.

After reading my dissertation he wrote to me:

Leaving aside your study a certain affinity occurred to me between Rav Weinberg and R. Jacob Emden.

To what you write about R. Weinberg’s responsum about co-education in the Yeshurun organization, I might add that in the late fifties I wrote to R. Weinberg asking him whether his p’sak was applicable to the Esra movement in Israel in which I was active. He never replied, but sent word by a messenger encouraging me to continue my educational activity without swerving to the right After his death I discovered that he had asked two of his students in Montreux to draft a response to my letter. The drafts are in my possession. They contradict each other. One of the two authors now teaches at a yeshiva in Bene Berak.

In his German volume on the history of German Orthodoxy, Breuer mentions that in R. Seligman Baer Bamberger’s synagogue there was no Frauengitter. I assumed that this meant that there was no mehitzah in the famed Wuerzberger Rav’s shul, and I wrote to him to inquire. He replied:

The “Frauengitter” mentioned in my note on p. 375 is the common German translation of mechitzah. It signifies some sort of lattice which was put on top of the parapet which surrounded the women’s gallery (or balcony). The parapet was low enough to allow the women to watch what was going on in the men’s hall downstairs. The lattice (“Gitter”) did not quite conceal the women from the men’s eyes; its significance was mainly symbolical. The lack of this lattice was one of the compromises made here and there with the Reform synagogues where women sat on the balcony, yet in full view of the men since there was no lattice.

This was very helpful to me since in the next issue of Milin Havivin I am publishing something relating to the great controversy in Frankfurt over who would succeed Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Breuer as rabbi of the Hirschian kehillah. Prof. Breuer’s uncle, Rabbi Raphael Breuer, was the rabbi of Aschaffenburg, and the family obviously wanted him to step into his father’s position. However, the members of the community refused to give him their support. One of the issues brought up against Rabbi Raphael was that his synagogue did not a proper mehitzah. I was unable to find any description of exactly what the problem was. Prof. Breuer could not recall either, although as a child he had been to the synagogue on a couple of occasions. He did, however, remind me that his uncle’s predecessor was R. Simcha Bamberger, a son of the Wuerzburger Rav. I therefore assume that the “problem” with the Aschaffenburg mehitzah was the lack of latticework on top of the partition.

After gaining so much from Professor Breuer, I was happy that I was able to give him a present — a copy of a manuscript letter from Hirsch. I didn’t even know what it said, as I found it impossible to read the old handwriting. He wrote to me as follows:

The letter is quite important. R. Hirsch was asked about the relative significance of the Sabbath in Jewish law. I guess the question arose through some discussion with German authorities. They compared the Sabbath to the Christian Sunday. R. Hirsch showed by citing biblical and rabbinical sources that in Jewish law and practice the Sabbath ranked much higher than any other day of rest or festival.

I had hoped that Breuer would be able to publish the letter himself, complete with an introduction. But alas, it was not meant to be. Beli neder, I shall do so.
Despite his age, Prof. Breuer was always prompt in answering all of my questions, and I will be forever grateful. I am also in his debt for another reason. No doubt realizing that he would not be able to write about everything in his files, he offered to give me unpublished material relating to the controversy over the talmudic commentaries of R. Joseph Zvi Duenner, chief rabbi of Amsterdam. Needless to say, I was thrilled, and I thank my friend, Aharon Wexler, who went to his house, picked up the material, and mailed it to me. I hope to be able to publish it before too long.

For those who don’t know, Duenner’s approach anticipated that of Halivni in some respects, primarily in the assumption that the answers given by the amoraim, while binding for halakhic purposes, are not necessarily the best explanation of the Mishnah. Duenner also pointed to a couple of passages in the Talmud — both of which are in the current daf yomi tractate — which he believed are interpolations from the heretics, intended to mock the rabbis. He claimed that the rabbis would never have discussed the case of one who falls off a roof and while landing on a woman has sex with her (a highly improbable scenario, to put it mildly), or that a holy sage would come into a new town and announce that he was looking for a wife for the night (Yevamot 37b, 54a). According to Duenner, these texts are the product of those intending to mock the rabbis, and were unfortunately taken by later scholars as authentic.

Breuer’s grandfather, Rabbi S. Z. Breuer, was one of the leading opponents of Duenner, going so far as to threaten to place him into herem if he didn’t stop publishing his hiddushim, and put the ones already in print into genizah. Duenner refused, and the threat of a herem was never carried out. His hiddushim were later reprinted by Mossad ha-Rav Kook, and some unpublished material was also included in this new edition.

Dr. Marc B. Shapiro holds the Weinberg Chair in Judaic Studies, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Scranton. He is the author of Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy: The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, 1884-1966 (London: Littman Library, 1999) previous posts at the Seforim blog include “Uncensored Books” and an obituary for Rabbi Yosef Buxbaum zt”l, founder and publisher of Machon Yerushalayim.

Notes:
[1] It is even more ironic that the bête noire of Hirsch and S. Z. Breuer, R. Mordechai Horovitz (the Matteh Levi), has a descendant, R. Baruch Horovitz, who runs the fairly haredi Dvar Yerushalayim Yeshiva. In fact, when Rabbi Horovitz reprinted the Matteh Levi in 1979, he received a haskamah from R. Yitzhak Yaakov Weiss, Av Beit Din of the Edah Haredit and a man far removed from the cultured and tolerant Orthodoxy of the Matteh Levi. (Of course, what some would call “tolerant Orthodoxy,” Hirsch and S.Z. Breuer regarded as fraudelent Orthodoxy.)

[2] See Mordechai Breuer, The “Torah-im-derekh-eretz” of Samson Raphael Hirsch (Jerusalem, New York, Feldheim, 1970)
[3] See Mordechai Breuer, Oholei Torah: The Yeshiva, Its Structure and History (Merkaz Zalman Shazar 2003)
[4] See my “A Letter of Criticism Directed Against the Yeshivah of Eisenstadt,” Ha-Maayan 34 (Tishrei, 5754 [1993]), 15-25 (in Hebrew).
[5] Ha-Rav Yonah Merzbach: Pirkei Hayyim, Darko U-Fe’alav (Bnei Brak, 2004)