New Writings from R Kook Part 1 by Marc B. Shapiro

New Writings from R Kook and Assorted Comments, part 1
by Marc B. Shapiro
20 Marheshvan,[1] 5771
I now want to return to R. Kook and discuss some of his writings that have recently appeared. This is the first of what will be a five part post. It will be followed by at least one other multi-part post also dealing with R. Kook’s new writings.
For those who have never read R. Kook and don’t understand why there is such excitement every time a new collection is published, I suggest you do the following: Take one of the volumes and sit with it for an hour, just going through it, page after page. Odds are that you will be hooked. The originality that you find, and the power of his writing, is just breathtaking. It is impossible not to sense the power of his spirit, and it draws you in.
Books will be written on R. Kook, focusing on the insights found in the recently published volumes. They will analyze what is original in these works and the evolution of his thought. My purpose is more limited as I just want to call attention to some passages that caught my attention and which I think are significant, not just in the context of R. Kook’s writings, but also for anyone interested in Jewish thought.
In 2006 R Kook’s Kevatzim mi-Ketav Yad Kodsho appeared, and we can thank Boaz Ofen for this. Included in this volume is what is referred to as the last notebook from Bausk, which was where R. Kook served as rabbi from 1901 until his aliyah in 1904. On pp. 66-67 we find what I think is R. Kook’s first discussion of evolution. Unlike his other writings, here R. Kook mentions that he is relying on Maimonides on how to deal to deal with it. He mentions that Maimonides assumes the eternity of the world when he seeks to prove the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God. Maimonides adopts this model so that his proof will be acceptable to everyone. R. Kook states that this is also how we should deal with the issue of evolution. In other words, even if we don’t accept it, we should, for the sake of argument, assume that evolution is correct and explain the Torah based upon this. This will mean that even people who accept evolution will see the truth of Torah. By rejecting evolution, and declaring that it is in opposition to the Torah, right from the start you are stating that Judaism has no place for those people who accept one of the major conclusions of modern science. It is noteworthy that this text does not have any of R. Kook’s later thought, which speaks of the theory of evolution as being in accord with kabbalistic truth.

Another early statement of his with regard to evolution is found in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:594. Here he says that it is very praiseworthy to attempt to reconcile the Creation story with the latest scientific discoveries. He says that there is no objection to explaining the Creation, described as six days in the Bible, to mean a much longer period. He also states that we can speak of an era of millions of years from the creation of man until he came to the realization that he is separate from the animals. This in turn led to the beginning of family life, in other words, “civilization”.
What R. Kook is saying is that the entire story of the creation of Adam and Eve is not to be viewed as historical. Rather, it is a tale that puts in simple form a long development of man’s intellectual and spiritual nature.[2] He doesn’t see this development as random, for he says that at the end of the long period it was a vision, or perhaps we should call it an epiphany, that offered man the perception that it was time to establish family life. It is, I think, obvious that the אדם referred to by R. Kook as beginning civilized life is not an actual historical man (i.e., Adam), but rather humanity as a whole.[3]

אין מעצור לפרש פרשת אלה תולדות השמים והארץ, שהיא מקפלת בקרבה עולמים של שנות מליונים, עד שבא אדם לידי קצת הכרה שהוא נבדל כבר מכל בעלי החיים, ועל ידי איזה חזיון נדמה לו שצריך הוא לקבע חיי משפחה בקביעות ואצילות רוח.
R. Kook also explains that the deep sleep God placed Adam in (Gen. 2:21) can be understood as representing the length of time it took for humanity to come to the awareness of the idea of “bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh”. In other words, R. Kook sees the opening chapters of Genesis as representing a long period of development of the most important ideas of civilization, that of the dignity of man and the importance of family and the bond of marriage. Nothing here is as it appears, and literalism is out of the question.
We find in R. Kook’s most recently published book, Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, more passages that relate to what I have been discussing.[4] This is an early work which was being prepared for publication and was released on the internet against the wishes of the editor. It has now been widely distributed and there is no reason not to cite it. R. Kook saw this book as a modern day Guide for the Perplexed, so obviously there is a great deal we can learn from it. Shortly after the work was “released,” another edition of the book was published by the folks at Merkaz ha-Rav. They called it Pinkesei ha-Reiyah, vol. 2, and like everything else produced by these people, it is heavily censored.[5] (Parts of Pinkesei ha-Reiyah have been included in the new Humash ha-Reiyah that was just published. Here is a sample.

Although it would have been better had the editors used Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, this new Humash is still a wonderful book to take to shul. You can find out more about it here.)

Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor begins (ch. 2) by arguing that it is the “obligation of the true sages of the generation” to follow in the path of the medieval greats who were always concerned about those suffering religious confusion. While the contemporary spiritual leaders must respond to the concerns of modern Jews, R. Kook points out that since the issues confronting people today are so different than those of the medieval period, the works of the rishonim are of only limited value in confronting the current problems.

In ch. 3 R. Kook states that the medieval approach of trying to “prove” religion will not work in our day, and that in place of this, religious leaders should stress justice and righteousness, i.e., the humane values of Judaism.[6] He recognizes that the real problem for modern Jews is not the scientific or philosophical challenges to Torah, but the ethical ones, and that Torah scholars must explain those concepts that appear to stand in contradiction to modern ethical values. He sees this task as just like what the medievals did in dealing with the physical descriptions of God in the Bible, which contradicted the philosophical notion that God has no form. These sages showed the way out of this problem and in the end the truth of the Torah was understood. R. Kook says that contemporary sages must do the same thing with regard to ethical challenges. If not, people will reject the Torah because they view its message as contradicting what they know to be ethical, that which R. Kook refers to as “the laws of natural morality” (חקי המוסר הטבעיים).
With this in mind, let me quote an amazing passage of R. Kook that I have referred to before. It appears in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:75 and the translation is by David Guttmann.[7]

Yir’at Shamayim—fear of heaven—may not supplant the natural sense of morality of a person, for in that case it is not a pure Yir’at Shamayim. The signpost for a pure Yir’at Shamayim is when the natural sense of morality (המוסר הטבעי) that is extant in the straightforward nature of man is improved and elevated by it more than it would have been without it. But if one were to imagine a kind of Yir’at Shamayim that without its input, life would tend to do well and bring to fruition things that benefit the community and the individual, and furthermore, under its influence less of those things would come to fruition, such a Yir’at Shamayim is wrong.

The upshot of this passage is that some (much?) of what passes for piety today is really nothing more than a corrupted religiosity.

This natural morality that R. Kook spoke of was not only in nature, but also in people. This led R. Kook to a unique understanding of the relationship between scholars and masses. Anyone who has studied in a yeshiva knows that it inculcates a certain amount of condescension for the masses. For what could the masses, the typical am ha-aretz, possibly have to offer the scholar? Yet R. Kook saw matters differently, and recognized that there was an element of natural Jewish morality in the masses that was no longer to be found among the scholars, and the scholars ignored this to their own detriment. And let us not forget that the masses that R. Kook was referring to were not like many of our masses who go to day school, yeshiva in Israel, and attend daf yomi before going to work. The East European Jewish masses never opened a Talmud after leaving heder. They were pious and recited Psalms and came to a shiur in Ein Yaakov or Mishnayot, but without having studied in yeshiva, and lacking an Artscroll, the Talmud was closed to them. Incidentally, the rabbis had no problem with this arrangement, unlike today when Talmud study has become a mass movement.

Had the masses in R. Kook’s day had any serious learning, then he couldn’t have said what he did, because his point is precisely that learning “spoils” some of the Jew’s natural morality. Here are R. Kook’s words in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:463:

האנשים הטבעיים שאינם מלומדים, יש להם יתרון בהרבה דברים על המלומדים, בזה שלא נתטשטש אצלם השכל הטבעי והמוסר העצמי על ידי השגיאות העולות מהלימודים, ועל ידי חלישות הכחות וההתקצפות הבאה על ידי העול הלימודי.
This is a an anti-intellectual passage, in which we see R. Kook favoring the natural morality and religiosity of the simple Jew over that of his learned co-religionist. (It was precisely this sort of sentiment that was expressed by Haym Soloveitchik at the end of “Rupture and Reconstruction.”) Can anyone be surprised that this passage was not published by R. Zvi Yehudah? He recognized all too well the implications of these words, which I am only touching on here.

