[1] R. Elhanan Wasserman suggests that it makes no difference if a non-believer fulfills a mitzvah since he does not believe in the concept of mitzvot. See R. Elhanan’s Kovetz Ma’amarim ve-Iggerot (Jerusalem, 2000), vol. 1, p. 96. However, this does not mean that R. Elhanan would actually tell a non-believer that he can violate the Torah, and I am certain that he would encourage him to fulfill mitzvot, as a means of kiruv.

[4] In Yehudah Mirsky’s fantastic new book (which deserves all the accolades it has received), Rav Kook: Mystic in a Time of Revolution (New Haven, 2014), p. 38, he writes: “He [R. Kook] suggests that one may accept the findings of biblical criticism and still keep faith with tradition.” This sentence is poorly formulated as it implies that R. Kook thought that biblical criticism was acceptable. Yet this is not true, as all R. Kook was saying is that even if one unfortunately does accept the falsehoods of biblical criticism, this does not mean that he should then discard Torah observance.

[7] See here. R. Chaim Navon apparently approves of Cassutto’s contention that the Torah incorporates pagan mythological conceptions, such as the taninim referred to in Genesis 1:21. See Navon, “The Torah and Ancient Near Eastern Culture,” available here.

[9] See also R. Kook, Eder ha-Yekar, pp. 38-39. Regarding Torah mi-Sinai, and how some segments of the Modern Orthodox world have begun to accept aspects of Higher Criticism, see my post here.

In that post I wrote: “In the next installment of this series I will present further evidence that in some parts of the Modern Orthodox world the old taboo against Higher Criticism has begun to fade.” I have decided to incorporate this further material into an academic article. Once this appears, I will summarize matters on the Seforim Blog. But in the meantime, let me offer the following interesting example relevant to the wider subject (called to my attention by a reader). 

Ba’al ha-Turim to Lev. 1:1 states that because Moses was so modest, he did not want to write the word ויקרא, but instead ויקר which implies happenstance. God however told him that that he should also include the aleph at the end of the word, so Moses wrote this letter smaller than the other letters. In other words, this was done independently by Moses, without being told to do so by God. (The comment of Ba’al ha-Turim in the standard Mikraot Gedolot humashim is abridged. The entire comment can be seen in R. Yaakov Koppel Reinitz’s edition [Jerusalem, 1996]).

R. Akiva Eger, Teshuvot, Mahadura Kamma, Orah Hayyim no. 75, summarizes the Ba’al ha-Turim as follows:

R. Akiva Eger summarizes Ba’al ha-Turim as saying that when Moses did not want to write the word ויקרא, God told him to write the word with a small aleph. Yet this is not what Ba’al ha-Turim says. According to Ba’al ha-Turim, Moses made this decision on his own. The abridged version of the commentary available to R. Eger reads:

The person who alerted me to this assumes that this is a form of censorship, i.e., for dogmatic reasons R. Akiva Eger altered what Ba’al ha-Turim wrote. I think it is more likely that when he wrote his responsum he did not bother to check the actual words of Ba’al ha-Turim and simply misremembered, and thus unintentionally altered Ba’al ha-Turim’s explanation so that the provocative element was removed.

In the forthcoming article I will deal not merely with biblical criticism, but also with those who assume that the Torah is not necessarily teaching historical truths. One such example is R. Shlomo Riskin’s Oct. 14, 2014 devar Torah, available here After telling us that the Torah is “not interested in conveying literal and chronological facts in its story of creation,” R. Riskin writes:

Maimonides, in his Guide for the Perplexed, interprets all of the early biblical stories until the advent of Abraham as allegories, whose purpose is to convey moral lessons rather than historical fact.

What R. Riskin says about Maimonides is simply incorrect, as Maimonides does not say what he attributes to him. However, R. Riskin does reflect a common sentiment in the Modern Orthodox world that the first eleven chapters of Genesis (i.e., up until Abraham) are not to be understood as “history” in the way we think of it today. (Yet contrary to his point, other than the Garden of Eden story, I don’t think that there are many who would regard any of the other stories in the early Genesis chapters as allegories.)

It will be the task of Modern Orthodox theologians to explain why it not problematic to regard Gen. 1-11 as (prophetic) myth, and at the same time to insist that the events dealing with the Patriarchs are to be regarded as historical. Why the distinction?

R. Kook already stated that when it comes to determining which portions of the Torah’s narrative section should be taken literally, this is something that is left to the “clear feeling of the nation”. He also acknowledges, as I  have mentioned already, that the Torah’s descriptions could be in line with how matters were understood in ancient times, which need not be historically or scientifically accurate. See Iggerot ha-Re’iyah, vol. 2, p. 119:

Both of these sources from R. Kook have been cited by Tamar Ross in various publications, and I will deal with her position in my forthcoming article.

[10] Translation in Jerome (Yehuda) Gellman, “Judaism and Buddhism”, in Alon Goshen-Gottstein and Eugene Korn, eds. Jewish Theology and World Religions (Oxford, 2012), p. 315.

[11] See here where I discussed R. Kook’s suggestion that the future Sanhedrin could come up with new derashot to put an end to the practice of animal sacrifice.

[12] See my “Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits’s Halakic Vision for the Modern Age,” Shofar 31 (Summer 2013), pp. 16-36.

[13] R. Zvi Yehudah Kook stated that working the Land of Israel was the equivalent kiddush ha-shem as studying in yeshiva. See Hilah Wolberstein, Mashmia Yeshuvah (Merkaz Shapira, 2010), p. 248.

[14] Neriyah, Likutei ha-Re’iyah, vol. 1, p. 427.

[15] Quoted in R. Ze’ev Aryeh Rabiner, Or Mufla  (Tel Aviv, 1972), p. 80.

[16] In my post here I wrote: “There are, of course, many other differences between R. Soloveitchik and R. Kook. From the excerpt printed in The Rav Thinking Aloud, pp. 155-156, we see that the Rav regarded R. Kook as a saintly figure, but not as an intellectual great. Yet this impression was derived from one short conversation. All the gedolim who knew R. Kook had the exact opposite impression. They correctly saw that R. Kook was a master of the entire Torah, in all of its facets. I think you have to go back to Maharal, or perhaps even Nahmanides, to find such a wide-ranging Torah scholar as R. Kook.”

In addition to what I wrote, readers should be aware that R. Kook was quite ill when R. Soloveitchik spoke to him.

When The Rav Thinking Aloud was reprinted, what I refer to was deleted. Here is how it looks in the currently available edition.

[18] The title of R. Kook’s work is ערפלי טהר. How is one to pronounce the first word? I write Arpilei since in my experience this is how it is pronounced in Religious Zionist circles. It also appears this way in some machzorim (mussaf of Rosh ha-Shanah, at the beginning of Shofarot, in the paragraph (אתה נגלית. Most importantly (to me at least) is that R. Meir Mazuz states that the word is pronounced this way. See Ha-Mahzor Ha-Meduyak: Rosh ha-Shanah, at the end of לאוקמי גירסא which is found at the beginning of the volume. He sees ערפל (segol under the peh) as parallel to כרמל  (segol under the mem). In Isaiah 1:18 the latter word appears as וכרמלו, with a hirik under the mem.

