Shnayer Leiman: Did a Disciple of the Maharal Create a Golem?

What follows is a short essay by Prof. Shnayer Leiman, whose article on this topic, “The Adventure of the Maharal of Prague in London: R. Yudl Rosenberg and the Golem of Prague,” appeared in Tradition 36:1 (2002): 26-58 [PDF].

Did a Disciple of the Maharal Create a Golem?
Shnayer Leiman

I. In March 2006, Dei’ah VeDibur, a Charedi internet newsletter, published an essay on the Maharal and the Golem. Its conclusion was that “it is unclear whether or not the Maharal ever made a golem.”[1]

At the time, I responded on the internet with a congratulatory note praising Dei’ah VeDibur for its sober assessment of the evidence, and for its readiness to admit that it may be that the Maharal did not create a Golem.[2]

Shortly thereafter I received what appeared to be an angry email note from a distinguished academician at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. It read

“You still haven’t responded to the evidence that a talmid of the Maharal is known to have created a Golem and that this factoid is documented.”

Since I had never claimed that a disciple of the Maharal either did or did not create a Golem, it was unclear to me why I had to respond to such a claim. Nonetheless, I knew precisely what my academic colleague had in mind. The author of the Dei’ah VeDibur essay mentioned in passing that the story connecting the Maharal to the making of a Golem was ”invented at some stage or, alternatively , it was mistakenly attributed to the Maharal while in fact it was his talmid HaRav Eliyahu Baal Shem of Chelm who made a golem (though the Maharal might have played a part).”[3]

Alas, we know precious little about R. Eliyahu (b. R. Aharon Yehudah) Ba’al Shem of Chelm (16th century).[4] In 1564, he joined a coalition of distinguished rabbis including R. Solomon Luria (the Maharshal, d. 1574) — that permitted an agunah to remarry.[5] Most importantly, he was an ancestor of R. Yaakov Emden (d.1776), who preserved the following tradition about him:[6]

As an aside, I’ll mention here what I heard from my father’s holy mouth regarding the Golem created by his ancestor, the Gaon R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of blessed memory. When the Gaon saw that the Golem was growing larger and larger, he feared that the Golem would destroy the universe. He then removed the Holy Name that was embedded on his forehead, thus causing him to disintegrate and return to dust. Nonetheless, while he was engaged in extracting the Holy Name from him, the Golem injured him, scarring him on the face.

Thus, there clearly existed a 16th century rabbi by the name of R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of Chelm (contemporary sources prove this), and the creation of a Golem was ascribed to him (so according to 17th and 18th century sources).[7] Not a word is mentioned about his being a disciple of the Maharal.

So I sent off a note to my academic colleague in Jerusalem. It read in part:

“There is no evidence that any talmid of the Maharal created a Golem. You write: “this factoid is documented.” Let me assure you that no such “factoid” is documented. The claim has been made – I am well aware of that, but the claim is based on a misreading of texts that I plan to expose in a footnote or essay in a future publication.”

The remainder of this essay is devoted to fulfilling the promise I made to my academic colleague in Jerusalem.

II. The claim that a disciple of the Maharal created a Golem appears most prominently in an essay published by a close friend — and scholarly colleague – of mine, Dr. Shlomo Sprecher, in the Torah periodical Yeshurun. [8] I am certain he will forgive me for correcting him, if I am right. And if I am wrong, I urge him to correct my error publicly, thereby advancing discussion, and pray that he forgives my indiscretion.

The ישורון essay reads in part:[9]

“Regarding R. Eliyahu of Chelm, we know that he studied Torah under the Maharal and that he was a colleague of the Rabbi, author of the Tosafot Yom Tov…. The “true” Golem — according to a reconstruction based upon trustworthy sources — was the creation of R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem, Chief Rabbi of Chelm, who was a disciple of the Maharal (as mentioned earlier). For whatever reason, the Master and the disciple were confused, with the resulting confusion [as to who created the Golem.]”

In fact, R. Eliyahu of Chelm was neither a student of the Maharal nor a colleague of the Tosafot Yom Tov. Sprecher can hardly be faulted; he was misled by the source he quotes, namely R. Menahem Mendel Krengil (d. 1930) in his commentary to R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai’s Shem Ha-Gedolim.[10] In turn, Krengil was misled by the source he quotes, R. Yitzhok Shlomo of Ozorkov’s introduction to Mikhlol Yofi (Warsaw, 1883).[11] In turn, R. Yitzhok Shlomo was misled by the source he quotes, R. Yehiel Heilprin’s (d. 1746), Seder Ha-Dorot.[12] In common, all these sources – and others not mentioned here – confused two different rabbis with the same name and cognomen, Eliyahu Ba’al Shem, and compressed them into one person. Despite the best efforts of nineteenth and twentieth century Jewish historians to expose this error,[13] shabashta keyvan d’al ‘al.

The above-mentioned R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of Chelm, the ancestor of R. Jacob Emden, may have created a Golem. But he was not a disciple of the Maharal, and he was not a colleague of the Tosafot Yom Tov, and — so far as anyone knows – he never set foot in Prague. Yet another R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem was R. Eliyahu (b. R. Moshe) Loanz (1564-1636) of Worms.[14] Distinguished kabbalist and author, he was a disciple of the Maharal[15] and a colleague of the Tosafot Yom Tov, but no one ever suggested that he created a Golem! This is not even a case of the proverbial “two Yosef b. Shimons.” For R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of Chelm’s father’s name was R. Aharon Yehudah, whereas R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of Worms’ father’s name was R. Moshe.[16] Moreover, each was buried in the city where he served as Rabbi. Pilgrimages to the grave of R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of Chelm — in Chelm –were commonplace until World War II.[17] The tombstone inscription on the grave of R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of Worms – in Worms – was published in the nineteenth century.[18]

Other famous disciples of the Maharal include his son, R. Bezalel; his son-in-law, R. Yitzhok b. R. Shimshon; R. Yom Tov Lipmann Heller, author of Tosafot Yom Tov; and R. David Ganz, author of Tzemah David.[19] No source prior to the twentieth century ever imagined that these — or any other – disciples of the Maharal were involved in creating a Golem. In sum, until new evidence is forthcoming, the answer to the question raised in the title of this note appears to be: “No.”

Notes:

[1] B.Y. Rabinowitz, “The Golem of Prague – Fact or Fiction?” Dei’ah VeDibur, March 1, 2006.

[2] Posting on Mail-Jewish, March 6, 2006.

[3] See note 1.

[4] In general, see J. Günzig, Die Wundermänner in jüdischen Volk, Antwerpen, 1921, pp. 24-26; A. Brik, “רבי אליהו בעל שם זצ”ל מחעלם,” Moriah 7 (1977), n. 6-7, 79-85; and M.D. Tzitzik, “מהר”ר אליהו בעל שם מחעלם,” Yeshurun 17 (2006), 644-667.

שו”ת ב”ח החדשות, ס’ ע”ז [5]

[6]

שו”ת שאילת יעב”ץ, ח”ב, ס’ פ”ב. Cf. his בירת מגדל עוז, Altona, 1748, p. 259a; מטפחת ספרים, Altona, 1768, p. 45a; and מגילת ספר, ed. Kahana, Warsaw, 1896, p. 4. See also שו”ת חכם צבי, ס’ צ”ג, and the references cited in שו”ת חכם צבי עם ליקוטי הערות, Jerusalem, 1998, vol. 1, p. 421 and in the periodical כפר חב”ד, number 351 (1988), p. 51.

[7] See the sources cited by M. Idel, גולם, Tel Aviv, 1996, pp. 181-184 (English edition: Golem, Albany, 1990, pp. 207-212).

[8] S. Sprecher, בסתר בצל’:קווים לדמותו הסמויה של הג”ר בצלאל בנו יחידו של המהר”למפראג זצ”ל in Yeshurun 2 (1997), 623-634.

[9] See the text on p. 629; and the end of note 24 on p. 632.

[10] R. Menahem Mendel Krengil, ed., שם הגדולים השלם, Podgorze, 1905, vol. 1, p. 11b, n. 85. Cf. Krengil’s remarks at p. 12a, n. 90, and at p.117a, n. 12.

[11] R. Eliyahu Loanz, מכלול יופי, Warsaw, 1883, introduction. R. Yitzhok Shlomo of Ozorkov (near Lodz), who wrote the introduction, arranged for this reissue of R. Eliyahu Loanz’ commentary on Koheleth. The introduction is particularly confused and misleading.

[12] סדר הדורות , Karlsruhe, 1769, p. 64a. Cf. סדר הדורות השלם, Jerusalem, 1985, part 1, p.248. The passage reads:

הג”מ אליהו בעל שם אב”ד דק”ק חעלם בווירמז חבר ספר אדרת אליהו פירוש על הזוהר כ”י (הוא היה מקובל גדול ובעל שם וברא ע”י שמות אדם.)

[13] See, e.g., H.N. Dembitzer, כלילת יופי , Cracow, 1888, part 1, pp. 78b-79a; H. Michael, אור החיים , Frankfurt, 1891, pp. 170-171; and E.L. Gartenhaus, אשל הגדולים, Brooklyn, 1958, pp. 92-94.

[14] See J. Günzig, op. cit. (above, note 4), pp. 37-39; N.Y. Ha-Kohen, אוצר הגדולים, Haifa, 1966, vol. 2, p. 184; and the entry in Encyclopaedia Judaica, Jerusalem, 1971, vol. 11, column 420.

[15] See R. Barukh b. R. David of Gniezno, גדולת מרדכי, Hanau, 1615, letters of approbation (reissued: Jerusalem, 1991, p. 3). R. Eliyahu Loanz, in his letter of approbation to this volume, writes:

“ והנה ידוע שמ”ו ה”ה הגאון מהר”ר ליווא מפראג היתה תורתו אומנותו מיום הכיר את בוראו.”

For legendary accounts of R. Eliyahu Loanz and his meetings with the Maharal of Prague and the author of the Tosafot Yom Tov, see R. Moshe Hillel, בעלי שם, Jerusalem, 1993, pp. 10-87.

[16] Already noted by A. Brik (above, note 4), p. 81.

[17] A. Brik (above, note 4), p. 85. Cf. J. Günzig, op. cit., p. 26.

[18] L. Lewysohn, נפשות צדיקים, Frankfurt, 1855, p. 59-60. Cf. E.M. Pinner, כתבי יד, Berlin, 1861, p. 166 and notes.

[19] See A. Gottesdiener, המהר”ל מפראג, Jerusalem, 1976, pp. 88-97.



