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Megilat Rut: The night of Boaz and Rut Revisited

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Megilat Rut[1]:
The night of Boaz and Rut Revisited
 By Chaim Sunitsky
In a well known story of Megilat
Rut, Naomi tells Ruth to bathe herself, put on her [best] clothes and go down
at night to where Boaz is sleeping. Boaz then will “tell her” what to do. The
simple implication of this story is that Ruth would be sent to make a marriage
proposal to Boaz who could simply consummate the marriage immediately.[2]
It has been already noted[3]
that the story of Boaz and Ruth contains many elements of “yibum” procedure and
therefore it was concluded that at that time “yibum” was practiced by other
close relatives, not just the brother of the deceased.[4]
In theory Boaz could have relations with Ruth and thus do yibum immediately
that night, but since there was a closer kin[5]
he did not touch Ruth but waited until the morning. When in the presence of the
elders Boaz offered the closer relative to redeem the fields left for Ruth, he
was willing to do this, but when Boaz stipulated that he would have to marry
Ruth as well he refused saying: פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי (lest I destroy
my “inheritance”). Hazal[6]
understand him to argue with Boaz’s opinion that a female from Moav is
permitted to “enter the congregation of Israel” i.e. marry a regular Jew. The
word “inheritance” is thus taken to mean descendants who will not be kosher
Jews and won’t be able to marry others in the Jewish nation[7]. 
Before we go on it’s important to
understand a related issue: in the laws of yibum, what is the meaning of
(Devarim 25:6): “The first child born shall stand up in memory of the deceased
brother.” Hazal understand this not to mean the actual name of the person but
rather to be talking about inheritance belonging to the deceased brother.
However they explain[8]
that this inheritance is transferred to the brother that did the yibum.
According to Shadal[9] this
explanation was needed in order to encourage[10]
the brother to want to do yibum, but the original meaning of the Torah was
actually that yibum caused financial loss to the brother doing it as he would
not partake of the inheritance[11]
as it would all belong to the son born[12].
Another important point we need
to discuss before we continue is the issue of “kri” and “ketiv”: “written” and
“read” forms of words. It is well known that certain words in Tanach are not
read the same way as they are written. The Talmud[13]
assumes that this is part of “halacha leMoshe miSinai[14]”
– part of oral traditions stemming from Moshe who received them at Mt. Sinai.
The difficulty with this is that many of these “kri” and “ketiv” forms are in
Neviim and Ketuvim – prophetic works written long after Moshe. R. Reuven
Margolies therefore concludes[15]  that the expression “halacha leMoshe
miSinai” can mean a decision in some generation by the Great Sanhedrin[16].
Another explanation of “kri” and “ketiv” is offered by Radak[17]
and others: the two are preserved in some of the cases when different
manuscripts[18] had
different version of the word(s). Another possibility[19]
is that “kri” can be a kind of correction to the “ketiv” that the “Men of Great
Assembly” made for various reasons. Many of the “kri” and “ketiv” cases in fact
support this last opinion[20].
Some of the “kri” and “ketiv” differ only in that one of them reads as two
words what the other reads as one word. For example, the “ketiv” in “Devarim
39:2 is “Eshadot” but the “kri” is “Esh” “Dat” – fire of religion. Shadal[21]
writes that Dat is a Persian word and therefore the original meaning must have
been according to the “ketiv[22]”.
