Your mundane affairs are forbidden on it [Shabbat] and also to calculate accounts; Reflections are permitted and to arrange matches for maidens; To arrange for a child to be taught Scripture, to sing a song of praise.

Here is the letter of R. Mazuz that appears at the end of the volume.

It seems to me that R’ Moshe must hold that the prohibition on Kol Isha depends on whether a person is used to hearing women sing. R’ Moshe holds like the Aruch Hashulchan that nowadays one can say Shema in front of a woman with uncovered hair because the reality is that we are constantly confronted with such hair and therefore it is no longer arousing. For this to make sense we need to understand the Gemara in Berachos when it says “sear b’isha erva” to mean that hair could be ervah, meaning I would have thought that ervah by definition could only refer to parts of her body, ka mashma lan that hair despite not being skin can be ervah. However it won’t actually be ervah unless it is normally covered. Since the language of the Gemara is exactly the same (as is the source) it follows that the gemara means that Kol Isha could be ervah despite not physically being attached to the body at all. However, just as R’Moshe says that our constant exposure to uncovered hair makes sear no longer be ervah, the same logic dictates that if someone has been listening to women sing all his life kol isha will not be ervah. Arguably it can also be situational so that if someone has been going to the opera all his life such singing will not be kol isha, but pop music will be. It seems to me that this heter should apply to almost all Modern Orthodox men. This would explain how Rabbi Tendler could say that R’ Moshe held that the prohibition is situational despite R’ Moshe’s tshuva apparently holding it is forbidden. It depends on who is asking the question and the time, place and manner of the singing.

Azariah de’ Rossi’s Annotations on Sefer ha-Kuzari: Identification and Preliminary Analysis

Yehuda Seewald

Abstract

This article presents the identification of annotations on a 1547 Venice edition of Sefer ha-Kuzari (The Kuzari) as the work of the Italian-Jewish scholar Rabbi Azariah de’ Rossi (min ha-Adummim). The identification is based on detailed paleographic comparison between these annotations and de’ Rossi’s verified notes on a manuscript of Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed (Paris, BnF MS hebr. 691). The article examines the nature of these annotations, their sources, and their significance for understanding de’ Rossi’s interpretative approach and his conception of the relationship between these two major philosophical works.

Introduction

Rabbi Azariah de’ Rossi (1511-1578), one of the most important Jewish scholars in 16th-century Italy, combined traditional Jewish learning with innovative Renaissance research methodologies in his major work Me’or Einayim (The Light of the Eyes).[1] His research spanned various fields, from historiography and chronology through philology and source criticism to philosophy and natural sciences.

Among the works that were central to de’ Rossi’s study were Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed and Judah Halevi’s Kuzari. He frequently quoted and referenced these two works in Me’or Einayim, using their ideas as a foundation for his discussions.[2] It appears that de’ Rossi not only quoted and discussed these works but also systematically edited and annotated them.

Chapter 1: Identification of the Annotations

The manuscript of the Guide for the Perplexed preserved in the National Library of France (hebr. 691) includes de’ Rossi’s explicit ownership signature: “This book, the Guide, gracious dweller of heights, belonged to me, Azariah son of Moses min ha-Adummim”.[3] Alongside this signature, numerous marginal notes appear, some signed with the initials “A.E.” (Amar Azariah). These notes provide a reliable reference point for identifying his handwriting.

In January 2025, two hundred Judaica items from Mr. Klagsbard’s estate were offered for sale at the Kedem auction house’s 100th public auction. Among them was lot 96, a copy of Sefer ha-Kuzari in Judah ibn Tibbon’s translation, second edition, Venice 1547. While browsing through the catalog and attached images, I was excited to identify the previously unidentified annotations as written by Rabbi Azariah de’ Rossi.[4] A detailed paleographic comparison between the notes on his copy of the Guide and those on the Kuzari confirmed this identification. The similarity is evident in all characteristics: writing style, letter forms (particularly alef, final mem, and qof), and consistent use of certain abbreviations.

Beyond the similarity in the handwriting itself, similar editorial patterns can be identified in both works. In both texts, de’ Rossi created detailed tables of contents at the beginning of the book, using the same system of notation and reference. Additionally, the notes in both works are organized similarly in the margins, with consistent use of square brackets to indicate additions and completions.

Providence arranged that while the copy was sold to a private collector, it was photographed and made publicly accessible in the “Ktiv” digital platform of the National Library of Israel.

Chapter 2: Nature and Sources of the Annotations

Analysis of the annotations on the Kuzari reveals several layers of corrections and notes. The annotations can be classified into two types, similar to his notes on the Guide for the Perplexed. The first type consists of brief interpretative notes, where he generally appears as a concise yet profound philosophical commentator. The second type comprises quotations from other commentators. In his notes on the Guide, he quotes from Narboni, Ibn Kaspi, and a previously unknown commentator named Rabbi Abraham Kashlar.⁵ In his notes on the Kuzari, he quotes from Abraham Ibn Ezra’s biblical commentary, from Rabbi Nathanel ibn Kaspi’s commentary on the Kuzari, and from other commentators. An example of a quotation from Ibn Kaspi appears in his note on the science of music in Book II:65, which is found in Ibn Kaspi’s autograph manuscript, as we shall discuss below.

In the Kuzari, we also find systematic and extensive corrections to Judah ibn Tibbon’s translation as it appeared in the 1547 Venice edition before him. The Ibn Tibbon family played a crucial role in medieval Hebrew translation: Judah ibn Tibbon (c. 1120-1190), known as “the father of translators,” established their translation tradition and produced the first Hebrew translation of the Kuzari. His son Samuel (c. 1150-1230) became renowned for his precise translation of Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, while Samuel’s son Moses, though also active as a translator, was considered less rigorous than his predecessors.

De’ Rossi believed, as he explicitly stated in his work Imrei Binah,[6] that this Kuzari translation was flawed since it was not produced by Samuel ibn Tibbon, whom he considered the most authorized translator of philosophical works. Interestingly, de’ Rossi made a significant historical error: he was unaware that the translator was actually Judah ibn Tibbon, the patriarch of the family, and instead believed it was Moses ibn Tibbon, Samuel’s son, whose translation methodology he criticized. This misidentification led de’ Rossi to approach the text with particular critical attention, though ironically, he was correcting the work of the very founder of the translation tradition he admired.

In our copy, we can see that de’ Rossi’s corrections to the translation drew upon several distinct sources:

1. Translation corrections based on Judah ben Cardinal’s version, which was available to de’ Rossi.[7] A clear example of this is the correction of the term “Karaites” at the beginning of the book, which does not appear in the Venice edition but matches Cardinal’s translation.[8]

2. Corrections based on Judah ibn Tibbon’s own revisions, which were written as alternative readings. These corrections appear in the margins of various Kuzari manuscripts.[9]

3. Original translation suggestions by de’ Rossi himself, which were later incorporated into subsequent editions.[10]

To understand the sources of these corrections, we must first understand the history of Judah ibn Tibbon’s translation of the Kuzari. As David Zvi Baneth demonstrated in his foundational research, ibn Tibbon’s translation reached us in two distinct basic versions:

1. The first, which Baneth termed “Version T,” reflects ibn Tibbon’s original translation language.

2. The second, “Version S,” is a later adaptation.

Although the two versions are closely related, they differ in their translation methodology and language: Version S presents a more precise and consistent translation that strives to adhere to the Judeo-Arabic original and to translate each term uniformly.

Additionally, as Bar-Asher has shown, another layer of translation by Samuel ben R. Judah ben Meshullam entered ibn Tibbon’s translation. [11] This scholar initially intended to translate the entire book himself but, upon seeing ibn Tibbon’s translation, refrained from completing a full translation. The question of whether he translated the book based on ibn Tibbon’s translation or merely wrote corrections in the margins of ibn Tibbon’s translation remains unresolved.

Over the generations, these versions became intermingled, and later copyists combined them indiscriminately. This process gave rise to mixed and complex versions, which were also reflected in the first printed editions of the book.

Examination of de’ Rossi’s copy, with his annotations on the 1547 Venice edition, shows that he attempted to grapple with this complexity. He utilized various sources to determine the precise text – Judah ben Cardinal’s translation that was available to him, as he testifies in his book Imrei Binah, making his notes a potential source for identifying Cardinal’s largely lost annotations.[12] He also used the margins of Kuzari manuscripts that documented additional versions of ibn Tibbon’s translation, as well as adding notes of his own.

Chapter 3: The Influence of De’ Rossi’s Notes on Rabbi Judah Moscato’s Kol Yehudah

Professor Avishai Bar-Asher’s comprehensive study of the Hebrew translations of the Kuzari and the evolution of Judah ibn Tibbon’s translation[13] concludes with these words:

“It is to be hoped that the discovery of additional material—in other documents preserving translation fragments, in the extensive material preserved in the margins of manuscripts of ibn Tibbon’s translation in its various versions, or in secondary copies that have not yet been examined—will help to further evaluate the hypotheses and preliminary conclusions proposed in this study.”

It appears that one of the most important documents for understanding the evolution of ibn Tibbon’s translation from the edition published with the Kol Yehudah commentary onwards is this document containing de’ Rossi’s annotations.

We will examine two of de’ Rossi’s annotations that demonstrate his influence on Rabbi Judah Moscato, author of Kol Yehudah, which became the canonical commentary on the Kuzari from its first publication in Venice in 1594 until today.

The first concerns a textual matter. In the Kuzari, Book II:57, it states:

.אמר הכוזרי: אתם היום במבוכה גדולה מאלה החובות הגדולות, ואיזו עדה תוכל לשמור כל הסדר הזה

“The Khazar king said: You are today in great confusion regarding these great obligations, and which congregation could maintain all this order.”

De’ Rossi was convinced this translation was incorrect. In his Me’or Einayim, he criticizes it and rejects Ibn Kaspi’s attempt to justify it. He notes there that Ben Cardinal translated “in confusion” as “in quiet and rest”.[14] In the margins of his personal copy, he included ibn Tibbon’s alternative translation, “indeed in return and tranquility,” but also proposed his own correction: he crossed out the word “in confusion” and wrote above it “in rest.”

Notably, not by coincidence, the reading “in rest” appears in all editions of the Kuzari with Kol Yehudah onwards, to the puzzlement of Munk and other scholars who wondered about the source of this reading.[15]

It seems likely that de’ Rossi’s suggested correction found its way into Rabbi Judah Moscato’s work, as we find evidence of his influence in other places as well.

Here is another source that apparently shows such influence. In Book II:65, the Kuzari discusses the excellence of music, stating:

…אמר הכוזרי: שמה בלי ספק נגמרה ושמה היתה מעוררת הנפשות, כאשר יאמר עליה, שהיא מעתקת את הנפש ממדה אל הפכה

“The Khazar king said: There, without doubt, it was perfected and there it would stir the souls, as it is said of it that it transfers the soul from one disposition to its opposite…”

De’ Rossi writes in the margin:

כנגן דוד לפני שאול להעביר רוחו הרעה וכנגן אלישע בהסתלקות הנבואה. וכבר חשב האפודי שלזאת הסבה כתוב בקצת מזמורי תהלים למנצח, לפי שהיה השיר המיוחד למזמור ההוא ממה שינצח כח או כחות מה מהנפש להשיבם להיושר והנכון

“Like David’s playing before Saul to remove his evil spirit, and like Elisha’s playing when prophecy departed. The Efodi already thought that for this reason it is written in some psalms ‘To the chief musician,’ because the song designated for that psalm was among those that would overcome some power or powers of the soul to return them to uprightness and propriety.”