The Ethics of the Case of Amalek: An Alternative Reading of the Biblical Data and the Jewish Tradition

 The Ethics of the Case of Amalek: An Alternative Reading of the Biblical Data and the Jewish Tradition
by Reuven Kimelman
This study of Amalek deals with seven questions.
1. Is the battle against Amalek primarily ethnic or ethical?
2. What is the difference in reading the biblical data starting with Exodus and Deuteronomy or starting with I Samuel 15?
3. What is the evidence that the Bible already seeks ethical justification for punishing Amalek?
4. How does post-biblical literature in general and rabbinic literature in particular further the transformation of Amalek into an ethical category?
5. How is the “Sennacherib principle” applied to Amalek?
6. How is Amalek de-demonized?
7. How can Haman be an Amalekite when according to 1 Chronicles 4:43 the remnant of Amalek had been wiped out?
                                                1. Introduction
This study deals with the wars against Amalek. The popular conception is that the Bible demands their extermination thereby providing a precedent for genocide.[1] This reading of Amalek filters the Torah material through the prism of Saul’s battle against Amalek in the Book of Samuel. The total biblical data is much more ambiguous making the most destructive comments the exception not the rule as will be evident from a systematic analysis of all the Amalek material in the Bible.
                                                2. AMALEK
The first biblical reference to Amalek appears in Exodus 17:
7The place was named Massah and Meribah, because the Israelites quarreled and because they tried the Lord, saying, “Is the Lord present among us or not?” 8Amalek came and fought with Israel at Rephidim. 9Moses said to Joshua, “Pick some men for us, and go out and do battle with
Amalek. Tomorrow I will station myself on the top of the hill, with the rod of God in my hand.” Joshua did as Moses told him and fought with Amalek, while Moses, Aaron, and Hur went up to the top of the hill. 11Then, whenever Moses held up his hand, Israel prevailed; but whenever he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed. 12But Moses’ hands grew heavy; so they took a stone and put it under him and he sat on it, while Aaron and Hur, one on each side, supported his hands; thus his hands were faithful until the sun set. 13And Joshua overwhelmed the people of Amalek with the sword. Then the Lord said to Moses, “Inscribe this in a document as a reminder, and recite in the ears of Joshua:[2] ‘I will utterly blot out the memory of Amalek from under heaven.’ ” 15And Moses built an altar and named it Adonai-nissi. He said, “It means, ‘Hand upon the thro[ne] of the Lo[rd]!’ The Lord will be at war with Amalek throughout the ages.”
This text raises many questions: (1) why could Moses not keep his hands up fully aware that as long as they were raised Israel prevailed, (2) why are the hands of Moses called “faithful,” (3) why was it inscribed in a document and told specifically to Joshua that God — not he — is to blot out Amalek, (4) why is it God — not Israel — who will be at war with Amalek, and if God is waging the war (5) why does God not finish them off as was done with the Egyptians at the Sea rather than extending it throughout the ages. Finally, (6) why do the terms for God and throne appear in the Hebrew orthographically truncated? The inability to account for these matters in literal terms has generated the view that the battle between Amalek and God serves as a metaphor for the conflict between human evil and divine authority where human evil truncates, as if were, the divine presence and authority.[3] The metaphorical reading would account for locating the war with Amalek in Exodus after a crisis of faith — “Is the Lord present among us or not?” (17:7)[4]  and why the hands of Moses are described as faithful, namely, faith generating. It also accounts for its location in Deuteronomy after a warning against dishonest business practices that ends with “For everyone who does those things, everyone who deals dishonestly, is abhorrent to the Lord your God” (25:16).[5]
The appearance of Amalek is thus correlated with the absence of faith and morality. Its presence signifies their absence. The position is epitomized in the rabbinic statement: “As long as the seed of Amalek is in the world neither God’s name nor His throne is whole. Were the seed of Amalek to perish from the world the Name would be whole and the throne would be whole.”[6] In fact, an alternative version explicitly states “the wicked” instead of Amalek.[7] Thus the war against Amalek is not against a specific ethnicity, but the human ethical condition. Such a battle ultimately can only be waged by God not Joshua. Therefore Joshua is pointedly told that what he started with the historical Amalek is not his job to finish since that can only be done by God. In sum, the more Amalek comes to embody moral evil, the more it moves from ethnicity to ethics.
It is generally assumed that the metamorphosis of Amalek from the ethnic to the ethical is a product of post-biblical exegesis, absent in the Bible itself. Alternatively, the aforementioned terminological peculiarities reflect a process of metaphorization already evident in the Bible. The possibility that the Exodus text was already understood metaphorically in the Bible may be gathered from the other references to the actual nation of Amalek which lack awareness of the Exodus text. Thus in the next reference to Amalek, in Numbers 13:29 and 14:25, they are designated by their location only. Numbers 14:43-45 warns Israel:
42Do not go up, lest you be routed by your enemies, for the Lord is not in your midst. 43 For the Amalekites and the Canaanites will be there to face you, and you will fall by the sword, inasmuch as you have turned from following the Lord· and the Lord will not be with you.” 44Yet defiantly they marched toward the crest of the hill country, though neither the Ark of the Covenant nor Moses stirred from the camp. 45And the Amalekites and the Canaanites who dwelt in that hill country came down and pummeled them to/at Hormah.
There is no allusion to the Exodus episode unless it is in the metaphorical explanation that Israel meets defeat because they turn away from God. In any case, there is no command to do away with Amalek nor any special comment about them. In Numbers 24:20, it is predicted that Amalek will be gone or perish forever without any mention that Israel will destroy them.[8] It correlates well with the last biblical mention of Amalek in 1 Chronicles 4:43 where it is recorded that the last remnant of Amalek was done away with as part of its conflict with the tribe of Simeon, but not because of any mandated war against them.
The next reference to Amalek is in Deuteronomy 25. It adds three elements. It seeks to provide a basis for retributive justice by charging Amalek with an unprovoked ambush of the defenseless, seeking to “cut down all the stragglers in your rear.” It is precisely their immorality
that triggered the demand for retribution.[9] It also delays the battle until all the borders have been secured thereby removing it from any defense or security agenda. This process is extended by later authorities who further postponed the struggle with Amalek till the kingship was instituted and the Temple built,[10] while others delayed it to the messianic age.[11] And lastly, it shifts the responsibility for such retribution from God to Israel. It goes like this:
17Bear in mind what Amalek did to you on your journey, after you left Egypt—18how, he surprised you on the march, when you were famished and weary, and undeterred by fear of God, cut down all the stragglers in your rear. 19Therefore, when the Lord your God grants you safety from all your enemies around you, in the land that the Lord your God is giving you as a hereditary portion, you shall blot out the memory of Amalek from under heaven. Do not forget!
This description, especially the expression “undeterred by fear of God,” provoked various classical commentators to level against Amalek a slew of charges such as insolence, immorality in warfare, undermining divine authority,[12] and provoking other nations to attack Israel.[13] Thus it was claimed that they were “justly suffering the punishment which they wrongly strove to deal to others.”[14] Others, however, claimed that the expression “not fearing God” applied to Israel just as do the preceding expressions “famished and weary.”[15] Faulting Israel for “not fearing God” correlates with faulting Israel for the lack of faith, in Exodus 17:7, which precipitated the onslaught of Amalek in 17:8.[16]
 Amalek next appears in The Book of Judges.[17] He is described as a launcher of raids into the Israelite heartland without any special comment. In fact, he is sometimes associated there with Midian, who becomes the object of Israel’s wrath (ibid., 6:15), not Amalek. The absence of any special enmity for Amalek is telling.
The next reference to Amalek in 1 Samuel 15 is fateful. It places the responsibility to blot out the memory of Amalek on the king and identifies “the memory” with all the people and livestock. This position was harmonized with Deuteronomy’s position that it is the people’s responsibility by maintaining that the demand devolves upon the people only when led by a king in an act of war.[18]  It states:
1Samuel said to Saul, “I am the one the Lord sent to anoint you king over His people Israel. Therefore, heed the voice of the Lord’s words. 2‘Thus said the Lord of Hosts: I am exacting the penalty for what Amalek did to Israel, for the assault he made upon them on the road, on their way up from Egypt.’ 3“Now, go attack Amalek, and proscribe all that belongs to him. Spare no one, but kill alike men and women, infants and sucklings, oxen and sheep, camels and asses.”
There are two ways of parsing this section. Either both verse two and three are God’s, or only verse two while three is Samuel’s inference. According to the second parsing, we have here Samuel’s interpretation and application. He places the responsibility to blot out the memory of Amalek on the king, he interprets “blotting out” as physical extermination, and identifies “the memory” with all the people and livestock. Samuel thereby extends the innovation of Deuteronomy seven of including Canaanites in the proscription of Israelite idolators to the Amalekites.[19] This move was perceived as so harsh that the talmudic rabbi, R. Mani, had King Saul himself protest the order objecting that even if the adult males were guilty the children and livestock were not.[20] Since there is no similar objection with regard to the Amalek material in the Torah, the Torah material was not understood as including children and livestock. Saul’s objection in the Talmud must hence be against Samuel’s interpretation that the proscription of Amalek includes the destruction of those who did not partake in Amalek’s dastardly deeds. After all, Exodus faults Amalek for mounting the attack at all, whereas Deuteronomy focuses on their crude cowardice of attacking the stragglers. Both accusations are limited to those who fought.
 Just as Samuel expanded the biblical data, Maimonides later on circumscribed Samuel’s
position and harmonized it with Deuteronomy by limiting the attack on Amalek to the people when led by a king in an act of war.[21] He thus ruled that the appointment of a king precedes the war against Amalek. Since he also ruled there that the destruction of Amalek precedes the building of the Temple,[22] he ends up severely restricting its application to the period between the appointment of the king and the building of the Temple. In biblical chronology, that limits it to the reign of Saul and David. Even that, is not as limiting as the Bible itself since there is no mention of Amalek with regard to David’s failed attempt, or Solomon’s successful attempt, to build the Temple nor do either seek to do away with Amalek. Presumably, Amalek was already irrelevant or that Samuel’s understanding of Amalek was never accepted. This, as shall see, makes most sense of the biblical data.
Besides limiting the morally outrageous ruling on Amalek to a specific time, it was limited by a process of moral justification. This process begins already in Deuteronomy by spelling out their felonious behaviour and continues in the Book of  Samuel. Samuel thus justifies his slaying of the king of Amalek, Agag, not by referring to crimes of long ago but to recent ones, saying: “As your sword has bereaved women, so shall your mother be bereaved among women” (I Samuel 15:33).[23] By understanding the king as representative of the people, a four hundred year vendetta becomes a quid pro quod judicial execution. Only those who have wielded the sword will die by the sword. [24] Lurking behind this understanding is obviously the verse “A man shall be put to death [only] for his own sin” (Deuteronomy 24:16). A verse which was already used in the Bible (2 Kings 14:6 = 2 Chronicles 25:4) to prevent cross-generational vendettas. A similar understanding of the battle against Amalek as justified retribution appears in the reference to Amalek immediately preceding our story in 1 Samuel 14:48: “He (King Saul) was triumphant, defeating the Amalekites and saving Israel from those who have plundered it.” If the Hebrew of “and” is taken, as it sometimes is, as “namely,”[25] then Saul’s defeat of the Amalek is in response to Amalek’s plundering of Israel.
This reading that Amalek should only get as they gave is justified by David’s tit-for-tat response to Amalek’s plundering. 1 Samuel 30 states what Amalek did to Israel:
1By the time David and his men arrived in Ziklag, on the third day, the Amalekites had made a raid into the Negev and against Ziklag; they had stormed Ziklag and burned it down. 2They had taken the women in it captive, low-born and high-born alike; they did not kill any, but carried them off and went their way.
Again Amalek attacked the weak left behind. What did David do? Not knowing what to do he inquired of the Lord:
7David said to the priest Abiathar son of Ahimelech, “Bring the ephod up to me.” 8When Abiathar brought up the ephod to David, inquired of the Lord, “Shall I pursue those raiders? Will I overtake them?” And He answered him, “Pursue, for you shall overtake and you shall rescue.”
Evidently, there was no recourse to any standing order to kill Amalek. Indeed, nothing is made of the fact that they are Amalekites. They are simply called raiders. David’s counterattack sought only to recoup his own. Amalekites who fled are left alone and the livestock is taken as spoil:
17David attacked them from before dawn until the evening of the next day; none of them escaped, except four hundred young men who mounted camels and got away. 18David rescued everything the Amalekites had taken; David also rescued his two wives. 19Nothing of theirs was missing—young or old, sons or daughters, spoil or anything else that had been carried off —David recovered everything. 20David took all the flocks and herds, which [the troops] drove ahead of the other livestock; and they declared, “This is David’s spoil.”
