ArtScroll and More

ArtScroll and More

by Marc B. Shapiro

Continued from here.

1. As mentioned, I believe that on occasion ArtScroll is unaware that the text it is explaining is a censored text. Sometimes it might even be an internally censored text (i.e., censored by Jews so as to avoid difficulties with the non-Jewish authorities). This same problem is often found with aharonim. How about with rishonim? For example, was Rashi ever misled by an internally censored text? I would hesitate to say so but this is exactly what is suggested by R. Elijah David Rabinowitz-Teomim (the Aderet), though he piously prefaces his remarks with the words לולי דברי רש”י.

Sanhedrin 58b states:

Resh Lakish said: A heathen who keeps a day of rest, deserves death, for it is written, “And a day and a night they shall not rest” (Gen. 8:22), and a master has said: Their prohibition is their death sentence. Ravina said: Even if he rested on a Monday.

The Aderet sees it as obvious (פשוט) that the original version of Ravina’s statement was “Even if he rested on Sunday,” and this was changed to “Monday” due to fear of the Christians.[1] Rashi, however, offers an explanation as to why “Monday” is mentioned, meaning that if the Aderet is correct then even Rashi was misled by the altered text.[2]

As part of his explanation on this passage, Rashi also writes: אחד בשבת ששובתין בו הנוצרים. This is the authentic version of Rashi which appears in the early Talmud printings. It is also found in Steinsaltz and Oz ve-Hadar. The censored Vilna Talmud, followed by ArtScroll, omit the word הנוצרים.

Even in the censored Vilna Talmud the word הנוצרים appears in Ta’anit 27b where we find the following:

Our Rabbis have taught: The men of the Mishmar prayed over the sacrifice of their brethren that it may be favorably accepted, whilst the men of the Ma’amad assembled in their synagogues and observed four fasts, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of that week. On Monday [they fasted] for those that go down to the sea; on Tuesday for those who travel in the deserts; on Wednesday that croup may not attack children; on Thursday for pregnant women and nursing mothers, that pregnant women should not suffer a miscarriage, and that nursing mothers may be able to nurse their infants; on Friday they did not fast out of respect for the Sabbath; and certainly not on the Sabbath. Why did they not fast on Sunday? — R. Johanan said: Because of the Christians (הנוצרים). R. Samuel b. Nahmani said: Because it is the third day after the creation of Man. Resh Lakish said: Because of the additional soul. For Resh Lakish said: Man is given an additional soul on Friday, but at the termination of the Sabbath it is taken away from him, as it is said, “He ceased from work and rested” [shavat va-yinafash], that is to say, once the rest had ceased, woe! that soul is gone.

There is something very strange about this passage, and yet it is not noted in Soncino, ArtScroll, Koren, or by R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes whom I could have expected to pick up on it. I assume that most people read this passage without even realizing the problem, which for the rishonim was not a problem as I will explain. The Sages, in describing what went on in Second Temple days, make clear that the men of the Ma’amad did not fast on Sunday. R. Johanan, who lived in third-century Eretz Yisrael, says that this was because of the Christians. Rashi explains that the Christians “make this day [Sunday] their holiday.”[3] R. Gershom, in his commentary on the passage, writes that the Christians’ “holiday is on Sunday and if the Jews would fast they [the Christians] would be angered.”[4]

The problem with all this is that in the days of the Second Temple there was no significant Christian community for Jews to be concerned with. Furthermore, these early followers of Jesus would not have observed the Sabbath on Sunday.[5] I think the answer to this problem is that the talmudic sages regarded Jesus as a student of R. Joshua ben Perahyah who flourished in the latter part of the second century BCE (i.e., ca. 130-100 BCE). In other words, in the talmudic conception Jesus lived at least a century earlier than the historical record tells us, and the amoraim assumed that the Christianity as they knew it was also practiced centuries before. Robert Travers Herford writes: “R. Johanan transferred to the time of the Temple a feature of the religious life of his own totally different time.”[6] The predating of Jesus’ life was also shared by the rishonim, which explains why the chronological problem did not trouble them.

Ketubot 102b states:

If a man died and left a young son with his mother, [and while] the father’s heirs demand, ‘Let him be brought up with us’, his mother claims, ‘My son should be brought up by me’, [the son] must be left with his mother and may not be left with anyone who is entitled to be his heir. Such a case once occurred and [the heirs] killed him ער”ה.

What does ער”ה mean? The first thing to note is that these letters are not part of the original talmudic text. In talmudic manuscripts, the writings of the rishonim, and also the early printed editions in Pesaro and Venice, the uncensored text reads “killed him on the eve of Passover.”[7] Because this is the authentic reading, this is how it appears in Steinsaltz, Koren, and Soncino. ArtScroll, however, translates the last words of the passage as “They butchered him on the first evening of his stay,” reading ער”ה as ערב הראשון.

ArtScroll’s action is quite strange, as there is absolutely no question what the authentic reading of the text is. Not only does ArtScroll translate the false acronym, but it even offers an explanation of it. “They were so eager for his blood that he did not even last a single night with him. They killed him on the evening of his arrival.” This is wildly incorrect as the acronym ער”ה is simply a printer’s invention.

ArtScroll continues its explanation as follows:

The words ערב הראשון, the first evening, are not actually found in the Baraisa. Rather, the Baraisa contains an acronym – ער”ה – which is read as ערב הראשון (see Rosh; Mesoras HaShas). Another interpretation of this acronym reads it as ערב הפסח, on Pesach eve (Meiri; Hagahos Yavetz)

This note also needs to be corrected as there is no dispute among rishonim about how to how to read the acronym, as the acronym did not exist in the days of the rishonim. It is an invention of one of the printed editions. Thus, contrary to what the note states, Meiri never gave an interpretation of the acronym to mean ערב הפסח. Rather, these words were in his text of the Talmud, and they were also in the Rosh’s text of the Talmud and appear in the manuscripts of the Rosh. The printed version of the Rosh has been “corrected”, just like the text of the Talmud and Rif was “corrected”.[8]

Why did printed editions of the Talmud begin to use the acronym? This talmudic passage was cited by anti-Semites to support the blood libel, namely, that Jews would kill Christian children before Passover to use their blood.[9] Thus, this “correction”, like so many others, was designed to undermine anti-Semitic attacks against the Talmud.[10]

Seth Leibowitz called my attention to the Stone Chumash, p. 407, where in the introduction to the Ten Commandments it states:

Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim II:32) comments that they only heard the first two [commandments] from God, but they could hear only the sound of the Divine voice, as it were, and could not understand the words He was saying. . . . Thus, the people experienced prophecy, for they heard God’s voice, but their faith in Moses was reinforced, because only he understood what God was saying.

The first thing to note is that the reference should be II:33 not II:32. The passage just quoted states that the people experienced prophecy. Does Maimonides say this? Guide 2:33 is a very difficult chapter and any interpretation given can be challenged with alternative perspectives. (See Yaakov Levinger, Ha-Rambam ke-Filosof u-khe-Fosek, ch. 3.) Yet I think I am on safe ground in saying that Maimonides does not believe that what the people as a whole experienced is to be regarded as prophecy. While Guide 2:33 might be ambiguous in this matter, the previous chapter, 2:32, states explicitly: “As for the Gathering at Mount Sinai, though through a miracle all the people saw the great fire and heard the frightening and terrifying voices, only those who were fit for it achieved the rank of prophecy, and even those in various degrees.”

Shem Tov explains:

ואחר שסלק הרב אלו הטעיות אשר יראה מהם שהשם ינבא כל איש מבני אדם, סלק מעלינו ספק גדול והוא מעמד הר סיני אשר אנשים ונשים סכלים ובלתי ראויים כל היו נביאים וזה יביא לחשוב שהשם ית’ ינבא כל מי שירצה מבלתי שיהיה מוכן, ואמר שאף שכלם היו רואים האש הגדולה ושומעים הקולות הנוראות המפחידות וזה היה על צד הפלא, לא הגיע למדרגת הנבואה אלא הראוי לה והראויים יתחלפו מדרגותיהם ג”כ

Finally, so that all the attention is not on ArtScroll, the following point was called to my attention by Benjamin Apfel. Here is the first page of Jastrow’s introduction to his dictionary. Read the last paragraph.

Here is the first page of Philip Birnbaum’s introduction to his translation of sections of the Mishneh Torah.[11]

The first paragraph is lifted from Jastrow. Would it have been so difficult for Birnbaum to simply add a note indicating that he was adapting Jastrow’s words?

2. In my post here I referred to selections from Rashbam’s commentary on Psalms that were recently printed from manuscript. This should be distinguished from Rashbam’s commentary on Psalms published in Vienna in 1816 by Isaac Satanow. Here is the title page which tells us that the manuscript comes from the royal library in Berlin.

This commentary on Psalms is a forgery. While the volume is attributed to Rashbam it was actually written by Satanow. Regarding this forgery, David Rosin writes as follows:[12]

הכי קרא שמו יצחק ויהי כצחוק בעיניו להתחפש במעטה רבנו שמואל ולעשות מעשהו ולעבוד עבודתו. זר מעשהו ונכריה עבודתו, כל השומע יצחק לו

3. In my post here I quoted R. Moses Isaac Ashkenazi in his Ho’il Moshe that King David is not to be regarded as a prophet as he only had ruah ha-kodesh. One of the commenters wrote:

Rashi Megilla 14a quotes a Halachot Gedolot which names David as [a] prophet. Rashi speaks specifically about prophets as opposed to Ruach Hakodesh, and excludes Daniel based on Megilla 3a.

Another commenter was more strident:

Wonderful example how modern scholars have no place in the Torah world! As first commenter pointed out, Dovid Hamelech is prominent in the list of 48 neviim, and there are scores of sugyos based on the nevuah of DH. The makom mizbeach, etc. Pure AmHaaRatzus!

I am not sure if I am the am ha-aretz he is referring to, which in any case would be uncalled for since I never said that David only had ruah ha-kodesh and was therefore not a prophet. All I did was point out that R. Moses Isaac Ashkenazi said this. When I called the commenter’s attention to the fact that his strong words were directed against R. Ashkenazi, he wrote:

I wouldn’t start up with Hoil Moshe, but was pointing out the danger of someone reading this post, and then taking it at face value. For anyone fluent in Shas they will find numerous references to DH’s nevua. Ruach HaKodesh wouldn’t work for all the halachos we learn out from DH. . . . I do thoroughly enjoy your posts, but find them quite dangerous. I would prefer my children at least stick to Artscroll and have their basics –DH’s nevua – straight!

Now let me say something that I did not put in the comments because I want the entire audience to see it, not just the tiny group that reads the comments. The commenter just quoted is a perfect example of one who is certain of something, and certain that the opposing position is incorrect, and this leads to very harsh language. Let’s leave aside R. Moses Isaac Ashkenazi who is not an important scholar. All would agree that R. Moses Sofer, the Hatam Sofer, is important and certainly not an am ha’aretz (which is the term the commenter used). Yet the Hatam Sofer is explicit that David was not a prophet and only had ruah ha-kodesh, which is exactly what R. Ashkenazi states and what the commenter so harshly attacks. Here are the Hatam Sofer’s words in Torat Moshe ha-Shalem, Ba-Midbar, p. 74.

הנה לא מצינו לישראל מלך שיהי’ גם נביא משולח לעם כי אם משה רבינו ע”ה, דכתיב גבי’ (דברים ל”ג ה’) ויהי בישורון מלך, אבל שארי נביאים לא היו מלכים והמלכים לא התנבאו, ודוד המלך ע”ה רה”ק הו”ל ולא נבואה, ולכן אחז”ל (גיטין נ”ט ע”א) מימות משה עד רבי לא מצינו תורה וגדולה במקום אחד, דאלו כל הנביאים היו עליהם בגדולה השופט והמלך שבימיו, וכל המלכים אפי’ דוד ושלמה היו הנביאים שבדורם גדולים מהם בתורה . . . שהרי אין מלך נביא.

This notion, that the kings were not prophets (other than Moses), is also stated in Zohar, Terumah, p. 154a, and this is presumably the Hatam Sofer’s source. I don’t deny that there are other authoritative sources that contradict this, including passages in the Talmud. Some of them are cited by R. Reuven Margaliyot in his note to the Zohar, ad loc., and we can speculate as to why the Hatam Sofer preferred the Zohar over these other sources. I cite this only to show that commenters should be very careful before labeling something as am ha’aratzus, as you never know whom you might be insulting with this comment.

4. The latest book in my series with Academic Studies Press has recently appeared. It is Sara Reguer, My Father’s Journey: A Memoir of Lost Worlds of Jewish Lithuania. (Reguer is the granddaughter of R. Simcha Zelig Reguer, the dayan of Brisk.) Here is the book’s description.

Born into a leading Lithuanian-Jewish rabbinic family, Moshe Aron Reguer initially followed the path of traditional yeshiva education. His adolescence coincided with World War I and its upheavals, pandemics, and pogroms, as well as with new ideas of Haskalah, Zionism, and socialism. His memoir, recently discovered and here translated and published for the first time, discusses his internal struggles and describes the world around him and the people who influenced him. Moshe Aron Reguer wrote his memoir at the age of 23, on the eve of his departure for Eretz Israel in 1926. However, his story did not end there, but continued in British Mandated Palestine and the United States. He kept in touch with the family in Brest-Litovsk until the Nazis destroyed Jewish Lithuania, and some of their correspondence is included within this volume.

Anyone who is interested in Jewish Lithuania and the great yeshivot will find this book of value.

I also want to call attention to the recent publication of Menachem Kellner, Jewish Universalism, edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes. Kellner’s work has made a great impact, not only in Jewish scholarship but among thinking Jews in general. This small volume is a wonderful read and contains an intellectual portrait of Kellner written by James A. Diamond as well as a lengthy interview with Kellner.

This book is number 12 in Brill’s Library of Contemporary Jewish Philosophers. Here is what has appeared so far and what if forthcoming (taken from the Brill website).

Published Volumes

Vol. 1: Eliezer Schweid: The Responsibility of Jewish Philosophy

Vol. 2: Jonathan Sacks: Universalizing Particularity

Vol. 3: David Novak: Natural Law and Revealed Torah

Vol. 4: Eugene B. Borowitz: Rethinking God and Ethics

Vol. 5: Elliot N. Dorff: In Search of the Good Life

Vol. 6: Judith Plaskow: Feminism, Theology, and Justice

Vol. 7: David R. Blumenthal: Living with God and Humanity

Vol. 8: Moshe Idel: Representing God

Vol. 9: Lenn E. Goodman: Judaism, Humanity, and Nature

Vol. 10: Avi Sagi: Existentialism, Pluralism, and Identity

Vol. 11: Elliot R. Wolfson: Poetic Thinking

Vol. 12: Menachem Kellner: Jewish Universalism

Forthcoming Volumes

Vol. 13: J. David Bleich: Where Halakhah and Philosophy Meet (est. October 2015)

Vol. 14: Michael Fishbane: Jewish Hermeneutical Theology (est. October 2015)

Vol. 15: Norbert M. Samuelson: Reasoned Faith (est. November 2015)

Vol. 16: Arthur Green: Hasidism for Tomorrow (est. January 2016)

5. The issue of truth-telling in halakhic matters, discussed in the last chapter of my new book, has been of interest to many people. I did not want to be too lengthy in my response to Aryeh Frimer here, because it was not my own independent post. So let me now add some more details. DG reminded me of the following source. According to R. Jacob Moellin, when the Talmud states that a law is rabbinic but a verse is brought as an asmachta, this was done so as to mislead the people into thinking that it is a Torah law so that they would observe it more carefully.[13] In other words, the Sages were engaging in falsehood for a higher purpose.

This is exactly the sort of thing that Frimer claimed is not part of mainstream halakhic thought, a point which I disputed. It also is very relevant to my discussion of the dispute between the Hatam Sofer and R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes regarding “raising the prohibition”. Here are the Maharil’s words, as quoted by his student.

כל היכא דאיתמר מדרבנן הוא וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא, הכי פירושו ודאי תקנתא דרבנן הוא והם יצאו ובדקו ומצאו להם סמך מקרא, וסמכו דבריהם עליו כדי להחזיקם שיהיו סבורים דהוא מדאורייתא ויחמירו בו, ולא אתו לזלזל ולהקל בדברי חכמים

In the notes to this text, the editor informs us that one of the manuscripts has a different version. Instead of כדי להחזיקם שיהיו סבורים it reads להטעות הבריות שהם סבורים. This text is even more explicit that the Sages were not being honest with the masses. This manuscript has a handwritten note explaining that instead of reading להטעות הבריות it should say להטעים לבריות because the word להטעות is a דבר מגונה . In other words, the person who made this “correction” was troubled by the explicit statement that the Sages would deceive people, even if it was for a higher cause.

If there is one thing people have learnt from my posts over the years, it is that whenever you find a passage that diverges radically from what others think is appropriate, you will find those who deny the passage’s authenticity. In this case, the most prominent of the deniers is R. Joseph Engel[14]:

לענ”ד לא מיסתברי כלל ולא אאמין כלל שיצאו מפה קדוש המהרי”ל ז”ל

R. Simhah Klein writes[15]:

וכי ישקרו חז”ל לחזק דבריהם שיהיו סבורין דהוא דאורייתא

However, R. Eliyahu Bohbut is not at all bothered by the claim of the Maharil that the Sages engaged in a form of deception vis-à-vis the masses. After quoting the passage he explains matter-of-factly[16]:

כלומר דאסמכתא באה כביכול “להטעות” את העם שיסברו דאיכא איסור דאורייתא “ויחמירו בו”

Regarding one of the other matters I discussed in the book, namely, so-called “Orthodox history”, the folllowing appears in Divrei David (p. 30a), a collection of teachings of R. David Moses Friedman, the first Chortkover Rebbe.

פ”א סיפרו לפניו על איזה מעשה שאדמ”ור מרוזין זי”ע סיפר אותו פעם בסינגון זה ופעם בסיגנון אחר אמר על זה מרן אדמ”ור זי”ע שהסיפורי מעשיות שמספרים הצדיקים הוא לפי מה שצריך באותו שעה

This is an acknowledgment that the stories told by the rebbes are not really history, as they are designed to serve the needs of the present. As I think most people today realize, haredi “historical” writing in general is as much about the present as the past, and it is precisely because of this that authors feel it is legitimate to cover up or even alter the historical record in order to best serve the religious needs of the present.

Finally, a few people have asked about what I wrote on p. 244, that the strand of Jewish tradition that countenances falsehood “deserves to be understood in a sympathetic manner as well”. This does not mean that people need to agree with those who countenance falsehood, and I certainly do not. However, in writing an academic study as opposed to a polemic, it is important to recognize that approaches that today we might regard as unacceptable, were viewed very differently in other times and cultures (and for some, these “other times and cultures” continue into our own day). I am interested in understanding what leads people to diverge so dramatically from a value that I regard as important. In my book I did not set out to judge them, but in a sympathetic manner, i.e, with a sensitivity to their worldview, attempt to understand them. (When I used the word “sympathetic”, I did not mean that I approved of what I was describing, only that I was sensitive to the motivations behind the approach.) By the same token, when I see that great figures from earlier years have written troubling things about non-Jews or women, I also approach this in a sympathetic manner, understanding that for these people, living in a vastly different time and often suffering under terrible anti-Semitism, it made sense that they would express certain thoughts that today pretty much everyone regards as unacceptable. One need not be a complete historicist to acknowledge that all people are influenced by their era, for good and for bad. This is what I mean by understanding in a sympathetic manner.

Coming Soon: R. Ysoscher Katz and Modern Orthodox Halakhah; The Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Dispute Regarding the Historicity of the Hanukkah Miracle; R. Steinman and the Messianic Belief; R. Mazuz’s Short-Lived Entry into Politics; and a response to R. Aharon Lopiansky’s article in Dialogue.

[1] See his note in Mekabtzi’el 36 (2009), p. 64.