Others write Arpelei, with a sheva under the peh, and intuitively this is what most would assume. This is also how the word is vocalized by R. Seraya Deblitzky, Tikun Tefilah (Bnei Brak, 2010), vol. 2, p. 27, and by the ArtScroll machzor. Wolf Heidenheim, Philip Birnbaum, and Daniel Goldschmidt, in their editions of the machzor, place a patah under the ayin and under the peh. They also do not put a dagesh in the peh, so ערפלי is pronounced Arfalei. Heidenheim explains some of his reasoning in the Rodelheim Machzor (1872), p. 63b, and says that his vocalization is “without any doubt the correct version”.

                       

Regarding the words ערפלי טהר, it is also worth noting that in Bereshit Rabbah 99:3 the following words appear: ערפלא טורא. When I first saw this I thought that there must be some connection to the Rosh ha-Shanah prayer, and this is indeed noted by Matenot Kehunah, ad loc. Yet the truth is that none of the commentaries really know what to make of these words, and it would appear to be a corrupt text. See Albeck’s note in his edition of Bereshit Rabbah, vol. 3, p. 1275.

This apparently means that R. Meir’s Torah scroll differered from the current Masoretic text. However, many traditional commentators assume that it is only referring to a note that R. Meir added to his personal copy of the Torah or to a book of his commentaries on the Torah.

[22] The book of Jubilees must have also been troubled by the plural ובני דן, as it provides us with the names of Dan’s other sons and tells us that they died in the year that they entered Egypt. See Jubilees 44:28-30.

                       

According to Sotah 10a Hushim killed Esau. However, the Jerusalem Talmud, Ketubot 1:5 and other rabbinic sources state that that Judah killed him. See S. Buber’s note to Aggadat Bereshit (Cracow, 1903), p. 160 n. 14. Tosafot, Gittin 55a s.v. bihudah, tries to reconcile the conflicting sources, but there are difficulties with this reconciliation. See Buber’s note referred to above. Regarding this matter, R. Samuel Jaffe, in his classic commentary on the Jerusalem Talmud, Yefeh Mar’eh (Venice, 1590), to Ketubot 1:7 (p. 264a), has quite a strange passage. In commenting on the text in the Jerusalem Talmud that Judah killed Esau, rather than note that this is disputed by the Babylonian Talmud, Jaffe writes:

Has anyone ever seen this type of language – וליתא – used with reference to a talmudic source? It is one thing to use the term וליתא when rejecting a view put forward by one’s contemporary, but here Jaffe is rejecting a passage in the Jerusalem Talmud.

[24] “The Rov zt”l: The Nigleh and the Nistar,” in Zev Eleff, ed., Mentor of Generations (Jersey City, N.J., 2008), pp. 262-263.

[25] For other versions of the story, see Nathan Kamenetsky, Making of a Godol (Jerusalem, 2002), vol. 2, pp. 1118ff. See also Otzrot ha-Sofer 14 (5764), for a story (really a fairy tale) about how the Malbim came to the Hatam Sofer to request a haskamah. He falsely told the Hatam Sofer that the haskamah was for a book of his teacher when it was actually for a book the Malbim wrote. When the Hatam Sofer learnt of this deception, he declared that the Malbim’s life would bring him no peace, which is indeed what would later happen. 

[1] ArtScroll and other publishers should pay close attention to the words of Rabbenu Tam, which I would have thought would be enough to scare off the censors. Sefer ha-Yashar, ed. Rosenthal (Berlin, 1898), p. 75:

ומגיהי חנם, בעיני דינם, למדורי גהינם

P. 105:

כי כאשר לא יודעים, העולם מטעים, וכאשר תוהים, הספרים מגיהים. ואתם הרעות מהם, כי הם כותבים ה”ג בהגהותיהם, ולכן ניכר מעבדיהם. ואתה לא כן, אך סותם הגהותיך וסומכים עליך וטועים . . . אין עצה ואין תבונה, רק להעמיד על האמת ולזרוק מרה במגיהי הספרים

Even if they are not scared of מדורי גהינם, one would have thought that they would have seen the wisdom of what Rabbenu Tam writes in the introduction to Sefer ha-Yashar, ed. Schlesinger (Jerusalem, 1985), p. 9:

והדין נותן אם לא ידע אדם הלכה יכתוב פתרונו לפי ראות עיניו אם ירצה אך בספרים אל ימחק שדברי תורה עניים במקומן ועשירים במקום אחר ואם דבר רק הוא ממנו הוא [רק]

                       

[2] Sefer Bereshit, trans. Asher Wasserteil (Bnei Brak, 1969), pp. 26-27. Hoffmann writes as follows:

כמו גם פרשנים חדשים רבים הוא [רשב”ם] סבר, שבימי מעשה בראשית נמנו הימים באופן שונה מדרך מנייתם לאחר מכן, בימי מתן תורה, כשם שגם תחילת השנה לפני מתן תורה שונה – לדעת ר’ אליעזר – מזו שלאחריו.

[3] Emet le-Yaakov (Cleveland Heights, 2007), p. 17.

[4] Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem, 1998), p. 28.

[5] As far as I know, the first one to assert that Rashbam’s comments are heretical interpolations was R. Yehudah Nachshoni, Hagut be-Farashiyot ha-Torah (Bnei Brak, 1981), vol. 1, p. 262, but this had no impact on the haredi world. Here is the page from Nachshoni.

He writes:

לדעתו יש לחשוש שמא חלו ידי קראים בדברי הרשב”ם

What this means is that Ibn Ezra thought that perhaps Rashbam’s metaphorical interpretation of the commandment of tefillin in Ex. 13:9 is a Karaite interpolation. This is complete nonsense as Ibn Ezra says nothing of the sort. I think, therefore, that there is a typo and the first word should read לדעתי. It is still nonsense but at least now the sentence is understandable. Following this, Nachshoni adds another absurdity, stating that Rashbam’s interpretation of when the day starts is also a Karaite interpolation. (Prof. Daniel Lasker has confirmed to me that all Karaites began the Sabbath on Friday night.)

Now comes the real irony. ArtScroll published a posthumous translation of Nachshoni’s book in 1988. Apparently ArtScroll was embarrassed by what Nachshoni wrote so ArtScroll censored it! Here is the English version, Studies in the Weekly Parashah, vol. 2, pp. 414-415.

In 1988 ArtScroll censored the writings of Nachshoni because he said that Rashbam’s comments were heretical interpolations, but in 2014 ArtScroll accepted this very position and instead censored Rashbam! Can it get any crazier than this?

As an aside, let me also note that I find it strange that ArtScroll does not give Nachshoni the title “Rabbi” on the title page of its translation of his book, even though he is referred to as such in the preface.

[6] It is possible that the haredi publishers who censored Rashbam did so purely for financial reasons. After putting a lot of money into their editions, a pashkevil directed against them, incited by some extremist, could be financially devastating. In the haredi world it is often enough to say that there is a “problem” with a book for people not to buy it. The masses won’t have a clue about the issue, but if there is a choice between two competing mikraot gedolots, they will feel safer buying the one which has not had any questions raised about it.

