The Illusory Portrait of R. Yom Tov Lipmann Heller: Deceptive Art and Jewish Images in Vienna

The Illusory Portrait of R. Yom Tov Lipmann Heller: Deceptive Art and Jewish Images in Vienna

By: Dan Rabinowitz

For if I am deceived, I am.
for he who is not, cannot be deceived;
and if I am deceived,
by this same token I am.

Wolfgang Kemp after St Augustine of Hippo
(Epigraph to Rembrandt Hoogstraten: Colour and Illusion)

On October 8, 2024, Vienna’s Museum of Fine Arts, the Kunsthistorisches Museum, opened the exhibit “Rembrandt – Hoogstraten Colour and Illusion.” The museum’s permanent collection features remarkable works by Rembrandt, including a self-portrait and a now-confirmed portrait of his son, Titus van Rijn. This exhibit showcased many more items from its collection and loans from other museums. The term “illusion” in the exhibition’s title primarily refers to Samuel van Hoogstraten, a student of Rembrandt, and his exceptional use of the trompe-l’oeil technique. Trompe-l’oeil, from French, “fools the eye,” is an art that typically uses architectural elements, light, and perspective to trick the viewer into seeing a three-dimensional image, even when rendered on a single plane. Hoogstraten was one of the most skilled practitioners of this technique. It remains among the canonical approaches to art. Most recently, the Metropolitan Museum of Art recently held an exhibition, “Cubism and the Trompe-l’oeil Tradition,” featuring works by Picasso and his contemporaries.

In the lead-up to the Vienna museum’s exhibit, the city’s Morris columns were adorned with posters, and large billboards were scattered throughout the city announcing the exhibit. There were three variations of these advertisements: one featuring a Rembrandt self-portrait and two “illusory” portraits, Rembrandt’s “Girl in the Window” and Hoogstraten’s “Old Man at a Window.” In Rembrandt’s painting, the girl gazes directly at the viewer, gripping the exterior window frame, with her fingers extending beyond it. Combined with Rembrandt’s unparalleled usage of light and color, the image is unsettlingly realistic, even when reproduced in books.

Hoogstraten’s painting, “Old Man at a Window,” depicts an old, wizened, bearded man, crowned with a round fur hat, seemingly poking his head out of the window like a gargoyle protruding from the building. While the exhibit’s advertisements are silent about the man’s identity, many Orthodox Jews might recognize him as R. Yom Tov Lipman Heller, the author of, among other works, the Tosefos Yom Tov commentary on the Mishna. Heller is associated with Vienna, having served as its Chief Rabbi in the early 17th century; however, art historians and Jewish scholars have conclusively shown the impossibility of this being an authentic representation of Heller. Nonetheless, much like the trompe l’oeil technique, the Old Man at a Window continues to deceive, and many still believe it is Heller.

Figure 1 Samuel Von Hoogstraten, Old Man at a Window, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna

Rabbi Heller’s Chronicle of Imprisonment & Redemption

Rabbi Yom Tov Lipman Heller was born in 1578 in Wallerstein, a small village in Southern Germany, home to around twenty Jewish families (Davis 21). As a teenager, he married into a prominent family in Prague. His perspicacity and deep knowledge were quickly recognized, and at 19, he was appointed to serve on the Prague Beis Din, overseeing the largest Jewish community in Christian Europe (Davis 25-33). A year later, he published his first book, a somewhat unusual choice for a traditional rabbinic scholar, a commentary on the philosophical work Behinas Olam. He subsequently authored dozens of books across varied genres, completing his magnum opus, Tosefos Yom Tov in Heshvan 1616 (Davis 225-231). His identity quickly became bound up with this work, and even on the epitaph of his daughters’ headstone from 1639, he is referred to by the book and not his given name (Muneles 321). (The book’s original title is Tosefes Yom Tov, and later Tosefos Yom Tov. While some posit that this change was first documented in 1653, it already appears on the epitaph. (cf. Haberman 125n1)). He also “left ample records of himself… books, letters, archival documents, responsa, poems, prayers, sermons, commentaries, and even a memoir” (Davis 1). Nevertheless, there are no surviving portraits or other images.

Rabbi Heller spent time in Vienna on two occasions. The first, in 1625, he was induced to leave Prague for Vienna’s chief rabbi position. Despite his short tenure of only two years, he scored a significant victory for the Viennese Jewish community. Until then, it was dispersed throughout the city, and Heller secured the right for the community to reside in a single area and strengthen its ties. That cohesion was shattered in 1670 when Emperor Leopold I expelled them (one of the many expulsions Viennese Jews suffered), and the area was renamed after its extirpator, Leopoldstadt. Prague, however, drew him back, and in 1627, he took on the role of chief rabbi there.

Just two years later, some of the city’s Jewish community bristled at his involvement in tax collection, accusing him of determining tax rates unfairly. In June 1629, they denounced him to the government, which resulted in his arrest and summons to Vienna. He recounts the events in his autobiographical work, Megilas Eivah—an allusion to the first letters of the first four words of Megilas Eicha, written between 1644 and 1648. Initially placed under house arrest, he was imprisoned on the 17th of Tammuz and confined in a common jail with prisoners awaiting execution. He was denied visitors and remained isolated, “no one could speak with him, even via the window.” Two days later, following appeals from the Jewish community, he was transferred to a special prison and granted visitation rights. After forty days, the community agreed to pay a substantial fine, and he was released, almost immediately departing for Prague, never to return to Vienna. By 1643, he arrived in Krakow, where he served as chief Rabbi until his death in 1654. 

Megilas Eivah circulated in various manuscripts but was published only in 1836 (Davis 228 n31). While its authenticity is beyond doubt, the additional section that first appeared in the Hebrew 1880 edition is considered a forgery. Allegedly written by Heller’s son Samuel, it “has a quality reminiscent of Dumas and The Three Musketeers: [Heller] saves a young woman from a bull, and her husband, the French ambassador, intercedes on behalf of Rabbi Yom-Tov.” In 1905, “Moritz Steinschneider identified the source as based on a short story written by Ludwig Philippson (1811‒89), a rabbi and journalist, and the author of a series of Jewish historical novelettes and stories for young readers” (Davis 146 n36).

Samuel van Hoogstraten, Master of Illusion

Samuel van Hoogstraten was born in Dordrecht, one of the oldest cities in the Netherlands, on August 2, 1627. He was the eldest child of the artist Dirk van Hoogstraten and Maeiken de Coninck. Samuel started his art studies with his father, continuing until his father passed away in 1640. Around 1642, Samuel moved to Amsterdam and began studying under Rembrandt. He rapidly proved himself to be a standout student, leading classes, reviewing his classmates’ work, and so effectively absorbing his teachers’ lessons, that some of his works were mistakenly attributed to Rembrandt (Brusati 16-31). As part of the preparation for the current exhibit, “Young Woman at an Open Half-Door” (1645) has been reassigned to Hoogstraten (Illes; Van Sloten 125).

In 1651, Samuel traveled to Vienna, the epicenter of power and prestige within the Hapsburg Empire, seeking to enhance his reputation and standing among elite society. He succeeded almost immediately. Samuel’s student, Arnold Houbraken, recounted how, on August 6, 1651, Samuel presented three of his paintings to the emperor. The first two were well received, but “the third piece,” in the trompe l’oeil style, was a still life that captivated the Emperor, who appeared to be completely taken by it. He looked at it for a long time and, finding himself still deceived, said, ‘This is the first painter who has deceived me.’ And he went on to say that he would not get the picture back as a punishment for that deception, for the Emperor wished to keep it forever.” (Houbraken 2:157-58). However, Samuel did not leave empty-handed. The Emperor awarded him an imperial medallion and a gold chain, which he took immense pride in; this would become a standard element in his subsequent self-portraits and among the items he viewed as symbolic of successful artists (Hoogstraten 371-72; Brusati 54).

Hoogstraten broadly characterized art as a form of deception. In his magnum opus on the theory of painting and color, Inleyding tot de hooge schoole der schilderkonst: anders de zichtbaere werelt (Introduction to the Academy of Painting; or, The Visible World), he describes what he considers the “perfect painting.” It “is like a mirror of nature; it makes things that are not there appear to exist and deceives in a permissible, pleasurable, and praiseworthy way” (Hoogstraten 79). One way to achieve this effect is by combining architectural elements such as open doors or windows and adding “some figures” to the composition, “by which many have been artfully deceived” (Hoogstraten 304). He takes pride in having accomplished this with his paintings completed in Vienna. One is “Old Man at a Window,” painted in 1653. (Brusati 65).

The Religious Conversion and Reversion of the Old Man at a Window 

The earliest catalogs describing the painting Old Man at a Window do not mention the man’s religious affiliation. It was not until the 19th century that two scholars suggested a Jewish connection, and even then, there was no mention of Heller. Nonetheless, this association never gained traction, and the painting continued to be described without any reference to Jews. We must wait until the 1950s for Heller’s connection to emerge. However, that link lacked any supporting evidence, leaving us in the dark about what prompted the change from an Old Man to Heller. Even that association was quickly dismissed due to the significant gap between when Heller was imprisoned and when Hoogstraten painted Old Man at a Window.

The 1653 painting is one of the first works by Hoogstraten that Emperor Charles II acquired for his castle in Prague, possibly commissioned specifically for him. The painting is described in detail in an early catalog:

No. 4. By Samuel van Hoogstraten. A lifelike, grey-bearded old man looks out of a window. His fur hat, the furrows on his face from his age, and his grey beard are so well painted that one believes one can see nature itself in each one. Hoogstraten, who did not only paint as a mere colorist, showed his deep insight into the subject and reflected light in the chiaroscuro and the deep and penetrating shadows. Just look at the head . . ., and you will find that in it, the master’s hand, which . . . expresses itself quite magnificently. The lead on the round window pane, the wooden frame, that is the glass frame, is also very well painted, but the window’s stone frame makes you believe entirely that it is the work of a mason, almost as if you can see the mason’s hand on it. The straw stalk lying on the window stone, the feather, and the bottle standing there are no less well-painted and serve to prove the excellence of the whole. This picture is painted on canvas, 3 feet 6 inches high, 2 feet and 9 inches wide. The head is life-size. The artist has engraved his monogram and the year 1653 on the window stone of this painting” (Rigler 163-164).

During the 17th century, two inventories were created for the collection. In both, the painting is described as “a man sticking his head out of the window through the shutter,” without any reference to the man’s religious affiliation or any connection to Rabbi Heller (Köpl clvnn330; Brusati 361n76). Hoogstraten’s Old Man at a Window was relocated to Vienna after the Habsburgs acquired the Belvedere Palace in the 1730s. The Palace is perhaps best known today for Gustav Klimt’s “The Kiss” and other notable Viennese Expressionists. In one of the earliest catalogs of the Belvedere by Christian van Mechel from 1783, the subject is referred to simply as a “grey-bearded man with a round fur hat on his head, looking out curiously from a window” (Mechel 84n4). That is how the description remained, unadorned with any religious identity until the 19th century.

In the 19th century, two descriptions of the Old Man at a Window added his religion: he was a Jew. In 1839, German art historian Georg Rathgeber, in his study of Netherlandish art, asserts that “this picture’s title is “Böhmischen Juden,” “Bohemian Jew.’” Rathgeber disputes the identification not for its lack of historicity but because “the character of the facial features does not seem to correspond very well to” his antisemitic views on Jewish physiognomy (Rathgeber 147). Similarly, in 1861, French art critic Charles Blanc, in his encyclopedic work Histoire des Peintres de Toutes les Écoles, asserts that the Belvedere catalog now refers to the painting as “Un vieux juif (dit le Catalogue)” or “an old Jew (as it appears in the Catalog)” (Blanc 4). This portrait impressed Blanc and is among the few he reproduced in his discussion of Hoogstraten (Blanc 1). However, Blanc is notorious for identifying Jews in Rembrandt’s and his school’s works without any supporting evidence (Knotter and Schwartz 7-9). Contrary to the “catalog’s identification,” Blanc, like Rathgeber, asserts that the face “is not Israelite” (Blanc 2). Neither Blanc nor Rathgeber mentions Rabbi Heller.

 

Figure 2 Charles Blanc, Histoire des Peintres de Toutes les Écoles

Blanc’s and Rathgeber’s Jewish association did not take hold. For example, G.H. Veth, in his 1889 article discussing artists from Dordrecht, including Hoogstraten, cites Blanc and notes his reproduction of Old Man. However, Veth describes it without mentioning any Jewish connections (Veth 145). Similarly, a 1903 tour guidebook of Vienna confirms that at the Belvedere, the painting’s title remains unchanged as “Old Man at a Window” (Baedeker 73; cf. Gerson, 282).

Despite the absence of objective evidence and the dismissal of Blanc’s and Rathgeber’s 19th-century Semitic connection, one scholar in the 1950s cryptically associated Rabbi Heller with Hoogstraten’s painting. Margarethe Poch-Kalous, the head of the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna (Akademie der bildenden Künste in Wien), in her 1959 survey of Dutch art in Vienna, refers to the figure as “ein bärtiger alter Mann (Rabbi Heller),” “a bearded old man (Rabbi Heller)” (Poch-Kalous 198). The basis for her identification is opaque. Poch-Kalous’ two citations offer no support; neither mentions Heller nor suggests that the figure is even Jewish, nor does she reference Blanc or Rathgeber (Poch-Kalous 198 citing Engerth 207n928 and Köpl clvnn330).

Oddly, unlike other personalities, artists, and subjects discussed in her article, which consistently include personal names and birth and death dates, Poch-Kalous provides nothing beyond “Rabbi Heller.” This is especially puzzling for an article in the Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorische Sammlungen, whose readership is unlikely to be sufficiently familiar with the history of 17th-century Bohemian rabbis to provide the missing details.

Whatever the basis for Poch-Kalous’s connection between Hoogstraten’s painting and Heller, it was swiftly dismissed. In 1972, Klaus Demus, the art historian and curator at the Kunsthistorisches Museum, demonstrated that it was impossible for Heller to be the model. He explains that Heller was imprisoned in 1629, and by 1644, he was serving as a rabbi in Krakow, where he remained until his death in 1654. Hoogstraten, who was only two years old when Heller was imprisoned in Vienna, painted Old Man at a Window in 1653, long after Heller had left Vienna (Demus 47-48). Today, the Kunsthistorisches Museum’s website alludes to Poch-Kalous’ attribution and rejection: “According to a tradition that is now presumed to be mistaken, the man is Rabbi Yom Tov Lipmann Heller.” Hoogstraten’s “deception” and “illusion” did not extend to rendering persons he never saw.

Illustrious Jews and Illusionary Jewish Sources

Jewish sources similarly are not more persuasive in linking Heller to Hoogstraten’s painting. Generally, rabbinic portraits prior to the 19th century lack authenticity (Cohen), and Heller is no exception. Most of the few early verifiable images exist as frontispieces in books rather than as paintings, and none depict Eastern European rabbis. Heller’s image first appears in Jewish sources in the early twentieth century. It depicts an old man, yet he is completely different from Hoogstraten’s version. The first instance of Heller masquerading as the Old Man at a Window is over a decade after Demus debunks that theory!

Figure 3 Bader, Drasig Doyres, 175

The first Jewish source of an alleged portrait of Rabbi Heller appears in a Yiddish collection of stories and hagiographies of rabbis in Gerson Bader’s Drasig Doyres Yiden in Poylen, published in 1927 (Bader 175). Bader’s depiction of Rabbi Heller does not resemble the individual shown in Hoogstraten. Bader claims that his source is an “old drawing,” yet he does not provide any further details, such as where or when it was published.

Bader’s book features other alleged rabbinic images from “old drawings” that are demonstratably false. For example, Bader’s portrait of R. Aaron Shmuel Kaidanover, author of the Birkas ha-Zevach on Kodshim, is of the Karaite and forger Avraham Firkovich (1787-1875) (Bader 185). It is undoubtedly Firkovich, as it appears in his Avnei Zikaron, published in 1872, during his lifetime. Similarly, Bader misattributes Joseph Delmedigo’s (1591-1655) portrait from the frontispiece of his Sefer Elim (Amsterdam, 1629), and the photo of R. Shmuel Salant by Zadok Bassan, assigning them to alternative rabbinic figures (Bader 204, 321). Nonetheless, Bader’s depiction of Heller was often reproduced, to the extent that in a 2000 biography of Heller, it is referred to as “iyur amimi nafuts shel ha-Tosefos Yom Tov,” “the widespread folk image of the Tosefos Yom Tov” (Herskovics 32).

Figure 4 Bader, Drasig Doyres Yiden in Poylen, 175.

Figure 5 Firkovich, Avnei Zikhron, From the Gross Family Collection, The Center for Jewish Art

It was only in 1984 that a Jewish source connected the Hoogstraten painting to Rabbi Heller. The cover of the book The Feast and the Fast: The Dramatic Personal Story of Yom Tov Lipman Heller, a translation of Megilas Eivah, depicts Rabbi Heller in prison and is modeled on the figure in the Hoogstraten painting. To eliminate any doubt about the source of the cover art, the back of the book features reproductions of title pages from Heller’s works and his gravestone, along with a photo “of the drawing in the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna, Austria, entitled ‘Man at the Window’ (1653) by Samuel Van Hoogstraten (1627-1678)” (Lipschitz and Rosenstein). A similar image was used for the cover illustration of another translation of Megilas Eivah published in 1991 (Heller). The English section of the 2000 biography of Heller reproduces the cover of The Feast and the Fast, describing it as “featuring a picture of the Tosefot Yom Tov” (Herskovics 101). However, it does not attempt to reconcile this image with the clearly different “widespread folk image” presented in the Hebrew section of the biography. Although not mentioned in any of these sources, they were presumably misled by the bars on the window. However, those are not prison bars; rather, as was common in that era, the windows were supported by these architectural elements (Hermans 249).

Figure 6 Cover, Feast and the Fast, 1984

By 1999, however, Jewish sources also recognized the impossibility of associating Heller with the painting. R Ya’akov Yeruchum Wreschner republished Megilas Eivah based on four editions and two manuscripts and includes a comprehensive introduction regarding Heller. In two footnotes within the introduction, Wreschner briefly addresses Heller’s connection, or lack thereof, to Old Man at a Window. Like Demas, Wreschner contends that the nearly twenty-five-year gap between Heller’s departure from Vienna and Hoogstraten’s painting of Old Man renders it impossible for Heller to have been the model. Wreschner asks rhetorically, how could Hoogstraten “paint Rabbenu [Heller] when he never set eyes on him?” (Wreschner Megilas 48n3). Wreschner also contacted the Kunsthistorisches Museum and received a response confirming that “not only is it not the Rabbi, but it is not even a Jew” (Wreschner Megilas 17n4). As a result, Wreschner refused to reproduce that portrait in his book. Similarly, despite being titled Portrait of a Seventeenth-Century Rabbi, the most recent academic biography of Heller by Joseph Davis includes neither the Hoogstraten portrait nor any other image of Heller (Davis).

In 2024, Wreschner published a significantly revised and retitled edition of his book. Despite discrediting Heller’s connection to the painting over twenty years ago, various Jewish books, newspapers, and other ephemera continue to publish Old Man at a Window and link it to Heller (e.g., Alfasi 137; Stern 184-86; Berman). Wreschner was, therefore, compelled to revisit the painting, presenting additional arguments and greater detail regarding his discussions with the Kunsthistorisches Museum.

Wreschner, in 1999, first spoke telephonically with the Director of the Kunsthistorisches Museum, Dr. Karl Schütz, who confirmed that the painting was not connected to Heller. Schütz followed up with a letter detailing the sources for his rejection. Schütz stated that, with one exception, from the earliest catalogs to contemporary analyses of the painting, it was never associated with any specific individual, Jewish or otherwise. This is consistent with Hoogstraten’s intent, showcasing the trompe l’oeil technique rather than portraiture. The only time it appears – in Demus’s “detailed catalog of Dutch painters from 1972”—is solely to repudiate Poch-Kalous’s chronologically impossible and otherwise undocumented connection to Heller. Schütz also discredited the claim that following the Anschluss, the painting was categorized as Jewish art and consigned to the museum’s basement. On the contrary, a coterminous catalog lists the painting among those on display.

Despite Wreschner’s certitude about Schütz’s rejection, for unclear reasons, Wreschner attributes an otherwise unrecorded episode to Schütz. This alleged event appears to offer some support for linking Heller to the painting, but it is completely absent from the letter. According to Wreschner, the letter references an event in 1972 when an unidentified Jew approached the museum and claimed there was “a tradition that it was Tosefos Yom Tov” (Wreschner 2024, 24-26). The museum expressed skepticism about that tradition but did not completely dismiss it. In Wreschner’s retelling, it suggested the possibility that “a Jew conjured up Heller’s image and Hoogstraten copied it.” The actual text of the letter directly contradicts Wreschner’s account. Schütz references 1972 not as the date of an important meeting that supports the “legend” but as the first substantial discussion – by Demus – and his definitive rebuttal without mentioning a meeting with the Jew.

Beyond Schütz’s letter, Wreschner adds internal reasons why the painting cannot depict Heller in jail. The window is large enough for the man to stick his head out and features high-quality glass, an uncommon design for a prison. Furthermore, the expensive fur hat worn by the Man at a Window is an unlikely accessory in a prison housing hardened criminals sentenced to death and an incongruous headpiece for the July heat when Heller was imprisoned. Wreschner could have included another element in the painting that contrasts with a prison – the wall behind the Old Man has patterned wallpaper.

Following his earlier edition, Wreschner learned of an earlier source linking Heller to the painting, which is summarily dismissed. R. Shimon Fuerst, who lived in Vienna before 1940, in his book, Shem mi-Shimon, published in 1967, recalls visiting the museum where he saw firsthand “the painting made during the imprisonment” (Fuerst 426). Wreschner is unmoved by Fuerst’s identification. First, Fuerst was not an expert on Heller. Fuerst writes that Heller left Vienna to assume the Chief Rabbi position in Krakow, which is false. After his release, Heller returned to Prague, only leaving for Krakow fifteen years later. Aside from this obvious mistake, Fuerst’s opinion is irrelevant. Wreschner does not dispute Fuerst’s rabbinic bona fides, yet he is not an art historian. When faced with questions of rabbinic law, we defer to rabbis, but, according to Wreschner, “when it comes to questions of attribution of art, we look to experts in that field” (Wreschner 2024, 26). Regardless of the reliability of Fuerst’s claim, the mystery of Poche-Kalous’ source remains unsolved as her work predates Fuerst’s by four years.

Going Once, Twice, Three Times – Sold!

The identification of Heller with the Old Man at a Window is not the first, nor likely the last portrait erroneously attributed to a well-known Jew. One such example is the “traditional” portrait of the founder of the Hassidic movement, R Yisrael Ba’al Shem Tov. This portrait depicts a Ba’al Shem, a Wonderworker, but not Yisrael; rather, it is of Ya’akov Falk of London (Oron). He was an alchemist and an eccentric, and according to R Ya’akov Emden, a crypto-Sabbatian. However, evidence does not always prevail. Books and numerous sukkah decorations continue to utilize this portrait.

There is even another Hoogstraten portrait that falls into this category. A 1670 Hoogstraten portrait now in the Jewish Museum in New York was previously associated with Baruch (Bento, Benedictus) Spinoza. This is just one of many alleged portraits of Spinoza. Yet, most, if not all, lack independent verification or directly contradict the existing evidence (Ekkart). Indeed, “It is the same with the portraits as with so many other aspects of Spinoza’s life: little can be said with any certainty” (qtd. in Ekkart 25). This portrait was first linked to Spinoza in 1929, partly based on “a slip of paper on the back bearing the scholar’s name” (Ekkart 5). It is unclear who made that determination or even when the paper was inserted into the back of the painting. Consequently, the Jewish Museum now describes the painting as “Portrait of a Man (previously thought to be Baruch Spinoza).”

