New Writings from R. Kook and Assorted Comments, part 5

New Writings from R. Kook and Assorted Comments, part 5
by Marc B. Shapiro
Continued from here.
The next post (or perhaps the one following) will return to my analysis of R. Kook’s recently published Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor with which this series began. Yet before doing so, there are a number of other points I would like to make and respond to some comments and questions.

1. In previous installments I have mentioned how R. Kook compares the Torah scholars and the masses, and how the masses have elements of natural morality that are not to be found among the scholars. This is not the only provocative distinction R. Kook makes. He also distinguishes between the great tzadikim and everyone else. These two groupings are, of course, different in many ways. Yet one of the most interesting distinctions R. Kook makes—and one can find parallels to this in Ibn Caspi and hasidic texts— is that for the elites the nitty-gritty of halakhic study can have a negative affect on their spiritual life. Here is what he writes in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:412:

האדם הגדול כשהוא מכניס את עצמו יותר מדאי במדת הפרטים, בין בלימודם בין בחרדתם, הרי הוא מתקטן, ומעלתו מתמעטת, וצריך לשוב בתשובה מאהבה, מתוך גדלות הנשמה, לקשר את תוכן חיי נשמתו בענינים גדולים ונשגבים.

R. Kook goes so far as to say that for these elites the very practice of mitzvot is not part of their spiritual identity per se. They have, as it were, moved beyond this, and their involvement with the practical sphere of mitzvot is based on their connection to the larger world.[1] I think that this passage, from Shemonah Kevatzim 1:410, is the most antinomian in all of R. Kook’s writings. In it we also see how problematic the halakhic details of life are to the special personality who wants to soar the heights of spirituality and yet has to be involved with practical halakhic matters. I think it obvious that R. Kook is reflecting his own personal spiritual struggle here. On the one hand, he wants to lose himself in love of and experience of God, to bind his soul with the divine. On the other hand, as a practicing rabbi he was called upon day in and day out to answer all sorts of everyday halakhic questions. One can imagine him alone in his study, enraptured in mysticism, even nearing prophetic insights, and someone comes to his door asking him to determine the kashrut of a dead chicken. With this he is brought down to the mundane halakhic world.[2]
ישנם אנשים גדולים כאלה, שמהלך רוחם הוא כל כך נשא, עד שמצדם אם כל העולם היה במעמדם, היו המצות בטלות כמו שיהיה לעתיד לבוא, לימות המשיח או תחיית המתים. והם בכל זאת מקושרים הם במצות הרבה מאד, לא למענם, כי אם למען העולם כולו, המקושר עמם. וכשהם באים אל הפרטים, לעסוק בהם מצד עצמם, מוצאים הם סתירות נפשיות גדולות האלה, שהם נמוגים מרוב יגונם. וכשבאים לעסוק בתורה ובמצות בפרטיות בשביל העולם, יושפע עליהם מעין של גבורה ושל קדושה, שאין דומה לו.
Let me also return to the issue of the Jewish masses’ natural morality vs. the rabbinically tuned morality of the scholars, and how according to R. Kook the former is superior to that of the latter. I was asked if I can provide some examples of this. I think the most obvious such example is the response to sexual abuse that we have witnessed in the Orthodox world. While the natural impulse of the masses was that abusers must be immediately removed from any contact with children, many of the learned rabbis were able to come up with all sorts of reasons why this was not necessary, and why the police should not be called. Over time the view of the rabbinic class has evolved and many of them now advocate a strong response to sexual abuse. However, what took them a long time to get to was immediately understood by the Jewish masses, and they understood it intuitively. Years from now people will wonder how it was that rabbis refused to protect children. It will be incomprehensible to them how this could have happened. We who lived through this experience know that it was precisely the pressure on the ground, from the Jewish laypeople (and the bloggers and newspapers), that forced changes in this matter.[3] Here I think is a good example where talmudic learning led scholars לטהר את השרץ בק”ן טעמים, while the Jewish masses, with their intuitive natural morality, saw that evil must be exposed and they emerged victorious.[4]

The same phenomenon was seen in the Leib Tropper affair, where once again it was the masses, together with a couple of indefatigable bloggers, who saw what was really going on, and forced the issue. This happened while many leading rabbis continued to stand by Tropper. They were oblivious to what was unfolding before their eyes and what was obvious to everyone but them.[5] And let’s not forget about all the gedolim who signed a letter in support of the monster Elior Chen.[6] It is difficult to make sense of these terrible lapses of rabbinic judgment with a haredi Daas Torah perspective, but with R. Kook’s analysis all becomes clear.

I thought of R. Kook’s comments on the intuitive morality of the masses after hearing a few shiurim on the subject of lo tehanem. One of them has since been removed from the site. Listening to these shiurim was shocking to me, not simply because I found the views discussed at odds with what everyone in my community regards as basic Jewish values (and matters about which we would be quick to criticize non-Jews if they ever spoke this way). What was particularly surprising was how the speakers, all learned talmudically, have fallen into what I would call the textualist trap of Centrism. What this means is that the written word has become so sanctified that they feel it is their obligation to resurrect every halakhah recorded in the standard codes in order improve the masses’ behavior.

Yet for all their learning, these rabbis don’t appreciate that there are some halakhot that simply fell out of practice. This happened in pre-modern times, before there were Reform and Conservative movements. In other words, it happened at a time when communities had the status of kehillah kedoshah. Because of this, historically the poskim generally tried to be melamed zekhut on the actions of the people, on the assumption that kol hamon ke-kol sha-dai, which is in line with how R. Kook understood the pious Jewish masses. That explains why, to give just one example, confronted with the fact that pious people did not wash before eating wet food, the vast majority of poskim tried to find a justification for this. They did not lecture the people about how they were sinning and try to resurrect a practice that had fallen out of fashion. Their assumption was that there must be some justification for the practice of the masses, even if it is not readily apparent.[7]

As Haym Soloveitchik discussed in “Rupture and Reconstruction,” there is today no faith in the practice of the masses. Therefore, instead of justifying the practices which oppose the textual tradition, the rabbis are attempting to reestablish the textual tradition. The problem with this is that there is also what I call an aggadic tradition, where values and morality were passed on, and this sometimes was in tension with the letter of the law. The Jewish people, acting with their innate Torah-intuitive morality, developed an approach, and this was recognized as legitimate until recent times.[8] So we now have a situation where shiurim are being given on the prohibition of lo tehanem telling people all sorts of things about how to relate to non-Jews that no one, and this includes great rabbis, ever paid attention to (e.g., one can’t say that X is a good baseball player!).

I am not going to get into the halakhic justification which can be offered as to why the pious Jewish people didn’t follow the letter of the law. There is indeed halakhic justification. (See R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 15 no. 47.) Yet my point is that the Jewish people didn’t need any specific halakhic justification, because they knew from their intuitive natural morality what was proper. This is what R. Yehudah Amital meant when he said that growing up in Hungary he never heard anyone talk about “halakhah this, and halakhah that”.[9] As R. Amital pointed out, the people who speak like this, who have an endless focus on halakhic particulars, are those who have lost touch with the tradition. In a traditional society there is no need for one to delve into endless halakhic details, as simply by growing up in this society one knows how to conduct oneself. In a traditional society, you don’t need books to tell you, for example, how big the matzah needs to be and how much water you need to wash your hands, and by the same token you don’t need books to tell you what you can and can’t say about the Mets’ leading slugger or whether or not you can give your maid a gift on her birthday. There has been so much discussion about how Haredism is a modern invention, but the truth is that Centrism, with its Pan-Halakhism, is just as much a modern invention as haredism. Looking around, it is actually some groups of Hasidim who are the only real traditionalists, the ones who have a mesorah and who don’t need to constantly look into a book to tell them how they should live. As the great Hungarian scholar Ludwig Blau put it, “A drop of tradition is worth more than a ton of acumen.”[10]

2. In my last post I summarized R. Eleazar Ashkenazi’s position in his Tzafnat Paneah, pp. 29-30, as follows:

He also offers another explanation for the lengthy lifespans [in the Torah], namely, that the Torah recorded what the popular belief was, no matter how exaggerated, and Moses was not concerned about these sorts of things. In other words, just like today people say that the Torah is not interested in a scientific presentation of how the world was created, R. Eleazar’s position is that the Torah is not interested in a historically accurate presentation.
Dr. Eric Lawee, who has a chapter on Ashkenazi in his forthcoming book, wrote to me that he reads Ashkenazi differently than I did. I went back to the text and thanks to Lawee, I would like to clarify some of what I wrote.[11] It appears that the first part of Ashkenazi’s comment is merely stating that the Torah recorded exaggerated numbers as figures of speech, much like the Land of Israel is described as flowing with milk and honey which was never meant to be understood literally. Although it is true that people understand the lifespans literally, Ashkenazi sees this as a misinterpretation of the Torah. In other words, it is not correct to say that the Torah recorded the exaggerated numbers because that was what the people believed.

Yet in this very discussion, Ashkenazi also states that the exaggerated numbers are only found in the very ancient stories. However, with regard to events closer to Moses’ time the latter was more careful about recording the details accurately. It is because of this comment that I wrote that Moses left the stories of the distant path cloaked in legend. I should have also clarified that Ashkenazi is only referring to the ענייניהם ושנותיהם of the ancients who are not part of the prophetic tradition which includes Adam, Noah, and the Patriarchs. Here Ashkenazi does seem to be saying that the Torah records popular conceptions, for if not from these conceptions, where did Moses get the inaccurate information that he recorded?

It is possible to explain that the lengthy lifespans of people like Adam and Noah, whom Ashkenazi stresses were of concern to Moses and he was therefore careful with regard to their details, were always intended be understood figuratively. However, with regard to the others mentioned in the early chapters of Genesis, Ashkenazi speaks of הגוזמות הספוריים הבלתי מדוקדקים , and here it seems that he does advocate the notion that the Torah is including material that was popularly believed, even if not accurate.[12] He also writes about how certain matters in the Torah were recorded בבלבול ובקיצור מופלג ומקומותיהם ומקריהם שלא בדקדוק One such matter is the genealogies, about which he writes: לא היתה הכוונה לדקדק במספר שנות חיי כל איש כי אם על דרך כלל

Ashkenazi’s viewpoint is interesting because he acknowledges that in certain factual matters the Torah is not exact, and indeed this is not a concern of the Torah. This sounds very similar to how many people explain the first few chapters of Genesis. Yet it is much less common for Orthodox spokesmen to extend this approach to later chapters of the Torah, e.g., to say that say the genealogies recorded are not accurate. But is there a conceptual difference between saying that the Torah is not interested in presenting creation in a historically accurate form, and that is why there is no mention of billons of years or of evolution, and saying that the Torah is not interested in exact genealogies, but simply presents what was commonly thought and this explains the lengthy lifespans? If there is no conceptual difference, where does one draw the line? Surely there are some parts of the Torah in which factual history must be assumed. This is an issue that has not yet been adequately dealt with, and I will soon be publishing a letter by a great Torah scholar which refers to this problem.

3. In the last post I cited an example where R. Shalom Messas was criticized for not understanding an Aggadah literally. More than one person thought that I should have cited sources showing how foolish it is to take bizarre aggadot literally. It is, of course, easy to cite such sources, beginning with the Rambam’s Introduction to Perek Helek.[13] Most of these are quite famous, so let me call attention to a book not so well known. It is R. Eliezer Lippmann’ Neusatz’ Mei Menuhot, published in 1884. Here is its title page.

Neusatz was a student of the Hatam Sofer, and this book appears with the approbation of R. Simhah Bunim Sofer (the Shevet Sofer).


Here is the first page of the approbations to his book Be-Tzir Eliezer. Pay careful attention to how R. Abraham Samuel Sofer (the Ketav Sofer) describes Neusatz’ standing as a student of the Hatam Sofer.
On p. 16a, after citing Maimonides’ words that the majority err in understanding aggadot literally, Neusatz comments that this was the situation in earlier times, which were less religiously sophisticated than later generations. The proof that the earlier generations were religiously naïve is that belief in divine corporeality was widespread then. According to Neusatz, people who were so mistaken about God that they imagined him as a corporeal being would obviously not be able to understand Aggadah in a non-literal fashion. He contrasts that with the generation he lived in, which was able to properly understand Aggadah.

אמנם בדורנו זה נזדככו יותר הרעיונות ונלטשו הלבבות והמושגים האלהיים הנשגבים האלה מצטיירים בלבות המאמינים בטוהר יותר ורוב זוהר, ונתמעטו אנשי הכת הזאת, ותה”ל רובם יודעים שחז”ל כתבו אגדותיהם ע”ד משל ומליצה וחדות וכפי הצורך אשר היה להם לפי ענין הדורות אשר היה לפניהם, פנימיותם הם ענינים אמתיים נשגבים עומדים ברומו של עולם.
I assume that Neusatz would say that the traditional notion of the generations declining only refers to the scholars, as it is obvious from his words that when it comes to the masses the generations have been getting better.

Neusatz also has an interesting explanation as to why certain prophecies, in particular those of Ezekiel, are not written in proper grammatical Hebrew. This was already commented on by Abarbanel. Abarbanel simply attributes this to Ezekiel’s and Jeremiah’s unpolished Hebrew skills![14] He further claims that this is why there are an abundance of keri u-khetiv, ketiv ve-lo keri etc. in the book of Jeremiah. The original Hebrew had to be corrected!

Neusatz has a different approach to explain certain prophets’ apparent deficiencies in the Hebrew language. He explains that since the prophets were speaking to the lower classes, and they wanted their message to sink in, they adjusted their language accordingly. (Mei Menuhot, pp. 13b, 34b). This is also how he explains certain passages in the book of Ezekiel which would appear to be at odds with modest and proper speech. Since the prophet was speaking to the masses, he had to use their coarse language (p. 35a). This is no different than politicians today, who adopt a certain mode of speech to connect with the listeners. It also explains many of R. Ovadiah Yosef’s outrageous comments. In speaking to the masses he forgets who he is, and uses the sort of lower class language that allows him to connect with his listeners, but that is not acceptable for someone in his position.

Neusatz calls attention to R. Joseph Albo’s comment, Sefer ha-Ikarim 3:25, that even the Torah was written so as to speak to its various audiences, which included not just the wise people but also the foolish ones:

לפי שהתורה לא נתנה לחכמים ולמשכילים בלבד, אבל לכל העם מקצה גדולים וקטנים חכמים וטפשים, ראוי שיבואו בה דברים מוכנים [צ”ל מובנים כמ”ש במהדורת הוזיק] לכל.
Neusatz is also explicit that very few aggadot are actually the result of the Sages’ ruah ha-kodesh (p. 32a). He states that Maimonides’ astronomical views in the Mishneh Torah do not come from a holy source, but from the Greeks, and in our day must be rejected (p. 38a). He also acknowledges that at times the Sages’ opinions were based on the best scientific knowledge of their time, which we now know is mistaken (pp. 36a-36b, 38a-38b). On page 39b he discusses Maimonides’ rejection of astrology. The problem with Maimonides’ position is that the Talmud clearly accepts astrology. In Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters I argue that Maimonides must have assumed that the greatest of the Sages rejected astrology. Yet the problem is that although Maimonides might assume this, is there any rabbinic source to justify this assumption? Neusatz argues that there is. There is a famous rabbinic statement in Shabbat 156a: אין מזל לישראל This means that Israel is not under the planetary influence. However, the statement is not a denial of the efficacy of astrology per se, and indeed assumes that the nations of the world are under the planetary influences. In very original fashion, Neusatz argues for a different understanding of the statement that he believes was shared by Maimonides:

והנה ידוע דעת הרמב”ם שהמזל אינו פועל כלל ונ”ל דס”ל שזה הוא כונת ר’ עקיבא ור’ יוחנן ורב ושמואל ורב נחמן ב”י בסוף מסכת שבת שאמרו אין מזל לישראל, וכונתם שאין ראוי לישראל עם חכם להאמין שמזל פועל.

In other words, אין מזל לישראל means that it is not proper for a smart people like the Jews to believe in the efficacy of astrology!

Neusatz also discusses Maimonides’ general attitude towards superstition, and argues that today, when all the superstitious beliefs have been proven false, it is a religious requirement to advocate Maimonides’ approach in these matters (p. 40b). As to why the Sages appear to believe all these superstitions, Neusatz assumes that they had to deal with the masses who were enmeshed in these notions, and that as long as the superstitious ideas were not idolatrous, the Sages were willing to tolerate them (p. 41ff. This is exactly Meiri’s view with regard to Zugot, but Neusatz had no way of knowing this as this section of the Meiri had not yet appeared in print.) Neusatz adopts the same view with regard to demons, which like Maimonides he too sees as non-existent (pp. 43ff.).[15]

Neusatz sees no harm in the Sages using common figures of speech if they never actually took them literally. Just as today we use expressions such as “the devil is in the details,” so too the Sages would refer to phenomena as due to a demon even though they didn’t believe this literally. To support this assumption, he brings a very interesting example where the Sages even used a mythological image (p. 45a). Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, ch. 6, in speaking of the sun, writes: “The sun rides in a chariot and rises, crowned as a bridegroom.” This is obviously taken from the Greek myth of Helios, the god who drives the chariot of the sun across the sky every day. Yet despite this mythological origin, which Neusatz assumes must have been known to the Sages, the image appears in a Midrashic text. Neusatz writes:

ומי לא יבין? שרק על צד יופי הדבור והמשל אמרו כן לציירה כפי פעולתה, באשר מימי קדם ועד היום מפורסם משל זה לפעולת השמש ניתן לה מאת בעלי הממשילים (קראם הרמב”ם טלסמאות ובל”א מיטאלאגיע) ועד היום מציירים הממשילים את פעולת השמש בתמונה זו וכנודע.
It is in his discussion of demons that Neusatz brings amazing testimony from the Hatam Sofer, rejecting the authenticity of the vast majority of what is included in the book known as the Zohar.[16] Before quoting it, let me repeat that this book has the haskamah of the Hatam Sofer’s grandson, R. Simhah Bunim Sofer (the Shevet Sofer). Here is what Neusatz writes on p. 43b:
בפירוש שמעתי כן מפה קדוש אדומ”ו גאון ישראל קדוש ד’ מכובד מוהר”ר משה סופר זצוק”ל אב”ד ור”ם דק”ק פרעשבורג שאמר בפני רבים מתלמידיו, אלו היה יכולת ביד אדם להעמיד מדרשי רשב”י על טהרתן לבררם מתוך מה שנתחבר אליהם מחכמי הדורות שאחריו לא יהיה כולו רק ספר קטן הכמות מאד מחזיק דפים מעוטים.
The Hatam Sofer is often portrayed as both a religious extremist as well as lacking a critical sense. The first assumption, that he was an extremist, is absolutely false and is a creation of the nineteenth-century Reformers. I won’t go into it here, but suffice it to say that the Hatam Sofer was often a very lenient posek, the exact opposite of what people mean by “extremism”.

As for not having a critical sense, this too is false. I am not saying that he viewed matters as did R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes or R. Solomon Judah Rapoport,[17] but the quotation from Neusatz shows that the Hatam Sofer was much more complex than he was caricatured by his opponents. There are numerous examples that could be cited to illustrate this. In Limits of Orthodox Theology I mentioned that the Hatam Sofer leaned towards Ibn Ezra’s view that the entire last chapter of Deuteronomy was not written by Moses. He also wondered whether the Targum on Ruth was of Sadducean origin.[18] Another example relates to what was discussed in this post regarding the Jerusalem Talmud’s view that there is a mistake in the book of Jeremiah. (I neglected to mention that the J. Talmud there also states that there is a mistake in the book of Ezekiel.) According to the Hatam Sofer, the mistake in our book of Jeremiah is due to an erroneous emendation that dates back to biblical times.[19]

4. In my last post I quoted what R. Itzele of Ponovezh said about the superiority of the religious masses’ outlook to the Daas Torah of the gedolim. I had originally quoted this in an earlier post and referred to what R. Avraham Shapiro said about it. R. Avraham, before he became known as the Rosh Yeshiva of Merkaz ha-Rav and Chief Rabbi of Israel, had published R. Itzele’s teshuvot, Zekher Yitzhak, in 1949. Here is the title page of the book (taken from hebrewbooks.org).
Unfortunately, the version on Otzar ha-Hokhmah has been censored. Here is the title page at it appears on Otzar ha-Hokhmah, with no indication as to who brought the book to publication.

The Otzar ha-Hokhmah version is also missing R. Avraham’s learned introduction. I have no doubt that Otzar ha-Hokhmah is innocent in this matter, and was unaware that the volume it put online had been tampered with. (If you have Otzar ha-Hokhmah there is actually no reason to use the first edition of Zekher Yitzhak, as a second edition, with an additional volume, was published by Machon Yerushalayim in 2000, and this is also found on the Otzar.)

All this is by way of introduction to saying that a couple of people wondered if R. Avraham had any interesting ideas in addition to being a posek and Talmudist.. Many people indeed only see him in the latter mold. I remember some years ago when I asked an acquaintance in Israel how it was possible that some people in Merkaz ha-Rav were willing to go against the Rosh Yeshiva, R. Avraham, and establish Yeshivat Har ha-Mor. It was explained to me that “if you want to know if something is muktzeh, then you should ask R. Avraham. But in terms of hashkafah, R. [Zvi] Tau is the one to follow.”

Yet I think this is an exaggeration, and those who are interested in R. Avraham can find lots of interesting things in his book Morashah, as well as in the two volumes published on R. Avraham by R. Yitzhak Dadon, Imrei Shefer and Rosh Devarkha. (Dadon is the man – ספרא וסייפא – who killed the terrorist who attacked Merkaz a few years ago.) I have also given two lectures on R. Avraham at Torah in Motion that can be downloaded.

R. Avraham knew an enormous amount about the history of great Torah scholars, and while he didn’t have a critical sense, he knew when a story was nonsense.[20] For example, R. Shalom Schwadron told a story about how when R. Kook, R. Isser Zalman Meltzer, and R. Moshe Mordechai Epstein were together once, they decided that each one should repeat a tractate of Talmud by heart.[21] That was the extent of their conversation. R. Avraham thinks that the story is, to put it bluntly, crazy. No normal person could sit and listen to someone else rattle off an entire tractate. Furthermore, are we supposed to think that these gedolim had no Torah to speak to each other about and that they would be happy to just sit and listen to the other repeat the Talmud? (Imrei Shefer, p. 269).

A valuable story is recorded in Imrei Shefer, p. 34. One of the students asked as follows: If when peeling a cucumber he mistakenly took off some of the cucumber itself, is that is regarded as ba’al tashhit? The students started laughing upon hearing this question, but R. Avraham became very serious. He replied:
זו שאלה של “עצבנות”, יש עצבנות ביראת-שמים, לכן מגיעים לשאלות כאלה. אדם נורמאלי מקלף וזהו! אסור לבחורים להגיע למצב של שאלות כאלה.
We see from here that R. Avraham was aware that there is a fine line between religious practice and obsessive-compulsive behavior. Many readers have probably come into contact with individuals who unfortunately have crossed the line. It is interesting to speculate if observance of halakhah can sometimes lead to obsessive-compulsive behavior or if it is simply that an obsessive-compulsive personality is able to function very well in the halakhic system. As for humrot and hiddurim, which many critics see as connected with obsessive-compulsive behavior, R. Avraham had a simpler approach. He believed that the humrot we see are simply because people have more money today than in the past. When you have money, you can adopt hiddurim that no one dreamed about years ago.[22]

Since many people who read this blog are very interested in R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik and his family, let me mention something fascinating in Imrei Shefer, p. 251. R. Yehoshua Magnes, one of R. Avraham’s leading students, is quoted as follows (and the information certainly come from R. Avraham): R. Moses Soloveitchik supported R. Isaac Rubenstein. The extremists wanted to put R. Moses in herem until R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz told them in no uncertain terms that one doesn’t put “the son of the Rebbe” in herem!

This is referring to the great dispute in Vilna over the chief rabbinate in the late 1920s. The Mizrachi decided to put forth their own candidate, Rubenstein, who emerged victorious. This was seen as a terrible slap in the face to R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski, who until then was regarded as the unofficial chief rabbi of Vilna. The election of Rubenstein was also a rejection of the tradition that, since the late eighteenth century, there was no chief rabbi in Vilna.[23]

This story, assuming it is true, answers a perplexity I had for some time. Making of a Godol, p. 749, relates how some Polish rabbis were so upset at R. Moses Soloveitchik that they threatened to put him in herem. In response to this threat, R. Baruch Ber is quoted as saying that one doesn’t put the son of the Rebbe in herem. The story quoted by Kamenetsky has to do with a rabbinical dispute between a certain Agudist rabbi and a Mizrachi shochet. We are told that R. Moses opposed R. Zvi Hanokh Levin’s support of the rabbi. Yet why would this occasion a herem? Others have assumed that the rabbis may have wanted to place him in herem for accepting the position at the Warsaw Takhkemoni, the Mizrachi school. Yet again, why would this lead to a herem? R. Hayyim’s great student, R. Shlomo Polachek, the Meitchiter, also taught at a Mizrachi school.

Assuming the information in Imrei Shefer is correct, all is understandable. If R. Moses supported R. Isaac Rubenstein, then the herem would make perfect sense. Here was an issue in which the entire rabbinic world had joined together to support R. Hayyim Ozer. The great dayan of Vilna, R. Henokh Eiges, the Marheshet, resigned from the Mizrachi on account of the slight to R. Hayyim Ozer’s honor. R. Aaron Rabinowitz, the son-in-law of R. Reines, the founder of Mizrachi, did likewise.[24] To support Rubenstein would thus be viewed as a terrible betrayal of rabbinic solidarity, which in the rabbinic mind would be deserving of a herem.

Why would R. Moses have supported Rubenstein? Presumably this was tied in with his opposition to Agudat Israel. It is known that he was quite opposed to the Agudah, claiming that in this opposition he was simply following in the path of his father, R. Hayyim .[25] In fact, this opposition explains another interesting point. In Keneset Yisrael 10 (1932), a journal published by the Hazon Ish’s brother and brother-in-law, there appears an article by “Shlomo Kohen.” Kohen was one of the Hazon Ish’s students, but the article was by the Hazon Ish. Why did the Hazon Ish not want to sign his own name to it? The article is directed against another article published by R. Moses Soloveitchik in Ha-Pardes, in which he cited the hiddushim of his son, R. Joseph Baer. As the Steipler explained, the Hazon Ish wanted to disprove what R. Moses wrote (in the name of his son) because R. Moses was associated with the Mizrachi (teaching at Takhkemoni) and he therefore wanted to diminish his stature (לבטלו).[26] In other words, the fact that the Hazon Ish decided to dispute with R. Moses (and he rarely disputed with contemporaries) was not because he so respected the latter, but the exact opposite.[27]

With regard to Mizrachi rabbis, let me quote something else repeated by R. Avraham Shapiro: The Hafetz Hayyim once wrote to a certain Mizrachi rabbi with all sorts of elaborate titles. When R. Velvel Soloveitchik was asked how the Hafetz Hayyim could write with such respect to a Mizrachi rabbi, R. Velvel responded that this is what happens when you don’t listen to any lashon ha-ra! (Imrei Shefer, p. 271). He said this as a criticism of the Hafetz Hayim. In other words, sometimes you need to listen to lashon ha-ra in order to know how to properly evaluate people. (R. Avraham was very upset with this story and doubted its veracity, although the comment is very much in line with how R. Velvel would express himself.)

Regarding Imrei Shefer, I was very happy to see on p. 267 that R. Avraham studied Kitvei R. Weinberg, which I published a number of years ago. Both volumes of this work are now available on hebrewbooks.org.

5. People continue to write to me about my earlier posts on R. Kook.[28] Many are fascinated with R. Kook’s position on sacrifices that I discussed here.
Let me therefore call attention to another recently published text, found in R. Tsuriel’s Peninei ha-Re’iyah, p. 212. (It earlier appeared in Meorot ha-Re’iyah, Haggadah shel Pesah, p. 225.). This is actually the text from which R. Kook’s famous words in Olat ha-Re’iyah, p, 292, are taken. There R. Kook envisions a future of vegetable sacrifices.


Olat ha-Re’iyah was published in 1939, after R. Kook’s death. Now that the original text of R. Kook’s words has been published, we can see how R. Zvi Yehudah did not merely “abridge” his father’s text, as Tsuriel puts it, but clearly censored it to soften its radicalism, which is a pattern seen again and again in R. Zvi Yehudah’s editing.

What appears in R. Kook’s original text is further elaboration about how in Messianic days the animals will be raised in intelligence to the level of man, and he even brings a biblical verse in support of this notion. Isaiah 43:20 reads: “The beasts of the field shall honor Me, the jackals and the ostriches.” The fact that animals are portrayed as honoring God shows that they will move beyond behavior based purely on instinct. Then R. Kook writes as follows, and pay careful attention to what I have underlined, which is undoubtedly the reason why R. Zvi Yehudah thought he had to censor the text.
אם כן יהיה כערך האדם עכשיו. על כן לא יהיה צריך לקרב מהם ולהקריב, ויהיה איסור בזה, ותהיה ההקרבה רק מנחה מהצומח, שהוא לא ישכיל עוד על שיעלהו בפועל. על כן תערב המנחה, ולא שאר קרבן מהחיים.