[7] (Kislev-Tevet 5760), p. 150.

[8] Ibid., pp. 151-155.

[9] I don’t have the newly published ArtScroll mikraot gedolot on Exodus (and will refuse to buy it until Rashbam’s commentary is fixed). I was curious if Rashbam on Ex. 13:9 appears in full or if it too was censored. Here Rashbam states that the commandment of tefillin in this verse: והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך, is to be understood metaphorically. Ibn Ezra, in his commentary on Ex.13:9, harshly criticizes the metaphorical interpretation. A friend sent me a copy of this page of Rashbam and the commentary appears in full. I did notice, however, that in the following verse in Rashbam, Ex. 13:10, it reads חוקת הפסח with a dagesh in the kuf. This is a mistake, and in the next printing the dagesh should be removed.

If ArtScroll is looking for something to censor in the newly released volume, Or ha-Hayyim to Ex. 31:16 probably fits the bill. In this controversial passage Or ha-Hayyim states that we don’t violate Shabbat to save the life of someone who will not live until the next Shabbat. This contradicts an explict talmudic passage, Yoma 85a, that one violates Shabbat even for hayyei sha’ah. See R. Ovadiah Yosef, Hazon Ovadiah: Shabbat, vol. 3, pp. 296ff. R. Judah Aryeh Leib Alter, Sefat Emet: Likutim (New York, 1957), p. 77a (Ki Tisa), already suggested that an “erring student” wrote these words in Or ha-Hayyim.

[10] It appears in Kerem Hemed 4 (1839), pp. 160-161.       

[11] See Aharon Mondshine, “Li-She’elat ha-Yahas she-Bein Perusheihem shel R. Avraham Ibn Ezra ve-Rashbam la-Torah: Behinah Mehudeshet,” Teudah 16-17 (2010), p. 17.

[12]  Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra (Warsaw, 1894), vol. 1, part 2, p. 45 n. 4.

[13] In the previous post I noted four examples of ArtScroll’s censorship with regard to Rashbam’s peshat  understanding of when the day begins: Gen. 1:4, 5, 8, 31. I neglected to mention Rashbam’s commentary to Gen. 1:6 which is also censored by Artscroll. Regarding why Rashbam’s commentary to the first three parashiyot of Genesis were missing from the manuscript, see Itamar Kislev in Tarbiz 73 (2004), p. 229 n. 12.

[14] Torah Shelemah, vol. 10-11, pp. 276-279.

[15] Hiddushei Hatam Sofer to Shabbat 87a. R. Akiva Eger points out that R. Horowitz’s position leads to a very interesting conclusion. Here is the summary in R. Yaakov Moshe Shurkin’s commentary to Teshuvot Rabbi Akiva Eger (Lakewood, 2003), vol. 2, p. 769 (Pesakim, no. 121):

וכתב רבינו דלפי חידושו של הפנים יפות הנ”ל, דדין עכו”ם ששבת חייב מיתה הוא ביום ולילה שלאחריו, יש להמליץ זכות על אלו שבאו להתגייר ומרגילים את עצמם לשמור את השבת גם קודם שנתגיירו כנ”ל, די”ל שאינם עוברים בזה באיסור דעכו”ם ששבת, דסגי להו אם יעשו מלאכה במוצאי שבת, וכדברי הפנים יפות הנ”ל. ואין צריך למחות בשפחות הנ”ל מלשבות בשבת.

[16] Tziyun le-Nefesh Hayah to Pesahim 116b.

[17]  “Midot ha-Parshanut ha-Mikrait,” Sura 1 (1954), p. 396.

[18] Be’er Moshe (Lod, 1994), p. 14. He also questions R. Horowitz’s position by citing Mishnah, Hullin 5:5:

                  

מה יום אחד האמור במעשה בראשית היום הולך אחר הלילה

Rashbam could easily reply that the Mishnah is not speaking in terms of peshat. However, I am surprised that neither R. Horowitz nor R. Landau discuss this text which would appear to contradict their approach, as they assume that the Talmud agrees that before the giving of the Torah night came after day.

[19] Keter Nehora (Jerusalem, 2004), p. 114.

[20] (Berlin, 1848), vol. 1, p. 35 (2:17).

[21] “Hagdarat Zemanei ha-Yom ve-ha-Laylah al pi Halakhah u-Mahashavah” Or Yisrael (Nisan 5770), pp. 226ff.

[22] Sihot Kodesh (1967), part 2, sihah from 12 Tamuz 5727, p. 284.

[23] “Be-Inyan ha-me-Et le-Et shel Ma’aseh Bereshit,” Ha-Maor (Oct. 1957), pp. 4ff.

[24] This source was also noted by R. Abraham Elijah Kaplan. See Divrei Talmud (Jerusalem, 1958), vol. 1, p. 42 n. 97:

וזה מזכיר דברי רשב”ם שנלחם בם ראב”ע במחברתו אגרת השבת

[25] Kaplin, Keter Nehora, p. 115, also refers to this commentary to Nazir.

[26] (Be’er Sheva, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 26-27.

[27] Peshatim u-Ferushim (Mainz, 1888),  pp. 9-10

[28] Le-Misbar Kera’e (Bnei Brak, 2005),  p. 49.

[29] Derashot Beit Yishai (n.p., 2004), p. 48 n. 11.

[30] E-mail of this student to me.

[31] Commentary to Genesis, p. 33 in the standard edition.

[32] Regarding the Mishawites, see Zvi Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium (Jerusalem, 1968), pp. 372-416. Regarding whether the Dead Sea Sect started the Sabbath on Saturday morning, see Lawrence Schiffman, The Halakhah at Qumran (Leiden, 1975), pp. 84-85. See also Jacob Z. Lauterbach, Rabbinic Essays (Cincinnati, 1951), pp. 446ff.

[33] See The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela, ed. Adler (London, 1907), pp. 17-18 (Hebrew), p. 15 (English).

[34] Here is the page listing the texts used in preparation of the ArtScroll mikraot gedolot for the Book of Genesis.

There is no mention of the Mossad ha-Rav Kook editions, perhaps because of copyright concerns. But there is no doubt that in preparing its text of the mikraot gedolot, an important source for ArtScroll for the commentaries of Ibn Ezra, Ramban, Hizkuni, R. Bahya ben Asher, and Sforno were the Mossad ha-Rav Kook editions (and perhaps also Bar Ilan’s Mikraot Gedolot ha-Keter).

For instance, look at the description of Hizkuni. The page from ArtScroll states that its text is based on the first printing and the manuscript thought to be from the author. This is exactly what one finds in Chavel’s edition of Hizkuni published by Mossad ha-Rav Kook. Does anyone really think that ArtScroll compared, line by line, the first printed edition to the manuscript? This work was already done by Chavel. All ArtScroll had to do was use the text provided by Mossad ha-Rav Kook. So how come ArtScroll can’t tell us this, and instead puts on this charade?