These words are not found in any of the Efodi’s known works, but it appears that in de’ Rossi’s memory, he confused the Efodi with Rabbi Nathanel ibn Kaspi. The latter writes in his commentary on this passage:[16]

כאשר ראינו משאול כאשר ביעתתהו רוח רעה והיה כנגן דוד לפניו סרה מעליו הרוח הרעה ההיא כמו שמבואר מהספור, והיה בהיות אלהים אל שאול ולקח דוד את הכנור ונגן בידו ורוח לשאול וכו’. וכן היתה חכמת המושאיקא מעוררת הנפשות, כי מצד התלות השכל האינושי בחומר ישיגהו פעמים עכירות ובהלה ושכחה, ובה יקנו יתרון המעלות ויקנו המדות ויחזיקו התכונות. וכן יסירו הנגונים חליי הנפש ויכוונוה לקבל רוח הקדש. ובזה ינוצחו קצת תכונות רעות שבנפש ויוכנעו לעבודת האל, על כן כתב למנצח מזמור לדוד. ולהיות חכמת הנגון בנוייה על סדר הערכים, ר”ל על סדר הערך והיושר מסודר ומתוקן כראוי, על כן אמר דוד שיר המעלות

“As we saw with Saul when an evil spirit troubled him and when David played before him the evil spirit departed from him, as is clear from the story, ‘And it happened, when the spirit from God was upon Saul, that David took a harp and played with his hand; then Saul would become refreshed,’ etc. Thus the science of music would stir the souls, for due to the attachment of the human intellect to matter, it sometimes experiences turbidity, confusion and forgetfulness, and through it they acquire excellence of virtues and acquire good traits and strengthen dispositions. Thus the melodies remove the illnesses of the soul and prepare it to receive the holy spirit. In this way certain evil dispositions in the soul are overcome and subdued to divine service, therefore it is written ‘To the chief musician, a psalm of David.’ And because the science of music is built on the order of proportions, that is, on the order of proportion and uprightness arranged and established properly, therefore David said ‘A Song of Ascents.'”

It seems quite clear that de’ Rossi summarized and abbreviated ibn Kaspi’s comments here, making them the source of his note, though he mistakenly attributed them to the Efodi.

Now, I can find no logical explanation for Rabbi Judah Moscato’s words elsewhere, unless we say that he saw de’ Rossi’s words in this note and understood them in an interesting way.

This is what Rabbi Judah Moscato writes in his book of sermons, Nefutzot Yehudah:[17]

ומקרא מפורש הוא, יבקשו איש יודע מנגן בכינור. והיה בהיות עליך רוח אלהים רעה, וניגן בידו וטוב לך. ועל כתפות האפודי היתה זאת שומה, אל מול פניו, לעומת מחברתו, כי על כן נאמר בקצת המזמורים למנצח, להיות השיר המיוחד אליהם מועיל מאד לנצח התכונות שבנפש, להכניעם ולהשיבם אל תיקון היושר לעבודת האל יתברך. הוא דבר בעל הכוזרי, בהפליגו בשבחי המוסיקה הנמצאת מאז באומתנו, וזו לשונו, מאמר ב, סימן סה: שמה, מבלי ספק, נגמרה ונשלמה, ושמה היתה מעוררת הנפשות, כאשר ייאמר עליה שהיא מעתקת את הנפש ממידה אל הפכה. ע”כ

“And it is an explicit verse, ‘Let them seek a man who is a skillful player on the harp. And it shall come to pass, when the evil spirit from God is upon you, that he shall play with his hand, and you shall be well.’ And upon the shoulders of the ephod this was placed, before him, opposite its joining, for therefore it is said in some psalms ‘To the chief musician,’ as the song designated for them was very beneficial for overcoming the dispositions of the soul, to subdue them and return them to proper rectification for the service of God, blessed be He. This is what the author of the Kuzari said, in his praise of the music found then in our nation, and this is his language, Book II:65: ‘There, without doubt, it was perfected and completed, and there it would stir the souls, as it is said of it that it transfers the soul from one disposition to its opposite.’ End quote.”

It is quite clear that these are the same ideas that originated in ibn Kaspi’s commentary. But how did the words “and upon the shoulders of the ephod this was placed” enter into R. Judah Moscato’s discussion? What does the ephod, and specifically “Efodi,” have to do with King David? It must be that de’ Rossi’s words were before him, and he interpreted the word “Efodi” as referring to David’s ephod.

Conclusion

The identification of Azariah de’ Rossi’s annotations on the Kuzari sheds light both on his interpretative approach and on his influence on subsequent generations. Analysis of the annotations reveals a scholar combining expertise in commentarial literature with meticulous textual criticism, drawing on various sources and traditions. Particularly interesting is his influence on Rabbi Judah Moscato, who incorporated some of his corrections into his Kol Yehudah commentary, which became the canonical commentary on the Kuzari. These annotations thus join a series of testimonies to de’ Rossi’s significant contribution to the development of Jewish exegesis in the late Renaissance period.

The discovery of his annotations on the Kuzari, alongside his known annotations on the Guide for the Perplexed, allows us to better understand his relationship to these two major philosophical works and his conception of the connection between them. Further research into these annotations may shed light on additional questions concerning the textual history of the Kuzari and the development of its interpretation.

Rabbi Steinman and the Messiah, part 2

Marc B. Shapiro

Continued from here

1. R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin has a different perspective than what we have seen so far.[1] He rejects the notion that “waiting” for the Messiah means that one must believe that he can come at any second, for the Sages already said that the Messiah will not come at certain times. He writes:[2]

ובעיקר הענין הרביתי בראיות מן הגמרא שחז”ל לא ציפו שהמשיח יבוא בכל עת

Contrary to the Brisker Rav (whom he mentions by name), R. Henkin writes: “There is nothing in the Rambam requiring one to believe that the Messiah is ready to come at any moment.”[3] He claims that the Rambam’s real point is that one should not be at ease with the Messiah not having arrived, but rather one should be upset that he hasn’t yet come. A similar argument was made by R. Shmuel Yaakov Weinberg.[4] Unlike R. Shulzinger (see the previous post), R. Henkin does not find a problem with those who mentioned dates for the redemption (and this includes a few important figures[5]), since he suggests that the dates were never intended to be absolutely certain.

Yet R. Henkin adds that it is clear that the sages who gave dates for the Messiah—even if their suggested dates were not certain— did not have אמונה שלמה that the Messiah would come before the dates they predicted, and they obviously are not to be regarded as heretics. He sees this point as contradictory to the Brisker Rav’s claim (as it is usually understood) that one must hope for and await the Messiah’s arrival every day. R. Henkin’s explanation is certainly not in contradiction to the Rambam’s Principle. If the sages who gave dates for the Messiah did not deny that they could be wrong, and that the Messiah could come at any time, then they were not contradicting the Rambam’s Principle. The only thing they were contradicting is the version of the Principle in the siddur which adds the words באמונה שלמה. Yet these words not appear in the Rambam’s formulation.

R. Henkin adds that it is strange that the Brisker Rav would declare that anyone who does not have his understanding of the Twelfth Principle is a heretic, when his understanding is not explicitly found in the Torah, the Talmud, or the rishonim.[6]

ואפילו לדברי הגרי”ז שצריך להאמין שהנה ממש היום הזה הוא בא וכו’ עכ”ל, מן התימה על האי גאון וצדיק ז”ל להחזיק מי שאינו מאמין כן ככופר כיון שהדבר אינו מבואר לא במקרא ולא בחז”ל ולא בראשונים.

R. Henkin concludes that it is enough to believe that the Messiah will come even if you assume that he will not come today or tomorrow. He also cites his grandfather, R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, that “to wait for the coming of the Messiah” does not mean that you think he is ready to come at any instant.[7]

קושטא דמילתא המאמין באמונה שלמה בביאת המשיח ומחכה לו ומתאווה לבואו קדוש ייאמר לו אף על פי שסובר שלפי מאמרי חז”ל לא יבוא היום או מחר, וכן אמר מו”ז הגה”צ זצלה”ה שלחכות לביאת המשיח אין פירושו שעומד לבוא בכל רגע וכן עמא דבר.

In support of R. Henkin, we can cite R. Yohanan ben Torta, who when R. Akiva declared that Bar Kokhba was the Messiah, responded as follows: “Akiva, grass will be growing out of your cheeks and the Messiah will still not have come.”[8] As R. Meir Mazuz notes, R. Yohanan ben Torta believed in the concept of the Messiah, but he did not see any chance that the redemption would come in his generation.[9] In other words, he was not “actively waiting” for the Messiah.

R. Menachem Kasher has another approach. He understands Maimonides’ words that one must wait for the Messiah in a negative sense, namely, that if one despairs of the Messiah’s arrival he is in violation of Maimonides’ words, but not that there is a continuous obligation to wait for the Messiah’s arrival.[10] R. Yisrael Weinman also questions the Brisker Rav’s understanding (although he is not certain the Brisker Rav really said it), since according to some rishonim the Messiah cannot come on Shabbat and Yom Tov. He therefore assumes that it is enough to wait for the Messiah to arrive whenever he is able to come.[11]

R. Yaakov Nissan Rosenthal explains that the siddur’s version of Maimonides’ principle,

עם כל זה אחכה לו בכל יום שיבוא

does not mean that you must believe and expect every day that today is the day the Messiah will come. Rather, the meaning of בכל יום is that every day you must believe in the coming of the Messiah and await his arrival, whenever that will be.[12] He offered an example to illustrate this point: A man’s daughter married and moved to the Diaspora. The father waits every day for his daughter to return to Israel, but on every day he does not expect that all of a sudden he will hear a knock at his door and his daughter is standing there.[13]

אין המאמין מחכה דוקא שלפתע פתאום יבוא האדון אל היכלו באופן ניסי ושיודיעו לו שהיום בא המשיח, אך הוא כן מחכה בכל יום לביאת המשיח

Significantly, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach agreed with R. Rosenthal and didn’t even think this was a hiddush, but rather the simple meaning of the words אחכה לו בכל יום שיבוא. R. Rosenthal then tells about how he was at a meeting with R. Shlomo Zalman and other rabbis, and he presented his understanding. A few of the hasidic rebbes present started screaming that what he said was wrong and in contradiction to one of the Principles of Faith. R. Shlomo Zalman didn’t say a word. After the meeting R. Rosenthal asked R. Shlomo Zalman why he didn’t defend him from the attacks of the hasidic rebbes. R. Shlomo Zalman replied that you shouldn’t start up with Hasidim

עם חסידים לא צריך להתחיל

R. Rosenthal couldn’t recall if the following witticism was said to him by R. Shlomo Zalman or someone else later told it to him: In the Amidah we say: על הצדיקים ועל החסידים. We see that the word צדיקים goes before חסידים

כי לא “מתחילים” עם חסידים

It is noteworthy that according to the Vilna Gaon’s understanding, if the Messiah does not come in a “hastened” fashion (see Sanhedrin 98a), it certainly seems that no one would be able to hope for the Messiah to arrive in Tishrei. The reason I say this is because of how the Vilna Gaon describes the terrifying things that will happen if the Messiah arrives in its “due time,” and this is in Tishrei.[14]

אם חלילה לא יזכו ותהיה “בעתה” ואז אם היתה הגאולה בתשרי לא היה להם תקומה ח”ו ולא היו נשארים חלילה אלא אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה מפני שמדת הדין שולט בתשרי

Also of interest is the report of how R. Jacob Kamenetsky told someone that the Messiah would not be arriving soon. A certain man had been convinced by people in Chabad that the Rebbe would soon reveal himself as the Messiah, and this had led him to start observing Shabbat. However, R. Kamenetsky thought that it was important to uproot the man’s belief that the Messiah would soon be here, as he worried about the negative consequences to the man’s Judaism when the Messiah did not arrive as he had been expecting.[15]

אל תאמין להם. משיח, לצערנו, עדיין אינו עומד לבוא . . . [רי”ק הסביר לתלמידיו] מה שהשיגו אנשי חב”ד הוא הישג מדומה, שיצא שכרו בהפסדו. בעתיד הקרוב, כשיראה יהודי זה שההבטחה לא נתמלאה והמשיח לא הגיע, יתחיל שוב לחלל את השבת. יתרה מכך, עד עכשיו הוא האמין בתמימות מוחלטת בביאת המשיח, ואם יתאכזב, יפסיד את אחד היסודות החשובים ביהדות – האמונה בביאת המשיח.

Based on this, I think we can say that R. Kamenetsky did not expect the Messiah to arrive in the near future.