[2] Was Maimonides ever misled by a censored text? According to R. Eliyahu Zini, Eretz Hemdatenu, p. 75, this was indeed the case. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 9:13 states:

המוכר ביתו לעבודה זרה דמיו אסורין בהנייה ויוליך אותם לים המלח

As Kesef Mishneh and others point out, the origin of this halakhah is Gittin 44a. Yet the authentic reading there is המוכר ביתו לגוי (the Vilna Talmud has לעובד כוכבים). As Dikdukei Soferim ha-Shalem (Jerusalem, 2001), ad loc., informs us, לגוי is the reading in all surviving manuscripts and early printings. Meiri, ad loc., explains the halakhah as follows:

שהמוכר בית לגוי בארץ ישראל ר”ל לאחד מעובדי האלילים דמיו אסורים מתורת קנס על שנתן לעובדי האלילים חנייה בקרקע

Since Maimonides had the reading לעבודה זרה, R. Zini concludes that the talmudic manuscript he used had been altered. This is much more compelling than the explanation offered by Kesef Mishneh and Lehem Mishneh that Maimonides interpreted לגוי to mean לעבודה זרה.

Yet there is no doubt that R. Zini is incorrect. As has been pointed out by many, one who examines Tosefta, Avodah Zarah 7:2, will see that this, and not Gittin 44a, is the source for Maimonides, and Kesef Mishneh and Lehem Mishneh were simply unaware of this source. It is significant that לעבודה זרה appears even in manuscripts of the Tosefta.

Regarding Tosefta, Avodah Zarah 7:2 and Gittin 44a, I assume that only one of the versions preserves the authentic text, but I don’t think we can determine which one it is. The only thing that remains to be explained is why Maimonides did not codify the halakhah in Gittin 44a. (It could be that his version of Gittin 44a was indeed the same as that which appears in the Tosefta, but this has nothing to do with censorship.)

[3] Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:9, cites Rashi. You can see the uncensored text of Kesef Mishneh in the Frankel edition. The version of Kesef Mishneh that appears in older editions of the Mishneh Torah is a censored text, and instead of recording Rashi’s statement about Sunday, the following appears: או בע”ש ששובתים בו הישמעלים. For printers in the Christian world there was no problem speaking about Muslim beliefs and practices, so in this case the original statement, made with reference to Christians, was substituted with one referring to Muslims. The printers who made this “correction” had the same misconception as many today, namely, that Friday is a day of rest for Muslims. It is not. Friday is a day of gathering for prayer, but Muslims do not have a sabbath, i.e., a day of rest.

[4] Interestingly, I found an anonymous medieval Italian text that records a “minhag tov” not to eat meat on Sunday. One reason offered is kevod Shabbat, namely, by having meat so soon after Shabbat one lessens the special nature of this day in which meat is the main dish. (Obviously, meat was not regarded as an everyday meal in this author’s time and place.) The second reason is מפני קלון הנוצרים. What this means is that since Sunday is the Christians’ holy day, Jews should avoid eating a special food like meat on that day. See Minhag Tov, ed. Weiss (Budapest, 1929), p. 230, no. 47.

[5] See Reuven Kimelman, “Birkat ha-Minim and the Lack of Evidence for an Anti-Christian Jewish Prayer in Late Antiquity,” in E. P. Sanders, et al., eds., Jewish and Christian Self-Definition (Philadelphia, 1981), vol. 2, p. 242.

[6] Christianity in Talmud and Midrash (London, 1903), p. 172. His first name “Robert” never appears in his works, as he went by “R. Travers Herford”. I supplied the first name in full as I did not want people to assume that we are dealing with “Rabbi Travers Herford”. Herford wrote a number of works about the Pharisees. His positive portrayal of them was in opposition to the standard Christian view. This highly impressed R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, who suggested translating Herford’s works into Hebrew. See his letter here where he writes:

חשבתי אז להעירו ע”ד ספריו החשובים של החכם האנגלי הרפורד, – היודע ואוהב את היהדות באופן נפלא, – ע”ד תורת היהדות הפרושית וערכה העולמי, כהמשכה האמיתי של הנבואה בחיוניותה הנמשכת עד היום. כדאי וחשוב מאד היה לתרגמם לעברית, בשביל הנוער שלנו המתחשב מאד עם דבריו של גוי, וביחוד לעומת הרבוי של תרגומי דברי תפלות, שזכו ומזכים בהם את ספרותנו החדשה. אולי יואיל כ’ לזכות במצוה זו בהתמחות זריזותו ושקידתו

Herford’s commentary on Pirkei Avot is full of interesting points. To give one example, he argues that the proper vocalization of אמרו in Avot 1:5: באשתו אמרו קל וחומר באשת חבירו, is amaro, not amru. (R. Mazuz told me that this is definitely incorrect.)

[7] See Dikdukei Soferim ha-Shalem, ad loc., Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-Feshutah, Ketubot, p. 365.

[8] See R. Yonatan Binyamin Buchinger in Or Yisrael 46 (Tevet 5767), pp. 237ff., ibid. 48 (Tamuz 5767), pp. 240-241, ibid. 51 (Adar Sheni 5768), p. 246. The authentic text of the Rif, which reads ערב הפסח, is found in the Constantinople 1509 edition. See Hilkhot Rav Alfas, ed. Zaks (Jerusalem, 1969), vol. 2, p. 128.

[9] See Ariel Toaff, Blood Passover (available online) ch. 8 n. 8. (Unfortunately, this book continues to give ammunition to anti-Semites.)

[10] See F. H. Wettstein, Halifat Mikhtavim (Cracow, 1900), p. 97; R. Dovid Cohen, He-Akov le-Mishor (Brooklyn, 1993), to Ketubot 102b (p. 106); Soncino’s note, Ketubot 102b.

[11] Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah (New York, 1967).

[12] Introduction to his edition of Rashbam on the Pentateuch, p. xix. See also Reuven Elitzur, Degel Mahaneh Reuven (n.p., n.d.), pp. 365ff. Not knowing who Satanow was, R. Yisrael Yaakov Fisher of the Edah Haredit refers to him as ר’ יצחק מסטנוב ז”ל. See Even Yisrael, vol. 8, no. 9. I found the same lack of awareness in R. Aryeh Leib Neimark, Even Yaakov (Slutzk, 1910), p. 57b: יפה פירש החכם מהר”י סאטנאב

[13] Sefer Maharil, ed. Spitzer (Jerusalem, 1989), Likutim, no. 70 (p. 629).

[14] Beit ha-Otzar, vol. 1, kelal 190 (p. 118b).

[15] Peleitat Soferim 1 (2012), p. 87 n. 7.

[16] Shoshanat ha-Amakim (Jerusalem, 2008), p. 257.

וְהָאֱמֶת וְהַשָּׁלוֹם אֱהָבוּ; On Changing the Immutable by Marc B. Shapiro

By Yitzchok Stroh

Professor Marc Shapiro’s latest work, Changing the Immutable, contains considerable interesting and pertinent information for the student of Jewish history. As stated on the cover, the author attempts to reveal how the (Jewish) orthodox ‘establishment’ silences both past and present dissenting voices through “Orthodox Judaism Rewriting Its History.” I don’t intend this to be a review of the entire work (that would take a lot more time and space), however I did want to share some of my frustration here, because I sense that the author’s bias affected his objectivity, and I am afraid that many a reader will be left with an impression that in many ways does not reflect the reality of this complex topic. In this article, I would like to examine one passage of Shapiro’s work to illustrate this point. In chapter eight, entitled, “Is the truth really that important?” Shapiro writes:

Because my purpose in this chapter is to chart the outer limits of what has been viewed as acceptable when it comes to falsehood and deception. I will be focusing on the more ‘liberal’ positions. My aim is to show just how far some rabbinic decisors were willing to go in sanctioning deviations from the truth. One must bear in mind, however, that there are often views in opposition to the ones I shall be examining. Perhaps this knowledge can serve as a counterweight to the shock that many readers will experience upon learning of some of the positions I will mention.

One ‘liberal’ position was expressed by R. Moses Isserles, who went so far as to say that one can even slander someone for the sake of preserving the community. The particular case he was discussing concerned a terrible community dispute that had created the possibility that the Jewish population would be expelled from the city. In what many will find a problematic decision, Isserles offered the opinion, which was then put into action, that it was acceptable to provide false information about an individual whom the government suspected of wrongdoing, if this would alleviate the situation. Although the Talmud states, with regard to giving a man up for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews, that this is not the way of the pious, Isserles defended his approach: “Even if we did not act in accord with the way of the pious, nevertheless, we acted in accord with the law. I have proven that it is permitted to speak leshon hara [slander] in order to preserve peace.”[1]

Here, Shapiro portrays the רמ”א, the primary codifier of halacha for Ashkenazic Jewry, to have ruled that for the sake of preserving the peace, it is acceptable to provide false information to non-Jewish authorities about a presumably innocent individual whom the government suspected of wrongdoing.

Shocking indeed.

Unfortunately, Shapiro fails to present the תשובה of the רמ”א thoroughly and accurately, and as a result, the reader is left with an erroneous understanding of the opinion of the רמ”א. Furthermore, Shapiro fails to present the relevant section of Talmud precisely, which may lead to further misunderstanding. I am not accusing Professor Shapiro of intentional distortion, but חז”ל do teach us הוי זהיר בתלמוד ששגגת תלמוד עולה זדון — so, with this in mind, I would like to offer a more careful presentation of the Rema’s position as a counterweight for those who’ve read this (inaccurately presented) ‘shocking’ position of the רמ”א.

סימן י”א in שו”ת הרמ”א is written in complicated rabbinic style, and does not provide a full account of what transpired — but, as the רמ”א writes in the introduction to the תשובה, we should be able to extract sufficient background information as necessary for our purposes[2]:

The תשובה is a כתב התנצלות[3] (a “writ of justification”) defending actions taken by the בית דין of the רמ”א in response to a local crisis, and as the רמ”א makes it quite clear in his description of the events, the ensuing bitter results were unexpected and troubling:

… הנה בכל אלה לשלום נתכוונו בעצם וראשונה, אף כי במקרה מרה היתה באחרונה, ואף מקצת עזי פנים היו בקרבנו ועכשיו מהפכים דברינו לתוהו ובהו. מיהו אנו לשם שמים נתכוונו, והכל נמשך אחר המחשבה והכוונה. אף כי אחריתו ראש ולענה. “Behold in this entire incident our intention was peace, first and foremost, even though by happenstance the end was bitter. There were also a few brazen individuals amongst us, who are now turning things into utter chaos. However, our intent was for the sake of Heaven, and ‘everything follows one’s thoughts and intentions’, even though the end was gall and wormwood.”

While it is probably impossible to reconstruct a precise account of the incident, the following is obvious from the details presented in the תשובה: (1) The government did not suspect anyone of any type of wrongdoing[4]. (2) It was not an individual that was slandered; it was a group of about one hundred respectable community leaders or activists that were slandered. (3) False information was never provided to non-Jewish authorities, and those slandered were not slandered publicly — they were slandered in a private ruling by the decision of a בית דין which was then recorded in a written document. (4) Furthermore, the document was fashioned in a manner which made it evident that the ruling was an exaggeration and not an actual account, and (5) it was drafted only to be used as a means of forcing two opposing sides to reconcile a community quarrel. Unfortunately, (6) the document did become public knowledge and its intention was misconstrued by unscrupulous individuals.[5] And (7) there were dire consequences, probably due to involvement of the non-Jewish authorities, but we do not know what those consequences were.

The actual events that led up to this action are described at length and can be summed up as follows:

A group of pretentious rabbinic and lay leaders[6] convened to place a ban on a certain individual, causing him great harm[7]. (The reason for the ban is not clear.) This individual then sought to take revenge upon those who had placed the ban upon him[8] and was joined by others who sympathized with his cause,[9] ultimately splitting the entire community between his supporters and his enemies[10]. This caused a tremendous desecration of G-d’s name as the strife continued to escalate[11], which led to placing the entire community in danger of being expelled by the authorities[12].

The רמ”א and his colleagues attempted to intercede with the individual’s opponents, but were completely ignored[13], and the matter escalated to the point of death threats against the man upon whom the ban had been placed[14]. In an attempt to resolve matters, the רמ”א and his partners decided to write a fictitious halachic ruling[15], containing exaggerated and slanderous accusations against the individual’s opponents, with the goal being that the individual in question would then use this document to extort the ruling written against him from his enemies, whereby both the documents would be exchanged and destroyed.

Now, before you extrapolate from here that the רמ”א had a flippant attitude towards honesty, please consider:

(1) The רמ”א and his colleagues were quite concerned about the possibility that this individual might use the document inappropriately (i.e. reveal its contents to the authorities), and to prevent this, they had him swear a strict oath that he would not show the document to anyone else, and that he would only use it to get his opponents to hand over their original חרם document to him[16]. Anyone familiar with the severity of an oath in Jewish law, and the general fear of swearing falsely at that time, will understand why the outcome was quite a surprise to the rabbis who signed this slanderous document. Furthermore, רמ”א had taken additional steps to insure that the document would be null and void if misused, and as the רמ”א concludes in his justification, “אבל לא נחתם להרע בו לשום אדם חלילה לנו מרשע” (…it was not signed to inflict harm upon any person; G-d forbid that we should do evil).

(2) Regardless of the fact that the slanderous ruling and the resulting document were extremely limited in nature and not meant to be seen by the public (and certainly not the government), the רמ”א was clearly still troubled by the elements of dishonesty. He makes it quite obvious that he felt that he had no choice, and that it was entirely out of concern for the safety of the community that made speaking and writing falsely and negatively about fellow Jews necessary in this case. It is this decision that the רמ”א is attempting to justify in his כתב התנצלות – and as we will see, this was hardly taken lightly.

The רמ”א goes on to quote various sources to support his decision, and proceeds, in rabbinic style, to argue the point by analyzing a Talmudic ruling. Shapiro, when he discusses the Talmudic ruling tells only half the story. Shapiro writes, “The Talmud states, with regard to giving a man up for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews, that this is not the way of the pious.” However, as we shall see, giving a man up for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews has nothing to do with the pious — indeed, it is strictly forbidden according to the Talmud. The Mishnah in תרומות rules that if non-Jews were to approach a group of Jewish women and demand that they hand over one of them be defiled or else they would defile all of them, that it is forbidden to hand over one of the women. The Talmud Yerushalmi adds that the same rule would apply in a situation where a non-Jew demands of a group of Jews that they hand over one Jew to be executed or else they would all be killed, that it is likewise forbidden to hand over one of them[17].

In this תשובה the רמ”א applies an analogy: Just as it is forbidden to save the lives or the innocence of all through giving over one individual to be defiled or killed, so too it would be forbidden to slander, ridicule, and deride one individual, or a group of individuals (even if no one ever became aware of the slander) in order to remove slander and ridicule from the entire community.

However, the רמ”א sees two distinctions between the cases: Firstly, the halachah that forbids giving someone over applies to a situation where it is done with an action, whereas if it is a matter of speech it would be permitted. Meaning that if the powers that be needed information with which they could kill one of the group, and they threatened that unless that information is provided they would kill them all, it would be permissible to give this information — since by merely providing information they are not directly participating in the action of murder, and therefore they would not be considered accomplices to the execution. So too in our situation, since slander is a matter of speech, the Talmud’s aforementioned rule would not apply. And secondly, the prohibition not to give someone over to the gentiles, is only in a case where they do not request a specific individual. However, were the non-Jews to demand a specific individual to defile or kill, and threaten that if he isn’t turned over they would defile or kill the entire group, then it would be permitted to turn him over. The רמ”א compared the situation in his city to a situation where specific individuals are being targeted; therefore he permitted falsehood and לשון הרע to be spoken.

Regarding this second limitation, the רמ”א questions his ruling based on the following anecdote related in the Talmud Yerushalmi: An individual was sought by the royal government, and he escaped to לוד. When the government surrounded the מדינה, ר’ יהושע בן לוי handed him over to them. Until this point in time it had been common for Eliyahu HaNavi to visit R. Yehoshua, but after this incident, אליהו הנביא ceased his visits. Subsequently, R. Yehoshua fasted many fasts, and Eliyahu appeared to him, and said, “Shall I reveal myself to a slanderer?” To which R’ Yehoshua responded, “But have I not acted according to the משנה?” To this Eliyahu replied, “Can this be considered משנת חסידים?”

It is in response to this that the רמ”א states, “even if we did not act in accordance with ‘the way of the pious’, nevertheless, we acted in accordance with the law.” It seems reasonable to assume that since the slander recorded in the document written by the רמ”א and his colleagues was never meant to be seen by anyone and would have alleviated the threat of expulsion, the רמ”א felt that it was not necessary to follow “the ways of the pious” and was satisfied with following the letter of the law[18]. Hence, Shapiro’s claim in the name of the רמ”א “that it was acceptable to provide false information about an individual whom the government suspected of wrongdoing if this would alleviate the situation” is neither fair nor accurate.

In conclusion, I think it is fair to say that the position of the רמ”א in שו”ת הרמ”א סימן י”א does not represent a radical position which may shock many readers as being “on the outer limits of what has been viewed as acceptable when it comes to falsehood and deception”. Rather, there is no reason not to view this as the position of a responsible community leader of a high moral caliber, and it is unfortunate that he has been portrayed differently.

Postscript:

Although the following does not affect the above, I include it for whatever historical interest it may have: From the language of תשובה י”א in שו”ת הרמ”א (קהלתנו, עירנו, רחובותינו, = our community, our city, our streets) it seems almost certain that the case under discussion took place in the author’s city. If the author was the רמ”א, that city would be Cracow, Poland where the רמ”א served as Rav from an extremely young age until his passing. However R. Asher Ziv, the Rema’s biographer and editor of his תשובות, suggests that the incident took place in the city of Prague in Bohemia[19]; a city plagued by strife and under the constant threat of expulsion. Since the five תשובות following סימן י”א in שו”ת הרמ”א were written by various rabbanim regarding problems in the city of Prague, it is not unlikely that תשובה י”א also concerns a dispute in Prague.

Based on the above, it would seem plausible to conclude that תשובה י”א was not even authored by the [20]רמ”א; rather it was sent to him by a colleague from Prague[21]. It is additionally possible that the תשובה was in no way connected to the רמ”א, however, since the תשובה was found among the other תשובות relating to Prague it was included accidently. This would not be all that surprising, since we do know that there are תשובות in שו”ת הרמ”א which were erroneously included in the collection[22].

Response by Marc B. Shapiro

Let me begin by thanking Rabbi Yitzchok Stroh and the many others who have read my book carefully, especially those who have sent comments. Some readers have pointed out errors or alternative ways to read passages and others have called attention to important new sources. I have already mentioned some of these in past posts and will continue to do so in future posts.

Stroh believes that my presentation of a responsum of R. Moses Isserles is inaccurate and suggests that it was my bias that led to my objectivity being affected. I am not sure what my bias would be in this case, presumably a desire to make use of an important source in support of my argument.

Stroh’s summary of the responsum is helpful, especially since as Stroh notes it is difficult to reconstruct exactly what happened. The beginning of the case was, as Stroh states:

A group of pretentious rabbinic and lay leaders convened to place a ban on a certain individual, causing him great harm. (The reason for the ban is not clear.)

In reading over the responsum, I think that the reason for the ban is explained on p. 56 in Siev’s edition. It states:

עליו נגזרה גזירה ונחתך עליו דין מסור הגמורה

I assume this means that they regarded him as a moser, and that is why he was placed under the ban. Earlier it states regarding this man ודמו להיות מותר which apparently alludes to the fact that a moser should be killed.

Stroh notes that I am mistaken in assuming that the government suspected one of the Jews of wrongdoing and that R. Isserles ruled that false information could be provided if this was the only way to save the community. He also states that contrary to my presentation, it was not one person who was to be slandered but numerous community leaders.

I have read over the responsum and I have to agree that the slander was not directed against one person but against a group, so I thank Stroh for this correction. In fact, I am not the only one to make this mistake, and am indeed in good company (not that this is in any way an excuse). Nachum Rakover also describes the case as being one of slander against an individual.[23]

מוציאי הדיבה קיוו, שאם “ישנו את טעמם”, כלומר ישקרו אודות מישהו מהקהילה, יעלה בידם להחזיר את השלום על כנו.

Based on this, Rakover then has an entire section dealing with if it is OK to sacrifice an individual to save the many.