R. Kook continues by saying that the masses need the guidance of the learned ones when it comes to the halakhic details of life. That we can understand, since the masses can’t be expected to know, say, the details of hilkhot Shabbat. But in a passage quite subversive to the intellectual elite’s self-image, R. Kook adds that the learned ones also have a lot to learn from the masses. In fact, if you compare what each side takes from the other, I don’t think there is any question that what the masses give the learned is more substantial than the reverse.
והמלומדים צריכים תמיד לסגל לעצמם כפי האפשרי להם את הכשרון הטבעי של עמי הארץ, בין בהשקפת החיים, בין בהכרת המוסר מצד טעביותו, ואז יתעלו הם בפיתוח שכלם יותר ויותר
In ch. 4 of Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, R. Kook comes to evolution and here he speaks of the billions of years of history identified by modern science. He says that this is a problem for the קטני דעה who think that evolution is a rejection of God, but those who hold such a position are making a great error. The true believer will be led to even greater wonder at the ways of God when he sees how long it has taken for species to evolve. As for the Creation story, R. Kook begins ch. 5 by telling us that it is not to be understood literally, as Maimonides had already taught. Knowing that some might nevertheless be tied to a literal reading of the opening chapters of Genesis, R. Kook insists that this is not one of the principles of the Torah. (Until a few years ago this was not a principle in the haredi mind either.)
In ch. 5 we see R. Kook’s preference for the evolutionary scheme over the traditional story of creation at one time, and he sees this understanding as bringing us closer to God. Just as we are amazed by the growth of a baby inside the womb, so too we will be in awe at the development of the physical world. He is absolutely clear that the creation story is not a scientific description but is directed towards a moral end:
ויסוד הדבר, שלא דברה תורה כי אם במה שנוגע לכדור ארצינו, וגם זה רק לפי התוכן שיובן הצד המוסרי שנוגע להישרת דרכי האדם הליכותיו החיצוניות ורגשותיו הפנימיים יפה יפה
This is a strong rejection of the neo-fundamentalist hermeneutical acrobatics of people like Gerald Schroeder (and to a lesser extent Nathan Aviezer).[8] They start with the assumption that the Torah’s Creation story is indeed describing scientific reality, yet until they explained it, no one in history had understood the meaning of the verses. From R. Kook’s perspective, this is a great misinterpretation of what the Creation story is telling us. As for the “young earthers’” objection (which I admit to having never understood) that Shabbat depends on seven 24 hour days of creation, R. Kook disposes of that without much ado:
אין כל מניעה בזה לא מצד הכתובים, ולא מצד חובת קדושת השבת שמכוונת כפי הציור הפנימי של האדם
He continues by saying that other parts of the Creation story can also be explained in a non-literal fashion:
ואפילו אם נפרש עוד יותר על פי משל את הסידור של בריאת האדם, שימתו בגן עדן, קריאת השמות, בנין הצלע, אין דבר מתנגד ליסודי התורה . . . ואין קפידא אם נצייר הנחש כולו ציורי, וכן עץ הדעת על התגלות הנטיה לצאת ממצב המנוחה והתמימיות העדינה
Crucial for R. Kook’s understanding is that that there came a point in human development when man was able to recognize the Divine. Only then could he be described as created in the image of God.
Even before the recent publications, these thoughts of R. Kook were not unknown. Here is what he writes in Iggerot ha-Reiyah, no. 134:
אין לנו שום נפ”מ אם באמת היה בעולם המציאות תור של זהב [=גן עדן], שהתענג אז האדם על רב טובה גשמית ורוחנית, או שהוחלה המציאות שבפועל מלמטה למעלה מתחתית מדרגת ההויה עד רומה, וכך היא הולכת ומתעלה
The last part of this quotation refers to the evolutionary understanding, in that existence works its way “from the bottom up”.
Returning to Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, ch. 5, as an example of how the allegory works, R. Kook refers to Eve being taken from Adam’s rib, which cannot be understood literally if we are dealing with an evolutionary scheme. He sees this as a vision, designed to show that family life can only succeed if both husband and wife join together. The wife cannot be a helpmate alone, but has to be joined with her husband. A surface read of this passage might lead one to think that according to R. Kook this “vision” was an actual event that occurred with the historical “first man”, which would means that this first man had a relationship with God. Yet from Shemonah Kevatzim 1:594, which is a parallel passage to the one in Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, we see that this is not the case.
להשוות סיפור מעשה בראשית עם החקירות האחרונות הוא דבר נכבד. אין מעצור לפרש פרשת אלה תולדות השמים והארץ, שהיא מקפלת בקרבה עולמים של שנות מליונים, עד שבא אדם לידי קצת הכרה שהוא נבדל כבר מכל בעלי החיים, ועל ידי איזה חזיון נדמה לו שצריך הוא לקבע חיי משפחה בקביעות ואצילות רוח, על ידי יחוד אשה שתתקשר אליו יותר מאביו ואמו, בעלי המשפחה הטבעיים. התרדמה תוכל להיות חזיונית, וגם היא תקפל איזה תקופה, עד בישול הרעיון של עצם מעצמי ובשר מבשרי. והודיע הכתוב שקדושת המשפחה קדם להבושה הנימוסית בזמן, וכן במעלה, שאחר ההתעוררות מהתרדמה הוחלט דבר זאת הפעם, ומכל מקום היו שניהם ערומים ולא יתבוששו.
According to R. Kook’s portrayal of humanity’s development in the direction of a stable family unit, there is only one word to describe the story told in Gen. 2, and that is “myth.” While in the popular mind myth often is identical with fairy tale, this is not how scholars understand myths. For them, myths communicate cosmic truths in non-historical story form, and they are not synonymous with legends. My dictionary explains myth as “a usually traditional story of ostensibly historical events that serves to unfold part of the world view of a people or explain a practice, belief, or natural phenomenon.” This explanation is a perfect description of what R. Kook writes in the passage just quoted from Shemonah Kevatzim.
The problem is, where do you draw the line? Is it only the stories at the beginning of Genesis that can be interpreted in a non-historical fashion, or has the door been opened to other sections of the Torah as well? R. Kook already confronted this issue in one of his classic letters to his student, Moshe Seidel (Iggerot ha-Re’iyah, vol. 2, no. 478), whom he had encouraged to study Semitic languages.[9] R. Kook admitted that there was no clear dividing line, but that the Jewish people as a whole would come to a proper insight.
ואם אין כל יחיד יכול להציב גבול מדויק בין מה שהוא בדרך משל בתורה ובין מה שהוא ממשי – בא החוש הבהיר של האומה בכללה ומוצא לו את נתיבותיו לא בראיות בודדות כי אם בטביעות עין כללית.
Following this, R. Kook raises the issue of what to do if it can be proven that the Torah’s description of matters is not entirely accurate. Often when R. Kook spoke about these matters, he was referring to the Torah’s description of creation vs. what science tells us. Yet I don’t think that this is what he is referring to in this letter. To begin with, he doesn’t speak about issues of science here. He is talking generally about matters described in the Torah that conflict with research (hakirah). These would also include historical descriptions found in the Torah. We must remember that the letter is to Seidel, who was involved in academic Bible study and was struggling with this. I think it is pretty clear that his concern was not with science and creation but with the larger issue of what the Torah recorded vs. what the critical scholars were saying. (Unfortunately, I am informed that Seidel’s letter to R. Kook, which R. Kook is in turn responding to, is not found in the R. Kook archive.)
R. Kook tells Seidel that even if the Torah’s descriptions (“the commonly accepted description”) are not accurate, there must be an important and sacred purpose for these matters to have been presented in this way, rather than being described in an exact fashion. In order to show that this is a proper approach, R. Kook brings two amazing parallels. The first one is the law of yefat toar. In my earlier post dealing with developing morality, available here, I quoted R. Kook’s other recently published comments about yefat toar. Here is making a different point. He refers to the Talmud in Kiddushin 21b which states that this entire law is a concession to human passions, but it is not proper. The proper thing would be for a Jewish soldier never to do this, but since in the real world this sort of thing will happen, the Torah provides a context for it to be done in a more civilized manner.[10] The parallel R. Kook sees is that just like the morality described in the law of yefat toar is not perfect, but rather a concession to human weakness, so too descriptions of various things in the Torah need not be “perfect”, that is, historically accurate. There are times when for its own purposes the Torah needs to describe matters in ways that will accomplish certain goals, even if the descriptions are not “true,” i.e., historically true.