Some Jewish traditions speak of a great war that will occur before the coming of the Messiah, and even of the death of Messiah ben Joseph in this war.[16] Other traditions see this great war as occurring after the coming of the Messiah. R. Hayyim Soloveitchik is reported to have said that if the messianic era will bring even one Jewish death, then he doesn’t want it, and if we had a choice in the matter the halakhah would require us to reject the Messiah in such a circumstance. I wonder, therefore, if R. Hayyim was really able to look forward to the messianic era, knowing that its arrival would bring the possibility of Jewish death.

Here is how R. Hayyim is quoted by R. Dov Katz.[17]

מספרים בשמו של ר חיים סולובייצ’יק מבריסק, הגאון של הדור הקודם, שבימי המלחמה כשנפלו כל כך הרבה חללים בחזית המלחמה וסבלו כל כך הרבה, אמרו לו פעם בשיחה, שלוא היתה לכל הפחות מביאה המלחמה הזו את הגאולה, כי אז היה אולי כדאי הדבר. גער בהם ר’ חיים ואמר להם: “תדחינה מאות גאולות ואל תפול נפש אחת מישראל, כי אם היתה באה שאלה לפנינו שאם על ידי קרבן של אדם אחד יבא המשיח, בודאי שהיינו פוסקים שלא יבוא המשיח ולא תמות נפש אחת, כי הלא פיקוח נפש דוחה כל התורה כולה, ואף המשיח והגאולה בכלל.”

I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of this report. It is very much in line with what we know about R. Hayyim’s views both about the value of human life, and also about the downplaying of messianism. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik stated: “To R. Chaim, a good chidush in Torah and Kodshim – if I may say so, perhaps I shouldn’t say it – was more important than the whole beis ha-mikdash, in his intuitive weighing.”[18] R. Soloveitchik had some hesitations about what he said, because he knew it would be shocking to people, but he said it anyway. R. David Holzer, in his note on this sentence, writes: “Obviously, the Rav is speaking derech guzma, just to express the concept.” Even if the Rav is exaggerating his point is clear, namely, that Torah study is much more important than what will take place in the future Temple.

I think the Rav’s point is that an Ish Halakhah is simply not interested in the messianic era in any practical way. He believes it will come (and thus fulfills Maimonides’ requirement), but he doesn’t focus on it, for he has everything he needs in a non-messianic world, namely, the study of Torah and the fulfillment of mitzvot. As for the study of Torah, as the Rav said, creating a chiddush about the laws of sacrifices is more important than the sacrifices themselves, because at the end of the day Torah study is the focus of our lives, not sacrifices which we have been without the last two thousand years.

Even though I said that I have no reason to doubt what is reported in the name of R. Hayyim, and this report is also cited by R. Ovadiah Yosef,[19] I must note that R. Eliyahu Zini completely rejects the reported statement which he sees as absolute nonsense.[20]

טענות אלו דברי תימא גדולים הן. הלא הן סותרות כל מלחמה יזומה, אף כל מלחמת מצוה, וכ”ש מלחמת רשות! ואם נקבל אותן, נצטרך לגזור אומר, שגם כבוש הארץ בזמן יהושע איסור גמור היה, ושהיה עדיף להשאר במדבר כדי לחסוך בחיי יהודים רבים. ואסור להאמין שגדול בישראל אמר דבר כזה, שהרי טענות מרגלים יש כאן, מסוג “ארץ אוכלת יושביה היא וכל העם אשר ראינו בתוכה אנשי מידות”. ואם נאמץ אותן, עלינו לומר שהיה אף אסור לצאת ממצרים, כי יציאת מצרים הביאה למות דור שלם, ולכן היה עדיף לדחות אפילו גאולת מצרים!

לכן אסור להאמין לעדות זו. וגדול כר’ חיים מבריסק לא יאמר דברי הבל כאלו ויש כאן הוצאת דיבה על גאון זה, ובפרט שעדות זו מוכחשת ממה שכתב במפורש ר’ חיים עצמו [שלפי ר’ חיים אין דין פיקוח נפש חל בשעת מלחמה], והבאנו אותה כבר פעמיים לעיל

I don’t believe that R. Zini’s words, which come from a right-wing religious Zionist perspective, create any difficulty in believing that which R. Hayyim is quoted as saying, namely, given the choice between a Messiah which will require the loss of human life or no Messiah, that he would prefers the latter. What about R. Zini’s point that according to what is reported in R. Hayyim’s name, that human life stands above all, that the concept of milhemet mitzvah makes no sense? I think the answer is clear, namely, that R. Hayyim obviously acknowledged that in a halakhically valid war, and certainly in a war commanded by God (such as to conquer the Land of Israel), human life will be lost and we cannot have “conscientious objection.” (It is, however, hard to imagine how R. Hayyim would have been able to support a milhemet reshut.) 

Yet there is no halakhic imperative to bring the Messiah, and if given a choice between the Messiah with loss of life or no Messiah, R. Hayyim would forego the Messiah. Given the choice between a Jewish state that will require the loss of life—even a state that functions according to halakhah—or no state, R. Hayyim would forego the state. This was one of the two reasons for the anti-Zionism of R. Isaac Zev Soloveitchik, namely, that the actions of the Zionists endangered Jewish life. His other reason was that he believed that the Zionists would persecute religious Jews in a Zionist controlled state.

To be continued

Excursus

The old question is why did rabbis give dates for the Messiah’s arrival when the Talmud, Sanhedrin 97b, states: “Blasted be the bones of those who calculate the end (i.e., the Messiah’s arrival).” Maimonides actually mentions a family tradition as to when prophecy will be renewed, and this will precede the messianic era. See Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Sheilat, vol. 1, pp. 152-153.

On the second day of the Ten Days of Penitence, one of the selihot we read (Tohelet Yisrael) states:

חשבון אחר חשבון עמך יפתור

“Thy people interpret reckoning after reckoning.” This refers to predicted dates of the Messiah’s arrival. R. Zev Wolf Leiter sees this as a proof that there is no prohibition in offering dates for the Messiah as long as one does not lose faith in the messianic principle if the projected date comes without the Messiah’s arrival. See his Kevod Melakhim, Hilkhot Melakhim 12:2, found here and on Otzar haChochma.

In agreement with R. Leiter’s perspective, R. Menasheh Grossberg, Shevet Menasheh, no. 46, also suggests that there is no problem in giving dates of the Messiah’s arrival, and what the Talmud is criticizing is those who, if the Messiah does not come on the predicted arrival date, would then deny the principle of messianic redemption. His proof for this interpretation is the passage that comes directly after what I quoted above from Sanhedrin 97b: “For they would say, since the predetermined time has arrived, and yet he has not come, he will never come.” Thus, we see that the Talmud itself explains the reason for the curse of those who predict the Messiah’s arrival, and it is because if the Messiah does not arrive at the predicted date it will lead to heresy in that people will completely deny the principle of the Messiah. R. Grossberg goes so far as to write:

הנה הראשונים שהיו כמלאכים או כבני אדם מאמינים באמונה שלמה להם ראוי לחשוב בקצין ולחקור באמונה

R. Joseph Kafih states that the reason why sages gave dates for the Messiah’s arrival, or in Maimonides’ case the renewal of prophecy, was only in order to strengthen the people, that they not despair of redemption. In other words, the sages themselves did not take the dates seriously, as the point of publicizing this information was for an entirely different purpose. In R. Kafih’s words:

לא פעל רבינו כפי ההלכה לכתחילה, אלא בכדי לעודד את העם

See Teshuvot ha-Rav Yosef Kafih le-Talmido Tamir Ratzon (Kiryat Ono, 2018), p. 389.

This is the very same reason Maimonides gives for R. Saadiah’s messianic calculations. Maimonides writes as follows in his Letter to Yemen (Abraham Halkin and David Hartman, Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides [Philadelphia, 1985]), p. 116):

As for Rabbi Saadiah’s calculations, there are extenuating circumstances for them though he knew they were disallowed. For the Jews of his time were perplexed and misguided. The divine religion might have disappeared had he not encouraged the pusillanimous, and diffused, disseminated, and propagated by word of mouth and the pen a knowledge of its underlying principles. He believed, in all earnestness, that by means of the messianic calculations he would inspire the masses with hope to the Truth. Verily all his deeds were for the sake of heaven. Consequently, in view of the probity of his motives, which we have disclosed, one must not decry him for his messianic computations.

R. Meir Leibush Malbim also provided dates for the messianic era. He believed that the initial stage of the Redemption would be between 1868 and 1913. The Temple would be rebuilt in 1925, sacrifices would begin to be offered in 1928, and the resurrection of the dead would take place in 2203. See Noah Rosenbloom, Ha-Malbim (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 159-160.

R. Judah Leib Maimon reports that his father asked the Malbim how he could offer such dates in opposition to the talmudic statement against this. He replied that the proscription against offering dates was only in the early years after the destruction of the Temple, when the path until the end was still long. However, as we are now close to the end of the Exile it is permitted to give dates. See Maimon, Le-Ma’an Tziyon le Ehesheh (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 19. The same answer in the name of the Malbim is found in R. Yissachar Dov Teichtal, Em ha-Banim Semehah (Jerusalem, 1998), pp. 150-151. In both sources, in order to offer a parable explaining his point, the Malbim tells the story of a father and son taking a long journey. At the beginning of the journey, when the son asks if they almost there, the father is annoyed with him. However, after much time on the road, when the father asks the coachman the same question, he explains to his son that now that they have journeyed far the question is appropriate. It is the same with the exile, the Malbim explains. At the beginning, it was improper to offer predictions of its end. However, now that we are almost near the end, it is OK to do so. (In the version of the story told by Maimon, the young son is none other than the Malbim himself, and the answer comes from his father.)

R. Jacob Isaac Horowitz, the Chozeh of Lublin, is quoted as saying that those who, based on hints in the Torah, predicted dates for the Messiah’s arrival were really just offering a strong suggestion to God that it is time for Him to redeem the Jews. This is just like a son does not explicitly tell his father that he is doing something wrong, but instead shows him the Torah source so his father can draw the proper conclusion.

כי עפ”י הלכה באם בן רואה לאב שאינו עושה חלילה כיאות אז משום כיבוד אב לא יוכל לומר לו שאינו עושה כשורה רק החיוב להראות לו הדין בתורה ופוסקים ולומר לו אבא כך כתוב בתורה (עיין יור”ד סימן ר”מ סעיף י”א מש”ס קידושין דף ל”ב) וכיון שאנו רוצים לחות דעתינו לאבינו שבשמים שירחם על בניו ויגאל אותנו בקרוב וכי אין מן היושר כביכול שיסבלו עוד עול גלות לכן צדיק הדורות מחדשים איזה קץ משיח ועושים על זה רמז באיזה פסוק בתנ”ך איך שבשנה זו יבוא משיח צדקינו והוא להראות לאבינו הבורא ית”ש אבא כך כתוב בתורה היינו דבאותו מקום בתוה”ק כתוב שבשנה זו יבוא משיח בב”א

See R. Moshe Menahem Mendel Walden, Or ha-Niflaot, p. 12a, included in Ohel ha-Rabbi (Petrokov, 1913); Mendel Piekarz, Ha-Hanhagah ha-Hasidit (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 190.