Coming back to the story of Ruth,
the key verse (4:5) has a “written” and “read” form:
 וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז בְּיוֹם קְנוֹתְךָ הַשָּׂדֶה מִיַּד נָעֳמִי
וּמֵאֵת רוּת הַמּוֹאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת הַמֵּת קָנִיתָה לְהָקִים שֵׁם הַמֵּת
עַל נַחֲלָתוֹ
The key word is written קניתי but is read as קָנִיתָה. It has been noted by modern scholarship[23]
that according to the ketiv (the written form) an opposite[24]
from traditional understanding immerges. According to “ketiv” Boaz did
consummate the marriage and when talking to the kinsman he says that Ruth is
already his wife. If he will later have a child from Ruth, the child will
inherit her husband’s property and the money the other relative paid to redeem
the field will go to waste.[25]
This then is the meaning of the other relative’s rejection of the offer (4:6):
לֹא אוּכַל
<לגאול> לִגְאָל לִי פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי גְּאַל לְךָ אַתָּה אֶת
גְּאֻלָּתִי כִּי לֹא אוּכַל לִגְאֹל:
“I will not redeem lest I harm my inheritance”, literally
meaning he would lose the field he would purchase.
[1] Many reasons are offered as to why we read Megilat
Ruth on Shavuot, the simplest being that the main action takes place when
gathering barley and wheat crop, around the time of Shavuot.
[2] While most commentators try to avoid this obvious
interpretation, this is implied by Rut Rabbah 7:4. See also Taz, Yore Deah
192:1 who assumes this and discusses why the gezeira of seven days due to “dam
chimud” did not apply.
[3] See for instance Malbim (Ruth 3:4), see also Ramban,
Devarim 25:6.
[4] Boaz was a cousin of Ruth’s husband Machlon (Baba
Batra 91a).
[5] Referred to as “ploni almoni”, he was Machlon’s
uncle.
[6] Ruth Rabbah 7:7.
[7] The simple meaning may be that he did not want to
marry Ruth since he already had another wife (see Targum ad loc) or so that his
older children won’t have to split the inheritance with his children from her
(see similarly Rema, Even Haezer 1:8).
[8] Rashi in the name of Yevamot 40a.
[9] Ad loc.
[10] Similarly later when Ashkenazi Jews encouraged
halitzah, a financial incentive was used for this too, see Rema, Even Haezer
163:2.
[11] Maybe this is the reason Yehudah’s son Onan did not
want Tamar to have children.
[12] The Ramban hints that this son will have the soul of
the deceased thus the inheritance coming back to the original owner.
[13] Nedarim 37b although it might be this is not the only
opinion in this sugia, see also Orach Chaim 141:8.
[14] Presumably this implies that both kri and ketiv have
meaning. Various propositions have been offered regarding the relationship
between the two.
[15] Yesod Hamishna Vearichata, chapter 2 in
berurim (page 36).
[16] The Rishonim already noticed that at least some of
“halacha leMoshe miSinai” statements should not be taken literally see for
instance Rosh in the beginning of Mikvaot, see also Pesachim 110b.
[17] See his introduction to the prophets; see also R.
Marc Shapiro, Limits of Orthodox Theology, page 101 who brings other
Rishonim that follow the same opinion. In one place in his commentary Radak
goes a step further and notices that Targum Yonatan seems to have a reading
where a letter is moved from the beginning of the word to the end of previous
word (Melachim 1:20:33, see also our next note).
[18] We know that there were variant manuscripts of Tanach
in the times of Second Temple and probably before that as well. There are many
examples of this, see for instance Tosafot s.v. Maavirim and R. Akiva
Eiger, Shabbat 55b. One of the famous examples seems to be the well known
drasha in the Agada that criticizes the “wicked” son for excluding himself from
other participants: “lachem velo lo”. The obvious difficulty is that the wise son
also says: “etchem” (to you). Now we know that in some manuscripts the verse in
Devarim 6:20 indeed uses the expression “otanu” (us), see also Yerushalmi
Pesachim 10:4 (70b), Mechilta, end of Bo (chapter 18 in some editions,
paragraph 125 in others). Note also that many of the variants can be learned by
studying the old Torah translations, for instance Septuagint. It seems that
some of “deliberate changes” mentioned in Megila 9a-b were actually based on
variant manuscripts. In case of “naarei bnei yisrael”, we actually learn from
Masechet Sofrim 6:4 and parallel sources that there were variant manuscripts.