Here R. Kook isn’t just expressing a preference for vegetable sacrifices, but telling us that it will actually be forbidden to offer animal sacrifices.

Regarding Tsuriel’s Peninei ha-Re’iyah, some of the passages from R. Kook cited from manuscript are quite valuable. See e.g., p. 385, where R. Kook states that when it comes to a war to defend the Jewish people even the tribe of Levi goes out to fight. What this means, of course, is that R. Kook would be opposed to any draft exemption for yeshiva students.

In addition, Tsuriel has selected passages from R. Kook’s writings and arranged them in order of the various parshiyot, so that one can always find a good piece for a devar Torah. For parashat Metzora (p. 231), he quotes R. Kook’s statement in Ezrat Kohen, no. 21, that even if one expresses heretical thoughts, this doesn’t mean that he really is a heretic. Rather, it could be that he is simply trying to show that he is in line with what “the world” is saying, but it doesn’t mean that he really believes it.

This is just one more angle whereby R. Kook tries to defend the modern free-thinkers. His most famous defense is that modern heretics have the status of onsin, in that the environment today almost forces them into their false beliefs so that they cannot be held responsible for their views. He also states that those who express heretical beliefs are not really certain of their heresy, and it is only one who is certain in this who is to be regarded as a heretic.

With the publication of Shemoneh Kevatzim we see that R. Kook goes even further and completely removes the orthoprax individual from the status of heretic. I quoted the relevant passage here.
We see from R. Kook that one who holds a heretical belief, but lives as an observant Jew in his daily life, is regarded as part of the Torah community. As I put it in my earlier post: Two important things stand out. First, while not condoning orthopraxy, R. Kook states that one who is observant, despite the fact that he denies ikkarim, is to be regarded as an erring Jew, not as a heretic. R. Kook’s position is a complete rejection of the idea that people who are shomrei Torah u-mitzvot can be read out of the fold and be regarded as heretics because of their incorrect beliefs. The second important point is that he rejects the Rambam’s entire theological conception of Principles of Faith and aligns himself with the Ra’avad, showing once again that the Rambam’s position has not attained unanimity.[29]

Had R. Zvi Yehudah printed this text, we might have been spared some of the heresy hunting in the religious Zionist world, and discussions of whether one can drink this or that observant Jew’s wine due to the fact that he might have some heretical thoughts. In fact, it is only with the publication, uncensored, of R. Kook’s writings that the “lights” of his soul are revealed in all their grandeur. What other spiritual leader with unconventional views could declare that he is ready to fight the entire world for the truth as he sees it, to proclaim his views without any compromises and without worrying about what the “world” will say? While I greatly respect R. Herzog, R. Weinberg, and R. Soloveitchik, they certainly could never say the following (Pinkasei ha-Re’iyah [2010], vol. 2, p. 201):

“אם אני מוכרח להיות איש ריב לכל העולם מצד הנטיה של האמת העמוקה שבנפשי, שאינה סובלת שום הטיה של שקר, אי אפשר לי להיות איש אחר. וצריך אני להוציא מן הכח אל הפועל רק את יסודות האמת העקריים הצפונים ברוחי, בלא שום התחשבות עם מה שחושב העולם בכל הסכמותיו.” זהו הפתגם של דורש האמת, המתעורר בגבורתו העליונה.

See also ibid., p. 208, where we see his self-image as a prophet of old, and that no one other than he can see clearly what is taking place in the world:

מה יש עכשיו בעולם? וכי מפני שאין שום איש, ושום למדן ביחוד, רוצה להביט מה שיש עתה בעולם, וכי בשביל כך, גם אנכי לא אביט? לא! אני אינני משועבד להרבים. הנני הולך במסילתי, בדרך הישרה, ישר אביט.
R. Kook’s commitment to his path, despite the controversy that ensued, was a trait also seen in R. Shlomo Goren, with all the tragic consequences, both personal and professional. Perhaps the Lubavitcher Rebbe is the only one after R. Kook who was able to successfully chart a path undisturbed by the opposition, and without any need for compromise.

One other passage from R. Kook’s recently published Pinkasei ha-Re’iyah vol. 2, p. 207, is worth noting. While tolerance of opposing viewpoints is often viewed as characteristic of a watered-down commitment to one’s own belief, R. Kook adopts a different perspective:

הסבלנות בדעות, כשהיא באה מלב טהור ומנוקה מכל רשעה, אינה עלולה לקרר את להבת רגש הקודש שבתוכן האמונה הפשוטה, מקור אושר החיים כולם, כ”א להרחיב ולהגדיל את יסוד ההתלהבות המקודשת לשמים.


To be continued.
[1] For a different perspective, see the recently published Pinkesei ha-Re’iyah, vol. 3, p. 69, where R. Kook states that one might have expected non-Jewish philosophers, since they are not involved with practical mitzvot, to be able to attain a higher grasp of theological truths, as they can devote themselves exclusively to this. Yet R. Kook explains that this is not the case.
[2] In R. Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Man we also see his dissatisfaction with practical halakhic decision-making. His alternative to this is theoretical halakhic study, which is very different than what R. Kook saw as his goal. In the hasidic world, the communal rav was relegated to the role of halakhic technician, while the focus of spiritual leadership was the Rebbe, who did not involve himself in practical halakhic rulings.
[3] Together with the crackdown on sexual abuse, there have been other changes as well. In my youth there were teachers who would punish students physically. This was, in fact, the traditional method of disciplining students, and is mentioned in Makkot 2:2, Bava Batra 21a, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 2:2, Rotzeah u-Shemirat ha-Nefesh 5:6, and Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 551:18, Yoreh Deah 245:10. See also the picture from the 1395 Coburg Pentateuch, of a teacher with his whip, available here.
It is clear from the rabbinic sources that the physical punishments were not designed to inflict real pain, although one wonders whether the picture from the Coburg Pentateuch reflects a harsher reality. See Elliot Horowitz, “The Way We Were: ‘Jewish Life in the Middle Ages,’” Jewish History 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 81-82. In any event, today, what parent will allow the teacher to lay a hand on his child, even if the pain is minor?
Even though, as mentioned, teachers were never supposed to inflict real pain, I think it is fair to say that the physical punishments over the generations sometimes did get out of hand (see next note). I recall vividly one rebbe who would squeeze kids’ arms and even throw them against the wall. Today, in every Modern Orthodox school and even some haredi schools, that type of behavior would be grounds for immediate termination. Regarding how students were physically punished in the great yeshivot, we have reports of Roshei Yeshiva and mashgichim who would slap students in the face. See e.g., Moshe Tzinovitz, Mir (Tel Aviv, 1981), p. 464; Shaul Stampfer, Ha-Yeshivah ha-Litait be-Hithavutah (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 335 n. 76. Even R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin, who was a very gentle person, would occasionally slap a student in the face. On one occasion this even led to the students going “on strike” (i.e., ceasing all Torah study) in protest against the Netziv’s action. They viewed the slap as an insult to the entire student body since this was the sort of thing one would expect a melamed to do in a heder, not the rosh yeshiva of the great Volozhin. The Netziv was forced to publicly apologize to the entire student body. See M. Eisenstadt, “Revolutzyah ba-Yeshivah,” Ha-Tzefirah, 1 Sivan 5676; Stampfer, Ha-Yeshivah ha-Litait, pp. 128-129, 149.
On at least one occasion, a student certainly deserved being slapped in the face. It happened at Telz in 1905. At this time there were two mashgichim, and as was often the case at the great yeshivot, the students were very opposed to the mashgichim. (A few years earlier the students had gone on strike due to the invasive actions of a previous mashgiach, R. Aryeh Leib Hasman. See Stampfer, Ha-Yeshiva ha-Litait, p. 334.). One of the students waited above and when given the signal poured a bucket of fish sauce upon the mashgiach. R. Eliezer Gordon, the Rosh Yeshiva, slapped the suspected student on the face. Simcha Assaf, who records the story, tells us that this was the only time Gordon ever did such a thing. See Assaf, “Shenot ha-Limudim sheli bi-Yeshivat Telz (5665-5668),” in Immanuel Etkes and Shlomo Tikochinski, eds., Yeshivot Lita (Jerusalem, 2004), p. 235.

I have seen haredi authors who argue that opposition to physical punishment in school is a sign that people have moved away from “Torah values” in favor of modern psychology. See R. Chaim Rapoport’s response to this approach in his wonderful discussion of the issue in Datche 41 and 41 (2008). See also R. Avraham Steinberg, Encyclopedia Hilkhatit Refuit, vol. 6 cols. 767-768.

Another change in our era is that signs of physical affection between a rebbe and student, which at one time were very important especially as the rebbe served as a father figure, are no longer acceptable. A student cannot even sit on his rebbe’s lap, as was done in years past. It is reported that when R. Hayyim Soloveitchik visited his great student, R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz, who at this time was serving as rosh yeshiva of Keneset Beit Yitzhak in Slobodka, R. Baruch Ber sat on R. Hayyim’s lap. Just like he sat on R. Hayyim’s lap when he was a young student, R. Hayyim wanted R. Baruch Ber to sit on his lap when he was a grown man. See Making of a Gadol, p. 87. The fact that we could never imagine something like this happening today shows how different our mindset is. There are loads of stories of rebbes kissing their students. R. Zvi Yehudah Kook was known in particular for this. See e.g., Iturei Yerushalayim, no. 55 (2011), p. 4. Here are three stories from R. Shlomo Riskin’s recently published memoir, Listening to God, which also bring us back to a more innocent time.
I couldn’t wait to share my discovery [of Darwin’s theories and how they could help explain the Torah] with my rebbe, Rav Mandel, that Monday morning. I brought him the book, and showed him the relevant passages—totally ignorant of the “red flag” raised in religious circles by the mere mention of Darwin. Rav Mandel barely took the book in his hand; he slapped my face, and then kissed my forehead. “Your interpretations are magnificent, but it is forbidden to read such heretical literature,” he said gently. I smarted at the slap, felt vindicated by the kiss, and continued to adore my rebbe. . . . “ (p. 51)
Riskin describes being tested by Dr. Samuel Belkin.
He asked me which Talmudic tractate I was studying, spoke to me “in learning,” and gave me a section of Gemara and the Tosafot commentary to read. He then came around the desk where I was sitting, kissed me on the forehead, and said to Tante, “you’re right, He can have a full scholarship to Yeshiva University.”(pp. 67-68)
After Riskin passed the examination to become a city rabbi in Israel, “Rabbi [Shaul] Yisraeli rose—and visibly moved—kissed me on the forehead.” (p. 369)
In general, I have to say that Riskin’s book is quite interesting. I must note, however, that in a number of places where he is critical of people or tells a story that might be embarrassing, Riskin refers to individuals by their initials. If he did so in order to leave the figures anonymous, he was not entirely successful, since in a few cases it is not that hard to figure out whom he had in mind.
[4] Unfortunately, refusal to protect children is not a new thing. See this post where I mentioned even allowing rapists to go free.
What is new is that parents are now beginning to stand up. Here is a passage from a nineteenth-century memoir from which we see that in the past even murder was covered up. (The case described is definitely not manslaughter, which is what is described in Makkot 2:2 and Rambam, Hilkhot Rotzeah u-Shemirat ha-Nefesh 5:6. Incidentally, the latter two sources are only speaking about a society in which teachers were permitted to hit the students, and have no applicability today vis-à-vis most of the Orthodox world.)
One of the angry teachers I mentioned was nicknamed David with the tangled hair, as his head was covered with a mass of knotted hair. He was hot-tempered and frightening, and often came to within an inch of killing a pupil. When particularly enraged, he would lift a child up and ferociously throw him to the ground, so that he landed like a corpse. That actually did happen once. After the funeral the parents of the deceased never dared accuse him of murdering their child. They accepted it as preordained that their son should die while learning Torah, and so did the rest of the community. No one considered the melamed a murderer. Even the sons of M.S. who made it their business to ferret out sinners in the town, in order to cause strife and contention, kept silent on this matter, and David the melamed kept on teaching as if nothing had happened.
Yekhezkel Kotik, Journey to a Nineteenth-Century Shtetl (Detroit, 2002), p. 145. On p. 431, David Assaf, the editor, calls attention to a different memoir which tells of a child dying as a result of his melamed’s beating. On p. 145, Kotik also speaks of another melamed who “would take all his anger out on that particular part of the boy’s anatomy that is generally not mentioned in print.”
(In some segments of the hasidic world the cover-ups unfortunately also continue. Had the New Square madman succeeded and killed the five people in the house he was intent on burning down, does anyone think that the community would have assisted the police in finding the murderer? In a future post I will mention cases of murder and attempted murder carried out for “pious” reasons.)
After my previous post on ultra-Orthodox tolerance of sexual abuse, there were some who doubted that there is any rabbinic support for this. Those who can read Hebrew, please read the following responsum from R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 16, pp. 169-171.
According to Klein, there is never a time when sexual abuse can be reported to the police, even if a child is being continuously raped. That is because there are never two male witnesses who see the abuse. If someone does report the abuse, it is a mitzvah to kill the moser. If anyone has a difficult time understanding why a segment of the hasidic world time and again offers support for the perpetrator and ostracizes the victim, this is all the explanation you need. From their perspective, the victim who goes to the police is worse than the sexual abuser. Based on Klein’s understanding, I don’t think there is a “heter” for a woman who has been raped by a Jew to go to the police, because there is no halakhic evidence of a crime. (He also says that it is forbidden to turn in a murderer. In case anyone needs to be reminded how crazy this viewpoint is, I am writing these words only a few hours after the monster who killed Leiby Kletzky was identified.)

A friend insists that there is no difference between Klein’s position and that of Agudat Israel. This is not true at all. Whereas Klein states that someone can never be turned in to the police, the Agudah position is that a molester can be turned in, but only after a rabbi gives approval. The Agudah position continues to develop, and I have no doubt that in the end the Agudah will end up holding a position identical to that of the RCA. I also think that it is public pressure that will move Agudah in this direction, as public pressure has been responsible for all the adjustments in the Agudah’s position that we have seen until now.
Yet even without public pressure, the current Agudah position is so untenable, that it will have to be updated. For one, it asks people to violate the law. The law is clear that some people are obligated to contact the police when they suspect child abuse. By insisting that a rabbi be consulted before doing so, mandated reporters are being put in the position of being told by a rabbi to refrain from doing something that the law requires. Do the Agudah constituents realize that listening to the rabbi in these circumstances can open them up to both criminal and civil penalties?

As for the rabbis, I can’t imagine who would agree to be on the Agudah’s panel of rabbis that will examine accusations of abuse in order to determine if it is permitted to go to the police. If one of these rabbis rules that the evidence is not compelling and it is therefore forbidden to go to the police, and the rabbi is wrong, he opens himself (and the mandated reporter) to a lawsuit by the parents of the molested child. Whatever the ultimate verdict, the lawyer fees alone will end up bankrupting the rabbi. Is the Agudah prepared to set up a fund to defend rabbis sued by parents of molested children? Certainly not, which is why no rabbi who is thinking straight will ever agree to put himself in such a circumstance. The Agudah’s position also leaves the organization itself vulnerable to a lawsuit by parents of victims.

Finally, unlike so many of the cynics in our community, I don’t think the Agudah position is all about protecting rabbis, guilty or not. I really do believe that the Agudah recognizes that there is a problem. It is convinced that the rabbis it will charge with examining abuse cases will indeed make sure that molesters are turned in. The problem, however, is that we have seen all this before. We have seen over and over again that it is precisely the rabbis who have failed in this matter, often because they are not willing to turn on their own. It was precisely because of this that the community of laypeople rose up and said “No more.” One doesn’t need to be a prophet to see that by relying on individual rabbis to determine if an accusation of sexual abuse is credible, there will continue to be cover-ups. (Am I wrong in assuming that these cover-ups never would have happened if women were in charge? Would mothers ever have permitted child molesters to continue to prey on the young?)
The Agudah position is thus both a public relations and legal disaster in the making. The Church tried such an approach already and it doesn’t work. I don’t understand why such smart people in the Agudah don’t see how their new position is doomed to failure.
[5] See here where I attribute the rabbinic silence to the money Tropper was handing out. I also brought proof that even great rabbis are not immune to being influenced by money. Regarding this point, see the recent biography of R. Zvi Pesach Frank written by Shabbetai Dov Rosenthal, Geon ha-Hora’ah (Jerusalem, 2011),, vol. 1, pp. 410-411. A letter from R. Frank is published in which he criticizes members of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate (of which he was a member). The subjects of his criticism were gedolei Yisrael, and yet he accuses them of being improperly influenced by Israeli government money. He adds:
מי לנו גדול מהכהן הגדול שלא צירפוהו לדון בענין עיבור השנה, שהיה חשש נגיעה שמפני הקור יכריע שלא לעבר השנה
[6] See e.g., here.
[7] I hope to treat this phenomenon in great detail when I am able to complete my article on contemporary halakhic practices in opposition to the Shulhan Arukh.
[8] There are loads of sources that speak of the great weight to be assigned to the practices of the Jewish people, even when these practices appear to violate the textual halakhah. For one example, see R. Solomon Laniado, Beit Dino shel Shlomo (Jerusalem, 1986), Orah Hayyim no. 17 (p. 96): שכל מה שנהגו ישראל שכינה מוסכמת עמהם
Laniado (died 1793) was the chief rabbi of Aleppo.
[9] See my post here.
[10] Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger, ed., The Rabbinical Seminary of Budapest 1877-1977 (New York, 1986), p. 77.
[11] I would also like to mention a recent article by Lawee that deals with some issues relevant to earlier installments of this series, such as the possibility of errors in the biblical text. See Lawee, “Isaac Abarbanel: From Medieval to Renaissance Jewish Biblical Scholarship,” in Magne Saebo, ed., Hebrew Bible/Old Testament (Goettingen, 2008), vol. 2, p. 210, who calls attention to Ibn Ezra, Ex. 25:29, who claims that there is a mistake in the Book of Chronicles. He also notes Abarbanel’s commentary to I Kings 10:22, which suggests another error in Chronicles, due to Ezra misunderstanding a verse in the Book of Kings.
[12] Elsewhere, Ashkenazi speaks of Moses having access to historical records, but there he assumes that these records are accurate. See Epstein, Mi-Kadmoniyot ha-Yehudim, p. 136:
כי כל התורה ברוח הקדש כתבה משה וידע שמות אלופי אדום ומשכנותם ומלכיהם ידועה [!] גמורה מפי ספרים ומפי סופרים ונודע לו האמת ונכתב בספר.
[13] See also this earlier post of mine.
[14] See Abarbanel’s introductions to Jeremiah, p. 298, and Ezekiel, p. 434. In the latter source he writes:
הן אמת שיחזקאל הנביא לא היה בקי בלשון הקדש ולא בכתיבתו
For other references, see Eric Lawee, Isaac Abarbanel’s Stance Toward Tradition )Albany, 2001), p. 276 n. 46.
[15] On p. 46a he offers a different perspective which I don’t think can be brought into line with what he says earlier. Here he accepts the existence of some sort of demonic beings, and claims that the superstition is only that humans can interact with and influence them. Neusatz’ book was published posthumously, and it is possible that had the author been alive he would have worked out a more consistent theory.
[16] In the next issue of Milin Havivin, I deal with Orthodox views of the Zohar. In the meantime, I was surprised to find that R. Berel Wein describes the Zohar in an unsympathetic manner. Although some may claim that Wein was only presenting the history, his less than reverential attitude towards the book comes across very clearly, even if he didn’t consciously intend this. See the video here.

For another surprising piece by Wein (called to my attention by Mel Barenholtz), see here.
Wein describes Midrash as “legend.” While this might be a term used by academics (and is in the title of Louis Ginzberg’s great work), the Yeshiva World has always rejected the word as a proper description. Wein’s entire article can be seen as a reflection on the fact that rabbis, in their sermons, quote all sorts of Midrashim as if they are historical, which they are of course not. So what value do these “legends” have, and why should we use them to fill in the “missing parts” of the biblical text? That is the question Wein deals with.
In fact, Wein’s entire article, with its demand for truth in history and the need to abandon fantasy, is the sort that in today’s day and age could generate a herem. Here, for example, is one very provocative sentence: “Many times legend becomes myth. Myth is a sense of human recognition that the story being told is not factual but it nevertheless changes legend from history or biography into literature and philosophy – sometimes sacred holy literature and philosophy.” (emphasis added). And how about this paragraph, which uses the word “mythology,” certainly knowing the knee-jerk reaction it will provoke among people.

The Torah does not deal with myth per se. Yet the Flood and Noah’s ark, the Tower of Babel, the centrality of the land of Israel, factual as they all are in the biblical narrative, nevertheless were all combined to create a basis for the holy mythology of the Jewish people. In addition, the idea that the “events of the works and decisions of our founders, the fathers of Israel, are a sure guidepost for their descendants” helped strengthen a mythology that binds the Jewish generations together and gives us insights into the values of Judaism and historical events, past and present (emphasis added).

In speaking of the Flood, Noah’s Ark and the Tower of Babel, Wein states that they are factual “in the biblical narrative.” Does this mean to imply that they are really not historical events, but it is only in the biblical narrative that they are regarded as factual? Since these events, Wein tells us, are among the great myths of Judaism, and he just finished telling us that myth is not factual, this seems to be what he is saying.
[17] These two scholars would never have said, as did the Hatam Sofer, that Yiddish was invented by the medieval Jewish sages to keep Jews separate from non-Jews. See She’elot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer, vol. 2 no. 11. There are many other examples that show that the Hatam Sofer was still very much part of the medieval worldview, which is why I state that he is a complex figure. For instance, he still leaned towards Ptolemaic astronomy, centuries after Copernicus (although he acknowledged that the issue was complicated). See Eliezer Brodt’s post here.
Another example is the Hatam Sofer’s famous comment that he doesn’t understand the value of Jews training to be doctors in medical schools where they dissect non-Jewish bodies. Since Jews keep kosher, how can the information obtained from non-Jewish bodies be applicable to them? See Hiddushei Hatam Sofer, Avodah Zarah 31b. Yet I think it is more important is that in this very passage the Hatam Sofer also laments how there is no Jewish medical school.
[18] See Lishkat Soferim to Even ha-Ezer 17:43 (found in standard editions of the Shulhan Arukh).
[19] Derashot Hatam Sofer, vol. 1, p. 331b. This text is discussed here.
[20] The same was true with R. Moshe Feinstein. See R. Aharon Felder’s recently published Rishumei Aharon, pp. 18-19. This book has lots of interesting stories about R. Moshe. Felder is not afraid to point out how R. Moshe, unlike other Roshei Yeshiva, had a more moderate viewpoint when it came to attending college. See pp. 19-21. See also p. 21 for the following story, which shows R. Moshe as a real down-to-earth person, who was far removed from “frumkeit” and had little patience for the aspiring pietist:
פעם ניגש למו”ר זצ”ל חתן ביום חתונתו וביקש לדעת איזו כוונה צריך לכוין בשעת ביאת מצווה. פנה אליו מו”ר זצ”ל וענה “איני מאמין שתוכל לכוין כלל וכלל”. והוא לא הסתפק והמשיך לשאול שוב את שאלתו, אם אני יכול לכוין מה הכונה הראויה לאותו זמן? ומו”ר זצ”ל לא הגיב, ורק המשיך ללכת לדרכו.

For another such story, see p. 20 where he records how R. Moshe told a certain Rosh Yeshiva that it was inappropriate for him to refuse to be mesader kidushin just because there would be mixed seating at the wedding. See also p. 22 that R. Moshe refused to write a letter to the judge on behalf of one who was to be sentenced for drug dealing. R. Moshe told the criminal’s father that his son damaged people’s lives and therefore “Let him sit in prison.” On p. 28 he quotes R. Moshe’s positive view of R. Kook. On p. 73 he quotes R. Moshe that a male massage therapist can massage a woman if he does not have a continuing professional relationship with her (!), a man can cut a woman’s hair, and a male teacher or principal can be present when girls in the school sing as the assumption is that he is involved with other things and not paying attention.
What many will regard as a surprising pesak appears on p. 36:
מותר להיות Wine Tester ולטעום סתם יינם, באופן שפולט ואינו בולע
I assume this pesak is based on Rama, Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 108:5, who is speaking about יין נסך, implying that it is permitted to taste but not swallow סתם יינם. See also Pithei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 98:1, for the view that it is permitted to taste, but not swallow, things forbidden by the Sages.
(Regarding tasting without swallowing, see Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 567:1-3. Based on the Rama in 567:3 it would appear that it is permissible to chew gum on a fast day other than Yom Kippur.)
Although I can’t be certain, I find it hard to believe that R. Moshe would require the wine taster to make a blessing on the non-kosher wine. If so, then R. Moshe would presumably agree with those poskim who have ruled that one does not make a blessing on gum and that you can chew it before morning tefillah. See what I wrote here.
See R. Yitzhak Barda, Yitzhak Yeranen, vol. 2, no. 11, and R. Moshe Levi, Birkat ha-Shem, vol. 2, pp. 41ff., vol. 5, pp. 537ff., for complete discussions of the topic. R. Meir Mazuz also holds that one does not make a blessing on gum. See Or Torah, Tamuz 5771, p. 973. The logic of this viewpoint is explained by the Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 210:
ולי נראה דברכה לא בטעימת חיך תליא אלא באכילה תליא כדכתיב ואכלת וברכת ואכילה היינו הנאת מעיים כדברי הרא”ש ז”ל
Speaking of gum, I wonder if R. Moshe would agree with R. Yitzhak Abadi that all the standard gums (Wrigleys, Trident, etc.) are kosher. See Or Yitzhak, vol. 1, Yoreh Deah no. 24:
כפי שבררנו החלק הטעים והמתוק שבו אין בו שום שאלה, ומה שנשאר הגומי אח”כ וממשיכים ללועסו אין בו לא טעם ולא ריח, והרי הוא כעץ בעלמא ושרי ללועסו כל היום כולו אף אם עירבו בו מדברים האסורים.
The kashrut organizations assume that gum needs a hashgachah. Here is what R. Zushe Blech has to say on the subject
The need for reliable Hashgacha for gum stems from many ingredient concerns. Plasticizers can be pure lard or tallow and emulsifiers are also often made from animal fats. Flavors and glycerin can also be completely non-Kosher. Even if all of the ingredients in a Kosher gum were acceptable, the equipment on which the product is made requires a Kashering from non-Kosher productions. Although the gum itself is not swallowed, these fats and flavors migrate from the gum into the mouth.
See here. (What does Blech mean by “reliable Hasghacha”? Does it mean that hashgachot that disagree with his understanding are not “reliable”?)
Let’s leave flavors out, as none of the flavors in the major gums are non-kosher. Let’s also leave out the issue of equipment, since this is not a real halakhic concern (as anyone who has ever lived in a place other than Israel and America, and thus has to buy foods without hashgachah, is well aware.) The issue is glycerin, emulsifiers etc. I don’t understand why this should be a problem. Even assuming that it is forbidden to swallow these things as part of a food, why would it be prohibited to simply chew on these tasteless items? Is there any kashrut problem when my son chews on his pigskin baseball glove while waiting patiently for a ball to be hit to him?
Returning to Felder, I give him credit for not being embarrassed to tell us how he once asked R. Moshe the following idiotic question (p. 20):
פעם הלכתי עם מו”ר זצ”ל לניחום אבלים, ולפני שנכנסנו לרכב ביקש ר”מ אחד מישיבת “רבינו יצחק אלחנן”, אם יכול להצטרף לנסיעה כי בית האבלים היה בקרבת מקום לשכונה של הישיבה הנ”ל. ושאלתי את מו”ר זצ”ל האם מותר לנו לקחת את אותו ר”מ לאותה ישיבה? וענה לי “למה לא, הרי נמצאים שם הרבה גדולי ראשי ישיבה שמלמדים תורה”.
Could it be that Felder didn’t know that R. Moshe’s great student, R. Nissan Alpert, taught at YU, or that his son-in-law, R. Moshe Tendler, likewise did? Did he not know that R. Moshe had close relationships with many of the Roshei Yeshiva at YU, and was colleagues with them in Agudas ha-Rabbonim?
While on the subject of teachers at YU, here is a page of a letter, never before published, by R. Yaakov Kamenetsky. It was sent to his son, R. Nosson, whom I thank for giving me permission to publish it. (The notations on the side of the letter are by R. Nosson.) In the letter, R. Yaakov admits that it would have been better for him to teach at YU, since the YU musmachim have a much more significant role in American Orthodoxy than those he was teaching. However, what prevented him from doing so is how this would appear to his sons. They would wonder, if YU was good enough for him to be part of the faculty, why did he think it so important to send his sons to haredi yeshivot?
[21] Kol Hotzev (Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 178-179.
[22] Among my children’s generation, many kids believe that there is a halakhic requirement to have two sinks. Some of these kids have literally never been to a kosher home which doesn’t have this. If they saw such a home, they would probably assume that there must be a heter for one sink, but only for those who can’t afford to redo their kitchens.
[23] R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik wrote of the difficulties R. Hayyim Ozer had, and strongly identified with the latter. See his hesped for R. Hayyim Ozer in Divrei Hagut ve-Ha’arakhah (Jerusalem, 1982), p. 194:
הגאון ר’ חיים עוזר לחם על זה בחרוף נפש. הוא סבל הרבה בעטיה של שיטה זו, סבל יסורי נפש ורוח. בשעה שהרבה מאחינו נכונים היו למסור את החושן לידי זרים ולהסתפק בציץ. עמד הוא בפרץ ומחה נגד זה.
The truth is that R. Soloveitchik is incorrect when he writes עמד הוא בפרץ ומחה נגד זה R. Hayyim Ozer did not protest the slight to his honor, or lead the opposition to Rubenstein. It was the other sages, including the Hafetz Hayyim and the Hazon Ish, who took the reins in this matter. Regarding the Hazon Ish, see Binyamin Brown, Ha-Hazon Ish (Jerusalem, 2011), p. 53.
[24] See Aharon Sorasky, Rabban shel Yisrael (Bnei Brak, 1971), p. 115; Moshe Tzinovitz, Ishim u-Kehilot (Tel Aviv, 1990) p. 240. Rabinowitz was the father-in-law of R. Avigdor Zyperstein, who taught at YU. In Vilna, the center of European Jewish scholarship, an Agudah rav, Grodzinski, and a Mizrachi rav, Eiges, sat on the same beit din and worked closely together. In Europe, every small town had a rav. Sometimes the rav was an adherent of Agudah, and other times a follower of Mizrachi. But as far as the townspeople were concerned, that didn’t matter. He was the rav and if there were halakhic questions in the town he was the one to decide them. If you were an Agudist and the rav was a Mizrachi man, when you had a halakhic question you would go to your rav. The politics of the Jewish world did not interfere when it came to halakhah. Furthermore, the various Agudat Rabbanim in Europe (and also in the U.S.) welcomed all rabbis, regardless of where one stood in the Agudah-Mizrachi dispute. In the post-World War II world, however, the haredi world has entirely changed all this and rewrote the rules. They were able to convince their followers that unless a rav follows the haredi Daas Torah he is not a reliable rav, and therefore he should not be consulted on halakhic matters. In other words, the halakhic competence of a rav was made dependant on his political outlook. This is a complete break with Jewish tradition, as it existed in Europe. While some might regard this development as simply another example of haredi “shtick”, I think it is more significant as it illustrates once again that haredi Judaism can be just as modern and revolutionary as that which it sees itself as fighting against.
[25] See Zvi Weinman, Mi-Katovitz ad Heh be-Iyar (Jerusalem, 1995), pp. 52ff.
[26] E. Horowitz, Orhot Rabbenu (Bnei Brak, 2005), vol. 5, p. 169
[27] See Brown, Ha-Hazon Ish, pp. 55-56.
[28] One well-known haredi rav wrote to me as follows:
I just read your post . . . regarding the abolishment of animal sacrifices. Barukh sheKivanti l’Da’ato shel Harav Kuk when I once told my students at . . . (and advised them to keep it under wraps) that perhaps a future Sanhedrin will find a drash to do that. But I had a caveat in that our present moral sensitivities were formed during the Exile in which we were enslaved to general, non-Jewish thinking. Therefore, after the Messiah arrives and we are able to think independently, and until we are on own long enough to form our own, Jewish ideas, all we will be able to do is continue from where we left off at the Destruction of Ba’yit Sheni. Only after some time has passed may the Sanhedrin decide that animal sacrifices ought to be abolished. This approach explains why the Rambam sets down Hilkhot Korbanot though he may have been prepared to abolish them had he been sitting on the Sanhedrin. It’s for that interim time — between the arrival of Mashiah and whenever the Sanhedrin makes its Judaism-inspired [changes].
He then added the following critical note:
Within the blog you used a term which ruffled my sensibilities: “Messianic Judaism.” Simply because that term has been usurped and corrupted by Christians who call themselves “Messianic Jews,” you should have written “Messianic-Era Judaism”.
[29] R. Isaac Hutner is quoted saying something very similar to that of R. Kook.. See R. Yitzhak Alster, Olat Yitzhak (Jerusalem, 2003), vol. 1, p. 188 (referred to by Bezalel Naor, The Limit of Intellectual Freedom [Spring Valley, 2011]):
שאין דנים הכופר עפ”י מחשבתו ודבורו לחוד עד שעושה מעשה מומרות. וכך היה לשונו: איך וואלט ניט געפסקנט אויף אימיצר אז אעהר איז אן אפיקורס סיידן איך וואלט געזעהן א ריעותא אין זיין מצוות מעשיות, כאיטש אפילו אפיקורסוס איז נישט תלוי אין מעשים, אבער מעלע וואס א מענטש רעדט – ער גלויבט אליין נישט וואס ער רעדט