R. Aryeh Pomeranchik writes:[24]

בתשו’ הרמ”א סי’ י”א למד מזה, דמותר להוציא שם רע על אחד מן הצבור כדי להשקיט בזה המריבה שנפלה בין הצבור ולעשות שלום

R. Aharon David Goldberg writes:[25]

אמנם בתשובות הרמ”א סי’ י”א מפורש דלא כדבריו, שדן בשאלה אם מותר להוציא שם רע על אחד מן הצבור כדי להשקיט מריבה

R. Yitzchak Zilberstein might also make this error (although it could be that he was simply not being exact in his description of the case, as his focus is on the underlying halakhah):[26]

ובתשובות הרמ”א (סימן יא) למד מזה, שמותר להוציא שם רע על אחד, כדי להשקיט בזה מריבה שנפלה בין הציבור ולעשות שלום.

It is certain, however, that R. Zilberstein is mistaken when he states[27] שלמעשה הרמ”א לא התיר, as the entire responsum is indeed a justification of the action which occurred, and R. Isserles states: “Even if we did not in accordance with ‘the way of the pious’, nevertheless, we acted in accordance with the law.”

What about the non-Jewish government? Again, I have to agree with Stroh that there is no evidence that the slander was ever directly reported to the government, although I still assume that R. Isserles would agree that to save the community, one would even be permitted to slander someone to the non-Jewish authorities, not merely to the Jewish community. As I see it, and please correct me if I am wrong, the entire logic of R. Isserles’ responsum leads to this result even if, in the case under discussion, the slander was intended to remain in the Jewish community. How else is one to understand his words (p. 53):

דמותר להוציא שם רע אם כוונתו לשמים ולתכלית טוב כדי לעשות שלום

I thank Rabbi Stroh for setting the record straight.

Regarding giving up a man for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews, I thought I was clear that we were dealing with a demand for a specific person, the details of which Stroh properly explains. Yet I should have also mentioned that the case must be one where the entire community will itself be killed if they do not give up the man.[28]

In his conclusion, Stroh states that the position of R. Isserles should not be seen as radical. “Rather, there is no reason not to view this as the position of a responsible community leader.” Yet I still think that in the eyes of most people what R. Isserles agreed to will be seen as “on the outer limits of what has been viewed as acceptable.” In fact, R. Daniel Eidensohn, who translates some of R. Isserles’ responsum here, writes as follows: “As far as I know the ruling of the Rema was not accepted and is not cited with approval by anyone else. It is the thinking, however, of one our major poskim and illustrates how important community peace is.”

R. Israel Zev Minzberg finds the permission to slander another for the sake of peace incomprehensible, and states that one cannot rely on this ruling.[29]

דברי התשו’ הנז’ נפלאו ממני ולדעתי אין לסמוך ע”ז למעשה כלל וכלל.

R. Yitzhak Hutner also found the responsum unacceptable and stated that it was not written by R. Isserles.[30] In other words, contrary to Stroh, Rabbis Eidensohn, Minzberg and Hutner do find the conclusion of the responsum surprising, and indeed “on the outer limits”.

Finally, I must note that R. Zilberstein refers to the responsum of R. Isserles in another place where he discusses the following problem:[31] Reuven is a very good and God-fearing student. His brother Shimon is not, and causes Reuven all sorts of serious problems. The teacher of Reuven wants to stop Shimon from doing this, and the only way to do so is to tell Shimon’s father, Yaakov, that Shimon said that he was going to steal from Yaakov in order to hire some thugs who would attack Reuven. When Yaakov hears this, he will take steps against Shimon and this will stop Shimon’s harassment of Reuven. Is it permitted for the teacher to lie about Shimon in order to protect Reuven?[32]

R. Zilberstein concludes that it is permitted to tell Yaakov the falsehood about Shimon, since Shimon is a “ba’al mahaloket”. In addition to citing R. Isserles’ responsum, he also cites an opinion of the Hafetz Hayyim.[33] The Hafetz Hayyim states that if one sees that a certain individual will be a bad influence on his son or student, he should warn him to keep away from this individual. If, however, by telling the truth about this individual, it will not be enough to keep one’s son or student away, the Hafetz Hayyim states that “it is possible” that it is permitted to exaggerate the individual’s wrongdoing, on the condition that one does this le-shem shamayim and not because of any personal grudge.

ולענין הפרט שלא יגדל העולה יותר ממה שהיא אם יספר להם כאשר היא לא יתרחקו מאתו ויכול לבוא מזה ריעותא אפשר דמותר לגדל

Although the Hafetz Hayyim shows some hesitation as to whether this is permissible, R. Zilberstein has no such qualms and concludes that it is permitted to lie for the good purpose of helping Reuven.

This decision provides further proof for my point that there are many voices in the tradition that sanction departing from the truth when they deem it necessary.

[1] Shapiro, Changing the Immutable, p. 255.

[2] All excerpts from שו”ת הרמ”א are from R’ Asher Ziv’s 1970 edition. “יבינו הקורא מעצמו מתוך דברי ענין ההתנצלות בעצמו”. (שו”ת הרמ”א נ”ב ע”ב.)

[3] “כתב התנצלות בענין מעשה שנעשה בשנות טעמים מפני רדיפת שלום” (שם).

[4] כנראה שטעותו של שפירא נובע מב’ קטעים בתשובת הרמ”א, הא’ – ממה שכותב הרמ”א שם עמ’ נ”ד “ובנדון דידן ייחד לנו אחם מהם, שאומר האויב כי נפשותיהם של אלו היה מבקש כמו שנתבאר”, וכנראה ששפירא הבין שהמדובר הוא באויב אינו יהודי מאישי הממשלה, אבל ברור שה”אויב” הוא אותו היהודי שהיה מוחרם מתחלה כפי שמבואר בפירוש בהמשך התשובה שהוא היה האויב של קבוצת הקצינים שהחרימו אותו. עי’ בהמשך דברינו בפנים.

הב’ – ממה שכותב הרמ”א “ולא היה לנו למסור נפש אחת מישראל …” ושפירא הבין שהכוונה למסור נפש אחת מישראל לעכו”ם, אבל ברור הדבר כפי שכותב הרמ”א בהמשך דבריו שמדובר אודות מסירה ללעג ולקלס ולהוצאת שם רע כמו שכותב הרמ”א “ולא היה לנו למסור נפש אחת מישראל ללעג ולקלס ולהוציא עליו דברים אשר לא כן. כ”ש על חשובים כמאה מנהיגי המדיניה, כמו שעשו במעשה אשר אבאר למטה” וכפי מה שמבאר הרמ”א למטה לא היה מעולם מסירה לאינו יהודים.

וגם בהקטע שם נ”ה ע”א “דמצינו שפת יתר על קציני ארץ ליתן אותם לפני בני בליעל” כוונתו על המסירה לפני אויביהם היהודי הנ”ל וחביריו.

[5] שם עמ’ “… ומפרש בו (בהפסק דין) דברים זרים אשר לא עלו על לבנו מעולם, והתחברו אליו אנשים רקים … מוציאי דבה…”

[6] שמכנף הארץ שמענו שנתחברו יחד כתרנגולים של בית בוקיא, ועי’ ברש”י יבמות פ”ד ע”א שפי’ בקיאים וחריפים ואין מניחים תרנגול נכרי ביניהם.

[7] שם נ”ה ע”א “וזה המעשה אשר אירע לא ראינו מעשה מעולם כזה לרוע, שמכנף הארץ שמענו שנתחברו יחד כתרנגולים של בית בוקיא כל רועי ישראל האזינו גדולי ארץ גודרי פרץ פרשו מצודתם בנציבותינו על אחד ונלכד בחרמם ובמצודתם וכדגי הים יאסוף במצותם, ודמו להיות מותר וכסהו בעפר.”

[8] שם “הנ”ל רצה על אויביו שהמציאו עליו הדברים לנקום ובהם התעבר הצריח ואף התגבר.”

[9] שם “ונתחברו אליו אנשים לעזרתו, אשר היה להם צר בצרתו.”

[10] שם “ובסבת זה נחלקה הקהלה לשנים …”

[11] Apparently the strife came to be judged before the authorities as the רמ”א writes: “כמו שהיה ידוע מקדמות דנא לכל באי שער עירנו, המעשים הרעים שהיו נגד פנינו, ואויבינו היו פלילים. וכאן כנראה כוונתו לאויבים אינו יהודים כמאמר רז”ל המובא ברש”י ריש פרשת משפטים.

[12] שם. “ובזה נתמוטטו עמודי ארץ ויסודיה. והיה לחוש בן יפוק ח”ו חורבא מיניה מאת פני המלך והשרים לגרש כל העם הזה כולו כהניה ושריה.”

[13] שם. “פתחנו לשלום ודברנו עם הצד שהיה מנגד להשלים אתו והיינו בעיניהם כמתעתע”

[14] שם. “[ואמרו] כי לא ישקטו עד אשר רצו להרוג אותו” (בדפוסים אחרים כתוב עד שרצו להרוג אותנו).

[15] שם עמ’ נ”ז: “גם מתוך השטר ניכר כי לא דינא עבדנו רק ע”ד גיזום … כי השטר מזויף מתוכו … השטר בטל ומבוטל … כי לא נתקן אלא מפני השלום …”

[16] שם נ”ו: “כי נשבע לנו שבועה חמורה שלא רצה לגלות השטר החתום לעולם ובשמנו לא יהא נקרא. רק שיוכל להתפאר בו שגם לו חתומים כאלה, באולי יכול להוציא ע”י זה השטר החתום עליו (כלומר שטר החרם) ויבואו על ידי זה להשלים אתו, ויבערו שני הצדדים השטרות מן העולם. ואם ככה היה עשה לנו לא היה בדבר אלא קדוש השם יתברך … אבל מעולם לא עשינו בכוונה אחרת כי אם להוציא את שלום. ואם לא קיבל עליו להחזיר לנו את חתימתנו.”

[17] כמובן שכל זה מיירי אף כשברור הדבר שביכולתם להרוג את כולם, ולדוגמא אם נמצאו כמה יהודים בבנין ויש ביכולת הנכרים להרוג כולם ע”י שיפוצצו כל הבנין, והנכרים מבקשים למסור להם אחד מהיהודים אסור מן הדין למוסרו להם. וביאור הדבר הוא כי אף באם לא ימסרו אחד מהיהודים להנכרים יהיה אותו יהודי נהרג עם האחרים אך אין לנו רשות לברר מי הוא זה שיצא להריגה. אך כאשר הנכרים מבקשים איש פרטי אזי מעיקרא דדינא מותר למסור אותו אמנם עפ”י דברי הירושלמי אינה ממידת חסידות כי למעשה אנו מוסרים אותו להריגה וטוב לנו להניח הדבר בידי שמים אף שעל פי דרך הטבע מן הסתם יהיו כולם נהרגים.

[18] If one were to be מדייק in the language used by the רמ”א in formulating his ruling, he will notice that the רמ”א permits one to be משנה (alter) for the sake of peace, but he never allows one to be משקר (lie) for the sake of peace. This רמ”א would be proof to the opinion of the Lubavitcher Rebbe Ztz”l (שיחות קודש שבת פ’ עקב תשמ”א אות כ”ז עי”ש) who explains that one may be משנה (alter) for the sake of peace, but not be משקר (lie) for the sake of peace.

[19] הר’ זיו שם הערה 64, “אבל קרוב הדבר לומר שהכוונה פה לקהילת פראג העתיקה …”

[20] ואולי זהו הכוונה במש”כ בתוכן הענינים שנדפס בדפוס ראשון של שו”ת הרמ”א, כתב התנצלות בענין רדיפות שלום לגדול אחד, היינו שהתשובה הוא לגדול אחד ולא יצא מידי הרמ”א.

הר’ אשר זיו מילת אלו מתוכן הסימנים והעיר בשולי הגליון, בכל ההוצאות נוסף פה ‘לגדול אחד’. ואולי הבין שהכוונה הוא שהתשוב נכתב אל גדול אחד.

[21] אולם הר’ זיו לא הזכיר שתשובה זו אינו להרמ”א

[22] זיו בהמבוא לשו”ת הרמ”א עמ’ 30

[23] Matarah ha-Mekadeshet et ha-Emtza’im (Jerusalem, 2000), p. 176 (emphasis added here and in subsequent quotations).

[24] Emek Berakhah, p. 41.

[25] Shirat David, Bereshit-Shemot, p. 132.

[26] Hashukei Hemed, Sukkah, pp. 443-444.

[27] Ibid., p. 444.

[28] JT Terumot 8:4.

[29] She’erit Yisrael, Orah Hayyim no. 13.

[30] Sefer ha-Zikaron le-Maran Ba’al “Pahad Yitzhak”, p. 334.

[31] Hashukei Hemed, Makot 11a.

[32] One should not assume that this question, or any of the other strange questions in R. Zilberstein’s works, are actual cases. I think it is obvious that he makes them up in order to have a springboard to discuss various halakhic issues.

[33] Hafetz Hayyim, Kelal 4, Be’er Mayim Hayyim, no. 43.

ArtScroll and More

ArtScroll and More

Marc B. Shapiro

In an earlier post here I discussed ArtScroll’s use of a censored talmudic text.[1] This happens quite a bit and it is not always clear if the translators were aware that they were working with an inauthentic text. However, for many passages there is no question that they realize that what they are translating is not authentic but was added because of fear of non-Jewish reaction. Here is a chart someone drew up showing how the various new Talmud editions deal with the matter of censorship.

It is significant that even in the Hebrew ArtScroll the text that is used is censored. ArtScroll has never publicly explained why they have adopted this approach, but I think it is obvious that unlike other publishers, ArtScroll is still worried about creating anti-Semitism and thus continues to print a censored Talmud. While I think everyone agrees that the ArtScroll Talmud translation is a masterpiece, opinions will obviously differ as to whether ArtScroll made a mistake in not restoring the Talmud to its pre-censorship state.[2]

ArtScroll’s approach is different than that of other publishers who are very happy that they can now include the complete uncensored words of the Talmud. Ezra Chwat’s words express the feeling of every publisher other than ArtScroll.[3]

אין צורך להדגיש את החשיבות של הנגשת הסוגיה המקורית לעשרות אלפי הלומדים את הגמרא כפי שיצא מפיהם הקדושים של האמוראים, ושלא יסתפקו ב”גירסא” שאושרה על ידי הכנסייה.

Yet R. Leopold Greenwald had the exact opposite approach, and he was upset when he heard that a new Talmud was being printed that reinserted the censored texts. His words reflect the approach later adopted by ArtScroll [4]:

ומה מאד דאבה נפשנו בראותנו, כי מכריזים גם עכשיו על “המציאה הגדולה”, כי בירושלים מדפיסים כעת תלמוד עם כל ההשמטות שהשמיטו הצנזורים במשך מאות שנים. ועל זה אנו קוראים: שקול טובתך! בני ישראל לא ישבעו עונג מהטובה הזאת, לא ספרותנו ולא חכמתנו יתעשרו מהשמטות הללו, לא בזמננו ולא בהדורות שאחרינו. כבר שבענו צרות ומכאובות. ולהיות בפי כל מחבל בודאי אסון הוא. איפוא הם חכמי ירושלים? האם אינם רואים כי מזה לא תושע יהודה וכי צוררי ישראל ישיגו חומר מסוכן חדש?

For those who are unaware of the details, let me just mention that I am not referring to a word here or there that was censored and has not been restored by ArtScroll. Sanhedrin 43a has a number of lines dealing with the execution of Jesus and his disciples. While the entire section is found in Soncino (in translation), Steinsaltz, Wagshal and Oz ve-Hadar, it is not to be found in ArtScroll. Both the English and Hebrew editions of ArtScroll tell the reader that a section has been deleted from the Vilna Shas. However, in Sanhedrin 67a, where another section has been deleted and is found in the other editions just mentioned, ArtScroll does not inform the reader of the deletion.

An allusion to the Sanhedrin 67a text is found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin, attributed to R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz. This explosive text, which remained in manuscript for almost three hundred years, has just appeared in print, edited by Pawel Maciejko.[5] Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin is very important to understanding the controversy over R. Eybeschuetz. (I hope that the manuscript Gahalei Esh, a treasure trove of documents dealing with eighteenth-century Sabbatianism, will also soon appear in a scholarly edition.) Quite apart from the radical theological notions found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin, Maciejko describes the work as follows: “[I]t is blatantly pornographic (in fact, it is possibly the only truly pornographic text ever written in the rabbinic idiom.)”[6]

Speaking of pornography let me add the following. Not long ago I was visiting a certain synagogue for Shabbat. When it came time for Torah reading I took out the chumash that was near me. It happened to be the one published by R. Aryeh Kaplan. I actually am not a fan of this chumash for use in synagogue as its focus is entirely philological, and doesn’t deal with any of the issues that a typical person would want explained in reviewing the Torah portion. But this was what I had so I used it. In Exodus 35:22 an unusual word appears: כומז. It means some sort of golden bodily ornament. The word also appears in Numbers 31:50. According to the Exodus passage, this was one of the items the Israelites in the desert donated at the time of the building of the Tabernacle. The passage is Numbers refers to booty taken from the Midianites. Among the different interpretations Kaplan offers for כומז is “a pornographic sculpture.” This is quoted in the name of R. Aaron Alrabi (fifteenth century). I was quite shocked when I saw this and later saw that this interpretation is also quoted by R. Kasher in Torah Shelemah, which must have been where Kaplan saw it.

Alrabi wrote a commentary on Rashi which was published in Constantinople in 1525. In this work, on Exodus 35:22, Alrabi writes:

יראה לי שהוא תכשיט מצוייר צורת רחם האשה כדי שישתוקק רואהו לפועל המשגל והצנועות היו מביאות אותו עליהן בחדריהם לתת תשוקה לבעליהן העין רואה והלב חומד בו, והיה זה לכונה טובה לכן הותרו לשרת בקדש

What this means is that the item in question had a picture of a woman’s private parts. The Israelite women would have their husbands look at it in order to sexually excite them before they had marital relations. Since this pornographic viewing was for a good purpose, it was permitted for these items to be donated for use in building the Tabernacle. Here is the original text.

Those who want to see the book in its entirety can view it here.

I find this explanation quite strange. I don’t know what led Alrabi to his original understanding and why he did not find any of the prior explanations compelling.

Incidentally, one of the other explanations cited by Kaplan is that כומז means a chastity belt. R. Ephraim ben Shimshon (12th-13th centuries) writes[7]:

הכומז היה כלי כמנעול שקושרת האשה פתחה שלא יודעו להם שם אדם, כי אם בעלה לבד, והוא גודר הערוה.

This is how he understands Shabbat 64a which states that כומז means דפוס של בית הרחם. Soncino translates this as “cast of the womb” and ArtScroll translates it the exact same way. Koren translates “a mold [in the shape] of the womb.” In general I would say that disagreeing with these three translations is not a smart thing to do, yet in this case I must do just that. The translations I have cited are incorrect as they do not reflect what the Talmud is saying. בית הרחם in Shabbat 64a does not mean “womb” but rather something else. In order not to cause problems for those with internet filters I won’t spell it out completely, but I think the reader already understands.[8]

Rashi, Exodus 35:22, in summarizing the Talmud leaves no doubt in this matter:

כלי זהב הוא נתון כנגד אותו מקום לאשה

The very text in Shabbat 64a also lets us know that this matter has nothing to do with a “womb”, as immediately following the explanation of דפוס של בית הרחם the Talmud explains that the wordכומז is an acronym of כאן מקום זימה “here is the place of lewdness”, and there is no issue of lewdness with the womb. ArtScroll itself, in its note on this latter passage, explains the matter well: “The place encased by this ornament is the part of the body which is the focus of lewdness.” In other words, in its commentary ArtScroll tells us that we are not dealing with the womb at all, but with another part of a woman’s anatomy. As such, it was a mistake for ArtScroll in its translation to adopt Soncino’s rendering of כומז as “cast of the womb”.

In his commentary to Berakhot 24a s.v. תכשיטין שבפנים, Rashi explains that a כומז is a chastity belt. From the context of this talmudic passage we see that it also had ornamental significance:

כומז דפוס של בית הרחם שהיו עושין לבנותיהן ונוקבין כותלי בית הרחם כדרך שנוקבין את האזנים ותוחבין אותו כדי שלא יזדקקו להן זכרים

In its commentary, ibid., ArtScroll summarizes Rashi as follows: “The kumaz was an ornament that covered a woman’s private parts.”