Note that there is no condemnation of David, à la Saul, for not slaying Amalek or for taking the spoil. Similarly, 1 Chronicles 18:11 records that David dedicated to God the spoils of Amalek[26] just as he did to those of Edom, Moab, Ammon, and the Philistines. Again Amalek is treated as other enemies without a distinctive comment or special treatment just as is the case in Psalm 83:7-9 which lists Amalek among the many enemies of Israel. One tradition, cited by Rashi and Radak to 2 Chronicles 20:1, has the Amalekites trying to pass as Ammonites to wage war against Israel in the time of Jehoshaphat, whereas another, based on Numbers 21:1, has them trying to pass as Canaanites to exploit Israel’s vulnerability upon the death of Aaron.[27]
The final case which shows that the treatment of Amalek was not different from other enemies is David’s encounter with the Amalekite who slew King Saul in 2 Samuel 1:
4“What happened?” asked David. “Tell me!” And he told him how the troops had fled the battlefield, and that, moreover, many of the troops had fallen and died; also that Saul and his son Jonathan were dead. 5“How do you know,” David asked the young man who brought him the news, “that Saul and his son Jonathan are dead?” 6The young man who brought him the news answered, “I happened to be at Mount Gilboa, and I saw Saul leaning on his spear, and the chariots and horsemen closing in on him. 7He looked around and saw me, and he called to me. When I responded, ‘At your service,’ 8he asked me, ‘Who are you?’ And I told him that I was an Amalekite. 9Then he said to me, ‘Stand over me, and finish me off for I am in agony and am barely alive.’ 10So I stood over him and finished him off, for I knew that he would never rise from where he was lying. Then I took the crown from his head and the armlet from his arm, and I have brought them here to my lord.” … 13David said to the young man who had brought him the news, “Where are you from?” He replied, “I am the son of a resident alien, an Amalekite.” 14“How did you dare,” David said to him, “to lift your hand and kill the Lord’s anointed?” 15Thereupon David called one of the attendants and said to him, “Come over and strike him!” He struck him down and he died. 16And David said to him, “Your blood be on your own head! Your own mouth testified against you when you said, ‘I put the Lord’s anointed to death.’ ”
The Amalekite who informed David that he had slain Saul at his request expected a reward not retribution. The fact that he tells David that he informed Saul that he is an Amalekite indicates his obliviousness of any Israelite crusade to do away with Amalek. Indeed, as we have seen, David treated Amalek no different than any other enemy.
Samuel’s demand for the wholesale killing of Amalek thus stands as the exception not the norm. It does not even coincide with the other biblical data. After all, if Saul had slain all the Amalekites why did they remain so numerous in David’s time? In Numbers, Judges, and elsewhere in 1 Samuel (14:48, 27:8) Amalek gets the same quid pro quod treatment as other ancient enemies. This is even their lot at the hands of Saul in 1 Samuel 14:48.
The normalization of Amalek reaches its peak in the en passant record of their destruction in 1 Chronicles 4:41-43:
41 Those recorded by name came in the days of King Hezekiah of Judah and attacked their encampments and the Meunim who were found there, and wiped them out to this day, and settled in their place because there was pasture there for their flocks. 42 And some of them, five hundred of the Simeonites, went to mount Seir with Pelatiah, Neariah, Rephaiah, and Uzziel, sons of Ishi, at their head. 43 Having destroyed the last surviving Amalekites, they live there to
this day.
The destruction of the remnant of Amalek is told as part of a local conflict with the tribe of Simeon during the reign Hezekiah in the late eighth century BCE. Neither king, prophet, or God is involved. No biblical precedent is noted. It simply is not a big deal. Any subsequent reference or allusion to Amalek is perforce metaphorical. The major biblical example of the metaphoraization of Amalek is Haman, the would-be exterminator of the Jews in the Book of Esther. The association of Amalek with Haman through the term ‘Agagite’ is a consequential development in the move from the ethnic to the ethical. Since, as 1 Chronicles 4:43 notes, the last Amalekites were done away centuries earlier, the association of Amalek with Haman is part of the move of identifying Amalek with their historical wannabees.  Apparently, aware of the historical problem, the Greek versions of Esther 3:1 call Haman, or his father Hammedatha, a Bougaean or Macedonian not the Agagite. The Talmud itself understood Hammedatha, in Esther 3:1, 10, as an expression of moral opprobrium.[28]
The Haman case is complex and requires extended analysis. It is common to see the conflict between Mordecai and Haman as an episode in the ongoing bout between Israel and Amalek by linking Mordecai with King Saul and Haman with Amalek. Both links are problematic. The identification of Mordecai with Saul is based on identifying Saul with “the son of Jair, the son of Shimi, the son of Kish, a man of Benjamin” (Esther 2:5). The assumption is that Kish is the Benjaminite Kish, the father of Saul (1 Samuel 9:1),[29] yet no mention is made of the most illustrious and pertinent ancestor — King Saul. Moreover, Jair is not a Benjamite name, but rather a son of Manasseh according to Numbers 32:41, or a priest of David according to 2 Samuel 20:26. Finally, Shimi is identified only as a member of the clan of Saul (2 Samuel 16:5), not as a descendant of Saul. Frustrated by these discrepancies, the Talmud takes Jair, Shimi, and Kish to be metaphorical epithets of Mordecai himself.[30]
With regard to designating Haman the Agagite (Esther 3:1, 10; 5:8; 8:1, 3, 5; 9:10, 24), note that Haman is not designated an Amalekite as other Amalekites are but only as an Agagite.[31] Moreover, the antagonism of Haman for Mordecai is attributed to Mordecai’s provocative
behavior (Esther 3:2-5), a stance he maintains even after the decree (Esther 5:9), and not to Haman’s genealogy. There is no evidence that Haman on his own had it in for the Jews.  Similarly, the Greek Addition A to Esther (v. 17) attributes Haman’s ire against Mordecai and his people to Mordecai having exposed the plot against the king of the two eunuchs who, according to Josippon 4, were relatives of Haman. He only becomes subsequently the nefarious model of classical Judeophobia; ticked off by one Jew he seeks to eliminate all Jews.
Note that Haman is not executed because of his genealogy, but because of his murderous machinations. He is specifically hanged on the gallows he prepared for Mordecai as an expression of poetic justice and not for any long standing vendetta. As Samuel justifies Agag’s execution by his iniquitous acts so does the Book of Esther justify Haman’s by his. Neither is punished for the sins of their fathers. Similarly, the Book of Esther no more concludes with a mandate to remember Amalek than does the story of Saul and Agag. In both cases by doing away with the enemy, in Haman’s case also his sons, there remains no remnant in the story itself and the case is closed. Even Haman’s sons are slain not because of their father but because, as 9:5-10 notes, they numbered among the foes of the Jews. Had this been part of a historical vendetta, a tit-for-tat allusion to the impalement of Saul’s sons by the vindictive Gibeonites in 2 Samuel 21:9 would have been in order. Clearly, the moral structure of the book is predicated on a measure for measure system not on any historical retribution or squaring of accounts.
Instructively, if not ironically, Haman’s plan “to destroy, massacre, and exterminate all the Jews, young and old, children and women” (Esther 3:13) smacks of Samuel’s order to Saul: “kill alike men and women, infants and sucklings” (1 Samuel 15:3). In pointing out the moral absurdity of Haman’s designs there is an oblique critique of Samuel’s. Josephus indeed states that Haman’s hatred of the Jews derives from this incident,[32] as if to say that the Jews are now getting as they gave. A vendetta against Amalek has become a vendetta against the Jews. The Midrash, however, sees this as a preemptive comeuppance arguing that “God gave Amalek a taste of his own future work.”[33] The Midrash is extending Samuel’s moral justification for slaying Agag. Just as Samuel justified killing Agag because he killed others, so the Midrash justifies the order for wiping out Amalek because Haman ordered the wiping out of the Jews. Not able to anchor Amalek’s extraordinary punishment in any prior behavior, the Midrash perforce extends its moral compass to include Amalek’s future behavior. In any case, the issue remains moral.
This moral self-criticism extends to comments made about Amalek’s mother Timna. Accordingly to the Talmud, her efforts to convert were rejected by all three Patriarchs. Wanting to join this people at all cost, she marries Isaac’s grandson, through Esau, Eliphaz. The fruit of
this relationship is Amalek who goes on to aggrieve Israel for their having ticked off his mother Timna.[34] The insight is that Israel’s lack of receptivity to converts can trigger a resentment that leads to retributive vindictiveness.
The allusion to the Saul-Amalek incident explains another relevant peculiarity of the Book of Esther. Thrice, it states that “they did not lay hands on the spoils” (9:10, 15, 16) of those persons slain in trying to kill the Jews even though the royal edict (8:11) explicitly permitted it. Since the original decree specifically mentioned (3:13) the right of spoils for the slain Jews why did the Jews not act in kind? Unless it was to avoid transgressing the prohibition against taking the spoils of Amalek mentioned in 1 Samuel 15:3. But the murderous Persians are not of Amalek stock,[35]  unlike the sons of Haman where the same scruple was adhered to (see Esther 9:10). If they are not of Amalek why were they treated as if they were? if not because they were Amalek in character. Despite no chance for spoils, now that government support had been rescinded, they pressed on to kill the Jews. Wanting to kill Jews for its own sake, they are dubbed thrice-fold not just the enemies of the Jews, but also their haters (Esther 9:1, 5, 16).[36]
Acting like Amalek, they are treated as Amalek, no longer an ethnic designation but an ethical metaphor.[37]
Maimonides also makes no special provision for Amalek when he argues that all wars must be preceded by overtures of peace indicating that were Amalek to sue for peace they would not be subject to destruction.[38] The ruling that all must be offered terms of peace flows from the following Midrash:
God commanded Moses to make war on Sihon, as it is said, ‘Engage him in battle’ (Deuteronomy 2:24), but he did not do so.  Instead he sent messengers . . . to Sihon . . . with an offer of peace (Deuteronomy 2:26). God said to him: ‘I commanded you to make war with him, but instead you began with peace; by your life, I shall confirm your decision.  Every war upon which Israel enters shall begin with an offer of peace, as it is written, “When
you approach a city to attack it, you shall offer it terms of peace”
(Deuteronomy 20:10).[39]
Since Joshua is said to have extended such an offer to the Canaanites,[40] and Numbers 27:21 points out Joshua’s need for inquiring of the priestly Urim and Tumim to assess the chances of victory, it is evident that also divinely-commanded wars are predicated on overtures of peace as well as on assessments of the outcome.[41] Moreover, the cross-generational struggle against Amalek, according to Maimonides, is limited to Amalek maintaining the practices of their biblical ancestors of rejecting the Noachide laws which stipulate the norms of human decency and civil society.[42] Were Amalek to accept them they would achieve the status of other Noachites. Again morality trumps biology.
The concern with the humanity of the enemy is also a factor. Referring to Deuteronomy 21:10ff. Josephus says the legislator of the Jews commands “showing consideration even to declared enemies.  He . . . forbids even the spoiling of fallen combatants; he has taken measures to prevent outrage to prisoners of war, especially women.”[43] Apparently reflecting a similar sensibility, R. Joshua claimed that his biblical namesake took pains to prevent the disfigurement of fallen Amalekites,[44] whereas David brought glory to Israel by giving burial to his enemies.[45] It is this consideration for the humanity of the enemy that forms the basis of
Philo’s explanation for the biblical requirement in Numbers 31:19 of expiation for those who fought against Midian. He writes:
For though the slaughter of enemies is lawful, yet one who kills a man, even if he does so justly and in self-defense and under compulsion, has something to answer for, in view of the primal common kinship of mankind.  And therefore, purification was needed for the slayers, to absolve them from what was held to have been a pollution.[46]
The position that the negation of Amalek is ethical not ethnic is also reflected in the following talmudic anecdote about Amalek’s ancestor Esau[47] who was later identified with Rome:
Antoninus (the Roman Emperor) asked Rabbi (Judah the Prince): Will I enter the world to come?” “Yes,” said Rabbi. “But,” said Antoninus, “is it not written, ‘And there will be no remnant to the house of Esau’ ” (Obadiah 18). (Rabbi replied) “The verse refers only to those who act as Esau acted.” We have learned elsewhere likewise: “And there will be no remnant of the house of Esau,” might have been taken to apply to all (of the house of Esau), therefore Scriptures says specifically — “of the house of Esau,” to limit it only to those who act as Esau acted.[48]
Once the criterion becomes behavior and not birth, the Talmud can claim that even the descendants of Haman the Amalekite became students of Torah.[49] Following suit, Maimonides ruled: “We accept converts from all nations of the world.”[50] Radak even entertains the possibility that the Amalekite who refers to himself as a ger in 2 Samuel 1:13 meant a convert to Judaism. For him and Maimonides, the wiping out of Amalek can be accomplished by the wiping out of Amalekite qualities. This is why Maimonides states with regard to Amalek: “It is also a positive commandment to remember always his evil deeds.”[51] He adopts the position of Sifrei Deuteronomy[52] that “remember” is fulfilled with the mouth, and “do not forget” is fulfilled through the heart. No act of violence is mandated against Amalek. So why, according to him, was Amalek punished so harshly to begin with? To deter future Amalek wannabees.[53]
As Amalek became more and more a metaphor for human evil, the eradication of Amalek from the national-historic plane was shifted to the metaphysical and psycho-spiritual.[54] The interioralization of Amalek imposes the duty of eradication on all. This shift parallels the aforementioned rabbinic reading of the Amalek episode in Exodus if not that of the Bible itself.