Additional examples can include “hamor” – “hemed” and “bekirba” – “bekroveah”,
where the words are very similar. R. Reuven Margolies in his “Hamikra Vahamesora”,
chapter 17 brings some interesting examples of translations that were based on
variant manuscripts. Without knowing this we can’t understand some words of
Hazal correctly. Just to bring two examples here, the question of how to read
“dodecha” in Shir Hashirim 1:2 (see Avoda Zara 29b) can be understood in light
of Septuagint translation as “breasts” (from the word “dad”; this also explains
why this particular question was asked when discussing the prohibition of
non-Jewish cheese; the verses describe that the Jewish nation’s wine, oil, and
breasts, i.e. milk are the best, and we should not use any of these products
made by non-Jews). In this example the difference with Masoretic text is only
in the vowels that are not written in the scrolls (see another example in
Mishley 12:28 that has in our Masoretic text “al mavet” – “not death” but
according to the Aramaic Targum the verse seems to read “el mavet” – “towards
death”). Another example with a real textual difference in consonants is in the
verse of Bereshit 26:32. The Bereshit Rabbah (end of 64) seems to at first not
be sure whether they found water or not. R. Reuven Margolies claims that the
uncertainty was whether the correct reading is “we did NOT find water” (based
on Septuagint translation) or “we found water” (as it is in our Masoretic
text). The difference is whether the word “Lo” should be with “Vav” (they said
to him) or with Aleph (they said: “we didn’t”, see however Rashash ad loc who
thinks that even according to the Masoretic text there is a possibility to
understand Lo with Vav as “not”).
[19] A similar idea is brought in Abarbanel’s introduction
to Yirmiyahu. This may be related to a similar question of what is “tikun
sofrim”, see R. Marc Shapiro, Limits of Orthodox Theology, starting
with page 98 and R. Saul Lieberman “Hellenism in Jewish Palestine”
starting with page 28.  Indeed in
Midrash Tanchuma (Beshalach 16) the tradition is brought that tikun
sofrim is an actual change made by Anshey Kneset Hagedola.
[20] This might be especially true when the “kri” is a
synonym of “ketiv” but the expression used is a softer form, when the “ketiv”
is too crude, see Devarim 28:27 and 28:30, see also Talmud Bavli Megilah 25b.
[21] Ad loc.
[22] In general some of the commentators sometimes follow
the “ketiv” but most explain the meaning of verses according to the “kri”.
[23] Professor Cyrus Gordon “Forgotten Scripts”
1982, page 171. He additionally writes based on discoveries in Ebla that ומאת is to be
understood not as “and from” but rather “but”. For Hazal’s understanding of
this “kri” and “ketiv” see Ruth Rabbah 7:10.
[24] It’s actually quite unusual that kri and ketiv would
offer the exact opposite understanding.
[25] Apparently this is the field that Ruth was selling.
It seems that according to the practice of the time a widow of a person was
able to enjoy some of the rights to his property or possibly make decision as
to which of the relatives takes possession of it.


Mikva Revisited – Understanding Shabbat 13a-b in light of Parshat Metzora

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Mikva Revisited –
Understanding
Shabbat 13a-b in light of Parshat Metzora
by Chaim Sunitsky
(with some additional comments by Marc B. Shapiro)
It is well known that when
describing the purification of niddah and zava the Torah does not explicitly
mention that immersion is required.[1]
The present article will briefly examine the proofs given for such an immersion
and show a novel understanding of a story brought in the Talmud (Shabbat
13a-b).