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2. In the last post I mentioned Elliot Wolfson’s argument that the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s secret teaching is that there will be no physical redeemer, but the messianic redemption is able to occur within each person. A number of people were surprised to hear about this, as there is, I believe, literally not one person in Chabad who accepts this argument. While I do not believe that Wolfson is correct, it is important to note that one does find in Hasidic thought the concept of inner redemption.[21] Although this is not intended to replace the ultimate physical redemption, these Hasidic teachings do turn passages in the Talmud on their head. For instance, R. Meir of Apta asks why we need to pray for redemption if God has promised that he will redeem us. He quotes the Chozeh of Lublin who said that the Talmud, Megillah 16a, mentions that if you repeat a teaching in the name of someone else, you “bring redemption to the world.” The Chozeh points out that this is difficult, as every page of the Talmud has someone repeating a teaching in the name of someone else, and yet the redemption still has not come. The Chozeh replies that the redemption being spoken about is a personal redemption, that one is delivered from his difficult circumstances. Similarly,  when we pray for redemption, it is a prayer for personal redemption.[22]

דהנה השי”ת הבטיח לנו לפדותינו ולגאלינו מהגלות המר, ולכאורה יפלא מה צורך להתפלל על הגאולה, ההוא אמר ולא יעשה. אך ששמעתי [!] מרבינו הקדוש מוהרי”י זצללה”ה מלובלין על הגמרא כל האומר דבר בשם אומרו מביא גאולה לעולם, והתמיה נשגבה, כי בגמרא מצינו ממש בכל דף שאומר התנא דבר בשם חבירו או בשם רבו, ומדוע עוד לא נושענו מהגלות. ותירץ, כי הבאת הגאולה הוא גאולה פרטית לאיש ישראל ממצוקותיו, כאשר אמרנו, ותקם בעוד לילה שבהגלות יוושעו ישראל ויקומו בהרחבה והרוחה, וע”ז אנו מתפללים, וזה בכלל גאולה

3. In recent months there have been a number of discussions about epidemics in Jewish history and how the rabbis responded. No one has yet cited what the great R. Elijah Klatzkin wrote.[23] You can see this in R. Klatzkin’s Miluim le-Sefer Devar Halakhah (Lublin 1923), pp. 126-128. For some reason, the copy of this book on Otzar haChochma is missing the second half of the book. However, the complete work is available on hebrewbooks.org here.

R. Klatzkin prints an open letter he wrote in 1916 to his community in Lublin, when they were suffering a typhus epidemic. It originally was published in Yiddish and Polish. He obviously thought it was important that his message should be preserved for posterity, and over a hundred years later what he says unfortunately remains relevant to us.

R. Klatzkin tells the community that he has to write to them, rather than speak to them, as due to the danger they can no longer gather together in the synagogue. He mentions that although the government established rules to keep people healthy, nevertheless there are many who are ignoring the laws. (To this I would add, the more things change the more they stay the same.)

R. Klatzkin stresses that the various government rules are also required according to the Torah, and one who violates the rules, which bring danger to him and his neighbors, “his sin is too great to bear.” R. Klatzkin expresses wonder that he needs to warn people about these matters, which relate to their health and the health of their families. What he observed over a hundred years ago has of course repeated itself in our time, when for incomprehensible reasons entire communities simply ignored basic health guidelines which allowed the virus to spread very quickly, leaving a terrible toll.

R. Klatzkin states that he wouldn’t need to warn people to watch over their money, so how is it that people treat their health with less concern than their money? He then turns to the issue of hillul ha-shem, and we see that in his day it was also the case that there were Jews who created a hillul ha-shem in how they responded to the crisis. R. Klatzkin notes that even repentance, Yom Kippur, and personal suffering do not atone for hillul ha-shem.[24] “If we would behave in accordance with the Torah, then we would be a light unto the nations and would sanctify the name of heaven and the honor of the holy Torah.” In R. Klatzkin’s day, one of the reasons for the spread of the epidemic was the unsanitary conditions that the poor lived in, and he concludes his letter by appealing to the wealthy to support the poor so they can improve their living conditions.

In his open letter R. Klatzkin states that he spoke about the issue of hillul ha-shem and kiddush ha-shem in his book אמ”ש. This refers to his responsa Imrei Shefer which appeared in 1896, and he has in mind no. 92 in this book. In this responsum he makes a number of noteworthy points. To begin with, R. Klatzkin makes very clear that when it comes to halakhah there is a great distinction between real idolaters and the nations among whom Jews currently live. He cites the Meiri to back up this position and the entire lengthy responsum is in support of this point.

ורבים טועים ומתעין עצמם לחשוב שכל מה שמבואר בספרים להחמיר בטעות ואונאת אינו יהודי הוא רק מפני איבה ובאמת לא כן הדבר והוא איסור גמור . . . ומזה מבואר דכל מקום שכתוב בטור ושו”ע עכו”ם היינו בדיוק עובדי כוכבים ממש ואינו מדבר כלל מהאומות שבזמנינו המאמינים בהשגחה ושכר ועונש וכמו שמפורש במאירי

This shows that he really means what he says, unlike other works that include a comment at the beginning of the book saying that any time non-Jews are referred to it means idolaters who live in places like India and China. Comments like this were never taken seriously. In fact, the very existence of these comments was said by R. Moshe Feinstein to be a proof, contrary to R. Solomon Luria, that one is allowed to alter Torah teachings in the face of danger.[25]

R. Klatzkin begins his responsum by calling attention to a passage in R. Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim 3:25, where Albo states that one is not allowed to charge interest to a ger toshav. The problem is that this contradicts an explicit Mishnah, Bava Metzia 5:6, as well as the talmudic explanation of this Mishnah, Bava Metzia 71a.[26] R. Klatzkin offers an original explanation that when the Talmud says that you can charge a ger toshav interest this refers to one who is wealthy, but if a ger toshav is poor, and he needs the money to survive, then he is not to be charged interest. Also significant is R. Klatzkin’s point that in this matter, and similar things, contemporary non-Jews who observe the Noahide laws fall into the category of ger toshav. He assumes that Christians are not to be regarded as idolaters, so they too fall into this category.

R. Klatzkin discusses R. Moses Isserles’ responsum in which he tries to find some justification for the practice in Moravia to drink non-Jewish wine.[27] R. Klatzkin suggests that this leniency arose due to theological reasons, because most of the inhabitants of Moravia were followers of Jan Hus (i.e., Hussites) who rejected many Catholic practices, including the veneration of images. In other words, they were distant from any “idolatrous” practices, and thus there was a reason in people’s minds why the prohibition on non-Jewish wine should not apply to them.

R. Klatzkin also takes up the issue of darkhei shalom. He cites the Talmud and Maimonides that when it comes to non-Jews – even idolaters – the Sages said to bury their dead, visit their sick, and support their poor because of darkhei shalom. After mentioning this, Maimonides also quotes Psalms 145:9: “The Lord is good to all; and His tender mercies are over all His works,” and Proverbs 3:17: “Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.”[28] R. Klatzkin derives from this that the expression מפני דרכי שלום does not mean that Jews behave a certain way to avoid non-Jewish enmity. Rather, it means that by Jews acquiring the trait of mercy for all people, there will be peace on Israel. He cites the Jerusalem Talmud, Eruvin 7:9, which states:

מפני מה מערבין בחצרות מפני דרכי שלום

In this passage it is obvious that darkhei shalom means something positive, to create neighborliness. R. Klatzkin claims that this is exactly what the expression means when dealing with non-Jews, He states that when Jews extend themselves for non-Jews in the ways mentioned by the Talmud, there will be real peace – in a positive sense – between Jews and non-Jews.[29]

ומוכח מזה דמ”ש מפני דרכי שלום, אין הכוונה שלא ינטרו שנאה לישראל, אלא דקאמר שעי”ז שידבקו ישראל במדת החמלה ורחמים על כל יציר נוצר, יהיה שלום לישראל . . . הרי דפירוש מפני דרכי שלום, היינו שעי”ז אוהבין זא”ז ונעשה ביניהם שלום אמת, וה”נ הפירוש שיהא שלום אמת עם העמים, כאשר ידבקו ללכת בדרכי ה’ המרחם על כל מעשיו

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3. In my last post I had a quiz with two questions. A number of people got one of the questions correct, but only a few individuals got them both correct. I won’t mention any names because one of those who answered correctly asked to remain anonymous.

The first question was: Where in Rashi’s commentary on the Talmud does he say that a certain individual knew all of Shas?

In Beitzah 24b s.v. ולערב, Rashi writes about R. Kalonymus ben Shabbetai of Rome who had journeyed from Rome to Worms:[30]

גם עתה בא אלי מכתב מגרמיי”ש שבא לשם אדם גדול זקן ויושב בישיבה מן רומא ושמו ר’ קלונימוס ובקי בכל הש”ס

I took this question from R. Shlomo Schneider, author of the responsa volume Divrei Shlomo. In a work that has not yet been published he has a number of “quiz questions,” and in future posts I will cite more of them.

In terms of “knowing Shas,” it is noteworthy that today we hear about different great rabbis who have completed Shas twenty or thirty times, or even more than this. Yet in earlier days we see that the achievements of great rabbis are described in much more limited fashion. R. Joseph Karo’s maggid said to him that he would finish Shas three times, and that was thought to be a great blessing.[31] This was not just the prediction of the maggid, as R. David Conforte quotes the grandson of R. Karo that when his grandfather was on his deathbed he, too, said that he merited to complete the Talmud three times.[32] R. Karo also testified as to how rare it was in his day for anyone to complete the Talmud:[33]

בדורות אלו לא ימצא מי שלמד כל התלמוד כי אם אחד מעיר

Of course, it must be noted that when R. Karo speaks of completing the Talmud he is not referring to daf yomi style, but rather an in-depth study of every page.

Just like with have seen with R. Karo, in a letter to R. Betzalel Ashkenazi, the author of Shitah Mekubetzet, R. Moses Galante of Safed (1620-1689) writes that he has finished the Talmud three times.[34]

In describing the unique greatness of his teacher, R. Nissim of Gerona, R. Isaac ben Sheshet states that he was expert in three sedarim of the Talmud. Today, saying this about a leading sage would not be viewed as a compliment, as what about the other three sedarim, is he not also an expert in them? But this is what the Rivash writes.[35]

ה’ צב-אות הותיר לנו שריד דַבָּר אחד לדור הוא מורנו הרב הגדול רבינו נסים נ”ר היה כאחד מהם לדעת טוב טעם ודת בקי בשלשה סדרים ודמו לי’ כמאן דמנחי בכיסתיה ודעתו רחבה מני ים ושכלו זך וישר אין ערוך אליו בכל חכמי ישראל

For the other quiz question, I asked about the letters שב that are found after the first and second set of shofar blasts. What is this about?

I was going to discuss this matter and present various sources. However, Moshe Babad alerted me to the existence of a comprehensive article that recently appeared on this very topic, and thus there is no need for me to go into any detail. The article is by R. Yehudah Aryeh Markson and appears in the journal Etz Hayyim 30 (Elul 5778), pp. 408-437 (it is not yet on Otzar haChochma). The title of the article is

שב בני שב – לגלגוליו של מנהג קדמון שנשתכח

R. Markson begins by noting that he, like everyone else, simply paid no mind to the word שב that appears together with tekiat ha-shofar. It was only after he was asked what the meaning of שב is that he investigated the matter. This led him to uncovering the story of what used to be a widespread minhag that for some reason simply disappeared and was almost entirely forgotten from Jewish communal memory (with the exception of a few “pure” German minyanim, such as KAJ in Washington Heights).

R. Markson mentions various explanations that have been offered for שב including the incorrect suggestion that it is one of the holy names that you need to have in mind before shofar blowing. Another incorrect explanation was offered by R. Simhah Bunim of Peshischa that שב is an abbreviation for שוטה בלאז – “Idiot, blow.” In other words, blow the shofar without any special kavvanot and just have in mind to fulfill the mitzvah. (I am sure that R. Simhah Bunim didn’t really think that this is the meaning of שב but was only offering a “midrashic” understanding. This is probably also the case with those who explain the letters to mean שוואנץ בלאז.) A third incorrect explanation is that שב is related to תשובה and is directed to the people to urge them to do teshuvah. A fourth incorrect explanation mentioned by R. Markson is that שב should be read שֵב, as in שב ועל תעשה, and the meaning is that the person who blows the shofar should cease his blowing and wait a bit before resuming the next set of shofar blasts. According to this explanation, the reason for waiting is to give him time for silent prayer or to separate the different groups of shofar blasts. R. Markson records other incorrect explanations as well.

The fourth explanation mentioned in the previous paragraph is closest to the truth, which, as R. Markson shows, has its origin in medieval Ashkenazic minhag where it is first mentioned by Maharil. The word שב should indeed be read שֵב, and it means “sit”. The one calling out the shofar sounds was telling the blower to sit down between the series of blasts. R. Markson, p. 426 n. 71, refers to Maharil as ‘אבי ומייסד מנהג אמירת ה’שב. However, I don’t know on what basis one can say this, as opposed to assuming that Maharil is simply recording a minhag that was already practiced in his day. After all, as R. Markson notes, R. Meir of Rothenburg records the practice of the shofar blower to sit between the series of blasts, though there is no mention of the shofar blower being told שב.