Similarly, despite art historians and Jewish sources resoundingly rejecting Heller’s connection to the Old Man at a Window, it seems unlikely that the idea of Hoogstraten depicting Heller will be dislodged in the collective Jewish consciousness. The attribution is so deeply ingrained that someone spent a staggering $120,000 before fees on a late 19th-century reproduction of Hoogstraten’s painting.

Figure 7 Lot 318, Kestenbaum Auctions, March 12, 2014

In 2014, the American Judaica auction house Kestenbaum & Company listed an 1887 painting described as “Yom Tov Lipman Heller, Portrait: Imprisoned in Vienna,” with a $12,000-$18,000 estimate. The portrait also served as the front cover image of the catalog. It is described as “the celebrated portrait of the Tosefos Yom Tov” and claims that Hoogstraten “painted Rabbi Heller in 1653 and entitled it ‘Old Man in the Window.’” The catalog warns that “it is not known if van Hoogstraten ever met or saw [Heller]; however, it is likely that he was aware of the Rembrandt (School) painting of 1643 entitled ‘Portrait of an Old Jew’ (today in the National Gallery of Denmark) – where a similar, bearded Jewish man, with head cocked, looks emotively at the viewer.” Scholars acknowledge that elements of Man at a Window and other Hoogstraten paintings evoke “the face studies of costumed figures routinely produced in Rembrandt’s studio,” but this does not transform the man into a Jew, let alone Rabbi Heller. The Jewish identification of the painting in the National Gallery of Denmark is also of questionable relevance. Some aspects of that painting, most notably the chain around the man’s neck, make it highly unlikely that it depicts a Jew (Alexander-Knotter 80-81). The catalog’s only citation for attributing the subject to Heller is the 1984 book, The Fast and the Feast, mentioned earlier. It does not reference Demus’ or Wreschner’s discussions that challenge that attribution. 

The significance assigned to the artistic rendition of the original is also debatable. The 1887 reproduction bears the signature of the artist “Paul Krüger.” However, Krüger was not a recognized artist; instead, it was a commercial reproduction company in Vienna that commonly attached its labels to the works. Its full name is “Paul Krüger Atelier für Porträtmalerei in Wien” (Paul Krüger Studio for Portrait Painting in Vienna). The studio functioned in the late 19th century and reproduced numerous paintings from the Kunsthistorisches Museum. Today, for those wanting to display a similar commercial reproduction of the painting on their wall, it is available through many websites that specialize in creating highly accurate copies of famous artworks. One such site offers a hand-painted version, almost the exact size of the original, with a similar frame, for about $1,400.

 

If the buyer had waited a year, they could have acquired an earlier reproduction by a recognized and significant artist. On May 18, 2015, Ferdinand Waldmüller’s (1793-1865) painting “Old Man at the Window,” modeled after Hoogstraten and executed in 1819, was auctioned with an estimate of €22,400 to €28,000. Unlike Krüger’s shop, which served as a commercial entity, Waldmüller is regarded as one of “the most important Austrian painters of the Biedermeier period.” Nevertheless, the lot remained unsold.

The Krüger copy may not be the best reproduction, but the auction catalog description proved worthwhile for reproduction. Rabbi Moshe Bamberger is the author of a series of books on “Great Jewish” items published by Artscroll. One book focuses on letters, another on important Jewish books, and another titled Great Jewish Treasures, is “A Collection of Precious Judaica, Associated with Torah Leaders.” This work contains a chapter dedicated to “Artwork” that discusses some well-known examples of rabbinic images. He ably covers several of these topics and discusses the traditional portrayal of Yisrael Ba’al Shem Tov, accurately aligning it with London’s Ba’al Shem, Jacob Falk.

Bamberger also includes a section focused on the “famous depiction of Rabbi Yom Tov Lipmann Heller (1579-1654) peering through the window of his prison cell” and reproduces a version of the Hoogstraten painting. Bamberger tries to reconcile the inconsistency between the dates of imprisonment and the time when Hoogstraten painted Old Man. Bamberger’s source is the auction catalog, yet he seems to disagree with one item: which of Rembrandt’s “Jews” Hoogstraten supposedly used as a model for Heller. Rather than the 1643 “Portrait of an Old Jew” attributed to Rembrandt’s school and currently housed in the National Gallery of Denmark; according to Bamberger, the model was the subject of a painting by Rembrandt, also titled “Portrait of an Old Jew,” now held in the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad. Bamberger does not provide a rationale for selecting the Hermitage painting over the one in the National Gallery. Nevertheless, the Hermitage painting is equally unlikely to depict a Jew and is now referred to generically as “Man in an Armchair.” (Schwartz 371-373). Ironically, Bamberger’s use of the Hermitage painting only reinforces the unlikelihood that Heller served as a model for Hoogstraten. The Hermitage Rembrandt originates from 1654, one year after “Old Man in a Window.” Hoogstraten certainly did not use a nonexistent painting to model his artistic expression.

Whether we will ever fully explicate to our satisfaction the enigmatic history of Hoogstraten’s 1653 painting Old Man at a Window, Hoogstraten’s masterful execution of the Trompe l’oeil technique makes the painting worth seeking out on its own. The exhibition closed in Vienna on January 12, 2025, but relocated to Rembrandt House in Amsterdam, “The Illusionist. Samuel van Hoogstraten,” from February 1 to May 4, 2025. The Amsterdam exhibition is entirely dedicated to Hoogstraten. To accompany the Vienna exhibit, the Kunsthistorisches Museum published a collection of articles titled Rembrandt Hoogstraten: Colour and Illusion, edited by Dr. Sabine Pénot, the Curator of Netherlandish and Dutch Paintings at the museum. This book is of excellent quality, beautifully reproducing many of the exhibit’s paintings and etchings. One article is a detailed study of Hoogstraten’s process and technique in Old Man at a Window (Hermens). While it employs various infrared and other technologies to uncover what lies beneath the surface, no rabbi is lurking behind the layers of paint.

* I want to thank Dr. Shnayer Leiman for bringing to my attention Gershom Bader as the earliest source of Heller’s representation within Jewish sources. I also wish to thank Professor Marc Michael Epstein, Professor Marc Shapiro, Dr. Lara Lempertienė, and Menachem Butler for their thorough review of the draft and invaluable feedback, Dr. Sabine Pénot for scouring the Kunsthistorisches Museum’s collection for information regarding Heller’s link to the painting, and Shaul Seidler-Feller for his expertise in translating Yiddish. Additionally, I am grateful to Rabbi Yaakov Yeruchum Wreschner for sharing his correspondence with the Kunsthistorisches Museum, and, as always, Eliezer Brodt, whose enviable encyclopedic knowledge, which he freely shares, ensured I did not overlook crucial materials.

Sources:

Alexander-Knotter, Mirjam, et al. The ‘Jewish’ Rembrandt, The Myth Unraveled. Waanders Publishers/Jewish Historical Museum, [2006].

Bader, Gershom. Drasyig Doyres Yiden in Poylen. Oriom Press, 1927.

Bamberger, Moshe. Great Jewish Treasures. Artscroll, 2015.

Blanc, Charles. Histoire des Peintres de Toutes les Écoles, vol. 2, “Samuel van Hoogstraten”. Paris, 1861.

Brusati, Celeste. Artifice and Illusion: The Art and Writing of Samuel Van Hoogstraten. University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Cohen, Richard I. Jewish Icons: Art and Society in Modern Europe. California UP, 1998.

Davis, Joseph M. Yom-Tov Lipmann Heller: Portrait of a Seventeenth-Century Rabbi. Littman Library of Civilization, 2004.

Demus, Klaus. Friderike. Katalog der Gemäldegalerie: Holländische Meister des 15., 16., und 17. Jahrhunderts. Kunsthistorisches Museum, 1972.

Ekkart, Rudi. Spinoza in Beeld: Het onbekende gezicht/Spinoza in Portrait: The Unknown Face. Amsterdam Vereniging het Spinozahuis, 1999.

Engerth, Eduard van. Gemälde Beschreibendes Verzeirchness, vol. 2. 1884.

Gerson, Horst. Ausbreitung und Nachwirkung der holländischen Malerei des 17. Jahrhunderts. De erven F. Bohn n. v, 1942.

Haberman, A.M. “Piyutav ve-shirav shel R. Yom Tov Lipman Heller.” Le-Kovod Yom Tov, edited by Judah Leib Maimon. Mosad HaRav Kook, 1956, pp. 125-145.

Heller, Yom Tov Lipmann. A Chronicle of Hardship and Hope. Translated by Avraham Yaakov Finkel, C.I.S. Publishers, 1991.

Hermens, Erma, et al. “Samuel van Hoogstraten’s Illusionistic Paintings for Emperor Ferdinand III – Two Case Studies.” Rembrandt Hoogstraten: Colour and Illusion, edited by Sabine Pénot. Hannibal, 2025, pp. 232-51.

Herskovics, Mayer. Two Guardians of the Faith: The History and Distinguished Lineage of Rabbi Yom Tov Lipman Heller and Rabbi Areyeh Leib Heller. Graphit Press, 2000.

Hoogstraten, Samuel Van. Introduction to the Academy of Painting; or, The Visible World. Edited by Celeste Brusati and Translation by Jaap Jacobs. Getty Research Institute, 2021.

Illes, Angelina. “List of Works.” Rembrandt Hoogstraten: Colour and Illusion, edited by Sabine Pénot. Hannibal, 2025, 258.

Knotter, Mirjam, and Gary Schwartz, editors. Rembrandt Seen Through Jewish Eyes: The Artist’s Meaning to Jews from His Time to Ours. Amsterdam UP, 2024.

Lipschitz Chaim Uri, and Neil Rosenstein, The Feast and the Fast: The Dramatic Personal Story of Yom Tov Lipman Heller. Moriah, 1984.

Mechel, Christian van. Verzeichniß der Gemälde der Kaiserlich Königlichen Bilder-Gallerie in Wien, Vienna, 1783.

Oron, Michal. Rabbi, Mystic, or Imposter. Translated by Edward Levin. Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2020.

Poch-Kalous, Margarethe. “Das Legat Wolfgang van Wurzbach-Tannenberg an die Gemäldegalerie der Akademie der bildenden Künste in Wien,” in Jahrbuch der kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien vol. 55, 1959.

Rathgerber, Georg. Annalen der Niederländischen Malerei und Kupferstecherkunst: Van Rubens Abreise nach Italien bis auf Rembrandt’s Tod. Gotha, 1839.

Rigler, Hieronumus. “Beschreibung und Beurtheilung verschiedener Gemälde der S.S. Bildergalerie in Belvedere van Hieronymus Rigler aus dessen 1783 herausgegebenen, ausser Wien wenig bekannten und bereits geendigten mächentlichen Anzeigen van Künstlern und Kunstsachen,” in Miscellaneen artistischen Innhalts, 21, 1784, pp. 158-177.

Schwartz, Gary. The Rembrandt Book. Abrams, 2006.

Stern, Yechiel Michel. Gedoli Ha-Doros. Minchas Yisrael, 1996.

Van Sloten, Leonore and David de Witt. “Challenged by Rembrandt,” in Samuel van Hoogstraten, The Illusionist. Edited by Nathalie Maciesza and Epco Runia. WBOOKS, 2025.

Wreschner, J. Megilat Eivah le-Ba’al Ha-TY”T.  [], Jerusalem, 1999.

Wreschner, J. Ha-Tosefos Yom Tov u-Megilaso. [], Beni Brak, 2024.

Appendix:

Hoogstraten’s painting was copied and reinterpreted multiple times, with variations in style and even gender. (See Brusati 361, which discusses two copies in royal collections.)

A few more examples:

A more compact version with a whiter and shaped bear is attributed to a Dutch painter of Hoogstraten’s school and possibly one of the versions mentioned by Brusati.

Described as 18th Century Flemish School, without identification of a specific artist, sold for CHF 800.

Two versions: a man that is a crude likeness of Old Man in a Window and a woman wearing a linen cap sold for $2,000.

An alternative version of a woman was painted by Josef Hauzinger, (1726-1787), currently at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow. A later version of this rendering appeared at auction in 2022.

Old Woman in a Window

Another example of a woman at the window is a 1936 Picasso painting.




Marc B. Shapiro – Responses to Comments and Elaborations of Previous Posts III

Responses to Comments and Elaborations of Previous Posts III
by Marc B. Shapiro

This post is dedicated to the memory of Rabbi Chaim Flom, late rosh yeshiva of Yeshivat Ohr David in Jerusalem. I first met Rabbi Flom thirty years ago when he became my teacher at the Hebrew Youth Academy of Essex County (now known as the Joseph Kushner Hebrew Academy; unfortunately, another one of my teachers from those years also passed away much too young, Rabbi Yaakov Appel). When he first started teaching he was known as Mr. Flom, because he hadn’t yet received semikhah (Actually, he had some sort of semikhah but he told me that he didn’t think it was adequate to be called “Rabbi” by the students.) He was only at the school a couple of years and then decided to move to Israel to open his yeshiva. I still remember his first parlor meeting which was held at my house. Rabbi Flom was a very special man. Just to give some idea of this, ten years after leaving the United States he was still in touch with many of the students and even attended our weddings. He would always call me when he came to the U.S. and was genuinely interested to hear about my family and what I was working on. He will be greatly missed.
1. In a previous post I showed a picture of the hashgachah given by the OU to toilet bowl cleaner. This led to much discussion, and as I indicated, at a future time I hope to say more about the kashrut industry from a historical perspective.[1] I have to thank Stanley Emerson who sent me the following picture.
It is toilet bowl cleaner in Israel that also has a hashgachah. Until Stanley called my attention to this, I was bothered that the kashrut standards in the U.S. had surpassed those of Israel. I am happy to see that this is not the case. (In fact, only in Israel can one buy a package of lettuce with no less than six (!) different hashgachot. See here)
But in all seriousness, I think we must all be happy at the high level of kashrut standards provided by the OU and the other organizations. This, of course, doesn’t mean that we have to be happy with what has been going on at Agriprocessors. I realize that this is a huge contract, but it was very disappointing to see that the first response of the OU to the numerous Agriprocessors scandals, beginning with the PETA video, has been to circle the wagons and put out the spin. Any changes from the OU only came after public outrage, and if the hashgachah is eventually removed from Agriprocessors, it will once again be due to this outrage. To be sure, we no longer can imagine cases of meat producers locking the mashgiach in the freezer,[2] but it does seem that the company was being given pretty free reign in areas where the hashgachah could have been using more of its influence. (Let’s not forget that Agriprocessors needs the OU more than the reverse.) At the very least, we need some competition in the glatt kosher meat business. Agriprocessors has a near monopoly and as we all know, competition is what forces businesses to operate at a higher standard.
In fact, the entire glatt kosher “standard” should be done away with and turned into an option for those who wish to be stringent. This has recently been tried in Los Angeles, with the support of local rabbis, but I don’t know how successful it has been. The only way this can happen on a large scale is if the OU once again starts certifying non-glatt. The masses have been so brainwashed in the last twenty years that they will not eat regular kosher unless it has an OU hashgachah. There is no good reason – there are reasons, but they aren’t good – why the OU does not certify non-glatt. As is the case with the Chief Rabbinate in Israel, the OU should certify both mehadrin (glatt) and non-mehadrin.
It might be that people in Teaneck and the Five Towns don’t feel the bad economic times. Yet there are many people who are having difficulty making ends meet. It is simply not fair to create a system where people are being forced to pay more money for meat than they should have to. The biggest problem Orthodoxy faces, and the factor that makes it an impossible lifestyle for many who would otherwise be drawn to it, is the enormous costs entailed. Anything we can do to lower this burden, even if it is only a couple of hundred dollars a year–obviously significantly more for communal institutions–should be done.
Returning to Agriprocessors, while the current issue focuses on the treatment of workers, the problem of a couple of years ago focused on the treatment of animals. Yet the two should not necessarily be seen as so far apart. According to R. Joseph Ibn Caspi (Mishneh Kesef [Pressburg, 1905], vol. 1, p. 36), the reason the Torah forbids inflicting pain on animals is “because we humans are very close to them and we both have one father”! This outlook is surprising enough (and very un-Maimonidean), but then he continues with the following incredible statement: “We and the vegetables, such as the cabbage and the horseradish, are brothers, with one father”! He ties this in with the command not to cut down a fruit tree (Deut. 20:19), which is followed by the words כי האדם עץ השדה. This is usually understood as a question: “for is the tree of the field man [that it should be besieged of thee?] Yet Caspi understands it as a statement, and adds the following, which together with what I have already quoted from him will make the Jewish eco-crowd very happy.
כי האדם עץ השדה (דברים כ’ י”ט), כלומר שהאדם הוא עץ השדה שהוא מין אחד מסוג הצמח כאמרו כל הבשר חציר (ישעיה מ’ ו’) ואמרו רז”ל בני אדם כעשבי השדה (עירובין נד ע”א)
Finally, in Rabbi Shmuel Herzfeld’s op-ed on Agriprocessors in the New York Times (see here) he wrote as follows: “Yisroel Salanter, the great 19th-century rabbi, is famously believed to have refused to certify a matzo factory as kosher on the grounds that the workers were being treated unfairly.” Herzfeld was attacked by people who claimed that there is no historical source to justify this statement. While the story has been garbled a bit, the substance indeed has a source. I refer to Dov Katz, Tenuat ha-Mussar, vol. 1, p. 358. Here R. Yisrael Salanter is quoted as saying that when it comes to the production of matzah, one must not only be concerned with the halakhot of Pesah, but also with the halakhot of Hoshen Mishpat, i.e., that one must have concern for the well-being of the woman making the matzah.
אין כשרות המצות שלמה בהידוריהן שבהלכות פסח לבד, כי אם עם דקדוקיהן גם בדיני חשן משפט
2. In my previous post I wrote: “With regard to false ascription of critical views vis-à-vis the Torah’s authorship, I should also mention that Abarbanel, Commentary to Numbers 21:1, accuses both Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides of believing that the beginning verses of this chapter are post-Mosaic. Yet Abarbanel must have been citing from memory, since neither of them say this. In fact, Ibn Ezra specifically rejects the notion that the verses were written by Joshua.” I made a similar point in Limits of Orthodox Theology, p.106 n. 102.
I looked at Abarbanel again and would like to revise what I wrote. I don’t think it is correct to say that Abarbanel was citing from memory, since he quotes Nahmanides’ words. With regard to Ibn Ezra, I now assume that Abarbanel thinks Ibn Ezra is being coy. In other words, although Ibn Ezra cites a view held by “many” that Joshua wrote the beginning of Numbers 21, and then goes on to reject this view, Abarbanel doesn’t trust Ibn Ezra. He thinks that Ibn Ezra really accepts the “critical” view. I see absolutely no evidence for this. Ibn Ezra has ways to hint to us when he favors a critical view, and he never does so with this section. Furthermore, I am aware of no evidence that the “many” who hold the critical view are Karaites, as is alleged by Abarbanel.
What led Abarbanel to accuse Nahmanides of following Ibn Ezra in asserting that there are post-Mosaic verses in Numbers 21? As with Ibn Ezra, Abarbanel sees Nahmanides as hiding his critical view and only hinting to it. Numbers 21:3 reads: “And the Lord hearkened to the voice of Israel, and delivered up the Canaanites; and they utterly destroyed them and their cities; and the name of the place was called Hormah.” Yet as Nahmanides notes, it is in Judges 1:17 that we see the destruction of the Canaanites and the naming of the city Hormah. How, then, can the city be called Hormah in Deuteronomy when it won’t be conquered and named for many years?
Nahmanides writes that the Torah here is relating “that Israel also laid their cities waste when they came into the land of Canaan, after the death of Joshua, in order to fulfill the vow which they had made, and they called the name of the cities Hormah.” In other words, the Torah is describing an event, including the naming of a place, which will only take place a number of years later. This event is described in the book of Judges. The verse in Numbers is written in the past tense, which would seem to render Nahmanides’ understanding problematic. Yet as Chavel points out in his notes to his English edition, this does not concern Nahmanides. “Since there is no difference in time for God, it is written in the past tense, for past, present, and future are all the same to Him.”
This is certainly true with regard to God, but what about the Children of Israel? How are they supposed to read a section of the Torah that speaks about an event as having happened in the past but which in reality has not yet even taken place? These are problems that the traditional commentators deal with, but Abarbanel sees Nahmanides as departing from tradition and offering a heretical interpretation. He is led to this assumption because Nahmanides uses the ambiguous words “Scripture continued” and “Scripture, however, completed the account.” Why didn’t Nahmanides say that Moses wrote this? It must be, according to Abarbanel, that Nahmanides is hinting that this was written down after Moses’ death. In Abarbanel’s words:
כי הרב כסתה כלימה פניו לכתוב שיהושע כתב זה. והניח הדבר בסתם שהכתוב השלימו אבל לא זכר מי היה הכותב כיון שלא היה משה עליו השלום והדעת הזה בכללו לקחהו הראב”ע מדברי הקראים שבפירושי התורה אשר להם נמנו וגמרו שלא כתב זה מזה והרמב”ן נטה אחרי הראב”ע והתימה משלימות תורתו וקדושתו שיצא מפיו שיש בתורה דבר שלא כתב משה. והם אם כן בכלל כי דבר ה’ בזה.
From here, let me return for the third time to what some would see as an aspect of biblical criticism in Radak. To recap, in his commentary to I Sam. 4:1 Radak writes:
על האבן העזר: כמו הארון הברי’ והכותב אמר זה כי כשהיתה זאת המלחמה אבן נגף היתה ולא אבן עזר ועדיין לא נקראה אבן העזר כי על המלחמה האחרת שעשה שמואל עם פלשתים בין המצפה ובין השן שקרא אותה שמואל אבן העזר שעזרם האל יתברך באותה מלחמה אבל מה שנכתב הנה אבן העזר דברי הסופר הם וכן וירדף עד דן.
Dr. H. Norman Strickman convinced me that Radak means that the words “and pursued as far as Dan” are a later insertion, since the city was only named Dan after it was conquered in the days of Joshua (Joshua 19:47). In a comment to the post, Benny wrote:
There is no reason to assume that Radak is not referring to Moses prophetically writing the word Dan. It just means that in the time that the story took place, the name was not Dan. . . . I think that it is definitely possible that Radak understood that Moshe is the one who wrote “Et HaGilad Ad Dan”.
Dr. Yitzchak Berger wrote to me as follows:
I think the commenter ‘Benny’ was right about Radak’s view of Gen. 14:14. At I Sam 4:1 he’s probably merely contrasting the author-narrator’s [i.e. “sofer’s”–MS] perspective with that of the players in the story, concerning the phrases in both Samuel and Genesis (in the case in Samuel there would be no reason for him to introduce a later editor).”
As is often the case in these sorts of disputes, I find myself being moved by the last argument I hear. As I noted in the earlier post, Radak elsewhere insists on complete Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Thus, it is certainly easier to read this text in a way that would not create a contradiction.
While on the subject of Mosaic authorship, let me also add the following. David Singer recently wrote an interesting article on Rabbi Emanuel Rackman.[3] With the recent passing of Rabbi Moses Mescheloff,[4] Rackman, born in 1910, might be the oldest living musmach of RIETS. If this is so, don’t expect this to be acknowledged in any way by the powers at YU.[5] The ideological winds have blown rightward in the last thirty years, and Rackman has moved leftward. He is thus no longer regarded as representative of RIETS or worthy of any acknowledgment.[6]