There are 5 most commonly brought
proofs for mikva immersion. Three are brought in Tosafot (Hagiga 11a
s.v. lo nitzrecha, Yevamot 47b s.v. bimakom and Yoma
78a mikan), one in Rambam (Isurey Biah 4:3), one in Ramban (Shabbat
13b s.v. bimey and in his Chumash commentary Vayikra 15:11). One of
Tosafot’s proofs is in the Gemara itself (Shabbat 64b): “and she shall
remain in her niddah status”. The earlier sages used to understand this to mean
that a woman during her menstruation should not use makeup or wear nice clothes[2]
until R. Akiva came and said that this way he will divorce her[3]
and explained rather that she shall be niddah until she immerses. Needless to
say, there is no direct proof of immersion in this statement.[4]
Tosafot (ibid) bring an
additional proof from newly obtained vessels after the war with Midian, where
according to Hazal’s understanding they required immersion as the Torah states
(Bamidbar 31:23): “the waters of niddah”, seemingly implying that niddah needs
an immersion too.[5] The simple
meaning of the Torah in this verse is that water with ashes of “red cow” had to
be sprinkled on these vessels.[6]
Indeed there is an understanding based on Rambam[7]
that immersing new vessels is not Deoraita at all.
The third proof of the Tosafot in
the name of a Gaon[8] is from the
fact that even those that touched a bed of niddah need to immerse to become
pure, how much more so niddah herself. However, this would only at best prove
that a niddah needs to immerse in order not to cause ritual impurity to spread
on the objects[9].
Ramban’s proof that immersion is
required is based on the case of a male zav.[10]
The problem with this is that zav requires immersion in “mayim chaim” (a
natural source of water) whereas a niddah can immerse even in regular mikva
made from snow or rain water.[11]
Rambam’s proof is that all purifications require immersion so it must be that
niddah does too,[12] though the
verse he uses as a proof is also talking about ritual purity and not
necessarily implying any marital prohibition.[13]
After we see that there is no
conclusive proof that the immersion of niddah is a Biblical law, we may gain a
better understanding of a story in the Talmud (Shabbat 13a-b, Avot
Derabbi Natan, 2). It tells us that a certain rabbinical student used to
sleep in one bed[14] with his
wife after her seven days of niddah were over until she counted the “seven
clean days” and went to the mikva. The implication seems to be that after the
Biblical period of seven days the prohibition is only Rabbinical.[15]
The Rishonim are quite surprised at this as there is absolutely no relaxation[16]
of the prohibition for a woman who is niddah after the seven days are over as
she remains biblically prohibited to her husband until she immerses in the
mikva. Some Rishonim therefore suppose that the minhag at that time was for a
woman to go to the mikva twice, once in the end of the seven days of niddah and
one at the end of “seven clean days”. However according to what we wrote it is
possible that this student thought that the entire immersion in the mikva is
also rabbinical in nature and therefore was more lenient once the Biblical
seven days were over.[17]
* * *
I sent this post to Marc Shapiro
and here are his comments:
See Shem Tov’s
commentary on Maimonides, Guide 3:47, where he has a radical view that
according to Maimonides immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic. R. Kafih, in
his commentary on the Guide, ibid., is outraged by Shem Tov’s comment:
ראה
שם טוב ששאל “ומה יאמר הרב בטבילת זבה ונדה במים קרים בסתיו”, והמשיך
בדברי הבל שאסור לשמען שכאלו דעת רבנו שטבילת נדה וזבה מדרבנן. וחלילה חלילה.
R. Kafih continues by explaining why Shem Tov is
mistaken and concludes:
והארכתי מפני שכבר הטעה את קלי
הדעת
In his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, Sefer
Kedushah, vol. 1, p. 184, R. Kafih returns to this matter:
והבל
יפצה פיהו של בעל שם טוב מפרש המורה, בח”ג פרק מז שכאלו סובר רבנו שטבילת נדה
דרבנן, וענה גם כאן שקר ברבנו ותלה בו מה שלא אמר ולא עלתה על לבו חלילה
The matter you discuss in your post also concerned
R. Solomon Zvi Schueck. In his Torah Shelemah, vol. 2, p. 129b, he
prefaces his discussion as follows:
ורבים
מגדולי הראשונים והאחרונים (עיי’ תורה תמימה במקומו) עמדו להקשות וכי עיקר גדול
כטבילת נדה שקדושת ישראל תלוי בה לא תמצא בתורה רק ברמז דק וקל. ועוד מקשים, כפי
משמעות הגמרא בשבת הנ”ל דרשו זקנים הראשונים מן והדוה בנדתה רק שלא תכחול ולא
תתקשט הנדה בימי נדותה, אכן לא שנלמוד טבילת נדה במי מקוה, עד שבא רע”ק ולימד
בנדתה תהא עד שתבא במים, וכי עד רבי עקיבה לא טבלו?