Quiz Answers; Response to Criticism; Rav Schwab Writes to the Rogochover

Quiz Answers; Response to Criticism; Rav Schwab Writes to the Rogochover

Marc B. Shapiro

1. Let me begin with the riddles from my last post here.

A. Where do we find that Shammai not only disagrees with Beit Shammai, but also agrees with Beit Hillel?

B. In the days of the tannaim a certain item was unquestionably muktzeh. However, in the post-talmudic period, some hold that this item is no longer muktzeh. What item am I referring to? Provide the actual source in the Talmud and later authorities to justify your answer.

The answer for number 1 that I intended is found in Orlah 2:4-5. Mike Wiessenberg, David, Shimi, and Sam got this right.

Yet Moshe Schwartz offered a different answer which I think is also correct. He wrote:

From the baraisa brought down in Beitzah 20a, it could be suggested that only Beis Shammai held that one can’t bring an olah on Yom Tov, but from the fact that Bava Ben Buta said the halacha is in accordance with Hillel, it can be inferred that he is testifying to Shammai’s opinion as well. Especially since the Gemara in Shabbos 15a doesn’t ask from the machlokes of olah on Yom Yov when it says that there was only three times that Hillel and Shammai argued.  So, all this suggests to me that here Shammai was in agreement with Beis Hillel and Hillel himself that you can bring an olah on Yom Tov. See also Tosafos in Chagigah 7b.

For number 2, no one gave the answer I intended: In the days of the tannaim a get was muktzeh. That was because you could not do anything with it on Shabbat. You could not even use it to learn the halakhot of writing a get since Torah learning was to be entirely oral. Yet after the Oral Law was written, R Moshe Isserles states, Even ha-Ezer 136:7, that according to some it is now permitted to handle a get on Shabbat as it is not muktzeh. In other words, since you can learn various halakhot by examining the get, one is now permitted to do so on Shabbat. That this is what R. Isserles means is made clear by his comment in Darkhei Moshe, ibid.:

בזמן הזה שנתנה תורה שבע”פ לכתוב לכ”ע מותר לטלטל גט שהרי אדם יכול ללמוד ממנו כמה הלכות גטין

It is interesting to note that while in Darkhei Moshe R. Isserles says that everyone agrees with this opinion, in the Shulhan Arukh he writes “some say”.

The Beit Yosef, Even ha-Ezer 136, also says that everyone agrees that today it is permitted to carry a get, but in the Bedek ha-Bayit he questions this permission.

As mentioned, during the era when the Oral Law was not written all agree that a get was muktzeh (and the same law would apply to a ketubah) since all learning had to be oral. What I don’t understand, and maybe some of our learned readers can enlighten me, is what are we to make of what the Talmud refers to as megilat setarim. These were private notebooks that the Sages had during the period when the Oral Law could not be written down for the public. In order not to forget what they were taught, the Sages wrote things down. Rashi, Shabbat 6b and Bava Metzia 92a, tells us that these notebooks had to be hidden. However, Maimonides, in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah, also notes that the Sages recorded both what they were taught and their own independent Torah insights. Yet, unlike Rashi, he does not mention that they hid their notebooks. Furthermore, unlike Rashi, Maimonides does not view the permission to write down Torah thoughts as intended solely to prevent forgetting. For him, Torah she-be-al Peh signifies that Torah is transmitted orally rather than through written means. Nevertheless, it was never forbidden to write down the Oral Torah for personal use; it was kept hidden only to prevent its use for public teaching.[1]

According to Rashi, in the era of Torah she-be-al Peh one was not allowed to study the Oral Law from a written text. Writing it down was permitted only as an emergency measure, to prevent forgetting, but under normal circumstances it was forbidden. On this view, it makes sense that a get would be considered muktzeh. However, according to Maimonides, it was never forbidden to write down the Oral Law for private use. Since, in his opinion, one could study the Oral Law privately from written texts, why should a get be muktzeh? How is it different from a private notebook used for study? If anyone has an answer to this, I would be interested to hear it.

R. Meir Mazuz offers another interesting example of how halakhah has evolved in response to changing realities. Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 320:6, states: “One is permitted to squeeze lemons [on Shabbat].” R. Mazuz explains that this ruling is not mentioned by the Geonim or by Maimonides because, in their time, lemons were only primarily for medicinal purposes rather than as a food. Consequently, squeezing them for drinking would have been considered forbidden on Shabbat. This is in line with the halakhah recorded in Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 328:37: “Anything that is not eaten or drunk by healthy people is forbidden to be eaten or drunk for medicinal purposes [on Shabbat].”

2. In my article “The Brisker Method Reconsidered” and also in my book Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters, I refer to how R. Hayyim Soloveitchik ignored Maimonides’ own explanation to the sages of Lunel of Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 4:4.[2] Maimonides informed them that their text of the Mishneh Torah was incorrect and supplied the proper reading. However, R. Hayyim, in his commentary, disregarded Maimonides’ correction, illustrating how the Mishneh Torah had taken on a life of its own such that there was no perceived need to follow even Maimonides’ own assertion that the text was mistaken.[3]

In a recent article, Rabbi Elisha Friedman takes issue with my point:[4]

To correct the record it is worth pointing out one error in Shapiro’s overall excellent discussion of this subject. One of his central proofs for his approach, which he repeats in his Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters (University of Scranton Press, 2008), 55, refers to R. Hayyim’s explanation in Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 4:4. The problem is that Rambam, in a letter, revised the text of this halakha, as R. Yosef Karo in his commentary Kesef Mishneh, ad loc., cites. R. Hayyim completely omits any mention of this revision in his discussion, which leads Shapiro into a reflection of how to view halakhic works which are based on faulty texts. This point is made even more emphatically in the book he is reviewing, Norman Solomon, The Analytic Movement: Hayyim Soloveitchik and His Circle (Scholars Press, 1993), 219. While the overall point—that R. Hayyim is impervious to such textual matters—is undoubtedly correct and can be proven from other explanations in his work,[5] Solomon and Shapiro’s example is in fact not one of them. The piece is unrelated to the words Rambam changed in his letter; it works according to all versions. R. Hayyim proves that Rambam must be referring to an animal which pays damages from its own value and then wonders why this halakha appears in the context of the watchman’s larger responsibility for damages. Quoting Rambam’s responsum might have been proper scholarly etiquette for the sake of accuracy, but it would not have changed the overall trajectory.

Let us examine this case. Maimonides writes as follows in Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon 4:4:

When a person entrusts his animal to an unpaid watchman, a paid watchman, a renter or a borrower, these individuals assume the owner’s responsibilities. If the animal causes damages, the watchman is held liable. When does the above apply? When they did not guard the animal at all. If, however, they guarded the animal in an excellent manner, as they should, and it got loose and caused damage, the watchmen are not liable, and the owners are liable.

The problem with this halakhah is that if the watchman guarded the animal properly, and it still got out, why should the owner be liable? Maimonides was asked about this by the Sages of Lunel and he told them that they should correct their texts to read: “If, however, they guarded the animal in an excellent manner, as they should, and it got loose and caused damage, the watchmen are not liable. If the watchmen guarded the animal in an inferior manner, they are not liable if they are unpaid. Instead, the owners are liable, even if the animal kills a person. The watchman is liable if he is paid, a renter, or a borrower.”

What I said—and what Friedman criticizes—is that R. Hayyim offered an analysis of the mistaken text. Looking again at R. Hayyim, I see no reason to retract what I wrote, and I don’t understand how Friedman can criticize me. The issue isn’t whether one of R. Hayyim’s hiddushim works with both the mistaken text and the corrected text. The issue is, as I said, that R. Hayyim analyzes and explains the mistaken text. He does not pay attention to Maimonides’ correction, which he knew as it is mentioned in the Kesef Mishneh. Thus, right at the beginning of R. Hayyim’s commentary to Nizkei Mamon 4:4 he writes:

וא”כ הא קשה רישא שכתב הרמב”ם שבשמירה מעולה הבעלים חייבין, ואמאי חייבין כיון דעיקר הנגיחה הויא נגיחה של פטור

Yet in the corrected text of the Mishneh Torah, it never states that the owners are liable. R. Hayyim continues discussing the uncorrected text, leading the Hazon Ish in his comment on this passage to write: וכבר כתב הכ”מ בשם הר”מ בעצמו שהוא ט”ס

In R. Hayyim’s commentary to Nizkei Mamon 4:11, which I additionally mention in Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters, his analysis also ignores the corrected text. He cites the uncorrected text and states:

הרי דדעת הרמב”ם דרק בזמן שהשומרין פטורין הוא דהבעלים חייבין

He also writes:

ולפ”ז הרי לכאורה יש למידק מדנקט הכא הרמב”ם הך דינא דהבעלים חייבין

Yet as we have seen, in his responsum to the sages of Lunel, Maimonides says that the underlined words are a mistake, meaning that R. Hayyim’s presentation of Maimonides’ view is not in accord with his corrected text.

In response to what we have just seen from R. Hayyim, the Hazon Ish writes:

צ”ע למה לא נקבל מש”כ הכ”מ בשם רבו בתשובתו לחכמי לוניל

In other words, the Hazon Ish calls attention to the fact that R. Hayyim, in his explanation, operates on the assumption that the printed text is correct, while ignoring Maimonides’ responsum in which he states that the text is mistaken.

In Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters, p. 55 n. 232, I refer to R. Eliyahu Soloveitchik’s note to an article by Prof. Shlomo Zalman Havlin.[6] Let me cite his words, stated with regard to Nizkei Mamon 4:4, as I think they explain well the phenomenon we are discussing and are in line with my approach.

אמנם עיון בספר חידושי רבנו חיים הלוי מראה (וזוהי גם רוח הדברים בבית מדרשו) שכשהוא נפגש עם שינויי גירסה מסוימים בגמרא או ברמב”ם, אין הוא דן בשאלה “מה יצא מתחת קולמוסו של מר בר רב אשי או של רבנו משה בן מימון”, הוא גם לא דן בשאלה הכללית יותר “מהו הנוסח הנכון”. רבי חיים מתייחס לשינויי גירסה אצל הקדמונים כאל כל מחלוקת אחרת בפשט הסוגיה, שלומדים את שתי הדעות בשווה ואלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים. מבחינה פרשנית אפשר לומר שרבי חיים קידש את אשר היה לפניו והרחיק את עצמו מכל דיון בשאלות עובדתיות היסטוריות, ובמקומו עסק בחקר התבונה הטהורה של תורתינו הקדושה . . . ומאחר שאין ענייננו “בירור הנוסח” אלא לומדים אנו את הנוסחאות השונות, לכן גם כשהרמב”ם בתשובה מגיה את דברי עצמו, ומנמק את הנוסח הנפוץ בטעות מעתיקים, העובדה שלפני המגיד משנה היה נוסח מסויים ברמב”ם (הנוסח הנפוץ) דיה היא כדי לקבוע שהנוסח הזה תורה הוא, ויש להתייגע על פירושו.

The very point I made, and which Friedman criticizes, is also made by R. Yehoshua Inbal.[7] He writes:

והרי הגר”ח קיצוני בדבר עוד הרבה יותר מהחזו”א, וכנודע גם במקום שהרמב”ם עצמו הסביר את דבריו, והובאו הדברים בנו”כ, וגם במקום שהרמב”ם שלפנינו ט”ס לפי עדות הרמב”ם עצמו המובאת בנו”כ, התעלם מכך הגר”ח.

In his note to this passage, he refers to Nizkei Mamon 4:4 and Maimonides’ correction of the text, and then states:

אבל הגר”ח לא קיבל גילוי זה ומיישב הג’ הישנה ובסו”ד כותב שזה גם ד’ הרמב”ם

I realize that Friedman can criticize Inbal just as he criticized me, but I feel comfortable knowing that I am in such good company.[8]

Turning to a related issue, the Hazon Ish is often cited as one who was opposed to the Brisker approach. However, the most famous opponent was R. Jacob David Wilovsky, the Ridbaz. I have discussed his opposition to what he called “chemistry” (which includes the Brisker method) in earlier posts here, and here. In my earlier writing about the Ridbaz, I was unaware of another example of his criticism of the analytic approach. This appears in his Nimukei Ridbaz, Parashat Terumah, p. 24a:

שבעו”ה נתפרצה במדינות ליטא וביחוד בזאמוט ע”י איזה רבנים לימוד בדרך הכאמי או הגיון והוא לא רוח התורה אך רוח זרה באה מבחוץ והכניסו בעו”ה להתורה שבע”פ ונתפשטה לימוד הזה אצל בחורים בעו”ה עד שהתורה לבשה צורה אחרת בעו”ה והמבינים מועטים והוא רחום יכפר עון

Regarding the Hazon Ish’s critique of R. Hayyim’s hiddushim, R. Elyakim Schlesinger reports that this was not intended for public consumption, meaning that it never should have been published.[9]

R. Hayyim Dov Ber Gulevsky, the grandson of R. Simcha Zelig Reguer, also claimed that the critique of the Hazon Ish was published against the wishes of the Hazon Ish’s family.[10]

והנה בשלהי קיץ שנת תשל”ה, שמוע שמעתי שיצאו אנשים בלתי הגונים, ולא שמעו לקול הורים ומורים, ולמשפחת הגאון החסיד צדיק יסוד עולם בעל החזון איש. והוציאו במרמה נגד רצונם את ההשגות שהחסיד הנ”ל רשם על ספר חדושי רבינו חיים הלוי. והדפיסו את זה יחד עם הספר חדושי רבינו חיים הלוי

R. Hayyim Kanievsky also reported that his father, the Steipler, was unhappy that the Hazon Ish’s critique had been printed, though not because he feared it would be seen as disrespectful. Rather, his concern was that among the Hazon Ish’s comments were some weak proofs. Readers might mistakenly assume that these weak arguments formed the basis of the Hazon Ish’s position, when in fact they were merely supplementary points that did not affect his fundamental argument.[11]

3. In Renewing the Old, Sanctifying the New, I discuss R. Kook’s view about the substitution of vegetarian sacrifices in place of animals. I also refer to what the Nazir—who unlike R. Kook was a vegetarian—says about this. Unfortunately, I overlooked an important passage from the Nazir that appears in Elchanan Shilo, Yahadut Kiyumit (Tel Aviv, 2017), p. 199. This text, written after the Six Day war, was published by Shilo from manuscript:

כל רוחי מתקומם לזביחת זבחים ולהזאת דמם. הן אנו מנוזרים מבשר בהמות ועופות, אני בערך ששים שנה, ובני ביתנו כל ימי חייהם. וכיצד תהי עבודת הקודש והמקדש בזביחת בעלי חיים והזאת דמם
אמנם זה רוח טהור, כמו רוח הקודש, המתקומם נגד זה. אבל זאת היא חוקת התורה, חוקה חקקתי, גזרת התורה, ואין לנו רשות להרהר אחריה
אמנם כבר קדמו חכמינו ז”ל ואמרו בגלוי, עתידים כל הקורבנות שיתבטלו, חוץ מתודה. וכן בשערי אורה. ואולי מתקרב ובא העתיד לבא. ומשום זה מן השמים המניעות והמכשולים, לעכב שלא תתחדש עבודת המקדש בזבחים, כמו קרבן פסח. אמנם יכולה להתחדש העבודה במקדש, בהקרבת המנחות

The Nazir wonders if the future time when there will be no animal sacrifices is almost upon us. This would explain why we are precluded from rebuilding the Temple at present, so as to prevent us from having to offer animal sacrifices. In other words, the Temple will only be rebuilt after we have forsaken animal sacrifices and have moved into the era when only vegetarian sacrifices will be acceptable to God.

4. In a nice post on the Seforim Blog here, R. Shmuel Lesher dealt with aspects of R. Shimon Schwab’s approach to R. Samson Raphael Hirsch. I would like to add a few points.

Lesher deals with the famous letter from R. Schwab to the East European gedolim asking about the validity of the Hirschian approach. Lesher writes: “There seems to be some discrepancies among those who record the story. Marc B. Shapiro dates the letter to 1933, whereas Jacob J. Schacter says it was 1934. Most surprising is R. Dr. Norman Lamm’s assertion that the question was posed from America.”

The letter was sent in 1933. I know this because R. Joseph Rozin’s reply has been published in Leo Levi’s Sha’arei Talmud Torah, p. 348. It is dated 25 Adar, 5693 which corresponds to March 23, 1933. In fact, a copy of R. Schwab’s original letter, which identifies him as assistant rabbi in Darmstadt— the senior rabbi was R. Yonah Merzbach—survives in the R. Joseph Rozin archives at Yeshiva University. It is dated Erev Shabbat, Parashat Ki Tisa, 5693. This corresponds to March 17, 1933. Based on the replies that R. Schwab received, I believe that the identical letter was sent to all the rabbis R. Schwab turned to in 1933.

Leo Levi at one time mistakenly assumed that R. Schwab wrote the letters when he was a yeshiva student in Lithuania.[12] Lesher correctly writes: “Contrary to what Dr. Levi writes that R. Schwab was still a student in a Lithuanian yeshiva when he posed the question, R. Schwab had already left the Mir Yeshiva by 1931.”

But then, Lesher also writes:

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that Dr. Levi’s record of the story should be the most accurate. In addition to publishing the four responses to R. Schwab, Dr. Levi writes in his Torah Study: A Survey of Classic Sources on Timely Issues (New York: Feldheim, 2002), 363n13, available here, that R. Schwab himself shared R. Yosef Rozen’s response with him personally. It is unlikely that Dr. Levi would not have gotten the context of the letters accurately from R. Schwab. Perhaps one can suggest in Dr. Levi’s defense, that R. Schwab may have posed the question at least twice. Once when he was a yeshiva student in Lithuania and then again in writing later when opening a yeshiva in Bavaria.

Yet this is needless speculation, as there is no question that in the text referred to in note 12 Levi was mistaken about the context of the letters. (As we shall soon see, Levi would get something wrong much more significant than this). In fact, in a later article, Levi correctly writes that R. Schwab sent the letter to the gedolim when he was a young rabbi in Germany, but he was wrong is stating that R. Schwab wrote it when it was rabbi in Ichenhausen.[13] As mentioned, he actually sent it before this, when he was assistant rabbi in Darmstadt.

In Ha-Pardes, December 1939, R. Schwab published what he later said was the letter he sent to the gedolim.[14] Yet this is not correct. The article in Ha-Pardes only includes his halakhic discussion about secular studies, which was the main part of the letter.[15] Missing from Ha-Pardes is the introduction to the letter, which is itself a fascinating historical document that illustrates R. Schwab’s disillusionment with the German Orthodox Torah im Derekh Eretz approach. It is published here for the first time, and in the transcription I have added paragraphs for ease of reading:[16]

מו”צ דק”ק דארמשטאדט והגליל

Rabbin. Ass. S. Schwab

Darmstadt

בעה”י דארמשטאדט עש”ק פ’ כי תשא תרצ”ג לפ”ק
החיים הברכה והשלו’ יחולו על מרום פסגת ראש הר קדש ה”ה עטרת תפארת גאון יעקב מחמד עינינו נשיא ישראל שר התורה קדוש וטהור יאמר להוכקשת”ר רשכבה”ג אדמו”ר מרן הגאון האדיר מו”ר הג”ר יוסף ראזין שליט”א ראב”ד דק”ק דווינסק יע”א

אחרי קידה והשתחוי’ מול הדרת קדשו ופ”ש כנכון!

בזה אגיש נגד פני כקשת”ר שליט”א שאלה חשובה למעשה בבקשה שטוחה שכשת”ר ימחל נא בטובו להשיבני דבר ולהודיעני שמעתתא אליבא דהלכתא בענין דלקמן וכוונתי ללבן ולברר האמת לאמיתו בשאלה זו ואציעה שאלתי ובקשתי בזה רק לידע הלכתא בקושטא ותורה היא וללמוד אני צריך ומעומק מקור חכמת תורתו ידלה נא כשת”ר לי מים חיים ויורני דרך הישר ואורח מישור אלך בה בס”ד

הנה בודאי ידוע להוכקשת”ר שיטת רוב יהודי אשכנז החרידים [!] על דבר ד’ ומקורם הטהור הוא הגרש”ר הירש זצ”ל בענין התחברות חכמת התורה עם חכמות אומות העולם וסברתם היא שכך פירוש המשנה באבות: “יפה תלמוד תורה עם דרך ארץ”, כלומר ללמוד חכמת התורה ביחד עם חכמות חצוניות ויסדו מכאן שיטתם שכל מה שרוח האדם פועל טוב בעולם – ר”ל כל מה שקוראין בלשון אשכנז קולטור ה”ה התרבות האנושית וכל מה שסופריהם וחכמיהם של האומות מפרסמים ומודיעים ומלמדים בעולם – שכל זה נובע ממקור חכמתו של הקבה”ו החונן לאדם דעת ולכן ראוי להגות בכל החכמות ולהתעסק עמן ובכלל להיות “געבילדעט” ככל הגוים אשר סביבותינו ואומרים שגם בדורות הראשונים היתה השיטה הזאת מקובלת בקרב עם ישראל כמו במדינות ספרד שגם שם היו לאנשים היותר חשובים שבכלל ישראל עסק עם כל חלקי החכמה והיתה להם יד בפילוסופיא, ברפואה, בתבונה, ובהנדסה ובשאר המדעות ומציאות זו משמשה לאחבנ”י כאן במדינותינו לראי’ חזקה לתמוך שיטתם. (ובפרט שחושבים הם שע”י התגשמותה של השיטה הזאת תהא להם אפשרות להראות לאפקורסים שיכול אדם להיות בעל תורה ויראה וגם בעל תרבות ומדע. ואין אחת מפרעת חברתה אלא אדרבא יחדיו תהיינה תואמות בשלמות.)

כך שיטתו של הגרש”ר הירש זצ”ל והבאים אחריו המשיכו מזה להתיר לעצמם כל מיני עניני החיצוניות, ועל פי שיטתם הזאת מותר בעיניהם ללמוד כל מיני ספרים חצונים בין ספרי טבע ופילוסופיא בין ספרי אפיקורסים ומינים וכופרים וגם ספרי משוררים שונים ואף ספרי “ראָמאַנעֶן” שבהן נכרכו דברי חכמה ומדע עם דברי חשק וספורי אהבת נשים – ושבר אל שבר יחדיו ידובקו – וגם מותר לגמרי בעיניהם לבקר באוניברסיטאות ששם מתעסקים בקביעות בכל מיני חכמה ומדע ואף הרבה פעמים בתוכן עניני מינות ממש, וגם הבקור בבתי טיאטראות כהיתר גמור נחשב להם שאומרים שבל ישגיחו בדברי עגבים שבהן אך ורק ימצאו ענין בחכמת אומנות – הבימה ובחכמת מעשה הציורים והתוארים שישנם שם – ולא אדבר עוד לא על אדות ענין לימודי החול שילמדו את בניהם עפ”י חוקי הממשלה וגזירת המלכות ואפשר שג”כ יש קצת היתר משום אומנות שכמעט א”א למצא פרוטה מספקה במדינות אלו מבלי איזה ידיעות באותן החכמות וגם בזה לא אדע בעניי עד עתה יסוד חזק של היתר ודאין. אולם לא על זאת עיקר שאלתי שכעת לפ[עמים] אפשר נדונים כמוכרחים עפ”י דינא דמלכותא ללמוד קצת חכמות כלליות בבתי ספר עממיים של כל אתר ואתר אך בראש וראשון אדאג איך למצא היתר לאותם שלומדים בלי הכרח רק מחפץ לבם חכמות אחרות מלבד תלמוד תורה בפרט בבתי הגימנסיות וכדומה

וגם אבקש לידע בבירור פירוש המשנה “יפה ת”ת עם ד”א” אם אפשר בעולם לפרשה על אופן שפרשו תלמידי הג’ רש”ר הירש זצ”ל להתאם תורה וחכמות אחרות יחד, כי כמדומה שהיתה בזמנם אז הוראת שעה אך אין להביא ראי’ מש”ס ופוסקים ליסד הוראת שעה שאין הלכה כמותה בשאר העתים ולפי כל הנ”ל לא היתה מעולם לבי שלמה עם בעלי השטה הנזכרת

R. Schwab lays out the case as follows: Most German Orthodox follow the path of R. Samson Raphael Hirsch regarding joining Torah with worldly wisdom, and they think that this is the meaning of the passage in Avot, “Yafeh Torah im Derekh Eretz”. They believe that culture and literature arise from the wisdom that God grants to humanity, and therefore one should engage in these pursuits in order to become cultured, just like non-Jews. They also maintain that this reflects how Jews lived in medieval Spain, where they were involved in philosophy, medicine, astronomy, and other sciences. Furthermore, they argue that this approach best demonstrates to heretics that one can be a pious and learned Jew while also being cultured and educated. In this way, the different aspects of one’s personality coexist harmoniously rather than creating tension.