A similar thing happened at Hebrew Theological College in Skokie. Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits (died 1992) was, in my opinion, the most significant and influential person ever to teach on its faculty. (Unfortunately, they didn’t let him teach Talmud, only philosophy.) Yet not only does HTC currently have no interest in recognizing him, in 2001, some eighteen years (!) after the appearance of Not in Heaven, a very negative review appeared in the Academic Journal of Hebrew Theological College.[7] To show how insignificant Berkovits is in Skokie, neither the author, Rabbi Chaim Twerski, nor any of the editors, realized that his last name is not spelled Berkowitz! Were he alive today, can anyone imagine that HTC would allow him to speak? (It would be interesting to create a list of people who founded or taught at institutions and today would be persona non grata there. A few come to mind, and for now let me just mention R. Zev Gold, the outstanding Mizrachi leader who was one of the founders, and first president, of Yeshiva Torah Vodaas. Gold, who was also a rabbi in Scranton, was one of the signers of Israel’s declaration of independence.[8])
Some people pointed out that in Twerski’s negative review, Berkovits is never even referred to as Rabbi, only as Dr. (A cynic might add that in his zeal to use the title “Dr.” instead of “Rabbi” for those he doesn’t approve of, Twerski even gives R. Judah Leib Maimon a doctorate, referring to him as Dr. Maimon.) In the following issue, Twerski apologizes for any disrespect, noting that while some people took offense at how he referred to Berkovits, others “who know [!] him well have told me that he always preferred to be addressed as ‘Dr. Berkovits.'” I think this is a fair response. After all, would anyone criticize an author for referring to “Dr. Lamm”? Yet I must also say that someone reading the article will not learn that Berkovits was a great talmudic scholar, and I don’t even know if Twerski recognizes this.
Returning to Singer, in his article he writes that Rackman accepted the Documentary Hypothesis. I discussed this issue with Rackman some years ago and this is definitely not what he told me. The most he would say was that he would not regard someone as a heretic if he accepted biblical criticism. Yet he personally was not a believer in the theory. In support of Singer’s assertion to the contrary, he quotes the following passage from Rackman: “The most definitive record of God’s encounters with man is contained in the Pentateuch. Much of it may have been written by people in different times, but at one point in history God not only made the people of Israel aware of his immediacy, but caused Moses to write the eternal evidence of the covenant between Him and His people.” He also quotes another statement by Rackman: “[T]he sanctity of the Pentateuch does not derive from God’s authorship of all of it, but rather from the fact that God’s is the final version. The final writing by Moses has the stamp of divinity – the kiss of immortality.”
Singer misunderstands Rackman. There is no Higher Criticism here, no Documentary Hypothesis. What Rackman is saying is that the stories in the Pentateuch might have been recorded by various people before Moses, but that these stories were later included in the Torah at God’s command, with Moses being the final author. In both of these passages Rackman is explicit that the Torah was written by Moses. Rackman’s position in these quotations is very traditional, asserting that all that appears in the Torah is Mosaic. With this conception it doesn’t matter if, for example, the stories of Noah or the Patriarchs had earlier written versions passed down among the Israelites, since what makes them holy and part of the Torah is God’s command to Moses that they be included in the Holy Book. This was done by Moses’ “final writing.” I can’t see anyone, even the most traditional, finding a problem in this.
While on the subject of Rackman, let me make a bibliographical point. R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah IV, no. 50:2 refers to:
המאמרים של רב אחד שמחשבים אותו לרב ארטאדקאקסי שנדפסו בעיתון שבשפת אנגלית . . . והנה ראינו שכולם דברי כפירה בתורה שבעל פה המסורה לנו.
R. Moshe goes on to further attack the heresy of this unnamed rabbi, who is none other than Rackman. This can be seen by examining Ha-Pardes, May 1973, p. 7, where R. Moshe’s letter first appeared. It is not a private communication but is described as coming from Agudat ha-Rabbonim of the United States and Canada, and R. Moshe signs as president of the organization. Earlier in this issue (it is the lead article) and also in the April 1973 Ha-Pardes, R. Simhah Elberg published his own attack on Rackman, referring to him as ראביי ר. Elberg refers to Rackman’s articles which appeared regularly in the American Examiner, and which so agitated the haredim – and also many of the centrist Orthodox. This paper then joined with the Jewish Week, and became known as the Jewish Week and American Examiner. Rackman continued to publish in the paper until around 2001. (His article discussing my biography of Weinberg was one of the last ones he would write, and it is reprinted in the second edition of One Man’s Judaism [Jerusalem, 2000], pp. 402-404.)
3. Many people were interested in the claim, quoted in an earlier post, that rabbis turned over their own children to become soldiers if these children were no longer observant. If something like this ever happened it would have been very heartless, and there were, of course, many children of gedolim who became non-religious. While in some cases the child choosing a different path led to estrangement with his father, in others, father and son remained close, and I think today everyone realizes that this is the only proper approach to take.
R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg thought that it might be a good idea for a father to attend his son’s intermarriage, in order not to break ties completely. (Believe it or not, this statement was published in Yated Neeman.) Yet to see how different things were in years past, at least among some parts of our community, consider the following responsum by the important Hungarian posek, R. Jacob Tenenbaum.[9] The case concerned an Orthodox shochet whose son went to the בית האון (This means the non-Orthodox rabbinical seminary in Budapest, against which the Orthodox rabbis carried on a crusade.) The problem was that during his vacations the son came home to his parents’ house. Tenenbaum was asked if this meant that the shochet was disqualified and could no longer serve the community. The father pleaded that he loved his son, and Tenenbaum replied that התנצלות זה הוא הבל. Tenenbaum also rejected the father’s claim that if he doesn’t show love to his son, the latter will go even further “off the derech.”
Tenenbaum demanded that the father make a complete break with his son (that is, if the father wanted to be regarded as a Jew in good standing). The choice was clear: The father had to decide between loving his son and making a living (for if chose the former he would be blacklisted throughout the country):
ואם אביו יתן לו מקום בביתו או יתמכהו באיזה דבר בזה יגלה דעתו שגם בו נזרקה מינות [!] ובזה אין חילוק בין שו”ב לאיש אחר . . . אם יחזיק ידו או יתן לו מקום בביתו הנה ידו במעל הזה אשר בנו פנה עורף לדת ה’ ועל כן צא טמא יאמר לו, ושלא יוסיף עוד ראות פניו אם לא ישמע לדבריו לעזוב דרך רשע.
I know this sounds like a Hungarian extremist approach, but R. Kook had basically the same viewpoint. In Da’at Kohen no. 7, he too is asked about a shochet whose non-religious sons live at home. R. Kook replies that while technically the actions of the sons do not destroy the hezkat kashrut of the father, nevertheless, the matter is very distasteful (מכוער). Even if the father could not be blamed at all in this matter, nevertheless, it is a hillul ha-shem. Since the beit din has the power to legislate in matters beyond the strict law, “there is no migdar milta greater than this.” He explains the reason for his uncompromising viewpoint:
שלא ילמדו אחרים להפקירות עוד יותר, כשרואין שבניו של השו”ב הקבוע הם מחללים ש”ק, ע”כ לע”ד ברור הדבר, שכ”ז שבניו הם סמוכין על שולחנו, ואין פוסקין מחילול ש”ק, איננו ראוי להיות שו”ב קבוע, ומה גם בעדה חרדית.
If this is said about a shochet, how much more would it apply to a rav of a community. It is therefore easy to understand why non-religious children of some well-known rabbis are no longer welcome in their parents’ home. (Other well-known rabbis have a completely different outlook, and reject what they would categorize as the conditional-love approach of Rabbis Tenenbaum and Kook).
4. Since I have mentioned R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg a few times, I must call attention to something that was pointed out to me by Rabbi Chaim Miller. Miller might be known to some readers for his wonderful editions of the Chumash and Haggadah with a commentary based on writings of the Lubavitcher Rebbe. He has also published the first volume of a multi-volume work on the Thirteen Principles.[10]
I have often been asked if Weinberg gave semikhah to the Lubavitcher Rebbe. There is such a story yet I always found it suspicious that it was never mentioned in the Rebbe’s lifetime. Furthermore, Weinberg never mentions this in his letters. (He does mention that R. Yosef Yitzhak Schneersohn loved him.) So when asked, I always replied that I didn’t believe the story to be correct, as there is no evidence. In fact, I thought that the story was created as a clever way of giving the Rebbe semikhah. There is no record of him receiving semikhah before he arrived in Germany or after he left, so it made sense to have him receive it during his time in Berlin. Once you assume that the semikhah is received in Berlin, who better than Weinberg to give it to the Rebbe? Yet I always assumed that that this was a legend and wondered if the Rebbe even had semikhah.
Rabbi Miller called my attention to the new book, Admorei Habad ve-Yahadut Germanyah, pp. 103ff., where R. Avraham Abba Weingort, who is completely trustworthy (and far removed from Habad), records the testimony of two other reliable people from Switzerland who knew Weinberg well. Although there is probably some exaggeration in the details of the story they tell, they report being told by Weinberg that he indeed gave semikhah to the Rebbe, and the circumstances of how this came about (including requiring that the Rebbe come to some of his shiurim at the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary).[11] I can now better understand why the Rebbe’s contact information given to the University of Berlin was the address of the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary.[12] From now on, whenever I am asked if the Rebbe received semikhah from Weinberg, I will reply yes.
5. In recent years a few volumes from the writings of R. Yehudah Amital have been translated into English, allowing many new people to be exposed to his thoughts. Here is a provocative passage from his newest volume, Commitment and Complexity: Jewish Wisdom in an Age of Upheaval, p. 48:
We live in an era in which educated religious circles like to emphasize the centrality of Halakha, and commitment to it, in Judaism. I can say that in my youth in pre-Holocaust Hungary, I didn’t hear people talking all the time about “Halakha.” People conducted themselves In the tradition of their forefathers, and where any halakhic problems arose, they consulted a rabbi. Reliance on Halakha and unconditional commitment to it mean, for many people, a stable anchor whose purpose is to maintain the purity of Judaism, even within the modern world. To my mind, this excessive emphasis of Halakha has exacted a high cost. The impression created is that there is nothing in Torah but that which exists in Halakha, and that in any confrontation with the new problems that arise in modern society, answers should be sought exclusively in books of Halakha. Many of the fundamental values of the Torah which are based on the general commandments of “You shall be holy” (Vayikra 19:2) and “You shall do what is upright and good in the eyes of God” (Devarim 6:18), which were not given formal, operative formulation, have not only lost some of their status, but they have also lost their validity in the eyes of a public that regards itself as committed to Halakha.
This reminds me of the quip attributed to Heschel that unfortunately Orthodox Jews are not in awe of God, but in awe of the Shulhan Arukh. In truth, Heschel’s point is good hasidic teaching, and R. Jacob Leiner of Izbica notes that one can even make idols out of mitzvot.[13] He points out that the Second Commandment states that one is prohibited from making an image of what is in the heavens. R. Jacob claims that what the Torah refers to as being in the heavens is none other than the Sabbath. The Torah is telling us that we must not turn it into an idol. In this regard, R. Jacob cites the Talmud: “One does not revere the Sabbath but Him who ordered the observance of the Sabbath.”[14]
I believe that the “halakho-centrism” that Amital criticizes has another pernicious influence, and that is the overpopulation of “halakhic” Jews who have been involved in all sorts of illegal activities. A major problem we have is that it is often the case that all sorts of halakhic justifications can be offered for these illegal activities. One whose only focus in on halakhah, without any interest in the broad ethical underpinnings of Judaism, and the Ramban’s conception of Kedoshim Tihyu, can entirely lose his bearings and turn into a “scoundrel with Torah license.” The Rav long ago commented that halakhah is the floor, not the ceiling. One starts with halakhah and moves up from there. Contrary to what so many feel today, halakhah, while required, is not all there is to being a Jew, and contrary to what so many Orthodox apologists claim, halakhah does not have “all the answers.” One of the most important themes in Weinberg’s writings is the fact that there are people in the Orthodox community who, while completely halakhic, are ethically challenged.
Since I already mentioned Rabbi Rakow, let me tell a story that illustrates this. I went to Gateshead to interview him about his relationship with Weinberg. When I got there I had a few hours until our meeting so I paid a visit to the local seforim store. I found a book I wanted and asked the owner how much it cost. He gave me a price, and then added that if I was a yeshiva student there was a discount. When I later met with Rakow I asked him if it would have been OK for me to ask one of the yeshiva students to buy the book at discount, and then I could pay him for it. He replied that there was certainly no halakhic problem involved. After all, the first student acquires the book through a kinyan and then I buy it from him. But he then added: “Yet it would not be ethical.”

Weinberg’s concerns in this area were not merely motivated by the distressing phenomenon of halakhically observant people who showed a lack of ethical sensitivity. His problem was much deeper in that he feared that this lack of sensitivity was tied into the halakhic system itself. In other words, he worried that halakhah, as generally practiced, sometimes led to a dulling of ethical sensitivity. Weinberg saw a way out of this for the enlightened souls, those who could walk the middle path between particularist and universal values. Yet in his darkest moments he despaired that the community as a whole could ever reach this point. This explains why he esteemed certain Reform and other non-Orthodox figures. Much like R. Kook saw the non-Orthodox as providing the necessary quality of physicality which was lacking among the Orthodox, Weinberg appreciated the refined nature of some of the non-Orthodox he knew and lamented that his own community was lacking in this area. It was precisely because of his own high standards that he had so little tolerance for ethical failures in the Orthodox community. Weinberg’s sentiments, which focused on inner-Orthodox behavior, were not motivated by fear of hillul ha-shem. It was simply an issue of Jews living the way they are supposed to. [15]

In his opposition to halakho-centrism, Amital finds a kindred spirit in R. Moses Samuel Glasner and cites the latter with regard to the following case. What should someone do if he has no food to eat, except non-kosher meat and human flesh. From a purely halakhic standpoint, eating non-kosher meat, which is a violation of a negative commandment, is worse than cannibalism. The latter is at most a violation of a positive commandment (Maimonides) or a rabbinic commandment according to others.[16] Yet Glasner sees it as obvious that one should not eat the human flesh, even though this is what the “pure” halakhah would require, for there are larger values at stake and the technical halakhah is not the be-all and end-all of Torah.[17]
Glasner writes as follows in his introduction to Dor Revi’i:
כל מה שנתקבל בעיני בני אדם הנאורים לתועבה, אפילו אינו מפורש בתורה לאיסור, העובר על זה גרע מן העובר על חוקי התורה . . . ועתה אמור נא, בחולה שיש בו סכנה ולפניו בשר בהמה נחורה או טרפה ובשר אדם, איזה בשר יאכל, הכי נאמר דיאכל בשר אדם שאין בו איסור תורה אע”פ שמחוק הנימוס שמקובל מכלל האנושי, כל האוכל או מאכיל בשר אדם מודח מלהיות נמנה בין האישים, ולא יאכל בשר שהתורה אסרו בלאו, היעלה על הדעת שאנו עם הנבחר עם חכם ונבון נעבור על חוק הנימוס כזה להינצל מאיסור תורה? אתמהה!
In other words, the Torah has an overarching ethos (Natural Law?) which is not expressed in any specific legal text, and this can sometimes trump explicit prohibitions.[18]
Glasner has another example of this: Someone is in bed naked and a fire breaks out. He can’t get to his clothes and has two choices: He can run outside naked or put on some women’s clothes. The pure halakhic perspective would, according to Glasner, require him to go outside naked, since there is no biblical violation in this. But Glasner rejects this out of hand:
ובעיני פשוט הדבר דלצאת ערום עברה יותר גדולה . . . כי היא עברה המוסכמת אצל כל בעלי דעה, והעובר עליה יצא מכלל אדם הנברא בצלם אלוקים.
While I don’t know if the Rav would agree with Glasner, he too acknowledged that ethical concerns are a part of halakhic determination, meaning that not everything is “pure” halakhah. “Since the halakhic gesture is not to be abstracted from the person engaged in it, I cannot see how it is possible to divorce halakhic cognition from axiological premises or from an ethical motif.” Yet he adds: “Of course, in speaking of an ethical moment implied in halakhic thinking, I am referring to the unique halakhic ethos which is another facet of the halakhic logos.”[19] I wonder, though, if the approach set out here stands in contradiction to how, in his famous essay, he portrays the Halakhic Man’s mode of thinking. Would Halakhic Man, whose values arise exclusively from the halakhic system, be able to write the following, which acknowledges a significant subjective element?
Before I begin the halakhic discussion of the subject matter I wish to make three relevant observations . . . I cannot lay claim to objectivity if the latter should signify the absence of axiological premises and a completely detached attitude. The halakhic inquiry, like any other cognitive theoretical performance, does not start out form the point of absolute zero as to sentimental attitudes and value judgments. There always exists in the mind of the researcher an ethico-axiological background against which the contours of the subject matter in question stand out more clearly. . . . Hence this investigation was also undertaken in a similar subjective mood. From the very outset I was prejudiced in favor of the project of the Rabbinical Council of America and I could not imagine any halakhic authority rendering a decision against it. My inquiry consisted only in translating a vague intuitive feeling into fixed terms of halakhic discursive thinking.[20]
How often have I seen Orthodox polemicists criticize this very approach?
Finally, with regard to the issue of cannibalism mentioned above, let me point to one more relevant source (I can’t resist). In a previous post I mentioned that since every topic in halakhah has been dealt with in such detail, scholars today have to find new areas to focus on. Because of this, large books constantly appear about all sorts of things that are found in the sources, but to which no one ever gave much thought in previous years. The example I gave was an entire book dealing with the halakhot of sex change operations. The halakhot of cannibalism is one of the last areas which hasn’t yet been given a book-length treatment. However, R. Yosef Aryeh Lorincz has recently published Pelaot Edotekha.[21] The author is a rosh kollel whose previous book won an award from the municipality of Bnei Brak (see here). He is also the son of Shlomo Lorincz, one of the elders of haredi politics. He raises the following question (before reading any further, make sure the digitalis is in easy reach): Is it permitted to eat the flesh and drink the blood of demons?! Let me quote some of what he says on the topic:
יש לעיין באותם השדים שיש להם דמות אדם ומתו מה דין בשרם ודמם האם אסורים באכילה, דפשוטו אינם אדם וגם אינם בהמה אלא בריה בפנ”ע ולא מצינו שאסרה תורה לבשר ודם דשדים, אולם להאמור לעיל דשד הוה מקצת אדם, א”כ הוה כעין חצי שעור ואסורים באכילה, עוד יש לעיין אם בשרו ודמו יש להם טומאה כמת עכו”ם, ואם אסורים בהנאה לשיטות דמת עכו”ם אסור בהנאה.
Whatever you may think about hashgachot on candles and toilet bowl cleaner, I am fairly certain that even if Lorincz can prove that demon’s flesh and blood is kosher, none of the kashrut organizations will be rushing to add their symbol to this product. But in all seriousness, I know that I am not the only one who thinks that it is very unfortunate that we have Torah scholars spending time on this sort of thing.
6. I have been asked to say something about the current conversion controversy. The halakhic problems will be sorted out by the poskim, but let me make a few comments about the historical issue. There have been a number of people who have stated that the lenient approach often associated with R. Uziel is a singular opinion, or that this view was original to him. That this is mistaken can be seen by anyone who examines Avi Sagi’s and Zvi Zohar’s book Giyur u-Zehut Yehudit. In fact, throughout most of Jewish history a lenient approach to conversion was the mainstream approach.
Now it is true that R. Herzog famously states that in earlier times one could be more lenient than today, because in a traditional society when someone converted he was immediately part of a community and was required to be observant.[22] Things are very different today when you can convert and move to a secular neighborhood in Tel Aviv. There is no communal pressure for you to be observant, and the convert can look around and see that the leaders of the Jewish people in Israel, Peres, Olmert and Livni, are not religious. In such a world, R. Herzog didn’t think we could rely on certain leniencies used in the past.

However, despite R. Herzog’s opinion, the lenient approach, which didn’t insist on a convert’s complete observance of mitvot remained popular in modern times. (Contrary to what has often been stated, the lenient approach, and this includes R. Uziel, always insisted on kabbalat mitzvot. The dispute concerns what “kabbalat mitzvot” means, and whether a formal acceptance, without inner conviction, is sufficient.) Until recent years the lenient approach was even a mainstream position, alongside the more stringent (and widespread) approach. Among the adherents of the lenient approach one must mention R. David Zvi Hoffmann, who was the final halakhic authority in Germany until his death in 1921. Almost every Orthodox rabbi in that country, and many in other parts of Western Europe, looked to him as their authority. Others who held this position include R. Unterman and R. Goren. In addition, the Israeli Chief Rabbinate batei din, which were full of haredi dayanim, until recently followed the lenient approach. Many non-Jews were converted in Israel by dayanim who knew perfectly well that these people were not going to live an Orthodox life. Some of them were even intent on marrying people who were living on secular kibbutzim.[23] No one ever challenged the validity of these conversions. The situation was similar in places outside of Israel. See R. Yitzhak Yaakov Weiss, Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 6, no. 107:
לצערנו הרב גם רבנים חרדיים ומומחים מגיירים כעין זה ומחשיבים אותה כבדיעבד.
Unlike what goes on today, in previous generations there were never any classes for future converts. In fact, according to R. Akiva Eger, these classes are improper, since one is not permitted to teach Torah to a non-Jew.[24] Now obviously, this is not the position we accept, but it does illustrate that in reality converts don’t need to know much about Judaism. R. Malkiel Zvi Tenenbaum writes similarly in dealing with a case from England where a man was with a non-Jewish woman and wanted to convert her. The man had stopped eating non-kosher and attended synagogue on Rosh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur, but he was obviously not a completely observant Jew. Tenenbaum notes that even though it is possible that the only reason the woman is converting is so that she can remain with her husband–apparently she thought that this was in doubt due to his new religiosity– nevertheless, one should not be too exacting with her, other than telling her a few weighty and light mitzvot. This approach should be adopted because ex post facto the conversion will be fine, “and by doing this, we will save the Jew from living with her in a forbidden manner . . . but it is best that she learn everything [relating to Judaism] after she converts, and in particular in this case when we have to hurry to save the husband from sin.”[25]
Even R. Moshe Feinstein’s opinion regarding conversion is not uniform, and you can see changes in his view in the direction of leniency. But leaving that aside, although R. Moshe requires real kabbalat mitzvot, he acknowledges that a rejection of complete halakhic observance might not really be a rejection, because the person might not think that a particular law is really required. For example, what about a case where a woman converted in order to marry a Sabbath violator and was herself now a Sabbath violator? This is the exact sort of conversion that would be thrown out today. The fact that after the conversion she never observed Shabbat would suffice to show that there was no kabbalat mitzvot. Yet R. Moshe disagrees. He says that it depends on the woman’s mindset. In this case, perhaps she never intended on violating the halakhah, but she didn’t believe that Shabbat is really a law! And why should she, when she sees that most Jews don’t keep it? In R. Moshe’s words, she thought that observing Shabbat was hiddur be-alma, that is, something nice, but not required. This means that she never rejected the halakhah of Shabbat, she just didn’t know about it, and people are not required to know every halakhah before they convert. Therefore, R. Moshe concludes that the conversion is valid.[26] In another responsum,[27] R. Moshe explains that even if one rejects a particular mitzvah of the Torah, ex post facto the conversion is still valid:
ולכן צריך לומר שכיון שאיכא עכ”פ קבלת מצות אף שלא בכולן הוא גר ונתחייב בכולן אף שלא קבלם דהוה מתנה ע”מ שכתוב בתורה.
Anyone who reads responsa literature of the last hundred years often comes across cases where a man was intermarried and wanted to convert his wife, or wanted to convert his future wife. Often he had a child with the non-Jewish woman and wanted the child to be converted. A few different issues are discussed in these responsa, in particular nitan al ha-shifhah, but one thing you find very little discussion of is kabbalat mitzvot. The rabbis often give permission to convert the children even though the parents are not religious, and they give permission to convert the non-Jewish spouse even though there is no expectation that the person is going to lead a religious life. This obviously shows us that these rabbis had a different conception of conversion than what is today declared to be the only acceptable approach. Rabbi Yehudah Herzl Henkin[28] has recently called attention to Rabbi Abraham Price’s comments in this regard.[29] Price was the leading rav in Toronto, and he defends the lenient approach (which was being carried out all over the world). Yet today, these conversions would be thrown out. Here is the page from Price’s sefer.
In the recently published responsa of R. Eliezer David Rabinowitz-Teomim (the Aderet), Ma’aneh Eliyahu, no. 65, he discusses converting a Gentile who was involved with a Jewish woman. He raises the issue of whether it is proper to convert the man if he will not be observant. Even though the woman will be spared the sin of intermarriage, the man who is converted will now be violating the prohbitions of Niddah and Shabbat. This means that he was in a better place before he converted, as he was not obligated in these laws. The Aderet never assumes that the conversion won’t be valid because the man will be non-observant. Indeed, his entire responsum is based on the fact that it will be valid, which leads him to wonder if conversions like this are a good idea.
אם הם מדור החדש, וקרוב הדבר שלא תשמור לטבול בזמנה, ויחללו שבת, ויכשלו באיסור נדה החמורה, רחמנא ליצלן, ועוד ועוד, באופן כזה חלילה, צריך ישוב והתבוננות אם לטובלו לדת ישראל.
(There are many other responsa where halakhists show great annoyance that people who convert often don’t live a religious life, but very few of these halakhists mention anything about the conversions not being valid.)
Here is another example that nicely illustrates what I am talking about. It has not been quoted in any of the numerous discussions of the issue and can be added to the lenient side. Yet as I indicated, there is nothing unusual in this case as the approach seen here was very popular. R. Shlomo Sadowsky was a rav in Rochester and in 1918 he published his sefer, Parparaot le-Hokhmah. On page 63 he discusses converting a non-Jewish woman who is married to a Jewish man. In this case, he turned to R. Gavriel Zev Margulies, one of the leading poskim in America. (Joshua Hoffman wrote a wonderful masters dissertation on him.) The decision is made to convert her, and there is no mention of authentic acceptance of mitzvot. The halakhic concern focuses on a different matter, and the two rabbis are guided by the desire to help the man get out of the sin of intermarriage. Here is the responsum.