The next parallel he offers is Ex. 18:19, which describes Mt. Sinai at the time of the Revelation and states that “its smoke ascended like the smoke of the lime pit.” Rashi, based on the Mekhilta, comments that this reference to the smoke being like a lime pit was “to explain to the ear that which it can understand (לשבר את האזן).” In other words, it wasn’t really like a lime pit but this description is used to accomplish a larger goal. R. Kook develops this concept, and refers to this Rashi. Here is the passage in full:
ואם נמצא בתורה כמה דברים, שחושבים אחרים שהם לפי המפורסם מאז, שאינו מתאים עם החקירה של עכשו, הלא אין אנו יודעים כלל אם יש אמת מוחלטת בחקירה הזמנית, ואם יש בה אמת, ודאי יש גם מטרה חשובה וקדושה שלצרכה הוצרכו הדברים לבא בתיאור המפורסם ולא המדויק, כמו שהוא פשוט במושגים הרוחנים ובכמה יסודי מעשה, ש”דבר תורה כנגד יצה”ר” או “לשבר את האזן.”
Elsewhere, in Eder ha-Yekar, pp. 37-38, R. Kook explains that the Torah can describe events in a way not in accord with the astronomical or geological (i.e., historical) truth. This is done in order for the Torah to accomplish its goal, which is not focused on such matters but rather on
ידיעת האלהות והמוסר וענפיהם בחיים ובפועל, בחיי הפרט, האומה והעולם
In words very similar to those in his letter to Seidel, R. Kook writes there:
כבר מפורסם למדי שהנבואה לוקחת את המשלים להדרכה האנושית, לפי המפורסם אז בלשון בני אדם באותו זמן, לסבר את האוזן מה שהיא יכולה לשמוע בהוה, “ועת ומשפט ידע לב חכם”, וכדעת הרמב”ם וביאור הרש”ט במורה נבוכים סוף פרק ז’ משלישי, ופשטם של דברי הירושלמי שלהי תענית לענין קלקול חשבונות של תשעה בתמוז.
What R. Kook is saying here is that prophecy uses what is “widely accepted”, even if mistaken, as well as the forms of speech current among contemporary listeners.[11] With this conception, one can’t be disturbed if the Torah or other prophets describe matters not in accord with the facts as we know them today, because the immediate audience of the prophet did think that these were the facts. So, for example, the Torah does not describe a universe billions of years old because that was not part of the mental conception of the ancient Israelites. What is new in this passage is R. Kook’s reference to Maimonides and Shem Tov’s commentary.
He doesn’t explain what he has in mind when he refers to Maimonides, but by examining Shem Tov’s commentary to Guide 3:7, which R. Kook also refers to, all is revealed. Here Shem Tov is discussing Maimonides’ view of Ezekiel and a scientific error the prophet made. Shem Tov concludes his discussion with the following revealing words:
ידבר הנביא בענינים העיוניים במשפט החכם ולא ידבר בהם כמו נביא אם שאמרם הנביא
What this means is that when the prophet is speaking about philosophical or scientific matters, he is speaking from his own wisdom, not prophetic insight. Shem Tov’s point is that the prophet will assimilate his prophetic message to his own words, and the latter, based as they are on his own life experience and knowledge, could also contain error.
This is all based on what Maimonides himself writes in Guide 2:8. Here he explains that there is a dispute if the heavenly spheres emit sounds. The Sages believe they do, and Aristotle rejects this. Maimonides adopts Aristotle’s view and explains that the Sages were mistaken. In Guide 3:3 Maimonides identifies the wheels (ofanim) in Ezekiel’s vision with the spheres, and if you examine Ezekiel 1:24 and 10:5 you find that the prophet describes the wheels (=spheres) as producing sounds. The upshot of this is that according to Maimonides Ezekiel’s prophecy incorporated a mistaken scientific view, a view which he points out was later shared by the Sages of Israel. This explanation of Maimonides, quoted from Narboni, is recorded by Shem Tov in his commentary to Guide 3:7.[12] As mentioned, this is what R. Kook refers the reader to.
Ralbag, commentary to Gen. 15:4 and to Job, end of ch. 39, also refers to Maimonides’ view that the prophets could be in error about scientific matters. He refers in particular to Ezekiel’s scientific error, and expresses his agreement with Maimonides’ position. In his commentary to Job he explains:
ספר זה עם ספורו שאר הדברים הנעלמים להיות זה נעלם לאיוב כי בנבואה יבואו כמו אלו הענינים לפי המקבל . . . שכבר יגיע לנביא דבר כוזב בעת הנבואה, במה שאין לו מצד שהוא נביא מצד הדעות אשר לו בענינים ההם.
In other words, prophetic books might record mistaken ideas because that is what the prophet thought. Ralbag gives another example of this. In Gen. 15 Abraham was told to look at the sky and just as he could not count the stars of heaven so too his children will be so numerous. According to Ralbag, this is an example of a prophet receiving false information in accord with his mistaken conception. Since Abraham falsely believed that there are many stars, his prophecy contained this false conception, while in reality according to Ralbag there are actually a limited number of stars.
Ralbag further explains his view of the stars in Milhamot ha-Shem 5:1:52, which has not yet been published and is quoted from manuscript in the Birkat Moshe edition of Ralbag on Genesis, pp. 222-223. Here Ralbag rejects the view of those who thought that there were many unseen stars and asserts that the only stars are those that can be seen. (Maimonides, Guide 1:31, states that the number of the stars is unknown.) He mentions that others had assumed that there were unseen stars because otherwise the prophecy of Abraham would not make sense. If you look up at the stars there aren’t so many of them, and therefore, what type of promise is it that Abraham’s descendants will be as many as the stars?
Unlike in his commentary to Genesis, here Ralbag does not claim that Abraham’s prophecy was incorrect when it came to the number of stars. Instead, he states that the meaning of the verse is not that Abraham’s descendants will be so many that they can’t be counted. Rather, just like it is difficult to count the stars, so too it will be difficult to count the descendants of Abraham because they will be so many. His proof for this contention is Moses’ words to Israel, Deut 1:10: “The Lord your God hath multiplied you, and, behold, ye are this day as the stars of heaven for multitude.” Moses says this even though he had already counted the Children of Israel. Yet because they were so many that it was difficult to count them, he refers to them as “the stars of heaven”. According to Ralbag, this proves that the comparison with the stars does not mean “too many to count”, but only “difficult to count”.
Ralbag also cites a talmudic passage (Berakhot 32b) which speaks of an enormous number of stars (three hundred and sixty five thousand myriads). This contradicts his own view that the number of stars are quite limited. Yet Ralbag is not troubled and declares, in words that would get him banned today:
שבכמו אלו הדברים לא נרחיק שיהיו לקצת חכמינו אז דעות בלתי צודקות, כמו שיזכרו שחכמי ישראל היו אומרים שהגלגל קבוע ומזלות חוזרים ומה שדומה לזה.
In his commentary to Genesis 15:4 he writes:
לא יחוייב שיהיו אצל הנביא כל הדעות האמיתיות בענין סודות המציאות
Obviously, if you are prepared to say that great prophets such as Abraham and Ezekiel were wrong in scientific matters, it is only natural to assume the same thing when it comes to the Sages.
Of course, we know today how wrong Ralbag was. In fact, it is only in modern times that one can really appreciate Abraham’s prophecy. Later, in Gen. 22:17, he is told that his descendants will be as numerous as the sand and as the stars in the heaven. Centuries ago I think many people must have wondered about this verse. They could understand the promise that his descendants would be like the sand since the sand is so numerous it can’t be counted. Yet how is this comparable to the stars, since anyone can look up at the sky and see that there aren’t that many stars at all? Thus, pre-modern man should have been troubled since the two parts of the verse don’t correspond, even though they are supposed to. It is only with the invention of telescopes that people could see that the two parts of this verse, the sand and the stars, are really saying the same thing. Scientists now believe that the amount of stars runs into the sextillions and that there are more stars than grains of sand on the earth!