In the post-biblical period the shift from ethnicity to ethics is total. In both the Saul-Amalek and Haman episodes, Scripture indicates that no one remained. Their ethnicity was also rendered operationally defunct by applying the same “Sennacherib principle” to them that was applied to the long gone Canaanites.[55] This principle was based on the fact that Sennacherib, the king of Assyria, erased the national identity of those he conquered which included all of the nations of ancient Canaan and surrounding nations,[56] as he says: “I have erased the borders of the peoples; I have plundered their treasures, and exiled their vast populations” (Isaiah 10:13). Independent of the “Sennacherib principle,” others limited the moral relevance of the command against Amalek by restricting the waging of a war of total destruction against Amalek to King Saul.[57] Such limitations best reflects the total biblical data. Applying the “Sennacherib principle” and limiting the commandment to a specific period in the past or postponing it to the messianic age effectively removes the case of Amalek from the post-biblical ethical agenda.
In sum, there are four ways of rendering Amalek operationally defunct:
1. The recognition that the mandate for their extermination was a minority position based on Na”kh (1 Samuel 15), not confirmed in the rest of the Bible indeed implicitly denied.
2. The realization that the process of transmuting Amalek into a metaphor for human evil is rooted in the Torah (Exodus 17).
3. The limitation of the conflict to King Saul and/or postponing the battle to the messianic era
4. The application of the same “Sennacherib principle” to Amalek that was applied to the long gone Canaanites.
 These four overlapping stratagems of the biblical and post-biblical exegetical tradition mitigate the ruling regarding the destruction of the Amalekites. This trumping of genealogy by ethics helps account for the absence of any drive to exterminate or dispossess Amalek even when Israel was at the height of its power under the reigns of David and Solomon.
[1]On the practice of
genocide in antiquity, see Louis Feldman, “Remember Amalek!”: Vengeance,
Zealotry, and Group Destruction in the Bible according to Philo, Pseudo-Philo,
and Josephus, (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2004), pp. 2-6.
[2]Taking kee as
introducing direct speech; see The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old
Testament, eds. L. Koehler, W. Baumgartner, et al., (3 vols.,
Leiden: Brill, 1994-1996), 2:471a; and Amos Ḥעakham, Sefer Shmot,
(2 vols., Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1991), 1:329a.
[3]See Pesikta de–Rav
Kahana 3; and Pesikta Rabbati 12.
[4] Which is how the
Midrash takes it; see Midrash Tanḥעuma, Be–Shalaḥע
25, p. 92; and Pesikta de–Rav Kahana 3.8, ed.
Mandelbaum, 1:47 with parallels in n. 5. Otherwise it should probably be
located several chapters later after the Sinaitic narrative.
[5]So Pesikta de
Rav-Kahana 3.4, ed. Mandelbaum, 1:42-43:
R. Banai, citing R. Huna, began his discourse
[on remembering Amalek] with the verse “A false balance is an abomination to
the Lord …” (Proverbs 11:1). And R. Banai, citing R. Huna, proceeded: When you
see a generation whose measures and balances are false, you may be certain that
a wicked kingdom will come to wage war against such a generation. And the
proof? The verse “A false balance is an abomination to the Lord” … which is
immediately followed by a verse that says, “The immoral kingdom will come and
bring humiliation [to Israel]” (Prov. 11:2).
See Rashi and Abarbanel
to Deuteronomy 25:17 with Tosafot to B. T. Kiddushin
33b, s. v. ve-eima.
[6]Pesikta De–Rav Kahana
3.16, ed. Mandelbaum, 1:53 with parallels in n. 8.
[7]See Menaḥem Kasher,
Torah Shelemah (Jerusalem: Beth Torah Shelemah, 1949-1991), 14:272f.
[8]This may be what allowed
Josephus (Antiquities 3:60) to say that Moses predicted that the
Amalekites would perish with utter annihilation.
[9]As spelled out in the
end of the first stanza of the kerovah of Parshat Zakhor; see the Yotzer
for Parshat Zakhor in The Complete ARTScroll Siddur for
Weekday/ Sabbath/ Festival, Nusach Ashkenaz (Brooklyn: Mesorah
Publications, 1990), p. 880f.
[10]Sifrei Deuteronomy 67, T.
Sanhedrin 4.5, B. T. Sanhedrin 20b.
[11]The eschatological
reading may already be in the Dead Sea Scroll 4Q252, 4.1-3; see Louis
Feldman, “Remember Amalek!”: Vengeance, Zealotry, and Group
Destruction in the Bible according to Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and Josephus
(Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2004), p. 52f. It is clearly already
tannaitic. Rabbi Joshua reads Exodus 17:6 to mean “When God will sit on His
throne and His kingship is established — at that time will the Lord war on
Amalek.” And according to Rabbi Eliezer: “When will their names be blotted out?
When idolatry is uprooted along with its devotees,when the Lord is alone in the
world and His kingdom lasts forever– then the Lord will go out and war on
those people” (Mekhilta de–Rabbi Ishmael, ed.
Horowitz-Rabin, p. 186). See the version and discussion in Menahem Kahana, The
Two Mekhiltot on the Amalek Portion [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press,
1999), p. 239f. The Aramaic translation, Targum Jonathan, takes
the word “end” in Numbers 24:20, which refers to Amalek, as an allusion to the
Messianic era. For medievals who also postponed the conflict to the messianic
period, see Moses b. Jacob of Coucy, Sefer Mitsvot Gadol (SeMaG),
negative commandment #226; and R. David b. Zimra (RaDBaZ) with Maimonidean
Glosses to Hilkhot Melakhim 5:5.This probably includes Maimonides
since he made the battle with Amalek contingent upon a king, see his “Laws of
Kings and Their Wars,” 1:2.
[12]See Nachmanides,
Abarbanel, and Sforno ad loc., and Exodus 17:16 along with Josephus, Antiquities
4.304.
[13]See Josephus, Antiquities
3.41; Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Amalek 1 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin), p. 176; Mekilta
de-Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai 81 (ed. Epstein-Melamed) 119; and the end of the
second stanza of the kerovah of Parshat Zakhor in The Complete
ARTScroll Siddur for Weekday/ Sabbath/ Festival, Nusach Ashkenaz (Brooklyn:
Mesorah Publications, 1990), p. 882f.
[14]Philo, The Life
of Moses, 1:218 (LCL 6:391).
[15]Mekhilta, Amalek 1, ed.
Horowitz-Rabin, p. 116, l. 9 (see p. 116, lines 3 and 18). See Ralbag
(Gersonides) as cited by Abarbanel ad loc.
[16]See Midrash Tannaim,
ad loc., ed. Hoffmann, p. 170; and Hizkuni ad loc.
[17]Judges 3:13; 6:3-5, 33;
7:12; 12:15. The
word עמלק
appears also in 5:14, but, based on the Septuagint, probably should be emended
to עמק.
[18]Based on B. T.
Sanhedrin 20b, Maimonides explicitly
states that the commandment devolves only on the collectivity not the
individual; see his Book of Commandments,
end of positive commandments #248. In his “Laws of Kings and Their Wars,” 1:2,
based on 1 Samuel 15:1-3, Maimonides rules that the appointment of a king
precedes the war against Amalek. He also rules there that the destruction of
Amalek precedes the building of the Temple; see Sifrei Deuteronomy  67, ed. Finkelstein, p. 132, with n. 4.
Nonetheless, there is no mention of Amalek with regard to David’s failed
attempt, or Solomon’s successful attempt, to build it. Presumably, Amalek had
already disappeared or was irrelevant.
[19]See Michael Fishbane, The JPS Bible Commentary Haftarot
(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 2002), p. 344f.
[20]B. T. Yoma
22b; and Yalqut Shimoni 2:121 (Genesis–Former
Prophets [10 vols., ed. Heyman-Shiloni, Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook,
1973-1999], Former Prophets, p. 242 with parallels).
[21]Based on B. T.
Sanhedrin 20b, Maimonides explicitly
states that the commandment devolves only on the collectivity not the
individual; see his Book of Commandments,
end of positive commandments #248.
[22]“Laws of Kings and Their
Wars,” 1:2; see Sifrei Deuteronomy  67, ed. Finkelstein, p. 132, with n. 4.
[23]This sentiment leads, in
the nineteenth century, Avraham Sachatchover (Bornstein) to reject the idea
that the seed of Amalek is punished for the sins of their fathers, for it is
written (Deuteronomy 24:16): “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,
neither shall children be put to death for fathers.” Thus the punishment
of Amalek is contingent upon their maintaining the ways of their fathers (Avnei Nezer, part 1: Orahע Ḥayyim [New York: Hevrat Nezer, 1954]
2.508).
[24]As Maimonides states:
“Amalek who hastened to use the sword should be exterminated by the sword” (Guide for the Perplexed 3:41. ed. Pines, p. 566); see
Eugene Korn, “Moralization in Jewish Law: Genocide, Divine Commands and
Rabbinic Reasoning,” The Edah Journal
5:2 (Sivan 5766/2006), pp. 2-11, especially p. 9.
[25]See The Hebrew and Aramaic
Lexicon of the Old Testament,
eds. L. Koehler, W. Baumgartner, et al., (3 vols., Leiden: Brill, 1994-1996)
1:258a
[26]Just as Saul, in 1
Samuel 15:15b, claimed was his intention.
[27]See Numbers Rabbah 19.20, Yalkut Shimoni 1:764 with Menahem Kasher, Torah Shleimah 41:196,
nn. 4-5.
[28] צורר בן צורר, see  P. T.
Yevamot  2:5 with Penei Moshe ad loc.; and Agadat Esther 3.1, ed.
Buber, p. 26, along with Louis Ginzberg, Legends
of the Jews, 7 vols. (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1968)
6:461, n. 88, and 462f., n. 93.
[29]See Midrash Psalms 7.13-15,
and B. T. Moed Qatan 16b
[30]B. T. Megillah
12b; see Menachem Kasher, Torah Sheleimah, Megillat Ester (Jerusalem 1994), p. 60, n. 45.
[31]Accordingly, Targum Rishon adds “Agag son of Amalek” and Targum Sheinei traces the
genealogy all the way back to Esau echoing Genesis 36:12.
[32]Josephus, Antiquities 11.212
[33]Pesikta Rabbati 13.7, ed.
Friedmann, p. 55b; ed. Ulmer, 13.15, p. 205. For the demonization of Amalek,
see the Yotzer for Parshat Zakhor, Birkat Avot, found in The Complete ARTScroll Siddur for Weekday/ Sabbath/ Festival, Nusach
Ashkenaz (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 1990), pp. 880-883.
[34]See B. T. Sanhedrin 99b, Midrash Ha–Gadol, Genesis, ed. Margulies, p. 609
[35]Pace Targum Rishon 9:6, 12; Rabbenu Baḥעyעa to
Exodus 17:19 and Ralbag to 1 Samuel 15:6
[36]The combination of
“enemies and haters” recurs in the blessing after the Shema of the evening
service referring to Israel’s opponents in general not just the Egyptians.
[37]This is similar to the
classical Soloveitchikean position which identifies Amalek with those groups
whose policy with regard to the Jewish people is “Let us wipe them out as a
nation” (Psalm 83:5). See the discussion of Norman Lamm, “Amalek and the Seven
Nations: A Case of Law vs. Morality,” in War
and Peace in the Jewish
Tradition, ed. Lawrence Schiffman and
Joel Wolowelsky (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2007), p. 215.
[38]“Laws of Kings and Their
Wars,” 6.1, 4. This became the normative position; see Aviezer Ravitsky,
“Prohibited Wars in Jewish Tradition,” ed. Terry Nardin, The Ethics of War
and Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 115-127.
[39]Deuteronomy Rabbah 5.13 and Midrash
Tanhעuma, Sעav 5.
[40]“Who came and told the
Cannanites the Israelite were coming to their land?
R. Ishmael b. R. Nahman said, ‘Joshua
sent them three orders: “He who wants to leave may leave; to make peace may
make peace, to make war against us may make war.” ’ The Girgashites left …
The Gibeonites made peace… Thirty-one kings made war and fell” (Leviticus
Rabbah 17.6, ed. Margulies, p. 386 and parallels).
[41]The position that all
wars must be preceded by an overture of peace gained widespread acceptance; see
Maimonides, “Laws of Kings and Their Wars” 6:1, 5; Nahmanides and Rabbenu
Baḥaya to Deuteronomy 20:10; SeMaG
positive mitzvah #118; Sefer Ha-Hעinukh mitzvah #527 along with Minḥat
Hעinukh, ad loc.; and possibly
Sa’adyah Gaon, see Yeruḥעam Perla, Sefer
Ha-Mitsvot Le-Rabbenu Sa’adyah (3 vols., Jerusalem, 1973) 3:251-252. Cf. Tosafot, B. T. Gittin 46a, s.v. keivan.
[42]See Maimonides, “Laws of
Kings and Their Wars” 6.4, with Joseph Caro, Kesef Mishnah, ad  loc.; and Avraham Bornstein, Avnei Nezer, to Oraḥע Ḥעayyim
508.
[43]Josephus, Contra Apion II. 212-13.
[44]Mekhilta, Amalek 1, ed.
Horovitz-Rabin, p. 181; ed. Lauterbach, 2:147; and Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin, Ha‘ameq Davar to Deuteronomy 17:3.
[45]See Rashi and Radak to 2
Samuel 8:13. In general, no one is to be left unburied. Deut. 21:23 allows for
no exceptions; see B. T. Sanhedrin 46b with Saul Lieberman, “Some
Aspects of After life in Early Rabbinic Literature, in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubileee Volume (Jerusalem: American Academy
of Jewish Research, 1965), pp. 495-532, 516.
[46]Philo, Moses 1.314.
[47]See Genesis 36:12, 16; I
Chronicles 1:36.
[48]B. T. Avodah
Zarah 10b. A later midrash even
applies “Your priests O Lord,” (Psalm 132:9, or 2 Chronicles 6:41) to Antoninus
the son of Severus; see Bet Ha–Midrasch,
ed. Jellinek (Jerusalem: Wahrmann, 1967) 3:28; and Yalqut Shimoni 2:429. He
is also included among the ten rulers who became proselytes; see Louis
Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews, 7
vols. (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1968), 6:412, n. 66.
[49]B. T. Sanhedrin 96b, B. T. Gittin 57b. For a range of modern traditional opinion on the
issue, see Yoel Weiss, “Be-Inyan Mi-Benei Banav Shel Haman Lamdu Torah Be-Benei
Beraq, Ve-Ha’im Meqablim Gerim Me-Zera Amaleq,” Kovets Ginat Veradim 1.1 (5768 [20008]), pp. 193-196.
[50]“Laws of Prohibited
Relations,” 12:17.
[51]“Laws of Kings and Their
Wars” 5.5. Not dealing with messianic reality, the subsequent codes, Arba‘ah Turim and the Shulkhan Arukh, make no mention of Amalek’s elimination only the possible
(!) requirement of reading it from the Torah; see Joseph Karo, Shulkhan Arukh, Orakh Hayyim 685:7.
[52]296; see Finkelstein
edition, p. 314, l. 8, with n. 8.
[53]Guide for the Perplexed
3:41 (ed. Pines, p. 566).
[54]See Zohar 3:281b. The approach gained currency in medieval philosophy, in
medieval and Renaissance biblical exegesis, in Kabbalah, in Hasidic literature,
and in other modern traditional commentaries; see Eliot Horowitz, Reckless Rites: Purim and the Legacy of
Jewish Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 134-35;
Alan Cooper, “Amalek in Sixteenth Century Jewish Commentary: On the
Internalization of the Enemy,” in The
Bible in the Light of Its Interpreters: Sarah Kamin Memorial Volume, ed.
Sara Japhet (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1994), pp. 491-93; Avi Sagi, “The
Punishment of Amalek in Jewish Tradition: Coping with the Moral Problem,” The Harvard
Theological Review, 87 (1994), pp. 323-346, esp. 331-36; and Yaakov Meidan, Al Derekh
Ha–Avot (Alon Shvut: Tevunot, 2001), pp. 332-35.
[55]See Elimelech (Elliot)
Horowitz, “From the Generation of Moses to the Generation of the Messiah: Jews
against Amalek and his Descendants,” [Hebrew] Zion 64 (1999), pp.
425-454; and Sagi, “The Punishment of Amalek in Jewish Tradition: Coping with
the Moral Problem,” op. cit. pp. 331-336, who cites Yosef Babad, Minḥat Ḥinukh, 2. 213 (commandment
604); and Avraham Karelitz, Ḥazon Ish Al
Ha-Rambam (Bnei Brak, 1959), p. 842.
[56]See M. Yadayim 4:4, T. Yadayim 2:17 (ed. Zuckermandel, p.
683), T. Qiddushin 5:4 B. T. Berakhot
28a, B. T. Yoma 54a, with Osעar Ha–Posqim, Even Ha–Ezer 4.
[57]See Minhעat Hעinukh to Sefer Ha–Hעinukh,
end of mitzvah #604; and Avraham
Karelitz, Ḥעעazon Ish Al
Ha–Rambam (Bnei Brak, 1959), p. 842.