A few pages prior to this, Sadowsky has a responsum from 1906, when he was a rav in Albany. Here he discusses converting the son of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother. The mother had no interest in converting. Sadowsky agrees to convert the child who would, of course, be raised in an intermarried home without any Torah or mitzvot. He sent his responsum to the great R. Moses Danishefsky, the rav of Slobodka, and Danishefsky agreed with him. There is absolutely no discussion about the fact that the boy will be brought up without Torah observance. Both Sadowsky and Danishefsky assume that there is a benefit to being Jewish, even if one is being brought up in an intermarried home.[30] Here are the responsa from Rabbis Sadowsky and Danishefsky.

The technical issues are probably easier in this last case, as a child doesn’t need to have kabbalat mitzvot to be converted. Yet it is still significant that the issue of being raised in a non-religious home is not considered. There have been cases in Israel where the rabbinate refuses to convert children in situations like this, since the parents are not religious. The parents are thus forced to raise non-Jewish Hebrew speaking children, who of course will serve in the army and then marry Jewish Israelis.
For another example of converting women where there is no real expectation that they will be “observant” (by current standards), since their husbands were themselves not religious, see this responsum by R. Judah Leib Zirelson, from his Atzei ha-Levanon, no. 63.
I could cite a number of other sources, but it should be obvious by now that the lenient approach is hardly a daat yahid, identified only with R. Uziel. I believe that an examination of the responsa literature reveals that until recently this was a mainstream approach among both rabbis doing conversions and poskim who dealt with this issue. I am not saying that it was the dominant approach, only that it was widespread. As we all know, however, many converts of years past would not be accepted by batei din today. (Nothing I have mentioned so far should imply that R. Druckman’s beit din followed any of the sources mentioned so far. From what I have been able to determine, his beit din required a lengthy instruction period as well as attachment to an Orthodox family during this period, and also complete acceptance of mitzvot. For one relevant article, see R. David Bass in Tzohar 30, available here.)
There is another important source, a pre-modern responsum that is not mentioned by Sagi and Zohar and is directly relevant to the issue of revoking of conversions. It is cited by the Shas member of Kenesset (and author of seforim), R. Hayyim Amselem,[31] as part of his responsum against the revoking of any conversions. R. Simeon ben Tzemach Duran, Tashbetz, vol. 3, no. 47, writes as follows:
מי שלא נתגייר אלא שעה אחת וחזר לסורו לאלתר ועבד ע”ז וחלל שבתות בפרהסיא כמנהגו קודם שנתגייר ומין הוא ומן המורדים הוא, דלא קרינן ביה אחיך כמ”ש למעלה, ואפ”ה חשבינן ליה ישראל משומד וקידושין קידושין . . . וכן ראיתי בתשובה למורי חמי הרב רבנו יונה שכתב כן, וכן כתוב בספר העיטור ובספר אבן העזר, שמעשה הי’ בכותי שקידש ואצרכוה גיטא מר רב יהודה ומר רב שמואל רישי כו’, והדבר ידוע שגזרו עליהם להיות כעכו”ם גמורים כדאיתא בפרקא קמא דחולין.
In other words, in a case where a convert immediately after the conversion practices idolatry and violates Shabbat, the rishonim mentioned hold that the conversion is valid and the person has the status of a sinning Jew. Today, we would be told that such a conversion is completely invalid, as it is obvious that the convert never intended to accept Judaism. The proof of this is that immediately following the conversion he continued in his old ways. Yet these rishonim hold that the conversion is binding.
R. Shlomo Daichovsky, until recently a dayan on the Supreme Rabbinic Court, held this position. Eight years ago he expressed his opinion against R. Avraham Sherman and wrote as follows:[32]
נשותיהן של שלמה ושמשון עבדו עבודה זרה – כך מפורש בתנ”ך. גירותן היתה מפוקפקת מלכתחילה, כלשון הרמב”ם: ‘והדבר ידוע שלא חזרו אלו, אלא בשביל דבר’. בנוסף: ‘הוכיח סופן על תחילתן שהן עובדות עבודה זרה שלהן’. ועוד יותר: ‘לא על פי בית דין גיירום’. יש כאן שלושה חסרונות גדולים. אין לי ספק, כי אם היתה באה גירות כזאת לפני בית הדין ברחובות, היו פוסלים אותה, ללא כל בעיה. יתכן, וגם אני הייתי מצטרף לכך. אף על פי כן, רואה אותן הרמב”ם כישראליות לכל דבר. ומוסיף בהלכה י”ד: ‘אל יעלה על דעתך ששמשון המושיע את ישראל או שלמה מלך ישראל שנקרא ידיד ה’ נשאו נשים נכריות בגיותן’. כלומר, אסור להעלות על הדעת, אפשרות כזו. ובעצם, למה לא?
אין מנוס ממסקנה כי בדיעבד, אינו כלכתחילה. ולא ניתן לפסול גיור בדיעבד, לאחר שנעשתה.
R. Ovadiah Yosef believes that we can void a conversion, but only if there was (or should have been) a certainty before the conversion that the whole thing was a sham. But if there was no reason to think so, even if the convert did not become an observant Jew the conversion is valid. He writes (Masa Ovadiah, p. 438[33]):
“אם באמת היה הדבר גלוי וידוע מראש שאינם מקבלים עליהם עול תורה ומצוות, רק ע”ד האמור: ‘בפיו ובשפתיו כבדוני ולבו רחק ממני’, ואנן סהדי שלא נתכוונו מעולם לקיים המצוות בפועל, אז גם בדיעבד י”ל שאינם גרים. אבל אם לא היה כאן אומדנא דמוכח בשעת הגיור, אע”ג דלבסוף אתגלי בהתייהו, דינם כישראל מומר, שאע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא.
In the famous Seidman case, where R. Goren – based on R. David Zvi Hoffmann’s well-known responsum – converted a woman who was going to be living with a kohen after the conversion, R. Ovadiah agreed that the conversion was valid be-diavad. (See R. Shilo Rafael, “Giyur le-Lo Torah u-Mitzvot,” Torah she-Baal Peh 13 (1971), p. 131).
R. Yitzhak Yaakov Weiss was opposed to voiding conversions carried out by a valid beit din (Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 6, no. 107):
אם היה הגירות נעשה בפני בי”ד כשרים היינו מוכרחים לומר שהבי”ד בדקו היטב בשעת מעשה וראו שמקבלים בלב שלם, ע”כ אף שראינו שאח”כ אין מחזיקין במה שקבלו עליהם אמרינן דהדרו בהו ויש להם דין ישראל מומר
The rabbis at Kollel Eretz Hemdah were asked from Karlsruhe, Germany, about people who convert and continue to violate Shabbat and act no differently than before the conversion.[34] In other words, they fooled the Beit Din. Are they to be regarded as converts? The reply is that while le-hatkhilah one cannot convert people unless they accept to observe the Torah
אי-אפשר לבטל את הגירות של גרים שנתגיירו בבית-דין אורטודוקסי, אף על פי שלא היו כנים בבית-הדין ולא קיבלו על עצמם באמת לקיים את כל מצוות התורה, כל עוד שבאמת הם רוצים להיות יהודים, ורוצים להשתייך לעם ישראל.
As mentioned already, this is a matter that will have to be decided by the halakhic authorities. But I think that what I have written so far is sufficient to establish that there has been a great deal of distortion regarding this issue, often by well-meaning people. (In particular, I noticed that a number of writers, including talmidei hakhamim, have mistakenly claimed that the Bah is the only one to say that the Rambam didn’t require kabbalat mitzvot be-diavad.)
What is important to remember is that it is not just some modern Orthodox and religious Zionist rabbis who oppose the revoking of a conversion, but no less a figure than the Tashbetz. If today’s authorities disagree, that is their right, but it is simply wrong for haredi leaders to say that conversions have always required absolute commitment to mitzvah observance, and that lacking such commitment the conversions were always regarded as having no validity. As is often the case, there are different traditions. The adherents of the stricter approach are attempting to recreate the past, as if there has been only one approach. In fact, there is an even more radical view found in the rishonim. I refer to the Meiri’s position that be-diavad one can convert without a beit din. That is, following circumcision one can then accept the Torah and immerse all by oneself, and ex post facto it is a valid conversion.[35]
I understand that all the discussions about the revoking of conversions have been very difficult for converts. After all, they were taught that once they convert they are as good as any other Jew. They have begun to learn that matters are not so simple. What is one of these converts supposed to think when they see the heading of R. Menasheh Klein’s responsum, Mishneh Halakhot vol. 9, no. 237: גרים כשרים אין להם יחוס וראוי לזרע ישראל לרחק מהם ? 
He explains:
וודאי שיש מצוה לקרב ולאהוב את הגרים אבל אין זה מחייב להתחתן עמהם והרי משה רבינו קבל כמה גרים דכתיב וגם ערב רב עלה אתם ואפ”ה לא נתערבו בהם ולא התחתנו עמהם בני ישראל.
(By the way, the heading of the responsum following this is בענין נשים בעצם אם הם במדרגה אחת עם אנשים. Maybe on another occasion I will return to this, but I think everyone can predict what his conclusion is.)
This is a theme that is found in a number of his responsa.[36] In fact, it appears that if he had his way there would be a complete ban on conversions.[37] Since not every convert will be able to find another convert to marry, I guess he would advise having them marry the community’s losers, as no self-respecting Jew should marry a convert, at least not if you want your children to turn out right.[38] As to why the children of converts don’t turn out properly, Klein has his own theory.[39]
ודע דעלה בלבי מפני מה גרים לא יצליחו בניהם ע”פ רוב לפמ”ש דגר שנתגייר בידוע שנשמתו גם כן היתה מאותם שרצו לקבל התורה מסיני ולכן סופה שתתגייר, והנה כל זה נשמתו אבל נשמת זרעו שממשיך לא היו במעמד הר סיני ולכן אין זרעיו מצליחין . . . ומעתה מי פתי יסור הנה לישא אשה אשר יצאו ממנה בני סורר ומרה, ואם לפעמים ימצא שלא יצאו בדור הזה אולי עד עשרה דרי לא תבזה ארמאה ויחזרו ח”ו לסורם, ועכ”פ ע”פ רוב הכי הוא, והגע עצמך אם יאמרו לו שישא אשה חולנית שבעוד חמשה שנים תמות ורק על דרך נס יש אחת מיני אלף שתחיה או שע”פ רוב תלד בנים חולי גוף או רוח ודאי לא ישאנה . . . וכ”ש הכא שיצאו ממנו ח”ו דורות כאלו וכיוצא בה, מי הוא בעל אחריות שייעץ לאדם לישא אשה כזו.
He then quotes some negative things said about converts in the Zohar, and concludes as follows, in words that the Eternal Jewish Family[40] will never include in its literature and which are very hurtful:
ומעתה מי זה יכול ליעץ לאדם מישראל אשר נתחייבנו עליו ואהבת לרעך כמוך ואמרו ז”ל מה דסני לך לחברך לא תעבד והאיך נעבור על יעצנו רע ח”ו לזרע קודש משרשא קדישא וגזעא דקשוט להתערב ולתתגעל בגיורת המזוהמה בזוהמת הנחש . . . ולכן ודאי דכל מי שחש וחס על עצמו ועל זרעו יראה להדבק בטובים.
It is interesting that R. Moshe Sternbuch expresses the exact opposite approach to converts.[41] We can see the same sort of dispute between them with regard to baalei teshuvah, with Klein having a suspicious and at times negative view toward them, and Sternbuch having the opposite approach. But before one assumes that Klein’s outlook is just another example of the far-out positions he often takes, take a look at the following from R. Kook,[42] commenting on Berakhot 8a which states: “Some say it means: Do not marry a proselyte woman”:
כי ראוי לדאוג שיהיו תולדותיו זרע ברך ד’ בטבעם קשורים ג”כ בקשר טבעי עם ד’. אבל הגיורת, קשורה אינו כ”א בחירי ואיננו חזק כ”כ כהטבעי. ע”כ יש לחוש על קיומו, גם המדות הקדושות שהאומה הישראלית מעוטרות בהן חסרות הנה בהכרח, והמזג פועל על הבנים.
Finally, let me say something about RCA’s agreement with the Chief Rabbinate that all conversions already recognized by the RCA will be accepted in Israel. Unfortunately, I don’t believe that the Chief Rabbinate can deliver on this. That is because, as we have seen in the latest controversy, the dayanim are not bound by the Chief Rabbinate’s agreements. The Chief Rabbinate can accept a convert for its own purposes, but local dayanim have the autonomy to issue their own rulings, as we saw Rabbi Sherman do.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the agreement with the Chief Rabbinate will be upheld for a more fundamental reason: It violates the conscience and halakhic standards of the haredi world, which is currently taking over the religious court system. Let me explain what I mean. Many people who converted through RCA rabbis did not become completely observant. Some didn’t become observant at all. (I have already mentioned that this was the case with haredi rabbis as well.) If a dayan feels that such a conversion is invalid halakhically, the fact that the Chief Rabbinate made an agreement that all RCA conversions from previous years will be accepted is irrelevant. An agreement of this nature cannot override halakhah. So the dayan in question will be forced to reject this conversion no matter when it took place.
To show how difficult the situation can become, take a look at this article from Yated Neeman that appeared a few years ago.[43] I think we can get a good sense from it where we are heading with regard to conversion, and why the only solution is to have two separate court systems dealing with this matter. Yes, it is true that people converted by the Religious Zionist courts might not be accepted by the haredim, but so what? In the unlikely event that one of these converts or their children will want to marry a haredi, they can undergo a second haredi conversion. This is hardly a big deal, and certainly not reason enough for the Religious Zionists to entirely abandon their vision of halakhah, all in order to satisfy the haredi demands for a “single standard,” which by definition always means the haredi approach.
[1] In the meantime, see my article in the Forward. R. Menachem Genack responded here.
Contrary to Genack, the Modern Orthodox world would unquestionably still be eating non-glatt if it was available under (what they viewed as) reliable hashgachah. I also think everyone understood that my comments about the D symbol was not in criticism of identifying a product as dairy, but that the OU does not use the DE symbol (Incidentally, neither of these symbols existed when I was growing up. You knew if a product was dairy by looking at the ingredients, and one does not need to be concerned with the equipment unless you are specifically told – as you now are – that a product was made on dairy equipment. Even then, there are poskim who hold that you can ignore the DE and eat the product with meat, since despite what it says on the label, we don’t actually know that the parve food we are eating was produced within 24 hours of a dairy run.) Why do I think the D symbol instead of DE reflects a turn to the right?: I called the OU on three separate occasions and spoke to three different rabbis, and all of them explained that the reason DE is not used is because they have a fear that some small bits of milk might still be in the product. This is an incredible chumra, which incidentally has no real basis, as companies have to be very careful about not allowing milk into products which are non-dairy. (The threat of major lawsuits from people who are allergic to milk is a constant concern for the companies.) Furthermore, to claim that any such milk might exist in large enough quantities not to be batel is incredibly far-fetched. Despite raising these points in all three conversations, I was told that the organization chooses to be strict.
[2] R. Gedaliah Silverstone, who for many years was the leading rav in Washington, D.C. writes as follows (Tokhahat Hayyim, 1928, p. 14):
מעשה היה בעירי שטבח אחד הסגיר את הרב המשגיח בתיבת המקרה לערך חצי שעה ולא נתן לו לצאת, ואמרתי אז בדרוש על הטבח הזה שלכל הפחות היה לו פעם אחת בתיבת המקרה (שנקרא איז באקס) שלו חתיכה של בשר כשר.
For those who don’t read Hebrew: When the Mashgiach was locked in the freezer, Silverstone quipped that at least on one occasion there was a piece of kosher meat found there! See Yosef Goldman, Hebrew Printing in America 1735-1926 (Brooklyn, 2006), p. 765.
[3] “Emanuel Rackman: Gadfly of Modern Orthodoxy,” Modern Judaism 28 (May 2008), pp. 134-148.
[4] See here.
[5] When planning its ninetieth anniversary celebration in 1976, Yeshiva University was upset to find that Mordecai Kaplan was its oldest living graduate. This squelched any plans to make a big to-do in honor of the graduate. See Jeffrey S. Gurock and Jacob J. Schacter, A Modern Heretic and a Traditional Community (New York, 1997), p. 1.
[6] No one has yet written an article focusing on the Rackman-Lamm contest for election to the presidency of YU, and the historical significance of Lamm’s victory. I hope that a capable YU student takes upon himself this task. To do it right, he must interview the people still alive who were on the committee and can testify as to what led them to go with the younger and less distinguished Lamm. Until now, all we have had are rumors and fairy tales. One example of this is the following passage from R. Herschel Schachter’s Mi-Peninei ha-Rav (p. 170).
לפני כעשרים וחמש שנים, לאחר שנפטר הר”ר שמואל בלקין, והיו צריכים לבחור נשיא חדש לישיבה אוניברסיטה, החליט רבנו שאחד מהמועמדים לא היה ראוי לאותה אצלטא בגלל דיעותיו הבלתי-מסורתיות. רבנו כינס את כל הרמי”ם ביחד, וערך וניסח מכתב לועד-הנאמנים של הישיבה שהוא מתנגד מאוד להתמנותו של פלוני, וחתם את שמו למטה, ומסר את המכתב לשאר הרמי”ם שאף הם יחתמו. אחד מהרמי”ם פתח ושאל לרבנו, ומה כל הרעש הזה, מה פשעו ומה חטאתו של אותו פלוני. ענה רבנו ואמר, שיהודי המדפיס במאמר בעתון שלפי דעתו שני חלקי ספר ישעיה נכתבו על ידי שני בני אדם נפרדים, אפיקורס הוא, ואי אפשר למנותו כנשיא של הישיבה. והמשיך הלה לטעון ואמר, דהלא אף באברבנאל גם כן מצינו לפעמים דברים זרים אשר הם נגד מסורות רז”ל חכמי התלמוד. וענה רבנו ואמר, שאף את האברבנאל לא היה רוצה לראות כנשיא ישיבה-אוניברסיטה. ובזה נסתיים הויכוח. כל הרמי”ם שהיו נוכחים בשעת מעשה חתמו על מכתבו של רבנו, המכתב נמסר לועד הנאמנים, ונתבטלה מועמדותו של הלה.
I have it on very good authority (from conversations with two people who were intimately involved in the election process) that the event described here never happened. There might, however, be a kernel of truth in the story, as is often the case with such tales, and perhaps one of the readers can illuminate the matter. As for Rackman and Deutero-Isaiah, since he is not a Bible scholar I am certain that he never expressed his opinion in the way described here (I also hope that the Rav never said what is attributed to him. R Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Berakhot 3:8 refers to Abarbanel as הנשר הגדול)
What Rackman does say is as follows (One Man’s Judaism, pp. 248-249):
The Talmud itself was not dogmatic, but contemporary Orthodoxy always feels impelled to embrace eveery Tradition as dogma. The Talmud suggests that perhaps David did not write all the Psalms. Is one a heretic because one suggests that perhaps other books were authored by more than one person or that several books attributed by the Tradition to one author were in fact written by several at different times? A volume recently published makes an excellent argument for the position that there was but one Isaiah, but must one be shocked when it is opined that there may have been two or three prophets bearing the same name? No Sage of the past ever included in the articles of faith a dogma about the authorship of the books of the Bible other than the Pentateuch. . . . How material is it that one really believes that Solomon wrote all three Scrolls attributed to him? Is the value of the writings itself affected? And if the only purpose is to discourage critical Biblical scholarship, then, alas, Orthodoxy is declaring bankruptcy: it is saying that only the ignorant can be pious – a reversal of the Talmudic dictum.
The book about Isaiah he refers to is Rachel Margalioth’s The Indivisible Isaiah: Evidence for the Single Authorship of the Prophetic Book, published in 1964 by Yeshiva University’s Sura Institute. (She was the wife of famed scholar Mordechai Margalioth.)
[7] No one has yet written an article focusing on the Rackman-Lamm contest for election to the presidency of YU, and the historical significance of Lamm’s victory. I hope that a capable YU student takes upon himself this task. To do it right, he must interview the people still alive who were on the committee and can testify as to what led them to go with the younger and less distinguished Lamm. Until now, all we have had are rumors and fairy tales. One example of this is the following passage from R. Herschel Schachter’s Mi-Peninei ha-Rav (p. 170).
לפני כעשרים וחמש שנים, לאחר שנפטר הר”ר שמואל בלקין, והיו צריכים לבחור נשיא חדש לישיבה אוניברסיטה, החליט רבנו שאחד מהמועמדים לא היה ראוי לאותה אצלטא בגלל דיעותיו הבלתי-מסורתיות. רבנו כינס את כל הרמי”ם ביחד, וערך וניסח מכתב לועד-הנאמנים של הישיבה שהוא מתנגד מאוד להתמנותו של פלוני, וחתם את שמו למטה, ומסר את המכתב לשאר הרמי”ם שאף הם יחתמו. אחד מהרמי”ם פתח ושאל לרבנו, ומה כל הרעש הזה, מה פשעו ומה חטאתו של אותו פלוני. ענה רבנו ואמר, שיהודי המדפיס במאמר בעתון שלפי דעתו שני חלקי ספר ישעיה נכתבו על ידי שני בני אדם נפרדים, אפיקורס הוא, ואי אפשר למנותו כנשיא של הישיבה. והמשיך הלה לטעון ואמר, דהלא אף באברבנאל גם כן מצינו לפעמים דברים זרים אשר הם נגד מסורות רז”ל חכמי התלמוד. וענה רבנו ואמר, שאף את האברבנאל לא היה רוצה לראות כנשיא ישיבה-אוניברסיטה. ובזה נסתיים הויכוח. כל הרמי”ם שהיו נוכחים בשעת מעשה חתמו על מכתבו של רבנו, המכתב נמסר לועד הנאמנים, ונתבטלה מועמדותו של הלה.
I have it on very good authority (from conversations with two people who were intimately involved in the election process) that the event described here never happened. There might, however, be a kernel of truth in the story, as is often the case with such tales, and perhaps one of the readers can illuminate the matter. As for Rackman and Deutero-Isaiah, since he is not a Bible scholar I am certain that he never expressed his opinion in the way described here (I also hope that the Rav never said what is attributed to him. R Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Berakhot 3:8 refers to Abarbanel as הנשר הגדול)
What Rackman does say is as follows (One Man’s Judaism, pp. 248-249):
The Talmud itself was not dogmatic, but contemporary Orthodoxy always feels impelled to embrace eveery Tradition as dogma. The Talmud suggests that perhaps David did not write all the Psalms. Is one a heretic because one suggests that perhaps other books were authored by more than one person or that several books attributed by the Tradition to one author were in fact written by several at different times? A volume recently published makes an excellent argument for the position that there was but one Isaiah, but must one be shocked when it is opined that there may have been two or three prophets bearing the same name? No Sage of the past ever included in the articles of faith a dogma about the authorship of the books of the Bible other than the Pentateuch. . . . How material is it that one really believes that Solomon wrote all three Scrolls attributed to him? Is the value of the writings itself affected? And if the only purpose is to discourage critical Biblical scholarship, then, alas, Orthodoxy is declaring bankruptcy: it is saying that only the ignorant can be pious – a reversal of the Talmudic dictum.
The book about Isaiah he refers to is Rachel Margalioth’s The Indivisible Isaiah: Evidence for the Single Authorship of the Prophetic Book, published in 1964 by Yeshiva University’s Sura Institute. (She was the wife of famed scholar Mordechai Margalioth.)
[8] Here is a bit of Jewish Scranton trivia. Many people know that Harry Wolfson and R. Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz lived there. But did anyone know that R. Herschel Shachter was born in Scranton?
[9] Naharei Afarsemon, mahadurah tinyana, no. 15.
[10] See here.
[11] R. Pini Dunner writes: “I asked him [R. Yosef Tzvi Dunner] if he remembered the Rebbe from his time in Berlin (1932-36). He smiled and said he remembered him well – he was the rather modern-dressed young man with the neatly trimmed beard who stood at the back of the shiur room and who would talk in learning after almost every shiur with Rav Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg z”l.” See here.
[12] See Shaul Shimon Deutsch, Larger Than Life, vol. 2 (New York, 1997), p. 75.
[13] Beit Yaakov, vol. 2, p. 256.
[14] Yevamot 6b
[15] I think an important point, which I have not seen anyone make, is that the entire concept of hillul ha-shem has basically disappeared in the United States. This perhaps has had some impact on Orthodox misconduct. What I mean is that in years past people were held back from doing things because of a fear of how it would look to the non-Jewish world, i.e., it would lead to Jews and Judaism being degraded in their eyes. Today, very few Jews think like that. We live in a great country. If a Jew, or an Orthodox Jew, does something illegal, even if he is on the front page of the newspaper, the typical non-Jew does not take this as a reflection on Jews as a whole or on the religion – and we have had many examples to illustrate the empirical truth of this statement. People know that there are scoundrels in every religious group, and one should not judge another person or religion based on the actions of individuals. When we have reached this wonderful point, what room is there for hillul ha-shem as a motivating factor?
[16] See J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 1 pp. 194-196.
[17] Ve-Ha’aretz Natan li-Venei Adam (Alon Shvut, 2005), pp. 38ff.
[18] In attempting to explain why there is no explicit prohibition against cannibalism in the Torah, R. Kook expresses a similar concept (Otzarot ha-Re’iyah [2002], vol. 2, p. 89):
לא הוצרכה תורה לכתוב עליו איסור מפורש, שאין האדם צריך אזהרה על מה שקנה לו כבר מושג טבעי בזה.
Weinberg speaks of cannibalism as being against “the will of the Torah,” even though not explicitly forbidden. See Seridei Esh, vol. 3, no. 127 (p. 342). See the discussion in Daniel Sinclair, “Musar u-Mishpat ha-Tiv’i be-Mishpat ha-Ivri: Akihlat Basar Adam ke-Mashal,” available here.
[19] Community, Covenant and Commitment, ed. N. Helfgot (Jersey City, 2005), p. 276.
[20] Ibid., pp. 24-25.
[21] (Bnei Akiva, 2008). The passage I refer to comes from vol. 2, pp. 125-126.
[22] See Pesakim u-Khetavim, Yoreh Deah nos.89, 92. R. Abraham Dov Ber Kahana Shapiro expressed the same sentiments. See Devar Avraham, vol. 3, no. 28.
[23] In referring to such a case, where after conversion the woman would live on a secular kibbutz where she would not be able to observe mitzvot, R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin writes (Bnei Vanim, vol. 2, p. 135):
אם היא סברה שסדורי החיים שבקבוץ לא איפשרו לה דהוי כעין אונס שעומד לבוא עליה לפי דעתה ואינו חסרון בקבלת המצוות אף על פי שלדינא אינו אונס שהרי לא נאנסה להשאיר בקבוץ.
[24] Teshuvot, vol. 1, no. 41.
[25] Divrei Malkiel, vol. 6, no. 19.
[26] Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah I, no. 160. This notion, that even apparently obvious Jewish laws could be viewed by some people as not binding, has all sorts of ramifications and has often dealt with by poskim. One interesting example is Teshuvot Maharam Lublin, no. 15, where R. Meir of Lublin was asked about a man who was caught having sex with a Christian prostitute, and he was sentenced to death. He could escape this sentence by converting to Christianity. (The responsum, which was sent to the city of Apta, deals with a young man held prisoner by the “Ishmaelites” because he was found with an “Ishmaelite” prostitute. Obviously, R. Meir is speaking in code, as Muslims were not in large supply in Apta. I will speak more about this sort of code in a future post.) The local community wanted to know if they had an obligation to ransom him, as it could be that the imprisoned man had the status of a mumar le-teavon. R. Meir rejects this point and offers the following incredible justification:
ופרט בזמנינו זה בעו”ה שרבים נכשלים בעבירה זו שאין להחשיבה כמומר לתיאבון.
See also the famous responsum of R. Akiva Eger (Teshuvot, vol. 1, no. 96), who deals with otherwise otherwise religious Jews who shave with a razor. (While reading his words ask yourself if the community he describes sounds more like a haredi community or a Modern Orthodox one.):
י”ל דהשתחת בתער דנתפשט בעו”ה אצל הרבה לא חשב שזהו איסור כ”כ דלא משמע להו לאינשי דאסור, וכאשר באמת נזכר בג”ע שהשיב להמוכיח שהרבה אנשים חשובים עושים כן, וכיון דבאמת פשתה המספחת בזמנינו גם לאותן הנזהרים בשאר דברים נדמה להם דאינו איסור כ”כ.
R. Eliezer Papo, Pele Yoetz, s. v. hov, writes:
ע”פ מה דקיימא לן אומר מותר אנוס הוא ומאחר שדרך איש ישר בעיניו נמצא שהוא אומר מותר ואנוס הוא.
The last three sources mentioned are quoted by R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, Li-Netivot Yisrael, vol. 1 pp. 154-155.
[27] Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah III, no. 106.
[28] See here.
[29] Mishnat Avraham, vol. 2, p. 274.
[30] R. Moshe Feinstein recognized the logic of this approach. See Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah I, no. 158:
לא ברור הדבר במדינה זו שהוא זכות כיון שבעוה”ר קרוב שח”ו לא ישמור שבת וכדומה עוד איסורים. אך אפשר שמ”מ הוא זכות שאף רשעי ישראל עדיפי מעכו”ם.
Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer IV, no. 26:
וגם אף אם לא יתגדלו להיות שומרי תורה מסתבר שהוא זכות דרשעי ישראל שיש להם קדושת ישראל ומצותן שעושין הוא מצוה והעבירות הוא להם כשגגה הוא ג”כ זכות מלהיות נכרים.
R. David Horowitz, Imrei David, no. 172, also permits the conversion of the child, and holds out hope that the parents will do teshuvah (apparently even including the non-Jewish mother in this):
מה לנו להתחכם נגד מצות ד’ . . . מצינו כי אדם רע עשוי לעשות תשובה, וגם כאן נאמר כי עוד יבוא יום וישעה אדם אל עושהו ותפקחנה עיני עורים וידעו כי ערומים הם והרבה לחטוא.
[31] Or Torah, Tamuz 5768.
[32] See here.
[33] In Yabia Omer, vol. 10, Yoreh Deah no. 26, he decides that a particular conversion can be voided, and one of the reasons is subsequent non-observance. Yet this was not the main justification for his decision. In addition, this was a special case as it concerned an agunah.
[34] Be-Mar’eh ha-Bazak, vol. 3, p. 149
[35] Beit ha-Behirah, Shabbat 68a.
[36] See e.g., Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 10, no. 239:
ודאי דזרע אברהם יצחק ויעקב המיוחסים מתרחקים מן הגרים כפי האפשר הגם שמקרבים אותם מצד מצות ואהבתם את הגר אבל אין זה מצוה לנו להתחתן עמהם.
I certainly think he is going overboard when he writes (ibid., vol. 15, p. 151): ואין ממנים גר להיות שמש בביהכ”נ
[37] See ibid., vol. 16, p. 384: .ומשבח אני בזה מנהג הספרדים שאין מקבלין בקהלותיהם גרים He is referring to the Syrian ban on converts, which has its own racist elements, as in both the popular and even in some of the rabbinic mind of this community there is a stress on “pure Jewish blood.” This latter point is far removed from opposition to converts in order to prevent intermarriage, and leads to a shunning of all converts, even those converted as babies, as well as a shunning of children and even grandchildren of converts.
[38] ] See ibid., vol. 9, no. 239
[39] See ibid., vol. 10 no. 239.
[40] See here.
[41] Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, Even ha-Ezer no. 728. See also ibid., vol. 2 no. 623, where he writes: עיקר היחוס הוא כששומרים מצוות.
[42] Ein Ayah, Berakhot 8a.
[43] Available here. The “so-called Orthodox rabbis” referred to in this article are Rabbis Gedaliah Dov Schwartz, Reuven Bulka and Shmuel Goldin. The RCA is described as an “organization of rabbis who call themselves Orthodox, but are known as modern.” The article also defames Rabbis Shear Yashuv Cohen and Shalom Messas. There are a number of falsehoods in the article, but let me just mention one: “The conversion was made for the purpose of marriage, and such types of converts are not to be accepted according to the halocho.” Yet the almost unanimous opinion of poskim, from all circles, is that when confronted with a possible intermarriage, one should convert the non-Jewish partner if all all feasible. The only dispute is how observant the convert must be in order to be accepted.