Returning to R. Kook’s letter to Seidel, he also refers to the end of Taanit in the Jerusalem Talmud. What is this about? According to Jeremiah 39:2 the Jerusalem city walls were breached on the ninth day of Tamuz. Yet JTaanit 4:5 states that this occurred on the seventeenth of Tamuz. How to make sense of this contradiction? The Jerusalem Talmud answers as follows:
קלקול חשבונות יש כאן

Korban Edah explains:
מרוב הצרות טעו בחשבונות ולא רצה המקרא לשנות ממה שסמכו הם לומר כביכול אנכי עמו בצרה
In other words, the book of Jeremiah records mistaken information, but that is because it chooses to reflect the mistaken view of the people, rather than record the accurate facts. As the final words of Korban Edah explain, there are more important considerations for the prophet than to be accurate in such matters. R. Kook sees the lesson of this talmudic passage as applicable to elsewhere in the Bible, namely, that absolute accuracy in its descriptions (both scientific and historical) is not vital and can therefore be sacrificed in order to inculcate the Bible’s higher truths. R. Kook does not tell us how far to take this principle, and no doubt he himself was not sure.[13] The only thing he could say was that these matters would be settled by, as mentioned already, החוש הבהיר של האומה
Another example of a biblical book containing incorrect information is found in Nehemiah 7:7, as explained by the medieval commentary attributed to Rashi. After noting that the numbers given in Nehemiah ch. 7 are not always the same as those mentioned in the book of Ezra, “Rashi” states:
ולא דקדק המקרא בחשבונות כל כך אבל הכלל שוה . . . ועל זה הכלל סמך כותב הספר ולא דקדק בחשבון הפרטיות כל כך.
What this means is that the author of the book of Nehemiah was not careful in the details he recorded, as long as the big picture—in this case, the total number of people—was correct. How many other places in the Bible can we apply this insight to?
The fourteenth-century R. Eleazar Ashkenazi ben Nathan ha-Bavli has an even more radical approach, as he believes that there are inaccuracies in the Torah itself.[14] It is true that at times he is quite conservative. For example, he rejects Ibn Ezra’s assumption that there are post-Mosaic elements verses in the Pentateuch.[15] He also strongly rejects the aggadah that the Land of Israel was not included in the Flood,[16] because the verse tells us that all life on earth was destroyed: ואין לחוש על דבר משמכחיש גופי התורה
Yet his more “liberal” side is seen many other places. For example, he assumes that the extremely long lifespans found at the beginning of Genesis are not to be taken literally (p. 29).
וימי חייהם אז היו כימי חיי אנשי דורנו לא פחות ולא יותר כי לא היו אז מזהירים כשמש ולא חזקים כנחושה, אבל היו מבשר ודם ומזרע אשה ומדם נדותה ככל אשר אנחנו עושים פה היום
If people never lived so long, why were these number included in the Torah? R. Eleazar claims that Maimonides’ approach is to regard the lengthy lifespans as simple figures of speech, not meant to be taken literally any more than the statement that the Land of Israel was flowing with milk and honey or that the cities in Canaan were “fortified up to Heaven” (Deut. 1:28).[17]