Let me return to Shabbat 64a where כומז is explained as being an acronym for כאן מקום זימה. The Maharal, Gur Aryeh, Ex. 35:11, writes:

מפני שהוקשה להם לרז”ל שאין דרך לשון הקודש לקרא שם מיוחד לדברים שהם ערוה . . . כל דבר ערוה אין הכתוב נותן לו שם מיוחד . . . וכאן למה קרא כומז שם מיוחד אל הכלי הזה שהוא דפוס בית רחם, ולכך דרשו רז”ל שהוא כאן מקום זימה והשתא אין שם מיוחד לכלי זה רק כאילו נקרא כאן זימה.

I don’t understand the Maharal’s point. Just because there are no words in leshon ha-kodesh for sexual organs, why should we assume that there is no name for an item designed to cover a sexual organ?

Returning to the matter of “pornographic viewing” as described by Alrabi, I wonder if this could also have halakhic significance. I mention this only because of the controversy some years ago by an answer given by R. Shlomo Aviner that in a she’at ha-dehak (i.e., there are serious marital sexual issues) it would be permitted for a husband and wife to together view explicit pictures in a book. See here.

The entire conversation with R. Aviner was a set-up, and the anti-Aviner website used it to attack R. Aviner, and portray him as permitting viewing of pornography. Yet it is obvious that he was referring to sexual self-help books (which would have explicit pictures) since he refers to books found in Steimatzky. R. Moses Feinstein had earlier permitted a soon-to-be-married man to read sexual self-help books.[9] There is no indication in R. Feinstein’s responsum that he is also including the viewing of pictures in such books, but I do not know if he would regard this as a problem if the pictures are not of real people but are drawings.

Let us return to the subject of chastity belts. In the Wikipedia entry for “Chastity Belt” one finds the following:

Gregory the Great, Alcuin of York, Bernard of Clairvaux and Nicholas Gorranus all made passing references to ‘chastity belts’ within their exhortatory and public discourses, but meant this in a figurative or metaphorical sense within their historical context.

The first detailed actual mention of what could be interpreted as “chastity belts” in the West is in Konrad Kyeser von Eichstätt’s Bellifortis (1405), which describes the military technology of the era.

As we have seen, Rashi and R. Ephraim are not referring to chastity belts in a metaphorical sense. Thus, their mention of the item is of general historical significance, and Rashi (1040-1105) might be the earliest recorded example of someone referring to a chastity belt. Eric John Dingwall wrote an entire book on the subject of chastity belts entitled The Girdle of Chastity (Scranton, 1959). On p. 14 he writes: “There can be little doubt that the idea of such a device, at least in a somewhat modified form, was current at least as early as the second half of the twelfth century.” He then cites the late twelfth-century Guigemar Epic, written by Marie de France, as a source of this. Yet Rashi’s mention of the chastity belt predates this source by around a century.

See also here where as part of a museum exhibition on chastity belts it states:

Until the 12th century, there are no textual memories related to chastity belts at all (not even any allusions without actually using the term) where the reference is not in a theological or mythological context.

This sentence is incorrect, for as we have seen Rashi referred to chastity belts many decades before Marie de France, who is also cited in the museum exhibition as the first one to refer to the item. What we have here is a good example where scholars make judgments based exclusively on their knowledge of medieval Latin, Romance and Germanic literature. Exposure to what appears in medieval Hebrew texts would have caused them to alter these judgments.

Returning to ArtScroll, here is an example where I believe that ArtScroll has printed something that they know is incorrect, but did so in the interest of good Jewish-Gentile relations. I think it is a noteworthy example as it has nothing to do with a censored text, but focuses on the explanation of the Talmud. Avodah Zarah 6a states that according to R. Yishmael it is forbidden to do business with idolaters because of Sunday. Rashi explains that this means that one can never do business with idolaters since one cannot do business with them three days before and three days after their holiday, and this includes the entire seven-day week.

It doesn’t take much imagination to realize what the Talmud is referring to by “Sunday”, and in the uncensored text it actually has נוצרי, נוצרים or יום הנוצרי instead of “Sunday”. Yet ArtScroll in its translation states that the Talmud is referring to “Babylonian pagans who observe a sun-worshiping festival every Sunday.” It is true that Meiri states as much.[10] Meiri also claims that when the Talmud uses the word נוצרים it does not mean followers of ישו הנוצרי, but refers to the use of the term in Jeremiah 4:16, which Meiri claims is derived from the word נבוכדנצר.[11] While it is true that R. David Kimhi also sees the word in Jeremiah 4:16 as related to נבוכדנצר, it is Meiri alone who claims that this is also intended when the Talmud refers to נוצרים.

It is certainly appropriate that ArtScroll cited Meiri’s explanation in a note, but how is it that this is the only explanation cited, when other than Meiri everyone else has assumed, with good reason, that נוצרים refers to Christians? This can only be an example of ArtScroll shading the truth for apologetic reasons. People can debate the appropriateness of this, but there can be no doubt that ArtScroll is not being frank in its presentation here.

In the ArtScroll Hebrew edition it also quotes Meiri and states the that Talmud is not referring to Christians. Yet unlike in the English edition, in the Hebrew ArtScroll there is a note which states: “See Rambam, Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 9:4”. If you open up the Mishneh Torah what you find is that the Rambam states:

הנוצרים עובדי עבודה זרה הן ויום ראשון יום אידם הוא

In other words, by referring to the Mishneh Torah after mentioning Meiri, ArtScroll is alerting readers to the fact that the Rambam does not agree with Meiri and believes that the passage in Avodah Zarah 6a indeed refers to Christians. Yet this is never spelled out in ArtScroll, and you need to take their suggestion to consult the Mishneh Torah in order to learn that not everyone agrees that when the Talmud mentions those who make Sunday their holiday that it is referring to Babylonian pagans. (In fact, as already mentioned, only Meiri advocates this position.) Does the average person who learns daf yomi realize this?

In case anyone has any doubts as to what I am saying, please note the following. After referring to Maimonides, the note in the Hebrew ArtScroll calls attention to the Venice edition of the Talmud with Rashi, and to Dikdukei Soferim. Again, only one who examines these sources will learn that they offer an interpretation at odds with Meiri. If you look at the Venice Talmud or Dikdukei Soferim (or even Steinsaltz) you will find that in Avodah Zarah 6a Rashi explains:

נוצרי, ההולך בטעותו של אותו איש שצוה להם לעשות להם יום איד בא’ בשבת

In other words, Rashi tells us, just like Maimonides, that when the Talmud refers to those who celebrate נוצרי יום it means the Christians who follow Jesus.I find it significant that even in the Hebrew edition ArtScroll feels the need to only allude to the explanation of Rashi and Maimonides, while presenting Meiri’s explanation as the standard understanding of the text. ArtScroll certainly knows that this is not the standard understanding, and ArtScroll itself cannot believe that Meiri’s understanding is what the Talmud really means. After all, every other medieval commentator agrees with Rashi and Maimonides. In this case, the only explanation is that ArtScroll is following a long apologetic tradition, which was based on fear of what the non-Jews would say if they knew the true meaning of certain talmudic passages.

Another example of this tendency was called to my attention by R. Moshe Maimon. Ketubot 15a discusses the case of A killing B, when A actually intended to kill another person. In its discussion the Talmud refers to “Canaanites”, which in the current context simply means non-Jews. In fact, in all manuscripts and early printings what appears is not “Canaanites” but “goyim”.[12] “Canaanites” is simply a “correction” of the censor. Yet ArtScroll has a note explaining that “The Canaanites were the pagan people who lived in Eretz Yisrael before the Israelites entered the land.” The implication of this comment is that the halakhah stated in the Talmud was only applicable with the ancient Canaanites but not with regard to other non-Jews. This is false and ArtScroll knows it is false, but it is no different than the “note to reader” found in many seforim that all the halakhot about non-Jews only refer to the pagans in faraway places. In the latter case everyone knew (and knows) that these words are not to be taken seriously, but I would assume that the typical user of the ArtScroll English Talmud does not realize this. It is noteworthy that the ArtScroll Hebrew Talmud does not include the note about the Canaanites.[13]

In 1728, an era in which Jewish-Gentile relations were not the best, R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz printed Tractate Berakhot with many deletions, as this was the only way he was given permission to publish the volume. Here is the title page.

The volume can be found at hebrewbooks.org here. True to form, R. Jacob Emden accused R. Eybeschuetz of being in league with the bishop of Prague and intent only on making money from his new printing.[14] There was also a lot of controversy about this edition, not only because of the many deletions but even more so because of the instances where the talmudic text was rewritten. While non-Jewish censorship has a long history, this latter practice, of Jews agreeing to rewrite sections of the talmudic text, was a new and more dangerous phenomenon. Other tractates were later printed, but R. Eybeschuetz had nothing to do with them, and in any event the controversy focused on Berakhot as the other tractates simply printed the censored text from the earlier Basel edition, but did not add anything new.[15]

In his recent outstanding study of this episode, which makes use of manuscript sources, Pawel Maciejko writes:

In both academic scholarship and Jewish collective memory, the best-known controversies concerning Rabbi Jonathan Eibeschütz (1690-1764) are those about his kabbalistic tract Va-avo ha-yom el ha-‘ayin . . . and about the allegedly Sabbatean amulets that he distributed to the members of the communities of Metz and Altona, Hamburg, and Wandsbeck in the 1750s. However, during his early years, the most important controversy concerning Eibeschütz was not the dispute surrounding his suspected Sabbateanism and the heterodox writings attributed to him but rather the outrage engendered by his friendly relations with the local Catholic clergy and his alleged involvement in the publication of heavily censored editions of the Pentateuch, the Talmud, and the prayer book. In the eyes of many contemporaries, the damage caused by the appearance of these latter publications vastly overshadowed any harm stemming from the heretical views expressed in Eibeschütz’s kabbalistic works and amulets.[16]

Maciejko notes that R. Moses Hagiz was so outraged by R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud that he asked other rabbis to issue a ruling that it be burnt!

Shortly after the publication of R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud someone wrote a defense of it, explaining why it was necessary to print a censored Talmud.[17] Raphael Kirchheim, who published this document, cites another who states that its author was none other than R. Eybeschuetz, since the author refers to R. Abraham Broda as his teacher.[18] R. Broda had served as rosh yeshiva in Prague, and later rav of Metz and Frankfurt.

While Maciejko also accepts this view,[19] the reference to R. Broda as the author’s teacher, מורי ורבי, would appear to show that R. Eybeschuetz could not have written the letter, since he was not a student of R. Broda.

We have good information about R. Eybeschuetz’s life, but there still is a lot we don’t know. Even though R. Eybeschuetz is not recorded as R. Broda’s student in the standard biographies, one could claim that it is possible that he studied for a short time under him, and for some reason this fact was not known to the biographers.[20] Yet in this case we can indeed make the definitive statement that R. Eybeschuetz did not study with R. Broda since R. Eybeschuetz tells us this himself. Some thirty years after R. Broda’s death in 1717 his Eshel Avraham was published (Frankfurt, 1747). Here is the title page.

Among those who provided an approbation was R. Eybeschuetz, who at that time was in Metz. His respect for R. Broda is great, but he leaves no doubt that he never studied with him:

ממש רובי חכמי ישראל בדור הזה השלימי’ המה שותי מימיו ואף אני אם לא זכיתי לאורו לחזות לרבי מקמא כי בבואי לפראג שנת תע”ל כבר חמק דודי ופנה הודו לכאן ק”ק מיץ היא העיר אשר כעת אני יושב בה בתוך עמי, מ”מ נפתולי נפתלתי עם גדולי תלמידיו הרבני’ וחכמי’ מובהקים ושלימים במדע אשר נשארו שם ושמעתי’ תמיד בבי מדרשי’ בדיבוק חברי’

Returning to the document published by Kirchheim, it describes the history of the banning of the Talmud in the years before R. Eybeschuetz printed his volume. Interestingly, it tells about the confiscation of Jewish books from the Jews of Prague, which were then handed over to the Jesuits to be examined for anything against Christianity. From other sources we know that the Jesuits burnt the copies of the Talmud they confiscated, and “[i]n the 10 years from 1715 to 1725, very few copies (according to some sources, none) of the Talmud existed in Bohemia.”[21]

This need for copies of the Talmud explains why R. Eybeschuetz had to take the step he did. The document also tells of the punishment of a man from Nikolsburg who was caught smuggling Talmuds into the Prague ghetto. He was forced, in chains, to clean the streets for a year. The smuggled Talmuds were supposed to be burnt, but this was somehow prevented (probably with a good bribe).

The only way to print a Talmud in Prague was to remove everything the Jesuits viewed as offensive to Christianity. They also viewed certain aggadot as objectionable, such as the description of God wearing tefillin in Berakhot 6a, and these too had to be removed.[22] The document tells us that having the Church agree to publication of the Talmud, even with these restrictions, was regarded as a great achievement. It also tells us that all the important rabbis in Prague permitted the publication of the bowdlerized Talmud.[23]

וכאשר הגיעו לידינו רשימה אספנו להגאון מורנו ורבנו האב”ד ור”י נר”ו בצירוף כל חכמי רבינו [!] עירנו אשר ת”ל המה גדולים בחכמה ובמנין וטבעם יצא בכל ארץ לעיון במילין אם כשר ונאות לעשות כן אם לא ואחר הלנת דין פעמים ושלש ומשא ומתן עלתה הסכמה להדפיס מס’ ברכות הנודע הגהתן וסדר זרעים אשר לא יחסר בו דבר, אך ממסכת שבת והלאה לא עבר הסכמתן כי לא נודע עדיין טיב הגהות נוצרים בו אם מעט אם רב

The document then quotes a statement issued by the scholars of Prague defending their decision, a statement that was only intended to be viewed by other learned Jews. In justifying their decision to publish a censored Talmud – since this was all they were permitted and it was a censored Talmud or nothing – we find the following very interesting passage:[24]

ודאי שנכון הדבר לעשות לבלי כושל ועיכוב כלל כי ודאי שניתן הש”ס להצילו באחד מאיבריו ולא יהיה הש”ס חמור מג”ע וש”ד אשר ק”ל יהרג ואל יעבר קימו לן אם מיחדים על אחד ימסר להם ואל יהרגו וכ”ש הדבר בש”ס שבזמן שמיחדים לומר השמיטו דא מאתכם שיהא הנשאר לפליטה שישמיטו זאת ולא יצאו כולם לבית השריפה מבלי שריד באהלינו אהל תורה ובפרט כי חז”ל שיסדו התלמוד לא על זה יסדו להיותו בדפוס גלוי לכל עמים כי אם כתבוהו בכתיבה תמה ומסרו זאת לזרע אמונים להנחיל לבניהם אחריהם לחלקם ביעקב ולהפיץ בישראל.

The last sentence is making the point that there are certain things in the Talmud that should not be published for all to see, as these are the sorts of things that could create great problems with non-Jews. The Prague scholars then state that it is actually a good thing to cut out certain passages from the Talmud. In other words, they are acknowledging that even without Christian demands, it would be best in internally censor certain passages so as to prevent problems from arising. This is exactly what ArtScroll is doing today. No one is forcing them to self-censor, but they see matters as the sages of Prague who wrote (emphasis added)[25]:

וזה לערך ר’ שנה שהחל להתפשט ספרינו בדפוס לתקנות אחינו למען יהיו להם הספרים בנקל ומצוי, אמנם בדברים כאלו תקנתם קלקלתם שגורמים סכנה לכל ספריהם ומטילים איבת הנוצרים עלינו ודאי ראוים שדברים אלו יהיו חוזרים לאיתנם הראשון מבלי לחוקקם בעט ברזל ועופרת.

They are not saying that the censored matters should be forgotten about. Rather, they should be only be passed on in a non-published form (“Torah she-Ba’al Peh”) to advanced students who study the Talmud; they should not be put down in print for all to see and thus create a Christian backlash. The sages of Prague make the same point about strange Aggadot that are not to be taken literally and can only be understood by a few, and which have become subject to Christian mockery. These too should be omitted[26] להציל דברי חז”ל. When possible, the Prague sages state, one should not delete an entire passage but simply change certain words. In this way the sense of the passage is not changed for any learned person, but problematic words are removed thus helping to blunt anti-Semitic attacks:[27]

ומכ”ש לשנות הלשון במילות ושמות נרדפים באופן שלא ישתנה הענין פשיטא שמותר

The Prague sages then state that if necessary it is even permitted to alter (i.e., falsify) halakhic rulings that appear in the Talmud in order to prevent anti-Semitism (which obviously could lead to real danger). They note that R. Solomon Luria disagrees but that the accepted practice is not in accord with what he wrote, a point that was later made by R. Moses Feinstein:[28]

דעת מהרש”ל להחמיר אף במקום סכנה. אמנם מעשים בכל יום שמהפכין הדין ומשנין מדרכי השלום בהפקעת הלואה וכדומה ולא שמענו פוצה פה לעולם וכן נראה היפוכו בדברי מהר”ם רבק”ש בש”ע ח”מ סי תכ”ה ודברים המה מועתקים בספרים רבים.

It is interesting that the Prague sages quoted the famous words of R. Moses Rivkes in his commentary to Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:5, who responds to a particular anti-Gentile law as follows:

The Rabbis said this in relation to the pagans of their own times only, who worshipped stars and the constellations and did not believe in the Exodus or in creatio ex nihilo. But the people in whose shade we, the people of Israel, are exiled and amongst whom we are dispersed do in fact believe in creatio ex nihilo and in the Exodus and in the main principles of religion, and their whole aim and intent is to the Maker of heaven and earth, as the codifiers have written. . . . So far, then from our not being forbidden to save them, we are on the contrary obliged to pray for their welfare.[29]

Some, such as Jacob Katz,[30] have seen R. Rivkes’ words as reflecting a new tolerant approach. However, the sages of Prague, who were closer to the time R. Rivkes lived, saw his words as merely designed for non-Jewish eyes and not to be taken seriously by Jews. R. Rivkes’ comment would therefore be no different than the declarations found at the beginning of many seforim that all negative statements about non-Jews are only directed towards pagans but have nothing to do with the Christians of Europe who worship God and allow the Jews to dwell among them.

Unlike what has been described by the Prague sages, Maciejko does not view the “corrections” in R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud as simply defensive. He writes:

Eibeschütz believed that there was no final, fixed, and canonized text of the Talmud. . . . Eibeschütz put himself in the shoes of the ancient sages and saw himself not as expurgating but rather as creating the text of the Talmud.[31]

Maciejko further writes:

Eibeschütz seems to have been the only early modern Jewish author who believed that the talmudic sages needed to be edited for style. For themselves, such changes were only possible thanks to the editorial freedom Eibeschütz granted himself in his “Apology and Answer of the Rabbis Prague”: Eibeschütz considered the talmudic text open and unfinished and therefore felt free to “correct” it even in instances in which he experienced no external pressure from the church or from any other powerbrokers. As for the character of these changes, one thing can be said with certainty: most of them aimed to create a neater and simpler text of the Talmud, one that avoids intricate grammatical constructions or potentially misleading expressions.[32]

It is hard for me to accept that R. Eybeschuetz could have viewed himself as “updating” the Talmud. Yet Maciejko is correct that we are confronted with the fact that R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud contains linguistic and stylistic changes that were not required by the censor. Unlike Maciejko, I would explain matters in the following way: Since the Talmud was already being published in a censored fashion, with numerous passages deleted or rewritten, R. Eybeschuetz saw no reason not to make other changes that would create a more user-friendly text. However, this has nothing to do with the talmudic text being “open and unfinished” as Maciejko puts it. It wasn’t that he was improving on the original Talmud or seeking to replace it, but since the Talmud he was publishing was already “damaged”, as it were, he did not see a problem making other changes if these changes could be of assistance to the reader. Furthermore, everyone who bought this Talmud knew that it was a she’at ha-dehak publication and that it was only to be used if one had no access to an uncensored text. I have no doubt that R. Eybeschuetz felt the exact same way, and thus I would need more evidence before accepting Maciejko’s theory.

Maciejko makes a further claim that R. Eybeschuetz’s “editing” of the Talmud hints to his secret universalist religious views that are also found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin. This is a much more provocative claim than what I discussed in the previous paragraph, and I am curious as to what other scholars will have to say about it.