Hillel Noach Magid Steinschneider’s Ir Vilna

Hillel Noach Magid Steinschneider’s Ir Vilna
by Dan Rabinowitz

Vilna being one of the most important cities in Jewish history has a fair amount written about it. One of the classic works discussing the history and persons of Vilna is that of Hillel Noach Magid Steinschneider‘s Ir Vilna. This book was originally published in 1900 by the Romm press. This was only the first volume and Steinschneider envisioned publishing a second volume in short time, however, due to financial constraints he was unable to do so. Steinschneider did was not a historian by profession and instead was employed as a stone etcher for burial monuments – hence his surname Steinschneider which means “stone cutter.” [1] Although he was not a professional historian, his work on Vilna was universally recognized. He not only write this book on Vilna but was also intimately involved with Shmuel Yosef Fuenn’s work on Vilna – Kiryah Ne’emana. Steinschneider gave Fuenn material and eventually, in the second edition, wrote extensive notes. [2]

As for Steinschneider’s own work, it was not until 2003 Magnes published the second volume of this work (and included a nice introduction both about Steinschnider and his work). In part, the reason Steinschneider was unable to publish the second volume, was because people were hesitant to purchase just one volume of a multi-volume work. I have heard people make the same comment about the second volume, namely, they don’t only want the second of two volumes. But, now this has been remedied as someone has republished the first so both are now in print. (Both are available at Biegeleisen of Boro Park 718-436-1165.)