He also offers another explanation for the lengthy lifespans, namely, that the Torah recorded what the popular belief was, no matter how exaggerated, and Moses was not concerned about these sorts of things. In other words, just like today people say that the Torah is not interested in a scientific presentation of how the world was created, R. Eleazar’s position is that the Torah is not interested in a historically accurate presentation. In his mind, this has nothing to do with the Torah’s goals, and therefore there was no reason for the Torah not to present matters as they were believed at the time, even if these perceptions were inaccurate. The important thing, he says, is that the people would know that from the creation of the world until Israel stood at Sinai was close to three thousand years. This would help solidify belief in creation. The records of lifespans are just a means to illustrate this information.[18] He adds that when it came to events closer to Moses’ time, Moses was careful in preserving a more accurate accounting, while leaving the stories of the distant past cloaked in legend.
There are other ways rationalists have dealt with the lengthy lifespans. For example, R. Nissim of Marseilles regards these years not as indicating an individual life, but rather the “lifespan” of the way of life (i.e., laws, customs) instituted by the figure in question, or the time until another one like him arose. He also assumes that when the Torah says that someone bore a son, it doesn’t have to mean a literal son. Here is what he writes in Maaseh Nissim, p. 274:
יש מי שפירש שהכונה בחיים ההם קיום נמוסיו והנהגותיו הזמן [בזמן] הנזכר, בין בחייו בין אחר מותו. כי אלו, אפשר שהיו אנשי שם, מחקים חוקים ונימוסים, ומנהגים במידותיהם, גם במאכלם ומשתיהם ובמלבושיהם, ואחר הזמן ההוא אפשר שנשתכח הכל ובחרו דרך אחרת. או תאמר, שלא קם כמוהו עד זה הסך מן השנים במעלת ידיעת ההנהגה לבני דורו. ובזמן ההוא קם כמוהו במעלה, נמשך לדעתו וכונתו, ונחה רוחו עליו כאשר נחה רוח אליהו על אלישע. ואם לא ראה הראשון זה שקם אחריו ולא היה בזמנו, אפשר למד מספריו או התבונן בדבריו המקובלים, ועל זה כתוב: “ויולד” שהוליד בדמותו במעלה, כאלו הוא הוליד האיש ההוא מאשר הוא בעל הדעת ההוא שלמדוהו.
In support of this approach, he refers to Va-Yikra Rabbah 21:9 which cites an opinion that Scripture intimated to Aaron that he would live 410 years. Although the Torah tells us that he only lived to 123 (Num. 33:39), the Midrash says that the righteous High Priests in the First Temple are called by Aaron’s name. In other words, they represent the spirit of Aaron, so in that sense it can be said that he lived so many hundreds of years. So too, R. Nissim thinks, when Scripture speaks of other people living so many hundreds of years it is to be understood in this fashion.
Another approach was suggested by R. Moses Ibn Tibbon, who is quoted by R. Levi ben Hayyim.[19] According to Ibn Tibbon, the years given for people’s lives are actually the years of the dynasties they established.[20] (His other suggestion is the same as that of R. Nissim, mentioned above.):
והחכם ר’ משה פירש, כי כל אחד מאלו היה מלך או הניח נימוס, וכל זמן התמדת מלכותו ומלכות זרעו, או כל ימי המשכות נימוסו, קרא דור אחד, כאלו היה המלך או מניח הנימוס חי, וטעם “ויולד בנים ובנות” כי לאורך הזמן רבו ועצמו בני מלכותו או אנשי דתו, ושלחו קצתם אל ארץ אחרת.
R. Levi ben Hayyim offers basically the same approach (p. 326):
ונראה לי כי הדורות הנזכרים היו ראשי אבות, וזרע כל אחד נקרא בשמו כפי מספר השנים ההם. כי כל אחד, כמו שנאמר, הוליד בנים ובנות, כמו שנראה היום, עד שנשקע השם מהדורות הבאים אחריו, וקח מאתו זרע איש אחד מפורסם, וקראו בני זרעו ומשפחתו על שמו זמן מה, וכן התמיד עד שנתחדש דור אחר, נקרא [!] בניו ובני בניו על שמו [צ”ל שם] חדש. והורה ספור הדורות ההם מאדם ועד זמן משה על חדוש העולם.
To be continued
* * *
The new semester of Torah in Motion has just begun. The first figure I am dealing with is R. Elijah Benamozegh. You can sign up to participate in the classes here.
You can also sign up for the classes of Moshe Shoshan, Abe Katz, R. Daniel Feldman, and William Gewirtz. Dr. Gewirtz, who has published on the Seforim blog, will be giving three FREE special classes dealing with various aspects of time in Jewish law. This is a topic that few have been able to master and the classes promise to be a treat.
Even if you can’t watch the classes live, videos and audio are sent to you so that you can watch or listen at your convenience.