In addition to being given permission to print an expurgated Talmud, the non-Jewish authorities also permitted “strange” aggadic passages to remain if a good explanation could be provided for them. In R. Eybeschuetz’s edition of Berakhot such explanations are found at the back of the volume, and the reader is alerted to them by a note on the talmudic page.[33]

Until Hebrewbooks.org put the Prague edition of Berakhot online, it was a very rare book, and Maciejko knows of only three copies in existence.[34] In 1981 Professor Shnayer Leiman republished R. Eybeschuetz’s explanations to Berakhot.[35]

To be continued

[1] See also Jeremy Brown’s post here and regarding Brown’s post see David Zilberberg’s earlier post here.

[2] Only in the last year or so have I started to examine the ArtScroll Talmud on a regular basis and I am continuously impressed. This has to be one of the most significant Torah publications of the twentieth century. Since that is the case, I don’t see why such effort is being put into producing the new Koren Talmud. While it sometimes has points that do not appear in ArtScroll, I don’t know why anyone would prefer it over ArtScroll. I have had a chance to use both ArtScroll and Koren in reviewing some sugyot in Berakhot with my son, and in my mind ArtScroll always comes out on top. I even found one place where Soncino is to be preferred to Koren (although generally this is not the case). In Berakhot 29a it states: “Corresponding to what were these twenty-four blessings of the Amida prayer of the fast days instituted?” Unlike Soncino, Koren provides no note to this sentence and most people who read it will have no clue what it is talking about since when they look in the siddur they will not find twenty-four blessings in the Amidah on fast days (as they will assume that the fast days referred to are Yom Kippur, Tisha be-Av, etc.). ArtScroll helpfully explains as follows: “On certain public fast days decreed in times of drought, an additional six blessings, enumerated in the Mishnah in Taanis 15a, are added to the eighteen regular blessings of the Shemoneh Esrei, for a total of twenty-four blessings.” I would only add that the proper transliteration of עשרה is esreh, not esrei.

[3] See here where Chwat also posts a page of R. Hananel from the censored Sanhedrin 43a.

[4] See his letter in Moshe Chaim Ephraim Bloch, Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgameihem (New York, 1948), p. 8. For more opposition to publishing the censored talmudic texts, see Eliezer Zvi Zweifel, Saneigor (Warsaw, 1885), pp. 265-266

[5] (Los Angeles, 2014). Regarding the Sanhedrin 67a text, see Maciejko’s English introduction, pp. xlviii-xlix.

[6] P. xix.

[7] Perush ha-Torah (Johannesburg, 1950), p. 69.

[8] David Brodsky also discusses בית הרחם as a synonym for “va–na”. See A Bride Without a Blessing (Tübingen, 2006), pp. 55, 65, 84. In Alcalay’s English-Hebrew dictionary, s.v. va–na, it gives three Hebrew definitions, one of which is .בית הרחם

[9] Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer 1, no. 102. This appears in the second to last paragraph of the responsum. The last paragraph is where R. Moshe presents his famous view that living in the Land of Israel is not an obligatory mitzvah, a mitzvah hiyuvit, but rather a mitzvah kiyumit.Here is a good time to cite an email I received from a Lakewood scholar which I think is quite insightful, and relates to the “immodest” title pages I discuss in my recent book. This scholar writes:

There is one comment that I want to make right now regarding the pictures of the topless women that appeared and then disappeared in seforim. In addition to a point that I already once made that perhaps in earlier times the breasts were associated more with breastfeeding than with romance (it certainly was associated with that as well as can be seen from the Song of Songs, but not exclusively as today; perhaps it was more like a woman’s hair which can be seen in pictures), I would like to add a stronger point regarding these pictures.

It would seem to me that before photography when it wasn’t possible to produce real live looking pictures, people would be inclined to consider drawing an ערוה. But after the advent of real photographs, one gets the feeling that he is looking at a real image of a woman. It is for this reason, perhaps, that pictures of topless women became taboo. Once photographs began to be associated with ערוה, paintings and drawings followed since they are so similar to photographs. In other words, they became guilty by association.

If there is any merit to this argument (or speculation) then one can go a step further and say that the advent of color motion pictures which is more alive caused further stringency in this area. A picture of a woman is not that “problematic”, but to watch her video is already more like “mingling without a mechitza”. Once the women are struck from the videos, it is natural that they should be expunged from the magazines as well. It is worth noting that both the laws outlawing pornography and the invention of photography coincided with one another. It would seem that it wasn’t outlawed as long as it was only in the form of a drawing, painting, or sculpture.

While it is true that earlier sources do speak of the sexual nature of breasts (see my post here note 19), I think that my correspondent has put his finger on a very important point. It would appear that breasts were more commonly associated with breastfeeding which meant that it was not problematic to show them in pictures. We even find such a portrayal on two tombstones in the old Sephardic cemetery in Altona. Here are the pictures as they appear in Michael Studemund-Halevy and Gaby Zuern, Zerstoert die Erinnerung Nicht. Der Juedische Friedhof Koenigstrasse in Hamburg (Munich, 2002), p. 109.

There are also a whole series of paintings and sculptures showing the Virgin Mary breastfeeding, obviously showing that this was not regarded as immodest in Christian circles.

The non-sexual nature of breasts also explains Shabbat 13a:

עולא כי הוי אתי מבי רב הוה מנשק להו לאחוותיה אבי חדייהו

(Perhaps because he found this text so strange, the Hatam Sofer interpreted it allegorically: היה מנשק החכמה. See Hiddushei Hatam Sofer, ad loc.)In response to the email from the Lakewood scholar, S. commented as follows

Another point which I think needs to be brought up about nude art is just how ubiquitous it was in Europe, statues, frescoes, and title pages in books, etc., very much influenced by Classical culture, which was of utmost importance in European learning and culture. If you’re in Venice or Prague or any major city in Europe you can’t avoid seeing it. The style of title pages may have changed, as styles do, so it is not surprising that Jewish printing culture changed as well. And eventually these seforim became one, two, and three centuries old and were only seen by individuals. Nudity in art was not ubiquitous in Eretz Yisrael and America, and it is not surprising that we woke up in the 20th century in American and EY and found these things surprising. My point is that it doesn’t necessarily have to do with them seeing breasts as sexual or not (what about thighs and bare midriffs? And seforim even depicted nude women bathing in the mikveh.) It is also important to note that in the writing of many great people they refer to specific editions they used, and it is clear that they saw it and neither defaced or said anything about it. So attitudes might be a European city vs. non-European city thing as well.

In an earlier post here I dealt with this picture which appears in the Venice 1574 edition of the Mishneh Torah.

Jacob D. called my attention to Shlomo Zalman Havlin’s comment in Yeshurun 29 (2013), p. 791 n. 7. Here Havlin states that when he attended the Chevron yeshiva its library had the Venice 1574 Mishneh Torah, but the yeshiva attempted to keep this edition from students due to the “immodest” picture reproduced above. Havlin also notes that some great rabbis were involved in the publication of this edition of the Mishneh Torah, including R. Menahem Azariah of Fano and R. Moses Provencal.

[10] Meiri to Avodah Zarah p. 4.

[11] Meiri to Avodah Zarah p. 4, Ta’anit 27b (p. 97). Regarding Meiri’s claim, see Lawrence Zalcman, “Christians, Noserim, and Nebuchadnezzar’s Daughter,” JQR 81 (1991), pp. 411-426. Zalcman argues that Meiri did not just make up his interpretation for apologetic reasons, but was aware of Mandaeans who were known as natzurai and were linked to Nebuchadnezzar.

[12] See Dikdukei Soferim ha-Shalem, ad loc.

[13] The Talmud pages used by ArtScroll in its most recent printings are taken from Oz ve-Hadar’s edition (minus certain notes that appear only in the Oz ve-Hadar Talmuds). This means that ArtScroll omits the Shitah Mekubetzet, citing Meiri’s and R. Jonathan of Lunel’s tolerant comments, which appears in the standard Vilna edition, Bava Kamma 38a and 113a.

[14] Hit’avkut, p. 2a.

[15] See R. Raphael Rabbinovics, Ma’amar al Hadpasat ha-Talmud, ed. Haberman (Jerusalem, 1952), pp.112ff.; David Leib Zuenz, Gedulat Yehonatan (Petrokov, 1930), vol. 1, pp. 12ff.

[16] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit” On Rabbi Jonathan Eibeschütz and Father Franciscus Haselbauer Editing the Talmud,” Jewish Social Studies 10 (Winter 2014), pp. 147-148.

[17] The defense was published in installments in Ha-Magid, May 9, 16, 23, 30, 1877. Sections of the document appear in Zweifel, Saneigor, pp. 264-265, and in Saul Pinchas Rabinowitz’s edition of H. Graetz, Divrei Yemei Yisrael, vol. 8, p. 464 in the note. The complete document was published in Zuenz, Gedulat Yehonatan, pp. 135ff., but he does not identify its source, leading the reader to assume that he is quoting from a manuscript.

[18] See Ha-Magid, May 9, 1877, pp. 170-171. (The reference to R. Broda as his teacher appears on p. 171.) As we shall see, R. Eybeschuetz had a great deal of respect for R. Broda. Yet R. Jacob Emden’s father, the Hakham Zvi, had a different perspective. See Yehezkel Duckesz, Ivah le-Moshav (Cracow, 1903), p. 14.

[19] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 166.
[20] S. points out an interesting source which gives an unknown, but presumably true, biographical detail of R. Eybeschuetz’s life in the spiritual autobiography of an apostate Jew named Salomon Duitsch, A Short Account of the Wonderful Conversion to Christianity of Solomon Duitsch … Extracted from the Original Published in the Dutch Language (London 1771).S. wrote to me as follows:

Prone to mystical visions and ascetic practices like fasting, he was regarded locally as a tzadik, but he eventually became convinced of Christianity. When this became known was forced to divorce his wife. After a period of wandering he ended up in Altona. He still looked Jewish and his issues were unknown there. He writes of meeting and staying the night at R. Eybeschuetz, who was very delighted to host him on account that R. Eybeschuetz was educated and taken care of as an orphan in the house of his great-grandfather in Nikolsburg. This information about a Nikolsburg period in R. Eybeschuetz’s life, and who this great-grandfather might be, is not mentioned in the biographies, and is a reminder that much information about people’s lives is not necessarily in books.

[21] Maciejko, p. 150.

[22] For details see ibid., pp. 169ff.

[23] Ha-Magid, May 16, 1874, p. 180.

[24] Ibid., May 23, p. 188.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., May 30, 1877, p. 199.

[27] Ibid. In my post here I discussed how R. Jehiel Michel Epstein engaged in self-censorship in the Arukh ha-Shulhan in order not to have problems with the non-Jewish authorities. Rabbi Shalom Baum called my attention to Arukh ha Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 480:1, for another example of this. I have underlined the words which any educated reader would understand were not to be taken seriously (since how could contemporary Jews ask God to pour out his wrath on the Babylonians who departed the historical stage over two thousand years ago?):

ואחר ששתו הכוס השלישי נוהגין לומר שפוך חמתך וגו’ ולפתוח הדלת כדי לזכור שהוא ליל שמורים ובזכות אמונה זו יבא משיח וישפוך חמתו על הבבליים שחרבו בהמ“ק

[28] Ha-Magid, May 30, 1877, p. 199. Regarding the views of R. Luria and R. Feinstein, see my Changing the Immutable, p. 42.

[29] I have used the translation in Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), p. 165.

[30] Ibid., pp. 164ff.

[31] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 167.

[32] Ibid., pp. 173-174.

[33] I don’t know why this procedure was not required for the other tractates published in Prague.

[34] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 179

[35] Or ha-Mizrah 29 (1981), pp. 418-428. Leiman’s publication remains valuable because of his introduction and notes.

Truth be Told[1] Comments on Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro

Truth be Told[1]

by Aryeh A. Frimer*

Comments on Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro (Oxford – Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2015).

*Rabbi Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer holds the Ethel and David Resnick Chair of Active Oxygen Chemistry at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel; email: Aryeh.Frimer@biu.ac.il. He has lectured and published widely on various aspects of “Women and Halakha;” see here. His most recent paper is: “Women, Kri’at haTorah and Aliyyot (with an Addendum on Partnership Minyanim),” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 46:4 (Winter, 2013), 67-238, available online here.

I found R. Prof. Marc Shapiro’s new book Changing the Immutable a fascinating read and very hard to put down. The first seven chapters deal with censorship of halakhic and philosophical works, while the eighth focuses on lying and misrepresentation in pesak. As we know from his previous works, Shapiro has a very fluid writing style and the subject matter is always well researched. He does his best to be honest, unbiased and complete in his presentation. He is, moreover, intrigued with exploring the limits of the traditional consensus, which makes for some captivating reading. Yet, despite all these wonderful qualities – or perhaps, because of them, I found the present volume particularly unsettling and disconcerting.

R. Jacob J Schacter’s classic article “Facing the Truths of History” had already sensitized me to the fact that publishers censor and even rewrite portions of the books they bring to press.[2] They do so because they find some of their author’s positions “unacceptable” – views which don’t fit the publishers’ or the intended reader’s “party line.” That such censorship continues unabashedly in the 21st century is disappointing, but then “there is no shame anymore.” But these are, by and large, sins of omission; somehow, with that I could live.

But what I found particularly troubling with Changing the Immutable was the last chapter, which deals with lying in pesak. After going through the many examples Shapiro cites, the reader is left with one clear impression. One sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek, since he may well be misrepresenting something in his ruling. It could be the source and authority of the prohibition. For example, is the prohibition based on a biblical commandment (positive or negative), rabbinic edict, custom or mere public policy (slippery slope) considerations? Alternatively, the expressed reason may not be the real grounds for the prohibition. In addition, the application may be much broader than halakhically permitted. To my mind these are shocking revelations: these are not sins of omission but commission; the perpetrators are scholars and religious leaders; and these deviations constitute intellectual dishonesty at its worst.

Our author is not insensitive to this dissonance. In an attempt to explain how these scholars justify not being fully honest in pesak, Shapiro writes in the last two pages of the book (pp. 284-285) about “redefining truth.” He indicates that these decisors see nothing wrong in what they are doing, since their ultimate goal is the “higher good”. As they see it, they have ultimately prevented their respective communities and congregants from sinning and deviating from the proper path of shemirat mitsvot. The fact that these scholars have bent the truth, and distorted Jewish law in the process, is of lesser importance. The ends in these cases, justify the means.

It is with these jarring observations that the book comes to an abrupt end, without any further comment or soul-searching. This is despite the fact that on page 239ff, Shapiro brings one citation from Hazal after another about the centrality of truth, and the seriousness of the sin of lying. After all, the Torah itself commands us: “mi-Devar sheker tirhak” – “From untruthfulness, distance thyself” (Exodus 23:7). If what the author writes in the last chapter is true, then Hazal’s eloquent statements about the importance of honesty have become nothing but a mockery. It raises serious moral questions with insufficient and unsatisfying answers. How are we now supposed to educate our children and talmidim as to the cardinal nature of truth and truthfulness?! How are we to live with such a clash between theory and practice?

In the course of our own study of Women’s Tefilla Groups, my brother R. Prof. Dov Frimer and I researched misrepresentation in pesak in the context of women’s issues.[3] Many leading Rabbis were deeply and justifiably concerned that some of the feminist practices introduced were ultimately “bad for the Jews” on public policy grounds.[4] But instead of saying so clearly, some rabbis adduced reasons that were not halakhically sound. Our own research has led us to the clear conclusion that the vast majority of the gedolim do not condone this type of misrepresentation or that discussed in the last chapter of Changing the Immutable. Giving an erroneous ruling – despite one’s good intentions, or even misstating the reason or source for a prohibition, violates the prohibition “mi-Devar sheker tirhak“, if not a variety of other issurim.

We begin our discussion of this issue with the famous Pesak Din (halakhic ruling) promulgated by a conference of rabbis who met in Michalowce Hungary in 1865. This edict initially signed by twenty-five leading rabbinic figures and subsequently by many more, ruled that nine practices (including, inter alia, synagogue choirs, sermons in the vernacular, synagogues weddings, absence of a central bima, canonical robes for the Hazan) were halakhically forbidden. Leading rabbis Moses Schick and Esriel Hildesheimer and many of their colleagues refused to sign. The fundamental claim of Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer was that, contrary to the impression given by the Pesak Din, the only grounds for some of the edicts were public policy (mi-gdar milta) – not halakhic – considerations.[5] The term “Pesak Din” (legal ruling) was in fact a conscious misnomer, an attempt to hide the truth, and, hence, a flagrant deviation from Jewish law with which they could take no part. R. Schick also argued that, since the Pesak Din was promulgated by a Jewish court, it violated bal tosif, adding a mitsva to the Torah.[6]

Similarly, R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes[7] argues that it is forbidden to call a rabbinic edict a biblical prohibition because it violates not only bal tosif but also mi-devar sheker tirhak. Similarly, R. Chayim Hirschensohn[8] charges those rabbis who forbid women to become involved in politics with violating both bal tosif and lying. R. Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk[9], maintains that both Ra’avad and Rambam agree that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” forbids a posek from claiming that a rabbinic injunction is biblical. R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky,[10] refuting the suggestion that it is forbidden to take part in elections in the secular State of Israel, writes: “…And your Honor should know that even to be zealous, it is forbidden to teach Torah not according to the halakha (Avot V:8), and that which is not true will not succeed at all.” R. Haim David Halevi[11] prohibits a posek from misrepresenting halakha and/or giving an erroneous reason for a prohibition for two basic reasons: (1) the biblical prohibition of “mi-devar sheker tirhak” and (2) a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority would result should the truth become known (see more below). [See also the related opinions of Rabbis Ehrenberg, Rogeler and Sobel cited below.]

As Prof. Shapiro documents in Changing the Immutable, some posekim dissent. They argued, on various grounds, that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” is not applicable to cases where halakha is misrepresented so as to prevent future violations of Jewish law. Other scholars argue that the dispensation to modify the truth in order to maintain peace (me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom, Yevamot 65b) also applies to misrepresenting halakha in order to maintain peace between kelal Yisrael and the Almighty. Yet others maintain that if a posek believes an action should be prohibited because of mi-gdar milta, he may misrepresent the reason for or source of a prohibition; since there will be no change in the legal outcome, mi-devar sheker tirhak does not apply.[12] Finally, some have argued that mi-devar sheker tirhak only refers to lying in court.[13]

But these arguments have been seriously and vigorously challenged. Thus, R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg[14] demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose (ve-afilu li-devar mitsva). Similarly, R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin[15] chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble. R. Ovadiah Yosef[16] discusses at length whether a judge, maintaining a minority position on a three judge panel, can lie and say “I do not know what to rule,” – so that two more judges will be added to the panel and his minority opinion will have a chance to become the majority view; he concludes that it is forbidden. R. Solomon Sobel[17] explicitly states that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom only allows one to change the facts, not the halakha. Both R. Jacob Ettlinger and R. Reuben Margaliot[18] maintain that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom allows one only to obfuscate by using language which can be understood in different ways, but not to lie; hence, misrepresenting halakhic reasons or sources would also be forbidden.

Also unmentioned is the long list of posekim (including the Radba”z)[19] who maintain that even if one is theoretically permitted to misrepresent Halakha, under certain unique circumstances – one is nevertheless forbidden to do so in practice. This is because “the truth will out.” Not only will this revelation ultimately lead to a terrible hillul Hashem, but it will undermine peoples’ trust in the rabbinic establishment. In this regard R. Benjamin Lau has observed:[20]

The rabbi is expected to know and present the various aspects of each issue and not to conceal those aspects that are inconsistent with his own point of view. If a rabbi is untrue to the sources and reaches his decision without taking account of conflicting views, he will be seen to be untrustworthy. And a lack of trust between a rabbi and his community of questioners will drive a wedge between that community and the Torah overall. Stating the truth, of course, does not require the decisor to remain neutral; his role requires him to reach a decision one way or the other. But the decision must be reached through disclosure, not concealment, of the alternatives….. Now, when everyone has access to the [Bar Ilan] Responsa Project data base and Google provides answers to all imaginable questions, everyone can check every responsum and examine its trustworthiness. A rabbi who rules in an oversimplified way, whether strictly or leniently, in a area of halakhic complexity will be caught as untrustworthy.