R. Schwab states forthrightly that this was the approach of Hirsch, and that those who followed him continued in this path, permitting for themselves all sorts of “external things.” Thus, they studied all kinds of books in science and philosophy, including works written by heretics, as well as poetry and novels in which insights of wisdom and science were interwoven with erotic themes. In their view, it is entirely permissible to attend universities, even though one may encounter heretical ideas. They likewise regard going to the theatre as permissible, advising that any erotic elements simply be ignored.

R. Schwab explains that his question does not concern young people who study secular subjects, since this may be considered obligatory due to government requirements. Moreover, such study may be permitted because it is virtually impossible to earn a livelihood without some secular education. His concern, rather, is with those who engage in secular studies not out of necessity, but out of a desire to immerse themselves in Western culture. He also wants to know if the Mishnah’s expression, “Yafeh Talmud Torah im Derekh Eretz,” can really be understood in accord with the approach of Hirsch’s students, that one should join Torah together with secular studies. He assumes that Hirsch’s approach was a hora’at sha’ah but you cannot apply a hora’at sha’ah to other times. R. Schwab confesses that because of the considerations he lays out, he was never comfortable with the German Orthodox approach to Torah im Derekh Eretz. (In his 1966 work, These and Those, R. Schwab recognized that his earlier understanding, that Torah im Derekh Eretz was intended by Hirsch as a hora’at sha’ah, was a mistake.)

This is the introduction to his letter which is followed by the halakhic section of the letter, and it is this section which was published in Ha-Pardes.

Interestingly, a year after R. Schwab sent his letter to the gedolim of Europe, he sent a shorter but similar letter to R. Kook, together with the halakhic section that had been sent to the other gedolim and would later appear in Ha-Pardes. This letter to R. Kook was first published by Levi.[17] It is striking that R. Schwab, who is identified with the Hirschian separatist ideology, nevertheless included R. Kook among the gedolim he consulted. He also addressed R. Kook with exalted titles:

הגאון הנפלא בצדקתו ובחכמת תורתו מרן הגרא”י הכהן קוק

There is no record of Rav Kook replying to R. Schwab.

One point that Levi does not note is that in the halakhic section sent to R. Kook, R. Schwab added a paragraph that is not found in the original article sent to the gedolim, in which he again expresses his view that Hirsch’s approach was a hora’at sha’ah.

האף למ”ד כי שיטת הגרש”ר הירש זצוק”ל שיש חיוב בלימוד כל חכמות האומות בכדי להתאים התרבות האנושית עם חכמת התורה, בתכלית להיות “געבילדעט” ככל הגוים אשר סביבותנו, כי שיטה זאת שאינה מורה היתר בתנאים המובאים הנ”ל רק מלמד גם חיוב – זו היתה רק ואך הוראת שעה בזמנו ועתו, ויש לחקור אם ההוראה חלה ג”כ בזמננו אנו. עיין געזאמעלטע שריפטען צד 449, 456 חוברת ב’ ועוד מקומות [ועי’ בעל חתם סופר בספרו “תורת משה” פרשת שמות ופרשת בשלח]

Let us now return to Levi, who is cited in Lesher’s post. Although Levi considered himself an advocate of Hirschian Torah im Derekh Eretz, his understanding represents a very restricted version of Hirsch’s ideas. Indeed, his conception of the content of Torah im Derekh Eretz appears to be largely identical to that of R. Schwab. If you examine Levi’s Sha’arei Talmud Torah or his article “Torah im Derekh Erets in Our Time”,[18] the advocacy of secular studies is in order that one is able to make a living—Torah im Parnasah—as through work we join with God in perfecting the world. Levi also regards knowledge of science as an integral part of Derekh Eretz, and he further maintains that art and music, when used in the service of God, are also included within Derekh Eretz.

Yet the humanities, the bedrock of Western Civilization, are completely absent from Levi’s understanding of Torah im Derekh Eretz. Despite the fact that he writes that according to Hirsch, “the Torah affirms all that is true in modern culture,”[19] his presentation of Hirsch’s views completely ignores what modern culture means. He even claims that “it may be argued that it [Hirsch’s Torah im Derekh Eretz educational system] was a hora-at sha’ah, a temporary measure.”[20] Since the notion of Torah im Derekh Eretz as a temporary measure stands in fundamental opposition to Hirsch’s own understanding, Levi’s acknowledgment that this might indeed reflect Hirsch’s view highlights the problematic nature of his approach. I say this even though, after mentioning the point about hora’at sha’ah, Levi adds: “though even if we grant this [that the Torah im Derekh Eretz educational system was a hora’at sha’ah], there may be good reason to maintain that its time has not yet passed.”[21] His footnote to this last sentence is itself enlightening as to how Levi understood Torah im Derekh Eretz.

Today science and technology play an increasingly pervasive role, as we rely more and more on technological devices for our daily needs. Hence all that our sages have said about the importance of scientific knowledge applies today with even greater force.

It would therefore seem that R. Hirsch’s hora-at sha’ah, issued 150 years ago, is no less applicable now. However, any decision on this issue must be made by those rabbinic leaders who are shouldering the responsibility for the community’s spiritual welfare.

Here we see that the Torah im Derekh Eretz educational system is unequivocally regarded as a hora’at sha’ah, unlike in the earlier text, where he presents this as a debatable point.[22] He portrays Torah im Derekh Eretz as focused on science and technology. Finally, Hirsch’s imprimatur is not reason enough for it to be regarded as a valid approach, but contemporary rabbinic leaders must decide on the matter.

In a later article, Levi also notes how Hirsch not only advocated the study of science but also history. He then states:[23]

He encourages the study of nature, of the nature of man (through psychology and anthropology), and of history—but not the study of the humanities, which deal with the meaning of the world, man’s place in the world, aspirations and values, goals and ideas. Even when, on one occasion, dictates of good manners compelled him to eulogize a gentile poet, he praised that poet for having absorbed many lofty Jewish teachings, and for having enriched the gentile world by clothing those teachings in an inspiring form. Nowhere, however, in an address of fourteen pages, did he imply that we, as Jews, should—or need to—absorb ideas from a Gentile.

Levi is referring to Hirsch’s famous speech on Schiller, delivered on the hundredth anniversary of his birth. He is saying that Hirsch felt forced to deliver his speech in order that his school not be seen as departing from what was proper. Elsewhere, he makes the outlandish assertion that Hirsch only “permitted” reading German literature in order to learn the language, but not in order to know the content! [23b]

Contrary to Levi, the issue for Hirsch was not whether Jews need to absorb ideas from non-Jews, but if there is value in non-Jewish wisdom. The notion that Hirsch did not encourage the study of humanities is completely false. He, and his followers, believed strongly that great works of literature can often teach lessons fully compatible with authentic Torah teachings, and these writings are therefore to be included in “Derekh Eretz”. In his Schiller speech he explicitly states that “our forefathers in their wisdom have taught us to look among the ‘wise men of all nations’ for the ‘spirit of wisdom imparted by God to mortals.’”[24] Will anyone be surprised to learn that the study of German literature was included in the curriculum of Hirsch’s school. This was to remain a distinctive feature of Hirschian philosophy. I discuss this at greater length in my article “Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch and Friedrich von Schiller,” available here.

Naomi Schwab Schendowich has recently written that Hirsch’s intention in instituting Torah im Derekh Eretz in his school “was that the pupils should have intensive Torah studies as well as a wide secular education in preparation for earning a livelihood.”[25] Yet listen to what Hirsch himself says, completely rejecting the notion that Torah im Derekh Eretz is exclusively about earning a livelihood.

A good secular education can give our young people substantial new insights, added dimensions that will enrich their religious training. . . . Any supporter of education and culture should deplore the fact that when these secular studies are evaluated in terms of their usefulness to the young, too much stress is often placed on so-called practical utility and necessity. Under such circumstances the young are in danger of losing the pure joy of acquiring knowledge for its own sake, so that they will no longer take pleasure in the moral and spiritual benefits to be obtained from study.[26]

* * * * * * * *

[1] See R. Bezalel Zolty, Mishnat Yaavetz, Orah Hayyim, p. 95.

[2] For a recent academic article that deals with R. Hayyim, see Sergey Dolgopolski, “Constructed and Denied: ‘The Talmud’ from the Brisker Rav to the Mishneh Torah” in  James A. Diamond and Aaron W. Hughes, eds., Encountering the Medieval in Modern Jewish Thought (Leiden, 2012), pp. 177-200. Despite the title referring to the Brisker Rav, the article is about R. Hayyim. This reminded me of something interesting. I know someone who delivered a Daf Yomi shiur to a Hasidic audience. Unsure how they would react if he quoted Joseph B. Soloveitchik by name, he instead referred to him as the Brisker Rav.

[3] Here are two other points of note regarding R. Hayyim’s commentary.

1. At the end of the introduction the sons include a four-line remembrance of their mother.

2. It is reported that when R. Hayyim’s commentary was published in 1936, R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz had a ceremony whereby the book was brought into the beit midrash together with music, just as if it were a new Sefer Torah. Students even danced with the book from R. Baruch Ber’s house until the yeshiva. See R. Dov Eliakh, Be-Sod Siah, p. 212.

[4] “Rambam of Brisk: R. Hayyim Soloveitchik’s Relationship with Mishneh Torah,” Tradition 5 (Summer, 2024), p. 2 n. 2.

[5] Friedman, however, points to one example where R. Hayyim suggests that the text of the Mishneh Torah is in error. See Hiddushei R. Hayyim HaleviEdut 21:9. R. Hayyim supports his suggestion by claiming that his preferred reading appears in an old manuscript. However, this raises the question of where he obtained this information, since the Frankel edition of the Mishneh Torah reports that no manuscripts preserve an alternate reading. See Hiddushei R. Hayyim HaleviEdut 21:9 and Friedman, “Kelalei Ha-Gaon Rabbi Hayyim mi-Brisk be-Veur ha-Rambam,” Alumot 1 (2026), pp. 390-391.

[6] “Ha-Yahas li-She’elat Nusah be-Sifrei Hazal,” in Yoel Catane and Eliyahu Soloveitchik, eds., Beit ha-Va’ad (Jerusalem, 2003), pp. 27-28, n. 28.

[7] “Yesodot ve-Ekronot Parshanut ha-Talmud,” Ha-Otzar 6 (Av 5777), p. 266.

[8] See also R. Raphael Amihai Hadad in the recently published Ha-Mashbir, vol. 12 (2026), p. 126:

ושמעתי בשם הגרב”ש דויטש זצ”ל שאף שהגר”ח בחידושו הידוע על “שומר שמסר לשומר” (הלכות נזקי ממון פ”ד ה”ד), בונה מערכת שלמה ליישב ולהסביר דברי הרמב”ם בעוד שהרמב”ם עצמו בתשובתו לחכמי לוניל (הובא במעשה רוקח שם) תולה את זה בטעות סופר, “דומה, כי גם אילו היה הגר”ח יודע את תשובת הרמב”ם, לה היה חוזר בו”

This volume of Ha-Mashbir, edited by the indefatigable Rabbis Yissachar Dov Hoffman and Ovadya Hoffman, is as usual a fascinating publication. It includes a previously unpublished commentary by R. Ovadiah Yosef on Tehillim. It also includes letters I received from R. Meir Mazuz in the years after the publication of Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan. You can see the letters here.

[9] Ha-Dor ve-ha-Tekufah, p. 48. Truth be told, I am hesitant to quote anything from this book. I say this because the following passage (p. 32), citing R. Isaac Zev Soloveitchik in explaining why R. Kook came to London, is so historically uninformed that it raises questions about the reliability of the entire book. There is no way that R. Isaac Zev could have said what he is quoted as saying.

פעם שאל אותי אם יודע אני איך הגיע רב קוק ללונדון, וסיפר לי כי הוא הורחק מישיבת וואלוז’ין לפי שהי’ קייליקער, ועסק בלימודי השכלה, ואח”כ התחתן וחפש רבנות, כשמוע הגר”ח ז”ל שהוא מחפש רבנות, חרה לו ז”ל מאוד, אמרו לו הלא כבר עשה תשובה, אמר להם וכי ממנים בעל תשובה להיות רב, וכתב הגר”ח לכל העירות שבליטא שלא יקבלוהו לרב, ולכן הוכרח לברוח ללונדון

The statement that we would not appoint a baal teshuvah as rav of a community, which was widely accepted throughout the generations, refers to the classic baal teshuvah, namely, someone who “went off the derekh” and then repented. It does not refer to a “tinok she-nishbah,” i.e., someone born into a non-religious family—either a Converso family or a modern non-Orthodox family—who later in life became religious. The same can be said about a hazzan, concerning which Ta’anit 16b states that he must not have had a bad reputation in his youth. See R. Moshe Sternbuch, Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 1, no. 99; R. Netanel Meoded, Mizrah Shemesh, vol. 4, no. 1. See also R. Sternbuch, Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 2, no. 462, who sees value in having a baal teshuvah as a darshan. R. Avraham Shapiro has a different perspective; see his Rosh Devarkha (Jerusalem, 2010), p. 565:

כאשר ראה הסבא מסלובודקה זצ”ל שכל הישיבה שלו הלכה לשמוע את הרצאתו של החוזר בתשובה – הרב בירנבוים זצ”ל – הוא אמר: אני הייתי רגיל שבעל תשובה יושב בפינה ובוכה, והיום, יושב על במה ונותן הרצאות

I would only make two points about this passage. The first is that Nathan Birnbaum was a classic baal teshuvah in that he abandoned Orthodoxy before later returning, so his situation is not comparable to current baalei teshuvah who grew up irreligious. Second, Birnbaum was not a rabbi, a mistake that can be attributed to the editor of the book, as R. Shapiro would never have referred to him with the rabbinic title. In R. Shapiro’s Siah Ish, attached to his Hag ha-Sukkot (Jerusalem, 2012), p. 96, R. Shapiro’s comment about Birnbaum also appears. Yet here he refers to “Dr. Nathan Birnbaum,” which is what R. Shapiro would have said.

[10] Gulevsky, Lahat ha-Herev ha-Mithapehet, pp. 5-6.

[11] Kanievsky, Orhot Rabbenu (new ed.), vol. 4, p. 169.

[12] See Levi, “Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch – Myth and Fact,” Tradition 31 (Spring 1997), p. 11, called to my attention by Lesher.

[13] Ha-Ma’yan 48 (Nisan 5768), p. 37.

[14] See Jacob J. Schacter, “Torah u-Madda Revisited: The Editor’s Introduction,” Torah u-Madda Journal 1 (1989), p. 15, n. 1.

[15] There are also a few minor differences between the original letter and what appears in Ha-Pardes. The following sentence is only found in Ha-Pardes.

ואם אסור מן הדין בודאי גם כן משום פרנסה אסור ובפרט אם יכול האדם למצא אומנות אחרת נקיה וקלה אף גם שאינו מרויח כך כך

[16] The letter is found in the R. Joseph Rozin Collection, Yeshiva University Archives, MS. no. 1142. I thank Yeshiva University for permission to publish the letter. You can see the original letter here.

[17] Ha-Ma’yan 48 (Nisan 5768), pp. 38-39.

[18] Tradition 28 (Fall 1993), pp. 46-81.

[19] “Torah im Derekh Eretz in Our Time,” p. 68.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] When Levi reprinted R. Schwab’s article on Torah im Derekh Eretz in Ha-Ma’yan 48 (Nisan 5768), pp. 38-39, he is clear that Hirsch did not regard Torah im Derekh Eretz as a hora’at sha’ah. See ibid., p. 37.

[23] “Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch – Myth and Fact,” pp. 7-8.

[23b] Ha-Ma’yan 48 (Nisan 5768), p. 38 n. 12.

[24] Hirsch, Collected Writings, vol. 9, p. 146.

[25] Schendowich, Hermann Schwab: Historian of German Jewry, His Life and Shorter Works (Jerusalem, 2022), p. 79 n. 24.

[26] Hirsch, Collected Writings, vol. 7, p. 88.

 




Rav Shmuel Ashkenazi: a Hidden Genius

Rav Shmuel Ashkenazi: a Hidden Genius
By Eliezer Brodt

This Monday night is the first yahrzeit marking the passing of a unique Talmid Chacham, R’ Shmuel Ashkenazi of Yerushalayim, at the age of ninety-eight. R’ Shmuel was one of the hidden giants of the seforim world, in both ultra-orthodox and academic circles. I had the Zechus to learn much from him and in this article, I wish to describe this fascinating but hardly known Gaon and what we can learn from his life. An earlier abridged version of this article appeared in the Ami Magazine last year. IY”H in the future I will expand this essay.

One day back in 2000, while learning in the Mir as a Bochur, I was having a conversation with a friend, R’ Yaakov Yisrael Stahl, and R’ Shmuel Ashkenazi’s name came up, R’ Yaakov described him as an extraordinary Talmid Chacham. A little while later, during one of my daily seforim store trips I noticed a recent arrival, a very heavy sefer (844 pp.) with a peculiar title, Alfa Beta Kadmita de-Shmuel Zeira. I opened it up and immediately put two and two together, realizing that the author is the same R’ Shmuel Ashkenazi I just heard about. Upon purchasing it, I could not put it down. Learning through it I was immediately able to tell that my friend had not exaggerated in the slightest way. It appeared that this person knew literally everything about anything connected to Torah.

First Meeting

At the time, I had been working on researching and publishing my first article which dealt with tracing everything about the custom of not sleeping on Rosh Hashanah. One of the earliest sources quoted was in the name of a Yerushalmi which appeared to have been lost at some point. I had been searching all over for any information on this topic, and it was then that I noticed that R’ Ashkenazi was planning on writing about this topic in the next volume of his. I am not sure why but at the time I did not make an effort to speak with him about this. I returned to the US for a few years, and while in the US I drafted a letter to him listing all of my issues on this topic but I never got around to sending it. When I returned to Eretz Yisroel in 2004, one of the first of my planned stops was to visit R’ Shmuel Ashkenazi. Almost immediately upon returning a newly made friend, R’ Duvid Vieder, a Toldos Aharon Chossid who was close to R’ Ashkenazi, brought me into him to visit. From then on, I began to visit him regularly, this custom continued until a few weeks before the 2020 coronavirus lockdowns. At times I visited him once a week for an hour or so, other times once a month, other times I would speak to him on the phone.

I must preface my reminiscences by saying that, sadly, I did not heed the advice of the Chasam Sofer who told his children and talmidim that since he won’t be around forever, they should “chap arein” and listen to his stories. Unfortunately, this is not the first person with whom this has happened to me. I took for granted that Rav Ashkenazi would be around forever, (he did die at the age of 98!) and assumed I would always be able to ask him again for a particular story or an idea that he mentioned.

What was the connection?

Basically, each visit I would prepare lists of questions to ask him. I would also bring him new seforim or articles (printed out in big letters, to help him read it easier). Sometimes when I would ask him something, he would say he is old and his head does not work, other times it was amazing what he remembered – on the spot. Sometimes he would pull down a file of material stored in – no jokes here – old cornflakes boxes.

I would then scan some of the material. Other times he offhand did not have anything to add on a particular topic but when looking at a particular sefer I would find a note written on the side or in a paper stored in the sefer that would be related to what I was searching. Other times I would find something else which was of great importance. Rarely did I leave his house empty handed. We both shared a love for seforim and information on a wide range of topics.

Love of Seforim

What drew me to him, and particular developed my relationship with him, was our shared love of seforim. I would update him on new seforim. At times he would ask me to purchase it for him or would borrow my copy for a bit. He told me numerous times how he enjoyed visiting and buying seforim from various shops for many years and that he started collecting when he was seven years old! Now he could not go to stores as he was too old; I got to know him when he was over eighty.

When I joined the editorial board of the journal Yeshurun, I would bring him each new volume as it was printed. Each visit he would ask me to check on the shelf where he kept them, to see if he was up to date and if needed, to update him with any missing volumes. A true lover of seforim, his face would lit up at each new volume. I would then point out some of the articles I thought he would enjoy and he would put in markers to read them.

I always wondered if he read the various volumes of Yeshurun I brought him. After he was niftar, while going through his seforim, I found inserted in one rare book a small paper which he wrote: “for more information about this author see the article in Yeshurun”. Then in a different pen he added another cite from another issue from Yeshrun from a few years later.

This small story also demonstrates a bit of his methodology; he would collect all kinds of information and store them at times in a related sefer and would constantly update these notes.

His love for seforim was something unique, the glow on his face when he opened up a new sefer, especially of someone he was into, was simply priceless. He would look carefully at the Shaar and if it was a reprint of an older sefer he would immediately check if they included the front page of the older edition to compare. He had seforim in every space possible in the four rooms of his apartment, including his porch. Many visitors noticed how even his kitchen was lined with seforim!

Dikdueki Sofrim Haskomot

An interesting story happened with me and his library. While working on an article about the Dikdueki Sofrim I was unable to track down some recorded Haskomot that the author R’ R.N.N. Rabinowitz had received for the first edition of his work. I, along with other scholars, had searched numerous copies of the first edition, but with no luck. Late one night, I came to R’ Ashkenazi’s house and mentioned to him my problem. He said “show me the issue inside,” keeping with his custom to take care to always view the source material firsthand (Osiosi Machkemios – a topic he wrote a lot about). I took down his copy of the sefer, and lo and behold it was a first edition with the missing Haskamot! I published these missing Haskamot in my article on the Didukei Sofrim, and attributed this rare and miraculous find to his extraordinary library.

His History:

Where this unique Talmid Chacham came from is simply a mystery. He was born in Yerushalayim and lived in Batei Ungarn. He learned by Rav Yosef Tzvi Dushinsky of the Edah HaChareidis. Originally, his name was Deutsch but, at some point changed it to Ashkenazi. He had four children with his wife who died over forty years ago. Since then, he lived alone in his apartment near some of his children. His son did an excellent job of Kibud Av bringing him food every day and looking on him a few times a day. Yom Tov and Simchos he spent time with his family.

When I and others asked him, who was his Rebbe, he would just smile and say no one in particular. The truth is the Mishnah in Avos states: Knei Lecha Chaver. Aside from the simple peshat, Rashi explains this Mishnah by citing some who say it means via Seforim others commentators explain this as ‘buying a pen’ (see R’ Ashkenazi’s in-depth article on this for sources). R’ Ashkenazi employed all of these methods; his friends and teachers were his seforim and his pen.

R’ Ashkenazi was a short, quiet and unassuming person. Most, having seen him walking on the street, would never believe he was such an erudite Gaon. Many times, R’ Ashkenazi did not express much emotion except to give a pleasant smile and was friendly and polite in conversation. But there were times he got very excited; for example, when he recalled a good story from his younger years or something unique that he discovered years ago. He was very polite and was a real Yekeh; for example as soon as they bentched Rosh Chodesh Kislev his Menorah was already prepared in the window.

R’ Yechiel Goldhaber, a Talmid Chacham and author of numerous articles and seforim had a close relationship with R’ Ashkenazi for many years. He recalled when he was introduced to R’ Ashkenazi for the first time by his father-in-law, he thought to himself who is this simple looking man? He soon learned that this man was a master of all of Torah and swiftly became a close Talmid of his.

Many times, he would tell me he wishes he could come visit my library. In Later years he would spend his Yomim Tovim at his daughter. One Chol Hamoed Succos, when he was over ninety, he made the difficult trek from her house to mine in order to spend time in my library.

He would love to read everything he could get his hands on. I visited him at many different times of day, even late at night and I always found him learning a sefer – even when he was over ninety. He read everything newspapers, books – he was just curious about everything with an incredible thirst for knowledge.

I recall visiting him a few times when he eighty-five and noticed he was learning the Shelah Hakodosh very carefully. I asked him why (of course he had learned through this sefer numerous times before!) and he responded that someone is reprinting the sefer and asked him to go through the sefer and send comments. He therefore sat down to learn the whole sefer, line by line, after which he wrote a ten-page letter with his comments on the sefer.

Over time, I learned again and again that R’ Ashkenazi personally believed his purpose in this world was to help people with the incredible amounts of information that he had gathered over the years of intense learning. This incredible Middah can be seen in this light; he did not feel that he was the “owner” of this extraordinary wealth of information he had collected, and thus gave very willingly without any conditions. He never asked me to cite him when he gave me some rare source even – although I always told him I would; he just was so happy to help someone else.

He would collect and catalog much of what he read. He had all kinds of systems to file the information he had gathered over eighty plus years of learning. When he would read an important article in a magazine or journal, he would cut out the parts and store them in their appropriate place. He gathered information on thousands and thousands of subjects (not an exaggeration in any form) which had some connection to our rich heritage. What’s more astounding is that R’ Ashkenazi never used a computer or the internet; all of his erudition came about simple by learning through thousands of seforim; a great many of them rare or unknown.

Over the years he helped so many people and for many years after he retired, he would visit the National Library of Israel on Tuesdays, where throngs of people would line up in wait to speak with him about all kinds of subjects.

Many years ago, he received a call from a young chassidish Talmid Chacham living in Monsey who was starting to work on publishing a new edition of the classic historical work Seder Hadorot. He started asking him questions about various issues he had. Over many phone-calls R’ Ashkenazi answered many of his difficulties while training him in proper research and writing skills. This year some volumes finally were published (see here). And this was not a onetime occurrence – he helped so many more people. He used to remark to me that when he was younger so many people would come to visit him – until the late hours of the night.

He was an expert in so many different topics, whether it was the standard ones like Tanach, Chazal, Halacha, Minhag or Chassidus or less commonly studied subjects such as Tefilah, Piyut, Dikduk, Kabbalah, Philosophy, Machshavah, History and Bibliography. In all of these areas his expertise was remarkable.

His Uniqueness

A sample of his bekius; one time I noted that the Maharsha often quotes a “Sefer Yoshon Noshon” and asked if we have any idea which sefer this is? He immediately responded that he found it usually refers to R’ Todros Abulafiah’s Otzar Hakavod.

His incredible Bekius was bolstered by an almost photographic memory, as the following story demonstrates. Once someone used the Bar-Ilan Responsa search engine to locate a passage in the Tana DeBei Eliyahu to no avail. He went to ask R’ Ashkenazi who immediately told him where the passage could be found. Checking the Bar-Ilan text, it was discovered that when the sefer was being entered into their database the passage in question had been mistakenly omitted. I first heard this story from someone else, so to make sure it was accurate I asked him about it and he confirmed it. A similar story happened with him and a passage from the Shut Chasam Sofer.

A few years back a friend was working on publishing out an esoteric Rishon on Mesechet Megillah. He thought no one ever heard of this author and randomly mentioned this to R’ Ashkenazi – without batting an eyelash – replied “of course, and one can find material by this author in the work of Rav Shlomoh Alkabetz on Megillas Esther (Manos Halevi). The fellow was stunned in elation; he had just been gifted new and important material for his project.

This remarkable Bekius which even beat out computer search engines, was just one aspect that made him remarkable. He would receive numerous calls and letters from all over the world from people of all walks of life seeking his assistance in tracking down a statement. He had an incredible knowledge of all of Chazal. I do not just mean the “standards”; Bavli, Yerushalmi and Midrash – even all the numerous and very often almost unknown Midrashim printed over the years. He was also expert in what is known as the lost Midrashim. Over the years many Midrashim we had were lost but some traces of them can be found in various Piyutim, cited by Rishonim or in other obscure places. Through his incredible amounts of learning and his phenomenal memory he was able to recall so much in this field.

To illustrate this with some samples. A few years back someone who was editing for publication a never before printed pirush of a Rishon on Avos came across a few statements in the name of Chazal. This person, a Talmid Chacham in his own right and familiar with tracking down such material, could not locate sources for these statements. Immediately he penned a letter to R’ Ashkenazi. A few days after he received a letter from R’ Ashkenazi with various incredible sources for his questions. This was a very common occurrence.