The Pitfalls of Disagreeing with the Gra

Sunday, the second day of Hol HaMo’ad, was the 210th yahrzeit of the Gra. The Gra, a towering figure in modern Judaism, was not immune from criticism. His views, like any other’s were subject to scrutiny. And, at times, there were those who disagreed with the Gra’s conclusions. While this criticism should come as no surprise (and especially so in light of the Gra’s dim view of deference to prior authorities), some felt the Gra should be immune from any criticism. Thus, we find the Gra’s dissenters taken to task for merely arguing with the Gra’s position.
Additionally, this post will be the beginning of a series of posts devoted to reviewing and highlighting one of the most important books in the history of the Jewish book to be published in recent memory. Dr. Yaakov Shmuel Spiegel (who has a terrific Hebrew Wikipedia entry here)has published two volumes of Amudim b’Tolodot Sefer HaIvri. Both volumes are tremendously rich in material and appear to have gone virtually unnoticed. (Unfortunately, Spiegel soon after the publication of the first volume came out with a revised edition. All citations are to the first edition of the first volume.)
As mentioned above, the first part of this post, is the first in a series discussing Spiegel’s book. The second part, although related to Spiegel is not discussed by Spiegel, and instead, is from another important bibliography work, Ohel Rochel.
There is but one review in HaMayaan [and in the latest AJS review of Spiegel’s second volume]. In fact, although those who have read it have recognized its import it has not stopped some from hiding their use of the book. Thus, a couple of weeks ago the Hiddushei HaBach were published on portions of the Talmud. Spiegel has an amazing discussion about the Hagot haBach. Spiegel discusses the history, what the Bach was doing, which edition of the Talmud he had. Perhaps most importantly, Spiegel discusses the errors that have crept into the Bach – mainly because the editors of the Vilna Shas removed the introduction to the work. The introduction explains certain devices that were employed to make clear which words the Bach was removing. Both the device (quotation marks) as well as the explanatory notes no longer appear, thus Spiegel provides numerous examples of people who based their Torah on an incorrect understanding of what the Bach was doing.

Returning to the new Hidushei HaBach, in the introduction they discuss the Bach’s other works. Of course, they discuss the Hagot HaBach and they rely heavily (read almost in entirety) on Spiegel. But, the only times they cite (p. 19 n. 1; p.43 n. 55; p. 46 n.65, n. 67) to Spiegel they use the following abbreviation עמודים בתולדות ה”ה. They do not provide what that means, and only a reader who was already aware of Spiegel’s book would have any idea. This is deliberate as although they are willing to use his book they are unwilling to let others know that.

In this post, however, I will not focus on the Bach, rather as mentioned above, we are going to discuss the Gra, and the first example focuses on the Hagot HaGra. This portion of the post mainly comes from Spiegel (Amudim: Haghot u’Maghim pp. 422-426, 461).

R. Gershon Henoch Leiner, the Radzyner Rebbi, published Sidrei Tahros. Sidrei Tahros is an attempt to fill a gap in the talmud. There are some mesechtot that do not have any talmudic commentary. While some, Zeraim for instance, have at least Yerushalmi, the mesechtot of Tahoros do not. Thus, R. Leiner culled the corpus of Rabbinic literature, Talmud, Midrash, Zohar, etc. and collected the relevant statements to create a “talmud” (it is even labeled as such – the legend on the page reads Gemara) on the two mesechtot of Ohelot and Kelim. Additionally, he wrote his own commentary on these volumes. The volume on Kelim was published in 1873 and included a map that can be seen here. The volume on Ohelot was published in 1903. After that both books were not republished until 1960 in a photomechanical reproduction.

Soon after it came out, people took issue with the entire concept – the concept of “creating” a gemara. Those who came out against him, did so in the newspaper Halevonon (available here – see the 1875 nos. 34, kovod levonon (machberes sheni year 11) 6 tamuz edition and see Ir Vilna vol. 1 p. 60 n. 7 for some choice quotes). Someone responded in Hamaggid (also available online see 17 Av, 1875). Much of this criticism was more focused on the concept of the Sidrei Taharos, (creating a “new” gemara) for our purposes, however, we are going to focus on one point, R. Leiner’s disagreements with the Gra.

In his commentary, R. Leiner takes issue with some of the Gra’s textual emendations. For instance R. Leiner states:
ודע דדברי הגר”א ז”ל בזה בספרו . . . לא איתברר לן ולא זכינו לעמוד בסוד דבריו ז”ל . . . דרכו בקודש נסתרה ונעלמה מאתנו

This is but one of the times R. Leiner disagrees with the Gra. At one time, R. Leiner is willing to attribute his disagreement not to the Gra, but instead, R. Leiner claims that perhaps the difficult statements in the Gra were not made by the Gra. Instead, a student misunderstood and thus it is now necessary to figure out what in fact the Gra said. Setting aside this justification (which, when it comes to the Gra’s notes on the Talmud is difficult to believe in light of the fact much comes from the Gra’s hand itself), R. Leiner still disagreed with the Gra for whatever reason it may be.

R. Yosef Refael and R. Betzalael HaKohen, Dayanim in the Vilna Bet Din were against the whole notion of the Sidrei Tahros. But, they also singled out R. Leiner’s disagreements with the Gra. Specifically, they say

ובהשגות המחבר [ר’ גרשון] על רבינו מאור הגולה הגר”א ז”ל כתב הרבה נגד כבוד הגר”א ז”ל בכמה מקומות ומדקדק עליו בדקדודי עניות לבד אשר אין מהצרוך להשיב עליהם כלל, וגם במהלליו את רבינו הגר”א ז”ל התנכר כנגדו כובד וכאילו היה חלילה אחד מחבריו . . . ובכמה מקומות תלה דברים זרים בפירוש הגר”א ז”ל, אשר לא יטעה כל המתחיל ללמוד לפרש כזאת

Another example is that of R. Barukh Brody in his book Bet Ya’akov where he states:

ועל של עתה באתי כי זה לא כביר נדפס ילקוט על מס’ כלים . . . והנה בעברי על פני דבריו באיזה מקומן ראיתי כי יצא בילקוטו באבני נגף נוכח תורת הגר”א ופגע ונגע בכ”מ [= בכמה מקומות] בכבוד רבינו הגר”א ומשיג על דבריו בעזות וחוצפה מאד, ושמתי עיוני על השגותיו ומצאתי ראיתי כי מלבד שאין קטן ערך כמוהו ראוי להתוכח עם ארי ארי[ה] דבי עילאה הגר”א ז”ל, בר מכל דין לא הבין ולא רצה להבין דברי הגר”א הקדושים רק שנאה וחוצפה מדברת מתוך גרונו . . . חכמתו המעט נסתקלה ממנו ולא הבין אפילו פשט הפשוט שבדברי הגר”א ז”ל

R. Brody thus accuses R. Leiner of brazeness, chutzpah, and that R. Leiner “is unable to understand even the simplest explanations.” Harsh words indeed all for disagreeing with the Gra.

The second example deals with a recently discussed book. In our discussion of Teffilah Zakah, we noted that various editions of the Hayye Adam were altered. In this case, we are going to deal with R. Danzig’s other well-known work the Hokhmat Adam. In the prior discussion the removal was due to the inclusion of a controversial book, in this case it was R. Danzig’s own words. [1]

The Hokhmat Adam was published after the Hayye Adam. In the Hayye Adam at various times, he take issue with the opinions of the Gra. R. Danzig was no stranger to the Gra, R. Danzig’s son married the grand-daughter (Gittel Vilner) of the Gra. It appears that R. Danzig’s disagreements with the Gra did not go unnoticed or unopposed.

In the first edition of the Hokhmat Adam, R. Danzig addresses criticisms. R. Danzig notes, inter alia, that the Gra himself would be more than happy to have people disagree with him. It appears, however, that only one copy remains of R. Danzig’s original words. This copy was discovered by Chaim Lieberman, one of the great bibliographers of the past generation, in what was R. Shmuel Straushun’s former library (a portion of the library is now housed in YIVO). The page, in relevant part, reads as follows:

והנה לא נמצא בחיבור זה מדברי מחותני הגאון רשכבה”ג מו’ אלי’ החסיד, והוא לסיבת כי שמעתי דבת רבים המתרעמים עלי שהשגתי עליו באיזה מקומות בחיבורי [חיי אדם] ובלתי ס[פק] שהאנשים המתרעמים לא ידעו דרך הפוסקים שכך דרך תה”ק זה בונה וזה סותר והתלמיד חולק על הרב כמש”כ בש”ע [יו”ד ס’ רמ”ב סע’ ג] ודרך זה היה נוהג אף בזמן תנאים ואמורים, ובודאי ניחא להגר”א מה שאני מפלפל בדבריו ממי שהוא אומר שפיר קאמר כדאר”י [=כדאמר רבי יוחנן] על בר לקישא. ולכתוב דבריו אף אם לא יהיה נ”ל זה לא אוכל, ולכן אחזתי במדת השתיקה להסיר תלונתם מעלי והם עתידים ליתן את הדין כי מנעו נ”ר [=נחת רוח] להגר”א לפלפל בדבריו, ודין אותי לכף זכות ידונו אותו משמים לזכות

This is not the text that appears in Hokhmat Adam, rather a slightly different text appears. These changes, however, as been demonstrated by Ch. Lieberman are significant. The following is how it appears (prior to the Binat Adam section):

והנה דברי מחותני גאון ישראל וקדושו אשר מימיו אנו שותים המקובל אלקי החסיד המפורסם מהו’ אלי’ חסיד דקהילתינו לא הבאתי כלל דבריו כמעט רק איזה גרגרים והוא לסיבה כי שמעתי דיבת רבים המתרעמים עלי על שבאיזה מקומות בחיברי חיי אדם השגתי עליו, ובלתי ספק שאנשים האלה אינם בקיאי’ בלימוד הפוסקי’ שכן דרך תה”ק זה בונה וזה סותר והתלמוד חולק על הרב והטור על אביו הרא”ש כמש”כ בש”ע ובפוסקי’, וזה ניחא להון כדאמר ר’ יוחנן על ר”ל דמיני ומיני’ רווח שמעתתא, ובודאי זהו נחת רוח להגואן יותר ממי שיאמר שפיר קאמר ועתידין ליתן את הדין על שמונעים נחת רוח מהגואן, והדן לכף זכות ידונו משמים לזכות

Lieberman points to four major changes. First, the honorifics surrounding the first mention of the Gra. Second, in the first iteration, R. Danzig decided to totally avoid any mention of the Gra while in the second iteration he cites “some small statements” of the Gra. Third, in the later iteration the statement of R. Yochonon is filled in. That is it provides the text. Lieberman allows that perhaps this was done to avoid “confusion” with another statement of R. Yochonon. R. Yohonon (Ketubot 84,b) says about Resh Lakish “what can I do my peer disagrees with me.” Rashi explains that “peer” means equal. Thus, perhaps the reader would think that R. Danzig was comparing himself with the Gra. Instead, the reader is now directed to the statement of R. Yohonon (Pesachim 88,a; Megilah 14,b) generally discussing Resh Lakish providing numerous answers to questions. Finally, in the later iteration the language “it is impossible for me to write what I don’t actually believe” is missing in it entirety. (For Lieberman’s article see Ohel Rochel, vol. 1, 473-74 [first printed in Kiryat Sefer, 37 (1962) pp. 413-14]).

Note:
[1] For examples of R. Danzig’s disagreements and some responses see Eliach, HaGoan, vol. 2 pp. 706-09.




Can Orthodoxy Decide Its Own History?

Can Orthodoxy Decide Its Own History?

Rabbi Shmuel Lesher 

The Making of a Godol

In his 2004 review of Rabbi Nosson Kamenetsky’s controversy-sparking Making of a Godol,[1] Professor Mordechai Breuer notes a marked change happening within haredi culture, specifically book culture:

The contents of the traditional Haredi bookshelf have expanded and transformed beyond recognition in recent generations. Alongside … the rabbinic classics … the shelves are now filled with books of types our ancestors could not have imagined.[2]

Breuer is referring to the proliferation of a new form of biography, or hagiography, of gedolim, or “Torah scholars” sometimes referred to as “Shivhei Tzaddikim” (Praises of the Righteous).

To be sure, historically, the practice of telling stories of praise and piety about gedolim is not new. Records of this literature can be found as early as the 19th century.[3] However, the recent proliferation and high demand for these works within contemporary haredi society is a fairly recent phenomenon.

It is against this backdrop that, in his review, Breuer celebrates R. Kamenetsky’s publication of Making of a Godol. He correctly notes that this book is not just another routine addition to the existing genre of hagiography. Quite the contrary, employing the rigorous research of an academic, the book makes a serious effort to depict the lives of Lithuanian yeshiva personalities as they truly were, without embellishment or distortion. In stark contrast to those who advocate for the idealized and sanitized portrayal of gedolim as saintly individuals devoid of human flaws or weakness, R. Kamenetsky authored a book whose content was subject to a single test: the test of truth.[4]

It is for this very reason that others did not celebrate the publication of Making of a Godol. In fact, shortly after the book was published in 2002, it was subject to a ban and removed from bookstores.

Breuer has his own critiques of the book. In addition to a number of serious methodological issues he raises with the book from an academic historical perspective, Breuer takes issue with a number of passages from a religious perspective, some of which may have been the reasons why it was banned within parts of the haredi community:

It is unfortunate that the author did not refrain from delving into minutiae that lack historical significance, including the personal weaknesses of Torah scholars… Yet, the author makes no effort to reconcile this phenomenon with the ideal of shemirat halashon (guarding one’s speech) …. The extensive treatment of such topics, without any attempt to analyze or integrate them into a cohesive picture of the “Making of a Godol” borders on gossip for its own sake. It would have been better to omit such material altogether.[5]

Jewish History: Lashon Harah?

Although Breuer categorizes the inclusion of some trivial and negative descriptions of gedolim in R. Kamenetsky’s book as “bordering on gossip for its own sake,” someone who levels the claim of actual lashon harah (prohibited negative speech) against any and all accurate history-keeping is Rabbi Shimon Schwab.