Why is the person blowing the shofar told to sit? R. Markson presents a variety of explanations such as to show that the three groups of shofar blasts are separate from each other, to show that these blasts are the tekiot di-meyushav, to give the shofar blower a chance to focus on teshuvah or just to rest, or to confuse the Satan.

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The Seforim Chatter podcasts are fascinating shows conducted by a skilled interviewer. I think Seforim Blog readers will especially enjoy the show focused on Dan Rabinowitz’s book on the Strashun Library. See here.

On December 24, 2020, 9pm Eastern Time, I will be giving a Zoom class on the topic: “Christmas Eve: Is it a Time for Torah Study?” Those interested can sign up here. Those who are interested in my continuing series of classes can sign up at Torah in Motion here, and you can also download my previous classes on the website. The current series is being placed on YouTube here.

Coming soon:

Rabbi Steinman and the Messiah, part 3

Fighting Over the Rav’s Legacy in the Algemeiner

Response to Criticism, part 4

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Notes

ומו”ר זצ”ל חידש כי המלה “חכה”, אין פירושה להמתין, אלא ר”ל לקוות וליחל לבואו. ומה שבא רבינו לומר כאן הוא שכל יהודי חייב להרגיש בחסרון של העדר המשיח, ולקוות וליחל לבואו ולא להתיאש ממנו אף אם יתמהמה, ולא שאנו צריכים להיות ודאים שהוא יבוא בשעה הקרובה

[5] See Excursus.

[6] Benei Vanim, vol. 3, p. 182.

[7] Benei Vanim, vol. 3, p. 184.

[8] Yerushalmi, Ta’anit 4:5 (24a).

[9] Bayit Ne’eman, no. 222 (18 Av 5780), p. 2.

[10] Ha-Tekufah ha-Gedolah, p. 380.

[11] Mishnat Yisrael, p. 416. He concludes that if the Brisker Rav really said that which is attributed to him, then he retracts what he wrote.

[12] See, similarly, R. Mordechai Peterfreund, “Nusah Yud Gimmel Ikkarim va-‘Ani Ma’amin,’” Yeshurun 22 (2010), p. 711 (called to my attention by Nochum Shmaryohu Zajac).

[13] R. Nahum Stepansky, Ve-Aleihu Lo Yibol, vol. 3, pp. 369-370.

[14] Even Shelemah (Jerusalem, 2013) p. 177 (ch. 11). Many vocalize this as Even Shlomo, and I have also done so in the past. However, based on what the editor, R. Samuel Maltzan, writes in the introduction, it is clear that Even Shelemah is correct.

Abraham Rosenberg, R. Chaim Heller, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach on Conversion, Abortion, Mercy Killings, and new pictures and videos of R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg

Marc B. Shapiro

1. In my post here I discussed the enigmatic plagiarizer Abraham Rosenberg. As we saw, in 1923 and 1924 Rosenberg published articles on the Jerusalem Talmud in the Orthodox journal Jeschurun, and he later published Al Devar Tikunei Nushaot bi-Yerushalmi. In this last work, Rosenberg refers to R. Chaim Heller as his friend. I and so many others assumed that “Rosenberg” was a pseudonym, but Moshe Dembitzer, the expert on everything related to R. Heller, has pointed out to me that this appears not to be the case. Here is a letter Dembitzer found in the JDC archives from R. Heller to Cyrus Adler. As you can see, R. Heller mentions A. Rosenberg—the letter that is unclear must be an “A”—and one of his essays on the Jerusalem Talmud. He also mentions that Rosenberg “is considered only one of the ordinary students.”

Dembitzer also found another connection between R. Heller and Rosenberg. Here is a note from R. Charles B. Chavel’s edition of Hizkuni’s commentary on the Torah, p. 525.

Here is Rosenberg’s Al Devar Tikunei Nushaot bi-Yerushalmi, p. 102, where he cites the same explanation that Chavel cited in the name of R. Heller (but Rosenberg takes credit for it himself).

Regarding the plagiarisms of Rosenberg, I must also thank Gershon Klapper who alerted me to other examples. He wrote to me:

Rosenberg’s first article (לחקר תלמוד הירושלמי) opens אין מן הצורך לשנות את הידוע כי תלמוד הבבלי שנחתם לא זזה ידם של חכמי ישראל ממנו, very similar to how R. Heller’s ע”ד מסורת הש”ס בירושלמי begins, אין מן הצורך לשנות את הידוע כי תלמוד הירושלמי הוא עדין כשדה שאין עובד בו. But the next part of his introduction to that article is taken, slightly rearranged, from Steinschneider’s ספרות ישראל vol. 2, p. 103 (it reappears at the beginning of ע”ד תקוני נוסחאות בירושלמי, which includes most of this article’s content), as is the line beginning פעולתם של הגאונים. He does paraphrase some other language from R. Heller in the introduction, but again it isn’t word-for-word.

His second article (פסוקי המקרא שבתלמוד) opens

כי חכמי התלמוד היו בקיאים בכל ספרי התנ”ך עד להפליא, – דבר זה ידוע לכל מי שלמד גמרא, ואפילו למי שהצליף בה סקירה שטחית. כמעט מכל דף ודף שבתלמוד נראה, כי פסוקי התנ”ך, ואפילו המקראות “האובדים והנדחים” שברשימות השמות בעזרא ובדברי הימים היו שגורים על פי התנאים והאמוראים בתכלית הדיוק. בעלי התוספות (ב”ב ד’ קי”ג בד”ה תרוייהו) לא חששו להחליט, שהאמוראים פעמים שלא היו בקיאים בפסוקים. אבל כבר הודו שם בעלי התוס’ עצמם שאין החלטה זו מוכרחת וכמו שכתב הרשב”ם שם. וגם הראיה שהביאו מדברי ר’ חייא בר אבא, שאינו יודע אם נאמר בי’ הדברות טוב או לא (ב”ק נה.) אינה מוכרחת שהרי ברור הדבר, כי דברי רחב”א, אינם אלא דברי בדיחותא, כדי לדחות את השואל.

Almost every word of this comes from an article of the same title by Yisrael Chaim Tawiow which appeared in HaShiloach 29 (July-Dec. 1913). The rest of the second article is taken from Baer Ratner, סדר עולם רבא pp. 103ff. and Samuel Rosenfeld, משפחת סופרים pp. 98, 100, 105, etc.

Klapper also called my attention to Rosenberg’s plagiarism of part of a paragraph in R. Heller’s article that appears in Le-David Zvi (David Zvi Hoffmann Jubilee Volume, Hebrew section). Compare p. 56 there with Rosenberg, Al Devar Tikunei Nushaot bi-Yerushalmi, p. 11. As Klapper notes, it is quite ironic that Rosenberg leaves out the following sentence from R. Heller that occurs in the middle of the passage he plagiarizes:

ויש שיועיל לנו הציון לברוח מן העבירה ולעשות מצוה לאמר דבר בשם אומרו

While on the topic of R. Chaim Heller, first let me share this wonderful picture from R. Ahron Soloveichik’s wedding in which one can see the Rav, R. Heller and R. Yaakov Kamenetsky. As far as I know, this picture has never appeared online. I thank Yoel Hirsch for providing me with the picture.

From R. Kamenetsky’s recently published Emet le-Yaakov al Nakh, vol. 1, p. 185 n. 2, we learn that in 1937 R. Kamenetsky visited Boston to discuss with R. Soloveitchik opening a yeshiva together.

In 1924 R. Heller published his study of the Samaritan version of the Torah, Ha-Nusah ha-Shomroni shel ha-Torah (Berlin, 1924). In 1972 Makor, which published so many valuable reprints of old seforim, decided to also reprint R. Heller’s Ha-Nusah ha-Shomroni. The problem was that R. Heller had an heir, and she was the only one with the legal right to reprint his books. This led to the following letters sent by Miriam Heller’s attorney (the letters are found in the Israel State Archives, 14924/3, available here [before the recent cyber attack on the archives], pp. 35ff.). From these letters, we learn that there were other unauthorized reprints of R. Heller’s works.

One final point about R. Heller is the following: In 1912 he was appointed rav of the city of Lomza. Here is a report on his appointment from the newspaper Ha-Mitzpeh, March 29, 1912.

The writer is simply amazed that a Polish city, full of Hasidim, would hire as its rav a “Rabbi Dr.” Of course, R. Heller was a very unique “Rabbi Dr.”

2. Because I discussed conversion in the last post, I would like to call attention to R. Yoel Amital’s discovery of how R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s view on the matter has been presented.[1] The issue R. Amital focuses on is whether a conversion for someone who does not observe mitzvot takes effect. I am referring to one who tells the beit din at the time of conversion that he accepts the mitzvot, but we see later that this was not the case.

In his letter in R. Zvi Cohen’s Tevilat Kelim (1975), R. Auerbach is clear that ex post facto such a conversion is still valid.

The crucial words are:

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף שבדיעבד הם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

According to R. Auerbach, because be-diavad such converts are Jewish, to convert them is a violation of lifnei iver. As R. Auerbach explains, before conversion, these people could work on Shabbat and eat non-kosher, but now that they are Jewish they are forbidden to do so. By converting people who will be committing these and other sins, the beit din has violated the prohibition of lifnei iver.

As R. Amital shows, in subsequent printings of R. Cohen’s book, R. Auerbach’s letter is printed with a significant addition (here underlined):

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף שהם טועים לחשוב שבדיעבד הם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

And

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף אם הם טועים לחשוב שבדיעבד הם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

When this letter was printed in R. Auerbach’s Minhat Shlomo, vol. 1, no. 35:3, the wording was altered further:

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף דהם טועים לחשוב שהם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה גם לשטתם המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

In Ha-Ma’yan 56 (Nisan 5776), p. 89, in response to R. Amital’s article, R. Aharon Goldberg, a grandson of R. Shlomo Zalman, published a picture of R. Auerbach’s original letter. The wording is identical to what appears in the first edition of R. Cohen’s book. So how to explain the later additions? R. Goldberg states that it is possible that the later changes were made with the consent of R. Auerbach. Although there is no evidence of this, I find it unlikely that R. Cohen would have altered R. Auerbach’s letter while R. Auerbach was still alive. A general rule of censorship and alteration of texts is that it is done after the author is no longer alive.

Leaving aside the updated version of the letter, there is still a problem that R. Amital confronts. According to R. Auerbach’s original letter, those who convert but do not become religious, their conversion is still valid. However, R. Auerbach also signed a public letter together with the Steipler, R. Shakh, and R. Elyashiv, which states that such a conversion has no validity. So which is it?

R. Mordechai Halpern has shown that R. Auerbach sometimes presented a “public” halakhah that was stricter than his true opinion, but which for some reason he did not wish to publicize.[2] R. Amital suggests that in this case we have a similar example where R. Auerbach publicly advocated a “strict” position regarding conversion that was not in line with his true opinion. (I put “strict” in quotes because while this position is strict in not regarding a conversion as valid, it is also “lenient” in that it tells someone who converted and did not intend to become religious that she can leave her husband without a get, does not need to fast on Yom Kippur, etc.)

R. Amital also claims, implausibly in my opinion, that the public letter R. Auerbach signed does not really stand in contradiction to the letter he sent to R. Cohen. How so? The public letter speaks of people who convert without accepting to observe mitzvot, while R. Auerbach in his letter to R. Cohen is referring to people who in front of the beit din do accept to observe mitzvot, but in their inner heart do not really have such an intention.

Contrary to R. Amital, this is clearly not what the public letter means. It is referring to people who converted in a beit din, but never intended to follow halakhah. It is simply impossible to read this public letter as referring to, in the words of R. Amital: גרים שלא קיבלו עליהם כלל בבית דין לקיים תורה ומצוות. There is no beit din in the world that does not require converts to accept Torah observance. The issue the letter was addressing is converts who, despite their verbal acceptance of mitzvot, do not follow through in practice. According to the letter, such a conversion is not valid. This is so obvious that one wonders how R. Amital could have ever offered his suggestion to explain the contradiction.