ArtScroll does not mention consulting manuscripts with any of the other texts included in its mikraot gedolot, only with the ones already published by Mossad ha-Rav Kook. ArtScroll also says that its edition of Hizkuni is based on the first printing, Cremona 1559. Yet the first printing was in Venice 1524. ArtScroll simply repeated Chavel’s mistake. See Chavel’s introduction to his edition, p. 11.

The title Hizkuni (which I don’t italicize since it is now used as a personal name) comes from the author’s introductory poem to the work. Here is the relevant page from the Chavel edition and on line 7 you can see the word vocalized.

Louis Jacobs, Jewish Biblical Exegesis (New York, 1973), p. 69, claims that the word should be vocalized as Hazekuni, which is the piel plural imperative (“strengthen me”; dagesh in zayin, sheva under zayin). R. Chaim Mordechai Brecher made the same point. See G. Kressel, ed., Ha-Ahim Shulsinger (Jerusalem, 1986), p. 119. I don’t see why this is preferable as Hizkuni is also correct, as the kal plural imperative, and the kal imperative is actually much more common in the Bible than the piel imperative. Furthermore, Hizkuni rhymes better with yizkeruni, the parallel word in the poem. Finally, look at the sentence in its entirety

ויקרא שמו בישראל חזקוני, למען קוראיו בשמו יזכרוני

This means that one who pronounces the title of the book, Hizkuni, will be reminded of the name of the author, Hizkiyah. This mnemonic only works if the title of the book has a hirik under the het, like in the author’s name. See A. Ben Ezra in Kressel, ed. Ha-Ahim Shulsinger, p. 119.

Here is the introductory poem from ArtScroll’s edition. The word חזקוני is missing a dagesh in the zayin which means that ArtScroll understood it as an imperative. (Chavel places a dagesh in the zayin, meaning that he understood it as  piel plural perfect.)

Look at the third line from the bottom on p. 8 where ArtScroll has

ומבואר [נ”א: ומכוער]

Anyone who understands Hebrew can see that ומבואר is incorrect (and this error also appears in the Venice 1524 edition). When ArtScroll prepared its mikraot gedolot it had Chavel’s edition in front of it. Chavel’s edition is based on what appears to be the manuscript of the author. In this manuscript (which ArtScroll claims to have consulted) one finds the reading ומכוער. So how come this is not the word that appears in the text published by ArtScroll? This is the original reading, not a נוסח אחר. (At best, ArtScroll could have put ומבואר in brackets, but why would this even be necessary in a non-critical edition?) If ArtScroll thinks that it is important to cite the Cremona reading, then how come immediately following this it doesn’t have כי מי ימצא בו דבר חכמה מפואר. As you can see, this is what appears in the Cremona text, and again, one who knows Hebrew will realize that it doesn’t make much sense.

In the manuscript, which is the basis of Chavel’s version, the text reads אשר ימצא בו דבר חכמה מפואר. This is what appears in ArtScroll, with no indication that there is an alternative text. So why did ArtScroll feel the need to add [נ”א: ומכוער] in the previous part of the sentence? Is this just a way of showing the reader that ArtScroll is “scientific” and has examined the different versions?

If you compare ArtScroll’s version of the introductory poem to that which appears in Chavel’s edition, which is based on the manuscript, you will find that other than the example just mentioned, ArtScroll relies entirely on the mistaken text from the Cremona edition instead of using the correct version from the manuscript. Just skimming through the commentary I found other examples where ArtScroll ignores the manuscript reading in favor of the Cremona edition. I don’t know why ArtScroll did this, but it again shows that ArtScroll’s new edition of mikraot gedolot was not properly edited. 

I also found what I think is a punctuation mistake in ArtScroll’s edition of the poem. See the page from Chavel printed above, the second column, second to last line: ובעיני א-להים יישר. Chavel punctuates יישר as a pual imperfect. ArtScroll punctuates it as a kal imperfect. Because of the rhyming, I think Chavel is correct.

The issue of how ArtScroll uses works of prior scholarship requires a more detailed study than I can provide here. I would, however, like to point to one problematic aspect. Let us look briefly at ArtScroll’s Five Megillos, the earliest ArtScroll publication. ArtScroll is very proud of the fact that it only uses traditional rabbinic sources. On the first page of the commentary to each of the five megillot, we are informed that all material in square brackets is a comment from the author, which we are to assume is an original insight.

Here is ArtScroll’s commentary to Ruth 4:10.

Now read what appears in the Soncino commentary to Ruth 4:10.

ArtScroll’s entire comment is lifted from Soncino. Quite apart from the plagiarism, I find it troubling that ArtScroll feels that Soncino is good enough to be used, just not good enough to be mentioned by name. (When ArtScroll changed some of Soncino’s wording, a mistake crept in. Soncino has “sacred duty of building a home.” ArtScroll intended to change this to “sacred task of building a home,” but instead of “task” it reads “text”.)

After David Farkas called this example to my attention, it did not take me long to find other examples, of which I offer two. Here is Soncino’s commentary to Ruth 4:1.

Now look at ArtScroll on this same verse.

It is obvious that Soncino is the basis for what is found in ArtScroll. (Note the words “fairly large edifice” in both Soncino and ArtScroll.) 

Here is Soncino’s commentary to Esther 2:20.

Now look at ArtScroll on this same verse

Again, it is obvious that Soncino is the basis for what is found in ArtScroll. (Note the words “filial piety” in both Soncino and ArtScroll.)

[10] See R. Eitam Henkin’s (unsigned) review of this edition in Alonei Mamre 120 (2007), pp. 119-124. The Hafetz Hayyim was aware of the fact that the popularity of the Mishnah Berurah led to a decline in study of the Magen Avraham. See Meir Einei Yisrael (Bnei Brak, 2004), vol. 5, p. 403.

[11] One reader called my attention to Tory Vandeventer Pearman, Women and Disability in Medieval Literature (New York, 2010), p. 80, who discusses how cutting off the nose of an adulterous woman was a common punishment and parallel to male castration. R. Menachem Sheinkopf reminded me of Hut ha-Meshulash (Munkacs, 1984), p. 38a, which records how the Hatam Sofer in his youth witnessed the sentencing to death of an informer. This text was deleted from the next edition of Hut ha-Meshulash. See Meir Hildesheimer, “The Attitude of the Hatam Sofer toward Moses Mendelssohn,” PAAJR 60 (1994), p. 155 n. 50. It is also reported that as a youth, the Hatam Sofer personally killed an anti-Semite. See Siah Sarfei Kodesh (Bnei Brak, 1989), vol. 4, p. 154. (I don’t think that this report has any substance).

[12] One example I have often given to illustrate this was that today every rabbi will be happy to speak about how Judaism opposes slavery, and that the slavery mentioned in the Torah was far removed from the slavery in pre-Civil War days. Yet two hundred years ago, plenty of rabbis would have found nothing objectionable with Southern slavery. (When I write “every rabbi” in the first sentence of this note, it is an exaggeration. See my post here. See also R. Avigdor Miller, Q&A, vol. 2, p. 12, that it was a mistake for Lincoln to free the slaves, as they could have used another 50 or 100 years of slavery in order to “civilize” them.)