See R. Schueck’s extended discussion as it is
quite interesting, even though it is complete speculation.
You cite Halakhot Gedolot, Hilkhot Niddah,
no. 41 (p. 439 in the Machon Yerushalayim edition), that the law of immersion
for a niddah is rabbinic:
זב וזבה טבילתן מדאוריתא, נדה
מדרבנן היא
This is a well-known passage that has been
discussed. Let me just make three comments.
1. See Teshuvot u-Fesakim me’et Hakhmei
Ashkenaz ve-Tzarfat, ed. Kupfer (Jerusalem, 1973), no. 158, p. 246 which
states:
ובהלכות גדולות פוסק טבילת
נידה דרבנן ושרא להו מרייהו
2. R. David Zvi Rotstein points out that the
Karaites were very stringent regarding niddah, and therefore it is possible
that the Behag’s comment, that the law of immersion for a niddah is only
rabbinic, does not reflect is true viewpoint but was only directed against the
Karaites. See Ohel Sarah Leah (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 638 in the note. As
far as I am concerned, this makes absolutely no sense. If something is a
rabbinic prohibition, and the Karaites were arguing that it is unnecessary,
then I can understand a rabbinic figure (falsely) stating that the matter in
question is a Torah law, in order to shore up observance. (I discuss this in my
new book.) But what sense does it make to do this in the reverse, i.e.,
declaring that something is only rabbinic because the Karaites took it as a
Torah law?
3. This view of Halakhot Gedolot is
mentioned in Besamim Rosh, no. 175. Here it is attributed to R. Yehudai
Gaon. As Saul Berlin explains in Kasa de-Harsana, some rishonim assumed
that R. Yehudai authored Halakhot Gedolot.
The case in Besamim Rosh deals with a man who
would publicly hug and kiss his wife even though she was a niddah. The rabbi
who wrote to “R. Asher” did not place the man in herem, and one of his reasons
was that the law of immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic, and therefore since
the man was not violating a Torah prohibition “better an unwitting sinner than
a willful sinner.” “R. Asher” rejects this position and thus on the surface
this responsum might appear quite pious. But as with a number of other responsa
in Besamim Rosh, what the forger Saul Berlin has done is put the radical
view in the public eye, even if in the end “R. Asher” rejects it. From this
responsum people will see that there is an argument to be made for not being
strict with the laws of niddah, since after all, they are only rabbinic. In his
reply “R. Asher” also mentions that many am ha’aratzim are more stringent when
it comes to the laws of niddah than the scholars. I see this too as an attempt
by Berlin to subvert traditional Judaism by making it seem as if the common
practices regarding the laws of niddah are based on ignorance.
[1]
Usually what is taken by Hazal as immersion in the mikva is a statement: “and
he/she shall wash his/her flesh in water”. No such statement is given in
regards to niddah or zava’s purification.
[2]
Based on the word “niddah” implying excommunication of sorts.
[3]
It has been noted by Yerushalmi (end of Gitin) that R. Akiva may be
following his general shita that a man can very easily divorce his wife if he
finds someone “better”.
[4]
In addition, there is a question as to whether this proof was even used before
R. Akiva came.
[5]
A similar proof is also brought in Yoma 78a based on a posuk in Nach
(Zecharia 13:1) and similar arguments against this proof can be used.
[6]
See for instance Targum Onkelos and Rashbam on this verse, see also Or Zarua
359.
[7]
Ma’akhalot Assurot, 17:5, see Magid Mishna, Hilchot Yom Tov 4:18,
see also Ramban, Avoda Zara 75b s.v. Gemora.