R. Schwab correctly notes that history must be accurate:

History must be truthful, otherwise it does not deserve its name. A book of history must report the bad with the good, the ugly with the beautiful, the difficulties and the victories, the guilt and the virtue. Since it is supposed to be truthful, it cannot spare the righteous if he fails, and it cannot skip the virtues of the villain. For such is truth, all is told the way it happened.[6]

Clearly, there is little use for inaccurate history books. 

R. Schwab further notes that since the canonization of Tanakh, no works of Jewish history were composed by our Sages. It appears that when prophecy ceased, the recording of Jewish history stopped at the same time.[7]

This phenomenon was noted by historian Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi. He writes that after the canonization of the Bible, it appears that Jewish historiography abruptly stopped:

After the close of the biblical canon the Jews virtually stopped writing history…. It is as though, abruptly, the impulse to historiography had ceased.[8]

This, Yerushalmi writes, is remarkable. Biblical Jewry and subsequent generations of Jews drew deep meaning from history. Their people’s history was deeply wedded to their sacred scripture. They came together weekly to read aloud from these passages in synagogues for thousands of years. Generation of scribes would copy and transmit these texts to the next generation with the utmost care and concern for their sacred task.[9]

Moreover, the Torah itself commands the Jewish people to remember “the days of old and to contemplate the years of every generation”:

זכר ימות עולם בינו שנות דור ודור שאל אביך ויגדך זקניך ויאמרו לך

Remember world history, study the generational epochs. Ask your father and he will relate to you, your elders and they will tell you (Devarim 32:7).

Therefore, R. Schwab asks: Why did our great Torah leaders not deem it necessary to register in detail all the events of their period just as the Torah and the prophets had done before them? 

R. Schwab’s answer will likely be shocking to all those who love history:

Only a prophet mandated by his Divine calling has the ability to report history as it really happened, unbiased and without prejudice….An historian has no right to take sides. He must report the stark truth and nothing but the truth…if an historian would report truthfully what he witnessed…He would violate the prohibition against spreading loshon harah which does not only apply to the living, but also to those who sleep in the dust and cannot defend themselves any more. What ethical purpose is served by preserving a realistic historic picture? Nothing but the satisfaction of curiosity. [10]

Using the imagery of Shem and Yefet who covered the nakedness of their father Noah when he became intoxicated, preserving their saintly memory of their father (Bereishit 9:23), R. Schwab argues for a more synthetic and sterilized version of Jewish history:

We should tell ourselves and our children the good memories of the good people, their unshakeable faith, their staunch defense of tradition, their life of truth, their impeccable honesty, their boundless charity and their great reverence for Torah and Torah sages. What is gained by pointing out their inadequacies and their contradictions? We want to be inspired by their example and learn from their experience. Rather than write the history of our forebears, every generation has to put a veil over the human failings of its elders and glorify all the rest which is great and beautiful. That means we have to do without a real history book….We do not need realism, we need inspiration from our forefathers in order to pass it on to posterity. 

Because a historian must record the facts, and the facts remain lashon harah and therefore forbidden, R. Schwab argues that Torah-true “historians” should engage in the genre of “story-telling” rather than truthful history focusing on telling the stories that will inspire, leaving out the truth if unflattering.

Is R. Schwab correct in asserting that the reading or writing of all accurate history is in violation of the formal prohibition(s) of lashon harah and therefore renders the field of Jewish history decidedly quite “un-Jewish”? Any serious student of history must respond to this question.[11]

It appears from the literature that the standard prohibition of lashon harah only applies to the living. The Gemara in Berakhot (19a) cites Rabbi Yitzhak who states, “Anyone who speaks negatively about the deceased is as if he speaks about a stone. Some say this is because the dead do not know, and some say that they know, but they do not care [about such speech].

Simply understood, R. Yitzhak’s statement means that just as there is no formal prohibition of lashon harah for slandering inanimate objects, there is no lashon harah when speaking negatively about the dead.[12]

Although the Raavya[13] and the Mordekhai[14] quote an ancient heirem (ban) against falsely libeling the deceased which is codified in Shulhan Arukh,[15] this would not constitute formal lashon harah.[16]

Interestingly, the father of the aforementioned R. Nosson Kamenetsky, Rabbi Yaakov Kamenetsky, writes that even this ban, which reaches beyond the scope of normative lashon harah, only forbids false libel. Whereas lashon harah is forbidden when speaking about living persons even when true,[17] one is permitted, according to the elder R. Kamenetsky, to tell negative stories about people from the past as long as they are true. R. Gil Student notes that when applied to history, this principle would provide a heter (allowance) for the accurate, albeit occasionally negative, recording of facts.[18]

On the other hand, R. Binyamin Yehoshua Zilber argues, contrary to the simple reading of the Gemara cited above, the dead do, in fact, know about and are affected by what is said about them. Therefore, he rules that one may not say anything bad about the dead, false or true.[19]

The Allowance of “Toelet

Either approach one takes to lashon harah about the dead, the allowances to permitted lashon harah would seem to apply to the dead just as it applies to the living. Regarding history, two allowances outlined by the Hafetz Haim seem particularly relevant: one permitting the “sharing of public knowledge”[20] and another based on “toelet” — having a legitimate or constructive purpose.[21] If something is already public knowledge, its inclusion in history books is permitted under the category of “sharing public knowledge.” If it is not already known, I would argue that documenting it for posterity, when it serves a constructive purpose for the historical record, should also be allowed.

Returning to Making of a Godol, R. Kamenetsky was aware of the potential for Breuer’s critique of lashon harah. In defense of his choice to include some less than savory passages in his book apparently for the sake of the historical record, R. Kamenetsky appears to utilize the “toelet argument”:

It goes without saying that R. Mordekhai Schwab [brother of R. Shimon Schwab who supported the study of accurate Jewish history] did not approve of revealing faults in any man without constructive purpose; and neither do I.[22]

R. Kamenetsky makes another argument to support disclosing even unsavory information. He claims there is some form of halakhic statute of limitations on people’s embarrassment. Things that transpired over a century ago are no longer subject to the rules of lashon harah:

I did not give much consideration to concealing then-sensitive matters for the reason that when my father talked about these long-past episodes he specifically applied the verse גם שנאתם גם קנאתם כבר אבדה (Both their [the principals’] enmity and their envy are already bygone)[23]…. In fact, my father considered the passage of only 50 years – a יובל (which the Torah labels ” לעולם [forever]”) – to have enough of a cumulative effect to erase one world and bring a new society in its stead.[24]

This rationale goes well beyond the toelet allowance or limiting lashon harah to the living. If one accepts this contention, any information that is at least 50 years old can be written even if the individual would not want this information shared.

Whatever the assumed allowance is, in recent years, it appears that many, even within the haredi community, have taken a more open approach to the study of Jewish history. 

Although Making of a Godol was banned, this did not impede the public’s interest in historical scholarship. Over twenty years after the Making of a Godol ban, interest in the academic study of Jewish history has only grown. Today, there is a new wave of Jewish historians, writers, and podcast hosts who are engaged in rigorous study and writing of Jewish history. In their weekly column in Mishpacha magazine “For the Record,” Yehuda Geberer and Dovi Safier cite directly from historical documents and materials from Jewish history. Geberer hosts a popular podcast entitled “Jewish History Soundbites (here).”Nachi Weinstein of Lakewood, New Jersey, the host of the Seforim Chatter podcast (here), routinely interviews academic historians and professors well outside the typical sources found in the more insulated Yeshiva community.

Although there is still a strong presence of the typical biographical or hagiographical, any careful observer of the Jewish community can discern a largely different approach being taken to the study of Jewish history.

The Ethical Imperative of Accurate Historiography

I have shown that, although debated, there is a halakhic basis for the study of accurate and truthful Jewish history. However, is there a moral imperative to study Jewish history? It may be permitted halakhically, but is there inherent value in the recording of history?

According to Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, we can derive from the Torah itself that there is an ethical value in preserving history. R. Hirsch notes that the Torah “does not hide from us the faults, errors, and weaknesses of our great men” and narrates events simply “because they took place”:

The Torah never hides from us the faults, errors, and weaknesses of our great men. Just by that it gives a stamp of veracity to what it relates . . . The Torah never presents our great men as being perfect, it deifies no man, says of none ‘here you have the ideal, in this man the divine became human’ . . . The Torah is no collection of examples of saints. It relates what occurred, not because it was exemplary, but because it did occur.[25]

In fact, recording the mistakes of our biblical heroes provides more credibility to the Torah.

R.Yehuda Leib Bloch, the Rosh Yeshiva of Telshe, Lithuania makes a similar point:

At the very moment it describes the greatness and holiness of the Patriarchs, [the Torah] does not remain silent about their shortcomings. It does not conceal their flaws, nor does it portray them as divine beings possessing every virtue without defects or shortcomings….Our Torah is a Torah of truth, a Torah of life. It teaches us that a person, by virtue of being human, cannot be divine.[26]

Aside from the lesson of our Patriarchs’ and Matriarchs’ humanity and the credibility gained by the Torah, the fact that the Torah records events simply “because they took place” is significant for R. Hirsch. The very notion that something occurred, in and of itself merits being recorded in the Torah because the Torah values the truth of history. Throughout many of his works, R. Hirsch emphasizes the importance of historical awareness and the necessity of the study of history.[27] One citation will suffice:

To obtain knowledge of Nature and History…is not only something permitted but something which is desirable to the fullest extent, for only a mind armed with such a wide panoramic view on all matters can draw the right conclusions of the Jewish position in the world, in the whole of its speciality.[28]

Censoring the “Inconvenient Truths” of History 

Rabbi Dr. Jacob J. Schacter has argued in a number of important essays that there is an ethical imperative to preserving historical truth about our past and “facing the truths of history.”[29]

In support of his position, which he notes has historically been the minority one, R. Schacter draws from R. Yaakov Emden,[30] R. Hirsch,[31] and the Hazon Ish.[32] Critical of hagiographic works that censor or remove “inconvenient truths” about gedolim, R. Schacter writes:

Is overlooking part of the truth, in fact, any less of a lie than actively distorting it? Do not both result in a less than true—let us call it what it really is, i. e., false—picture of the facts or figure being presented? W. E. B. Du Bois wrote: “One is astonished in the study of history at the recurrence of the idea that evil must be forgotten, distorted, skimmed over.”[33]

R. Schacter also responds to R. Schwab’s rationalization for omitting parts of history:

It is interesting that Rabbi Schwab does not deny that “important people” and “good people” have failings and inadequacies. Rather, he suggests that they are best overlooked and forgotten. However, even this…explains only the neglect and disregard of history; it does not justify the distorting of history. While it may explain why one should not write about the past, it does not justify distorting the past when one does write about it. Inventing the past is as foolish as foretelling the future, but more scandalous.[34]

Suffice it to say, although “facing the truths of history” may be difficult, even prohibitive according to some, according to R. Schacter and those of his school, it is imperative.

The Miracle of Jewish Survival 

There may be yet another reason to study Jewish history from a religious perspective. In an often-cited passage, R. Yaakov Emden writes that Jewish history very well may be the repository of the greatest miracle known to man:

Who is so blind as to not see the divine providence?… We the exiled nation, a dispersed sheep. After all the troubles and shifts for two thousand years. No nation in the world is as pursued as us….[Our enemies] have brought on us great sufferings but were never able to triumph over us…All these ancient, powerful nations have gone by, their strength has withered, their protection has eroded. But we who cling to G-d are all alive today…Can the hand of chance do all this? I swear by my soul that…these ideas are greater [miracles] in my eyes than all the great open miracles G-d has performed for our forefathers in Egypt, the Sinai Desert, and in the land of Israel. The longer the exile lasts, the more the miracle is confirmed…[35]

If, as R. Emden argues, the story of Jewish people’s survival is even more miraculous and contributes more to our faith than the Exodus, it would follow that the study of the Jewish people’s history and its survival would be a critical part of Jewish education and faith-building.

In fact, R. Emden’s theory of the significance of the Jewish story of survival and its place within history, was felt by Catholic historian Paul Johnson. In the prologue to his A History of the Jews, Johnson gives his fourth and final reason why he chose to write this book and to study the Jewish people:

The book gave me the chance to reconsider objectively…the most intractable of all human questions: what are we on earth for? Is history merely a series of events whose sum is meaningless?….No people has ever insisted more firmly than the Jews that history has a purpose and humanity a destiny. At a very early stage in their collective existence they believed they had detected a divine scheme for the human race, of which their own society was to be a pilot. They worked out their role in immense detail. They clung to it with heroic persistence in the face of savage suffering. Many of them believe it still….The Jews, therefore, stand right at the centre of the perennial attempt to give human life the dignity of a purpose.[36]

For Johnson, the Jews stand at the centre of the very question of history and of human existence itself. Believing and arguing, by their very existence, that mankind does matter, and that there is moral significance to the history of the human race. 

In sum, the value of the rigorous and accurate study of Jewish history has been the subject of debate. From the standpoint of halakhah, I have argued that even negative information that can provide a greater understanding of our history is permitted to be recorded if it serves a constructive purpose for the historical record. However, more fundamentally, I believe that the proper study of Jewish history is not only a moral imperative ensuring an accurate picture of the past, it provides us with a deep sense of memory and Jewish identity. 

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks notes that although Jews were the first people to write history, biblical Hebrew has no word for “history.” Instead it uses the root zakhor, meaning “memory.”[37] History and memory are not the same thing. History is about facts, memory is about identity. History is about something that happened to someone else. It is “his story.” Memory is my story, the past that made me who I am, of whose legacy I am the guardian for the sake of generations yet to come. While, as I have argued, the study of history is crucial, without memory, there is no identity, and without identity, we are “mere dust on the surface of infinity.”[38]

[1] R. Nosson Kameneksty, Making of a Godol: A Study of Episodes in the Lives of Great Torah Personalities (Mesorah, 2002).
[2]
 Mordechai Breuer, “Gidulo Shel Gadol (Making of a Godol)” Hamayan 44:2 Teves 5764, pp. 81-82. For more reviews of Making of a Godol see Zev Lev, “Al Gidulo shel Gadol,” Hamayan 50:1 (Tishrei 5770) , pp. 100-104; “Teguvah le-divrei Prof. Lev z”l al ha-sefer Gidulo shel GadolHamayan 50:7 (Tishrei 5770), pp. 77-104.
[3]
See Immanuel Etkes, “On Shaping the Image of ‘the Gedolim’ in Ultra-Orthodox Lithuanian Hagiographic Literature,” in Benjamin Brown and Nissim Leon, eds., The Gedolim: Leaders Who Shaped the Israeli Haredi Jewry (Magnes, 2017), p. 26 (Hebrew). I was introduced to this and several other sources referenced in this article through R. Dovid Bashevkin. See his “Is Jewish History Lashon Harah,” Reading Jewish History in the Parsha (April 10, 2024) (available here).
[4]
 Breuer, “Gidulo Shel Gadol,” p. 81.
[5]
 Breuer, “Gidulo Shel Gadol,” pp. 83-84. For more on Making of a Godol and the ban on it see R. Nosson Kameneksty, “Anatomy of a Ban: the Story of the Ban on the Book Making of a Godol; R. Nosson Kamenetsky, “Making of a Ban: A Look At the Banning of Making of A Godol,” YUTorah.org (March 12, 2005) (available here); Marc B. Shapiro, “Of Books and Bans,” The Edah Journal 3:2 (2003) (available here) and his “On Re-Reading a Banned Book: Nathan Kamenetsky’s Making of a Godol,” Jewish Review of Books (Spring 2022); Dovid Lichtenstein, “Supermen or Super Men: Acknowledging the Faults and Mistakes of Gedolim,” Headlines 3: Halachic Debates of Current Events (Mekor, 2021), pp. 385-413 and his Halacha Headlines podcast on the topic.
[6] R.
Shimon Schwab, Selected Writings, (1988), p. 233.
[7] Ibid.
[8]
 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle and London, 1982), 15-16.
[9]
 Yerushalmi’s thesis has been the subject of much debate in academic circles. See perhaps most notably,  Robert Bonfil, “How Golden was the ‘Golden Age’ of Jewish Historiography?” History and Theory, Vol. 27, No. 4, Beiheft 27: Essays in Jewish Historiography (Dec., 1988), pp. 78-102. Also see Amos Funkenstein’s Perceptions of Jewish History (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993); David N. Myers and Amos Funkenstein, “Remembering “Zakhor”: A Super-Commentary [with Response], History and Memory, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall – Winter, 1992), pp. 129-148; David Berger, “Identity, Ideology and Faith: Some Personal Reflections on the Social, Cultural and Spiritual Value of the Academic Study of Judaism,” in Howard Kreisel (ed.), Study and Knowledge in Jewish Thought (Ben-Gurion University, 2006), pp. 15-16. Thanks to Dr. Marc Herman and Dr. Tamar Ron Marvin for these sources.
[10] R.
Schwab, p. 234.
[11]
 For a discussion of the position of the Rambam on this question see R. Zev Eleff, “The Intersection of Halakhah and History,” Beit Yitzhak, Vol. 42 (5770), p. 425n4.
[12]
It should be noted that R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv is cited as reading this Gemara differently and thereby prohibits lashon harah spoken of the dead the same as the living. See R. Benzion Kook (ed.), Shiurei Maran HaGrish Elyashiv, Berakhot 19a, with nn. 53-54.
[13]
Yoma, no. 531.
[14]
Yoma, no. 724.
[15]
 Orah Hayim 606:4.
[16]
 Mishnah Berurah 606:16.
[17]
Emet Liyaakov al Hatorah, Vayeishev, p. 194.
[18] R.
Gil Student, “Toward a Halakhic Philosophy of History,” Torah Musings (March 15, 2011).
[19]
 Shu”t Az Nidberu 14:68. For more see R. Daniel Feldman, False Facts and True Rumors: Lashon Hara in Contemporary Society, (2015), pp. 228-230 and R. Eleff, pp. 422-431.
[20]
 Hafetz Hayim 1:2:2.
[21]
 Ibid. 1:10:2.
[22] R.
Nathan Kamenetsky, Making of a Godol, Vol. 1 (Improved Edition, 2004), p. xxv.
[23]
Kohelet 9:6.
[24] R.
Kamenetsky, Making of a Godol, pp. xxiii-xxiv.
[25] R.
Samson Raphael Hirsch, The Pentateuch, Genesis 12:10-13.
[26] R.
Yosef Yehuda Leib Bloch, Shiurei Daat, Vayikra Bishem Hashem, p. 157.
[27]
 See R. Hirsch, “On Hebrew Instruction As Part of General Education,” Judaism Eternal, Vol. 1 (Soncino, 1956), p. 199; The Nineteen Letters, Letter Eighteen (Feldheim, 1995), p. 273; Pentateuch, Devarim 4:32, 6:4, and 16:1. I am indebted to Professor Yehuda (Leo) Levi for many of these citations. See his “Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch: Myth and Fact,” Tradition (Spring 1997), 31.3, p. 7 and 18.
[28]
 Pentateuch, Devarim 4:32.
[29]
See his “Haskalah, Secular Studies and the Close of the Yeshiva in Volozhin in 1892,” The Torah u-Madda Journal, vol. 2 (1990), pp. 76-133 (available here) and “Facing the Truths of History,” The Torah u-Madda Journal, vol. 8 (1998-1999), pp. 200-276 (available here).
[30]
 “Facing the Truths of History,” pp. 203-204.
[31] R.
Jacob J. Schacter, “On the Morality of the Patriarchs: Must Biblical Heroes be Perfect?” in Zvi Grumet, ed., Jewish Education in Transition (2007), p. 5.
[32] Koveitz Iggerot Meiet Hahazon Ish, Vol. 2, no. 133.
[33]
 “Facing the Truths of History,” pp. 230-231.
[34] “Haskalah, Secular Studies,” pp. 111-112.
[35]
Siddur Yavetz, Vol. 1, Introduction.
[36]
 Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews (1988), p. 2.
[37] R.
Jonathan Sacks, “A Nation of Storytellers,” (Ki Tavo), Lessons in Leadership (2015), p. 278.
[38] R.
Sacks, Morality (2020), p. 15.




A Printing Mistake and the Mysterious Origins of Rashbi’s Yahrzeit*

A Printing Mistake and the Mysterious Origins of Rashbi’s Yahrzeit*
by Eliezer Brodt
In this post I would like to deal with tracing the early sources for the great celebrations that take place worldwide on Lag Ba-Omer, specifically at the Kever of Rashbi (R. Shimon b. Yochai) in Meron.[1] A few years back on the Seforim Blog I dealt with some of these issues (link). More recently in Ami Magazine (# 22) I returned to some of the topics. This post contains new information and corrections that I have found which were not included in those earlier articles.
The period of Sefirat ha-Omer is traditionally considered a time of great mourning. The most well-known reason given for the mourning – offered by the Geonim and Rishonim – is due to the death of twenty-four thousand students of R. Akiva who, according to the Gemara in Yevamot 62b, died during this time of the year for not having accorded respect to each other. Because this is deemed a mourning period, we refrain from shaving, taking haircuts, dancing, listening to music, and making weddings.[2] Sefer Ha- Tadir[3] writes:
ומנהג בין פסח לעצרת לומר מסכת אבות בכל שבת ושבת קודם המנחה משום מעשה תלמידי ר”ע… י”ב אלפים זוגות תלמידים היו לו לר”ע… שלא נהגו כבוד זה לזה… (ספר התדיר, עמ’ רכב).
However, the prohibitions associated with sefirah are suspended on Lag Ba-Omer, and many early sources offer reasons for additional levels of simcha on Lag Ba-Omer, which includes omitting tachnun on that day. Additionally, there is a custom to celebrate Lag Ba-Omer at the kever of Rashbi in Meron, amidst great celebration, complete with music, dancing, and bonfires. The remainder of this post at the Seforim Blog will offer some reasons for this practice.
R. Yehoshuah Ibn Shu’eib, a student of the Rashba and a great Mekubal, was unsure of the reason for the custom in his day of taking a break from mourning on Lag Ba-Omer, until he heard some say that it is because the students of R. Akiva stopped dying on that day.[4] He writes:
ולכן נהגו לגדל שפם עד עצרת, ואין כונסין נשים בזה הפרק, ואף על פי שיש טעם אחר במדרש על אותן שנים עשר אלף זוגות תלמידי דר’ עקיבא שמתו מן הפסח עד העצרת. ומה שנהגו רוב העם להגדיל שפם עד ל”ג לעומר לא מצינו בו ענין, ובתוספות פי’ כי מה שאמר ל”ג אינו כמו שנוהגין, אלא ל”ג יום כשתסיר שבעת ימי הפסח ושבעה שבתות ושני ימי ראש חדש שהן ששה עשר יום שאין אבלות נוהג בהם, נשארו מן הארבעים ותשעה ימים ל”ג, וזהו מאמרם ל”ג יום לעומר. שמעתי שיש במדרש עד פרס העצרת והוא חמשה עשר יום העצרת באמרם פרס הפסח פרס החג שהם חמשה עשר יום בניסן ובתשרי, וכשתסיר חמשה עשר יום מארבעים ותשעה יום נשארו שלשים וארבעה, והנה הם שלשים ושלשה שלימים ומגלחין ביום שלשים וארבעה בבקר כי מקצת היום ככולו. (דרשה לפסח יום ראשון)
Some other Rishonim, including the Manhig and Meiri, also give this reason, while others say that the students only stopped dying on the thirty-fourth day of the Omer, the day after Lag Ba-Omer. Thus, according to them, there would be no reason for festive celebrations on Lag Ba-Omer.[5] See, for example, the Tashbetz who writes:
וכן אירע לר’ עקיבא שהעמיד ארבעה ועשרים אלף תלמידים וכולם מתו מן הפסח ועד פרס העצרת אחר עבור ל”ג לעומר, כי פרס הוא חצי חדש שהם חמשה עשר ימים, כמו שנזכר בפרק מעשר בהמה בבכורות [נח א]. וכן בתוספתא [שקלים פ”ב מ”א] אמרו, איזהו פרס, אין פחות מט”ו. וט”ו ימים קודם עצרת, הוא יום ל”ד לעומר. ולזה נהגו להתאבל באותם ימים שהם מהפסח עד ל”ג לעומר ולא נהגו איסור ביום ל”ד לפי שמקצת היום ככולו. וכולם מתו מפני שהיתה עינם צרה זה לזה (מגן אבות, אבות, א:א).
If one looks in the Tur, the Shulhan Arukh as well as the various early commentaries, one will not find any other reason as to why there should be simcha on Lag Ba-Omer, other than that the students of R. Akiva stopped dying on Lag Ba-Omer. Be that as it may, this particular reason offers no insight into the connection between Meron, and more specifically Rashbi, and Lag Ba-Omer.
The most well known explanation to the connection between Rashbi and Lag Ba-Omer is that Rashbi died on that day, and he was one of the students of R. Akiva. Assuming for a moment that this is factually correct, it is quite strange that we celebrate Rashbi’s death. We don’t celebrate the yarzheit of Avraham Avinu, Moshe Rabbeinu, David HaMelech, or any other great people with bonfires. Rather, halakha states the opposite – to fast on a yahrzeit, especially on those days that great people died. This problem is addressed by the Sho’el u-Meshiv (5:39) and because of this question and others, he was very skeptical of the celebration that takes place at Meron. R. Aryeh Balhuver, in his Shem Aryeh (no. 13), points out that because of the celebration that takes place at Meron for Rashbi, people began to be lenient about fasting on the yarzheit of their parents.
Another problem is that neither Chazal nor any of the Rishonim mention Rashbi dying on Lag Ba-Omer; and as a general rule we do not make any form of a Yom Tov on a day that is not mentioned in Chazal. This issue was addressed by the Chatam Sofer in his teshuvot (Y.D. 233) and because of this, he too was very skeptical of the way Lag Ba-Omer is celebrated.
So what is the source that Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer? R. Yehosef Schwartz writes in his Tevuot Ha-Aretz (p.224) that he searched all over for the reason for the great simcha at Meron on Lag Ba-Omer, and concluded that it must be because Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer. R. Jonathan Eybeschutz, the Ba’al ha-Tanyah, Reb Zadok ha-Kohen, and the Arukha ha-Shulhan also say that Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer.
The Shem Aryeh (no. 14) writes that when we celebrate the yahrzeit of Rashbi, we are celebrating that he died a natural death, at the proper time and place, and not at the hands of the Romans, who did not bury the people they killed. The Gemara in Shabbat 33b–34a relates that the Romans wanted to kill Rashbi, and he ran away and hid in a cave for many years until the Romans stopped hunting him.
What appears to be an earlier source for some who say that Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer is R. Hayyim Vital, quoting in the name of the Arizal, found in the Peri Etz Chaim. Indeed, R. Hayyim Vital states that Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer, and he was one of the students of R. Akiva who died during Sefirah. In truth, it is a mistake to give R. Vital credit for this. The source of this mistake was based on a simple printing mistake in two edition of the Peri Etz Chaim. One was printed in Koretz 1785 (p. 108a).
The other was printed in Dubrowno 1802 (p. 124b).