Having lived through the crises and confrontations of women’s prayer groups, women on religious councils, women in communal leadership roles and women’s aliyyot – I can testify that there is great need for both in-depth knowledge and truthfulness. The “hillul Hashem and loss of trust” argument is not just hype – but painfully all too accurate! Many of the rabbis in the 1970s lost control of the religious leadership of their communities because they were unprepared or unwilling to deal with the challenges honestly and head on. Many rabbis simply tried to stonewall the situation, while others were not forthright about the real reason for forbidding such practices. As previously noted, the Rabbis may well have been correct that many of the feminist practices introduced were halakhically unsound or “bad for the Jews” on a variety of public policy grounds.[21] But instead of saying so clearly (as Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt”l had urged and himself practiced), some rabbis waffled, while others prevaricated. But the halakhic truth quickly became known – a consequence of the “information age.” And as a result, many balebatim lost trust in the religious leadership as a whole. For them the conclusion was simply: “Everything boils down to politics.”

It is, therefore, critically important to reiterate that the cases cited by our author, exemplify neither pesak in general, nor the consensus view of the posekim. It is forbidden to misrepresent in halakhic rulings as a matter of law and policy. In essence, then, Prof Shapiro’s scholarly and well-documented book presents the reader with a most fascinating review of an approach within halakhic decision making, which has been rejected by mainstream pesak. Indeed, such cases need to be actively addressed if they are to be uprooted.

Response by Marc B. Shapiro

I understand why Professor Frimer is troubled by what I wrote, and to a large extent my conclusions diverge from his own. All I would say is that the matter is complex, and rather than attempt to simplify matters, as I feel Frimer has done, we must attempt to understand how the same Sages who spoke about the importance of truth could at times countenance departure from it. This is a challenge that requires sensitivity and nuance, and appreciation of changing times and values. When Frimer sees a text that permits false attribution, he sees prevarication and hypocrisy. But a historically attuned outlook would seek to understand rather than condemn. Ironically, it is Frimer who is judging the Sages and decisors, because if their ideas do not conform to his understanding then these ideas are regarded by him as problematic.

Thus, Frimer cites the famous 1865 pesak din of Michalowce and tells us that R. Moses Schick and R. Esriel Hildesheimer opposed it since they saw it as departing from the truth. While their position is certainly significant, what about the fact that among Hungarian rabbis they were a minority, and most of the leading Hungarian rabbis supported the pesak? How is my argument refuted by citing Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer if they were opposed by most of their colleagues? Doesn’t the fact that most of the Hungarian rabbis opposed Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer support my position?

As for the various rabbinic opinions cited by Frimer, I don’t deny that these opinions exist, and in my book I refer to Frimer’s famous article on women’s prayer groups in which he cites these opinions. But I also make the point that there is an alternative tradition which allows much more leeway for authorities to at times diverge from the truth. I also believe, contrary to Frimer, that this is a mainstream position. Since this position is held by R. Ovadiah Yosef and R. Hayyim Kanievsky, I don’t see how it is possible for one to state that it is not a mainstream position.

The point of the chapter, however, was not to advocate for one position or the other, but to focus on the alternative tradition, the existence of which is more or less suppressed today. I was explicit that my aim was to show how far some were willing to go in sanctioning deviations from the truth, and I indicate that there are views in opposition to these. However, my intent was to study the views of those with a “liberal” perspective on the importance of truth. It is this tradition that I wished to explore, and to rescue it, as it were, from the well-intentioned apologetics. I never state that this is the only authentic position. On the contrary, one can find the opposite perspective presented in numerous articles. This is why I thought it was important to present alternative views, from the Talmud until the present, views which I think show that there is a rabbinic conception of the Noble Lie.

I also must dispute the following statement by Frimer: “R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose.” How can Frimer state that R. Ehrenberg “demonstrates” such a thing? What R. Ehrenberg does is present an argument, and everyone can evaluate its cogency. The fact is that numerous authorities do not accept R. Ehrenberg’s position, which means that they would not agree that he has proven his case.

To Frimer, and others like him who have the same reaction after reading chapter 7, I can only say that modern views of how to understand texts, and what we today regard as truth, cannot be used as a measure with which to judge people who lived in a very different time and had a very different understanding of these sorts of matters. It is their understanding that I seek to explore, rather than foisting my own value judgments upon them. Unlike Frimer, who is involved in halakhic writing and attempting to influence the community in religious matters, I write from a more “objective” perspective, without such concerns. As such, while Frimer wishes to “uproot” what he regards as unacceptable views of certain poskim. I seek to understand the phenomenon and to describe it.

When, on p. 284, I speak about redefining truth, I am not speaking about poskim per se but about how to understand the entire phenomenon that I have documented in the book. The question is how does the importance of truth coexist with what we have seen, and it is in this context that I discuss how truth need not be seen as equivalent to factual or historical truth.

I agree with Frimer that none of the great poskim supported lying in pesak as a normative option on a regular basis. Yet as I have already indicated, I believe that there is a tradition that allows for not being frank at certain times, when it is thought that other values are at stake. In the book I state that we should understand this position in a sympathetic fashion even if it is at odds with how today we generally approach matters.

Frimer asks how are we supposed to educate our children and students as to the importance of truth and truthfulness if what I say is correct. This is a good question with which educators need to struggle, but it is not a refutation of what I have written. If my position is correct, the world will not collapse. It will just be one more Torah matter, alongside Amalek, yefat toar, slavery, homosexuality, etc., that at certain times is not in line with contemporary values.

Here are some more comments relevant to the issue of truth.

1. Amichai Markowitz called my attention to a talmudic text that I overlooked. Nedarim 23b states: “The Tanna has intentionally obscured the law, in order that vows should not be lightly treated.” This relates to the issue of the truth not being made available to all. See also Kovetz Iggerot Hazon Ish, vol. 2, no. 78, that one should not reveal to the masses that the Sages forbade things that the Torah permitted.[22]

2. R. Joseph Ibn Caspi writes that at times it is appropriate for members of the intellectual elite to lie.[23] This explains how Joseph lied to his brothers when he accused them of being spies (Gen. 42:9). In support of this view Ibn Caspi cites both Maimonides and Aristotle.[24] The mention of Maimonides no doubt refers to the latter’s notion of “necessary beliefs”, but it is not clear where Ibn Caspi got his quote from Aristotle, since as far as I can determine Aristotle says no such thing.[25]

3. R. Abraham Arbel writes as follows[26]:

ואם מצא לנכון המגדל עז לשבח חכם כהרמב”ם שלא שקר והיה אמיתי, משמע דפשיטא ליה שגם אצל חכם בדרגתו אפשר למצוא שישקר משום כבודו.

R. Arbel also adds the following passage which I am sure will be very troubling to Frimer (as Frimer rejects the notion that “one sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek”). R. Arbel’s words should be understood in line with the many sources I cite in the last chapter of my book.

וע”ע טהרת ישראל (סי’ קפה אות סו) בדין אשה שאמרה שהחכם טהר לה הכתם ועתה מכחיש אותה החכם לומר שלא שאלה אותו, דחישינן שהחכם רואה עתה שטעה שטהר, ובוש לומר שטעה, ולכן משקר עתה לומר שלא שאלה אותו. וכ”כ בהפלאה (קונ’ אחרון סי קטו סק”א( שהחכם לא נאמן להכחיש אשה, שאומרת שהחכם טהר, כשהכתם לפנינו והוא טמא, שהרי הוא נוגע בדבר שהרי טעה.

4. R. Ovadiah Yosef stated that if X tells you something he wrote, you can tell others that you read it in X’s book, and this is not considered a lie.[27]

5. In Changing the Immutable, p. 253, I cite a passage from Devarim Rabbah which states that for the sake of peace, even “Scripture itself” recorded something false. I should have also cited Midrash Tanhuma 96:7, which is even more striking, attributing the falsehood directly to God (as opposed to merely speaking of “Scripture”):

ארשב”ג גדול הוא השלום שהכתיב [שכתב] הקב”ה דברים בתורה שלא היו אלא בשביל השלום.

6. Let me offer another example of censorship in halakhic matters, the sort of thing that Frimer claims must be battled against and “uprooted” for the sake of Torah truth.[28] Here is page 141 from R. Yitzhak Zilberstein’s and R. Moshe Rothschild’s Torat ha-Yoledet.

The matter dealt with is whether a husband can be in the delivery room. The authors quote the opinion that if there is a need the husband can be in the room. In note 2, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah II, no. 75, is quoted as follows:

הנה אם יש צורך, איני רואה איסור. אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .

However, if you look at the actual text of Iggerot Moshe, what he says is something different.

הנה אם יש צורך איני רואה איסור ואף בלא צורך איני רואה איסור, אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .

I have underlined the words that are deleted by Torat ha-Yoledet. This deletion allows them to present R. Moshe Feinstein as saying that only if there is a need for the husband to be in the room can be there. Yet R. Moshe explicitly states that even if there is no “need”, he can still remain with his wife.

I know that there are some who are thinking that I am making a big deal out of nothing, and that it must have been an accident that the words were deleted as that no one would dare to purposely alter what R. Moshe wrote. I am sorry to say that this is not the case. Here are two pages from R. Pesach Eliyahu Falk’s Levushah shel Torah.[29]

From it we see that someone asked R. Zilberstein about the words that were deleted, and R. Zilberstein did not say that they were deleted in error. On the contrary, he tells the questioner that the words were deleted on purpose, after consultation with “gedolei ha-poskim”. In other words, these poskim disagreed with R. Moshe and therefore instructed R. Zilberstein that when he quoted Iggerot Moshe he should censor R. Moshe’s words so that people should not learn the extent of R. Moshe’s lenient view. After all that I have written in my book, I don’t think people will be surprised by this. Frimer, however, who has assured us that this sort of thing is not “mainstream”, and indeed is “forbidden”, will have to explain how it is that a respected posek like R. Zilberstein, acting on the instruction of other great poskim, could adopt such an approach, an approach which stands as a refutation of Frimer’s point.

As I have said already, I am not claiming that this sort of distortion is an everyday phenomenon. But I do claim that many poskim believe that they have the authority to alter the truth when they think that this is necessary. We can’t pretend that the texts I have cited don’t exist.

7. In his post Frimer writes: “R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble.” I don’t think the word “chastises” is appropriate in this case. R. Elijah disagrees with the other rabbi, but the disagreement is not strident. For example, R. Elijah writes as follows in Yad Eliyahu, no. 62:

ע”ד אשר האריך רום מעלתו בלשונו בשפת אמת להעמיד שפת שקר במקומי אני עומד שאינו כדאי להיות רגיל בכך ואף שמותר בו מאיזה טעם שיהיה.

8. In the next issue of Masorah le-Yosef my article on “necessary beliefs” will appear. In this article I discuss how Maimonides and other figures say things that do not reflect their true opinion, but are merely “necessary beliefs”, i.e., “beliefs” that the masses should accept but which are not really true at all. If these authorities think that the masses can be fed false ideas when it comes to theology, why should halakhah be any different?

9. See R. Mordechai Eliasburg, Shevil ha-Zahav (Warsaw, 1897), p. 27-28, who claims that both Nahmanides and R. Jacob Emden recorded things in their writings that they did not really believe.

10. R. Chaim Sunitzky called my attention to R. Israel Weltz, Divrei Yisrael, vol. 3, no. 170, who doesn’t see such a problem with false stories if they lead people in a good direction.

.אין זה נורא כ”כ בספורי מעשיות כאלה כשהכוונה היא לטובה ללמוד ממנה מוסר ודרכי הי”ת

And now for some comic relief. A few weeks ago Ezra Glinter reviewed my book for the Forward. See here.

He used this opportunity to take some hits at the haredi world, focusing on matters that are not mentioned in the book. Rabbi Avi Shafran, who is paid to respond to this sort of thing, penned his own piece for the Forward available here.

The comedy starts in the first two paragraphs which read:

Psst! I’ve got a secret to share. It’s from deep inside the Orthodox Jewish world. Come closer… Okay, here it is: Orthodoxy changes!

It’s not much of a secret, actually. At least in these here parts. But it seems to be an unfamiliar concept for Marc Shapiro, a University of Scranton professor and author of the recent book, “Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History.”

It is obvious that Shafran has never even looked at my book and is only basing his comments on what appears in Glinter’s review. Those who have read the book know that a major theme of it is precisely how Orthodoxy changes. In fact, there is no one in the world today whose scholarship is more associated with the thesis that Orthodoxy changes than me. Much of the criticism of me is on precisely this point, that I have exaggerated the amount of change. Yet here Shafran comes and says that I am ignorant about how Orthodoxy changes. This is what I mean by comic relief.

Shafran then writes:

If a biography of Bertrand Russell can choose to elide the great philosopher’s serial marital infidelities and not be accused of rewriting the past, a hagiography of a great rabbi should certainly be permitted to overlook judgments he made with the best of intentions that in retrospect might seem misguided to some today. Such acts of civility are at times portrayed as scandalous by Shapiro and his reviewer.

A biography of Russel that chooses to omit his marital infidelities would indeed be rightly accused of rewriting the past. As for the second part of the sentence, I agree that a hagiography can leave out material of the sort Shafran mentions, but that is because it is a hagiography! If it intended to be a biography, then no, it cannot overlook mistaken judgments made by the subject, or else it ceases to be biography. I also do not think that it is an act of civility to refrain from writing about such mistaken judgments (as for example, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg’s early misjudgment of the Nazi regime).

Shafran provides a few examples of how practice in Orthodoxy has changed, none of which I disagree with. But then again, my book has nothing to do with this. He writes:

One opinion in the Talmud, for example, permits fowl and milk to be cooked together and eaten. Just try ordering milk-braised chicken in your local kosher eatery these days; they’ll sic the mashgiach on you in a Borough Park moment. Men using mirrors was once forbidden as a “womanly” act, a once-true assessment that, for most Orthodox men today, is no longer considered applicable.

Let us say that a new edition of the Talmud was published that deleted the lines that tell us that one opinion permitted fowl and milk to be cooked and eaten together? Would Shafran be OK with this? I assume not, and it is thus unfortunate that he doesn’t know that it is precisely this sort of censorship that my book is focused on. What we have here is not only criticism without having read the book, but criticism without having any clue as to what the book is about.

And then, to top off the comic relief, Shafran ends his piece as follows:

“Why is that so hard for Orthodoxy’s critics to understand?”

I have been called some different things in my life, but this is the first time I have been referred to as one of “Orthodoxy’s critics”.

Let me also add that Changing the Immutable has sold very well in the haredi world, and this is not surprising since it is not an anti-haredi book at all.

[1] AAF would like to thank Dov I. Frimer, Shael I. Frimer, David A. Kessler and Joel B. Wolowelsky for their insightful comments and suggestions on previous drafts.

[2] R. Jacob J. Schacter, “Facing the Truths of History,” Torah u-Madda Journal, 8 [1998-1999]: pp. 200-273.

[3] Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women’s Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 – Theory,” Tradition, 32:2 (Winter 1998), pp. 5-118. PDF available online

here. See in particular Addendum, part 6.

[4] See our discussion in Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Section E therein.

[5] R. Moses Schick in Likutei Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, R. Israel Stern, ed. (London, 1965), sec. 82, pp. 73-75; Meir Hildesheimer, “She’eilot u-Teshuvot Maharam Schick,” Tsefunot, 2:2(6) (Tevet 5750), pp. 87-95, at p. 93; Yona Emanuel, “Me’a Shana lePetirat haRav Azriel Hildesheimer Zatsal,” haMa’ayn, XXXIX, 4 (Tammuz 5759), pp. 1-7, “Al Kinus haRabbanim be-Mikhalovitch” pp. 2-4; Michael K. Silber, “The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Invention of a Tradition,” In The Uses of Tradition, Jack Wertheimer, ed. (New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1992), p. 23-84; Mordechai Eliav, “Mekomo shel Rav Azriel Hildesheimer be-Ma’avak al Demutah shel Yahadutr Hungariah,” Zion 27 (1962), 59-86; Nethanel Katzburg, “Pesak Din shel Michalovitch 5726,” in Perakim be-Toldot ha-Hevrah ha-Yehudit be-Yemei ha-Beinayim u-be-Et ha-Hadashah, Emanuel Etkes and Yosef Salmon, eds. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1980), 273-286; Jacob Katz, The Unhealed Breach: The Secession of Orthodox Jewry from the General Community in Hungary and Germany (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1994 – see especially Chapter 8.

[6] See Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Addendum, part 5.

[7] R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Darkei Hora’a, siman 6, first footnote,

[8] R. Chayim Hirschensohn Resp. Malki baKodesh, II, sec. 4, p. 13.

[9] Cited in R. Zvi [Hershel] Schachter, Nefesh haRav (Jerusalem: Reishit Yerushalayyim, 1994), p.178.

[10] R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky, Keraina deIggarta, letter 203, pp. 219-220.

[11] Responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 and published in Resp. Mayyim Hayyim, III, sec. 55.

[12] R. Chaim Kanievsky, Masekhet Kutim, 1:14, Me-taher, note 30, and conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer (February 20, 1995),

[13] R. Zelig Epstein, in a conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Noach Dear (March 8, 1996). R. Jerucham Fishel Perlau, Commentary to Rav Sa’adia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvot, I, p. 156b.

[14] R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg, Resp. Devar Yehoshua, I, addendum to sec. 19, no. 6 (see also V, Y.D. sec 12). See also R. Nahum Yavruv, Niv Sefatayyim (Jerusalem, 1989) Niv Sefatayyim, kelal 1; R. Eliezer Judah Waldenberg, Resp. Tsits Eliezer 15:12:2.

[15] R. Elijah Rogeler, Resp. Yad Eliyahu, sec. 61 and 62

[16] R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, II, H.M., sec. 3

[17] R. Solomon Sobel, Salma Hadasha, Mahadura Tinyana, Haftarat Toledot; cited in R. Jacob Yehizkiyah Fisch, Titen Emet leYa’akov (Jerusalem, 1982), sec. 5, no. 36.

[18] R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh leNer, Yevamot 65b, s.v. “she-Ne’emar avikha tsiva” and “Ko tomeru leYosef,” and R. Reuben Margaliot, Kunteres Hasdei Olam, sec. 1061, at the end of his edition of Sefer Hasidim (Mossad haRav Kook: Jerusalem, 5724). See also R. Moses David Maccabbi Leventhal, “Shinui beDevar haShalom,” Zohar, 3 (Spring 5760), pp. 49-64.

[19] R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Resp. Benei Vanim, I, sec. 37, no. 12, argues that such misrepresentation most often results in gossip, hate, unlawful leniencies in other areas, hillul Hashem, and a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority should the truth become known. (This despite the fact that R. Y.H. Henkin maintains that when a posek upgrades a prohibition for a just cause, there is no prohibition of either bal Tosif or lying). Similar views are expressed by Resp. Torah liShma, sec. 371; R. Moses Jehiel Weiss, Beit Yehezkel, p. 77; R. Abraham Isaac haKohen Kook, Orah Mishpat, no. 111 (pp. 117-120) and 112 (pp. 120-129); R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, Teshuvot Ivra, sec. 52, no. 3 (in Kitvei haGri Henkin, II); R. Haim David Halevi, responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 – published in Resp. Mayyim Hayyim, III, sec.55; and R. David Feinstein, conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, March 19, 1995. See also the commentary of Radbaz to M.T., Melakhim 6:3, where even normally permitted lying is forbidden lest it result in hillul Hashem should the truth be discovered. Similarly, in discussing Sanhedrin 29a and the cause of Adam and Eve’s sin, R. Hanokh Zundel, Eits Yosef, ad loc., s.v. “Ma,” comments that one must be particularly careful how a stringency and its rationale are formulated, for if no distinction is drawn between a stringency and the original ordinance, any error found in the stringency may lead the masses to believe that there is an error in the original ordinance itself.

[20] R. Benjamin Lau, “The Challenge of Halakhic Innovation,” Meorot 8 Tishrei 5771, pp 43-57 at pp. 45-46, available online here.

[21] See our discussion in Section E of Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3.