[8]
In some versions they are quoting Bahag (Hilchot Gedolot) but in our
versions this does not appear. Others quote this argument in the name of R. Hai
Gaon (see Semag, negative commandment 111).
[9]
See Tosafot, Hagigah 11a s.v. lo nitzrecha. We do find many other
laws of niddah that apply only for purity purposes but not applicable regarding
permitting her to her husband (see Tosafot ibid, see also GR”A, Yoreh Deah
196:31). In addition, sometimes the impurity of a person can go away
automatically without immersion. For example a woman who gave birth within her
“yemey tahara days” spreads some level of impurity on what she touches
but later she automatically becomes pure without additional immersions (Niddah
71b).
[10]
There are many differences between male zav and female zava but Ramban seems to
understand that since the passage of zava follows that of zav, the laws must be
similar.
[11]
According to many opinions even regular water drawn by people on Biblical level
can be used for niddah (see Tosafot, Bava Batra 66b s.v. yehe).
[12]
Rambam uses the verse (Vayikra 15:18) that after relations both the man and the
woman need to “wash themselves” (meaning immerse) and be unclean until the
evening. This particular Binyan Av is not found in our sources in Hazal but the
Magid Mishna (ibid) implies it was in some version of Sifra.
[13]
The very fact that each opinion rejects that of others seems to imply that
there was no clear proof that immersion of niddah is a Biblical command. In
fact Bahag (siman 41, p. 439 in the Machon Yerushalayim edition) seems to
consider niddah immersion as Rabbinical in origin but immersion of zava as Biblical. However, Or Zarua 359 says there is a
mistake in that version of Bahag.
[14]
There are other versions of the same story where he even slept naked next to
his wife after the seven days of niddah were over.
[15]
Ramban (ibid) however also brings a different interpretation.
[16]
However see Rama, Yoreh Deah 195:14.
[17]
Ramban and Rashba (ibid) specifically write that it’s impossible that this
student did not know that a niddah had to immerse. However, according to what
we wrote it is possible that the student thought that this immersion is a
Rabbinical command and that the drasha of R. Akiva is an asmachta (similarly to
the shita that holds that the immersion of vessels is only Rabbinical in
origin). 


How many children did Michal have? Explanation of a Talmudic passage in light of the writings of Josephus Flavius

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How many children did Michal have? Explanation of a Talmudic passage in light of the writings of Josephus Flavius[1]
 By Chaim Sunitsky
The following Talmudic passage appears in Sanhedrin 19b (we are using mostly Soncino translation):
R. Yossi was asked by his disciples: How could David marry two sisters while they were both living? He answered: He married Michal after the death of Meirav. R. Yehoshua ben Korha said: His marriage to Meirav was contracted in error, as it is said, Deliver me my wife Michal whom I betrothed unto me for a hundred foreskins of the Philistines. How does this prove it? — R. Papa answered: Because he said, My wife Michal but not ‘my wife Meirav’. Now, what was the error in his marriage [with Meirav]? [It was this:] It is written, And it shall be that the man who kills [Goliath], the king will enrich him with great riches and will give him his daughter. Now he [David] went and slew him, whereupon Shaul said to him: I owe you a debt, and if one betroths a woman by a debt, she is not betrothed. Accordingly he gave her to Adriel, as it is written, But it came to pass at the time when Meirav, Shaul’s daughter should have been given to David, that she was given to Adriel the Meholatite to wife. Then Shaul said to David, ‘If you still wish me to give you Michal to wife, go and bring me hundred foreskins of the Philistines.’ He went and brought them to him. Then he said: ‘You now have two claims on me, [the repayment of] a loan and a perutah’. Now, Shaul held