[13] Published in Mordechai Wilensky, ed., Hasidim u-Mitnagdim (Jerusalem, 1970), vol.. 2 p. 117. This strange passage is mentioned by David Biale, Eros and the Jews (Berkeley, 1997), p. 125.

[14] Wilensky leaned in this direction, see ibid., p. 112.

[15] Ibid., p. 120.

[16] Ibid., p. 119.

[17] (Jerusalem, 1910), p. 51b (second pagination)
[18] Mishnah, Sotah  1:5.

[19] Ibid. Although the Mishnah states אם היה לבה נאה this is obviously a euphemism for breasts. As is to be expected, R. Jacob Emden, Lehem Shamayim, ad loc., has something to say on this passage. How does the kohen know that she has attractive breasts, to know whether or not they can be revealed? Emden states that he heard as much from her husband. But this answer does not satisfy him, for סתם אשה כל יופי שלה שם הוא. As support for this notion, he cites Berakhot 10b שאחזה בהוד יפיה, which Rashi explains to mean “breasts” If he was more of a fan of the Zohar perhaps he would have cited Zohar, Bereshit 45a: ושפירו דאתתא באינון שדים . Zohar, Shemot 80b, states

ר’ אבא פתח (שיר השירים, ח,ח) אחות לנו קטנה ושדים אין לה מה נעשה לאחותנו ביום שידובר בה. אחות לנו קטנה דא כנסת ישראל דאקרי אחות לקב”ה. ושדים אין לה היינו דתנינן בשעתא דקריבו ישראל לטורא דסיני לא הוה בהון זכוון ועובדין טבין לאגנא עלייהו דכתיב ושדים אין לה דהא אינון תקונא ושפירו דאתתא ולית שפירו דאתתא אלא אינון

See also R. Yitzhak Ratsaby, Olat Yitzhak, vol. 2, p. 390. The second quote from the Zohar shows the importance of understanding the literal meaning of Song of Songs in order to appreciate the allegory.

[20] See Mishneh Torah, Tum’at Tzara’at 9:12.

[21] Pesakim u-Khetavim, Yoreh Deah no. 99 (p. 327). On this page R. Herzog also states we should require all ba’alei teshuvah, especially public Sabbath violators, to immerse themselves in the mikveh. This is the upshot of the Vilna Gaon’s comment to Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 268:30.

[22] Commentary to Ex. 13:9.

[1] In my post here I refer to R. Hirschensohn’s comment that a lamdan is one for whom a difficult Rashi or Rambam keeps him up at night. I noted that this is something R. Soloveitchik would certainly agree with. I now see that R. Soloveitchik actually said that he would wake up in the middle of the night and start answering talmudic difficulties that had troubled him all day. See R. Baruch Simon, Imrei Barukh (New York, 2005), vol. 1, pp. 124-125.

[2] Mehuyavut Yehudit be-Olam Moderni (Jerusalem and Ramat-Gan, 2003), pp. 299-300.

[3] See Aryeh Morgenstern’s informative article “Mishpahat Hirschensohn u-Vesorat ha-Haskalah ve-ha-Modernah bi-Yerushalayim,” Katedra 108 (2003), pp. 105-130.

[4] For examples of his early thought, see Sukkat Shalom, pp. 149ff (Hebrew numerals), where he defends the antiquity of the Zohar; p. 153a for his belief in the existence of demons.

[5] See Hirschensohn, Musagei Shav ve-ha-Emet (Jerusalem, 1932), p. 120 (second numbering).

[6] In my forthcoming book I deal with what R. Kook says about Spinoza. While significant in their own right, R. Kook’s words cannot be regarded as a defense of Spinoza. See also R. Jacob Moses Harlap’s recently published comments on Spinoza, Mei Marom (Jerusalem, 2012), vol. 18, p. 68.

[7] See here where Steven Nadler discusses a recent unsuccessful attempt to have the ban on Spinoza lifted. This would only be symbolic since there is really no such thing as a herem on a dead person. See the earlier discussion of R. Isaac Herzog, Pesakim u-Khetavim, vol. 5, no. 111. He concludes that even if there was a ban against the books (meaning that one who read them would be placed in herem), it no longer is applicable. R. Herzog does note, of course, that the prohibition on reading heretical literature still applies.

[8] Rabbi Jeremy Wieder has stated regarding ikarei emunah: “I know that there are many who would say it’s whatever that, we poskin like the Rambam. I’m not sure who poskins like the Rambam. I don’t know that the Shulhan Arukh ever issued such a pesak.” He then states that it is not certain that we accept the Rambam’s view that one who thinks God has physical characteristics is a heretic, as it could be that Rabad is correct.

Listen here beginning at minute 12:50.

In Limits and in previous posts I have cited authorities who, while they accept Maimonides’ ikarim, reject his view that someone who doesn’t believe in one of his principles, because he doesn’t know any better, is a heretic. They assume that there is a concept of kefirah be-shogeg, and believe that this is what Rabad’s point is in his hassagah to Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7. R. Chaim Rapoport has called my attention to the fact that the Lubavitcher Rebbe also accepted this position. See Iggerot Kodesh, vol. 22, pp. 33-34.

[9] The example comes from R. Abraham Hayyim Michelson, Ohel Avraham, p. 28b. See also R. Aryeh Zev Ginzberg, Divrei Hakhamim, pp. 286-287.

[10] Apiryon 2 (1925), p. 100 (no. 67).

[11] Guide 2:42.

[12] See Simhah Assaf, Ha-Onshin Aharei Hatimat ha-Talmud (Jerusalem, 1922), p. 69, who points out that the event described by R. Asher took place ten years after the Rashba died, thus proving that the responsum is a forgery. See also José Faur, In the Shadow of History (New York, 1992), p. 227 n. 82, who surprisingly assumes that Besamim Rosh, no. 301, is authentic. This responsum is actually one of the most notorious of Berlin’s forgeries.

[13] Ha-Onshin, p. 69.

[14] For a discussion of this responsum, see Jonathan Ray, The Sephardic Frontier (Ithaca, 2006), pp. 119ff. On p. 173 Ray writes: “Frustrated with their relative powerlessness against Jews who pursued relations with Gentile women, rabbinic authorities called for others to attack transgressors who they caught in such activity.” His sources for this statement are Zikhron Yehudah, no. 63 and R. Jonah Gerondi, Sha’arei Teshuvah, Gate 3, no. 131. Yet Zikhron Yehudah is explicit that the punishment has to be carried out by the beit din. On the other hand, R. Jonah quotes the law of kana’in pog’in bo and does not say that it is no longer applicable. This could indeed be seen as a call to kill transgressors.Israel Zinberg, A History of Jewish Literature, vol. 7, p. 164, quotes R. Isaac ben Elyakim’s (17th century) Yiddish book Lev Tov, which indeed does give license to kill transgressors:

For the sin of lying with a gentile woman is more grievous than adultery with a Jewess, and anyone who finds a man lying with a gentile woman may freely kill him. Indeed, it is a great mitzvah to slay him immediately, and it is like bringing him as a sacrifice, as Pinehas did. There is no need to give him any warning. Also, there is no need to obtain permission from any rabbi or from any judge or from any leader of the community, but whoever finds him . . . should kill him at once. One who slays him without judgment and without legal proceedings does a great mitzvah.