Piyut, Tefilah and language

Earlier, I mentioned his expertise in Piyut, Tefilah and language. A bit of background is needed to explain this. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, when describing Rabbi Elazar Hakalir’s greatness, (Koren Mesorat Harav Kinot (pp. 386-388) wrote the following:

The piyutim of Rabbi Elazar HaKalir, including his kinot, serve two purposes. The first is limmud, learning. Every sentence of the piyut quotes m’aamarei Chazal… The second purpose is tokhaha, rebuking the people for their misdeeds and instructing them in the proper way to act. These piyyutim deal with… repentance… acknowledgment of God’s justice. The shali’ah Tzibbur was not merely a chazan…, but was one of the great scholars of the generation who was the principal… moral critic of the people… Rabbi Elazar HaKalir was (also) a master of the Hebrew language and very creative in his use of Hebrew. If not for him, modern Hebrew could not have come into existence. Before HaKalir, the Hebrew language was very rigid. For example, the noun and verbs were fixed in their form… But HaKalir made a critical contribution to the development of the Hebrew language by endowing the language with flexibility… Rabbi Elazar haKalir’s piyutim served two purposes: limmud, study… As for the element of study, one of the dimensions of HaKalir’s piyyutim is that they are compilations of the statements of the sages. Most of us, who are expert in neither Hebrew nor aggadot Hazal, find HaKalir’s corpus of piyutim boring. But it is not boring at all; it is like a gold mine. His piyutim for Yom Tov explain the essence of the Yom Tov. The midrashim concerning Sukkot are replete with information about the sukka, etrog and lulav, and all the explanations in the Midrash, all the ta’amei sukka, the reasons for the sukka, all of the ma’amarei Hazal, are together in the HaKalir’s piyutim for the first day of Sukkot… If one were to study carefully and thoroughly the piyutim of Rabbi Elazar HaKalir for Rosh HaSahana, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, and Pesah, one would find many applicable halakhot and the entire pertinent Midrash, including many midrashim that are unknown to us from any other source.

Rav Ashkenazi was an expert on everything related to Tefilah and Piyut. He somehow read it all and retained it. But in addition, he was able to use his expertise in Chazal and Hebrew language to understand it on a much higher level and as a result was often contacted by the world experts on Tefilah and Piyut for his assistance. These requests came from experts such as Professor Shalom Speigel, Chaim Schirmann, Avraham Haberman, Ezra Fleischer and Daniel Goldschmidt who constantly sought his assistance while working on their Tefilah and Piyut related projects.

In an interview with Ami Magazine printed a few years back, Professor Shulamit Elitzur mentioned:

“there’s another amazing thing I find when doing research. I am constantly coming across midrashim that were lost to the ages… example, everyone knows that Haman was referred to as ‘the Agagi’ because Shaul allowed Agag to live one extra night, which allowed Haman’s ancestor to be born. However, the earliest makor we find in writing in the 16th century; this fact was discovered by Rav Shmuel Ashkenazi of Yerushalayim. But I found a ktav yad of a piyut about Purim that describes this very story and explains how Haman’s ancestor was born, which gives us a source from 1,000 years earlier! And there are many similar examples of lost midrashim being kept alive through unknown piyutim.”

R’ Ashkenazi wrote some articles on Piyut and Tefilah, but we have found much more among his papers and hopefully if I can raise enough funding all his fascinating material on Tefilah will come to light.

When the important Siddur Ezer Eliyahu (sponsored by his late friend Yeshaya Vinograd) was first printed, one can see R’ Ashkenazi’s name in the introduction, thanking him for his assistance (he assisted them for some of the later additions) and his great knowledge in this field.

I mentioned that he had an incredible knowledge of Dikduk and the Hebrew language and used it towards better understanding Piyut and Tefilah. He also authored articles on these subjects and in 1967, when reviewing an important dictionary, wrote a long article demonstrating this very point – and article that garnered much praise. He was very proud of this essay and mentioned it to me many times. A few years ago, I reprinted it with additions he had made in his own copy and a nine-page topical index.

One of the ways he developed this expertise was via learning Tanach so many times. He was an expert in Tanach and all the Rishonic commentaries (including the unknown ones); he even authored a small book of Riddles of Tanach.

He also used his extraordinary skills to become a master editor. However, in addition to the work he was born with an incredible innate sensitivity for text and language which made him one of the best editors out there. For many years he worked at the famous publishing house Mossad HaRav Kook, editing various works. He told me more than once how there was an expert there who would brag (jokingly) that after he read through an article it was impossible to find mistakes. The only person who could still find mistakes was R’ Ashkenazi. He had razor-sharp vision and could immediately spot a mistake.

Many times, I would bring an edited piece of mine to read. As soon as I put it down in front of him, he would take out a red pen and start marking it up and say to me “are you sure it’s been edited?”. He told me he had to mark up everything before he could read it properly, errata were so painful for him to see that it was hard for him to read something on Shabbos! He told me he was punished; when his work Alfa Beta Kadmita de-Shmuel Zeira came out, although he had edited it numerous times, he still found mistakes.

During his learning over the years, he found many people, great Gedolim as well as famous academics, had made mistakes, sometimes quite basic ones. At one point he printed two articles about this. However, he prefaced his articles that his intent was not to mock those who erred but to vividly illustrate that people are human and mistakes will happen. He was a master of humility and never held it over anyone that they did not know what he knew.

He was not only a great expert in all aspects of the Hebrew language but was an expert in Aramaic and Yiddish, both of which he displayed in various publications of his. Related to his expertise in Aramaic, which is very important for learning Gemara, is a very unique essay which he authored related to the Rambam as a translator of the Gemara. One of the world experts in old Yiddish is Professor Chava Turniansky, who has noted on many occasions that one of the people who have always helped her from her days as a student, was R’ Ashkenazi.

Related to this was another talent of his, which at first appears trivial; he was an expert on acronyms. This led to authoring a thesaurus of acronyms together with Dov Yardan, called Otzar Roshei Tevot, with a multitude of obscure and often almost impossible entries. His sensitivity to the text and work in the field of editing drew him to this field. Anyone who learns a lot, especially older material comes across abbreviations, and many times they cause great difficulty in understanding various passages. Abbreviations were employed in writing, sometimes as mnemonic devices and other times simply to save on printing costs. But over time many meanings were forgotten. This work is an extremely useful tool for solving this issue.

Ghostwriting

One day I was in a used bookstore and I noticed a small sefer titled Harif Umishnaso about the Rif. I recalled that this title appeared in the list in beginning of his work, Alfa Beta Kadmita de-Shmuel Zeira which listed out the various works he helped with over the years. I asked R. Ashkenazi if it’s worth buying and what his connection to the book was, as a different name appears on the cover.

R’ Ashkenazi replied “I can tell you it’s an important sefer and worthwhile to buy.” I noticed he was hesitant to continue the conversation. He then said “I will tell you something I did not tell anyone in over forty years – I wrote the whole sefer from beginning to end and it was one of the most important works I ever wrote.” The original plan was to for him to write a series of biographies on various Rishonim – in this book he already references a work on the Ri Migash – but due to a lack of funding this series was discontinued. However, not all of this remained unpenned; he wrote numerous entries in various encyclopedias. It turns out that R’ Ashkenazi had over fifteen different pen names!

I would like to elaborate on this work a bit more and thus cast further light upon R’ Ashkenazi’s uniqueness and greatness. The Rif’s Halachic work is one of the most important sources in Halacha, but what exactly makes it so unique has remained a mystery. R’ Ashkenazi sought to answer this question by collecting and collating all the authentic information we have about the Rif, from the Rif and from other Rishonim. He went through the Rif carefully examining what he did to each Gemara evaluating if remarks or material was added or not and to figure out why, allowing the reader to begin to understand the Rif’s significance. R’ Ashkenazi’s writing methods were honed to precision. He had an uncanny ability to utilize every piece of information without writing an extra letter and assemble it all in perfect order sans speculations commonly found in historical works. At times one does not need grand theories to understand something; just seeing all the known material in proper order helps one understand things. The wealth of material that Rav Ashkenazi commanded in producing this work is outstanding; this book was written in 1967 – long before any of the various search engines used today.

Haggadah Sheleimah

Similar to this is another work by R’ Ashkenazi, Haggadah Sheleimah. I hope to publish an article about this work in the near future, including the numerous additions R’ Ashkenazi found over the years and kept in his files. This work is highly unique for the following reasons. The collected bibliographies by Avraham Ya’ari and Yitzchak Yudlov bear witness to thousands of Haggados written throughout the generations in a multitude of styles, such as Pilpul, Peshat, Kabbalah, Derush and more. However, until 1955 there was no one work on the Haggadah which collected all the sources for each and every Halacha and minhag related to the Seder night. There was no volume which dealt with the various manuscripts of Geonim and Rishonim and at the same time to deal with the exact text of the Haggadah. Haggadah Sheleimah set out to fill those needs, and at the same time offer a running collection of Pirushim culled from over fifty different commentators focusing just on Peshat. In order to produce such an exacting work, it’s not good enough to just be a talented writer, one must also possess a keen understanding of all the material and relay this with incredible clarity. R’ Ashkenazi was such a person; one who sought out the simple Peshat, able to put this myriad of information together in so beautiful a fashion, and with tremendous clarity. His work in Haggadah Sheleimah is so clearly organized and always straight to the point that it is no wonder that to this day Haggadah Sheleimah remains a classic in both the Torah and Academic worlds.

Rav Ashkenazi once explained to me that one has to write precisely and to the point, not lengthily. He said he believed that one of the reasons Rashi’s works survived was due to his concise way it was written, as opposed to various works of Geonim which did not really survive as they were written in a much lengthier format.

Why didn’t he publish his material?

A few years ago, a partial bibliography of his writings was printed in his Alfa Beta Kadmita de-Shmuel Zeira. The listing is close to three hundred articles and seforim that he wrote or assisted in on some level. He started writing under various pen names over eighty years ago. The background to the publication of this volume was, as I mentioned previously, R’ Ashkenazi had been writing and collection information on thousands of topics for over eighty years. Unfortunately, he did not print much of what he gathered. The main reason for this was R. Ashkenazi’s “weakness”; he demanded incredible levels of perfection from himself. Although he strived for great perfection, nonetheless he stressed to me numerous times that he was mistaken in that approach and that I should not follow in his path. In his words it is better I print my work to the best of my current abilities and that worse comes to worse you can always reprint with additions and corrections. Over twenty years ago, R’ Teflinsky somehow convinced R’ Ashkenazi that his material needed to be printed. Together they began compiling some of his material for print, resulting in a volume over eight hundred pages!

After that experience both R’ Ashkenazi and R’ Teflinsky stopped, with no plans of continuing this project. A few years later my good friend, R’ Yaakov Yisrael Stahl and myself were able to convince him to continue. R’ Stahl took upon himself the daunting task to prepare the material for publishing; since, than three more volumes were printed.

Here is a small video clip of R’ Ashkenazi, when we brought him copies of the second and third volumes of his writings, ten years ago.

The topics that these works deal with cover, on some level, virtually everything; sources for expressions and idioms, for minhag, Halacha, the evolution of famous stories, bibliography, corrections of authors’ errors, encyclopedic style information on thousands of topics culled from thousands of seforim – many of them very rare or unknown. (A PDF of the Table of contents of this work is available upon request).

His Letters

Earlier I mentioned the story of someone who wrote him a letter seeking help. This was not a one-time occurrence. He authored well over a thousand such letters in response to such questions. Some requests were for sources to various Halachos or Minhagim, numerous others are various queries related to out rich literature. R’ Ashkenazi always invested his time to answer properly and clearly. Recently, R’ Stahl and I collected these letters for publication and the result is a three-volume set, available for purchase.

Over seventy years ago he purchased a typewriter which he used until his passing.

In an article written by the late Gaon R’ S. Deblitsky, he writes out various proper actions a Rav should “observe.” One of them is to respond to people who write to him, whether the issues are big or small. R’ Ashkenazi was very careful to try to respond promptly. Many people would send him their seforim after they were printed asking him for his comments. He would usually respond with a multi-page letter, beginning by thanking the author for sending it to him, then listing out some criticisms, usually written delicately, while adding all kinds of comments. He always tried to look to say something positive. Some people who heard of him through various channels over the years contacted him before they printed their works. Many times, he would write a collection of comments and corrections to such works. A sample listing of some of those works that benefited from him before going to print include recent editions of: Sefer Zechirah, Kav Hayasher, Sefer Hachayim and many others.

Thanks to the efforts of my special friend Menachem Butler, various academics wrote some praises about the significances of these letters; to partially quote one letter written by the esteemed Professor Shnayer Z. Leiman:

Reb Shmuel was

“bibliographer, bibliophile, and book collector, and his encyclopedic knowledge of all of Hebrew and Yiddish literature remains unparalleled in our time.” His collected writings are an intellectual treasure trove, “covering a wide range of topics in the field of Jewish Studies. Aside from his scholarly distinction, R. Shmuel Ashkenazi wrote in an elegant Hebrew with its own special charm. Not only did he advance discussion, but he did so in an aesthetically pleasing manner. Let it be said openly: this… set will enlighten every reader and will significantly advance scholarship. Anyone concerned with advancing the cause of quality Jewish scholarship will take special delight in the publication of these volumes…During his lifetime [Ashkenazi] corresponded with the greatest Jewish scholars and bibliographers the world over. They wrote to him, for only he could solve the countless historical and literary problems that stumped them…”

Another person to whom Menachem Butler reached out to via his numerous contacts was former editor of Mekizei Nirdamim’s journal Kabez Al Yad, Professor Shulamit Elizur of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In her aforementioned interview in Ami Magazine several years ago she said this:

“I am unequal to the task of adequately singing the praises of Rabbi Shmuel Ashkenazi, an erudite bibliophile. His familiarity with rabbinic writings from throughout Jewish history is unparalleled, and he is well-versed in the research literature of academic Jewish studies as well. I first met Rabbi Shmuel Ashkenazi through my teacher, the late Professor Ezra Fleischer. Prof. Fleischer, who was one of the greatest scholars of all time, would often chat with Rabbi Ashkenazi on scholarly topics, and he was careful to send Ashkenazi every article or book he published, knowing that in return he would receive enlightening comments on his work. When I began my own research, Prof. Fleischer instructed me in turn to send my publications to Rabbi Ashkenazi, and I too was privileged to learn a great deal from his comments. It once happened that I was searching for a particular midrashic theme which was alluded to in a liturgical poem (piyut), and although I consulted the leading scholars of Jerusalem who responded that it was a well-known homily, I was unable to locate its specific source. In my hour of need, I turned to Rabbi Ashkenazi, who immediately gave me several references. It emerged that every one of these references post-dated the piyut by almost a thousand years, and that this ancient tradition alluded to in the poem had been transmitted orally for that long period before being committed to writing in the later midrashim. Rabbi Shmuel Ashkenazi’s correspondence is a tremendous resource of Torah and scholarship. Every paragraph encapsulates a great deal in just a few words, and sometimes even with allusions whose explication require deep learning.”

Here is a short letter from Professor Gershom Scholem to R’ Ashkenazi:

Expressions and famous stories

In his writings some of the topics of these are about tracing expressions or the evolution of famous stories. Based on his knowledge, he was able to contribute a lot to these areas even editing some works on these topics.

One such story related to a supposed legend of a portrait of Moshe Rabbeinu which caused a great controversy over a century ago. In 1830, Rav Yisroel Lipschutz started printing his magnum opus, a commentary on the Mishnah titled Tiferes Yisroel. In the section on Maseches Kiddushin first printed in 1843, he brings a story about a king who lived in the time of Moshe, who, after hearing incredible things about this great leader, hired a painter to paint a picture of him so he could have his features analyzed by experts. The people who analyzed the picture reported that the person pictured was evil. The king went in person to visit Moshe Rabbeinu in the midbar and asked him how was it that an analysis of his pictures showed him to be of such wicked character. Moshe told him that the analysis was indeed true; however, after much work, he changed his character and became the great Moshe Rabbeinu.

In 1894 a booklet by the Vilkomir Maggid was printed railing against this story. This booklet presented numerous sources stating that Moshe Rabbeinu was born a kadosh and it was unthinkable to print such a story about him. Indeed, this story was censored out of the 1956 edition of the Tiferes Yisroel. In truth, this ancient legend can be found in various sources and in regard to different luminaries, some claiming it about Aristotle others, Socrates. In fact, R’ Ashkenazi documented it was long used in various Musar and Chasidus sefarim cited as an important lesson that one can change one’s born nature for the good, but not that it actually was true about Moshe Rabbeinu.

Another such story relates to a famous legend about the site where the Beis Hamikdash was built. Told in short, two brothers inherited a field, one brother had a family one did not. At the end of the harvest they divided up the wheat equally. That night the childless brother felt bad for his brother with a large family and said to himself “it’s unfair that while my brother needs more than I, we shared equally”, so he brought over from his pile to his brothers. The other brother thought that since his brother was childless, he should have a larger share of the crop, as consolation, so he added from his share to his brother’s. In the morning each brother realized their piles remained the same and this went on for two more nights. On the third night they met, realized each of their intentions was out of deep consideration for the other and hugged. Numerous people have searched for the early sources for this story. I decided to ask R’ Ashkenazi if he had any material on the subject. He found his file on the story and within was a letter from R’ Yudlov who had been asked by someone in the Education Ministry for the sources on this story. R’ Ashkenazi traced its first appearance in print to 1832 and from there he traced it to other sources.

Bibliography

I would like to conclude with just one more area in which R’ Ashkenazi was truly a legendary master: Bibliography. For many years, R’ Ashkenazi worked in the (now) National Library’s Bibliography of the Jewish Book Project. He also contributed to some of the important bibliographical works and journals written in the past century such as Kiryat Sefer, Otzar Sefer Haivri (Vinegrad) and Sifrei Yerushalyim Harishonim.

A few years back, while working on an article about the origins of eating Hamantaschen (see here), I found an important article from Dov Sadan containing sources on this topic. One of the sources was the interesting, controversial work Machberet Emanuel. I had a nice conversation with R’ Ashkenazi about this work – he had helped Dov Yardan prepare a critical edition of the work and even wrote a long book review on it (which he said he received a lot of Kovod for).

He mentioned two points of interest which will serve as a sample to some of his expertise. One, he noted that Emanuel of Rome wrote a commentary on sefer Mishlei. Interestingly, the preface to the Mishlei commentary sefer is signed Emanuel son of Yaakov, whereas Emanuel’s father’s name was Shlomo. Some have noted that this discrepancy and explained it is a mistake. R’ Ashkenazi suggested this was not a mistake, rather an intentional typo intended by the author to hide his connection to his controversial Machberes Emanuel. The second point he made to me was how the Chida writes in Shem Hagedolim that the best commentary to learn on Mishlei that by Emanuel of Rome. R’ Ashkenazi said he checked into the words of the Chida and he learned through all the works on Mishlei and concluded that the Chida was quite correct. He once had a dream to write a whole work on Mishlei, he even started to pen his comments in a special notebook, but the plans never worked out.

One final last story about R’ Ashkenazi’s bibliographic acumen. In 2009 my special friend Dr. S. Sprecher z”l (about him see this article on the seforim blog here) wished to reprint and distribute a small work called Tshuvah Be’Inyan Kriat HaKetubah, in honor of his son’s upcoming wedding, under that assumption that, just as the title page and the publisher’s introduction indicated, it represented an actual Halakhic Responsum issued in 1835 by the Chief Rabbi of Bialystok, one Rabbi Nechemiah. Sprecher wrote:

However, our close reading of this Tshuvah led us in an entirely different direction. To us, the work’s style manifested clear Maskilic echoes, and its arguments rejecting the binding nature of centuries-old Minhagim were clearly not in accord with 19th–century Halakhic thought. Our reaction was that the work must certainly be pseudepigraphal and could not have arisen from the pen of the Chief Rabbi of Bialystok. In fact, a quick perusal of the reference literature demonstrated that there never was any Chief Rabbi of Bialystok named Nechemiah.

At an impasse, we reached out to Professor Shnayer Z. Leiman, who suggested that the scholar most likely to solve the mystery would be the doyen of Israeli bibliographers, Rabbi Shmuel Ashkenazi. We were rewarded thanks to the tireless efforts of Eliezer Brodt who, on our behalf, pestered the aged Jerusalem sage until he successfully unmasked the name, but not quite the identity, of the author. Rabbi Ashkenazi concluded that the first line of the introductory poem that prefaced the Halakhic query contained the acrostic – “Meir Ish-Shalom”. (His initial contention was that this could not be the noted 19th–century Viennese scholar, Meir Ish-Shalom, because his heretofore known literary output began only some five years later, with his publication of the Sifre in 1864.)

Once Rabbi Ashkenazi had provided the key to the author’s name via the acrostic, it became apparent that all along the title page had been proclaiming that very same message. Let us recall the passage in Bavli Eruvin 13b where it is recorded that the celebrated Tanna, known to us as Rabbi Meir, was actually named Nehorai, according to one opinion; or alternatively, that both Meir and Nehorai were laudatory appellations reflecting his enlightening wisdom, whereas his actual name was Nechemiah. Recall also that the query first originated with Rabbi “Shalom” of Novgorod, and the word “shalom” appears twice more on the title page and is highlighted by the placement of a circle above one of its appearances.

In his copy of this work that Dr Sprecher printed for the Chasunah which I brought him, I found this paper inside:

A few weeks after R’ Ashkenazi’s Petirah the national library held a session devoted to him where Professor Zev Gries, Professor Chava Turniansky and R’ Yechiel Goldhaber spoke about him (here is a link to the whole session). I too had the privilege of being interviewed about him that night (Here is a link to my interview).

Publication of his writings

Last year, immediately after Rabbi Shmuel Ashkenazi was niftar I, along with my special friend Menachem Butler, initiated a campaign to raise funds to publish R. Ashkenazi’s letters via the Seforim blog. Baruch HaShem, and thanks to the help of some readers, enough money was raised to go to print and in the beginning of this past January copies of the book, coming in at over 1,700 pages, (three volumes!) arrived as announced (here). The Letters sold out in a few days. A second edition was printed right before Pesach (see here). Currently copies of the second edition are available for sale.

Future volumes

Already during the Shivah, R’ Stahl began going through the materials of R’ Ashkenazi to sort out what materials are print worthy.

Here is a picture of R’ Stahl taken during one such session which a friend of his humorously put side by side a famous picture of Solomon Schecter when working on Geniza documents.

We never imagined we would find so much print-worthy material that we were not previously aware of; at least eight volumes’ worth of prepared writings which we hope to print. Currently, we are in the process of categorizing the material. Among the topics are: Tefilah, Minhag, articles on Seforim and authors – and much, much more. As we sort and scan R’ Ashkenazi’s legacy, some material is already being sent out to be typed up for publication. Each of the above endeavors comes at a price, and every contribution to the cause helps greatly. IY”H in the near future I will make a more formal announcement with precise details regarding the works slated for print. Anyone wishing to help with funding this project can contact me at Eliezerbrodt@gmail.com



R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin and Yeshiva Students being Drafted to the Army, views of women, and more

Shlomo Yosef Zevin and Yeshiva Students being Drafted to the Army, Views of Women, and More

Marc B. Shapiro

1. In an earlier post I wrote about R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin and the famous essay about how yeshiva students need to serve in the army, an essay which is widely attributed to him. See here. In the post I cited important information uncovered by David Eisen that complicates the issue (as we see the Zevin family itself is of two minds on the matter), and we were left with no absolute proof that R. Zevin wrote the essay. I encourage all readers interested in the topic to read the six emails from Eisen quoted in my post, as they became the primary source material for all who wish to explore this matter.

One of the points that Eisen’s sources disagree about is when the essay was attributed to R. Zevin. R. Nachum Zevin, R. Zevin’s grandson, claims that it was only attributed to him after R. Zevin’s passing in 1978, but R. Menachem Hacohen states that already in the early 1970s he had seen the essay and it was believed that R. Zevin wrote it. As Eisen reports, one of the chief librarians at the National Library told him that he believes that already in the 1960s the essay was attributed to R. Zevin.

I am now able to put the matter to rest and establish beyond any doubt that R. Zevin is indeed the author of the essay. One of R. Zevin’s close friends was the author R. Zvi Harkavy, who served as an army chaplain. Harkavy regarded R. Zevin as his teacher, referring to him as מו”ר. In 1959 it was announced that Harkavy would publish a bibliography of all of R. Zevin’s writings, which were estimated to be over 1000 items, including material written under a pseudonym.[1] As far as I can tell, this never appeared. In Harkavy’s Ma’amrei Tzvi, p. 26, he includes a 1969 letter he received from R. Zevin is which Harkavy is addressed as ידידי הדגול. I mention all this only to show that when Harkavy speaks about R. Zevin you rely on what he says.

It has often been said that the identification of R. Zevin with the essay on yeshiva students and the army was only made years after its 1948 appearance, and this casts doubt on it having been being written by R. Zevin. I can now say that this is incorrect. In 1951 (Iyar 5711) Harkavy published an article in the Jerusalem Torah periodical Ha-Hed, which was a journal that R. Zevin himself often published in. (Unfortunately, very few issues from this periodical can be found on Otzar haChochma.) In Harkavy’s article he identifies R. Zevin as the author of the essay. Not only was Harkavy, because of his close friendship with R. Zevin, in a position to know that he wrote it, but R. Zevin never denied authorship in subsequent issues of Ha-Hed.

This shows without any doubt that R. Zevin is the author of the essay, and from this point on no one—including members of the family—should deny his authorship. Here is Harkavy’s article.

R. Nochum Shmaryohu Zajac called my attention to the recently published memorial volume for R. Yehoshua Mondshine,Sefer, Sofer, ve-Sipur. On p. 327 R. Mondshine wonders why R. Zevin—whom he seems to believe was indeed the author of the essay—would have felt it necessary to keep his authorship secret. R. David Zvi Hillman suggests that R. Zevin felt that if it was known that he wrote it, he would not have been welcome at the Brisker Rav’s home. He adds that it could have also created problems with the Habad synagogue he attended, as well as with his good friend R. Yehezkel Abramsky.

In going through the various issues of Ha-Hed, I discovered a picture of great interest in the Shevat 5711 issue.

On the right is Leah Seliger. She was a learned woman who edited the collected writings of her late husband, R. Joseph Seliger, 

Kitvei Ha-Rav Dr. Yosef Seliger (Jerusalem, 1930). The woman in the middle is R. Kook’s wife, Raize Rivka. Until recently I knew of only one other published picture of her, and this appears at the beginning of Pinchas Grayevski, Benot Tziyon vi-Yerushalayim, vol. 7 (Jerusalem, 1929; I think Dr. Yehudah Mirsky called my attention to this picture). The woman on the left is Miriam Berlin, the widow of R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin. I do not know of any other published pictures of her.

Shimon Steinmetz called my attention to this additional picture of R. Kook’s wife that can be found here.

2. In my post here I discussed these words from Exodus 15:16:

בִּגְדֹל זְרוֹעֲךָ יִדְּמוּ כָּאָבֶן

However, I neglected to mention one additional point. How come there is a dagesh in the כ when according to the grammatical rules it should not be there? R. Aaron of Lunel in his Orhot Hayyim offers an explanation. He states that if there was a dagesh people would read the last two words as יִדְּמוּךׇ אָבֶן, “stones are similar to you,” which is not a respectful thing to say to God.[2]

3. In my last post here I discussed the Hazon Ish’s opinion on the dispute between Maimonides and Rabad about an unwitting heretic, and the Hazon Ish’s assumption that Maimonides actually agreed with Rabad in this matter. It must be clarified that the Hazon Ish is not certain about his suggestion that there was no disagreement between Maimonides and Rabad when it came to someone who was completely “innocent” in his heresy. The Hazon Ish4. A couple of years ago in my post here I mentioned that in part two of the post I would have an excursus on the nature of women. For some reason I forgot to include this excursus in all the subsequent posts, so here it is.[4]

On the matter of the creation of women, and whether they are created “better” or “worse” than men, Shaul Regev calls attention to a strange comment by R. Jacob Matalon, Toldot Yaakov (Salonika, 1597), p. 7d (printed together with his She’erit Yaakov).[5] There are many comments in rabbinic texts that have a negative view of women, and most of these comments are based on a belief that women are inherently inferior to men. Yet not many texts are as explicit as R. Matalon in regarding women as almost a different species, standing between apes and men.

ובין החי למדבר הקוף ובין הקוף םמדבר [צ”ל למדבר] ומשכיל הם הנשים והאנדרוגינוס

Women obviously speak, so מדבר must mean speak with intelligence.

A passage similar to what R. Matalon says, but without mention of an ape, is found in Gersonides’ comment to Genesis ch. 3 (p. 110 in the Ma’aliyot edition).