that when a loan and a perutah are offered [as kidushin], he [the would-be husband] thinks mainly of the loan; but in David’s view, when there is a loan and a perutah, the mind is set on the perutah. Or if you like, I will say, all agree that where a loan and a perutah [are offered], the mind is set on the perutah. Shaul, however, thought that [the hundred foreskins] had no value, while David held that they had value at least as food for dogs and cats. How does R. Yossi interpret the verse, Deliver me my wife Michal? He explains it by
another view of his. For it has been taught: R. Yossi used to interpret the following confused passage thus: It is written, But the king took the two sons of Rizpah the daughter of Ayah whom she bore to Shaul, Armoni and Mephiboshet, and the five sons of Michal, the daughter of Shaul, whom she bore to Adriel the son of Barzillai, the Meholatite etc. But was Michal really given to Adriel; was she not given to Palti the son of Layish, as it is written, Now Shaul had given Michal, David’s wife, to Palti the son of Layish . . .? But Scripture compares the marriage of Meirav to Adriel to that of Michal to Palti, to teach that just as the marriage of Michal to Palti was unlawful, so was that of Meirav to Adriel. Now as to R. Yehoshua ben Korha, surely it is written, And the five sons of Michal the daughter of Shaul whom she bore to Adriel. R. Yehoshua [b. Korha] answers thee: Was it then Michal who bore them? Surely it was rather Meirav who bore them! But Meirav bore and Michal brought them up, therefore they were called by her name. This teaches you that whoever brings up an orphan in his home, Scripture ascribes it to him as though he had begotten him.
The accepted understanding of this passage is that according to Rabbi Yossi David married Michal only after her sister had five children from Adriel and died. Michal later brought up the five children as her own. The commentators[2] ask how Meirav could possibly have five children within just two and a half years of Shaul’s reign and answer that she was pregnant with twins twice, and once with the fifth child.  However, according to the calculation of all the events that had to occur before David married Michal and after he ran away from Shaul, there is not enough time left for three pregnancies of Meirav[3]. We need to look for a simpler understanding of the Talmud.
The difficulty of the Gemara is with the following verse from the end of David’s life (Shmuel 2:21:8): “And the king [David] took two sons of Rizpah daughter of Ayah whom she bore to Shaul, Armoni and Mephiboshet, and the five sons of Michal, the daughter of Shaul, whom she bore to Adriel the son of Barzillai, the Meholatite …” Five children of Michal and Adriel are mentioned in this verse. All the commentators follow the explanation of our Gemara that the children were born to Meirav and Michal only raised them. But a careful reading seems to reveal that R. Yossi is not the one who holds that the five children were Meirav’s. This explanation is provided by the Gemara later according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha. If so, R. Yossi must hold that indeed Michal was the one to have the five children. Since David only took her back seven years after he became king, there was plenty of time for her to give birth to five children. But Michal was never married to Adriel, she was “married” to Palti. It’s important to understand what Rabbi Yossi is implying by his words “confused passage” (מקראות מעורבין literally mixed up verses). Apparently he means that while Michal married Palti, the verse is using the expression “married to Adriel” to teach us that the marriage of Michal to Palti was just as sinful as the marriage of Meirav to Adriel. Both marriages were based on an incorrect decision of Shaul and his Bet Din. David’s Kidushin with Meirav was declared invalid and his later Kidushin with Michal was declared invalid again[4]. Indeed Josephus Flavius (Antiquities 7:4:3) says that Michal had five children from Palti.