In the first printed edition of the Peri Etz Chaim, which was printed in 1782 (p. 101a), it does not say that at all. Instead of saying “she-meit” (that he died) it has a very similar, but entirely different word, samach (was joyous). The letter chet was apparently confused for a tav in the later version, causing the whole mistake![6] (Interestingly, the Aderes in his work Zecher Davar has a whole collection of cases where a problem arose due only to a קוצו שלו יוד.)
In the Shaar ha-Kavanot from R. Vital first printed in 1752, where the same piece appears, it also reads samach (p. 127) like the first edition of Peri Etz Chaim. In a later edition of of Peri Etz Chaim printed in 1819 it also reads samach. These would seem to confirm that the error is indeed she-met rather than samach.
The late Meir Benayahu z”l and, more recently, R. Yaakov Hillel, confirmed, based on many early manuscripts that this reading that does not have Rashbi dying on Lag be-Omer, is the correct reading from the writings of R. Chaim Vital. Recently, R. Yaakov Hillel printed the Sefer Shaar Ha-Tefilah from a manuscript of R. Hayyim Vital’s actual handwriting, and in that location (p. 312), as well, the passage states that it was the day of Simchat Rashbi, not the day he died.[7]
Interestingly, the Chida in his work Birkhei Yosef, printed in 1774, writes that Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer. But in a later work of his, Ma’aret Ayin, printed in 1805, he writes that the Prei Etz Chaim is full of mistakes and this statement regarding Lag Ba-Omer and Rashbi’s death day is one of them. So the Chida’s conclusion is that it is not a reference to Rashbi’s day of death at all. This conclusion is accepted by later authorities, including Takfo Shel Nes (p. 59a), Shu”t Rav u-Po’alim (1:11), and Tziyun LeNefesh Chayah (no. 65).[8]
The Lubavitcher Rebbe[9] wrote in a letter to R. Zevin that there is a printing mistake in the Peri Etz Chaim.

הרה”ג הוו”ח אי”א נו”מ וכו’ מהורשי”ז שי’
שלום וברכה!
במקרה ראיתי, בספרית כ”ק מו”ח אדמו”ר שליט”א, את ספרו “המועדים בהלכה” מהד”ת, ומצאתי שם בפרק ל”ג בעומר העתקת לשון הפרע”ח (דפוס דובראוונע ודפוס לאשצוב) שער ספה”ע פ”ז בהערה, וז”ל: והטעם שמת רשב”י ביום ל”ג בעומר כי הוא מתלמידי רע”ק שמתו בספה”ע.
והנה ידוע, אשר קטע זה מוקשה הוא הן בנגלה, כי רשב”י הוא מהחמשה תלמידים שסמך רע”ק אח”כ, הן מצד הנסתר ע”פ המבואר, בפע”ח שם ובסידור האריז”ל, מדריגת הכ”ד אלף תלמידים שמתו ומדריגת ה’ תלמידים הנ”ל. וכבר עמד ע”ז בשו”ת דברי נחמי’ חאו”ח סל”ד סק”ז. וסיים: ואולי יש ט”ס בפע”ח שם במ”ש כי הוא כו’ כנ”ל וצ”ע בדפוס קארעץ ששמעתי ששם נשמט זה.
ואמת כן הוא, אשר בפע”ח דפוס קארעץ לא נמצא קטע הנ”ל. וכן בסידורי האריז”ל ובשני פע”ח כת”י, שישנם באוסף הכת”י אשר לכ”ק מו”ח אדמו”ר שליט”א, חסר כל ענין זה. כן לא מצאתי לביאור הנ”ל בכל דרושי דא”ח שראיתי לע”ע.
וז”ל ספר הכוונות (ענין ספה”ע דרוש יב) בטעמי מנהגי ל”ג בעומר: כי הרשב”י ע”ה הוא מחמשה תלמידיו הגדולים של רע”ק ולכן זמן שמחתו ביום ל”ג בעומר. ועד”ז הוא במשנת חסידים.

– ובעהמ”ס ד”נ כנראה לא ראה את סה”כ, מדאינו מביאו – ומכמה טעמים מהנכון, לפענ”ד, לתקן את הנ”ל בספרו, או עכ”פ להעיר על הספקות שבדבר, בהזדמנות הראשונה. ..

The question then is, what is the earliest printed source that Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer. Avraham Yaari and Meir Benayahu demonstrate that the earliest source to mention Lag Ba-Omer as the yarzheit of Rashbi is none other than the Chemdat Yamim. R. Yaakov Hillel also confirms this in his Aid ha-Gal ha-Zeh (p. 13).
The Chemdat Yamim was first printed in the 1730s and has been the source of controversy and debate until today. Some go out of their way to attack it, claiming it has strong ties to Shabbetai Tzvi. Others strongly defend it, saying it is a very special work. Whatever the case is, Chemdat Yamim has been established by many as the source of many different customs that we observe today. It is not necessarily the earliest source, but in the first few years after it first appeared, Chemdat Yamim was printed many times, becoming a bestseller as it were. Because of this, many customs contained therein became widespread. One notable example is the celebration of Tu Be-shevat. After the Chemdat Yamim was printed, many works about the customs of Tu Be-shevat were printed based on it. What is very interesting is that Chasidim, who are principally against the Chemdat Yamim, are very into this concept that Lag Ba-Omer is the yarzheit of Rashbi.[10]

If one looks at all early mentions of Lag Ba-Omer and the Arizal one will not see any mention of it being the yarzheit of Rashbi. Here are some examples:
The Magen Avraham, first printed in 1692, writes when talking about days when we do not say Tachanun writes:
מעשה באחד שנהג כל ימיו לומר נחם בבונה ירושלים ואמרו בל”ג בעומר ונענש על זה מפני שהוא י”ט [כונת האר”י] (מגן אברהם סי’ קלא ס”ק יז)
When talking about Lag Ba-Ome , the Magen Avraham writes:
ומרבים בו קצת שמחה – וכתו’ בכוונות שגדול אחד היה רגיל לומר נחם בכל יום ואמרו גם בל”ג ונענש (מגן אברהם סי’ תצג ג)
We see that he makes no mention of it being the yarzheit of Rashbi when he referencing to the Arizal and Lag Ba-Omer. It is generally accepted that the Magen Avraham is responsible for bringing the writings of the Arizal into the world of halakhic discourse. The question, however, is regarding the Magen Avraham’s source for this specific Arizal. In general R. Yosef Avivi shows that the Magen Avraham when quoting from the Arizal was using the work Shulhan Arukh Shel Arizal.[11] There are many works similar to this work, one was called Nagid U-metzaveh; another was called Lechem Min Hashamayim. In both of these works, the whole story with the Arizal and Nachem appears with the version that this was the day of Simchat Rashbi, and not the day he died.
Now in this work, the story as quoted above appears and no mention of it being the yahrzeit of Rashbi, but rather that it was the day of Simchat Rashbi. However we cannot say, for certain, that his source was the Shulhan Arukh Shel Arizal because he specifically quotes the Sefer Hakavanot as his source. Now the problem with this is, which Sefer Hakavanot was the Magen Avraham referring to? The only edition printed before the Magen Avraham was from R. Moshe Terniki printed in Venice in 1620. In that edition of Sefer Hakavanot, there is nothing about Lag Ba-Omer. In a personal communication, R. Yosef Avivi suggested to me that it was the Sefer Hakavanot that was written in Cracow in 1650 and the Magen Avraham had it in manuscript. This edition of Sefer Hakavanot was later printed under the name Peri Etz Chaim in 1785.[12]
Another example of an early source who quotes the Arizal about Lag Ba-Omer but makes no mention of it being his yahrzeit can be found in the Ateret Zekenim from R. Menachem Auerbach, first printed on the side of the Shulhan Arukh in 1702 (it was written much earlier). He also cites the story of the Arizal:
מנהג ארץ ישראל שנוהגין לילך על קברי רשב”י ז”ל ור”א בנו ביום ל”ג בעומר והעיד ר”א הלוי שהוא היה נוהג תמיד לומר נחם בברכת תשכון וכשסיים התפלה א”ל ר”י לוריא ז”ל משם רשב”י הקבור שם שאמר לו אמור לאיש הזה למה הוא אומר נחם ביום שמחתי ולכן הוא יהיה נחם בקרוב וכן היה שמת לו בנו הגדול (סי’ תצג).
Here too we see a version of the story that has nothing about it being the yahrzeit of Rashbi.
Another example of an early source that quotes the Arizal about Lag Ba-Omer, but makes no mention of it being his yahrzeit can be found in the Sefer Shirei ha-Levim. This work was first printed in 1677; it includes anything having to do with the topic of Shir Shel Yom including the Arizal’s custom that he found in different sources.[13] When talking about Lag Ba-Omer he writes:
ל”ג בעמור שייך מזמור לז על שם שנאמר בו צופה רשע לצדיק וגו’ וזה שייך על רשב”י וחבריו שנשארו מתלמידי ר”ע כמבואר בגמרא ולא שלט בהם המלאך המות ביום ההוא וכן מיום ההוא והלאה כי קצת דיעות. וכתב בספר כוונת האר”י הנדפס שהלך האריז”ל עם אשתו ובניו לגלח על קבר רשב”י ועשה משתה ושמחה ג’ ימים לג לד לה ולמדו ספר הזוהר על קברו לכבודו של רשב”י וחביריו שנשתיירו והעמידו תורה באותו שעה, וע”ש מעשה נפלא על אחד שנענש על שאמר נחם בתפילת יח בעת שמחתו אבל ספר כוונת של הקדוש ר’ חיים וויטל…
I am not sure which printed edition of Sefer Hakavanot he was referring to that contains this passage. However we see here also no mention of it being yahrzeit of Rashbi.
The Mishnat Chassidim, first printed in 1727, collected lots of material from the Arizal. When talking about Lag Ba-Omer, also makes no mention of it being the yarzheit of Rashbi.[14] He just writes:
ועל ידי ר’ שמעון בן יוחאי שהיה אף הוא תלמידו נתקיים העולם לפיכך אין להתאבל ביום זה כלל על החרבן שלא יענש אל מצוה לשמח שמחת ר’ שמעון בן יוחאי ואם דר בארץ ישראל ילך לשמוח על קברו.
Next is the historical work Divrei Yosef from R. Yosef Sambary, completed in 1672 but only printed a few years ago, (although parts were printed by Adolf Neubauer in 1887). When he records the story with the Arizal about someone saying Nachem at the kever of Rashbi, he does not even mention it was on Lag Ba-Omer; he, too, records the story stressing that it was a day of Simcha not the yahrzeit of Rashbi (p. 188).
It is also worth pointing out that the Shelah ha-Kadosh, an earlier work that was influenced by the Arizal, when talking about Lag Ba-Omer, also makes no mention of it being the yahrzeit of Rashbi.
The Divrei Nechemiah, written by the grandson of the Ba’al ha-Tanyah, writes (no. 34) that there is a printing mistake in the Peri Etz Chaim when he says that it was the yahrzeit of Rashbi. However he concludes:
אך המפורסמות אין צריך ראיה שכבר נתפרסם בכל העולם מכמה דורות ע’ הלולא דרשב”י בל”ג בעומר ומסתמא יש מקור לזה בזוהר או בכתבי האר”י ז”ל.
In short it is quite amazing that the whole source for Lag ba-Omer being the day of Rashbi’s death is based on a printing mistake found in only one version of the story with the Arizal, while all other versions I have found of the story does not say anything about it being the yahrzeit of Rashbi!
Returning to the origins of going to Meron on Lag Ba-Omer, Avraham Yaari, has a very detailed article where he collects many early sources[15] for going to Meron in general[16] from famous travelers such as R. Binyomin Me-Tudela in the 1170s, R. Pesachyah Me-Regensburg, but these early sources make no mention of going to Rashbi’s Kever, only to the kevarim of Hillel and Shammai[17] who are also buried in Meron.[18] The first source that Avraham Yaari found that mentions going to Rashbi’s kever is from the twelfth-century in the travels of R. Yaakov HaKohen. After that, he found it in other sources.[19] None of these sources mention to these kevarim at a specific time. In the beginning of the fourteenth century, however, a student of the Ramban mentions going to the kevarim of Hillel and Shammai in Meron on a specific date in the month of Iyar, on Pesach Shnei. We have other early sources that mention going to those kevarim on Pesach Sheini. In the famous letter of R. Ovadiah me-Bertinoro (1488) and the travels of R. Moshe Basola (1521-1523), we also find mention of going to Meron to visit the kevarim of Hillel and Shammai on Pesach Sheini. From many of these sources, we see that the reason they went was to daven for water, and that at times, water would miraculously appear from the caves. However, it is important to stress that while we have many accounts of going to Meron even during the month of Iyar none mention going to the kever of Rashbi during that time of year.
Avraham Yaari and Meir Benayahu cite many sources that clearly demonstrate that the Mekubelei Tzefat would go to Meron to the kever of Rashbi a few times during the year to learn Zohar. However, the first source we have for someone going to Rashbi’s kever specifically on Lag Ba-Omer, is the Talmdim of the Arizal, who say that the Arizal once went to the kever of Rashbi on Lag Ba-Omer while still living in Egypt. When recording this testimony, R. Hayyim Vital writers that he is not sure if this occurred before the Arizal was well versed in Kabbalah. But he stresses that he was doing something done by others before him. We do not know to whom R. Hayyim Vital referred. Meir Benayahu concluded that the custom of going to Meron on Lag Ba-Omer was begun by the Mekubelei Tzefat.
Although Yaari concedes that Mekubelei Tzefat were very into going to the kever of Rashbi, that is not how the minhag to go specifically on Lag Ba-Omer developed. Yaari shows that the custom of going to Meron was taken from an earlier custom of going to Shmuel Hanavi’s Kever on his yahrzeit, which was on the twenty-eighth day of Iyar.[20] The Tur brings down from the Behag that one should fast on this day. We have many early sources of prayers that were recited on this day at Shmuel Hanavi’s Kever.[21] In the travels of Meshulem Me-Volterrah from 1481, the travels of R. Ovadiah me-Bertinoro (1488) and the travels of R. Moshe Basola (1521-1523) we also find mention of going to Shmuel Hanavi’s Kever on his yarzheit. In these sources, we also see that they used to light many big flames. Avraham Yaari believes this to be the source of the minhag to go to Kever of Rashbi.
In sum, the above indicates that there are early sources for people going to Meron during the month of Iyar, on Pesach Sheni, to the kevarim of Hillel and Shammai. The Mekubelei Tzefat went to Rashbi’s kever throughout the year and Meir Benayahu feels that the minhag of going Lag Ba-Omer originated from them too. While Yaari feels that the custom of going to Meron on Lag Ba-Omer was taken from an earlier custom to go to Shmuel Hanavi’s Kever on his yahrzeit, it is also clear that the Arizal did, in fact, go to the kever of Rashbi on Lag Ba-Omer at least once.
However it appears to this writer that it is more likely that the custom of going to Meron to the Kever of R. Shimon Bar Yochai on Lag Ba-Omer grew out of the earlier minhag of going to Meron in the month of Iyar, to the kevarim of Hillel and Shammai on Pesach Sheini which is only a few days before Lag Ba-Omer, and not from the Minhag of going to Shmuel Hanavi’s Kever on his yahrzeit, which was on the twenty eighth day of Iyar, which is not even in Meron. Possibly support to this can be found in the travels of R. Moshe of Basola who writes that after going to kevarim of Hillel and Shammai on Pesach Sheini, the crowd would go to the cave where Rashbi and his son hid for thirteen years and they would spend a few days and nights celebrating in Meron.[22]
In the work Arugat Ha-Bosem, written in 1234, I found a very interesting version to the earlier quoted, famous Gemara of why the sefirah period is considered a time of mourning. He writes:
מה טעם מנהג בישראל אין עושין מלאכה בין פסח לעצרת, משתקשע החמה עד למחרת שחרית, ואמרו לנו שני טעמים אחד על פטירת תלמיד הילל ושמאי, דאמ’ שמוני’ אלף תלמיד’ היו להילל הזקן ושמאי מגבת ועד אנטיפרס, וכולן מתו מפסח עד עצרת על שאלה ונוהגים כבוד זה לזה… [ערוגת הבשם, א, עמ’ 75].
This version would be possible additionally support, that originally in Iyar Jews went to the kevarim of Hillel and Shammai on Pesach Sheini. However I was unable to find any other manuscript that records such a reading of this Gemara.[23]
R. Shemaryhu Adler has a very interesting insight into the deaths of the talmdim of R. Akiva during sefira and when they start dyeing. In this piece he also says as a fact that Rashbi died on Lag B’Omer.
נראה טעם הגון ונכון לעצומו של יום לג בעומר דהוא בכלל יום טוב. ובהקדם להבין עוד מה דלכאורה תמוה דלמה לכולהו הני שיטות ליכא התחלה לאבילות כי אם מזמן התחלת ספירת העומר והיינו מיום ב’ דפסח דאיזה שייכות יש לאבילות ךדלמידי ר”ע לזמן התחלת ספירת העומר כיון דיבמות ס”ב ע”ב אמר כולם מתו מפסח ועד עצרת וסתמא תנא מפסח מנ”ל דזהו מיום ב’ דפסח ולא מיום א’.
נראה ע”פ דאמר במנחות סח ע”ב יתיב ר”ט וקא קשיא ליה מה בין קודם לעומר לקודם שתי הלחם אמר לפניו יהודה בר נחמיה לא אם אמרת קודם לעומר כשן לא הותר מכללו אצל הדיוט כו’ שתק ר”ט צהבו פניו של רבי יהודה בר נחמיה אמר לו ר”ע יהודה הבצו פניך שהשבת את זקן תמהני אם תאריך ימים אר”י ב”ר אלעי אותו הפרק פרס הפסח היה עשעליתי לעצרת שאלתי אחריו יהודה בן נחמיה היכן הוא ואמרו לי נפטר והלך לו עכ”ל הגמרא יעו”ש
ומזה נראה דהי’ קודם פסח ט”ו יום ונשאו ונתנו בענינא דעומר וע”י דצהבו פניו של יהודה בן נחמיה במה דהשיב את ר”ט ועי”ז קפד ר”ע מסברא לומר דבעת שהגיע זמן הקרבת העומר דהוא זמן התחלת ספירת העומר ביום ב’ של פסח מצאה הקפידה מקום דתיחול כיון דעיקר דהשיב לר”ט היה בענינא דעומר וכיון דקפידת ר”ע היה על מה דתלמידו יהודה בן נחמיה התכבד בתשובתו לר”ט ולא נהג בו כבוד כראוי ומצאה הקפידה מקום לנוח בזמן הקרבת העומר דזהו היתה סיבה להא דהשיב הזקן ר”ט שפיר התפשטה קפידת ר”ע ג”כ על כל תלמידיו שלא נהגו כבוד זה לזה והלכך שפיר התחילה פטירתן מאותו זמן דעיקר הקפידה חלה והיינו מיום ב’ דפסח שהוא זמן הקרבת העומר והלכך שפיר שייכא אבילות דתלמידי ר”ע לזמן התחלת ספירת העומר וכנ”ל
ועיין כי רשב”י היה מתלמידי ר”ע והיה קפדן גדול וכדאמר במעילה יז ע”ב… וא”כ הו”א כיון דר”ש ג”ג נפטר ביום ל”ג בעומר נהי דכבר היה זה זמן טובא אחר שמתו תלמידי ר”ע כיון דאמר ביבמות ס”ב והיה… מ”מ כיון דקפידת ר”ע על מניעת נהיגת כבוד חלה בזמן בעומר שוב פטירת ר”ש דהיתה בזמן ימי העומר והיינו ל”ג בעומר ג”כ מקפידת ר”ע רבו על דהיה קפדן ובודאי לא נהג כבוד, והלכך לשלילת מחשבה כזו עושים קצת שמחה להראות דפטירת רשב”י אינו בגדר קפדנותו של ר”ע רבו ומטעמא דנהי דרשב”י היה קפדן מ”מ לא היתה לבד התכבדות בקלונו של חברו ח”ו דז”א דרשב”י הי צדיק גמור ועיקר קפדנותו לא היתה כ”א לכבוד השי”ת וקנאותו וזהו עיקר הלולא דרשב”י (שו”ת מראה כהן, סי’ כט אות ג).
R. Eliezer Dunner, in his work Zichron Yosef Tzvi, offers a very novel reason for the celebration on Lag Ba-Omer. He says that we know that R. Akiva was a strong supporter of Bar Kochba. He suggests that R. Akiva students were soldiers in his army to fight the Romans and they died in this time period of Sefirah. During this time, on Lag Ba-Omer, the Jews were winning, that is why they turned this day into a great day of celebration.
ידענו כי ר’ עקיבא היה הולך ונוסע ומלמד בכל תפוצת הארץ ובכל מקום היה לו תלמידים הרבה מאוד ועין שחושב לבר כוזבא כמשיח קרא כל תלמידיו להלחם בצד בר כוזבא ותחת רגליו נגד חיל האויבים… ואף על פי שבתחילה חלשו היהודים את אויביהם לפי חרב אחר כך גברו הרומיים ולכדו מישראל עיר ועיר ובאותה זמן היתה מלחמה בכל יום יום ובכל מלחמה נפלו ומתו הרבה אנשים מחיל בר כוזבא ובהן כמה תלמידי ר’ עקיבא וכששקעה החמה בכל יום ויום פסקה המלחמה ואז נקברו כל המתים. ואפשר שבתוך כל המלחמות הללו שהיו יום יום ושבהם גברו האויביהם על ישראל היה יום אחד והוא ל”ג בעומר שגבר בו ישראל אותו יום שבו היה להם ישעות ה’ בעת צרתם יום גבורה ותשועה אותו יום קבעו ליום שמחה לדור דורים וכמו כן שמעתי גם מפי הרב דק”ק פוזנא מוהר”ר זאב פיילכענפעלד ז”ל (זכרון יוסף צבי, סי’ תצ”ג).
However, this original explanation, while giving us new insight into the mourning period during sefirah does not help us understand the connection to Rashbi. Avraham Korman in his Pinu’ach Aggadot (pp. 190-210) cites others (not R. Dunner) that tie the death of the talmidim of R. Akiva to the rebellion of Bar Kochba and he goes further to explain the connection between this and Rashbi and other minhagim of Sefirah.
There is a custom in many chasidic courts to use bow and arrows on Lag Ba-Omer. Many explanations are offered, but Korman says that perhaps the bows and arrows serve as a reminder of the war that the students of Rebbe Akiva fought against the Romans. As an aside, although most sources for bow and arrows on Lag Ba-Omer are found in chasidic seforim, I have found a possible source that in Vilna in the early 1800’s they also used bow and arrows on Lag Ba-Omer.[24]
R. Mordechai Ha-Kohen suggests based on this connection between the students of R. Akiva and the battle of Bar Kochba, that we can understand another issue. The Tur brings an old minhag that woman would refrain from doing work at night from after sunset the whole sefirah. He says the reason was the woman too participated in the battles against Bar Kochba they acted as nurses and helped the fallen soldiers and buried the dead every day after sunset when the fighting stopped. Therefore he says a custom developed that woman today do not do work after sunset.[25]
The earliest source who ties the mourning period during sefirah period for the deaths of the students of R’ Akiva and the battle of Bar Kochba that I found was in the magnum opus of the famous Galician maskil, Nachman Krochmal, who write in his Moreh Nevuchei Ha-zman:
אכן נראה כי גברה עתה המחשבה והעצה למרוד גם בין קצת החכמים וביחוד בין התלמידים והבחורים, ויש זכר לדבר גם בתלמוד ובמדרשות, ד”מ השנים עשר אלף תלמידים שהיו לר’ עקיבא מגבת ועד אטניפרוס וכולם מתו מפסח ועד עצרת (כלומר שעזבוהו כולם בזמן קצר לעת המרידה ולבסוף ספו תמו במלחמה) [מורה נבוכי הזמן, שער י, עמ’ קט].
Support to this theory can possibly be found in the Iggeret R. Sherirah Gaon according to Gedaliahu Alon. R. Sherirah Gaon writes:
והעמיד ר’ עקיבא תלמידים הרבה והוה שמדא על התלמידים של ר’ עקיבא והות סמכא דישראל על התלמידים שנייים של ר’ עקיבא דאמור רבנן שנים עשר אלף תלמידים היו לו לר’ עקיבא מגבת ועד אנטיפטרס וכלם מתו מפסח ועד עצרת (אגרת ר’ שרירא גאון, ב”מ לוין, עמ’ 13).
Alon suggests that the words and “there was a Shemad” implies they were killed by the government.[26] However, it is not so simple that this is all historically true as there are many different discussions to what extent was R. Akiva was actively involved in the rebellion. It is well known that the Rambam writes:
וביתר שמה והיו בה אלפים ורבבות מישראל והיה להם מלך גדול ודימו כל ישראל וגדולי החכמים שהוא המלך המשיח, ונפל ביד גוים ונהרגו כולם והיתה צרה גדולה כמו חורבן המקדש (הל’ תעניות ה:ג).
Elsewhere he writes even more clearly:
אל יעלה על דעתך שהמלך המשיח צריך לעשות אותות ומופתים ומחדש דברים בעולם או מחיה מתים וכיוצא בדברים אלו, אין הדבר כך, שהרי רבי עקיבא חכם גדול מחכמי משנה היה, והוא היה נושא כליו של בן כוזיבא המלך, והוא היה אומר עליו שהוא המלך המשיח, ודימה הוא וכל חכמי דורו שהוא המלך המשיח, עד שנהרג בעונות, כיון שנהרג נודע להם שאינו… (הל’ מלכים יא:ג).
The Meiri writes:
וכן בדבור הזה עמד בן עוזיבא ועשה עצמו משיח, וטעו רבים אחריו, ואף ר’ עקיבא היה נושא כליו (סדר קבלה, מה’ אופק, עמ’ 77).
R. Hamberger in his Meshichei Sheker u-Mitnageidheim (pp. 676-681) has a long list of people who agree with the Rambam.
Zecharia Frankel in Darkei HaMishna (p. 128) concludes that he did not really have much to do with the rebellion[27]. Y. Derenberg concludes that R. Akiva and his students were very involved with Bar Kochba.[28] R. Issac Halevi in his Dorot Ha-Rishonim (5, pp. 602- 628) downplays R. Akiva’s role completely saying he did not really endorse Bar Kokhba for that long. From the Rambam and Meiri quoted above it seems they disagree. Aharon Heyman concludes that R. Akiva and his students were actively involved with Bar Kochba (Toledot Tanaaim ve-Amoraim 3, pp. 1002-1004).
To conclude with a well-known cute story related to R. Akiva and Bar Kochba: R. Zevin brings from R. Chaim Soloveitchik:
פעם אחת נסע רבי חיים ברכבת… היה שם איש אחד מן המסיתים, שהירבה דברים להוכיח שאותו האיש הוא המשיח… בתוך הויכוח נענה אחד ואמר להמסית וכי מי יודע יותר בטיבו של אותו האיש התנאים, שהיו בדורו והכירו אותו ואת מעשיו או אתה שאתה רחוק ממנו כאלפיים שנה? והרי התנאים של אותו דור דנוהו ותלוהו. השיב המסית אותם התנאים הרי אנו רואים, שטועים היו שכן טעה רבי עקיבא וחשב את בר כוכבא למשיח. נסתתמו טענותיו של היהודי ורבי חיים כשראה שיד המסית על העליונה, נענה ואמר וכי זו מנין לך שרבי עקיבא טעה בבר כוכבא? נתלהב המסית הרי הרגו את בר כוכבא! אם כן משיב רבי חיים בנחת הרי אתה מודה שמשיח שנהרג אינו משיח. (אישים ושיטות, עמ’ ס).
* Thanks to R. Yosef Avivi for his help with some of the issues related to the writings of the Arizal.
[1] Much has been written about all the customs of Lag Ba-Omer. The best collections of material on the topic appear in Avraham Yaari, Tarbiz 22 (1951); Meir Benayhu, Sefunot 6 pp. 11-40, summarized in Sefer Vilnai 2:326-330] and R. Betzalel Landau, Maseh Meron (1966). See also David Tamar, Eshkolet Tamar, pp. 116-120]. See also R. Shelomo Joseph Zevin, Moadim Bahalcha pp. 359-64; Shmuel Ashkenazi, Avnei Chain pp. 103-11. For more recent collections of sources see: R. Yaakov Hillel, Aid ha-Gal ha-Zeh, pp. 3-29; Moshe Blau, Yeshurun 15 (2008), pp. 854-872; Tuviah Freund, Moadim le-Simcha; Pardes Eliezer s.v Lag ba-Omer;Yitzhak Tessler, Pinnenei ha-Chag.
As I have noted in my previous post at the Seforim blog on the topic of Lag ba-Omer, Freund and Blau have each plagiarized greatly from the works of Landau, Yaari, and Benayahu.
[2] For a detailed discussion, see R. Gedaliah Oberlander, Minhag Avoteinu be-Yadeinu (Merkaz Halakhah, 2005), pp. 528-547.
[3] On this work see R. R.N. Rabinowitz, Ohel Avraham (1898) pp. 14-15; Y.Yudolov, Yeshurun 24 (2011), pp. 893-919.
[4] Dershos Ri Ibn Shu’eib, 1, p. 222.
[5];Peri Chadash, 493:2. See also Beis Yosef and Aruch Ha-shulchan.
[6] For more on this edition, see R. Yosef Avivi, Binyan Ariel, pp. 68-71 and his Kabbalat Ha-Ari, 2, pp. 705-06.
[7] One can see pictures of the manuscripts in the article from Moshe Blau cited in footnote one.
[8] It would appear to me that Reb Yosef Engel also did not think that Rashbi died on Lag B’omer as in his work Otzros Yosef he has many pages on Lag b’omer and talmidei R. akiva etc and he makes no mention that it was the day he died.
[9] Thanks to an anonymous commenter for pointing to this letter.
[10] For a partial list of sources regarding the Chemdat Yamim controversy, see my Likutei Eliezer, p. 2. It’s worth mentioning that a new three volume edition of the Chemdat Yamim has just been printed in Benei Brak. The edition is very nice and was based upon the first edition. However, the 250 page introduction is extremely amusing.
[11] See R. Yosef Avivi, Kabbalat Ha-Ari, 2, pp. 752-753.
[12] See R. Yosef Avivi, Kabbalat Ha-Ari, 2, pp. 593-598, 670-672, 705-06. See also Zeev Gries, Safrot Ha-hanhaghot, pp. 81-84, 87-90; Yaakov S. Speigel, Pitchei Tefilah u-Moed, pp. 308-309.
Edit 6.22.11: However after reading this post R. Bentzion Meisles (In a personal communication) showed me that this whole piece with the Arizal going to Meron does indeed appear in the Sefer Hakavonos of R. Terniki, (In the 2006 edition it appears on pp. 5-6) and it too says שמחתי.
[13] On this work see here and here.
[14] See R. Yosef Avivi, Kabbalat Ha-Ari, 2, pp. 757-759.
[15] The actual sources can be seen in his works Masaot Eretz Yisrael and Iggerot Eretz Yisrael.
[16] Much has been written about davening at kevarim in general see Yehezkal Lichtenstein, Me-Tumah Le-Kedusha, pp. 218-242, 293-386.
[17] M. Zulay published very early Piyutim that seem to show that Hillel and Shammai were brothers! See his Eretz Yisrael u-Piyuteh, pp. 539-545.
[18] On going to the kevarim of Hillel and Shammai see M. Weiss, Kivrei Avos, 129-132; Elchanan Reiner “Pilgrims and Pilgrimage to Eretz Yisrael (1099-1517),” (PhD dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1988), 295-320.
[19] General sources for going to the Kever of Rashbi can be found in M.Weiss, Kivrei Avos pp. 179-81; Z. Vilnai, Mazavos be-Eretz ha-Kodesh pp. 117-150.
[20] On this being his date of death see the Tur (O.C. 580); S. Elitzur, Lamu Tzamnu, pp. 177-180.
[21] M. Zulay, Eretz Yisrael U-piyuteh, pp. 401-412. For more regarding Shmuel ha-Navi and visiting his grave, see M. Weiss, Kivrei Avot, pp. 113-16; Lamu Tzamnu pp. 177-80; Reiner op. cit. pp. 306-20; Y. Lichtenstein, Me-Tumah Le-Kedusha, pp. 298-230.
[22] The Itinerary of R. Moses Basola (David ed.) p.91.
[23] See Makhon Talmud Yisraeli, Yevamot 62b.
[24] Kundes p. 49. For more on this 1824 parody see here. For more sources on using bow and arrows on Lag Ba-Omer: see the sources listed by Landau, ibid pp. 124-26; Moadim le-Simcha pp. 155-59; Pardes Eliezer pp. 229-49; ha-Koton ve-Halachosov chapter 24 p. 59 n. 22; Zikhronot Av u-Beno p. 231; A.S. Sachs, Worlds that Passed (Philadelphia, 1928), p. 112.
[25] Ishim Utekufot, pp. 102-105.
[26] Toldos Hayehudim Beretz Yisroel, 2, pp. 43-44.
[27] See also J. Brull in his Mavo Le-Mishna, 2. pp. 121-122. For more sources on all this see: G. Alon, Toldos Hayehudim Beretz Yisroel, 2, pp. 16-47; S. Safrai, R. Akiva Ben Yosef, pp. 26-33; M. Cohen, Ishim Utekufot, pp. 92-112; R. Y. Tamar, Alei Tamar, Tannis, pp. 390-392;C. Kulitz, Rosh Lechachochim; Ibid, Ben Ha-aliyah; collection of articles in Mared Bar Kochba, Ed. A. Oppenheimer; R. Hamberger, Meshichei Sheker U-misnagdim, pp. 138-155, 665-681.
[28] Maseh Eretz Yisroel, pp. 220-228.