[22] It could be that the Hazon Ish would not be opposed if this information was revealed in a responsible way. I say this since his language is

והבא להכריז בין המון העם כי חכמים גזרו עלינו דברים שהתורה לא אסרתן כונתו ידועה . . . והתוצאות ידועות

(Emphasis added) This might mean that it is only objectionable if someone makes a big deal out of the fact that a certain prohibition is only rabbinic

[23] Mishneh Kesef (Cracow, 1906), vol. 2, to Gen 42:12 (pp. 93-94).

[24] His quote of Aristotle is: נכון לגדול הנפש שיכזכ בהיות זה הכרחי

[25] See Jane S. Zembaty, “Aristotle on Lying,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993), pp. 7-29.

[26] Ahoti Kalah (Jerusalem, 2007), p. 149.

[27] Eliyahu Sheetrit, Rabbenu (Jerusalem, 2014), p. 266.

[28] This example, and also R. Falk’s Levushah shel Torah, were called to my attention by R. Yonason Rosman.

[29] (Jerusalem, 2007), vol. 2, pp. 783-784.

More About Rashbam on Genesis Chapter 1 and Further Comments about ArtScroll

More About Rashbam on Genesis Chapter 1 and Further Comments about ArtScroll

By Marc B. Shapiro

I had thought that I was done with ArtScroll’s censorship of Rashbam to Genesis chapter 1, but a number of people wanted some explanation about the manuscript of Rashbam’s commentary. This will also give me the opportunity to add some more comments about this distressing episode.[1]

In my prior post on the topic, available here, I referred to Rabbenu Tam’s strong words against those who “corrected” the talmudic text based on their understanding. ArtScroll is guilty of violating Rabbenu Tam’s “command”, as he would certainly also apply his words to later generations tampering with the writings of rishonim. I think everyone can understand that if people were simply allowed to emend or delete texts based on their own understanding, not a single talmudic tractate or medieval work would emerge unscathed. As such, the only honest thing for an editor to do is to point out in a note how he feels the text should read, or if he thinks that a passage should be deleted. Unfortunately, ArtScroll did not choose this to follow this honest, and common sense, approach.

It is not just Rabbenu Tam who dealt with this matter. Nahmanides, in commentary to Bava Batra 134a, blasts those “sinners” those who emend texts based on their own understanding.

וזו עבירה גמורה ולייטי עלה רבנן כל מאן דמגיה ספרים מדעתא דנפשיה

R. Abraham ben David (Rabad) also leaves no doubt as to his position, stating that one who deletes a text based on his understanding, “his hand should be cut off, since one who deletes [sections of] books is like those who burn the Torah.”[2]

ויד המוחקת תיקצץ שמוחק הספרים כשורפי התורה

Following my posts R. Yitzchak Zilber published two pieces in Hebrew.

With regard to ArtScroll, the two pieces don’t really contain anything not mentioned already on this blog, but for those who don’t read English they are valuable. It is also good to see a noted talmid hakham express his feelings about what he terms ArtScroll’s “stupid act”. (I understand why documents like the ones published by Zilber, which are directed towards a certain population, cannot cite the Seforim Blog. Yet it is noteworthy that Uriel Simon’s book אזן מלין תבחן is cited, even if the author’s name is not mentioned). One significant point made by Zilber is his claim that ArtScroll knows the truth, namely, that the passages it chose to censor are not heretical insertions, but it chose to censor them anyway.

I have received emails that make the same point, that the censorship is all about “business”. In other words, the haredi world today does not want to see Rashbam’s peshat understanding of when the day begins, so the censorship is necessary in order for ArtScroll’s mikraot gedolot Chumash to sell. Based on what I have been told by people supposedly in the know, I am inclined to believe this. This is also an appealing explanation as it is much easier to accept than that anyone at ArtScroll really believes in the justification for its censorship that was sent out and which I discussed in the earlier post.

In my post I referred to additional authorities, other than Rashbam, who understood that according to the peshat the first chapter of Genesis teaches that the day begins in the morning.[3] I also mentioned those who believe that this was how things were before the giving of the Torah. R. Moshe Maimon called my attention to the fact that R. Saadiah Gaon also apparently held this view.[4] Here is R. Kafih’s edition of R. Saadiah, Perushei Rabbenu Sa’adiah Gaon al ha-Torah, p. 71. Look at chapter 10, note 4.

R. Ovadiah Yosef cites a number of additional sources that mention the notion that before the giving of the Torah night came after day.[5] One of these is R. Moses Sofer,[6] who not surprisingly quotes his teacher, R. Pinhas Horowitz, whose view on this matter I referred to in the prior post.[7] R. Meir Mazuz[8] notes that R. Reuven Margaliyot says the same thing.[9]

A number of people commented on how ironic it is that Ibn Ezra is being used as a source to determine what is heretical, being that his views on Mosaic authorship are themselves regarded by heretical by ArtScroll.[10] Furthermore, Ibn Ezra has no reticence in citing Karaite interpreters, yet as we know, ArtScroll only cites “accepted” authorities, and won’t even mention the Soncino commentary by name. Incidentally, there are some times when ArtScroll errs in this matter. For example, in its commentary to Jonah, p. 111, it cites “Yefes ben Ali” (who is quoted by Ibn Ezra). Presumably, the ArtScroll editor assumed that he was a rishon.[11] In truth, he was a Karaite, and his inclusion in the Jonah commentary is diametrically opposed to the standard set up by ArtScroll with regard to which commentators they will cite, a standard that opposes the Ibn Ezra-Maimonides approach (adopted by Soncino) of “accept the truth from whomever said it”.[12]

When it comes to Karaite influence on Ibn Ezra, R. Joseph Delmedigo goes so far as to say that most[!] of Ibn Ezra’s explanations come from the Karaites. Reflecting the fact that Ibn Ezra does sometimes strongly reject the Karaite interpretations, Delmedigo states that Ibn Ezra is like a baby who nurses from his mother [i.e., the Karaites] but sometimes also bites her breast.[13]

ודע כי בספרי הקראים תמצא באור לדברי הר”א”ב”ע[!] כי רוב באוריו מקדמוניהם כגון הר”ר ישועה והר”ר יפת והר”ר יהודה הפרסי דולה מושך גם כי לפעמים כיונק שדי אמו נושך

Philip Birnbaum writes:

Ibn Ezra cites Yefet more frequently than any other exegete. In his commentary on the Minor Prophets, Ibn Ezra quotes Yefet forty-four times whereas he mentions Sa’adyah Gaon only five times. . . . Ibn Ezra borrows from Yefet much more than he acknowledges.[14]

This connection of Ibn Ezra to Yefet even led to the creation of a false legend that Ibn Ezra was a student of Yefet.[15]

While Ibn Ezra often adopts the interpretations of Karaite commentators, he also blasts them when necessary. One such example is in his commentary to Deuteronomy 12:17 where he writes: “The heretics [Karaites] say that there are two sorts of first-born. One is the first to break out of its mother’s womb. The second is the first-born of the flock. There is no need to respond to their nonsense.”[16] It is noteworthy that the “nonsense” interpretation that Ibn Ezra refers to is indeed found in a few rishonim including Hizkuni and R. Jacob of Vienna.[17]

Let us now turn to the manuscript of Rashbam. The first thing to mention is that there is only one surviving manuscript page for Rashbam’s commentary to the beginning of Genesis. There used to be another manuscript that contained his commentary to the rest of the Torah but was missing the commentary to Genesis chapters 1-17. Unfortunately, this manuscript was lost during World War II. For such a great figure as Rashbam, it is definitely noteworthy that so few physical specimens of his Torah commentary survived until modern times.[18] What this tells us is that not many scribes were interested in copying the commentary, and I do not know why this was the case. In fact, it is not merely his commentary on the Torah that suffered this fate. While we have Rashbam’s commentaries to most of Bava Batra and the tenth chapter of Pesahim, we know that he also wrote commentaries to most of the other tractates, yet these are lost.[19] Is there any way to explain this?

Here is the manuscript of Rashbam to the beginning of Genesis.

It is found in the Bavarian Staatsbibliothek (Munich) and is referred to as Hebrew Manuscript no. 5 (2). Here is the link.

You can examine the entire manuscript here.

This manuscript of Rashbam is bound together with another manuscript from 1233 that contains the earliest example we have of Rashi’s commentary on the Torah. It is also the first illuminated Ashkenazic manuscript (with the illumination by a non-Jewish artist).[20] The copyist of the Rashi manuscript was not some anonymous person, but R. Solomon ben Samuel of Würzberg. R. Solomon was an outstanding student of R. Samuel he-Hasid and a colleague of R. Judah he-Hasid. He was also a student of R. Yehiel of Paris, and R. Solomon’s son was one of the participants in the 1240 Paris Disputation together with R. Yehiel. R. Solomon wrote Torah works of his own and he may be identical with R. Solomon ben Samuel, the author of the piyyut ישמיענו סלחתי that is recited in Yom Kippur Neilah.[21] ArtScroll, in its Yom Kippur Machzor, p. 746, tells us that ישמיענו סלחתי was written by “R’ Shlomo ben Shmuel of the thirteenth-century.”[22]

It is significant that in this early copy of Rashi’s commentary, whose copyist was himself a Torah great, Rashi’s comment to Genesis 18:22 appears in its entirety.[23] In this comment, Rashi refers to one of the tikun soferim and states that the Sages “reversed” the passage. What this means is that Rashi understood tikun soferim literally. Some have claimed that Rashi could never have said this, and it must be a heretical insertion. (There is always someone who says this about texts that depart from the conventional view.) In line with this approach, ArtScroll deleted this comment of Rashi.[24] As we have seen with the passages of Rashbam that were censored, in this case as well ArtScroll would also no doubt claim that it accepts the view of those who do not regard the deleted comment as authentic. Yet how can such a claim be taken seriously when the earliest manuscript of Rashi’s commentary, dating from the early thirteenth century and copied by R. Solomon ben Samuel, contains the passage?

Returning to Rashbam, I have the following question. Just like there is only one manuscript for his commentary to Genesis chapter 1, for the rest of the commentary on the Torah there was also only one manuscript and we don’t know anything about the copyist. Why don’t ArtScroll and the other censors start deleting the many other “problematic” passages in Rashbam, with the excuse that they are heretical insertions? Why only focus on the commentary to Genesis chapter 1?

I must also note that Rashbam himself, in his introductory words to parashat Mishpatim, refers to his commentary at the beginning of Genesis. Rashbam explains that the point of his commentary is not to explain the halakhah but rather the peshat, “as I have explained in Bereishit.” Where does he explain this in his commentary to Genesis? As Rosin points out in his note, Rashbam discusses this matter at the beginning of his commentary to parashat Va-Yeshev, and also at the beginning of his commentary to parashat Bereshit (which is from the supposedly questionable manuscript).

In my opinion, there is no doubt that in parashat Mishpatim Rashbam had the commentary to parashat Bereishit in mind. You can see this by comparing his words. In his commentary to parashat Mishpatim he writes:

ידעו ויבינו יודעי שכל כי לא באתי לפרש הלכות אע”פ שהם עיקר כמו שפירשתי בבראשית כי מיתור המקראות נשמעין ההגדות וההלכות.

At the beginning of parashat Bereishit he writes:

ועיקר ההלכות והדרשות יוצאין מיתור המקראות

Please look at what I have underlined and compare it to the passage I cited from the commentary to parashat Bereshit.

There are a number of other parallels between what Rashbam states in his commentary to Genesis chapter 1 and what appears elsewhere in his Torah commentary, meaning that it is impossible for one to argue that the commentary on the first chapter of Genesis is of uncertain authorship.[25]

I must also mention that Hizkuni, in his commentary to Genesis chapter 1, incorporates a number of Rashbam’s comments (without mentioning him by name). A list of these was compiled by אריסמנדי on the Otzar ha-Hokhmah forum. [26] He concludes:

יש לנו להצטער ולמחות על כי שלטו ידי זרים בחיבורי הראשונים, ולתבוע מההוצאות השונות שידפיסו את פירוש רשב”ם בשלמות האפשרית, ואל יהינו לשלוח יד בו. וכשם שלא יעלה על דעת מאן דהוא לצנזר מפירוש ראב”ע את הקטעים שיצאו עליהם מתנגדים, וכיו”ב במשנה תורה להרמב”ם ושאר חיבורי רבותינו ז”ל. הכי לצנזורים הערלים והמשומדים יאמרו להידמות?

In all the correspondence I have had about this matter, which includes people in various haredi communities, no one has disagreed with this last paragraph. In other words, no one has expressed any support for ArtScroll’s censorship of Rashbam, and the reason is obvious. This is not a matter of ideological or scholarly disagreement. It has nothing to do with haredi vs. Religious Zionist. It is about basic scholarly integrity as well as respect for Rashbam and his readers. This is something scholars of all persuasions can agree on.

One final point regarding Rashbam: In my post here I referred to Rashbam’s famous words in his commentary to Gen. 37:2 that he heard from his grandfather that if he had time he would write new commentaries focused on the peshat. Later in his commentary to this verse, he cites an explanation which appears in Rashi (without mentioning him by name) and refers to this explanation as הבל הוא. In a recent article,[27] R. Meir Mazuz refers to this comment and notes that it is not merely Rashbam who, when it came to Torah matters, was not afraid to strongly reject his grandfather’s position. Rashbam’s brother, Rabbenu Tam, also had this approach.

הלא זה האיש שפסל כל התפלין של חכמי דורו (ובכללם של מר זקנו זצ”ל רבן של ישראל) ועשה אותם כקרקפתא דלא מנח תפלין ח”ו . . . וכן פסק ר”ת שכל המאכיל אונה סרוכה באומא מאכיל טריפות לישראל (תוס’ חולין דף מ”ז ע”א) בניגוד לדעת רש”י שמתיר (שם דף מ”ו סע”ב). וכן חידש לברך על תש”ר על מצות תפלין, בניגוד לרש”י והרי”ף והרמב”ם.

This will be my last post dealing with ArtScroll and Rashbam unless new information comes to light. I have made my position very clear and there is no need to go over this matter again and again. The important thing is that people not forget that ArtScroll’s new mikraot gedolot Chumash is a censored work.

By now no one is surprised that ArtScroll engages in censorship. This has been their modus operandi from the beginning. But is there more, that is, does ArtScroll also publish things that it knows are incorrect? This is a more difficult question to answer. In Changing the Immutable, p. 41, I cite an example where I am pretty sure that this is the case, since the alternative would be to assume ignorance of a pretty basic fact of which I am certain the learned folks at ArtScroll are well aware. Yet aside from a few such cases, which relate to Jewish-Gentile relations, I don’t know of any evidence that ArtScroll intentionally misinterprets sources. Contrary to what some others think, I assume that if there is a misinterpretation it is simply an error, which all people are liable to make. I admit, however, that I am not sure what to make of the following example (called to my attention by R. Yonason Rosman).

The following is ArtScroll’s commentary to Deut. 29:9, in which it quotes Or ha-Hayyim:

Moses divided the people into categories to suggest that everyone is responsible according to how many others he or she can influence. Leaders may be able to affect masses of people; women, their immediate families and neighbors; children, only a few friends and classmates; common laborers, hardly anyone. God does not demand more than is possible, but He is not satisfied with less (Or HaChaim).

This is a very nice thought, but does Or ha-Hayyim actually say this? Here is Or ha-Hayyim on the verse.

As you can see, Or ha-Hayyim does not say that everyone is responsible according to how many he or she can influence. He specifically states that children are not responsible for others since אינם בני דעה. He then adds that women are like children in this respect (i.e., not responsible for others; he is not including them as אינם בני דעה).[28] Thus, ArtScroll’s presentation of Or ha-Hayyim’s view with regard to children and women is actually the exact opposite of what he really says. Was this an intentional distortion in the name of political correctness or a simple misunderstanding? Does ArtScroll view itself, in darshanut-like fashion, as able to elaborate on and alter the message of the commentaries it quotes, so that when it indicates that an interpretation comes from Or ha-Hayyim (or any other source) it could also mean “based on Or ha-Hayyim”? If the latter is true, one must wonder why there is no indication of this in the preface to the Stone Chumash.

To be continued

* * * *

By now many people have read my new book and I have received lots of comments and additional sources. I will discuss some of them in future posts.Although I read the book over a number of times before publication and sat shiv’ah neki’im over every sentence, I knew that there would be some errors that got through. I have learnt that absolute perfection is simply unattainable. However, we are fortunate today that errors can be quickly corrected and the corrections publicized very widely through this blog. Those who have the book can simply insert the corrections. When the book is reprinted the corrections will be added as well.

P. 17. I refer to R. Eliezer David Gruenwald. This should be R. Judah Gruenwald (1845-1920). Thanks to Yisroel Rottenberg for catching this mistake.

P. 21. I discuss the concept of halakhah ve-ein morin ken. Shortly before the book went to press, I added a comment to note 74 in which I stated that Mishnah Berakhot 1:1 contains an example where the Sages did not reveal the true halakhah in order to keep people from transgression. This is a mistake and I thank R. Yonason Rosman for the correction. The Sages made a decree to keep people from transgression. Once this was done we are dealing with a actual rabbinic law so it has no connection to halakhah ve-ein morin ken. Furthermore, since it was a rabbinic decree binding on all there is no reason to think that the Sages were concerned that the masses not know that the biblical law allowed for more flexibility. (We do find such a concern in more recent rabbinic literature, as I discuss in the book.)

P. 55. I refer to an article by Jacob J. Schacter on the 93 Beth Jacob girls. I know this article well and I can’t explain how it is that I recorded the co-author of the article as Norma Baumel Joseph. The co-author is actually Judith Tydor Baumel.P. 205 n. 71. I refer to Teherani, Amudei Mishpat, vol. 1, pp. 147ff. This is the second pagination in the volume.

P. 225. I wrote that R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin stated that R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady’s arguments were only intended to intimidate the scholarly reader. R. Yonason Rosman pointed out that my language here is not precise. What the Netziv says is not that R. Shneur Zalman’s arguments were intended to intimidate the scholarly reader, but rather his statement that he has many arguments was for intimidation.

P. 259 n. 100 refers to volume 14 of R. Wosner’s Shevet ha-Levi. This should be volume 11.And while we are talking about typos, this is a good opportunity to correct an unfortunate error that appeared in the first printing of Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters, p. 152, right at the end. The first word from the verse from Hosea that I quote is מחמד, not מחמר. If this mistake is found in your copy of the book, please correct it.

_______________

[1] In my post here I mentioned that the Lubavitcher Rebbe referred to Rashbam’s peshat interpretation that the day begins in the morning, the interpretation that was censored by ArtScroll. My reference was to a talk the Rebbe gave, and R. Avrohom Bergstein and others called my attention to the fact that in a letter the Rebbe also referred to this peshat interpretation of Rashbam. See Iggerot Kodesh, vol. 24, no. 934, also found in Likutei Sihot, vol. 15, p. 493.

[2] This passage is quoted from the manuscript by R. Menahem Lonzano. See Jordan S. Penkower, Masorah and Text Criticism in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Jerusalem, 2014), p. 118. Lonzano also refers to Nahmanides’ comment that I quoted.

[3] In this listing I included R. Ezekiel Landau. A Lakewood scholar properly corrected me as R. Landau is only referring to the fact that when it comes to kodashim night goes after day.

[4] R. Moshe Maimon also called my attention to the following: In my post here I discussed R. Dovid Cohen’s book, Ha-Emunah ha-Ne’emanah (Brooklyn, 2012). Among other things, I wrote:

One more point about R. Cohen’s book is that it is obvious that at times he is responding to what I wrote in The Limits of Orthodox Theology (and he also makes use of many of the sources I cite). While I am not mentioned by name (no surprise there) I am apparently included among the משמאילים referred to on p. 5 (see Limits, pp. 7-8).

R. Cohen has recently published the seventh volume of his book of questions, Ve-Im Tomar. Look at page 14, no. 216.

Now look at the source for this question provided by R. Cohen.

The question R. Cohen refers to comes from Limits, p. 7 (although I ask why Maimonides does not mention anything about teaching a prospective convert the Thirteen Principles. I don’t ask this question about talmudic sages.). Although I was not mentioned by name in Ha-Emunah ha-Ne’emanah, I am certainly honored to be cited in Ve-Im Tomar.

Since I mention R. Cohen, here is a page from his Ohel David, vol. 3, p. 36.