R. Halpern himself notes that he knows that R. Auerbach never backed away from his earlier position, as seen in his letter to R. Cohen, that someone who was converted by a proper beit din, but did not intend to observe mitzvot, ex post facto the conversion is still valid. Yet he states that R. Auerbach later concluded that this liberal approach should not be publicized.[3]

Even with the initial two “corrected” versions of R. Auerbach’s letter, R. Auerbach mentions that rabbis who convert people who have no intention of observing Torah violate the prohibition of putting a stumbling block before the blind. R. Auerbach states that until now the person converting violated Shabbat and ate non-kosher food and these were not sins. But now, after the conversion, he is violating the Torah. R. Auerbach concludes his letter as follows:

נמצא שכל המגיירים והמסייעים לכך הו”ל כגדול המחטיאו, ועוברים בלאו של ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול

The implication of this is that ex post facto the conversion is indeed valid, as otherwise there would be no sin committed by the convert and there would be no issue of putting a stumbling block before the blind. In the words of R. Yisrael Rozen:[4]

למדנו מדבריו שהגירות חלה, דאי לאו הכי אין כאן מכשול, שהרי נשאר בגיותו

In fact, we find many poskim who say that we should not convert people who do not intend on observing mitzvot, because then they will be punished for their sins. This shows that these poskim regard a conversion without intent to observe mitzvot as valid ex post facto. In a previous post here I cited a number of examples of this, and here is one more.

R. Raphael Shapiro, Torat Refael, vol. 3, no. 42, has a short responsum about whether to convert a woman who will not be observant. It was sent to R. Mordechai Klatchko of Volozhin, who would later come to the U.S. and serve as a rav in Boston.[5] R. Klatchko was clearly a fine talmid hakham, as can be seen from the two volumes of his Tekhelet Mordekhai. R. Klatchko wrote to R. Shapiro arguing that the woman should be converted even if she was not going to be observant so that her intended husband (or perhaps current husband) could fulfill the mitzvah of procreation (which he could not do if his children would not be halakhically Jewish). R. Shapiro disagrees and states that it is forbidden to convert her, as she will certainly not observe the niddah laws, and this will cause them both to violate a Torah prohibition.

What is important for our purposes is that both R. Klatchko and R. Shapiro assume that one who converts without intending to observe Jewish law is regarded as a valid convert. As long as the person goes through a halakhically proper conversion ceremony, that is what activates the conversion. It is hard for people today to understand how R. Shapiro never even raises the possibility that a conversion is invalid if the person converting intends to routinely violate fundamental Jewish laws by living an irreligious lifestyle. But as can be seen in so many different examples, a widespread view in prior generations—I don’t know if it was the majority view or not—was that as long as the conversion is carried out properly, what happens later, and what is in the convert’s heart at the time of the conversion ceremony, have no legal significance.[6]

Here is one further example of this approach, Be-Mar’eh ha-Bazak, vol. 4, no. 96.[7]

As you can see, the approach of Kollel Eretz Hemdah is that there is no possibility of voiding a conversion carried out by a proper beit din, even if the people converting had no intention of observing mitzvot. At the beginning of the volume, it states that the responsa were reviewed by R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, R. Nachum Rabinovitch, and R. Yisrael Rozen, all significant figures in their own right.

Finally, it is also worth noting that no less a figure than R. Isaac Jacob Weiss refused to void a conversion even though the woman who converted never observed mitzvot. See Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 1, nos. 121-123.

I have a good deal more to say about conversion, but in the interest of space, let me just call attention to a couple of interesting things I recently saw. The first is that R. Moses Sofer states that non-Jews are rewarded in this world if they convert to Judaism.[8] I do not know of anyone else who says that there is a divinely ordained reward for one who converts.

The second interesting discussion about conversion I recently saw is R. Aviad Sar Shalom Basilea, Emunat Hakhamim, ch. 24 (pp. 264-265 in the Jerusalem, 2016 edition). Adopting the type of anachronistic explanation that some commentators have been fond of, R. Basilea assumes that Mahlon converted Ruth and married her with huppah and kiddushin. But this creates a problem, because if Ruth was Jewish, why did Naomi push her away? R. Basilea offers a possible answer: Naomi held like the Rif and the Rambam that since Ruth’s immersion in the mikveh was not before three men, it was invalid even be-diavad. However, Mahlon held like the other poskim that be-diavad, tevilah by oneself if valid.

והנה נעמי היתה סוברת כרי”ף והרמב”ם שאפילו בדיעבד אינה גיורת ולכן השתדלה להרחיקה, ומחלון היה סבור כאותם הפוסקים הסוברים כי גיורת גמורה היתה ולכן נשאה

Does anyone, even from the most traditional communities, still offer explanations along these lines? Here is what R. Shimon Shkop wrote in a different context, and you can see that he was not a fan of this type of explanation.[9]

ודבר זה מביא לידי גיחוך, כעין הפלפולים אם פרעה היה סובר שעבודא דאורייתא

Some time ago I was looking at Abba Appelbaum’s book Rabbi Azariah Figo (Drohobycz, 1907), and he offers the following examples of anachronistic explanations (p. 54):[10]

R. Gershon Ashkenazi (1618-1693), one of the greatest halakhists of his day, also wrote a work of homiletics, Tiferet ha-Gershuni. In his derashah for parashat Mas’ei (p. 236 in the 2009 edition) he portrays the daughters of Zelophehad as arguing from halakhic logic.

In his derashah for parashat Va-Yera (p. 48), in discussing the descendants of Ishmael, R. Ashkenazi suggests that they held that the law of ketubah is rabbinic.

אם כן בני ישמעאל היו סבורים כתובה מדרבנן

Appelbaum also calls attention to R. Meir Schiff’s elaboration at the end of his commentary to Bava Kamma (found in the Vilna Shas). He portrays the incident of Esau selling his firstborn status from a halakhic angle. As such, Jacob’s thoughts were no different than those of a later halakhic scholar:

ונסתפק יעקב באומרו כיום מחמת שני דברים, שגריעותא דבכורה מחמת דבר שלא בא לעולם ומחמת אונאה . . . ויעקב נתיירא או למד הפשט כרש”י ולזה אמר ויאמר השבע לי כמ”ש בח”מ סי ר”ט ס”ד בהגה”ה

Another example, not mentioned by Applebaum, is R. Samuel Edels (Maharsha) in his aggadic commentary to Sanhedrin 57b. R. Edels wonders why Pharoah commanded the Hebrew midwives to kill the newborn Hebrew children, as it would have made much more sense to have Egyptian midwives do this. He explains that the children were to be killed before birth and for non-Jews this would be regarded as murder, which Pharoah wanted to avoid.[11] He thus turned to Hebrew midwives as for them it is not murder to kill an unborn child.

Quite apart from the far-fetched nature of the explanation, as well as its assumption that even before the giving of the Torah the Israelites were bound by Jewish law, not Noahide law, I don’t think any reader of the biblical story would find it reasonable that Pharoah was concerned about anyone violating the commandment against murder. However, the passage is also of interest in seeing how Maharsha regarded the prohibition against abortion.[12] He even portrays Pharoah as thinking that there is no prohibition for Jews to abort a fetus, including right before birth.

דודאי פרעה לא שאל מהם להרוג הזכרים בידים דבן נח מוזהר על שפיכות דמים ולכך לא אמר כן למילדות המצריות שהוזהרו על שפיכות דמים אפילו בעוברים אבל למילדות העבריות אמר שהותר לכם להרוג עובר במעי אמו וראיתם על האבנים קודם שיצא לאויר העולם אם בן הוא וגו’ וכיון שאי אפשר בהם לפטור משפיכות דמים רק בתחילת יציאת הולד קודם שיצא ראשו או רובו הוצרך לתת להם סימנין כמו שכתוב בפרק קמא דסוטה [יא ע”ב]

There has been a good deal of discussion as to how to understand the Maharsha’s words שהותר לכם. Some assume that he meant that Pharoah was in error in thinking that there is no prohibition for Jews to abort a fetus.[13] It is also possible to explain that the prohibition against abortion for Jews is only rabbinic,[14] so at that period of time there was no prohibition. R. Yaakov Farbstein states flatly:[15]

ומבואר במהרש”א דאין איסור לישראל בהריגת העוברים

This notion, that the Maharsha is saying that there is no prohibition for Jews to abort a fetus, is not in line with the overwhelming majority view beginning with the rishonim. However, in one Tosafot, Niddah 44a-b, s.v. ihu, it does state that abortion is permitted for Jews, and it does not mention that there needs to be a good reason for this or provide a timeline after which abortion is not allowed.

וא”ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן . . . וי”ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע”ג דמותר להרגו

Pretty much every halakhist who deals with abortion struggles with this Tosafot, as they have found it very hard to accept that any rishon could permit abortion without restrictions. One approach offered is that Tosafot is saying that there is no Torah prohibition, but there would still be a rabbinic prohibition.[16]

R. Moshe Feinstein, in his classic responsum on abortion, claims that there is a mistake in Tosafot, and instead of the two appearances of דמותר it should instead say דפטור ההורגו in both places.[17] This is in line with the phenomenon I have discussed on a few occasions, where R. Moshe is prepared to deny the authenticity of problematic texts. R. Eliezer Waldenberg offered a strong rejoinder to R. Moshe.[18]

והנה עם כל הכבוד, לא אדוני, לא זו הדרך, וחיים אנו עפ”ד גאוני הדורות, והמה טרחו כל אחד ואחד לפי דרכו לבאר ולהעמיד כוונת דברי התוס’ בנדה וליישבם, ואף אחד מהם לא עלה על דעתו הדרך הקלה והפשוטה ביותר לומר שיש ט”ס בדברי התוס’ ובמקום מותר צריך להיות אסור [צ”ל פטור]

While no other authorities agree with R. Moshe that the Tosafot contains a mistaken text, many regard the language of Tosafot as not exact.[19]

Returning to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, I know of another example where he did not want a view of his to be widely shared. R. Amit Kula discusses R. Avigdor Nebenzahl’s argument that according to a variety of sources one who is suffering greatly is allowed to commit suicide. He further adds that it would be permitted to kill another in this circumstance (active euthanasia), for if you are allowed to kill yourself for a good purpose, you can do it to another as well. R. Nebenzahl adds that some of what he says comes from R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. He also quotes R. Auerbach that one can take medicine to reduce pain even if it will shorten one’s life.[20]

This information, which appeared in the first edition of R. Nebenzahl’s Be-Yitzhak Yikare, is not found in subsequent editions. R. Kula tells us that in these editions R. Nebenzahl inserted a note that the section was removed at the instruction of an unnamed scholar, and R. Mordechai Halpern quotes R. Nebenzahl that this scholar was none other than R. Auerbach.[21]

I find this of interest because if there is one thing that everyone knows, it is that Judaism does not allow active euthanasia (mercy killing). As is usually the case, matters are more complicated as has recently been shown by R. Yitzchak Roness in an article in Ha-Ma’yan.[22] He notes that R. Moshe Sternbuch does not believe that there is any prohibition for non-Jews to engage in mercy killing, since it is carried out for a good purpose. R. Yitzhak Zilberstein also inclines towards this position, and R. Moshe Feinstein suggests this as well, writing:[23]

אפשר שבן נח אינו אסור ברציחה שהוא לטובת הנרצח ושאני בזה האיסור לישראל מהאיסור לבן נח

R. Moshe and others specifically have in mind a non-Jew engaging in mercy killing of a Jew. The proof brought is the famous story of the death of R. Hanina ben Teradyon (Avodah Zarah 18a) where R. Hanina permits the executioner to raise the flame and remove the wool from his heart, thus actively hastening his death. R. Shaul Yisraeli goes the furthest, and for someone suffering greatly, and near death, he thinks that active euthanasia is permitted even if performed by a Jew.

