Megilat Rut[1]:
The night of Boaz and Rut Revisited

 By Chaim Sunitsky

In a well known story of Megilat
Rut, Naomi tells Ruth to bathe herself, put on her [best] clothes and go down
at night to where Boaz is sleeping. Boaz then will “tell her” what to do. The
simple implication of this story is that Ruth would be sent to make a marriage
proposal to Boaz who could simply consummate the marriage immediately.[2]

It has been already noted[3]
that the story of Boaz and Ruth contains many elements of “yibum” procedure and
therefore it was concluded that at that time “yibum” was practiced by other
close relatives, not just the brother of the deceased.[4]
In theory Boaz could have relations with Ruth and thus do yibum immediately
that night, but since there was a closer kin[5]
he did not touch Ruth but waited until the morning. When in the presence of the
elders Boaz offered the closer relative to redeem the fields left for Ruth, he
was willing to do this, but when Boaz stipulated that he would have to marry
Ruth as well he refused saying: פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי (lest I destroy
my “inheritance”). Hazal[6]
understand him to argue with Boaz’s opinion that a female from Moav is
permitted to “enter the congregation of Israel” i.e. marry a regular Jew. The
word “inheritance” is thus taken to mean descendants who will not be kosher
Jews and won’t be able to marry others in the Jewish nation[7]. 

Before we go on it’s important to
understand a related issue: in the laws of yibum, what is the meaning of
(Devarim 25:6): “The first child born shall stand up in memory of the deceased
brother.” Hazal understand this not to mean the actual name of the person but
rather to be talking about inheritance belonging to the deceased brother.
However they explain[8]
that this inheritance is transferred to the brother that did the yibum.
According to Shadal[9] this
explanation was needed in order to encourage[10]
the brother to want to do yibum, but the original meaning of the Torah was
actually that yibum caused financial loss to the brother doing it as he would
not partake of the inheritance[11]
as it would all belong to the son born[12].

Another important point we need
to discuss before we continue is the issue of “kri” and “ketiv”: “written” and
“read” forms of words. It is well known that certain words in Tanach are not
read the same way as they are written. The Talmud[13]
assumes that this is part of “halacha leMoshe miSinai[14]”
– part of oral traditions stemming from Moshe who received them at Mt. Sinai.
The difficulty with this is that many of these “kri” and “ketiv” forms are in
Neviim and Ketuvim – prophetic works written long after Moshe. R. Reuven
Margolies therefore concludes[15]  that the expression “halacha leMoshe
miSinai” can mean a decision in some generation by the Great Sanhedrin[16].
Another explanation of “kri” and “ketiv” is offered by Radak[17]
and others: the two are preserved in some of the cases when different
manuscripts[18] had
different version of the word(s). Another possibility[19]
is that “kri” can be a kind of correction to the “ketiv” that the “Men of Great
Assembly” made for various reasons. Many of the “kri” and “ketiv” cases in fact
support this last opinion[20].
Some of the “kri” and “ketiv” differ only in that one of them reads as two
words what the other reads as one word. For example, the “ketiv” in “Devarim
39:2 is “Eshadot” but the “kri” is “Esh” “Dat” – fire of religion. Shadal[21]
writes that Dat is a Persian word and therefore the original meaning must have
been according to the “ketiv[22]”.

Coming back to the story of Ruth,
the key verse (4:5) has a “written” and “read” form:

 וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז בְּיוֹם קְנוֹתְךָ הַשָּׂדֶה מִיַּד נָעֳמִי
וּמֵאֵת רוּת הַמּוֹאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת הַמֵּת קָנִיתָה לְהָקִים שֵׁם הַמֵּת
עַל נַחֲלָתוֹ

The key word is written קניתי but is read as קָנִיתָה. It has been noted by modern scholarship[23]
that according to the ketiv (the written form) an opposite[24]
from traditional understanding immerges. According to “ketiv” Boaz did
consummate the marriage and when talking to the kinsman he says that Ruth is
already his wife. If he will later have a child from Ruth, the child will
inherit her husband’s property and the money the other relative paid to redeem
the field will go to waste.[25]
This then is the meaning of the other relative’s rejection of the offer (4:6):

לֹא אוּכַל
<לגאול> לִגְאָל לִי פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי גְּאַל לְךָ אַתָּה אֶת
גְּאֻלָּתִי כִּי לֹא אוּכַל לִגְאֹל:

“I will not redeem lest I harm my inheritance”, literally
meaning he would lose the field he would purchase.

Mikva Revisited –

Understanding
Shabbat 13a-b in light of Parshat Metzora

by Chaim Sunitsky
(with some additional comments by Marc B. Shapiro)

It is well known that when
describing the purification of niddah and zava the Torah does not explicitly
mention that immersion is required.[1]
The present article will briefly examine the proofs given for such an immersion
and show a novel understanding of a story brought in the Talmud (Shabbat
13a-b).