Aside from the importance of this work for the history of Vilna, there is also something curious in this addition – the publishers introduction. Steinschneider included information about all the important (and lesser important) people in Vilna. In doing so, he includes information [3] which from an Orthodox perspective some would find objectionable. Rather than censor this material out or not reprint this at all, the editors deal with this up front. In the introduction they note that Steinschnider was a maskil and that his writing was influenced by the haskalah. They also note that he included people who others found objectionable. For instance they state that Steinschneider discusses the poet “Abraham Dov Lebensohn (Adam HaKohen)” of whom the Hafetz Hayyim would add ימ”ש (may his name be erased).

But, at the end, the publishers explain they decided that even though there was “פסולת” (lit. chaff) the good content outweighed the bad and therefore they have decided to republish this book.

Of course, this is stark contrast to numerous contemporary instances of either removal of the פסולת or not reprinting books that contain any פסולת at all.

Hillel Noach Magid Steinschneider


Notes:
[1] See Ir Vilna vol. 2 p. 1.
[2] Id. at 4-7 for how extensive Steinschneider’s involvement was.
[3] Although it is the second volume which is more or less dedicated to biographies and history of maskilim the first volume also contains some of that information as well.



Wrestling with the Ketsot – Review of ‘New Heavens: The Ketsot ha-Hoshen and the Rise of Lamdanut’, by Noam Samet

Wrestling with the Ketsot –

Review of ‘New Heavens: The Ketsot ha-Hoshen and the Rise of Lamdanut’, by Noam Samet

By Moshe Shochat

“…We also studied the Ketsot ha-Hoshen… The book was expensive, and my brother obtained a copy for consultation and decided to transcribe it in his fine handwriting. Only after prolonged arguments with me did my brother agree that we should first study it, and after each sugya and topic decide what was worth copying. We maintained this method throughout the two years we spent at Telz. Day after day we worked through the Ketsot ha-Hoshen, the Netivot ha-Mishpat, the novellae of R. Akiva Eiger, and several other books… My brother preserved the manuscript for many years; it was always for him a source of inner satisfaction and spiritual renewal, an occasion to resume his Talmud study…”[1]

— Ben-Zion Dinur (1884-1973)

“All the devotion of a Telz alumnus to the Gemara and its sharp nosei kelim – the Shita Mekubbetset, the Penei Yehoshua, the Ketsot ha-Hoshen, the Shev Shma’ateta, and works of that kind – a devotion that persisted even after he had turned to heresy and Haskalah – derived from the wisdom residing in the act of study itself, from the logic that bores down to the roots of things, dismantling and rebuilding. The capacity to hold one’s own in learned discourse (kennen redn in lernen) – that is the entire Torah. Where that is present, everything is present. The person who possesses it faces nothing beyond his reach, since everything else is acquired through labor, and it is of no consequence whether it has yet been acquired or not.”[2]

– Meir Shely (1893-1983)

These two descriptions fix the spirit of the Lithuanian yeshiva as it stood more than a century ago. But ask a yeshiva student today, and he will tell you that the hunger for the Ketsot ha-Hoshen – “Ketsoys” or “Ketseys” in Lithuanian-yeshiva pronunciation – has not abated, save for the fact that present-day students are no longer required to copy the book by hand, and copies circulate in abundance. But “why speak of others,” as the Simple Son asks in the Haggadah. Last Shabbat I found myself opening the Ketsot and paging through old notebooks from my yeshiva years – something I had not done in more than twenty years. I returned in my mind to the hours we spent wrestling with the lamdanut arguments of the Ketsot and the Netivot alongside the other commentators, and felt a sharp longing for an experience I have not had since. What accounts for the Ketsot’s hold? What historical and cultural situation produced it? What does it contain that has absorbed thousands of Torah students since it was first printed in Lvov some two hundred and thirty years ago?

It is this question that Rabbi Dr. Noam Samet sets out to answer in his newly-published book, New Heavens: The Ketsot ha-Hoshen and the Rise of Lamdanut.[3] Samet is a rare combination of research scholar and rosh yeshiva, a pairing that serves him exceptionally well in the analysis of the Ketsot’s lamdanut character. Throughout the book his deep investment in the Ketsot’s teachings is evident – a product of serious yeshiva study – alongside the scholarly discipline to organize and properly conceptualize both the novelty of the Ketsot’s work and the intensity of engagement it has drawn from successive generations of students. He addresses this openly in explaining his chosen appellations for his subject: “Choosing the family name or an acronym-based designation (such as ‘Ra’al’ or ‘Heller’) immediately situates the writing in a somewhat distancing register, one I feel is inappropriate to my relationship with the material. I shall therefore permit myself, with the reader’s indulgence, to employ various designations freely – Ra’al, ‘baal Ketsot ha-Hoshen,’ or ‘the Ketsot’ – in the hope that the learned reader will understand that in all cases the reference is to R. Aryeh Leib ha-Kohen Heller and his work Ketsot ha-Hoshen…”[4] For the same reason, I shall follow suit in the review below.

R. Aryeh Leib ha-Kohen Heller (1745-1812) was born and raised in Galicia. He served in the rabbinate of the small community of Rozhnyatov before moving to Stryi. In the year of that move, 1788, the first part of Ketsot ha-Hoshen was printed, accompanied by the Kuntres ha-Sefeikot composed by his elder brother R. Yehuda, later rabbi of Sighet. The second part appeared in 1796. Before going to press the book underwent extensive revision, with numerous passages excised for two principal reasons. First, upon discovering that R. Yonatan Eybeschütz had anticipated him in the Urim ve-Tummim, Heller deleted his own parallel formulations to avoid redundancy. Second, his brother R. Yehuda, who served as his editor, removed passages too heavily marked by the methods of pilpul and thus perhaps not qualifying as davar emet – a true statement. The accumulation of these revisions produced a curious phenomenon: a large proportion of the internal cross-references in the earliest editions are incorrect, reflecting the deletion of entire sections and the consequent displacement of section numbers.

According to Samet, these two editorial interventions together trace the intellectual coordinates within which the work positions itself. On one hand, the Ketsot regards itself as belonging to the nosei kelim literature of the Shulhan Arukh and thus as a natural successor to the Urim ve-Tummim. On the other hand, the removal of pilpul passages registers a methodological tension – between pilpul and halakhic ruling – that runs beneath the surface of the book.

A dedicated chapter in Samet’s study is devoted to the Ketsot’s celebrated introduction. “R. Aryeh Leib did us a service,” Samet writes, “by attaching to his work a searching introduction – a brief theological composition treating the hermeneutical tension, and in particular the gap between man’s finite capacity and the infinite divine Torah,”[5] The introduction centers on a passage from the Zohar according to which, when a person originates a hiddush in Torah, that word of innovation ascends before God, who kisses it, and the one who originated it becomes a partner in the act of Creation. These words elevate the creative act of Torah scholarship despite the tension between innovation and received tradition. The Ketsot proceeds, drawing on rabbinic teaching, to show that the Torah scholar does not merely transmit tradition but acts creatively within it – “and this is the covenant and the wondrous love that He gave us the Oral Torah as an outright gift, and ‘from the wilderness, a gift’ – in accordance with the rulings of the sages.” This wondrous love finds abundant expression in the Ketsot itself, through repeated registers of pleasure and satisfaction, particularly when the author notes that his reasoning coincides with a position of the Rishonim.

The Ketsot adds a further observation: God’s Creation is perfect; human beings are limited and deficient, and their engagement with divine truth is, from an absolute standpoint, error. Yet it is precisely this “error” that is accepted before God, and that even sustains Creation at every moment – and this is what is new in the descent of the Torah to human beings. Samet reads in these words a polemic against the Haskalah critique then being directed at pilpul and hiddush for their supposed falsity. But a competing tendency was also at work within the beit midrash itself – one that placed the recovery of original truth at the top of its agenda and admitted no other pursuit. This was the approach of the Vilna Gaon, as described by his disciple R. Hayyim of Volozhin: the Gaon worked to strip away corruptions and recover “original” truth through philological and critical methods. Samet connects the Brisker school to this same tendency, with its use of abstract conceptual analysis to locate the foundational source of a law. In this view, the quality of a hiddush is expressed not in its formal elegance but in its clarity and internal truth. The Ketsot took the opposing position: hiddush is a distinctive power and a central purpose of Torah study. This does not license falsity or remove all constraints – the indispensable condition for legitimate Torah innovation is mastery of the Torah’s proper methods. The scholar who recognizes that his innovations continue, rather than sever, the interpretive tradition of the Rishonim is the one whose Torah qualifies as truth.

Certain sections of the Ketsot have won particular standing in the batei midrash and are studied and cited repeatedly – it is not unusual to hear scholars say, “this is the Ketsots in lamed-dalet” or “the well-known Ketsot in resh-mem-alef.” In most sections the Ketsot follows the interpretive path of the nosei kelim without distinctive departure; but the sections that secured the book’s authority in the batei midrash are those in which he broke from his predecessors and proposed new insights and conceptualizations that opened fresh avenues of halakhic thought. The author devotes one chapter to the Ketsot’s treatment of the laws of testimony (hilkhot edut) and another to five examples drawn from different areas. To avoid leaving this review guilty of bittul Torah, I will select one of the shorter and more accessible examples from the book, through which some of the aspects the author wishes to illuminate can be seen at work.