Now we can offer a simple understanding of the entire Talmudic passage. The students asked R. Yossi, how could David marry two sisters? They are obviously assuming that some form of Kidushin was involved when Shaul offered his (presumably older[5]) daughter to the one who kills Goliath[6]. If David was technically married to Meirav he could not marry Michal even if Meirav was incorrectly given to a different man. R. Yossi answered that Meirav died before David married Michal. R. Yehoshua ben Karcha however holds that there was no kosher Kidushin between David and Meirav. He learns it from the words in a verse: “my wife Michal”, meaning only Michal is my wife, Meirav is not. The Gemara goes into the technical explanation of why Michal’s Kidushin was valid and not Meirav’s according to R. Yehoshua ben Karcha. R. Yossi however only learns from this verse that Michal was David’s wife meaning her Kidushin was valid just as Meirav’s, and giving her to Palti was incorrect. He learns that the verse (Shmuel 2:21:8) describing David’s giving five children of Michal and Adriel to Givonim[7] were really Michal’s children from Palti and is using the expression “mixed up verses” to teach us that Michal’s Kidushin with David was valid just like Meirav’s was.[8] R. Yehoshua ben Karcha however says the verse in Shmuel 2:21:8 is not talking about Michal’s children but about Meirav’s children whom Michal raised. The Gemara goes on to give other examples where children raised by someone are considered like one’s own children.

 

[1] Note that this article does not claim to research the words of Tanach but only the Chazal’s explanation of it. In particular we are trying to offer a novel explanation of R. Yossi’s shita in the Gemara. We will use a novel idea supported by Yosef ben Matityahu. While he was a controversial person at best, he had excellent Jewish education and his traditions are largely reliable and generally represent the opinions of Tanaim of his time. He is quoted numerous times in Daat Sofrim and other traditional commentaries.
[2] Yad Ramah, Tosafot Harosh.
[3] See Margoilyot Hayam. He therefore concludes that we must accept the shitah of Rabeinu Yeshaya on Shmuel (1:13:1) that the two and a half years that Shaul had ruled are only considered until the time David was anointed. However this shitah is in contradiction with Seder Olam which is a product of Rabbi Yossi himself. In the commentary of Gaonim on Sanhedrin another possibility is offered that Shaul himself did not realize that Meirav had been married to Adriel when he offeredher to David. Incidentally modern scholarship supposes that Shaul ruled over Israel for more than two years and possibly the word “thirty” is missing in Masoretic text before the word “two” in Shmuel 1:13:1: “[thirty] two years he ruled in over Israel.” Abarbanel has a different explanation of our text according to which Shaul also ruled longer.
[4] It is also possible (though this is not R. Yossi’s shita) that Palti was the same person as Adriel and Shaul first gave Meirav to Adriel and later when she died soon after this marriage and David was running away from Shaul and was considered a rebel, Meirav’s sister Michal was given to Adriel who was now called Palti.
[5] See Tosafot Kidushin 52b.
[6] As to the nature of this Kidushin, we do find some cases where “work” performed is counted as Kidushin as well as saving from danger (see Kidushin 8b, in particular “saving from a dog” in 30:11). Apparently both R. Yossi and his students don’t question that some kind of Kidushin happened here, and if Meirav was no longer minor it must be that she either agreed on Shaul’s proposal or made Shaul her shliach to accept such a Kidushin as saving from a “dog” (incidentally Goliath is in fact compared to a dog, see Sota 42b).
[7] Note that according to David these children were mamzerim.
[8] As mentioned previously neither R. Yossi nor his students had any doubt that Meirav’s Kidushin was valid. Therefore the verse used that Kidushin to compare to Kidushin of Michal and emphasize that giving Michal to Palti was just as sinful as giving Meirav to Adriel. The verse therefore means: “And the king took two sons of Rizpah daughter of Ayah whom she bore to Shaul, Armoni and Mephiboshet, and the five sons of Michal, the daughter of Shaul, whom she bore to [Palti to whom she was given incorrectly just like Meirav was given to] Adriel the son of Barzillai, the Meholatite”. This may be similar to Chazal’s explanation of Zecharia 12:11: “On that day the mourning will be as great in Yerushalaim as the mourning of Hadadrimon in the valley of Megiddo”. There is no known tragic incident in our history that is related to Hadadrimon and the valley of Megiddo. The Talmud (Megilah 3a) quotes the Targum adding a number of words and relating this verse to two different events: “On that day the mourning will be as great in Yerushalaim as the mourning of [Ahab who was killed by] Hadadrimon [and the mourning of Yeshayahu who was killed] in the valley of Megiddo.