In his commentary to 1 Kings 7:23 he quotes the verse as follows:

ויעש את הים מוצק עשר באמה משפתו על שפתו

The words I have underlined caught my eye because the verse actually states משפתו עד שפתו. I assume that what appears in R. Cohen’s book is a typo as I haven’t seen any editions of Tanach that contain this error. However, this verse is also part of the Sephardic Haftarah for parashat Va-Yakhel, and believe it or not there are chumashim that do make this mistake. Here, for example, is a page from a popular tikkun kor’im. Look at the last words on the page and you will see the mistaken text.

[5] See She’elot u-Teshuvot Hazon Ovadiah, vol. 1, p. 5.

[6] See Torat Moshe, vol. 3, p. 18b and Derashot Hatam Sofer, vol. 2, p. 231b.

[7] It has already been pointed out that while the yeshiva pronuncation of R. Horowitz’s book המקנה is Ha-Makneh, from Jeremiah ch. 32 we see that it should really be pronounced Ha-Miknah. R. Horowitz’s most famous work is הפלאה. This is an abbreviation of הקטן פינחס הלוי איש הורויץ. The spelling I have given of R. Horowitz’s last name is how he himself spelled it. Here is the title page of his Sefer Ketubah, the first part of his Hafla’ah, published in 1787.

[8] Or Torah, Sivan 5775, p. 945.

[9] Nitzotzei Or, Berakhot 4a.

[10] It is also ironic that in R. Moshe Feinstein’s condemnation of the publication of the commentary of R. Judah he-Hasid, he cites Ibn Ezra’s attack on Yitzhaki for the latter’s own “biblical criticism.” See Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah, vol. 3, no. 114.

[11] This example was earlier noted by B. Barry Levy, “Our Torah, Your Torah and Their Torah: An Evaluation of the Artscroll Phenomenon,” in Howard Joseph, et al., eds., Truth and Compassion: Essays in Judaism and religion in Memory of Rabbi Dr. Solomon Frank (Waterloo, Canada, 1983), p. 147.

[12] I was quite surprised to find that R. Moses Teitelbaum, Yismah Moshe: Shemot, p. 177b, comes off sounding just like Soncino rather than ArtScroll, in defending citation of Karaite interpreters.

הנה אנכי שולח מלאך ע’ באברבנאל שכתב בשם חכמי הקראים כי זה נאמר על יהושע, והנה האומר דבר חכמה אף באוה”ע חכם נקרא, ובאמת שהם גרועים כי הם מינים ואפיקרוסים, מ”מ את הטוב נקבל כי כמה מפרשים הלכו בדרך הזה שהנביא נקרא מלאך

Regarding the Karaites, even though they are to be viewed as heretics, and a Sefer Torah written by a min is to be burnt, R. David Ibn Zimra stated that if one of the Karaites writes a Sefer Torah it is not to be burnt. Rather, it is to be placed in genizah. The reason for this is that the Karaites believe in the written Torah. See She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, vol. 2, no. 774.

R. Ishtori ha-Parchi, Kaftor va-Ferah, ch. 5 (pp. 76-77 in the Beit ha-Midrash le-Halakhah be-Hityashvut edition) thinks that such a Sefer Torah does not need to be put away, even though one cannot publicly read from it since the letters of God’s name were not written with the proper intention and other rabbinic requirements were not fulfilled. But the Sefer Torah is not pasul simply because of who wrote it. He also mentions the beautiful Bibles produced by Karaites in the Land of Israel. (When he says “Sadducee” he means Karaite.)

מזה נראה שהצדוקי אם כתב ספר תורה שלא יהיה פסול ואע”פ שיקרא מין אינו ממין זה המין שעובד ע”ז . . . והנה תמצא עמנו היום בארץ הצבי הרבה צדוקים סופרים והרבה ספרים נאים מכתיבתם בתורה נביאים וכתובים. ועל ספר תורה מסתברא שבמה שאינו ניכר שאין ראוי לסמוך עליהם כבעבוד לשמה וכתיבת אזכרות לשמן ותפירת היריעות בגידי טהורה.

See R. Yitzhak Ratsaby, ed., Shemot Kodesh ve-Hol (Bnei Brak, 1987), pp. 5-6. See also the important comments of R. David Zvi Rotstein, “Sefer Torah Menukad,” in Ohel Sarah-Leah (Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 673ff. (Rotstein thinks that when Masekhet Soferim refers to “Sadducees” it too means Karaites.)

R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin, Meshiv Davar, vol. 2, no. 77, states that it is permissible to write a Sefer Torah for Karaites if they will treat it with respect. For more discussion regarding this matter, see R. Hayyim Hezekiah Medini, Sedei Hemed, vol. 9, Divrei Hakhamim no. 135.

[13] See his letter published in Abraham Geiger, Melo Chofnajim (Berlin, 1840), p. 20 (Hebrew section). See also שפ”ר in Ha-Magid, Sep. 7, 1864, p. 279, arguing that this letter was not written by Delmedigo.

[14] The Arabic Commentary of Yefet Ben ‘Ali the Karaite on the Book of Hosea (Philadelphia, 1942), pp. xliii-xliv. See Michael Wechsler, The Arabic Translation and Commentary of Yefet ben ‘Eli the Karaite on the Book of Esther (Leiden, 2008), p. 72, who characterizes Ibn Ezra as “the greatest single mediator of Yefet’s exegesis (and hence of Karaite exegesis generally) among the Rabbanites.”

[15] See Avraham Lipshitz, Pirkei Iyun be-Mishnat ha-Rav Avraham Ibn Ezra (Jerusalem, 1982), p. 192.

[16] I have used the translation of H. Norman Strickman and Arthur M. Silver.

[17] See R. Kasher, Torah Shelemah, vol. 12, pp. 192-193. R. Kasher writes:

ויש להתפלא איך שיטה זו נכנסה גם לפירושי הראשונים ולא ידעו שיסודה ממקור זר

At first I wondered why R. Kasher thought that the origin of this interpretation is with the Karaites. Why not posit that a Rabbanite peshat interpeter could independently arrive at the same conclusion as that offered by the Karaites? I later found that R. Kasher himself, Torah Shelemah vol. 17, p. 311, offers this exact same approach:

וצ”ל שכתבו כן בדרך פירוש בפשטא דקרא

Daniel Sperber, Minhagei Yisrael, vol. 1, p. 151 n. 8, assumes that the interpretation indeed originates with the Karaites. Regarding the Karaite understanding, see Torah Shelemah, vol. 27, p. 210. See also my post here where I refer to R. Moshe Feinstein’s attack on a “heretical” interpretation that is also found in a number of rishonim.

[18] Additional pieces from Rashbam were published by Moshe Sokolow, “Ha-Peshatot ha-Mithadshim”: Ketaim Hadashim mi-Perush ha-Torah le-Rashbam – Ketav Yad,” Alei Sefer 11 (1984), pp. 73-80 Jonathan Jacobs argues that these are not part of Rashbam’s Torah commentary but from a polemical letter Rashbam sent to a student. See “Rashbam’s Major Principles of Interpretation as Deduced from a Manuscript Fragment Discovered in 1984” REJ 170 (2011), pp. 443-463. For more comments of Rashbam found in another manuscript, see Elazar Touitou, “Ha-Peshatot ha-Mithadshim be-Khol Yom: Iyunim be-Ferusho shel ha-Rashbam la-Torah (Ramat Gan, 2003), pp. 189ff.

[19] See Israel Moshe Ta-Shma, Ha-Sifrut ha-Parshanit la-Talmud be-Eiropah u-vi-Tzefon Afrikah (Jerusalem, 1999), vol. 1, p. 58.

[20] See Eva Frojimovic, “Jewish Scribes and Christian Illuminators: Interstitial Encounters and Cultural Negotiation,” in Katrin Kogman-Appel and Mati Meyer, eds. Between Judaism and Christianity: Art Historical Essays in Honor of Elisheva (Elisabeth) Revel Neher (Leiden, 2009), pp. 281-305; Hanna Liss, Creating Fictional Worlds: Peshat Exegesis and Narrativity in Rashbam’s Commentary on the Torah (Leiden, 2011), p. 45 n. 32; Colette Sirat, Hebrew Manuscripts of the Middle Ages, ed. and trans. Nicholas De Lange (Cambridge, 2002), p. 170. Sirat gives the date of the manuscript as 1232. In truth, we can’t be sure if it is 1232 or 1233 as the colophon only gives the Hebrew date 4993, but convention in such cases to give the later date. See the transcription in Frojimovic ,“Jewish Scribes,” p. 301.

[21] See R. Moshe David Chechik, “Inyanei Aseret ha-Dibrot ve-Ta’amei Rut le-Rabbenu Shlomo mi-Würzberg,” Mi-Shulhan ha-Melakhim 4 (2006), p. 5. R. Yaakov Yisrael Stal hopes to soon publish one of R. Solomon’s works. See Sodei Humash u-She’ar mi-Talmidei Rabbenu Yehudah he-Hasid, ed. Stal (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 17 n. 115.

[22] Leopold Zunz, Literaturgeschichte des synagogalen Poesie (Berlin, 1865). p. 287, does not think that the two R. Solomon ben Samuels are identical. He assumes that the author of the piyyut pre-dates the 13th century R. Solomon ben Samuel we are discussing.

[23] See here.

[24] See Changing the Immutable, p. 44.

[25] See the post of מה שנכון נכון here.

[26] See here.

[27] Or Torah, Elul 5774, pp. 1199-1200.

[28] See R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, Edut be-Yaakov (Jerusalem, 2011), vol. 2, p. 164.

Mikva Revisited – Understanding Shabbat 13a-b in light of Parshat Metzora

Mikva Revisited –

Understanding
Shabbat 13a-b in light of Parshat Metzora

by Chaim Sunitsky
(with some additional comments by Marc B. Shapiro)

It is well known that when
describing the purification of niddah and zava the Torah does not explicitly
mention that immersion is required.[1]
The present article will briefly examine the proofs given for such an immersion
and show a novel understanding of a story brought in the Talmud (Shabbat
13a-b).

There are 5 most commonly brought
proofs for mikva immersion. Three are brought in Tosafot (Hagiga 11a
s.v. lo nitzrecha, Yevamot 47b s.v. bimakom and Yoma
78a mikan), one in Rambam (Isurey Biah 4:3), one in Ramban (Shabbat
13b s.v. bimey and in his Chumash commentary Vayikra 15:11). One of
Tosafot’s proofs is in the Gemara itself (Shabbat 64b): “and she shall
remain in her niddah status”. The earlier sages used to understand this to mean
that a woman during her menstruation should not use makeup or wear nice clothes[2]
until R. Akiva came and said that this way he will divorce her[3]
and explained rather that she shall be niddah until she immerses. Needless to
say, there is no direct proof of immersion in this statement.[4]

Tosafot (ibid) bring an
additional proof from newly obtained vessels after the war with Midian, where
according to Hazal’s understanding they required immersion as the Torah states
(Bamidbar 31:23): “the waters of niddah”, seemingly implying that niddah needs
an immersion too.[5] The simple
meaning of the Torah in this verse is that water with ashes of “red cow” had to
be sprinkled on these vessels.[6]
Indeed there is an understanding based on Rambam[7]
that immersing new vessels is not Deoraita at all.

The third proof of the Tosafot in
the name of a Gaon[8] is from the
fact that even those that touched a bed of niddah need to immerse to become
pure, how much more so niddah herself. However, this would only at best prove
that a niddah needs to immerse in order not to cause ritual impurity to spread
on the objects[9].

Ramban’s proof that immersion is
required is based on the case of a male zav.[10]
The problem with this is that zav requires immersion in “mayim chaim” (a
natural source of water) whereas a niddah can immerse even in regular mikva
made from snow or rain water.[11]
Rambam’s proof is that all purifications require immersion so it must be that
niddah does too,[12] though the
verse he uses as a proof is also talking about ritual purity and not
necessarily implying any marital prohibition.[13]

After we see that there is no
conclusive proof that the immersion of niddah is a Biblical law, we may gain a
better understanding of a story in the Talmud (Shabbat 13a-b, Avot
Derabbi Natan, 2). It tells us that a certain rabbinical student used to
sleep in one bed[14] with his
wife after her seven days of niddah were over until she counted the “seven
clean days” and went to the mikva. The implication seems to be that after the
Biblical period of seven days the prohibition is only Rabbinical.[15]
The Rishonim are quite surprised at this as there is absolutely no relaxation[16]
of the prohibition for a woman who is niddah after the seven days are over as
she remains biblically prohibited to her husband until she immerses in the
mikva. Some Rishonim therefore suppose that the minhag at that time was for a
woman to go to the mikva twice, once in the end of the seven days of niddah and
one at the end of “seven clean days”. However according to what we wrote it is
possible that this student thought that the entire immersion in the mikva is
also rabbinical in nature and therefore was more lenient once the Biblical
seven days were over.[17]

* * *

I sent this post to Marc Shapiro
and here are his comments:

See Shem Tov’s
commentary on Maimonides, Guide 3:47, where he has a radical view that
according to Maimonides immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic. R. Kafih, in
his commentary on the Guide, ibid., is outraged by Shem Tov’s comment:

ראה
שם טוב ששאל “ומה יאמר הרב בטבילת זבה ונדה במים קרים בסתיו”, והמשיך
בדברי הבל שאסור לשמען שכאלו דעת רבנו שטבילת נדה וזבה מדרבנן. וחלילה חלילה.

R. Kafih continues by explaining why Shem Tov is
mistaken and concludes:

והארכתי מפני שכבר הטעה את קלי
הדעת

In his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, Sefer
Kedushah, vol. 1, p. 184, R. Kafih returns to this matter:

והבל
יפצה פיהו של בעל שם טוב מפרש המורה, בח”ג פרק מז שכאלו סובר רבנו שטבילת נדה
דרבנן, וענה גם כאן שקר ברבנו ותלה בו מה שלא אמר ולא עלתה על לבו חלילה

The matter you discuss in your post also concerned
R. Solomon Zvi Schueck. In his Torah Shelemah, vol. 2, p. 129b, he
prefaces his discussion as follows:

ורבים
מגדולי הראשונים והאחרונים (עיי’ תורה תמימה במקומו) עמדו להקשות וכי עיקר גדול
כטבילת נדה שקדושת ישראל תלוי בה לא תמצא בתורה רק ברמז דק וקל. ועוד מקשים, כפי
משמעות הגמרא בשבת הנ”ל דרשו זקנים הראשונים מן והדוה בנדתה רק שלא תכחול ולא
תתקשט הנדה בימי נדותה, אכן לא שנלמוד טבילת נדה במי מקוה, עד שבא רע”ק ולימד
בנדתה תהא עד שתבא במים, וכי עד רבי עקיבה לא טבלו?

See R. Schueck’s extended discussion as it is
quite interesting, even though it is complete speculation.

You cite Halakhot Gedolot, Hilkhot Niddah,
no. 41 (p. 439 in the Machon Yerushalayim edition), that the law of immersion
for a niddah is rabbinic:

זב וזבה טבילתן מדאוריתא, נדה
מדרבנן היא

This is a well-known passage that has been
discussed. Let me just make three comments.

1. See Teshuvot u-Fesakim me’et Hakhmei
Ashkenaz ve-Tzarfat, ed. Kupfer (Jerusalem, 1973), no. 158, p. 246 which
states:

ובהלכות גדולות פוסק טבילת
נידה דרבנן ושרא להו מרייהו

2. R. David Zvi Rotstein points out that the
Karaites were very stringent regarding niddah, and therefore it is possible
that the Behag’s comment, that the law of immersion for a niddah is only
rabbinic, does not reflect is true viewpoint but was only directed against the
Karaites. See Ohel Sarah Leah (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 638 in the note. As
far as I am concerned, this makes absolutely no sense. If something is a
rabbinic prohibition, and the Karaites were arguing that it is unnecessary,
then I can understand a rabbinic figure (falsely) stating that the matter in
question is a Torah law, in order to shore up observance. (I discuss this in my
new book.) But what sense does it make to do this in the reverse, i.e.,
declaring that something is only rabbinic because the Karaites took it as a
Torah law?

3. This view of Halakhot Gedolot is
mentioned in Besamim Rosh, no. 175. Here it is attributed to R. Yehudai
Gaon. As Saul Berlin explains in Kasa de-Harsana, some rishonim assumed
that R. Yehudai authored Halakhot Gedolot.

The case in Besamim Rosh deals with a man who
would publicly hug and kiss his wife even though she was a niddah. The rabbi
who wrote to “R. Asher” did not place the man in herem, and one of his reasons
was that the law of immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic, and therefore since
the man was not violating a Torah prohibition “better an unwitting sinner than
a willful sinner.” “R. Asher” rejects this position and thus on the surface
this responsum might appear quite pious. But as with a number of other responsa
in Besamim Rosh, what the forger Saul Berlin has done is put the radical
view in the public eye, even if in the end “R. Asher” rejects it. From this
responsum people will see that there is an argument to be made for not being
strict with the laws of niddah, since after all, they are only rabbinic. In his
reply “R. Asher” also mentions that many am ha’aratzim are more stringent when
it comes to the laws of niddah than the scholars. I see this too as an attempt
by Berlin to subvert traditional Judaism by making it seem as if the common
practices regarding the laws of niddah are based on ignorance.

[1]
Usually what is taken by Hazal as immersion in the mikva is a statement: “and
he/she shall wash his/her flesh in water”. No such statement is given in
regards to niddah or zava’s purification.

[2]
Based on the word “niddah” implying excommunication of sorts.

[3]
It has been noted by Yerushalmi (end of Gitin) that R. Akiva may be
following his general shita that a man can very easily divorce his wife if he
finds someone “better”.

[4]
In addition, there is a question as to whether this proof was even used before
R. Akiva came.

[5]
A similar proof is also brought in Yoma 78a based on a posuk in Nach
(Zecharia 13:1) and similar arguments against this proof can be used.

[6]
See for instance Targum Onkelos and Rashbam on this verse, see also Or Zarua
359.

[7]
Ma’akhalot Assurot, 17:5, see Magid Mishna, Hilchot Yom Tov 4:18,
see also Ramban, Avoda Zara 75b s.v. Gemora.

[8]
In some versions they are quoting Bahag (Hilchot Gedolot) but in our
versions this does not appear. Others quote this argument in the name of R. Hai
Gaon (see Semag, negative commandment 111).

[9]
See Tosafot, Hagigah 11a s.v. lo nitzrecha. We do find many other
laws of niddah that apply only for purity purposes but not applicable regarding
permitting her to her husband (see Tosafot ibid, see also GR”A, Yoreh Deah
196:31). In addition, sometimes the impurity of a person can go away
automatically without immersion. For example a woman who gave birth within her
“yemey tahara days” spreads some level of impurity on what she touches
but later she automatically becomes pure without additional immersions (Niddah
71b).

[10]
There are many differences between male zav and female zava but Ramban seems to
understand that since the passage of zava follows that of zav, the laws must be
similar.

[11]
According to many opinions even regular water drawn by people on Biblical level
can be used for niddah (see Tosafot, Bava Batra 66b s.v. yehe).

[12]
Rambam uses the verse (Vayikra 15:18) that after relations both the man and the
woman need to “wash themselves” (meaning immerse) and be unclean until the
evening. This particular Binyan Av is not found in our sources in Hazal but the
Magid Mishna (ibid) implies it was in some version of Sifra.

[13]
The very fact that each opinion rejects that of others seems to imply that
there was no clear proof that immersion of niddah is a Biblical command. In
fact Bahag (siman 41, p. 439 in the Machon Yerushalayim edition) seems to
consider niddah immersion as Rabbinical in origin but immersion of zava as Biblical. However, Or Zarua 359 says there is a
mistake in that version of Bahag.

[14]
There are other versions of the same story where he even slept naked next to
his wife after the seven days of niddah were over.

[15]
Ramban (ibid) however also brings a different interpretation.

[16]
However see Rama, Yoreh Deah 195:14.

[17]
Ramban and Rashba (ibid) specifically write that it’s impossible that this
student did not know that a niddah had to immerse. However, according to what
we wrote it is possible that the student thought that this immersion is a
Rabbinical command and that the drasha of R. Akiva is an asmachta (similarly to
the shita that holds that the immersion of vessels is only Rabbinical in
origin).