והנה קראה האדם שם אשתו ‘חוה’, כאשר השיג בחולשת שכלה, רוצה לומר שלא עלתה מדרגתה על שאר הבעלי חיים עילוי רב, ואם היא בעלת שכל, כי רוב השתמשותה אמנם הוכן לה בדברים הגופיים, לחולשת שכלה ולהיותה לעבודת האדם. ולזה הוא רחוק שיגיע לה שלמות השכל, אלא שעל כל פנים היא יותר נכבדת מהם, וכולם הם לעבודתה

Gersonides is known for his negative view of women, and this reputation comes from passages like this. Here Gersonides states that women are on a higher level than animals, but not by much. Furthermore, just like the animals are at the service of women, so women’s role is to serve men. In discussing this passage, Menachem Kellner writes: “Gersonides apparently found Darwin’s missing link: woman!”[6]

For another explanation which Modern Orthodox women will probably regard as insulting, but more traditional women will probably see as a compliment, see R. Meir Mazuz, Bayit Ne’eman, no. 52 (parashat Terumah 5777), p. 1, who quotes R. Nissim Gaon as follows: The verse in Proverbs 1:8 states: אל תטוש תורת אמך – “Forsake not the teaching of thy mother”. Yet since women don’t have Torah knowledge, תורת אמך cannot mean this. Rather, it means the special holiday foods that the mother makes.

Readers can correct me if I’m wrong, but I do not believe that R. Mazuz’s understanding is correct, and I think R. Mazuz was citing R. Nissim from memory. That is, R. Nissim’s comment has nothing to do with women lacking Torah knowledge and identifying their cooking as תורת אמך. Rather, he cites the verse simply as a general statement about the importance of tradition. Here is the passage of R. Nissim Gaon as cited by R. Maimon the father of Maimonides.[7]

וכתב רבינו נסים במגילת סתרים כי כל מנהגי האומה באלו המנהגות כמו זה. והראש בראש השנה, החלב בפורים ובמוצאי פסח, והפולים ביום הושענא רבה. ואותם המנהגות אין לנו לבזותם ומי שהנהיגם זריז ומשתדל הוא כי הם מעיקרים נעשים ולא יבוזו במנהגי האומה וכבר אמר הנביא ע”ה ואל תטוש תורת אמך, דת אומתך אל תעזוב

Regarding the role and responsibilities of women, R. Mazuz has another interesting comment.[8] As part of his argument that women are not obligated in hearing parashat Zakhor, he says that this commandment is connected to the commandment of destroying Amalek, and women are not able to do this. How do we know that women cannot destroy Amalek and therefore are not commanded in it? “Because if she sees blood and even if she sees a mouse she becomes afraid, so how could she kill Amalek?” While many will not appreciate what they see as R. Mazuz’s flippant tone (which is obviously a joke, as he is well aware that there are women soldiers and doctors), do even feminists wish to claim that killing comes as easy to women as to men? Do they really want to be “equal” with men in this matter? I, for one, have always assumed that if women were running the world, there would be many fewer wars, as only someone who is blind to reality cannot see that men are naturally more inclined to violence than women.

Here is another interesting point relevant to the subject of women: Rashi, Menahot 43b s.v. היינו, in explaining the talmudic passage dealing with the blessings that a man recites in the morning, states that a woman is to regarded as a maidservant to her husband (i.e., to do his wishes), much like a slave is to his master: דאשה נמי שפחה לבעלה כעבד לרבו

Rashi’s comment is not surprising and has often been quoted. Indeed, although it will trouble modern readers, lots of similar comments can be found in rishonim and aharonim.[9] Furthermore, in at least three places the Talmud refers to a wife with the term shifhah.[10] Yet for a reason I can’t explain, R. Moshe Feinstein was very troubled by this comment of Rashi, and this led him to write something quite problematic.[11] See Dibrot Moshe, Gittin p. 511 (also in Iggerot Moshe, vol. 9, Orah Hayyim no. 2):

ולולי דמסתפינא הייתי אומר שצריך למחקו דח”ו לרש”י לומר דברי הבל כזה, דמן התורה הא ליכא שום שעבוד על האשה לבעלה חוץ מתשמיש ולענין תשמיש הוא משועבד לה יותר דהא עליו איכא גם איסור לאו . . . ואינה מחוייבת לעשות רק עניני הבית ולא עבודת שדה ומעט עשיה בצמר שהיא מלאכה קלה ממלאכות שדרכן של בנות העיר בזה

R. Moshe states that in no way can a woman be generally regarded as under her husband’s authority as only in a few areas does she have obligations to him (much like he has to her). He continues to expound on the way a husband is obligated to treat his wife in order to show that she is far removed from being a maidservant.[12] This is all true, and it would be easy to quote authorities who write similarly. Yet they did not see this as in any way contradicting Rashi’s statement. Understandably, some have expressed great surprise upon seeing how R. Moshe refers Rashi’s comment as הבל (as they do not accept R. Moshe’s point that Rashi could never have said דאשה נמי שפחה לבעלה כעבד לרבו).

R. Shlomo Aharon Gans goes so far as to say that if thegadol ha-dorhad not been the one to say this, it would be forbidden to write such a thing. He adds the following, bringing support for the notion expressed in Rashi that a wife is like a maidservant (not that she is a maidservant, but she is like one)[13]:

ולא הבנתי דהא הויא קנין כספו, ועי’ תורא”ש קידושין ה’ דהוא מושל עליה ומשעובדת לו וכדכתיב והוא ימשל בך, וא”כ מאי קשיא ליה כ”כ בדברי רש”י אלו

This conception, that a wife is like a maidservant, was actually criticized by R. Hayyim Hirschensohn who called attention to the “barbaric” way Jews treated their wives in the small towns of Galicia, where the wives did not even eat at the same table with their husbands.[14]

וה’ יסלח לו כי ההרגל הרע של בני מדינתו להתגאה על נשותיהן אשר לוקחים אותן רק לרקחות וטבחות ואין מסיבות בשלחן עם בעליהן וחושבים אותם כחמת כו’ [מ”ש: ראה שבת קנב ע”א] ואלמלי עלמא צריכי להו היו בעי רחמי דלבטלי מן העולם ח”ו, ההרגל הפראי הזה אשר בעירות הקטנות בגאליציא ובקצת ערי פולין גרם להרב הנז’ לבלי להרגיש את העלבון אשר עלב לבנות האבות והאמהות אשר קמו גם הן לאם לבנות את בית ישראל

As a curiosity, it is worth noting the opinion of R. Menasheh Klein that a husband should not help his wife with household tasks such as cleaning the dishes, as that is “women’s work”, while the husband works outside the home. (And what about when the wife also works outside the home?) Instead, the husband should use that time for learning Torah and other spiritual pursuits.[15]

כי לכן נתן לו הקב”ה אשה לאדם שיהי’ לו לעזר שתעשה לו צרכי הבית והוא יהיה פנוי בזמן שיש לו ללמוד תורה ולעבודת השם ולא לכבס ולהדיח הכלים אחרי האכילה ולסדר את המטות החיוב על הבעל לפרנס את אשתו ובניו ושאר הזמן כל רגע ורגע ינצל ללימוד התורה ולעבודת השי”ת שמו. ובעונ”ה נשתנה הוסת שהבעלי בתים הצעירים נעשים בעלת בתים מבשלים ומדיחים הכלים והולכים לחניות לקנות צרכי הבית איינקויפען בלע”ז בקיצור עושים כל מלאכת הנשים והנשים עושים מלאכת האנשים

I can only imagine what the reaction of a newlywed wife would be if her husband would tell her that no, he has no plans to help clean the table and do the dishes because that is women’s work.

Related to this is the following story told by R. Yosef Wineberg, the grandson of the Slonimer Rebbe. It is obviously designed to make the “Litvish” look bad.[16]

A newly married Litvishe couple was once sitting together. The wife asked her husband to please make her a cup of tea. He immediately jumps up, puts on his hat and jacket and walks out the door. About an hour later, the husband returns home, removes his hat and jacket and makes her a cup of tea. Puzzled by his strange behavior, she asks for an explanation.

He explains: when you first asked me to make you a cup of tea, I was upset. I am a Talmid Chacham, a scholar, and you are meant to “serve” me, not the opposite. Not wishing to get into an argument, I went to my Rav to ask him what I should do.

The Rav explained to me that “ishto k’gufo”, that the Halacha considers us like one person. Therefore, making tea for you is identical to making tea for me. As I feel no compunctions with serving myself, I returned home to fulfill your request.

In order to show that the husband is the boss of the household, R. David Kimhi states that while the husband calls his wife by her name, the wife does not call her husband by his name, but by some title which shows his superior status.[17]

כי האיש הוא הקורא לאשתו בשמה ולא האשה לאישה, אלא דרך כבוד בלשון אדנות קוראה לו ולא בשמו, כי כל מי שיש לו מעלה אל אחר אין ראוי לאשר למטה ממנו לקרוא אותו בשמו, כמו אביו או רבו או אדניו . . . וכן האשה לבעלה כי אדניה הוא כמו שאמר: והוא ימשוך בך

One of the proofs he offers for this idea is that in Genesis 17:17 Abraham refers to Sarah by her name, but in Genesis 18:13 Sarah refers to Abraham as “my lord” (אדני). Another proof he mentions is that when God changes the names of Abraham and Sarah he says to Abraham (Gen. 17:15): “Thou shalt not call her name Sarai.” From this we see that Abraham called his wife by her name. However, when Abraham’s name was changed the Torah states (Gen. 17:5): “Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram.” Sarah was not told this, Radak states, as she didn’t refer to her husband by his name. This was rather a general statement, that among those people who call Abraham by his name, they no longer would do so.

Although Radak states that a husband calls his wife by her name, we know that this was not always the case. Thus, we are told that R. Jacob Moellin in speaking to his wife would not call her by her name. When he referred to her in conversation with others, he would call her mein hausfrau (my housewife).[18] The text that records this information notes that already in the Talmud, Shabbat 118b, we find that R. Yose referred to his wife as “my house,” and I think most assume that this was done as a term of respect.[19] The text further notes that the general practice was that both husband and wife did not refer to each other by their first name. Such a practice was also found in the Sephardic world.[20] What this shows us is that contrary to what Radak records, the practice need not have anything to do with the husband being regarded as “superior” to his wife.

With all the discussions in rabbinic literature that show the essential differences between men and woman, let me mention another curiosity that, if you want to be cute, you can say that in one place the Talmud actually refers to women as men. I have in mind Zevahim 67b which, in discussing the burnt offerings brought by two women after childbirth, states:

חטאת לזו ועולה לזו עשה שתיהן למעלה . . . אימור דא”ר יהושע בחד גברא בתרי גברי מי אמר

In this passage, the word גברי, which means “men”, refers to the case of the two women (although the principle enunciated applies to all people).[21]

While on the male-female topic, let me mention something else that is relevant. We all know that the name Avi (short for Avraham) is quite popular. Yet how many know that this is already a biblical name, but used for a woman (2 Kings 18:2)?

I want to return to the notion already mentioned in this note, and found in a number of earlier works, that an ape stands between animals and humans. The Sefat Emet, Genesis 18:1, expands on this as follows:

ובין חי למדבר קוף. ואנו נאמר כי אחר מדבר אדם, שעל זה נאמר “אדם” אתם קרוין אדם ולא האומות. וישמעאל הוא הממוצע לכן נקרא פרא אדם, ולכן יד כל בו וידו בכל, כי על ידו יש התקשרות בין מדריגות מדבר למדריגת אדם

When he writes כי אחר מדבר אדם it means that after the level of מדבר, which means “humanity”, there is the level of אדם, which is the level of the Jewish people. He then adds that the Arabs stand between מדבר and אדם which is why they are called פרא אדם. Often פרא אדם is used to show that the Arabs are on a lower level than other nations. However, here we see that the Arabs are on a higher level, and closer to the Jews than the other nations, as among the nations of the world only the Arabs are also called אדם—no doubt because of their monotheism, see Yevamot 61a—even if this word is placed together with the negative term פרא.

The Sefat Emet’s comment is derived from the Zohar,[22] which explains פרא אדם as meaning one who possesses the “beginnings of אדם”. The Zohar also places the descendants of Ishmael on a higher level than the other nations because they are circumcised. Circumcision was widely practiced even in pagan Arabia, so the reference to circumcision alone would not be enough to date this passage of the Zohar to the post-Islamic period.

R. Jacob Emden, however, cites a different passage in the Zohar that assumes the existence of the Islamic world, meaning that it could not have been written by R. Shimon ben Yohai.[23] He writes:

הנה לפניך שבימי בעל ספר הזוהר כבר היתה אמונת מחמד הישמעאלי בעולם (שנתחדשה בימי אמוראים האחרונים על”ב) כי קודם זמן זה היו כל הישמעאלים עובדי אלילים גמורים, ככל יתר גוי הארצות.

R. Emden also cites another Zoharic passage that assumes Islamic rule in the Land of Israel. He comments:[24]

הרי כי בימי בעל ספר הזוהר היתה אומת ישמעאל שולטת בארץ הקדושה, ודבר ידוע הוא ומפורסם, שלא הגיעו הישמעאלים לממשלה כללית עד שנת שע”ד לאלף החמישי . . . נמצא עכ”פ יותר מחמש מאות שנה אחר רשב”י חובר ספר הזוהר, ואולי מאוחר עוד הרבה מזה, ואיך אפשר להסכים זה עם שמות האומרים אותם הדברים, והמה חבריו או תלמידיו של רשב”י, לפי המובן בלשונו של בעל ספר הזוהר, הלא זה כדבר שאין לו שחר

He cites a third such example and writes:[25]

מלכות ישמעאל לא נתפרסמה ולא נתפשטה בימי תנאים ואמוראים. כי היו אז ממלכה שפלה קטנה וירודה

Returning to the matter of how women have been viewed, R. Joseph Solomon Delmedigo mentions that jokers—ליצני הדור—come up with all sorts of gematrias. When it comes to women not all of them are negative. For example, the gematria of אשה is דבש, and אשה יפה = שמחה גדולה. However he also cites a gematria which is not very complimentary to women. זכר=ברכה and נקיבה=בקללה. R. Delmedigo sees this as a big joke, but it is actually mentioned by R. Hayyim the brother of the Maharal in his Iggeret ha-Tiyul, section ז, and it is also found in Ba’al ha-Turim, Gen. 1:27 (with some differences as to which letters are actually included in the gematria).

In 1807 R. Jacob Samson Shabbetai Senigallia[26] published his talmudic commentary Shabbat shel Mi. Here is the title page of the Livorno first edition. (It has been reprinted a number of times).

Here is what appears in the book on p. 89b. He is trying to explain why chapters 5 and 6 in tractate Shabbat are next to each other. Chapter 5 begins במה בהמה and chapter 6 begins במה אשה, and according to R. Senigallia this is because “birds of a feather flock together.”

If he was trying to make a joke, I can understand what he wrote. But who ever heard of making a joke in the middle of a talmudic commentary? Presumably, he was being serious, which leaves us with a very offensive comment.

There is, to be sure, humor in the Talmud, but I don’t know of any examples in talmudic commentaries. Yeshayahu Leibowitz quipped that the Sages must have had a good sense of humor, since they included the following text in the Talmud [27]: תלמידי חכמים מרבים שלום בעולם. In all seriousness, however, there are indeed humorous passages in the Talmud, as pointed out by R. Moses Salmon.[28] Here is one example he gives (Bava Batra 14a):

The Rabbis said to R. Hamnuna: R. Ammi wrote four hundred scrolls of the Law. He said to them: Perhaps he copied out the verse תורה צוה לנו משה

R. Salmon claims that anyone with a bit of sense can see that R. Hamnuna’s reply is a wisecrack made in response to the obvious exaggeration about R. Ammi.

Nehemiah Samuel Libowitz states that even in the Zohar we have passages that show a humorous side.[29] One of the many examples he points to is Zohar, Bereshit, p. 27a:

וימררו את חייהם בעבודה קשה בקושיא. בחומר קל וחומר. ובלבנים בלבון הלכתא. ובכל עבודה בשדה דא ברייתא. את כל עבודתם וגו’ דא משנה

I have no idea what to make of the following comment from R. Oury Cherki, dealing with humor, which does not sound like something that would be said by a leading kiruv figure (De’ah Tzelula: Olam ve-Adam be-Mishnat ha-Rav Kook [Jerusalem, 2015], p. 246). Rather, it sounds like something one of the maskilim of old would say.

התורה שבעל-פה אינה מובנה ללא שותפות רוח האומה. לכן כשלומדים הלכה רצוי להצטייד בחוש הומור, שכן לפעמים הדברים נראים משונים למדי. למשל, הכנת כוס תה בשבת. התלמוד אומר שאסור לשפוך מים קרים לתוך החמים אבל מים חמים לתוך הקרים מותר, כי יש כלל ש”תתאה גבר”, התחתון גובר. כששופכים מים חמים לתוך הקרים המים הקרים מתחממים ומתבשלים מה שאין כן ההפך – המים החמים מתקררים. יש כאן בהחלט סוג של הומור

I also found the following interesting comment by Moshe Meisels, the editor of Ha-Doar, in a letter to Chaim Bloch.[30] He suggests that the talmudic prohibition against a non-Jew observing the Sabbath is an example of rabbinic wit, and is not to be understood literally.

ואגב, לא אהא בבחינת מורה הלכה לפני רבו אם אינני מתאפק מלהביא מעין חידוש שנתחדש לי הקטן באחד המאמרים התמוהים בתלמוד מן הסוג הנ”ל, והוא אמרם: עכו”ם ששבת חייב מיתה, שנאמר יום ולילה לא ישבותו וכו’. ואין צורך להרבות דברים על הזרות שבדבר: מה איכפת למי אם שבת או לא שבת, ומה היא הראיה מאותו פסוק, המוסב על קיץ וחורף וכו’, ומה ענינו לכאן ולעכו”ם דוקא? ונראה לי שכל המאמר בא בדרך חידוד, וזה מובנו: עכו”ם ששבת מן הדין שיהא חייב מיתה בדיניהם. מדוע? ישראל שלא שבת חייב מיתה, משום שעל א-לוהיו נאמר וישבות ביום השביעי וכו’, אבל עובד כוכבים ומזלות, שעליהם נאמר יום ולילה לא ישבותו, מן הדין שעובדיהם יהיו חייבים מיתה אם שינו מדרך אלהיהם ושבתו

On the matter of non-Jews observing the Sabbath, R. Yaakov Koppel Schwartz makes a fascinating suggestion, which he acknowledges has no support in the rishonim and therefore he has doubts whether it is correct.[31] The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is in remembrance of the fact that we were slaves and God redeemed us. Therefore, it is understandable why non-Jews are forbidden to commemorate the Sabbath by abstaining from work, as this has no connection to them. However, there is another reason given for the Sabbath and that is so that we remember the creation of the world. Non-Jews are also supposed to acknowledge this and therefore there should be nothing wrong with non-Jews having some sort of celebration in honor of the Sabbath.

אבל הכיבוד והקידוש של יום השבת, שהוא משום אמונת חידוש העולם, שייך שגם הגויים יהיו בהם ואינם מנועים מלכבד ולענג את השבת

If we follow R. Schwartz’s approach, this is something that could be suggested for Noahides whose “religion” is lacking any rituals, which for most people is an essential component of their religion.

* * * * * * * *

[1] Ha-Tzofeh, June 16, 1959, p. 2.

[2] Orhot Hayyim, Or Etzion ed. (Merkaz Shapira, 2017), p. 106, quoted by R. Joseph Karo, Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 51 (end). Regarding negative expressions directed against God, there is an interesting passage in R. Yedidiah Solomon Raphael Norzi, Minhat Shai, Deut. 8:3. To understand it one must know that the old French word “fi” expressed disdain or disgust. See here. The issue Norzi discusses is that the verse reads:

‘כִּי עַל-כָּל-מוֹצָא פִי-ה

Norzi cites a view that in this case there should be a dagesh in the word פי even though that is not in accord with the general rule, because without the dagesh, reading it as “fi” would be disrespectful to God:

כי לשון גנאי הוא בלשון צרפת וחלילה לשם יתברך

Norzi completely rejects this and states that the rules of biblical grammar are not to be changed because of how words sound in languages other than Hebrew (and there are indeed examples where biblical Hebrew words sound like profanity in other languages).

ואין לנו לחוש ללשון צרפת שאין מבטלין דרכי לשון הקדש מפני שאר לשונות

See also Samuel David Luzzatto, Prolegomena to a Grammar of the Hebrew Language, trans. Aaron D. Rubin (Piscataway, N.J., 2005), pp. 133-134.

Regarding the pronunciation of פ, R. Meir Mazuz points out that the Vilna Gaon, Commentary to Tikunei Zohar, section 19, p. 38d (p. 166 in R. Zuriel’s edition), mistakenly believed that Sephardim pronounce פ with and without a dagesh the same way (just as they pronounce ת with and without a dagesh the same way). R. Mazuz notes that the Vilna Gaon’s point is repeated by R. Baruch Epstein, Mekor Barukh, vol. 1, p. 397b (without mentioning the Gaon). See Mazuz, Bayit Ne’eman (Humash), vol. 1, p. 13 (first pagination).

[3] Hazon Ish, Yoreh Deah 62:21.

[4] In my earlier post I cited R. Samson Raphael Hirsch as adopting the notion that women are created on a higher spiritual level than men. I neglected to note that Shaye J. D. Cohen earlier discussed Hirsch’s approach. See Cohen, Why Aren’t Jewish Women Circumcised (Berkeley, 2005), pp. 165ff.

[5] “Eshet Hayil: Kavim li-Demutah u-le-Ma’amadah shel ha-Ishah be-Hagut ha-Yehudit ha-Shesh Esreh,” in Ephraim Hazan and Shmuel Refael, eds. Mahbarot li-Yehudit (Ramat-Gan, 2012), p. 286.

[6] Torah in The Observatory (Boston, 2010), p. 287. I earlier discussed Ralbag here.

[7] See R. Yaakov Moshe Toledano, Sarid u-Falit (Tel Aviv, [1945]), p. 8.

[8] Bayit Ne’eman no. 153 (parashat Vayikra 5779), p. 2.

[9] See e.g., R. Israel Ibn Al Nakawa, Menorat ha-Maor, ed. Enelow, vol. 4, pp. 32-33, who instructs a wife as follows (using the word שפחה that so troubled R. Moshe):

ועושה צרכיו בעצמה ולא על ידי אחרים. ואפי’ היו לה כמה עבדים וכמה שפחות, תעמוד היא ותשרתנו, ותקראנו אדוני . . .ויהיו עיניה תלויין לו, כעיני שפחה אל יד גבירתה

For a translation of this passage, see here. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ishut 15:20, says that a wife should regard her husband כמו שר או מלך.

Radak, Gen. 3:16, writes:

והוא ימשול בך: לצוות עליך מה שירצה כאדון על עבד

Ramban, Gen. 3:16, explains that as a result of Eve’s sin, the relationship of man and woman was changed. From that point on:

 והוא יחזיק בה כשפחה ואין המנהג להיות העבד משתוקק לקנות אדון לעצמו אבל יברח ממנו ברצונו

R. Bahya ben Asher, Gen. 3:16, writes:

ואל אישך תשוקתך: שאע”פ שהאשה משועבדת ברשות הבעל ומנהג העבד לברוח מן האדון כדי שלא ישתעבד, גזר בזאת שתהיה משתוקקת לבעל ושתרצה להשתעבד לו בהפך מן המנהג

See also R. Chaim Rapoport’s letter in my Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan, p. 172.

R. Avraham Blumenkrantz, Gefen Poriah, p. 352, quotes approvingly another rabbi who states as follows (emphasis added):

Her tears are ever ready to flow at the most miniscule suggestion of being dealt with as a maidservant. She will concede you the service of והוא ימשל בך. She will consent to call you בעלי, but don’t accent the דגש in the בית too heavily. She must constantly be reassured that there is honor and dignity in her subservience. Honor her more than you honor yourself. She must be compensated for her subjugation, and be made to feel that she has a genuine share in the dignity of the throne.

Do haredi women really feel that they are subservient or subjugated? Do haredi men feel this way about their wives? Hasn’t haredi society accepted the notion of separate but equal when it comes to men and women?

[10] Sanhedrin 39a, Yevamot 113a, Nedarim 38b.

[11] As is well known, and I have written about previously, R. Moshe often rejected the authenticity of texts that he found problematic. Another example of this with regard to Rashi on the Talmud is found in Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer, vol. 4, no. 64:1. Here R. Moshe says to delete words in Rashi even though, as he notes, these words are found in “Rashi” on the Rif and in R. Nissim. See the strong responses to R. Moshe quoted in R. Yonason Rosman, Petihat ha-Iggerot, pp. 605-606. One of these responses is from R. Menasheh Klein in his notes to R. Eyal Shraga, Minhat Ish, vol. 1, pp. 302-303. R. Klein writes:

וח”ו ואטו עד כמה נילך ונמחוק בדברי רבותינו ז”ל שנאמרו ברוה”ק, ולולי דמספינא הייתי אומר דאיזה תלמיד טועה כתבו, אבל פשוט דדברי רש”י נכונים וליכא כאן טעות כלל

When R. Klein suggests—לולי דמספינא—that a “mistaken student” is responsible for the problematic passage in Iggerot Moshe, he does not mean it seriously. This is just his respectful way of saying that R. Moshe’s position is completely without basis. He uses the same language in Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 12, Yoreh Deah no. 214. There he responds to R. Moshe’s statement that he doesn’t know who R. Menahem Tziyoni is, but since he quotes a heretical—in R. Moshe’s opinion—passage from R. Judah he-Hasid’s commentary on the Torah, therefore R. Tziyoni’s work must be banned together with R. Judah he-Hasid’s commentary.

[12] R. Moshe also famously states that women do not have any less holiness than men. See Iggerot MosheOrah Hayyim vol. 4, no. 49 (p. 81). See also the new Mesorat Moshe, vol. 4, p. 476. This position is at odds with many earlier writers who saw men as holier because they are commanded in more mitzvot. This is also Maimonides’ position in his commentary to Horayot 3:7. See R. Chaim Rapoport’s discussion in Kovetz Hearot u-Veurim, no. 908 (2006), pp. 138ff. Yet see R. Dov Halbertal, Erekh ha-Hayyim be-Halakhah (Jerusalem, 2004), vol. 2, p. 399, who has a different approach and makes the point that just because a Kohen and Levi are to be saved before an Israel, no one would say that the Kohen and Levi have more holiness. See also R. Yitzhak Barda, Yitzhak Yeranen, vol. 11, p. 249, that women are holier than men. He offers an original explanation of this notion.

שהאשה שהקב”ה הפריש ממנו, מהצלע שלו, הוא מופרש, וממילא כל מופרש קדוש, ואז האשה יותר קדושה מהאיש. ובזה מובן למה האיש מקדש את האשה, לא אומר לה הרי את אשתי, או כל סממן לשון של נישואין, חברה או שותפה וכו’, זולתי: הרי את מקודשת לי! לפי שהקב”ה קבע כל מופרש קדוש

[13] Kinyan Shlomo, Yevamot, p. 89. See also R. Natan Einfeld, Minhat Natan: Kiddushin, pp. 139-140, who cites other sources in rejecting R. Moshe’s point.

[14] Malki ba-Kodesh, vol. 4, p. 50a. See R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 12, no. 351, for a defense of the practice of husbands and wives eating separately.

[15] Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 7 no. 155 (called to my attention by R. Aviad Stollman).

[16] The story is recorded by R. Chaim Dalfin, Faces and Places Boro Park (Brooklyn, 2017), p. 149.

[17] Commentary to Gen. 17:15. See the rejection of Radak’s opinion in R. Betzalel Stern, Be-Tzel ha-Hokhmah, vol. 1, no. 70.

[18] Maharil, Likutim (p. 610 in the Makhon Yerushalayim edition).

[19] On the other hand, R. Meir Schiff (Maharam Schiff), Gittin 52a, explains that R. Yose referred to his wife this way because she was a bad wife: אשה רעה. Yet the proof he brings for this is actually from a different R. Yose. See R. Judah Leib Maimon, ed., Sefer ha-Gra, vol. 1, p. 110 in the note. Regarding “bad wives”, R. Elazar of Worms is quoted as follows in R. Alexander Suslin, Sefer ha-Agudah, ed. Brizel, Yevamot, no. 78 (p. 41):

מי שיש לו אשה רעה יסבול יקבל ברצון ויקבל בשמחה ולא יראה פני גהינם

What does R. Elazar mean that if you suffer under a bad wife you will not see gehinnom? R. Moses Guedemann explains that with a bad wife you already saw gehinnom in your lifetime, so there is no need to see if after death. See Ha-Torah ve-ha-Hayyim, trans. Friedberg (Warsaw, 1897), vol. 1, p. 194:

כי פני הגיהנם כבר ראה בחייו

Regarding “good wives” see R. Shlomo Hoss, Kerem Shlomo, no. 43, who writes:

אין לך כשרה בנשים אלא אשה שעושה רצון בעלה: אהע”ז ס”ס ס”ט (אך אשת חיל כזאת מי ימצא)

R. Solomon Zvi Schueck was shocked at R. Hoss’ final comment, that one cannot find a wife who does the wishes of her husband. R. Schueck writes that based on this passage he assumed that R. Hoss must not have had a good wife.