There are 5 most commonly brought
proofs for mikva immersion. Three are brought in Tosafot (Hagiga 11a
s.v. lo nitzrecha, Yevamot 47b s.v. bimakom and Yoma
78a mikan), one in Rambam (Isurey Biah 4:3), one in Ramban (Shabbat
13b s.v. bimey and in his Chumash commentary Vayikra 15:11). One of
Tosafot’s proofs is in the Gemara itself (Shabbat 64b): “and she shall
remain in her niddah status”. The earlier sages used to understand this to mean
that a woman during her menstruation should not use makeup or wear nice clothes[2]
until R. Akiva came and said that this way he will divorce her[3]
and explained rather that she shall be niddah until she immerses. Needless to
say, there is no direct proof of immersion in this statement.[4]

Tosafot (ibid) bring an
additional proof from newly obtained vessels after the war with Midian, where
according to Hazal’s understanding they required immersion as the Torah states
(Bamidbar 31:23): “the waters of niddah”, seemingly implying that niddah needs
an immersion too.[5] The simple
meaning of the Torah in this verse is that water with ashes of “red cow” had to
be sprinkled on these vessels.[6]
Indeed there is an understanding based on Rambam[7]
that immersing new vessels is not Deoraita at all.

The third proof of the Tosafot in
the name of a Gaon[8] is from the
fact that even those that touched a bed of niddah need to immerse to become
pure, how much more so niddah herself. However, this would only at best prove
that a niddah needs to immerse in order not to cause ritual impurity to spread
on the objects[9].

Ramban’s proof that immersion is
required is based on the case of a male zav.[10]
The problem with this is that zav requires immersion in “mayim chaim” (a
natural source of water) whereas a niddah can immerse even in regular mikva
made from snow or rain water.[11]
Rambam’s proof is that all purifications require immersion so it must be that
niddah does too,[12] though the
verse he uses as a proof is also talking about ritual purity and not
necessarily implying any marital prohibition.[13]

After we see that there is no
conclusive proof that the immersion of niddah is a Biblical law, we may gain a
better understanding of a story in the Talmud (Shabbat 13a-b, Avot
Derabbi Natan, 2). It tells us that a certain rabbinical student used to
sleep in one bed[14] with his
wife after her seven days of niddah were over until she counted the “seven
clean days” and went to the mikva. The implication seems to be that after the
Biblical period of seven days the prohibition is only Rabbinical.[15]
The Rishonim are quite surprised at this as there is absolutely no relaxation[16]
of the prohibition for a woman who is niddah after the seven days are over as
she remains biblically prohibited to her husband until she immerses in the
mikva. Some Rishonim therefore suppose that the minhag at that time was for a
woman to go to the mikva twice, once in the end of the seven days of niddah and
one at the end of “seven clean days”. However according to what we wrote it is
possible that this student thought that the entire immersion in the mikva is
also rabbinical in nature and therefore was more lenient once the Biblical
seven days were over.[17]

* * *

I sent this post to Marc Shapiro
and here are his comments:

See Shem Tov’s
commentary on Maimonides, Guide 3:47, where he has a radical view that
according to Maimonides immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic. R. Kafih, in
his commentary on the Guide, ibid., is outraged by Shem Tov’s comment:

ראה
שם טוב ששאל “ומה יאמר הרב בטבילת זבה ונדה במים קרים בסתיו”, והמשיך
בדברי הבל שאסור לשמען שכאלו דעת רבנו שטבילת נדה וזבה מדרבנן. וחלילה חלילה.

R. Kafih continues by explaining why Shem Tov is
mistaken and concludes:

והארכתי מפני שכבר הטעה את קלי
הדעת

In his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, Sefer
Kedushah, vol. 1, p. 184, R. Kafih returns to this matter:

והבל
יפצה פיהו של בעל שם טוב מפרש המורה, בח”ג פרק מז שכאלו סובר רבנו שטבילת נדה
דרבנן, וענה גם כאן שקר ברבנו ותלה בו מה שלא אמר ולא עלתה על לבו חלילה

The matter you discuss in your post also concerned
R. Solomon Zvi Schueck. In his Torah Shelemah, vol. 2, p. 129b, he
prefaces his discussion as follows:

ורבים
מגדולי הראשונים והאחרונים (עיי’ תורה תמימה במקומו) עמדו להקשות וכי עיקר גדול
כטבילת נדה שקדושת ישראל תלוי בה לא תמצא בתורה רק ברמז דק וקל. ועוד מקשים, כפי
משמעות הגמרא בשבת הנ”ל דרשו זקנים הראשונים מן והדוה בנדתה רק שלא תכחול ולא
תתקשט הנדה בימי נדותה, אכן לא שנלמוד טבילת נדה במי מקוה, עד שבא רע”ק ולימד
בנדתה תהא עד שתבא במים, וכי עד רבי עקיבה לא טבלו?