[15] Although in the current post and in the earlier post I deal with physical punishments (other than execution and lashes) in Spain, this was not the only place where this was done. The Bible, Judges 1:6, already mentions cutting off the thumbs and large toes of the defeated Canaanite king. R. Moses Isserles, Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 388:10, refers to blinding a moser or cutting out his tongue. R. Shalom Shachna, R. Isserles’ father-in-law, had an actual case in which he permitted blinding and cutting out the tongue of an evildoer. See She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharam Lublin, no. 138. This responsum is deleted from the Warsaw, 1881 edition of the responsa, but is found in the earlier editions which have the title Manhir Einei Hakhamim. R. Meir of Lublin tells us that R. Shalom Shachna’s ruling had a negative result in the end, as the man ended up apostatizing and marrying a Christian, and he and his children caused problems for the Jewish community. R. Solomon Luria was also a student of R. Shalom Shachna and he too reports this case and how after the punishment the man caused problems. See Yam Shel Shlomo, Yevamot 10:20:

ראיתי בימי שתקלה גדול’ בא לישראל ממעשה כזה שנקרו עניו [!] וחתכו לשונו שיצא אחר כך מן הכלל, מבוכה גדולה בישראל לולי רוב רחמיו וחסדיו שנתן לנו יתברך חנינה.

In order to prevent such occurrences, both R. Meir of Lublin and R. Luria reject the punishments of blinding and cutting out tongues, believing that when necessary the wicked one should simply be killed. R. Luria writes:

ונראה לי הלכה למעשה לדון כל מוסר רבים ומגזם לרבים ומוחזק לכך לאבדו אפי’ בידים ולא לחוס עליו בנפש אבל לא לחתוך לשונו ולנקר עיניו אלא לאבד הרע מקרבנו ואדרבא בזה איכא למיחש וקרוב לודאי שיתפקר ביותר ויפרוק עול ויצא חוץ לדת כדי לנקום נקם ויעליל ח”ו על ישראל ליבדה מלבו דברים שלא היו

R. Meir of Rothenburg stated that it is permitted to amputate the arm of one who continuously beats his wife. See She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharam Rothenburg, ed. Bloch (Budapest, 1895), no. 81. The same ruling is quoted in the name of R. Simhah of Speyer in Beit Yosef, Even ha-Ezer 154 (end). Already R. Huna recommended cutting off the hand of one who continuously struck others. See Sanhedrin 58b.

R. Jacob Weil (fifteenth century) of Germany ruled that it was permitted to gouge out someone’s eyes who violated Shabbat and Yom Kippur. See She’elot u-Teshuvot Mahari Veil (Jerusalem, 1959), section Dinin ve-Halakhot (at the end of the volume), no. 58.

R. Tzemah Gaon tells us that with a kohen who married a divorcee and there was a fear that he would perform the priestly blessing (which he was now forbidden to do), they would cut off the top of his fingers. See Halakhot Pesukot (Cracow, 1893), no. 84.

ואי הוו חיישין דאזיל לדוכתא אחריתא ופריס ידיה הוו קצין ליה לראש אצבעותיה וקבעין ביה מומא דלא ליפריס ידיה

See also Sha’arei Teshuvah (Leipzig, 1858), no. 177. This ruling is recorded in Beit Yosef, Even ha-Ezer 6 (citing Orhot Hayyim).The penalty of blinding a murderer is mentioned in Sanhedrin 27a (see Rashi who assumes that this is the meaning of the passage). Blinding oneself was also occasionally used as a preventative measure to keep one from sin. A geonic source tells us that R. Joseph and R. Sheshet blinded themselves for this reason. See Sha’arei Teshuvah, no. 178. According to Yalkut Shimoni, Bereshit, parashah 49, remez 161 (p. 848 in the Mossad ha-Rav Kook edition), R. Matya ben Heresh blinded himself for the same reason.

Regarding cutting a tongue out, see also R. Moses Hagiz, Mishnat Hakhamim (Czernowitz, 1864), no. 405, who tells the story of a rabbi and martyr who was tortured before being killed. When it was decreed that his tongue would be cut out, he stated that this was a punishment for him having learnt Latin and other non-Jewish languages.

While we are on the subject of harsh physical punishments, let me call attention to R. Yitzhak Nahman Eshkoli, Tza’ar Ba’alei Hayyim be-Halakhah u-ve-Aggadah (Ofakim, 2002), p. 261, who cites a contemporary opinion that when dealing with an eved kena’ani who has not yet had milah and tevilah, if necessary one can remove one of his limbs! (Obviously, this is no more than a theoretical point resulting from a “hiddush”.)

שישראל שקנה נכרי כדי שיהא עבדו, אך עדיין לא מל ולא טבל לשם עבדות, יהא מותר הישראל לחתוך את יד הנכרי כדי לכתוב עליה גט

We all know that you need to do everything you can to save another’s life. Let’s say an evil ruler tells you that he is going to kill another Jew, and if you agree to let him chop off your arm he will spare the person’s life. Are you obligated to give up your arm to save another? R. David Ibn Zimra, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, no. 1052, discusses this question and concludes that you are not obligated, although to do so would be an act of hasidut. (This responsum is often cited in halakhic discussions of living organ donations.) I am sure readers are not surprised with this answer, yet R. Menahem Recanati records that some did think that he would be obligated to sacrifice a limb. See Sefer Recanati (Petrokov, 1894), no. 470. Radbaz’s responsum is actually in response to what Recanati writes, and Radbaz states the following important point, which is simply a matter of “sevara”.

דכתיב דרכיה דרכי נועם וצריך שמשפטי תורתינו יהיו מסכימים אל השכל והסברא ואיך יעלה על דעתנו שיניח אדם לסמא את עינו או לחתוך את ידו או רגלו כדי שלא ימיתו את חבירו

However, I wonder, is it really true what Radbaz says, that the laws of the Torah have to be in accord with sekhel and sevara?

[16] See Sanhedrin 35b.

[17] See R. Jacob Meshulam Ginzberg, Mishpatim le-Yisrael  (Jerusalem, 1956), p. 23 n. 158. See, however, this page from R. Reuven Margaliyot, Margaliyot ha-Yam, vol. 1, p. 91b (to Sanhedrin 46a), which reports the killing of a moser in the nineteenth century, and this indeed took place on Yom Kippur. The rabbi mentioned in this report, R. Joshua Kluger, served as rav in Greiding, Poland, from 1850-1885. See Zvi Horowitz, Le-Toldot ha-Kehilot be-Polin (Jerusalem, 1978), p. 194.

Now that you have had a chance to read the passage from R. Margaliyot, please look at the following pages from R. Moshe Blau’s Mishnat Moshe on Sanhedrin (Bnei Brak, 1989), pp. 152-153. It is completely lifted from Margaliyot ha-Yam, including the story that R. Margaliyot heard from his father!