Kosher Tube: TV Series on the 13 Principles

TV Series on the Thirteen Principles
by: Marc B. Shapiro
My next post will, God willing, appear after Pesah (in three parts). In the meantime, I wanted to let readers know about the thirteen episodes of a show focusing on the Thirteen Principles. It is called Credo 13 and you can find it here.
It appeared on Canadian television and “stars” myself, David Novak. Benjamin Hecht, Shalom Carmy, Eliezer Breitowitz, Mayer Schiller, and Leib Tropper. (If you can’t tolerate, or figure out, the game played by the girls in the show, just fast-forward through that section. Also, for some reason the quality of parts 10-13 is not perfect).
I was very impressed with the speakers, in particular Rabbi Breitowitz. Unlike the others, I had never heard of him, and found him to be a very insightful and really wonderful member of the “team”. The one weak link, in my opinion, was Leib Tropper, and I say this without any connection to recent events. Apart from the fact that he speaks as if he is talking to yeshiva bochurim rather than the larger community, there are times when he is simply wrong. For example, what he says in part 8 about the text of the Torah is based on a misunderstanding, and contrast what he says with the perceptive comments of Schiller and Hecht.
On this topic, in my book I cited a number of examples of authors who have no knowledge of the history of the Torah text[1] (or perhaps they do have knowledge, but are consciously engaged in the creation of a religious myth). A recent example of this is R. Ezriel Tauber, Pirkei Mahashavah al Yod Gimel Ikarei ha-Emunah (Jerusalem, 2008). This is what he says regarding the text of the Torah (p. 206):
עינינו הרואות כי מסורת זו נשמרה בישראל עד לימינו. ואף על פי שכלל ישראל התפזרו לארבע כנפות הארץ, בכל אופן כל ספרי התורה של כל העדות בכל התקופות ובכל המקומות הם בנוסח אחיד, והם זהים. זוהי תופעה מופלאה מאד שלאחר העתקות כה רבות וטלטולים נותרו כל ספרי התורה באותו נוסח.
What is one to make of such a statement? Can it be that Tauber really knows so little about this matter? Is he ignorant of a number of famous talmudic passages, of numerous teshuvot of rishonim and aharonim that deal with differences in Torah texts, of the famous comment of R. Akiva Eger? Does he not know anything about the Masoretes, and the work of Rambam, R. Meir ha-Levi Abulafia, R. Menahem Lonzano, and R. Yedidiah Solomon Norzi to establish a correct text? Does he not know that as we speak, the Yemenite text is not identical to the Ashkenazic and Sephardic texts?
I don’t for a minute think that Tauber, who is a very learned man, is ignorant of any of this. In fact, elsewhere in his book one finds a different perspective (p. 215):
בכל תפוצות ישראל אין הבדל משמעותי בין ספרי התורה
Is there any way to explain what Tauber is doing other than assuming that in the first passage I cite he is creating a religious myth, but his true opinion is reflected in the second passage?
Perhaps another example of his creation of a religious myth is the following comment, which is designed to illustrate the universal nature of Jewish observance despite the myriad of details in halakhah (p. 216):
אם באנו למנות את כל הדינים וההלכות הכלולים בזוג תפילין, נגיע לכשלושים אלף הלכות!
Correct me if I’m wrong, but it seems to me that this can only be read as לשון גוזמא , in other words, designed to impress and inspire, rather than being factual. Rashbam states (Pesahim 119a):
משוי שלש מאות: לאו דוקא וכן כל שלש מאות שבש”ס
R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes brings a bunch of other talmudic examples where the number 300 is used in an exaggerated fashion.[2] I think we can say the same thing about the number 30,000 in Rabbi Tauber’s book.
With regard to the text of the Torah, in Limits, p. 97 n. 41, I discussed the different readings of the word דכא vs. דכה in Deut. 23:2. I stated that Ashkenazim and Sephardim read it with a heh and Yemenites read it with an aleph. This is also how the matter is described in the responsum of R. Ovadiah Yosef that I refer to in this note. Yet matters are actually more complicated than this. R. Chaim Rapoport informs me that the Chabad practice is to write with an aleph. Furthermore, there was also an old Ashkenazic minhag to write it with an aleph.[3]
Right before I was going to post this, S. of On the Main Line asked me if I could make sense of a sentence that appeared in a Yated Neeman article entitled “Letter by Letter: The Story of the Romm Publishing House and the Vilna Shas”, available here.
The strange sentence reads: “The first manuscript that the Romm family obtained was Rabbenu Chananel’s commentary which now appears alongside the gemora on many masechtos. The manuscript was kept in the Vatican archives but it had not been well preserved. The pages were very worn and were marked by rust stains, while the edges of the sheets had been eaten away. Moreover, the commentary was written in Latin characters, which made deciphering and copying it much harder.”
One doesn’t need to be an expert in Hebrew manuscripts to realize that this is real howler. But S. wondered where they got got the idea that R. Hananel’s commentary was written in Latin characters. Before I was able to examine the matter carefully, Dan replied with the answer. The whole article is taken (and censored) from an earlier article by Shmuel Shraga Feigensohn,[4] as Dan has already shown. See here. As for the information about the Latin characters, Dan points to this passage
בראשית שמנו לבנו להעתיק כתב יד פירושו של רבנו חננאל בר חושיאל ז”ל (מימי המאה השמינית לאלף החמישי) על מסכתות רבות מתלמוד בבלי שנמצאו באוצר הספרים שבוואטיקאן ברומי והכתב הוא באותיות רש”י בצורות איטאליאניות [נוסח איטלקי] אשר רוב ישראל בזמננו לא כהלין כתבא דא למקריה
What this mean is that the manuscript was written in the Hebrew script popular in Italy, which was not easy for non-Italians read. The anonymous person who wrote this article thought that this referred to Latin characters! (Rashi letters in Latin characters!)
When reading this passage I was reminded of another error, this time not by an anonymous Yated writer, but, bi-mehilat kevodo, by Rabban shel Yisrael, R. Moses Isserles. In his responsa, no. 128, he suggests that Rashi’s commentary to the Torah was written in the vernacular, which I assume means French, and only later translated into Hebrew. It is a mystery how he came up with this bizarre idea. R. Asher Siev, in his edition of the responsa, writes about Rama’s suggestion:
השערה תמוהה ומיוסדת על סברת עצמו ולא על שום בסיס היסטורי או עובדתי
In the subsequent responsum, no. 129, R. Samuel Katzenellenbogen writes to Rama:
והס שלא להזכיר שפירוש רש”י לא נעשה בלשון הקדש כאשר כתב אדוני
As I noted in an earlier post, it is possible to find at least one strange idea in even the greatest of our sages.

Notes
[1] I neglected to cite Yosef Reinman, who writes as follows in One People, Two Worlds, p. 119:

[A]n examination of Torah scrolls from all over the world, from Ireland to Siberia to isolated Yemen, all handwritten by scribes, yielded just nine instances of one-letter spelling discrepancies. Nine! And none of them affect the meaning of the text. Why is this so? Because every week we take out the scrolls and read them in public. The people follow the reading closely and if something is wrong, they are quick to point it out.

Unfortunately, Reinman doesn’t realize that it was the invention of printing that unified Torah texts by creating a standard version that soferim could have access to and be guided from. Printed humashim also enabled people listening to the reading to point out errors. Yet let us not forget that most of the differences in Torah scrolls have concerned male and haser. Contrary to Reinman’s implication in his last sentence, there is no way for the people following the reading to catch such an error.
I also must point out that Reinman’s first sentence is an egregious error, and one doesn’t need to go to Ireland or Siberia to prove this (and, of course, no one has ever performed such an examination). If one simply takes fifty Torah scrolls from Lakewood one will find all sorts of discrepancies. I know this because the people who check sifrei Torah by computer claim that the overwhelming majority of scrolls they check, including those that have been in use for decades, have contained at least one error. In other words, contrary to what Reinman is statng, the truth of Torah does not rise or fall because of scribal errors. If it did, then we would be in big trouble because as I just mentioned, almost every Torah scroll in the world has discrepancies. What Reinman doesn’t seem to get is that while contemporary halakhic authorities are in dispute about only nine letters, this has nothing to do with the quality of actual Torah scrolls, which are obviously subject to human errors by scribes.
For the information on errors in Torah scrolls, including eye-opening pictures, see Kolmos, Elul 5748. Here is part of R. Shmuel Wosner’s letter quoted on p. 7
עכשיו שנכנס עבודת הקאמפיוטער בזה למסלולו, ונתברר על ידו לתמהון לבב כולנו, שמבערך ששים ספרים, ס”ת שהיו בחזקת בדוקים יצאו רק תשע ספרים נקיים מכל שגיאה וברובא דמינכר מאד נמצאו שגיאות פוסלות לרוב. וכן בדידן הוי עובדא בס”ת שנכתב ע”ש תלמידים גדולים וצדיקים שנספו בעו”ה, נמצאו ה’ טעיות ממש בחסר ויתר
[2] Mavo ha-Talmud, ch. 30 and his comment to Sotah 34a. For more on rabbinic exaggerations when it comes to numbers, see R. David Yoel Weiss, Megadim Hadashim (Jerusalem, 2008), Berakhot 51b.
[3] For details, see R. Yaakov Hayim Sofer in Mekabtziel 35 (Tishrei 5769), p. 124; R. Avihai Yitzhak, Masoret Teman be-Of (Zichron Yaakov, 2009), pp. 188ff.
[4] Yahadut Lita (Tel Aviv, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 268-296. See also Feigensohn’s Aharit Davar, at the end of the Romm ed. of Nidda.

Update from Dr.Ezra Chwat of the Giluy Milta B’alma blog:
R’ Hananel in the Vilna edition employed three manuscripts. Vatican 126/128 covers all of Moe’d. The missing pages at the beginning of 126 (Yoma 2-8) are also missing in print. This is in a clear, undamaged Ashkenazic square hand, perfectly legible even to laymen. More on Vatican 126/128 here: http://nli.org.il/imhm/vaticanhebmss.pdf Pages 91-92. Bava Qama and Bava Metzia are from London BL Add. 27194 (cat. 408), as both include only BQ 2-37 and BM 2-51. This is manuscript slightly less legible. The rest of Neziqin is from Rome, Angelica (not Vatican) 83. The censor’s erasure of 4 lines on fol. 100 (on Sanhedrin 43b), is described in respective daf in Vilna, in the editors footnote. Had the Vilna editors used the BL copy mentioned above, which continues to the end of Nezikin (except for Horiyot), they would not have omitted the page on Sanhedrin 18, which is missing from Angelica (between fols. 81-82), nor the missing line on Sanhedrin 43a, both are copied in BL. This is in Italian semi-cursive hand, slightly more difficult than the others. More on the uncensored Talmud and R’ Hananel on Sanhedrin 43 (of particular interest to Daf yomi participants, coming up, how hauntingly appropriate, this Shabbat Hagadol)Here: http://imhm.blogspot.com/2010/03/blog-post.html