See R. Schueck’s extended discussion as it is
quite interesting, even though it is complete speculation.

You cite Halakhot Gedolot, Hilkhot Niddah,
no. 41 (p. 439 in the Machon Yerushalayim edition), that the law of immersion
for a niddah is rabbinic:

זב וזבה טבילתן מדאוריתא, נדה
מדרבנן היא

This is a well-known passage that has been
discussed. Let me just make three comments.

1. See Teshuvot u-Fesakim me’et Hakhmei
Ashkenaz ve-Tzarfat, ed. Kupfer (Jerusalem, 1973), no. 158, p. 246 which
states:

ובהלכות גדולות פוסק טבילת
נידה דרבנן ושרא להו מרייהו

2. R. David Zvi Rotstein points out that the
Karaites were very stringent regarding niddah, and therefore it is possible
that the Behag’s comment, that the law of immersion for a niddah is only
rabbinic, does not reflect is true viewpoint but was only directed against the
Karaites. See Ohel Sarah Leah (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 638 in the note. As
far as I am concerned, this makes absolutely no sense. If something is a
rabbinic prohibition, and the Karaites were arguing that it is unnecessary,
then I can understand a rabbinic figure (falsely) stating that the matter in
question is a Torah law, in order to shore up observance. (I discuss this in my
new book.) But what sense does it make to do this in the reverse, i.e.,
declaring that something is only rabbinic because the Karaites took it as a
Torah law?

3. This view of Halakhot Gedolot is
mentioned in Besamim Rosh, no. 175. Here it is attributed to R. Yehudai
Gaon. As Saul Berlin explains in Kasa de-Harsana, some rishonim assumed
that R. Yehudai authored Halakhot Gedolot.

The case in Besamim Rosh deals with a man who
would publicly hug and kiss his wife even though she was a niddah. The rabbi
who wrote to “R. Asher” did not place the man in herem, and one of his reasons
was that the law of immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic, and therefore since
the man was not violating a Torah prohibition “better an unwitting sinner than
a willful sinner.” “R. Asher” rejects this position and thus on the surface
this responsum might appear quite pious. But as with a number of other responsa
in Besamim Rosh, what the forger Saul Berlin has done is put the radical
view in the public eye, even if in the end “R. Asher” rejects it. From this
responsum people will see that there is an argument to be made for not being
strict with the laws of niddah, since after all, they are only rabbinic. In his
reply “R. Asher” also mentions that many am ha’aratzim are more stringent when
it comes to the laws of niddah than the scholars. I see this too as an attempt
by Berlin to subvert traditional Judaism by making it seem as if the common
practices regarding the laws of niddah are based on ignorance.

How many children did
Michal have? Explanation of a Talmudic passage in light of the writings of
Josephus Flavius[1]

 By Chaim Sunitsky

The following Talmudic passage appears in Sanhedrin
19b (we are using mostly Soncino translation):

R. Yossi was asked by
his disciples: How could David marry two sisters while they were both living?
He answered: He married Michal after the death of Meirav. R. Yehoshua ben Korha
said: His marriage to Meirav was contracted in error, as it is said, Deliver me
my wife Michal whom I betrothed unto me for a hundred foreskins of the
Philistines. How does this prove it? — R. Papa answered: Because he said, My
wife Michal but not ‘my wife Meirav’. Now, what was the error in his marriage
[with Meirav]? [It was this:] It is written, And it shall be that the man who
kills [Goliath], the king will enrich him with great riches and will give him
his daughter. Now he [David] went and slew him, whereupon Shaul said to him: I
owe you a debt, and if one betroths a woman by a debt, she is not betrothed.
Accordingly he gave her to Adriel, as it is written, But it came to pass at the
time when Meirav, Shaul’s daughter should have been given to David, that she
was given to Adriel the Meholatite to wife. Then Shaul said to David, ‘If you
still wish me to give you Michal to wife, go and bring me hundred foreskins of
the Philistines.’ He went and brought them to him. Then he said: ‘You now have
two claims on me, [the repayment of] a loan and a perutah’. Now, Shaul held
that when a loan and a perutah are offered [as kidushin], he [the would-be
husband] thinks mainly of the loan; but in David’s view, when there is a loan
and a perutah, the mind is set on the perutah. Or if you like, I will say, all
agree that where a loan and a perutah [are offered], the mind is set on the
perutah. Shaul, however, thought that [the hundred foreskins] had no value,
while David held that they had value at least as food for dogs and cats. How
does R. Yossi interpret the verse, Deliver me my wife Michal? He explains it by
another view of his. For it has been taught: R. Yossi used to interpret the
following confused passage thus: It is written, But the king took the two sons
of Rizpah the daughter of Ayah whom she bore to Shaul, Armoni and Mephiboshet,
and the five sons of Michal, the daughter of Shaul, whom she bore to Adriel the
son of Barzillai, the Meholatite etc. But was Michal really given to Adriel;
was she not given to Palti the son of Layish, as it is written, Now Shaul had
given Michal, David’s wife, to Palti the son of Layish . . .? But Scripture
compares the marriage of Meirav to Adriel to that of Michal to Palti, to teach
that just as the marriage of Michal to Palti was unlawful, so was that of
Meirav to Adriel. Now as to R. Yehoshua ben Korha, surely it is written, And
the five sons of Michal the daughter of Shaul whom she bore to Adriel. R.
Yehoshua [b. Korha] answers thee: Was it then Michal who bore them? Surely it
was rather Meirav who bore them! But Meirav bore and Michal brought them up,
therefore they were called by her name. This teaches you that whoever brings up
an orphan in his home, Scripture ascribes it to him as though he had begotten
him.