נראה לי שהי’ לו אשה רעה, וממנה דן על כל הנשים שבישראל

See She’elot u-Teshuvot Rashban, Even ha-Ezer, no. 99 (p. 88b). He further tells us that he asked one of R. Hoss’ students who confirmed that this was indeed the case.

[20] See Tuvia Preschel, Ma’amrei Tuvyah, vol. 5, p. 142.

[21] See Or Torah, Shevat 5780, p. 460.

[22] Exodus 86a, 87a.

[23] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (at the beginning; p. 20 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition). In R. Reuven Rapoport’s edition of Mitpahat Sefarim, with his commentary Itur Soferim, p. 13, R. Rapoport sees it as obvious that this passage in the Zohar is a later interpolation much like there are Savoraic additions in the Talmud.

[24] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (p. 27 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition).

[25] Mitpahat Sefarim, ch. 4 (p. 54 in the Jerusalem 1995 edition). Regarding the larger issue that R. Emden points to, see Ronald C. Kiener, “The Image of Islam in the Zohar,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 8 (1989), pp. 43-65.

[26] See the recent discussion of R. Senigallia by R. Moshe Maimon in the Seforim Blog here.

[27] Sihot al Pirkei Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot (Jerusalem, 2003), p. 289.

[28] Netiv Moshe (Vienna, 1897), pp. 45-46.

[29] “Halatzot ve-Divrei Bikoret be-Sefer ha-Zohar,” Ha-Tzofeh le-Hokhmat Yisrael 11 (1927), pp. 33-45. For more on humor in the Talmud, see Yehoshua Ovsay, Ma’amarim u-Reshimot (New York, 1946), ch. 1; Meyer Heller, “Humor in the Talmud” (unpublished masters dissertation, Hebrew Union College, 1950), available here; R. Mordechai Hacohen, “Humor, Satirah, u-Vedihah be-Fi Hazal,” Mahanayim 67 (5722), pp. 8-19; and Ezra Brand’s post here. From Brand I learned that David Lifshitz wrote an entire doctorate on the subject. See also my posts here and here where I discuss Siftei Hakhamim’s comment that Moses thought God was joking with him, and how this has been censored in a recent edition. See also J. Chotzner, Hebrew Humor and Other Essays (London, 1905); Nehemiah Samuel Libowitz, Ha-Shomea Yitzhak (New York, 1907).

[30] See here (Chaim Bloch Collection, Leo Baeck Institute, 7155-7156, 1/13).

[31] Likutei Diburim, vol. 4, pp. 24-25.




Some Assorted Comments and a Selection from my Memoir. part 1

Some Assorted Comments and a Selection from my Memoir, part 1
By  Marc B. Shapiro
1. Fifty years ago R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg spoke about the fraudulence that was found in the Orthodox world. Unfortunately, matters have gotten much worse since his time. I am not referring to the phony pesakim in the names of great rabbis that appear plastered all over Jerusalem, and from there to the internet. Often the damage has been done before the news comes out that the supposed pesak was not actually approved by the rav, but was instead put up by an “askan” or by a member of the rabbi’s “court”. I am also not referring to the fraudulent stories that routinely appear in the hagiographies published by Artscroll and the like, and were also a feature in the late Jewish Observer. These are pretty harmless, and it is hard to imagine anyone with sophistication being taken in. Finally, I am also not referring to the falsehoods that constantly appear in the Yated Neeman. I think everyone knows that this newspaper is full of lies and in its despicable fashion thinks nothing of attempting to destroy people’s reputations, all because their outlooks are not in accord with whatever Daas Torah Yated is pushing that week.[1]
I am referring to something much more pernicious, because the falsehoods are directed towards the intellectuals of the community, and are intended to mislead them. There was a time when in the haredi world a distinction was made between the masses, whom it was permitted to mislead with falsehoods, and the intellectuals who knew the truth and who were part of the “club” that didn’t have to bother with the censorship that is ubiquitous in haredi world.
Yet I have recently seen many examples that show that even in the world of the intellectuals, fraudulence has begun to surface. Let me note an example that was recently called to my attention by Rabbi Yitzchak Oratz, and it is most distressing precisely because it is a son who is responsible for the lie. In an issue of the popular journal Or Yisrael, R. Yehudah Heller from London mentioned that the late R. Yerucham Gorelik, a well-known student of R. Velvel of Brisk, had taught Talmud at Yeshiva University.[2] Heller used this example to show that one can teach Torah in an institution even if the students’ devotion to Torah study leaves something to be desired.
 In the latest issue of Or Yisrael (Tishrei, 5770), p. 255, Heller publishes a letter in which he corrects what he had earlier written. He was contacted by Gorelik’s son, R. Mordechai Leib Gorelik. The only thing I know about the younger Gorelik is that he appears to be quite extreme. He published an essay in Or Yisrael attacking the Artscroll Talmud and his reason was simply incredible. He claimed that anything that tries to make the study of Talmud easier is to be condemned. He also argued that Talmud study is not for the masses, but only for the elite. Obviously, the latter don’t need translations. According to Gorelik, if the masses want to study Torah, they can study halakhah or Aggadah and Mussar. If they want to study Talmud, then they must do it the way it used to be studied, with sweat, but they have no place in the beit midrash with their Artscroll crutches.[3]
Apparently it bothers Gorelik that his colleagues might think that his father actually taught Talmud at YU. So he told Heller the following, and this is what appears in Or Yisrael: R. Yerucham Gorelik never taught Talmud at YU, and on the contrary, he thought that there was a severe prohibition (issur hamur) in both studying and teaching Talmud at this institution, even on a temporary basis, and even in order “to save” the young people in attendance there. The only subject he ever taught at YU was “hashkafah”.
The Sages tell us that “people are not presumed to tell a lie which is likely to be found out” (Bekhorot 36b). I don’t think that they would have made this statement if they knew the era we currently live in.[4] Here you have a case where literally thousands of people can testify as to how R. Gorelik served as a Rosh Yeshiva at YU for forty years, where you can go back to the old issues of the YU newspapers, the yearbooks, Torah journals etc. and see the truth. Yet because of how this will look in certain extremist circles, especially with regard to people who are far removed from New York and are thus gullible in this matter, R. Gorelik’s son decides to create a fiction.
I understand that in his circle the younger Gorelik is embarrassed that his father taught Talmud at YU. I also assume that he found a good heter to lie in this case. After all, it is kavod ha-Torah and the honor of his father’s memory, because God forbid that it be known that R. Gorelik was a Rosh Yeshiva at YU. However, I would only ask, what happened to hakarat ha-tov? YU gave R. Gorelik the opportunity to teach Torah at a high level. It also offered him a parnasah. Without this he, like so many of his colleagues, would have been forced into the hashgachah business, and when this wasn’t enough, to schnorr for money, all in order to put food on the table.
This denial of any connection to YU is part of a larger pattern. In my last post I mentioned how R. Poleyeff’s association with the school was erased. Another example is how R. Soloveitchik appears on the title page of one sefer as “Av Beit Din of Boston.” And now R. Gorelik’s biography is outrageously distorted.[5] Yet in the end, it is distressing to realize that the rewriting of history might actually work. In fifty years, when there are no more eyewitnesses alive to testify to R. Gorelik’s shiurim, how many people will deny that he ever taught at YU? Any written record will be rejected as a YU-Haskalah forgery, or something that God miraculously created to test our faith, all in order to avoid the conclusion that an authentic Torah scholar taught at YU.[6] I have no doubt that the editor of Or Yisrael, coming from a world far removed from YU, is unaware of the facts and that is why he permitted this letter to appear. I am certain that he would not knowingly permit a blatant falsehood like this to sully his fine journal.
2. Since I spoke so much about R. Hayyim Soloveitchik in the last two posts, let me add the following: The anonymous Halikhot ha-Grah (Jerusalem, [1996]), p. 4, mentions the famous story recorded by R. Zevin, that in a difficult case of Agunah R. Hayyim asked R. Yitzhak Elhanan’s opinion, but all he wanted was a yes or no answer. As R. Zevin explained, quoting those who were close to R. Hayyim, if R. Yitzhak Elhanan gave his reasoning then R. Hayyim would certainly have found things with which he disagreed, but he knew that in terms of practical halakhah he could rely on R. Yitzhak Elhanan.[7] Halikhot ha-Grah rejects R. Zevin’s explanation. Yet the same story, and explanation, were repeated by R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik.[8] In addition, a similar story, this time involving R. Hayyim and R. Simcha Zelig, is found in Uvdot ve-Hangagot le-Veit Brisk, vol. 4, pp. 35-36. Thus, there is no reason to doubt what R. Zevin reports.[9] Mention of Halikhot ha-Grah would not be complete without noting that it takes a good deal of material, without acknowledgment and sometimes word for word, from R. Schachter’s Nefesh ha-Raf. Of course, this too is done in the name of kavod ha-Torah.
3. Many posts on this blog have discussed how we now have entire books on topics concerning which until recent years a few lines sufficed. Haym Soloveitchik also made this point in “Rupture and Reconstruction.” Here is another example, the book Birkat Eitan by R. Eitan Shoshan.

 

This is a 648 page (!) book devoted to the blessing Asher Yatzar, recited after going to the bathroom. Shoshan has an even larger book devoted to the Shema recited before going to sleep.
4. In a previous post[10] I mentioned that R. Moshe Bick’s brother was the Judaic scholar and communist Abraham Bick (Shauli). Before writing this I confirmed the information, but as we all know, oftentimes such “confirmations” are themselves incorrect. I thank R. Ezra Bick for providing me with the correct information, and the original post has been corrected.
R. Moshe and Abraham were actually somewhat distant cousins.[11] Abraham was the son of R. Shaul Bick (and hence the hebraicized last name, Shauli), who was the son of R. Yitzchak Bick, who was the chief rabbi of Providence, RI, in the early 1930’s. R. Yitzchak was the son of R. Simcha Bick, who was rav in Mohiliv, Podolia. R. Simcha Bick had a brother, R. Zvi Aryeh Bick, who was rav in Medzhibush. His son was R. Hayyim Yechiel Mikhel Bick, was also rav in Medzhibush (d. 1889). His son was also named Hayyim Yechiel Mikhel Bick (born a few months after his father’s premature death), and he was rav in Medzhibush from 1910 until 1925, when he came to America. His son was R. Moshe Bick.
R. Ezra Bick also reports that after the Second World War, when Abraham Bick was in the U.S. working as an organizer for communist front organizations, he was more or less cut off by his Orthodox cousins in Brooklyn.
R. Moshe Bick’s brother, Yeshayah (R. Ezra’s father), was a well-known Mizrachi figure. In his obituary for R. Hayyim Yechiel Mikhel Bick, R. Meir Amsel, the editor of Ha-Maor, mentioned how Yeshayah caused his father much heartache with his Zionist activities.[12] This article greatly hurt R. Moshe Bick and he insisted that Amsel never again mention him or his family in Ha-Maor. In fact, as R. Ezra Bick has pointed out to me, rather than causing his father heartache, R. Hayyim Yechiel actually encouraged Yeshayah in his Zionist activities.

 

R. Bick’s letter is actually quite fascinating and I give the Amsel family a lot of credit for including it in a recent volume dedicated to R. Meir Amsel. I have never seen this sort of letter included in a memorial volume, as all the material in such works is supposed to honor the subject of the volume. Yet here is a letter that blasts Amsel, and they still included it.[13] They also included a letter from R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg in which he too criticizes Amsel for allowing personal attacks to be published in his journal. It takes a lot of strength for children to publish such letters and they have earned my admiration for doing so.
When I first mentioned R. Moshe Bick, I also noted that he was opposed to young people getting married too quickly. He therefore urged that boys and girls go out on a number of dates before deciding to get engaged. Needless to say, the haredi world was furious at this advice. R. Dovid Solomon reported to me the following anecdote: When the Klausenberger Rebbe told R. Bick how opposed he was to the latter’s advice, R. Bick responded: “That’s because you are mesader kidushin at all the marriages. But I am the one who is mesader all the gittin!”
5. In previous postings I gave three examples of errors in R. Charles B. Chavel’s notes to his edition of Nahmanides’ writings. For each of these examples my points were challenged and Chavel was defended. Here is one more example that I don’t think anyone will dispute. In Kitvei ha-Ramban, vol. 1, p. 148, Nahmanides writes:

 

 ובזה אין אנו מודים לספר המדע שאמר שהבורא מנבא בני אדם.
In his note Chavel explains ספר המדע to mean:
לדבר הידוע, יעללינעק מגיה פה שצ”ל: לרב הידוע.
Yet the meaning is obvious that Nahmanides is referring to Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mada, where he explains the nature of prophecy.[14]
5. In 2008 a Torah commentary from R. Joshua Leib Diskin was published. Here is the title page.

The book even comes with a super-commentary of sorts. This is completely unnecessary but shows how greatly the editor/publisher values the work. Diskin is a legendary figure and was identified with the more extreme elements of the Jerusalem Ashkenazic community. For this reason he often did not see eye to eye with R. Samuel Salant.
Here is a page from this new commentary.

In his comment to Num. 23:22-23, Diskin quotes a book called Ha-Korem. This is a commentary on the Torah and some other books of the Bible by Naphtali Herz Homberg, a leading Maskil who worked for the Austrian government as superintendent of Jewish schools and censor of Jewish books. This is what the Encyclopedia Judaica says about him:

Homberg threatened the rabbis that if they did not adapt themselves to his principles the government would force them to do so. . . . Homberg was ruthless in denouncing to the authorities religious Jews who refused to comply with his requirements, and in applying pressure against them. In his official memoranda he blamed both the rabbis and the Talmud for preventing Jews from fulfilling their civic duties toward the Christian state. . . . Homberg recommended to the authorities that they disband most traditional educational institutions, prohibit use of the Hebrew language, and force the communal bodies to employ only modern teachers. . . In his book Homberg denied the belief in Israel as the chosen people, the Messiah, and the return to Zion, and tried to show the existence of an essential identity between Judaism and Christianity. . . . Homberg incurred the nearly universal hatred of his Jewish contemporaries.
Incredibly, it is from his commentary that Diskin quoted. The editor didn’t know what Ha-Korem was, but almost immediately after publication someone let him in on the secret. All copies in Israeli seforim stores were then recalled in order that the offending page be “corrected”. I am told that the first printing is now impossible to find in Israel. When I was informed of this story by R. Moshe Tsuriel, I contacted Biegeleisen who fortunately had just received a shipment from Israel, sent out before the books were embargoed. Presumably, my copy will one day be a collector’s item.
The one positive thing to be said about Homberg is that he wrote a very good Haskalah Hebrew. I was therefore surprised when I saw the following in David Nimmer’s otherwise fantastic article in Hakirah 8 (2009): “We begin with Herz Homberg, a minor functionary who wrote in German since his Hebrew skills were poor” (p. 73). Since German was the last language Homberg learnt, I was curious as to how Nimmer was misled. He references Wilma Abeles Iggers, The Jews of Bohemia and Moravia (Detroit, 1992), p. 14. Yet Nimmer misunderstood this source. Iggers writes as follows, in speaking of the mid-eighteenth century: “Use of Hebrew steadily decreased, even in learned discussions. Naftali Herz Homberg, for example, asked his friend Moses Mendelssohn to correspond with him in German rather than in Hebrew.” All that this means is that Homberg wanted to practice his German, and become a “cultured” member of Mendelssohn’s circle, and that is why he wanted to correspond in this language. In this he is little different than so many others like him who arrived in Berlin knowing only Hebrew and Yiddish. Each one of them had a different story as to how they learnt German. According to the Encyclopedia Judaica, in 1767, when he was nineteen years old, Homberg “began to learn German secretly.”
6. In a previous post I noted the yeshiva joke that R. Menasheh Klein’s books should be called Meshaneh Halakhot, instead of Mishneh Halakhot. Strangely enough, if you google “meshaneh halakhot” you will find that the books are actually referred to this way by a few different people, including, in what are apparently Freudian slips, B. Barry Levy and Daniel Sperber. In fact, Klein’s books are not the first to be referred to in this sort of way. In his polemic against Maimonides, R. Meir Abulafia writes (Kitab al Rasail [Paris, 1871), p. 13):
הוא הספר הנקרא משנה תורה, ואיני יודע אם יש אם למסורת ואם יש אם למקרא.

Abulafia is mocking Maimonides’ greatest work, and wondering if perhaps it should be called Meshaneh Torah! As for Klein, there is a good deal that can be said about his prolific writings, and they await a comprehensive analysis. When thinking about Meshaneh Halakhot, I often recall following responsum, which appears in Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 5, no. 141, and which I am too embarrassed to translate.

A well-known talmid hakham pointed out to me something very interesting. Normally we understand hillul ha-shem to mean that a non-Jew will see how Jews behave and draw the wrong conclusions of what Torah teachings are all about. However, in this responsum we see the exact opposite. The hillul ha-shem is that the non-Jew will draw the right conclusion! Yet the truth is that this understanding of hillul ha-shem is also very popular and is used by R. Moses Isserles, as we will soon see..
Here is another responsum that will blow you off your seats, from Mishneh Halakhot, New Series, vol. 12, Hoshen Mishpat no. 445.

 

 

If you want to understand why three hasidic kids are sitting in a Japanese jail, this responsum provides all you need to know. Can anyone deny that it is this mentality that explains so much of the illegal activity we have seen in recent year? Will Agudat Israel, which has publicly called for adherence to high ethical standards in such matters, condemn Klein? Will they declare a ban on R Yaakov Yeshayah Blau’s popular Pithei Hoshen, which explains all the halakhically permissible ways one can cheat non-Jews? You can’t have it both ways. You can’t declare that members of your community strive for the ethical high ground while at the same time regard Mishneh Halakhot, Pithei Hoshen, and similar books as valid texts, since these works offer justifications for all sorts of unethical monetary behavior. The average Orthodox Jew has no idea what is found in these works and how dangerous they are. Do I need to start quoting chapter and verse of contemporary halakhic texts that state explicitly that there is no prohibition to cheat on one’s taxes?[15] Pray tell, Agudah, are we supposed to regard these authors as legitimate halakhic authorities?
I have no doubt that there was a time that the approach found here was acceptable. In an era when Jews were being terribly persecuted and their money was being taken, the non-Jewish world was regarded as the enemy, and rightfully so. Yet the fact that pesakim reflecting this mindset are published today is simply incredible. Also incredible is that R. David Zvi Hoffmann’s Der Schulchan-Aruch und die Rabbinen über das Verhältniss der Juden zu Andersgläubigen, a classic text designed to show that Jewish law does not discriminate monetarily against contemporary Gentiles, has not yet been translated. Hoffmann’s approach was shared by all other poskim in Germany, who believed that any discriminatory laws were simply no longer applicable.[16] R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg stated that we must formally declare that this is what we believe. Can Agudah in good conscience make such a declaration, and mean it?
The truth is that there is an interesting sociological divide on these matters between the Modern Orthodox and the haredi world. Here is an example that will illustrate this. If a Modern Orthodox rabbi would advocate the following halakhah, quoted by R. Moses Isserles, Hoshen Mishpat 348:2,[17] he would be fired.[18]
טעות עכו”ם כגון להטעותו בחשבון או להפקיע הלואתו מותר ובלבד שלא יודע לו דליכא חילול השם.
If I am wrong about this, please let me know, but I don’t believe that any Modern Orthodox synagogue in the country would keep a rabbi who publicly advocated this position.[19] Indeed, R. Moses Rivkes in his Be’er ha-Golah on this halakhah wants people to know that they shouldn’t follow this ruling.[20] See also Rivkes, Be’er ha-Golah, Hoshen Mishpat 266:1, 383:1, and his strong words in Hoshen Mishpat 388:12 where he states that the communal leaders would let the non-Jews know if any Jews were intent on cheating them. Today, people would call Rivkes a moser.
I believe that if people in the Modern Orthodox world were convinced that Rama’s ruling is what Jewish ethics is about, very few of them would remain in Orthodoxy. In line with what Rivkes states, this halakhah has been rejected by Modern Orthodoxy and its sages, as have similar halakhot. As mentioned, Hoffmann’s Der Schulchan-Aruch is the most important work in this area. Yet today, most people will simply cite the Meiri who takes care of all of these issues, by distinguishing between the wicked Gentiles of old and the good Gentiles among whom we live. Thus, whoever feels that he is living in a tolerant environment can adopt the Meiri’s position and confidently assert that Rama is not referring to the contemporary world.
Yet what is the position of the American haredi world? If they accept Rama’s ruling, and don’t temper it with Meiri, then in what sense can the Agudah claim that they are educating their people to behave ethically in money matters? Would they claim that Rama’s halakhah satisfies what we mean by “ethical” in the year 2009? Will they say, as they do in so many other cases, that halakhah cannot be compared to the man-made laws of society and cannot be judged by humans? If that is their position, I can understand it, but then let Aish Hatorah and Ohr Sameach try explaining this to the potential baalei teshuvah and see how many people join the fold. If this is their position, then all the gatherings and talks about how one needs to follow dina de-malchuta are meaningless, for reasons I need not elaborate on. Furthermore, isn’t all the stress on following dina de-malchuta revealing? Why can’t people simply be told to do the right thing because it is the right thing? Why does it have to be anchored in halakhah, and especially in dina de-malchuta? Once this sort of thing becomes a requirement because of halakhah, instead of arising from basic ethics, then there are 101 loopholes that people can find, and all sorts of heterim as we saw in Klein’s responsum. I would even argue that the fact that one needs to point to a halakhic text to show that it is wrong to steal is itself a sign of our society’s moral bankruptcy.[21]
7. In Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters I stated that Maimonides nowhere explicitly denies the existence of demons, yet this denial is clearly implied throughout his writings. It was because Maimonides never explicitly denied them that so many great sages refused to accept this, and assumed that Maimonides really did believe in demons. (In my book I cited many who held this position.) I first asserted that Maimonides never explicitly denied demons in my 2000 article on Maimonides and superstition, of which the second chapter in my new book is an expanded treatment. While working on the original article I was convinced that Maimonides indeed denied demons in his Commentary to Avodah Zarah 4:7. However, I had a problem in that so many who knew this text did not see it as an explicit rejection. In fact, I was unaware of anyone actually citing this text to prove that Maimonides denied the existence of demons. (Only a couple of months ago did R. Chaim Rapoport call my attention to R. Eliezer Simhah Rabinowitz, She’elot u-Teshuvot ve-Hiddushei Rabbi Eliezer Simhah [Jerusalem, 1998], no. 11, who does cite this text as an explicit rejection of the existence of demons. I also recently found that R. Avraham Noah Klein, et. el., Daf al ha-Daf [Jerusalem, 2006), Pesahim 110a, quotes the work Nofet Tzufim as saying the same thing. Unfortunately, as far as I can tell, Klein doesn’t have a list of sources, so I don’t know who the author of this work is.)
Seeing that R. Zvi Yehudah Kook was quite adamant that Maimonides believed in demons,[22] I turned to R. Shlomo Aviner, who published R. Zvi Yehudah’s work, and asked him about Maimonides’ words in his Commentary to Avodah Zarah. Aviner convinced me that Maimonides should be understood as only denying that occult communication with demons is impossible, not the existence of demons per se. He wrote to me as follows:
הרמב”ם לא כתב שם בפירוש שאין שדים, אלא ששאלה בשדים היא הבל, וכך אנו רואים מן ההקשר שהוא מגנה שיטת שונות להשיג דברים או ידיעות, כגון “כשוף וההשבעות והמזלות הרוחניות, ודבר הכובכים והשדים והגדת עתידות ומעונן ומנחש על רוב מיניהם ושאלת המתים.”

 

I was still not 100 percent sure, but the fact that so many great scholars who knew the Commentary to Avodah Zarah assumed that Maimonides indeed believed in demons gave me confidence that Aviner was correct.[23] Even R. Kafih, in speaking of Maimonides denial of demons, does not cite the Commentary,[24] and this sealed the matter for me. I therefore assumed that all Maimonides was denying in his Commentary to Avodah Zarah 4:7 was the possibility of conversation with demons, and not demons per se. (R. Aviner doesn’t speak of simple conversation, but this was my assumption.)
Following publication of the article in 2000 no one contacted me to tell me that I was incorrect in my view of Maimonides and demons. So once again I was strengthened in my assumption, and repeated my assertion in Studies in Maimonides. Not too long ago I received an e-mail from Dr. Dror Fixler. Fixler is one of the people from Yeshivat Birkat Moshe in Maaleh Adumim who is working on new editions of Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah. I will return to his work in a future post when I deal with the newly published translation of the Commentary. For now, suffice it to say that he knows Arabic very well, and he asserts that there is no doubt whatsoever that in the Commentary to Avodah Zarah 4:7 Maimonides is denying the existence of demons. So this brings me back to my original assumption many years ago, that Maimonides indeed is explicit in his denial. If there are any Arabists who choose to disagree, I would love to hear it.
8. I recently sent a copy of the reprint of Kitvei R. Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg (2 vols.) to a famous and outstanding Rosh Yeshiva. In my letter to him I mentioned that the books were a donation to the yeshiva library. He wrote back to me as follows:
מאשר בתודה קבלת כתבי הגאון רבי יחיאל יעקב וויינברג זצ”ל בשני כרכים. מלאים חכמה ודעת בקיאות וחריפות ישרה, ולפעמים “הליכה בין הטיפות” מתוך חכמת חיים רבה. אולם בכרך השני יש דברים שקשה לעכל אותם, כגון לימוד זכות על מתבוללים ממש (הרצל ואחה”ע [אחד העם] בגרון ועוד) למצוא בהם “ניצוצות קדושה”. ומי שיראה יחשוב כי מותר לומר לרשע צדיק אתה. לכן כרך ב’ נשאר אצלי וכרך א’ לעיון התלמידים הי”ו.

 

I don’t think that any Rosh Yeshiva in a Hesder yeshiva would say that we should shield the students from the words of a great Torah scholar, but maybe I am wrong. I would be curious to hear reactions. In response to his letter, I sent this Rosh Yeshiva R. Abraham Elijah Kaplan’s essay on Herzl, to show him that Weinberg’s views in this regard were not unique.
Interestingly, in his letter to me the Rosh Yeshiva also wrote:

 

מה מאד נפלא מ”ש בסוף עמוד ריט על שיטת הגר”ח מבריסק לעומת שיטת הגר”א. מבחינה זו אנו לומדים בישיבה בשיטת הגר”א.

 

He was referring to this amazing letter from Weinberg:
קראתי את מאמרו של הגרי”ד סולובייציק על דודו הגרי”ז זצ”ל. השפה היא נהדרה ונאדרה והסגנון הוא מקסים. אבל התוכן הוא מוגזם ומופרז מאד. כך כותבים אנשים בעלי כת, כמו אנשי חב”ד ובעלי המוסר. מתוך מאמרו מתקבל הרושם כאלו התורה לא נתנה ע”י מרע”ה חלילה כי אם ע”י ר’ חיים מבריסק זצ”ל. אמת הדברים כי ר’ חיים הזרים זרם חדש של פלפול ע”ד ההגיון לישיבות. בהגיון יש לכל אדם חלק, ולפיכך יכולים כל בני הישיבה לחדש חידושים בסגנון זה, משא”כ בדרך הש”ך ורעק”א צריך להיות בקי גדול בשביל להיות קצת חריף ולכן משכל אנשי הישיבות מתאוים להיות “מחדשים” הם מעדיפים את ר’ חיים על כל הגאונים שקדמו לו. שאלתי פעם אחת את הגרי”ד בהיותו בברלין: מי גדול ממי: הגר”א מווילנא או ר’ חיים מבריסק? והוא ענני: כי בנוגע להבנה ר’ חיים גדול אף מהגר”א. אבל לא כן הדבר. הגר”א מבקש את האמת הפשוטה לאמתתה, ולא כן ר’ חיים. הגיונו וסברותי’ אינם משתלבים לא בלשון הגמ’ ולא בלשון הרמב”ם. ר’ חיים הי’ לכשלעצמו רמב”ם חדש אבל לא מפרש הרמב”ם. כך אמרתי להגאון ר’ משה ז”ל אבי’ של הגר”יד שליט”א.

 

9. My last two posts focused on R. Hayyim Dov Ber Gulevsky. With that in mind, I want to call everyone’s attention to a lecture by R. Aharon Rakefet in which he tells a great story that he himself witnessed, of how students in the Lakewood yeshiva were so angry at Gulevsky that they actually planned to cut his beard off. It is found here  [25] beginning at 65 minutes. The clip has an added treat as we get to hear the Indefatigable One, who mentions travelling to Brooklyn together with a certain “Maylech” in order to visit Gulevsky.
10. And finally, apropos of nothing, here is a picture that I think everyone will get a kick out of. The bride is Gladys Reiss. It shows the Rav in his hasidic side. (Thanks to David Eisen and R. Aharon Rakefet for providing the picture.)