 

Here is a page from Mishnat Moshe on Rosh ha-Shanah, p. 89. Blau writes

והנה מ”ש בדברנו בס’ משנת משה על מסכת סנהדרין

and then once again prints the same text from Margaliyot ha-Yam, without any indication of where it comes from.

I understand plagiarism, but I don’t understand how Blau can refer to אבי מורי ז”ל when the person who told the story is not his father?

[18] R. Asher also states that the person in question, who caused Jewish monetary losses, could be killed without witnesses or warning or any ruling by a beit din.

אין צריך עדים והתראה למסור אלא רק השומע מפיו שהוא מגזם להפסיד ממון של ישראל ולמסור בידי ע”א

[19] The entire section of the responsum I discuss here was not included in the first edition, Constantinople 1517, or in the second edition, Venice 1552. It is included in the Venice 1607 edition.

[20] For detailed discussion of the halakhic status of the am ha’aretz, see R. Nahman Shlomo Greenspan, Mishpat ha-Am ha-Aretz be-Sifrut ha-Halakhah be-Khol Tekufoteha (Jerusalem, 1946). See also Eliezer Zweigel, Sanegor (Warsawk 1885), pp. 164ff., and Adolph Buechler, Am ha-Aretz ha-Gelili (Jerusalem, 1964). For my earlier comments about the am ha’aretz, see my post here.

R. Solomon ben Adret, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba, vol. 3, no. 314, goes so far as to say

וכולי עלמא השתא כעמי הארץ שהרוב אינן בני תורה

See also Beit Kelm (Bnei Brak, 2014), vol. 3, pp. 174-175.

[21] As part of his effort to delegitimize rabbinic Judaism, the notorious missionary Alexander McCaul referred to this text in his Netivot Olam (London, 1870), ch. 1. R. Isaac Margulies, Maoz ha-Talmud (Vilna, 1869), responded that it doesn’t mean that one can kill an am ha’aretz.

“ע”ה מותר לנוחרו” משמעו כך, שהע”ה מצד עצמו הנהו מותר, כלומר מתחייב בנפשו, אבל אין אדם בארץ שיהיה מותר להרגהו

[22] See also Hiddushei ha-Ran, ad loc.

[23] No. 203.

[24] Dov Halbertal, Erekh ha-Hayyim ba-Halakhah (Jerusalem, 2004), vol. 1, p. 232.

[25] Netivot Olam, ed. Pardes (Jerusalem, 1982), Netiv ha-Torah, ch. 15, p. 153.

[26] Ibid., pp. 158ff.

[27] She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba, vol. 1, no. 416. This doesn’t mean that the Rashba never cited philosophers. One of the places he cites Aristotle is in his Mishmeret ha-Bayit, printed in Torat ha-Bayit, ed. Brun (Jerusalem, 2010), vol. 1, cols. 360-361. Readers might recall that in my last post I spoke about people who not only don’t know, but don’t know that they don’t know, and referred to Plotinus in this regard. I neglected to mention that the Rashba refers to Aristotle as mentioning this phenomenon.

אמר הכותב המחבר בקי ברפואות יותר ממנו שיודע שאינו יודע אבל הוא אינו יודע ואינו יודע שאינו יודע וכבר אמר החכם ארסטו כי מי שאינו יודע שאינו יודע, אינו יודע

Samuel David Luzzatto also refers to the concept. See his letter quoted in Ephraim Chamiel, Ha-Derekh ha-Memutza’at: Reshit Tzemihat ha-Datiyut ha-Modernit (Jerusalem, 2011), p. 318:

הנה זה יתרון גדול שמצאתי לאיש ההמוני על האיש אשר התפלסף, כי הוא מכיר בעצמו שלא ידע, והאחר חושב שידע מה שלא ידע

See also R. Simhah Zissel of Kelm quoted in Beit Kelm, vol. 3, pp. 12, 214.

[28] See R. Avraham Hayyim Dov Levin,  Otzar Iggerot Kodesh (Jerusalem, 1952), no. 84 (who compares this to killing an am ha’aretz); R. Yeshayah Asher Zelig Miller in Or Yisrael 44 (Tamuz 5766), pp. 241-242; R. A. Biener in Or Yisrael 45 (Tishrei 5767), p. 247. R. Abraham Bornstein of Sochatchov wrote that the forged Besamim Rosh should be burnt on Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat, but this was censored from his published responsa. See Z. Y. Abramowitz, “’Besamim Rosh’ be-Aspaklaryah Hasidit,” Tagim 3-4 (5732), p. 56, and Dan’s post here regarding a later censorship of this comment.

[29] See R. Yeshayah Asher Zelig Margolies, Amudei Arazim (Jerusalem, 1932), p. 10a in the note

[30] Hakirah (Winter 2013), pp. 133-143.

[31] There has recently been a lot of discussion about R. Shmuel Kamenetsky’s statements against vaccination, even against the polio vaccine(which he sees as a money-making scam). Understandably, there have been many negative comments about R. Kamenetsky, including assertions that he will be responsible for any children who get sick or even, God forbid, die. I think this is going too far. People have to take responsibility for their own actions. If people are foolish enough to ignore their pediatricians and instead listen to R. Kamenetsky’s dangerous advice in this matter, and something bad happens as a result, only they can be blamed. (Just like if they allow metzitzah ba-peh and something goes wrong.) So yes, R. Kamenetsky’s view about vaccination must be publicly rejected, in order that unsophisticated people not be led astray, but parents, and only parents, are responsible for the health of their children. If a child is not vaccinated and then contracts polio it is the parents who must be blamed.

[32] Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 6, p. 163 n. 76. R. Waldenberg’s comment is found in Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 4, no. 13:2 (Bleich mistakenly has 13:3).

[33] While I have enormous admiration for R. Bleich’s erudition, not all of his conclusions are widely shared. For example, in a 9/11-type scenario R. Bleich argues that it is forbidden to shoot down an airplane which is going to crash into a building and the innocent passengers will die anyway. See “Sacrificing the Few to Save the Many,” Tradition 43:1 (2010), pp. 78-86. Without getting into the possible halakhic refutations of R. Bleich’s position, and why this case is not parallel to talmudic examples which speak of killing one innocent person to save many others, my approach in such matters is first to see if a conclusion leads to absurd results, and if it does, that would generally be a proof that it is not a tenable ruling. (This was exactly the approach followed by the Maccabees when they concluded, after many were killed, that not fighting on Shabbat, even in self-defense, cannot be what God wants. See 1 Maccabees 2: 29-41)If terrorists hijack an airplane, place a nuclear bomb on it, and fly to New York City or Tel Aviv, can it possibly be the halakhah that the plane cannot be shot down, and instead we will have to watch the city with all of its millions be killed? If I put an innocent person in my car trunk, load the car with explosives, and start driving the car to the middle of the city to explode it and kill hundreds, can it be that according to halakhah the military can’t blow up the car since an innocent person will be killed? If so, then in a state run according to halakhah terrorists will have a major new weapon: simply bring an innocent person along with them and this will prevent lethal attacks against the terrorists. In fact, they already do this in places like Gaza, and would anyone suggest that the State of Israel can’t defend itself even if it knows that an innocent person will be killed? It is thus not surprising to me that R. David Lau, when asked about shooting down a hijacked airplane to prevent it being crashed into a building, replied that it would be permissible. See here. When dealing with a 9/11-type scenario, Dov Halbertal refers to the innocent passengers as רודפים מאונס, thus meaning that it is permitted to shoot down the place. See Erekh ha-Hayyim ba-Halakhah, vol. 2, p. 382. R. Yitzhak Zilberstein states that during war the various rules about killing innocents to save others don’t apply. See Tefilah u-Refuah (Bnei Brak, 2011), pp. 58ff. He also suggests that one who is being held by terrorists intent on killing him (which is obviously the case with a hijacked plane) has the status of a גברא קטילא. This leads to the following conclusion (pp. 59-60):