In Bava Batra 149a, the Talmud recounts the case of Issur the proselyte, who transferred his assets to his son – who does not inherit him under halakha, owing to Issur’s conversion – by means of an odita, that is, a declaration of acknowledgment (hoda’a). The Rishonim debated the legal character of this mode of acquisition at length. The Ketsot addresses it in sections 40 and 194, and takes the position that odita is a fully independent mode of acquisition operating on the same footing as any other: “It is a complete act of acquisition, in no way inferior to any other mode of acquisition, whether for monetary matters or for ritual prohibitions” (194:4). The acquisition takes effect when a person declares before witnesses that a certain object belongs not to him but to another – the intended transferee. That declaration itself transfers the object, even if both parties know that the admission does not correspond to fact. The Ketsot’s engagement with this mode of acquisition grows out of a discussion of transfer of ownership to a gentile – for example, the sale of a firstborn animal (bekhor) to exempt it from the relevant sanctity, or the sale of hametz. Under halakha, a gentile cannot acquire through all the modes available to a Jew; he cannot, for instance, acquire movables (metaltelin) through the payment of money alone. Some proposed kinyan agav (acquisition incidental to real property), but the Ketsot was not satisfied that this mode applies to a gentile – nor does every seller possess land, and meshikha (formal pulling) is impractical for large quantities of hametz. His proposed solution was kinyan odita, but the mechanics of this mode had not been adequately worked out by the Aharonim; some had in fact restricted it to deathbed declarations (shekiv mera), or confined it to monetary matters and excluded ritual prohibitions – making it very difficult to press into service for hametz sales. This practical problem drove the Ketsot to undertake a lamdanut analysis aimed at clarifying and sharpening the mechanisms through which the acquisition operates.

The analytical discussion of those mechanics is found in section 40. Its foundation is the sugya of Ketubot 101b, concerning one who says to his fellow “I am indebted to you for a maneh.” In R. Yohanan’s ruling – which was accepted as normative – that statement binds him. Rashi and Tosafot understood the case to involve a written document, which they took to be the source of the obligation. The Rif and Maimonides, however, held that the admission itself creates the obligation. The Ketsot explains that kinyan odita is operative here and functions even for movables and in the absence of a written document. In this he also resolves a contradiction in the Shulhan Arukh that I will not pursue here; what matters is that the nosei kelim who addressed the Shulhan Arukh’s ruling kept their discussion within the sugya at hand, while the Ketsot alone saw fit to move outward to the sugya of odita and establish its halakhic principles from the ground up. The principle he extracts is that odita operates specifically through having witnesses attest to a declaration of prior obligation – not through a present-tense act of transfer. A declaration formulated in those terms is itself the act of acquisition. From this he draws a further ruling: kinyan odita requires witnesses; an admission made privately, or even before witnesses without the declarant’s having said to them “atem edai” – “you are my witnesses” – produces no acquisition. This holds despite the general principle that “la ivre sahade ela le-shakkarei” – witnesses exist only for the dishonest – meaning that where there is no suspicion of falsehood, witnesses are ordinarily unnecessary. That principle governs modes of acquisition in which witnesses serve only to document a transaction that has already occurred independently; in kinyan odita, by contrast, the presence of witnesses is constitutive of the transaction itself.

The discussion then turns to the Ketsot’s standing relative to the Rishonim and the pilpul tradition. The Ketsot presents his innovation as a resolution of a difficulty raised by the Tosafists in Bava Metsia 46a: why money cannot be transferred by odita. His answer is the absence of witnesses. R. Yaakov of Lisa, author of the Netivot ha-Mishpat, objects sharply: if Tosafot themselves did not resolve the difficulty in this way, by what right does the Ketsot depart from them? The Ketsot responds in his Meshovev Netivot, holding his ground: in kinyan odita, “as long as one has not said ‘atem edai’ before witnesses, there is no odita here, and if there is no odita there is no acquisition.” He further supports his position with a proof from Ramban, then returns to Tosafot. Committed as he is to the literature of the Rishonim, he insists that his position does not necessarily contradict Tosafot: the reason Tosafot did not themselves answer that witnesses were absent is that the case involves a threshing floor – a place where people are routinely present – but as regards his underlying account of the odita mechanism, Tosafot would, he maintains, concur.

As Samet summarizes, the Ketsot ruled by independent reasoning (sevara) that kinyan odita operates only before witnesses, and was prepared to legislate accordingly even against the surface implication of Tosafot’s words. The Netivot’s objection exposes the substantive disagreement between them over the role of reasoned argument and the degree of independence the lamdan may exercise against the rulings of the Rishonim. The Ketsot is prepared to follow sevara even when doing so forces strained readings of earlier authorities. The lamdanut sequence illustrates a dense interplay of practical necessity and conceptual ambition: the need to solve the hametz sale problem drives the Ketsot to define and conceptualize odita as a fully independent mode of acquisition, reconstructing that category through a series of earlier sources that he rereads and renegotiates in lamdanut terms.

This is a brief and compressed sampling of the work the author unfolds in a substantial book. My review has concentrated on the beit-midrash dimensions, but the book also engages the historical and legal context in which Heller operated – the dissolution of Jewish communal self-governance and the transfer of juridical authority to the state – and a dedicated chapter treats “Naturalism, Nominalism, and Lamdanut,” examining legal theories that may have shaped the development of study methods within the beit midrash. The book is not easy reading; it demands sustained intellectual effort. Yeshiva students and alumni will find a rigorous new account of a work they know well, while the book is structured to be accessible also to readers outside that world who want a serious introduction to the tradition of lamdanut. No copyeditor’s name appears on the book, and professional language editing would have broadened its reach. That aside, I owe the author an acknowledgment of genuine debt for returning me, if only for a few hours, to a part of my life I had set down a long time ago.

This article presents an English translation of a Hebrew review published by Moshe Shochat at his blog, Sefarim ve-Kitvei Yad, which originally appeared May 20, 2026, and available here.

  1. Ben-Zion Dinur, “Two Years at the Telz Yeshiva,” in Immanuel Etkes and Shlomo Tikochinski, eds., Yeshivot Lita: Pirkei Zikhronot (Jerusalem: Shazar, 2004), 250-251 (Hebrew). ↑
  2. Meir Shely, “Shards of Telz,” in Immanuel Etkes and Shlomo Tikochinski, eds., Yeshivot Lita: Pirkei Zikhronot (Jerusalem: Shazar, 2004), 266 (Hebrew). ↑
  3. Noam Samet, New Heavens: The Ketsot ha-Hoshen and the Rise of Lamdanut (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2026; Hebrew). ↑
  4. Ibid., 17n9. ↑
  5. Ibid., 121. ↑

 



Uncensored Books (Dr. Marc B. Shapiro)

Uncensored Books
Marc B. Shapiro

 

Dan Rabinowitz has provided many examples of censorship in seforim (examples which I look forward to using – with acknowledgment of course – in my own forthcoming book on the subject). What I would like to call attention to are two examples where the publishers would have certainly censored these texts had they known who was being discussed. Presumably, what I mention now has already been pointed out to them and will be excised if the books are reprinted.

1. In the recently published volume of R. Eliyahu Dessler’s letters (Bnei Brak, 2004), p. 166, there is a 1942 letter to Dr. Dov Hyman discussing the Gateshead Kollel. After mentioning how the kollel includes the best young bochurim in England, those who studied in the great yeshivot in Eastern Europe, he writes:

יש שמה צעיר א’ יליד מנשסתר (הוא היחיד מילידי המדינה) ולא אגזם אף מה שהוא אם אומר שמעודי לא ראיתי עלוי בעמקות יחד עם שאר הכשרונות כמוהו זולתי אחד, הוא גדול גדול ממש וכמעט א”א לרדת לסוף עומק דעתו

This passage is referring to none other than the late Rabbi Louis Jacobs — then referred to as Leibl — who was born in Manchester in 1920. In Jacob’s autobiography, Helping with Inquiries (London, 1989), pp. 42, 54, 59 he writes:

When I joined the Kolel, soon after its inception, the other members had all studied at one or other of the famous Lithuanian Yeshivot – Telz, Mir, Slabodka, Kamenitz, Baranowitz, Grodno, and Radin – before coming to England, with the exception of a fiery young Hungarian, Zusya Waltner. . . . As the “babe” of the Kolel (I was only twenty years of age, while some of my colleagues were several years older) and as one who had only studied in a Lithuanian Yeshivah in spirit (I was, so to speak, an honorary Telzer) I was welcomed very good-heartedly by the other members, but with an amused tolerance. . . . Before leaving my account of the Gatesehad Kolel, I feel it would be incomplete unless I said something more about Rabbi Dessler, one of the most remarkable men I have ever met. . . . .I cannot and do not want to forget what I owe to Rabbi Dessler. Although I was never officially his pupil, he was, in many respects, my teacher par excellence. He taught me and so many others to see Judaism in sophisticated terms. He was a great man whose place among the Gedoley Yisrael of the twentieth century remains uncontested.

2. Recently many books by the Gaon R. Eliyahu Rabinowitz-Teomim (the Aderet) have appeared, by publishers with very different hashkafot. The volume of teshuvot, Ma’aneh Eliyahu, was published by Yeshivat Or Etzion in Israel, whose Rosh Yeshivah is R. Hayyim Druckman. It is obvious that the editors have no knowledge of American Jewish history, otherwise, the words I quote (from p. 352) would never have been allowed to appear. The editors no doubt assumed that the Aderet was attacking some phony. The name Jacob Joseph means nothing to them.

 

וידענו היטב היטב את האיש ואת שיחו תהלוכותיו ותחבולותיו מתחילה ועד סוף . . . ואותו הרב ר’ יעקב, שלא שמש תלמידי חכמים ומלך מעצמו, ע”פ תבונתו, כי פקח גדול הוא, אינו מגיע לקרסולי תלמידי תלמידיו של הגאון חתם סופר ז”ל, לא בתורה ולא במעשים טובים, והרי לפנינו שעזב עיר ווילנא תפארת ליטא, והלך לנוע אל ארצות אמעריקא להיות שם רב ראשון בנויארק כחלומו אשר חלם. והרואה דברי הר”מ פ”ו ה”א מדיעות, יעוי’ שם היטב בלשונו, יראה עד כמה מלאה לבו יראת שמים לעשות כן

He goes on demeaning the Chief Rabbi of New York, but you get the picture.

As long as I am talking about the very interesting sefer Ma’aneh Eliyahu, let me also call attention to something in it that is relevant to what is in the news today. I refer to the problem of rabbis covering up cases of sexual abuse. In no. 32 the Aderet deals with a case where a girl was raped by two young Jewish men. Her family wanted to report this to the police, so that the rapists would receive a fitting punishment. The Aderet writes:

ודברתי אל לבם להשקיט הדבר, לבל יתחלל שם ישראל בעמים מהפקרות ופריצות צעירי הנערים, לאנוס ולנאוף ולחלל שבת ולרצוח, וגם יש סכנה בדבר לריב עם עזי פנים כמותם, ושמעו אלי

We see from this that the practice of covering up these sorts of things is hardly a recent phenomenon.