The accepted understanding of this passage is
that according to Rabbi Yossi David married Michal only after her sister had
five children from Adriel and died. Michal later brought up the five children
as her own. The commentators[2]
ask how Meirav could possibly have five children within just two and a half
years of Shaul’s reign and answer that she was pregnant with twins twice, and
once with the fifth child.  However, according to
the calculation of all the events that had to occur before David married Michal
and after he ran away from Shaul, there is not enough time left for three
pregnancies of Meirav[3].
We need to look for a simpler understanding of the Talmud.

The difficulty of the Gemara is with the
following verse from the end of David’s life (Shmuel 2:21:8): “And the king
[David] took two sons of Rizpah daughter of Ayah whom she bore to Shaul, Armoni
and Mephiboshet, and the five sons of Michal, the daughter of Shaul, whom she
bore to Adriel the son of Barzillai, the Meholatite …” Five children of Michal
and Adriel are mentioned in this verse. All the commentators follow the
explanation of our Gemara that the children were born to Meirav and Michal only
raised them. But a careful reading seems to reveal that R. Yossi is not the one
who holds that the five children were Meirav’s. This explanation is provided by
the Gemara later according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha. If so, R. Yossi must
hold that indeed Michal was the one to have the five children. Since David only
took her back seven years after he became king, there was plenty of time for
her to give birth to five children. But Michal was never married to Adriel, she
was “married” to Palti. It’s important to understand what Rabbi Yossi is
implying by his words “confused passage” (מקראות מעורבין literally mixed up verses). Apparently he
means that while Michal married Palti, the verse is using the expression “married
to Adriel” to teach us that the marriage of Michal to Palti was just as sinful
as the marriage of Meirav to Adriel. Both marriages were based on an incorrect
decision of Shaul and his Bet Din. David’s Kidushin with Meirav was declared
invalid and his later Kidushin with Michal was declared invalid again[4].
Indeed Josephus Flavius (Antiquities 7:4:3) says that Michal had five children
from Palti.

Now
we can offer a simple understanding of the entire Talmudic passage. The
students asked R. Yossi, how could David marry two sisters? They are obviously
assuming that some form of Kidushin was involved when Shaul offered his
(presumably older[5]) daughter to
the one who kills Goliath[6].
If David was technically married to Meirav he could not marry Michal even if
Meirav was incorrectly given to a different man. R. Yossi answered that Meirav
died before David married Michal. R. Yehoshua ben Karcha however holds that
there was no kosher Kidushin between David and Meirav. He learns it from the
words in a verse: “my wife Michal”, meaning only Michal is my wife,
Meirav is not. The Gemara goes into the technical explanation of why Michal’s
Kidushin was valid and not Meirav’s according to R. Yehoshua ben Karcha. R.
Yossi however only learns from this verse that Michal was David’s wife
meaning her Kidushin was valid just as Meirav’s, and giving her to Palti was
incorrect. He learns that the verse (Shmuel 2:21:8) describing David’s giving
five children of Michal and Adriel to Givonim[7]
were really Michal’s children from Palti and is using the expression “mixed up
verses” to teach us that Michal’s Kidushin with David was valid just like
Meirav’s was.[8] R. Yehoshua
ben Karcha however says the verse in Shmuel 2:21:8 is not talking about
Michal’s children but about Meirav’s children whom Michal raised. The Gemara
goes on to give other examples where children raised by someone are considered
like one’s own children.