[1] Some of the lies of this paper have been dealt with by R. Moshe Alharar, Li-Khvodah shel Torah (Jerusalem, 1988). Here are two condemnations of Yated printed in Alharar’s book.

 

For examples of the paper’s most recent outrages, take a look at two articles from the issue that appeared during the Ten Days of Penitence (!). The articles are available here and here.

 

The first is a vicious attack on the Shas MK R. Hayyim Amsellem for his authorship of a halakhic study arguing that those non-Jews who serve in the Israeli army should be converted using a less strict approach than is currently in practice. Amsellem, who is a student of R. Meir Mazuz and an outstanding talmid hakham, wrote this piece and sent it to some leading poskim to get their opinions. Amselem also discussed his approach in an interview.

 

What did Yated do? It attacked the “nonsensical, heretical remarks” of Amsellem, knowing full well that his article was not a practical halakhic ruling, but a work of Torah scholarship sent out for comment. And why is what he wrote “nonsensical” and “heretical”? Because it contradicts the viewpoint of “Maranan ve-Rabbanan Gedolei Yisrael,” the papacy that Yated has created.  As with every papacy, no one is permitted to have a different viewpoint. We see that clearly in the next article I linked to. Here the paper deals with the great sages who have permitted brain death. Obviously, Yated has started to believe its own papal rhetoric, since rather than offer any substantive comments, all it can do is refer to R. Elyashiv and unnamed former and current gedolei Yisrael. From Yated’s papal perspective, this is supposed to silence all debate, as if Judaism is a religious dictatorship. Yet it is not, and although Yated will never admit it, there are also former and current gedolei Yisrael who do accept brain death.
[2] “Be-Inyan ha-Gemarot ha-Mevuarot ha-Hadashim,” Or Yisrael 50 (Tevet, 5768), p. 42.
[3] “Be-Inyan Hadpasat ha-Gemara im Targumim u-Ferushim Hadashim,” Or Yisrael 50 (Tevet, 5768), pp. 39-40. Gorelik even claims that the only reason the Hafetz Hayyim agreed to support the Daf Yomi program was as a defense against the Haskalah and Reform. R. Chaim Rapoport responded to Gorelik, ibid., pp. 57ff.
[4] For the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s take on this, see here beginning at 8 minutes (called to my attention by a friend who wishes to remain anonymous). The Rebbe’s words are very strong: Since we know that “people” do not tell a lie that is likely to be found out, it must be that the liars are not in the category of “people” i.e., human beings!
[5] The phenomenon of children distorting their father’s legacy is also something that deserves a post of its own. One thinks of the efforts of the children and grandchildren of R. Gedaliah Nadel and R. Eliezer Waldenberg in opposition to the publication of Be-Torato shel R. Gedaliah and the reprinting of Hilkhot ha-Medinah. R. Nadel’s children were even successful in having Be-Torato removed from Hebrewbooks.org. There are many other such examples, some of which relate to the Rabbinical Seminary of Berlin, which like Yeshiva University was sometimes a place to be forgotten after one left the world of German Orthodoxy. For example, see R. Shmuel Munk’s biographical introduction to the work of his father, R. Shaul Munk, Bigdei Shesh (Jerusalem, 1973). There is no mention that R. Shaul studied at the Rabbinical Seminary. If that wasn’t enough, R. Shmuel, in the introduction, p 19, even attacks the German Orthodox practice of reading German poetry, going so far as to say that no one [!] has permitted this. As with the Yated, “no one” means “no one we regard as significant.” For an earlier post that deals with a posthumous removal of the Rabbinical Seminary from one graduate’s biography, see here.

 

None of the obituaries of R. Shlomo Wolbe mentioned that he studied at the Rabbinical Seminary of Berlin for a short while, but in this case I assume that the writers were unaware of this. The entry on Wolbe in Wikipedia does mention it, and I was the source for this information. My source is Weinberg’s letter to Samuel Atlas, dated June 10, 1965:

 

 

כך סיפר בן אחיו של וולפסון, מר אביעזר וולפסון, תלמיד מונטרה לפנים, ואח”כ תלמיד ישיבת באר יעקב, שבה משמש המנהל רוחני מר וולבה, יליד ברלין, בנו של סופר חילוני וכופר גמור. למד בכתות הנמוכות של בית מדרשנו, ואח”כ הלך לישיבת מיר ונעשה לחניכו של ר’ ירוחם ז”ל, המשפיע המוסרי הגדול.

 

 

The point mentioned by Weinberg, that Wolbe was raised in a non-Orthodox home, was never a secret. Some additional details of his turn to Orthodoxy were related by Anne Ruth Cohn, Dayan Grunfeld’s daughter. See here

 

Yet, as we have come to expect, the Yated cannot be honest with its readers. Thus, in its obituary here. It writes: “Shlomo Wolbe was born in Berlin to R’ Moshe in Tammuz 5674,” making it seem that he was from an Orthodox home. The obituary continues with more falsehoods: “As a child he studied in his home city and at a young age was sent to Yeshivas Frankfurt.” Needless to say, there is also no mention of Wolbe’s university studies.

 

Another example worth mentioning is the following: Those who read Making of a Godol will recall the description of R. Aaron Kotler’s irreligious sister who tried to convince him to leave the world of the yeshiva. Yet in Yitzchok Dershowitz’ hagiography of R. Aaron, The Legacy of Maran Rav Aharon Kotler (Lakewood, 2005), p. 63, this communist sister is described as “religious, but ‘secular education’ oriented.” See Zev Lev, “Al ‘Gidulo shel Gadol,’” Ha-Ma’ayan 50 (Tishrei, 5770), p. 104.

 

The absolute best example of this phenomenon relates to the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s brother, Yisrael Aryeh Leib. He was completely irreligious. There are people alive today who can testify to his public Sabbath violation. He even kept his store open on Shabbat. See Shaul Shimon Deutsch, Larger than Life (New York, 1997), vol. 2, ch. 7. Deutsch was even able to speak to his widow. Yisrael Aryeh Leib also has a daughter who presumably would be willing to describe what her father’s attitude towards religion was, if anyone is really interested in knowing the truth. I think it is very nice that Chabad in England commemorates his yahrzeit, see here, and this is very much in line with Chabad’s ideology that every Jew is precious. Yet what is one to make of this “institute”?

 

Here Yisrael Aryeh Leib, “the youngest brother of the Rebbe, Melech HaMoshiach, who lives forever,” is turned into a rabbi and devoted chasid. I actually contacted the person who runs the “institute” and asked him how he can so blatantly distort the historical record. Communicating with him was one of the most depressing experiences I have had in a long time. It is one thing for a person to believe foolish things, but here was a guy who had drunk an extra dose of the Kool Aid, and with whom normal modes of conversation were impossible. This is actually a good limud zekhut for him: unlike many other cases where the people distorting the historical record are intentionally creating falsehoods, in this case the distorter really believes what he is saying.
[6] R. Mark Urkowitz, who was a student of R. Gorelik, told me that at the end of his life Gorelik commented to him that he was very happy he taught at YU, since this was the only yeshiva whose graduates were bringing Torah to all corners of the United States. When Urkowitz later told this story to another of Gorelik’s son, he denied that his father could ever have said this. Urkowitz and one other person recalled to me how at Gorelik’s funeral YU was never mentioned in any of the eulogies. It was as if the major part of Gorelik’s life for forty years had never existed.
[7] Ishim ve-Shitot (Tel Aviv, 1952), pp. 58-59.
[8] Aaron Rakeffet-Rothkoff, The Rav, vol. 1, p. 227.
[9] This is Zevin’s preface to the story (translation in Louis Jacobs, A Tree of Life [London, 2000], pp. 54-55, n. 49):

 

Why did R. Hayyim refuse to write responsa? Some think that his remoteness from the area of practical decisions stemmed from the fact that he belonged to the ranks of “those who fear to render decision,” being afraid of the responsibility that it entails. But this is not so. The real reason was a different one. R. Hayyim was aware that he was incapable of simply following convention and that he would be obliged, consequently, to render decisions contrary to the norm and the traditionally accepted whenever his clear intellect and fine mind would show him that the law was really otherwise than as formulated by the great codifiers. The pure conscience of a truthful man would not allow him to ignore his own opinions and submit, but he would have felt himself bound to override their decisions and this he could not bring himself to do.
[10] See here.
[11] For more on Abraham Bick the communist, and his relationship with R. Moshe Bick, see here for the following report:

 

אברהם ביק הכרתי בפעם הראשונה כהרה”ר של רוסי’ בא לבקר לארה”ב בשנת תשכ”ח ביזמת הרב טייץ מאליזאבעט נוא דזשערזי. וכבוד גדול עשו לו וכל גדולי ארצינו באו לבקר אותו ולחלוק לו כבוד — הוא למד בסלאבאדקא והי’ ממלא מקומו של הרב שלייפער, וניהל בחכמה ובתבונה את רבנתו ועמד על משמרתו הוא בא ביחד עם החזושל לענינגראד -השומר- בבארא-פארק עשו פאראד גדול וכל הישיבות והבית-יעקב יצאו לרחובה של עיר לחוק כבוד להעומד על משמרת היהדות ברוסי’ משם נסעו לישיבת תורה-ודעת שכל הגדולים דברו וחיזקו את הרב לעווין .משם נסעו לאליזאבעט מקום הרב טייץ — שחלקו רב בענייני יהדות רוסי’ —  וגם שם הי’ פאראד גדול. והרב לעווין הי’ מאוד מרוגש .ודמעות נזלו מעיניו. נחזור לביק-הוא הי’ קאמאניסט. והי’ מכונה הרב של הקאמאניסטים. הוא כתב מאמרים בשבועון שלהם ותמיד המליץ טוב על הקאמאניסטים שהם לא רודפים את הדת. וכשהרב לעווין הי’ כאן הוא הי’ מראשי המחותנים שם. ואז דברתי איתו בפעם הראשונה. אח”כ הוא עלה לארה”ק ועבד במוסד הרב קוק ומצאתיו שם אך לא רציתי להכאיבו ולא דברנו על העבר. אז נתן לי שני ספרים א] זהרי-חמה הגהות על הזוה”ק מהיעב”ץ. ועוד ספר למוסרו לש”ב הרה”ג רמצ”א זצ”ל ביק — הוא פשוט רצה להתפייס איתו כי הם לא היו שוה בשוה-וכשהבאתי את הספרים להרב ביק דברתי איתו על אברהם ביק ואביו הרה”ג שהי’ חתן המשמרת שלום מקאדינאוו, והי’ בעל הוראה מובהק. בקיצור לאחר זמן חזר לארה”ב בגין אישתו וביתו שלא היו בקו הבריאות — הוא הי’ דמות טראגית — אביו שלחו מארה”ב ללמוד לארה”ק. אך הי’ תמיד שומר תורה ומצוות הי’ אידאליסט ולא הי’ בן יחיד במחשבתו שהקאמאניזום יציל את האנושות והיהדות .הוא לא עשה זאת מטעם כסף .הוא לא הי’ מאטראליסט. והשם הטוב יכפר בעדו.

 

[12] Ha-Maor, Tamuz 5726, p. 18.
[13] Ha-Gaon ha-Rav Meir Amsel (Monsey, 2008), p. 262.
[14] See R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer in Moriah, Nisan 5769, p. 150.
[15] R. Chaim Rapoport provides some of these sources in his article in Or Yisrael, Tishrei 5770.
[16] For R. Abraham Elijah Kaplan’s view, see his Mivhar Ketavim (Jerusalem, 2006), pp. 287-288.
[17] After quoting this halakhah, Rama cites an opposing view, but this is cited as יש אומרים, meaning that the first ruling is the one Rama accepts. Even this view is not something that would go over well in the Modern Orthodox world: וי”א דאסור להטעותו אלא אם טעה מעצמו שרי
[18] Although he might not be fired, any Modern Orthodox rabbi who stated as follows would also be in hot water, as the congregation would be outraged: “One is not allowed to admire gentiles or praise them.” The writer of these words goes on to say that collecting baseball cards is also forbidden. “While it may be that some people trade them only for financial gain, the reason for collecting the cards is more likely because of an appreciation and admiration for the personalities depicted on them. This is forbidden.” Quite apart from the terrible lack of judgment in putting the first sentence (“One is not allowed to admire gentiles or praise them”) into an English language book (for obvious reasons), should we be surprised that a halakhist who thinks baseball cards are forbidden is one of the poskim of the formerly Modern Orthodox OU? See R. Yisrael Belsky, Shulchan Halevi (Kiryat Sefer, 2008), pp. 132, 133. (For another ruling against baseball cards, see R. Yitzhak Abadi, Or Yitzhak, Yoreh Deah no. 26.) In discussing the issue of praising Gentiles and the prohibition of le tehanem, Meiri writes as follows, in words that have become basic to the Modern Orthodox ethos (Beit ha-Behirah: Avodah Zarah 20a):

 

כל שהוא מן האומות הגדורות בדרכי הדתות ושמודות בא-להות אין ספק שאף בשאין מכירו מותר וראוי.

 

[19] Samuel Cohon discusses Rama’s ruling in Faithfully Yours (Jersey City, 2008), pp. 87-88.
[20] See similarly R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady, Shulhan Arukh, Hilkhot Ona’ah, no. 11.
[21] Along these lines, see here for a recent article by R Binyamin Lau dealing with a husband who wanted to know if he was halakhically permitted to hit his wife.
[22] Sihot ha-Rav Tzvi Yehudah: Bereishit, ed. Aviner (Jerusalem, 1993), pp. 295-297, 310-312.
[23] In Studies in Maimonides I cite numerous examples. Here is one more to add to the list. R. Tzefanyah Arusi, “’Lo ba-Shamayim Hi’ be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Mesorah le-Yosef 6 (2009), p. 396:

 

מה שהשיג הגר”א בעניין השדים והכשפים, יש להשיב על כל דבריו: וכי מניין לו שלדברי רבנו אין מציאות לשדים ולמכשפים וכיו”ב.

 

[24] See his Ketavim (Jerusalem, 1989),  vol. 2, pp. 600-601.
[25] “The Bracha for Kidush Ha-Shem,” Sep. 21, 2008.



Tevie Kagan: The Enigmatic R. David Lida

The Enigmatic R. David Lida
by Tevie Kagan
Tevie Kagan works in the Seforim industry.  This is his first post for the TraditionOnline Seforim blog.
Part I: R. David of Lida and Plagiarism
R. David ben Aryeh Leib of Lida (c.1650-1696) is a fascinating and enigmatic figure. He was the rabbi of multiple communities over the course of his lifetime including Lida, Ostrog, Mainz, and the Ashkenazic community in Amsterdam. He was forced to leave Amsterdam under a cloud of alleged plagiarism and possible Sabbatean beliefs; though he was acquitted of these charges by the council of the four lands (Va’ad Arba Ha-Aratzot), he never recovered from the various accusations. He is not a well-known individual today, yet many of his works survive and are still available in print. This post (the first of two) will present a detailed account of his life and will attempt to see if both the accusations of plagiarism and heretical beliefs have merit.
R. (David) Lida was born in Zwollen, Lithuania into a prominent rabbinical family. His uncle was R. Moshe Rivkes, author of the Be’er Ha-Golah. Other family members that Lida cites within his works include R. Yeshaya Horowitz, author of the Shnei Luchos Habris (Shelah), R. Yosef of Pozna, R. Naftali Hertz of Lemberg, and R. Yaakov Cohen of Frankfurt. He was married to Miriam the daughter of R. Wolf Yuspef of Lvov (Lemberg) and had two sons, Nathan and Pesachya, and two daughters. One of the daughters was married to R. Yerucham b. Menachem, who helped prepare Shomer Shabbos (one of Lida’s early works) for printing, and the other was married to R. Abraham b. Aaron, who helped with the printing of Shomer Shabbos in Amsterdam. In his work Ir David, Lida testifies[1] that his primary teacher was R. Joshua Hoeschel b. Jacob of Cracow (c.1595-1663), who was one of preeminent rabbis of the time.[2]
From 1671 until 1677, R. David was rabbi in Lida. He then served as a rabbi in Ostrog and Mainz, replacing R. Samuel David b Chanoch of Lublin, the author of Divrei Shmuel who had passed away. In 1681, Lida left Mainz and became a rabbi in Amsterdam. After being forced out of Amsterdam, Lida appealed to the council of the four lands. By doing so he succeeded in getting himself reinstated in Amsterdam. However, his position was untenable, so he reached a financial agreement and moved to Lvov, where he lived until his death in 1696.[3]

The following is a list of Lida’s works (with the topic covered in parentheses):
¨ Beer Esek – Frankfurt on the Oder/Lublin, 1684 (apologetic)
¨ Beer Mayim Chaim- lost, never printed (on Code of law)
¨ Chalkei Avanim– Fuerth, 1693 (on Rashi’s commentary on bible) reprinted in Yad Kol Bo under the title Migdol Dovid
¨ Divrei David– Lublin, 1671 (ethics)
¨ Dovev Sifsei Yesheinim- lost, never printed (mishnah)
¨ Ir David– Amsterdam, 1683 (incomplete), 1719 (complete) (Homiletics)
¨ Ir Miklat – Dyhernfurth, 1690 (613 commandments)
¨ Migdol David –Amsterdam,1680 (Ruth)
¨ Pitschei She’arim – Pirush Tefilos- partially printed in Yad Kol Bo (prayer)
¨ Shalsheles Zahav
¨ Shir Hillulim– Amsterdam, 1680 (poem in honor of dedication of a new Torah)
¨ Shomer Shabbos – Amsterdam, 1687 printed with Tikkunei Shabbos, reprinted in Yad Kol Bo, and reprinted separately in Zolkolov, 1804 (laws of Sabbath)
¨ Sod Hashem Sharbit Hazahav– Amsterdam, 1680 (on circumcision)
¨ Tapuchei Zahav kitzur reishis chochma – Fuerth, 1693
¨ Yad Kol Bo- Amsterdam/Frankfurt on the Oder, 1727(Collection)
While in Amsterdam (about 1694), Lida was accused of libel, plagiarism and Sabbatean leanings. Since many of the documents surrounding both controversies no longer exist, we can only attempt to recreate what happened.
Lida is Accused of Libel

R. Yaakov Sasportas (c.1610-1698) has a series of responsa[4] that refer to the libel case. One of the prominent members of the Sephardic congregation, R. Nissan ben Judah Leib, the brother in law of R. Isaac Benjamin Wolf ben Eliezer Ashkenazi (Chief Rabbi in Berlin and the author of the Nachlas Binyomin (Amsterdam, 1682)), claimed that on a trip to Wessel R. Nissan had found defamatory letters about himself and R. Isaac Benjamin Wolf, which R. Nissan alleged were written by Lida. Lida denied having written these letters. R. Nissan submitted copies of the letters to the Sephardic court, presided over by R Yitzchak Abuhav, R Yaakov Sasportas and R Shmuel Deozida. The court requested the original letters, and when they could not be produced, the court decreed that Lida did not write the letters and that he was an upstanding rabbi of the community. The court also demanded that R. Nissan apologize, which he did. Subsequently the Sephardic court sent a letter to both R Wolf Lippman and the Council of the Four Lands requesting they revoke all bans against Lida and to forgive both themselves and Lida. This letter included the signatures of many prominent rabbis of the time, though many of these rabbis may have been influenced by Lida’s famous brother-in-law, Yitzchak b. Abraham of Posnan, who was the first signature on the list.
Additionally, Lida himself wrote a work entitled Beer Esek,[5] in which he attempts to clear his name.The work begins with an introductory homily, after which Lida then proceeds to defend himself from the charges of plagiarism. Lida’s letter ends off with letters and signatures of approbation..
Charges of Plagiarism

Charges of plagiarism hounded Lida regarding many of his works. The first work that this charge was leveled at was Divrei David (Lublin, 1671), an ethical treatise broken up into seven parts, corresponding to the days of the week. On the title page of this work, Lida states that it is culled from the words of Rishonim upon which he added his own additions. The bibliographer, Joseph Zedner (1804-71), in his Catalogue of the Hebrew Books in the Library of the British Museum (London, 1867), was the first to note that the text of the Divrei David is identical to a part of the text of the Sefer Yirah published by Aryeh Judah Loeb ben Aryeh Priluck.
The work itself contains information that is inconsistent with Lida’s biography. For example, the author talks about trips to Israel (nos. 6, 77, and 85), serving as rabbi in Israel (no. 46), and refers to a work that he wrote called Zer Zahav on the Bible (no.72). At the time Divrei David was published Lida was 21 and, as far as we know, never visited Israel, as he never mentions it anywhere else in any of his works. Even more puzzling is that he never authored a work on the Bible called Zer Zahav! Interestingly, Gershom Scholem argues that whoever the author of Divrei David was the author had Sabbatean leanings as there is a possible Shabbati Zevi reference in the beginning of the section on Shabbos.[6] Was this work stolen from a previous work? It would appear so; but, in defense of Lida, he admits that he culled his work from other sources. Nevertheless, this would not account for his borrowing of accounts of positions, travels or works written.
The Sefer Yirah was first published from manuscript in 1724 (Lida had published Divrei David in 1671). The publisher of the Sefer Yirah, Priluck, clearly states on the title page that he found a manuscript and had no idea as to whom was its author. Priluck adds statements and revises the original work where he saw fit. One example is in the “morning half” of the “first day,” where he adds (in the fifth section) that he already printed a prayer book which was grammatically correct. Most of the other additions are merely clarifications of the earlier work [for example, in the “night section” of the first day he clarifies that the Shema referred to is the one said in bed before sleep (Kriat Shema al Ha’Mita)]. Within the section of the fourth day Lida mentions (part 77) that he was in Jerusalem, and he concludes that one should cover their head with a hat when saying grace (birkat ha’mazon); yet this last item is not found in the Priluck version of Sefer Yirah. In total, there are about twenty slight differences, but most are stylistic, with Priluck changing particular words and verses. The Sefer Yirah concludes with a statement that this is where the manuscript ends and that he does not want to add from other sources. The Warsaw edition of 1873 of the Divrei David adds an entire section of good traits (minhagim tovim). Interestingly the most recent reprinting (Brooklyn, 2006 by R. N.M., German) adds 2 more pages of character traits not found in the Warsaw edition. This would not be the only work that would come under suspicion that Lida wrote.
Lida’s most famous work that is under the suspicion of plagiarism is his Migdol David, published in 1680 while Lida was still rabbi in Mainz. The work was published with 17 approbations (haskamot). While some of the approbations do not mention the work Migdol David specifically, by reading them one gets the idea that many felt it was an original work. In his Beer Esek, Lida alludes to R. Nisan’s claim that accused Lida of stealing the work (R. Nisan did so by saying that Lida “wears the talis of another”). Many believe that this work was really a copy of R. Hayim Ben Abraham Ha-Kohen’s (c.1585-1655) [7]Toras Chessed. For instance, R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai, ,writes “truthfully [Migdol David] is the work of R. Hayim Kohen, author of the Tur Barekes…” (Shem ha-Gedolim, Marekhet Seforim, s.v. Migdol David). ,Azulai also cites the Yaavetz (R. Yaakov Emden) and his charge in Toras Hakanaos (see below). The Menachem Tziyon attempts to clear Lida’s name by showing that many great rabbis attested to his kabalistic knowledge, but ultimately he too leans towards the plagiarism charge. [8]

The Yaavetz, in his Toras Hakanaos, lists a group of works that he charged with having Sabbatean leanings and allusions. He includes Lida’s work, not as a potential Sabbatean work,[9] but rather as a plagiarized one, and, more specifically, to support his claim that Lida’s character was suspect, and even possibly Sabbatean. Sabbateans were known to have “double natures,” one being outwardly righteous, while the inner being corrupt and immoral (more about this to come in part 2 of this post, R. David of Lida and Sabbatianism). The Yaavetz shows that Lida took the work but left an allusion to Hayim Kohen’s name in the introduction, which states, “ממקור מיים בריכה העליונה כה”נא רב”א” Lida’s choice of words is suspect, as Lida was neither a Kohen nor named Hayim.
More recently, Marvin Heller[10] has argued that a parable in the introduction to Lida’s work alludes to the fact that it is not an original work. The allegory (from the Zohar) regards a rooster who finds a pearl while searching for food. Startled by the pearl’s beauty, the rooster recoils and wonders what caused the pearl to be hidden. A man, seeing the rooster recoil, stops to see what caused the reaction; when he sees the pearl, he proceeds to give it to the king. As a result, the king honors the rooster. Lida writes: “So to I found in this scroll blossoms and fruit which give forth a brightness, delightful to the sight and desirable to the eye, ‘its fruit is good for food’ (Genesis 2:9)…when this distinguished book comes to the hand of one who appreciates its value … and also who publishes it will be remembered for good before the King, King of the universe” (emphasis added). This choice of language seems to be referring to a publisher not an author. In Lida’s Ir Miklat, in the glosses where Lida mentions “my book Migdol David,”[11] Azulai (in his comments) interjects: “He printed it.” Eisner seeks to defend Lida, even though he had never seen a copy of the rare Migdol David. Eisner argues that since all the charges were found to be groundless in the first case against Lida, so too the plagiarism charges must be false. He attempts to buttress this by showing that Lida had a reputation for being a Kabbalist. In 1681, the notorious anti-Semite Johann Andreas Eisenmenger (ca.1654-1704) visited Amsterdam and wrote about meeting Lida in his Entdecktes Judentum (Frankfurt am Main, 1700). He speaks of Lida and how he was a great scholar and Kabbalist. Interestingly, towards the end of the introduction of Ir David, Lida states that he hopes that this work will be printed without the mistakes and errors that the printers added to his work Migdol David, which he was unable to fix. Is Lida attempting to lay the groundwork for the argument that any troubling pieces within Migdol David are not his, but rather the work of the printers?
Slightly more telling about both of the works that are suspected of being stolen is that Lida references them in his other works very infrequently. In contrast, Ir David is referenced quite frequently within his other writings. When themes or interpretations are referenced in Chalkei Avanim that are supposedly printed in Lida’s other works (specifically Migdol David) he does not give the work’s name, but just the statement “and it is understood.”[12]

Even after his death Lida’s works have encountered problems. His son Pesachya printed a collected volume of his works entitled Yad Kol Bo (Amsterdam 1727) in which was included a work on Psalms called Assarah Hillulim. According to Brill, this was actually written by the Calvinist-Hebraist, Heinrich Jacob van Bashuysen (1679-1750) and published in Sefer Tehilim im Pirush ha-Katzar, Hanau, 1712.[13]
[1] Ir David, First Sermon
[2] See Dembitzer Kelilas Yofi Krakow:1893 pg59a-59b
[3] For the date of Lida’s death, see Solomon Buber, Anshei Shem (Krakow, 1895), where he recreates the correct date based on approbations Lida had given, which are marked after the date on his tombstone.
[4] Ohel Yaakov 75-76
[5] Reprinted in Abraham Eisner, Toledot Hagaon R. David Lida (Breslau,1938) and in Aaron Freimann, Sefer Hayovel for Nahum Sokolow (Warsaw, 1904)
[6] See Warsaw edition that actually puts Lida as author and includes that he wrote Zer Zahav and Bris Yitzchok, which Lida did not.
[7] See Encyclopedia Judaica entry where Scholem states that Lidas plagiarism was well known in Kabalistic circles before H.J.D. Azulai made it public. Scholem offers no source or examples for this statement. Also interesting to note is that whatever Azulai’s thoughts on Lida’s character may have been, he still wrote glosses to Lida’s work Ir Miklat.
[8] See also Ohr Hayim (Hayim Michael), where he unequivocally states that it is a stolen work from R. Hayim Kohen.
[9] Yehuda Liebes, in “Sefer Tzadik Yesod Olam- Mythos Shabetai” (reprinted in On Sabbateanism and its Kabbalah: Collected Essays (Jerusalem, 1995), pg. 303-304, note 22) shows that even Migdol David is not free of possible Sabbatean leanings. These could not have come from R Hayim Kohen as he died before Sabbateanism grew to the movement that it later became.
[10] Marvin J. Heller, David Ben Aryeh Leib of Lida and his Migdol David: Accusations of Plagiarism in Eighteenth Century Amsterdam, Shofar (Jan. 1, 2001) (translation of text is his).
[11] Commandment 190
[12] For examples see Brooklyn edition 2006-pg. 5, fn 1; pg. 8, fn 8.
[13] For more on Bashuysen, see Encyclopaedia Judaica under his name entry. Eisner strongly disagrees and says that it clearly is not a Christian work, and that it includes many ideas from Lidas other works.