Rabbinic Insults and Bibliographical Errors

One of the more interesting pioneers of the haskalah movement was R. Shelomo Zalman Hanau (Katz).  Hanau’s works mainly concern grammar and, in that vein, corrections to the siddur.  Hanau’s first book, Binyan Shelomo, Frankfort A.M., 1708 was published when he was 21.  This book focuses on grammar, but, as we have already discussed, was important in the development of the Siddur. (Additionally, see S.’s recent post on Hanau here.)  This book is now up for auction, however, I must note that there seems to be an exaggeration regarding the scarcity of a particular page. 

The catalog describes the book as follows:

The author was born in 1687 and was noted for his many books regarding the foundation of the Hebrew language . . . The author corresponded with many Torah luminaries regarding his subject of expertise.  His first book, Binyan Shlomo  . . . [a]s a young scholar he spoke sharply against many sages who preceded him by hundreds of years.  As the years passed, the author regretted his sharp language and printed a unique apology in which he notes the names of the sages whom he did not properly honor.  This list features at least five leading Torah scholars from previous generations.  To the best of our knowledge, this leaf is not extant today and is not listed in the C.D. of the Bibliographic Project.  The book itself was never reprinted and is very rare today.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the only known copy with the apology leaf.

Judaica Jerusalem, Elul 2009, lot # 144, (emphasis in original).  There are a number of corrections in order.  First, the description states that there was only one edition of Binyan Shelomo “and it was never reprinted.”  That is incorrect.  Aside from two photo-reproductions done by Copy Corner and Guttman, Binyan Shelomo was reprinted in  1723.  Vinograd, in his bibliography, Otzar Sefer ha-Ivri, lists this book as extant the Annenberg Library, which, according to their online catalog, the book can still be found.[1]  Turning now to the “apology leaf.” It is correct that the leaf is rare, however, it is an overstatement to say this is the only known copy with the leaf.  Indeed, the existence of the leaf is not mentioned in Vingrad’s Otzar ha-Sefer ha-Ivri, Jersusalem: 1994, vol. II, Frankfort A.M. # 218. But, the leaf was mentioned already in 1865 and the fact that Hanau issued an apology was mentioned as early as 1715.  The first mention that Hanau issued an apology (although there is no mention of a special leaf) was in Johann Christoph Wolf’s Bibliotheca Hebraea, Hamburg: 1715.  (S. has kindly translated the relevant passage here.) Shadal in Prolegomenon, Grimmae: 1838, 61-2 n.1, also records Wolf’s comments. (See S.’s comments regarding the use of Prolegomenon here.)  The first to republish the apology leaf was Meir Wiener in Ha-Maggid, May 17, 1865, Ha-Tozfeh le-Maggid.  Wiener decided to republish the text of the entire leaf “due to its rarity.”  Wiener obtained a copy from the Rosenthal library and in the catalog for the library by Roest, Yodeah Sefer, he says “that in my copy I have an extra page at the end.”  Yodeah Sefer, letter Bet, # 304.  This notation was then recorded in Wiener’s bibliography of St. Petersberg library, Kohelet Moshe.  Wiener says “that the extra page at the end, which Roest records and where the author asks for forgiveness for insulting various authors, is not in this copy.” While it wasn’t in these copies, nor is it in the copy on Hebrewbooks.org, it is in the JNUL’s copy which is online here.  Additionally, we have a copy which has this leaf, making it at least two others in existence. 

We now turn to what precipitated the inclusion of this leaf.  According to the auction description, R. Hanau did this on his when “the years passed” and he “regretted his sharp language.”  According to Roest, however, “it is without a doubt that Hanau was forced by the Rabbis to print this apology, just like R. Moshe Hayyim Luzzato.”  Roest, op cit.  Thus, according to Roest, the apology was not brought about from Hanau’s own introspection but because of the Rabbis.  Indeed, Friedberg in Bet Eked, says “that the author [Hanau] was forced by the Rabbi of Frankfort A.M. and his bet din to print a special page, in a smaller format, which was appended to the work, in which the author asks for forgiveness from the authors which [Hanau] insulted in his book.”  Bet Eked, letter Bet, # 1238. Similarly, Wolf states “Rabbis of Frankfurt were going to destroy it by flames” had Hanau not agreed to print the apology.  So according to these sources, Hanau was forced to print this apology.  According to a contemporary source, we can place the retraction before 1713.  This is so, because in Siddur of R. Azriel and R. Eliah of Vilna, published in 1713, they note that Hanau printed a page “asking for forgiveness.”  Additionally, according to this source, the request for forgiveness was at the behest of the Frankfort bet din.  R. Azriel and R. Eliah say that the page was printed “due to the decree of the head and leaders of the holy city Frankfort A.M.”  R. Azriel and R. Eliahu then continue, and mention the possibility that R. Hanau deserved to be placed under the ban due to his disrespectful words.  David Yitzhaki appears to have misunderstood R. Azriel and R. Eliah’s words as Yitzhaki says “that Hanau was almost placed under a ban.” D. Yitzhaki, “The Editors of the Ashkenzi Siddur & R. Shelomo Zalman Hanau and his Forgeries,” in Luach Eres, Toronto, 2001, 32.  If, as it appears, Yitzhaki’s source is the quote from R. Azriel and R. Eliah, that quote merely says that it was R. Azriel and R. Eliah’s opinions that Hanau “should” have been placed under the ban, they never say that there was a serious consideration of actually placing Hanau under a ban.[2] Of course, according to Wolf’s version, Binyan Shelomo was to be consigned to the flames, also implying a ban.  Wolf, however, provides no source for this assertion, and it seems unlikely that R. Azriel and R. Eliah would fail to mention the fact that Binyan Shelomo was almost destroyed.      

There is one more version of the story behind the retraction that is worth noting because it contains a major error.  This is a real honker.*  Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger, in Sefer ve-Seif, apparently confused R. Hanau’s Binyan Shelomo with another book that has the same title. Carmilly-Weinberger writes (172-73):

R. Yehezkel Landau the Noda be-Yehuda, stood with R. Yisrael Lifschitz [regarding the controversy surrounding the infamous Get of Cleves], who was in conflict with the head of the Frankfort bet din, R. Nathan Maz and R. Shelomoh Hena [sic] the author of the Binyan Shelomo.  Since R. Landau agreed with R. Yisrael Lifschitz, the enemy of R. Shelomoh Hena, [Hena] banned the work of the Noda be-Yehuda.

Carmilly then quotes a passage from the Hida’s work Shem ha-Gedolim in support of the above statement:

And because of this [fight about the Get of Cleves], when the book Noda be-Yehuda was published the Goan, author of Binyan Shelomo and his bet din prohibited anyone from reading [the Noda be-Yehuda].  The Noda be-Yehuda, however, took the opposite view and he said I tell anyone who is reasonable to go ahead the Binyan Shelomo, to look and see ערות האר”ש השמנה הוא אם רזה (a word play implying that there isn’t much in the Binyan Shelomo). 

Carmilly then continues, and he links the extra leaf in the Binyan Shelomo, to these statements explaining that Hana asked forgiveness for all those people he insulted.  Carmilly implies that the forgiveness related to the controversy about the Get of Cleves!  This is wrong. First, and foremost, the controversy regarding the Get of Cleves occurred in 1766, Hanau died in 1746.  Moreover, Hanau could not have counseled people not to read the Noda be-Yehuda as that was published in 1776 some thirty years after Hanau died.  Additionally, it is clear that Carmilly never saw this leaf as we will soon see, this leaf requests forgiveness from rishonim and doesn’t mention anyone involved in the Get of Cleves controversy.

Carmilly confused two books with the same title, Binyan Shelomo.  The first, by Hanau on grammar which is the subject of our discussion, and the second one, is written by R. Nathan Maz, and was published in 1784.  R. Nathan Maz [3] who was involved in the Get of Cleve controversy and who was on the Frankfort bet din (something that Hanau was not), was the subject of the above discussion. What makes this error even more ironic is that Nepi-Ghirondi, in his Tolodot Gedolei Yisrael, correctly notes that R. Maz authored a work titled Binyan Shelomo.  Carmilly, however, faults Nepi-Ghirondi “incorrectly associating Binyan Shelomo with R. Maz and, instead, the correct author is R. Hanau!”   Id. 172 n.297.  Of course, if one looks at the Hida in the original, it is also apparent that he is not referring to Hanau but to a different book with the same title.

Turning to the text of the “request for forgiveness.”  This text reminds me of a story I heard regarding a relative.  According to the story, A. calls C. “stupid.”  A’s mother then tells A. to apologies, to which A. turns to C. and says, “I am sorry you are stupid.”  Hanau’s request for forgiveness is similar as after offering a general request for forgiveness, Hanau then goes ahead and records every objectionable thing he said. For example, Hanau says

I erred in my ways when I disagreed with the authors.  I was too verbose and, at times, I insulted the authors . . . therefore I come to ask forgiveness: from the prince Don Isaac Abarbanel  when I wrote that “he speaks without logic and his words make no sense,” and in another place I wrote about him that “this statement [of the Abarbanel] is because of his lack of knowledge and that he didn’t understand what was being said” . . . Regarding the Ibn Ezra I wrote “he didn’t subject this statement to logic”

While this apology my be tongue in cheek, it seems to have appeased many or, at the very least, many thought Hanau’s next book didn’t suffer from the same lack of respect.  In R. Yehezkel Katzenellenbogen’s approbation to Sha’arei Torah, Hamburg 1717, he notes that while Hanau had in his prior work been too harsh with his language in “Sha’arei Torah, [Hanau] speaks with the appropriate measure of respect as I [R. Katzenellenbogen] have carefully checked.”[4] 

Notes:
[1] Wiener, in his article in Ha-Maggid (17 May 1865), questions the existence of this edition.  He claims that there is no such edition and that the abbreviation used for the date was misinterpreted. 
[2] It should be noted that R. Azriel and R. Eliah were not dispassionate observers.  Part of the reason that Hanau wrote Binyan Shelomo was to disagree with R. Azriel and R. Eliah’s opinions regarding proper punctuation of the Siddur. See Jacob J. Schacter, “Introduction,” in Luach Eres, op cit., 11-12.  R. Azriel and R. Eliah derogatorily refer to Binyan Shelomo as “Hurban Shelomo.”  
[3] For more information on R. Maz see M. Horovitz, Rabbanei Frankfort, Jerusalem:1972, 134-43.
[4] This did not appease everyone.  R. J. Emden really disliked R. Hanau’s positions. See Jacob J. Schacter, Luach Eres, op cit., 14-25.  
* I would like to thank A. Rottenberg for calling this error, as well as numerous other errors in Carmilly-Weinberg’s book, to my attention.