R. Roness then notes that there is a dispute if one suffering great pain is allowed to commit suicide. For the side that permits this, R. Zilberstein adds that if it is permitted for the suffering individual, it will also be permitted for another to assist (active euthanasia). R. Roness also cites R. Hershel Schachter who states that active euthanasia, with the agreement of the patient, is not to be regarded as murder. He even suggests that for one suffering greatly, active euthanasia should be permitted:[24]

ההורג את חברו ברשותו יש לומר דאין בו לאו דרציחה אלא רק לאו דאך את דמכם, דלא גרע הורג חברו ברשותו מההורג את עצמו . . . ולמנוע א”ע מלסבול ייסורים דינו כפקו”נ, וכמשמעות התוס’ הנ”ל. ואם באמת כ”ה גדר היתר זה, א”כ אף בחולה הסובל יסורים קשים ומתחנן לאחרים ליטול את נפשו, אם נאמר כנ”ל, דבכה”ג אין לומר דבטלה דעתו וכו’, ג”כ הי’ צ”ל מותר מטעם פקו”נ ועיין בזה

And finally, here is what R. Chaim Kanievsky responded when asked if a Jewish patient near death could allow a non-Jew to end his life. R. Chaim does not say this is murder. On the contrary, he is inclined to permit it.[25]

אם שוהה אדם בבית חולים דעכו”ם ויש לו יסורים רבים במחלתו האנושה, ורוצה הרופא לחסוך לו היסורים ולקרב מותו ושואל ממנו רשות, האם מותר לו להסכים לזאת. והשיב רבנו שליט”א “יתכן שיש ללמוד זה ממעשה דרחב”ת” . . . והיאך הסכים רחב”ת שהעכו”ם יקרב מותו, והשיב רבנו: “איפה שהחולה מרגיש שזה טובתו יתכן שמותר כמו שמותר להתפלל עליו שימות.”

My question is, how come the “liberal” views I have mentioned are not better known?

7. In my last post here I included the first-ever color pictures of R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg. These went around the world very quickly, and as is the nature of the internet, where the pictures came from was soon forgotten. In fact, within 24 hours someone who does not read the Seforim Blog sent them to me as a great new discovery. When I told him that I am the one who published the pictures he was at first incredulous, stating that he just got them from his cousin.

Here are two more pictures of R. Weinberg that he sent to his family. They are from before World War II when he was still in Germany. In the picture where he is lying the ground, I do not know who the couple next to R. Weinberg is.[26]

And for an extra treat, here are the only known videos of R. Weinberg, and one of them is in color. I thank Noam Cohn for putting this together, at my request, from his family’s collection. The first part has R. Weinberg with R. Arthur Ephraim Weil, the rav of Basel, and R. Leo Adler who succeeded Weil as rav of Basel in 1956. The second video, in which you can see R. Weinberg in color together with R. Samuel Brom, the rav of Lucerne, is from winter 1958-1959 at the Silberhorn kosher hotel in Grindelwald. The hotel had just inaugurated its new mikveh, and it was important to the family who owned the hotel that R. Weinberg give his approval to the mikveh.[27] At 1:12 and 3:20 you can also see the famed educator and student of R. Weinberg, Dr. Gabriel H. Cohn. Here is a picture from the event and you can see R. Brom and Dr. Cohn standing next to R. Weinberg.

Regarding R. Adler, before coming to Basel he studied ten years at the Mir Yeshiva, including in Shanghai. After the war he was in New York where he taught Torah at Yeshiva University.[28]

8. In my last post here I had the following quiz questions.

Please identify the following and email me your answers:

1. There are two se’ifim in the Shulhan Arukh that only contain two words.

2. There is one siman in the Shulhan Arukh whose number is the gematria of the subject of the siman.

The answer to no. 1 is Yoreh Deah 65:6: נוהג בכוי, and Even ha-Ezer 126:42: מותרת בויו

The answer to no. 2 is Orah Hayyim no. 586. This is the laws of shofar, and the gematria of shofar is 586. This was noted by R. Jacob Emden and I mentioned this in my article “‘Truth’ and Authorial Intent in the Study of Torah,” available here.

A number of people provided the correct answers for no. 1 and no. 2, but no one got both of my intended answers. However, Moshe Schwartz got no. 2 right with a different answer than I was thinking of (meaning he answered both questions correctly). He noted that Yoreh Deah 107 speaks about cooking eggs, and the gematria of ביצה is 107.[29] Also, shortly before this post was completed, Sol Reich provided another example: Yoreh Deah 334 is about הלכות נידוי וחרם and the gematria of נידוי וחרם is 334.

9. Information about my summer tours with Torah in Motion to Central Europe and Spain is available here.

* * * * * * *

[1] “Ha-Im Giyuram shel Gerim she-Einam Shomrim Mizvot Hal Be-Diavad? Berur Da’at ha-Gaon Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ZTL,” Ha-Ma’yan 56 (Tishrei 5776), pp. 43-46.
[2] Halpern, Refuah, Metziut ve-Halakhah (Jerusalem, 2011), pp. 35ff.
[3] Amital, “Ha-Im Giyuram,” p. 45.
[4] Ve-Ohev Ger (Alon Shvut, 2010), p. 161 n. 1.
[5] See R. Hayyim Fischel Epstein, Teshuvah Shelemah, vol. 2, Even ha-Ezer, nos. 29-30, and R. Elijah Klatzkin, Hibbat ha-Kodesh, no. 11, where they respond to R. Klatchko’s question about a get written in Roxbury (a neighborhood in Boston), but the get only mentioned “Boston”. This is mentioned by Hayyim Karlinsky, Rabbi Hayyim Fischel Epstein (New York, 1963), pp. 26-27.

This R. Klatchko should not be confused with an earlier R. Mordechai Klatchko of Lida who also wrote a book titled Tekhelet Mordekhai. It is noteworthy that R. Klatchko of Lida wrote a lengthy haskamah for the Mishnah Berurah. Regarding R. Klatchko of Lida, see here.[6] For another example, see R. Dov Cohen, Va-Yelkhu Sheneihem Yahdav (Jerusalem, 2009), pp. 333-334. Here R. Cohen describes how, at the direction of R. Isser Yehudah Unterman, he converted a woman intent on marrying a completely irreligious Jew. This is the sort of conversion that today would not be allowed in Israel or in any of the batei din recognized by the Israeli Chief Rabbinate. See also R. Avraham Shapiro, Kuntres Aharon in his edition of R. Isaac Jacob Rabinowitz, Zekher Yitzhak (Jerusalem, 1990), p. 396, who suggests that according to Maimonides, when it comes to conversion and acceptance of mitzvot,  כיון שקבל בפה אין דבריו שבלב דברים.

For a convert who is not observant, there is one halakhic consequence, at least according to many authorities: When they divorce the get should not say ben (or bat) Avraham avinu, but ploni ha-ger. See R. Shimon Yakobi, Bitul Giyur Ekev Hoser Kenut be-Kabbalat ha-Mitzvot (Jerusalem, 2009), pp. 103ff. (This is an official publication of the Israel rabbinical courts.) See also ibid., p. 105, for the shocking statistic that from 1996-2008, 97% of converts who divorced in the State of Israel were irreligious. There is no reason to doubt that the number of non-divorced converts who are irreligious is similar. If only 3% of converts in Israel are religious, then, as Yakobi rightly notes, it raises serious concerns about the conversion process.
[7] A similar responsum dealing with the same case appears in Be-Mar’eh ha-Bazak, vol 3, no. 89.
[8] Derashot Hatam Sofer, vol. 2, p. 301c. s.v. yeshalem.
[9] Hiddushei Rabbi Shimon ha-Kohen (Jerusalem, 2011), vol. 4, p. 324 (Kuntres Likutim, no. 5).
[10] I can’t say whether there is any plagiarism in this book, but another publication of Appelbaum was plagiarized from Abraham Berliner. See Nehemiah Leibowitz, “Al Devar ha-Takanah be-Venetzia,” Ha-Tzofeh le-Hokhmat Yisrael 13 (1929), p. 90.

Regarding anachronistic explanations, I think most would also include in this category R. Moses Sofer’s statement that Joseph wished to pray with a minyan rather than pray vatikin by himself. See Hatam Sofer al ha-Torah, vol. 1, p. 227.
[11] The same approach is independently suggested by R. Judah Rosanes, Parashat Derakhim, Derush 17, and R. Pinhas Horowitz, Panim Yafot, Ex. 1:15.

R. Ishmael holds that abortion is treated as murder for non-Jews (Sanhedrin57b) and Maimonides rules this way (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim9:4). This halakhah has often been cited as proof that the crime of abortion is stricter for non-Jews than Jews, and that public policy should be in line with this. Yet in Sanhedrin 57b the Tanna Kamma disagrees with R. Ishmael and does not regard abortion as murder. In fact, according to the Tanna Kamma, abortion would seem to be permissible for non-Jews. R. Jeremy Wieder has raised the question, which I would like someone to offer a serious reply to, that while Maimonides and other authorities accept R. Ishmael as the binding decision, who says that non-Jews have to accept this? Why can’t non-Jews “poskin” like the Tanna Kamma? See here at minute 35:30.

R. Shneur Zalman Fradkin,Torat Hesed, Even ha-Ezer, no. 42:5 (in the note), suggests that Tosafot,Niddah 44a, that I discuss in the text, adopts the Tanna Kamma’s position, not the view of R. Ishmael. See Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 184. The implications of this with regard to non-Jews are obviously significant.

See also R. Jacob Emden, Em la-Binah (Jerusalem, 2020), p. 197:

בילדכן את העבריות: לא גזר על שפיכות דמים אלא על העוברים

R. Emden seems to be saying that abortion is not regarded as murder for non-Jews. Perhaps relevant to this, it is worth noting that R. Meir Mazuz states that one should encourage a non-Jewish woman pregnant by a Jewish man to have an abortion. SeeMakor Ne’eman, vol. 3, no. 1509. See also R. Hanan Aflalo,Asher Hanan, vol. 8, no. 74. R. Joseph Babad, Minhat Hinnukh, 296:7, states that abortion is not murder for non-Jews, and therefore there is no law of rodef when it comes to a non-Jew seeking to kill a fetus. (Since later in this post I mention suicide, it is worth noting that R. Babad also states that non-Jews are not prohibited from committing suicide. See Minhat Hinnukh 34:8.)

Regarding abortion for Jews, R. Hershel Schachter has an interesting shiur here. His approach is, I think, the most lenient among contemporary poskim, as he states that for the health of the mother abortion is permitted up until the end of pregnancy, which is long after the time that the fetus is viable.

R. Schachter’s approach might be identical with the very lenient perspective of R. Abraham Isaac Bloch. See R. Mordechai Gifter,Milei de-Iggerot, vol. 7, p. 341:

בגדר האיסור דהריגת עוברין בישראל, שמעתי מאדמו”ר הגאב”ד ור”מ דטלז ז”ל הי”ד, שהוא מגדר בל תשחית, אשר לפי”ז כל שהוא לצורך רפואה או פגם משפחה, אין בזה גדר האיסור דהשחתה

[12] I would have thought that the Maharsha’s words could have halakhic significance, but R. Nahman Yehiel Michel Steinmetz states otherwise, noting אין לומדים הלכה מדברי הגדה. See Meshiv Nevonim, vol. 6, p. 250. See also R. Weinberg’s comments regarding the Maharsha in Seridei Esh, vol. 3, no. 126.
[13] See e.g., Siftei Maharsha: Shemot, pp. 16-17.
[14] For opinions that the prohibition against abortion is only rabbinic, see R. Yishai Yitzhak Shraga, Torat ha-Ubar (Jerusalem, 2017), pp. 72ff.
[15] Ohalei Yaakov: Shemot, p. 1.
[16] See R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 9, p. 231, vol. 14, p. 184.
[17] Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 2, p. 295. There are a couple of strange things in this responsum, which first appeared in the R. Yehezkel Abramsky Memorial Volume. For example, see p. 298 how R. Moshe describes R. Joseph Hayyim’s responsum in Rav Pealim. (The word שהחכם in the bottom line right column should be שהתחכם, as it appears in the R. Abramsky Memorial Volume.) Yet as R. Waldenberg points out, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 186, R. Moshe’s summary of Rav Pealim is inaccurate and he also does not show much regard for R. Joseph Hayyim, leading R. Waldenberg to write: והוא פלאי, ושרי ליה מריה בזה. See Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 186. (R. Moshe actually ends his own responsum by saying ושרי ליה מריה בזה about R. Waldenberg.)