ולכן יתכן שאין בהריגתו חידוש מצב של מיתה

This is in line with R. Elyashiv’s opinion that if terrorists are holding an innocent hostage, and are intent on killing him, it is permitted to drop a bomb on the terrorists even if you know that the innocent person will be killed at the same time. R. Elyashiv sees the action of killing the terrorists as a מעשה הצלה for future innocents. This pesak was given to R. Yaakov Wiener, and as R. Wiener notes, and contrary to R. Bleich’s opinion, this means that one can also shoot down a hijacked airplane in a 9-11-type scenario, since by doing so you save those currently on the ground from the intended assault. See R. Wiener, “She’elot u-Teshuvot be-Hilkhot Pikuah Nefesh,” Yeshurun 13 (2003), p. 552.

[34] See also R. Bleich, Bi-Netivot Ha-Halakhah, vol. 2, p. 158 n. 10. One source I haven’t yet quoted is R. Joel Ibn Shuaib, Olat Shabbat (Venice, 1577), parashat Shoftim (no page numbers; cited in Zweifel, Sanegor, p. 210).

[8] Meor Einayim (Vilna, 1866), vol. 2, ch. 38 (p. 25). Regarding Abarbanel, see also my post here where R. Soloveitchik is quoted as saying that he wouldn’t want Abarbanel as president of Yeshiva University. I have been informed that R. Ruderman did not like Abarbanel and that is why his biblical commentaries are not found in the Ner Israel beit midrash. I was told that the reason for this dislike was that Abarbanel rejects certain aggadic statements (sometimes in a harsh manner). Some have argued that Abarbanel was not a talmudist by pointing out that he apparently didn’t realize that Bnei Brak was a place, instead thinking that מסובין בבני ברק refers to the furniture the Sages were sitting on. See his commentary to the Passover Haggadah, s.v. מעשה בר’ אליעזר. Yet it is hard to imagine that Abarbanel did not know what Bnei Brak is, for it is mentioned a number of times in the Talmud, including the famous statement in Gittin 57b and Sanhedrin 96b that descendants of Haman studied Torah in Bnei Brak. It is also mentioned in the book of Joshua 19:45. Interestingly, R. Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, in his commentary on the Haggadah, seems to say that the name of the city is Brak, and Bnei refers to its inhabitants. See Otzar ha-Rishonim al Haggadah shel Pesah, ed. Holzer (Miami Beach, 2006), p. 20. As with Abarbanel, it is hard to imagine that R. Shem Tov did not know the earlier biblical and rabbinic passages from which it is clear that the city’s name is Bnei Brak. For more regarding Abarbanel, see the interesting discussion in R. Yisrael Veltz, Divrei Yisrael, vol. 2, Even ha-Ezer, no. 14, and see also Pardes Eliezer: Erusin ve-Nisuin (Brooklyn, 2010), pp. 176-177.

אינני מכת המדברים בעלי הלשון כי כבד פה ולשון אנכי

מדברים ולא מבינים מה שמדברים

[24] A Modern Heretic and a Traditional Community (New York, 1997), p. 206 n. 14

הוא סבר שעל “גדולי הדור” להעלים עיניהם מקיומן של זונות יהודיות מחשש לתגובה קשה של הסביבה הנוכרית, אם יהודים יקיימו יחסי מין עם נשים נוכריות

[22] See also Maimonides. Hilkhot Melakhim 9:5, that this is permitted for non-Jews. I will return to the matter of incest in a future post.

[29] See also Tosafot, Shabbat 118b, s.v. eima, that R. Yose ben Halafta performed yibbum with five different women.

[34] R. Yerucham’s formulation is also quoted by R. Moses Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, Even ha-Ezer 21:2.

גם הנשים אסורות להשחית הזרע שלהן, כמ”ש רבינו האר”י ז”ל. מיהו נראה גם באשה אם בעלה עושה משמוש ידים באותו מקום דרך שחוק והתעוררות תאוה ודאי גורם לה בזה הזרעה לבטלה, ואיכא איסור של השחתת זרע

I was surprised to see that R. Shlomo Aviner does not regard female sexual pleasure as having any real significance. Here are passages from two separate letters (quoted in Yakir Englander and Avi Sagi, Guf u-Miniyut be-Siah ha-Tziyoni-Dati he-Hadash [Jerusalem, 2013], p. 108).

מה שאין אשתך נהנית בשעת החיבור אין זה אסון, זה קורה לנשים רבות, והעיקר שהיא אינה סובלת מזה. היא נהנית הנאה רגשית פנימית מעצם הקרבה, מעצם האהבה האחווה השלום והרעות, ואינה זקוקה להנאה גופנית

בעניין ההנאה – מה שאינך נהנית, אינו קריטי, ישנן נשים שלא נהנו כל ימי חייהן אפילו פעם אחת ולא הפריע להן, אלא הכול היה באהבה גדול

I hope to return to this very interesting book. But for now I can’t resist citing a passage from R. Eliezer Melamed (quoted ibid., p. 128). Not only could an American Modern Orthodox rabbi never express such sentiments (if he wants to keep his job), but I am convinced that even if such a passage appeared in an American haredi publication, the women would be quite offended.

R. Aryeh Leib Steinman, Ayelet ha-Shahar, Kiddushin 30b, also states that a wife is obligated to obey her husband. It is easy to find plenty of earlier sources that say this, but I wonder how many haredi women today have such an understanding of their position in a marriage.

Regarding R. Melamed’s point that a man has to be a “man”, it reminded me of an interesting Meiri to Kiddushin 82b. The Talmud, ibid., states: “Happy is he whose children are males, and woe to him whose children are females.” Meiri suggests the following explanation: “Woe to him whose sons are like females,” with all the negative implications this implies:

 

R. Yoel Schwartz, Ben Torah vi-Yeshivah (Jerusalem, 1978), p. 143, mentions this Meiri in the course of his discussion of male and female roles in Judaism. Schwartz makes the following very enlightened comment about how men should relate to “women’s work”, i.e., housework.

 

[38] Mikhtevei Mehkar u-Vikoret (Vilna, 1907), vol. 1, p. 51. See also David Biale, Eros and the Jews (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 42-43, who sees here a conflict between the Sages and popular belief, with the latter assuming that there is a place for sexuality in messianic days. (When the Talmud refers to the World to Come it means the messianic era.)