R. David M. Feldman wrote to R. Waldenberg that R. Moshe did not write the responsum on abortion, and that could explain what he saw as various problems in this responsum. SeeTzitz Eliezer, vol. 20, p. 140.

I find this approach completely untenable, although in conversation with me R. Feldman insisted on it. Some might suggest that others were involved in writing the responsum, and that explains the passage dealing with Rav Pealim. I find this impossible to accept, and would prefer to assume that at least with regard to the inaccurate Rav Pealim description, that R. Moshe did not have the text in front of him and was citing from memory from what had earlier been shown to him. As such, it is easy to imagine how he could have forgotten the details, as we have all had similar experiences. For more on this responsum, see my post here.
[18] Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 183.
[19] See R. Zvi Ryzman, Ratz ke-Tzvi, vol. 2, p. 295.
[20] Tehumin 37 (2017), p. 124.
[21] Refuah, Metziut, ve-Halakhah, p. 28.
[22] “Ha-Im Muteret ‘Hamatat Hesed’ al Yedei Amirah le-Goy,” Ha-Ma’yan 62 (Tamuz 5782), pp. 54-64.
[23] Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 2, p. 313.
[24] Ginat Egoz, p. 74.
[25] R. Yosef Aryeh Lorintz, Mishnat Pikuah Nefesh, p. 26.
[26] The pictures in this post are now kept at Ganzach Kiddush Hashem in Bnei Brak.
[27] All the big rabbis stayed and ate at the Silberhorn hotel, and yet until 1975 it had no hashgachah. People knew the family that owned it to be absolutely reliable in matters of kashrut, and like the other kosher hotels in Switzerland, the kashrut was trusted without any hashgachah. In 1974 the Swiss rabbinate informed the various kosher hotels that they would need to acquire a hashgachah, thus ending the era of religious owners’ kashrut being trusted without any outside supervision. (Thanks to Dr. Joshua Sternbuch who passed on this information from the family who owned the Silberhorn hotel.)

Regarding the pious practice of eating eggs at seudah shelishit, see Kaf ha-Hayyim 289:12.

Stet in the Beit Yosef: Fish and Milk, from Typographical Error to Typological Exemplar
Aton M. Holzer

Rabbi Dr. Holzer is Director of the Mohs Surgery Clinic in the Department of Dermatology, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, and is an assistant editor of the recent RCA Siddur Avodat HaLev. ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9852-3958/ 28 Binyamin, Beit Shemesh, Israel 9952200/ Aton.holzer@gmail.com

A passage in the magnum opus of R. Joseph Karo (Maran, or the Mehaber, 1488-1575), the Beit Yosef (YD 87:5) tends to be reckoned among the more consequential scribal errors in Jewish legal texts.

[ה] ”דגים וחגבים מותר לאכלן בחלב“. ריש פרק כל הבשר (קג:) ”(כל הבשר) אסור לבשל בחלב, חוץ מבשר דגים וחגבים“. וכתב הר”ן דכיון דלבשלן שרי משמע דלאכלן בחלב נמי שרי, דאיסור בשר בחלב בלשון בישול אפקיה רחמנא, וכן כתב הרמב”ם והרשב”א דלאכלן בחלב נמי שרי. ומכל מקום אין לאכול דגים בחלב מפני הסכנה, כמו שנתבאר בספר אורח חיים סימן קע”ג.

“Fish and locusts, it is permitted to eat them in milk.” In the beginning of the chapter kol basar (bHullin 103b) [it is written]: “(all flesh) it is prohibited to cook in milk, except for the flesh of fish and locusts.” And R. Nissim wrote that since cooking them is permitted, it implies that to eat them in milk is also permitted, for the prohibition of meat in milk was set out by the Torah in the semantics of cooking, and likewise did Maimonides and R. Shlomo ibn Adret write, that to eat them in milk is also permitted. And in any event, one should not eat fish in milk because of the danger, similar to what was elucidated in Orah Hayyim 173.

In his 2014 “A Guide to the Complex,”[1] Shlomo Brody highlights this passage – which invokes a heretofore ostensibly unknown ‘danger’ regarding consumption of fish in milk, and which makes reference to a chapter that deals with measures that must be taken with regard to the ‘dangerous mixture’ of fish and meat[2] – as a banner example of the ‘impact of inaccurate texts on Jewish law.’ He adds that ‘Ancient manuscripts regularly suffered from poor penmanship, slipping of the eyes, and misunderstandings by unlearned or confused copyists.’ The first to make this sort of observation regarding this passage was none other than R. Karo’s younger contemporary and interlocutory commentator R. Moses Isserles (Rama, 1530-1572), who puts it humorously (Darkei Moshe, Tur YD 87:4):

.ולא ראיתי מימי נזהרין בזה וגם בא”ח סימן קע”ג אינו אלא שלא לאכלו בבשר משום סכנה אבל בחלב שרי ועי”ל סימן קי”ו ולכן נראה שנתערב להרב בשר בחלב

And in all my days I have never seen [anyone] take care with regard to this, and also in Orah Hayyim 173 there is not but not to eat [fish cooked] in meat because of danger, but in milk it is permitted, and see earlier in chapter 116, and therefore it appears that the Rabbi has confused (mixed) meat and milk.

As neat as this solution appears, there remain some problems. For one thing, in context, the Beit Yosef discusses the consumption of various forms of flesh – fish and locust – in milk, not meat; replacing the word ‘milk’ for ‘meat’ would render the ultimate sentence a nonsequitur with regard to the full passage.

For another, the idea of danger attendant to mixtures of fish and dairy is not entirely unprecedented. R. Bahye b. Asher (1255-1340), who hailed from R. Karo’s native Christian Spain two centuries earlier (but from Zaragoza, quite a ways from Toledo), seems to make reference to such a practice in his commentary to Exodus 23:19:

.וכן דעת הרופאים בתערובת דג וגבינה שנתבשלו כאחד שמוליד תכונה רעה וחולי הצרעת

And so is the view of the physicians regarding the mixture of fish and cheese that were cooked together, that they beget a bad character and the illness of tsara’at (biblical ‘leprosy’).

To be sure, this is a lone statement, found in a decidedly non-Halakhic work, at a distance of two centuries and one continent from R. Karo’s work, which was completed in Ottoman Safed.

A third is that it is difficult to ascribe scribal error to the Mehaber’s project, if only because Beit Yosef was not transmitted in manuscript, and does not exist in manuscript – at least not beyond the author’s autograph. The four volumes of Tur with Beit Yosef were printed in different Italian publishing houses over the course of the 1550’s, in the author’s own lifetime, and he lived to see several printings of the Beit Yosef and Shulhan Arukh, the precis of the conclusions of halakhic discussions in the Beit Yosef. In fact, printing, and particularly choosing to do so in Renaissance Italy – where there was a Christian censor but superior presses to what was available in Ottoman Turkey, but more importantly, where (Jewish exile) cultures met and wide dissemination was guaranteed[3] – was central to R. Karo’s stated mission, a messianic objective of a piece with his participation in reconstituting the Sanhedrin to administer corporal punishment.[4] Taking a page from the messianic project of Sultan Suleiman, Kanuni or “the lawgiver,”[5] his project would complete Maimonides’ project[6] to unify the Jewish people under a uniform system of law in anticipation of redemption. And indeed, in his own lifetime, Beit Yosef and Shulhan Arukh enjoyed wide dissemination and readership, if not universal acceptance.[7] 

Figure 1: 87:5 in its first printing (Venice, 1551)

Given this, if “milk” is an error, it is much more likely typographical than scribal, and not the best example of the phenomenon R. Brody describes. But more importantly: given that the printed versions were available to the author, and were widely read and used, in his presence, for more than twenty years, the possibility that a typographical error of such consequence would go unnoticed by the author or his immediate milieu is at least somewhat diminished. The author himself issued a work called Bedek ha-Bayit with corrigenda and addenda, and there is a gloss on siman 86, but not 87.

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Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf al-Munāwī (1545-1621), a renowned scholar in Ottoman Cairo whose hadith commentary is still popular in Sunni Islam, also composed a compendium of fundamental, practical scholarly-spiritual knowledge related to a number of everyday issues[8] – a sort of Islamic Orah Hayyim, as it were – known as Tadhkirat ūlī al-albāb bi-maʻrifat al-ādāb. This work is significant as a snapshot of the cultural climate in Early Ottoman Cairo, and has traces of persistent Mamluk attitudes, reconfigured in light of Ottoman sensibilities and cutting-edge intellectual trends in his time in Cairo, which, under the Mamluks, had long been a hub of science and the occult (which, at the time, were also deemed ‘sciences’) in the Islamicate world.[9]

In his compendium,[10] there is a fascinating discussion of food mixtures, launching off a discussion of Galenic medicine and the inadvisability of combining food that relate to different humors/elements (moisture/water, dryness/air, coldness/earth and hotness/fire). In pertinent part:

يعسر علينا اثبات كثير من ذلك بالقياس فمن ذالك انه لا يجمع بين سمك و لبن فإنه يولد أمراضا مزمنة كالجدام والبرص والفالج

It is difficult for us to prove much of this by (syllogistic) reason. For example, that combining fish and milk causes chronic diseases such as leprosy, vitiligo, and paralysis.

Figure 2: Tadhkirat ūlī al-albāb bi-maʻrifat al-ādāb,folio 14a (Yale, Landberg MSS 163)

Paulina Lewicka, a Polish scholar who studied foodways in Mamluk and Ottoman Cairo,[11] highlights this passage and notes that it represents a novelty on the Egyptian scene.

In fact, there seems to be no evidence that avoidance of mixing fish and milk products had been observed in Egypt of the Mamluk period, or in the medieval Middle East in general. This combination, which is considered unhealthy today, appeared in a number of old Arabic-Islamic recipes where fish and yoghurt were put together. Al-Munāwī’s remarks may have reflected, then, a new trend in medico-culinary thinking.[12]

Lewicka also notes in al-Munāwī’s treatment of Galenic medicine an interesting development: even though Galen’s theory of humors had formed the basis of Islamicate medicine for centuries, in the Muslim-Sufi environment of early Ottoman Cairo there was discomfort with use of pagan theories and concepts. Instead, al-Munāwī traces the theory of humors to Kitāb al-Tawrāt, the Torah,[13]  where, according to him, Adam was created with dry soil, wet water, heat (nefesh/nafs) and cold (ru’ah/rūḥ).

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R. Yosef Karo, living in the same territorial-ideological expanse as al-Munāwī – with frequent interchange between Safed and Cairo by figures no less than R. David abi ibn Zimra, R. Bezalel Ashkenazi, and R. Isaac Luria – had ample access to the developments in Cairene medicine that inspired the Tadhkirat passage.

His relationship with classical philosophy – the ostensible basis for Galenic (as opposed to prophetic) Cairene medicine – is complicated. In his mystical diary Maggid Meisharim (80a-b), he cites his angelic guide who allows that, pace the view of other Kabbalists of his day, Maimonides was not condemned to reincarnate as a worm because of his philosophical views – but only because he was saved from this fate by his Torah and good deeds, and thus was allowed to reincarnate in a usual way before ascending to join the souls of the righteous. However, there is evidence that he himself was more accepting and even dabbled in philosophy – but assigned it a decidedly secondary or tertiary position to the study of Talmud and Halakhah, either behind or on par with Kabbalah, which also took a backseat to Halakhic sources in terms of study and Halakhic decision/pesak.[14]

The case of milk and fish may serve as something of an acid test for medical science. R. Karo includes it in his Beit Yosef, but as an ayn le-ekhol – it should not be eaten – rather than ‘it is forbidden.’ Clearly R. Karo prohibits it, as perhaps a contemporary posek (if not for the Igrot Moshe) might prohibit smoking, but does not share al-Munāwī’s view that humoral medicine is a de’orayta. And while cutting edge Galenic knowledge merits mention in Beit Yosef, the Mehaber omits it from the Shulhan Arukh (87:3), the repository of pesak, regarding which, just as for Kabbalah,[15] the Talmudic sources – which explicitly permit such a mixture (kutah, e.g. Pesahim 76b) – trump all.