Also from Torah in Motion, information will soon be coming about the July trip to Central Europe that I will be leading.
[1] For the proper explanation of the etymology of Marheshvan, see Ari Zivotfsky’s article in Jewish Action, Fall 2000, available here. See also Abraham Epstein, Mi-Kadmoniyot ha-Yehudim (Vienna, 1887), pp. 23ff. Zivotofsky does not offer any sources for the mistaken etymology that Heshvan is bitter (mar) because it has no holidays in it. I don’t know the first appearance of this notion, but it already is found in R. David Meldola, Moed David (Amsterdam, 1740), p. 64a.
[2] Among rishonim, Ibn Caspi had already stated that Adam was not the first man. See Matzref ha-Kesef, pp. 16-17 (contained in Mishneh Kesef, vol. 2). In order to understand what Ibn Caspi is saying in this passage, one needs to be attuned to his elusive style. See also his commentary to Guide 1:14, where he understands Maimonides to be saying that the Adam of Genesis is really referring to Moses.
[3] Rishonim already proposed that the word האדם in Gen. ch. 2 refers to humanity, rather than an individual person. See e.g., Ibn Ezra to Gen. 2:8, who states that this interpretation is a secret, i.e., not designed for the masses. See also his commentary to Ex. 3:15. R. David Kimhi also felt that this “truth” should be kept from the masses, who should instead be taught a different “truth”, namely, the Adam and Eve story in a literal fashion. See his esoteric commentary to Genesis, printed in Louis Finkelstein, ed., The Commentary of David Kimhi on Isaiah (New York, 1926), p. LIV:

עתה אשוב לפרש הנסתר אשר מפסוק וייצר ה’ א-להים את האדם (בראשית ב, ז) עד זה ספר תולדות אדם (בראשית ה, א) ותחלה אומר כי האדם הנזכר מפסוק זה עד זה ספר תולדות אדם הנגלה הוא על אדם הראשון והנסתר הוא על שם המין ושניהם אמת אך הנגלה הוא להמון והנסתר הוא ליחידים שהם סגולת ההמון.

Here is how he understands the Garden of Eden (ibid.):

עדן הוא משל לשכל הפועל הוא העדן האמתי הרוחני והא-ל נטע בו גן מקדם בראש בריותיו כשברא השכלים הנבדלים.
[4] You can find the book here
[5] See Eitam Henkin’s post here. For another post by Henkin on this book, see here. English readers are probably unaware of Henkin, the son of R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin. In the last few years he has really created a reputation for himself as he has authored a number of important articles which show an incredible amount of knowledge on the history of Torah Judaism in modern times. He has also written a sefer, soon to be published, which deals with the halakhot of bugs in food. Unlike the rage today, he rejects the extreme positions, one of which is that due to bug infestation, strawberries are no longer permitted to be eaten. See e.g., here. Henkin’s book will carry the following haskamah of R. Meir Mazuz.

[6] R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg would later argue against trying to “prove” Judaism in the medieval fashion. In the post-Hume and post-Kantian world I thought that this was pretty much agreed upon by everyone. How wrong I was can be attested to all who attended my lecture on Maimonides at the 2008 New York Limmud conference and recall the dispute that took place afterwards. An individual who is involved in kiruv adamantly insisted that the major doctrines of Judaism can be proven to the same degree of certainty as a mathematical proof, and that these truths can thus be proven to non-Jews (who if they don’t accept the proofs are being intellectually dishonest). In this conception, there is no longer room for “belief” or “faith”; since the religion has been “proven” we can only speak of “knowledge”. The notion that Judaism could not be proven in this fashion was, I think, regarded by him as akin to heresy. I have had a lot of contact with “kiruv professionals” and had never come across such an approach. Yes, I know that people speak about the Kuzari proof for the giving of the Torah. However, I always understood this to be more in the way of a strong argument rather that an absolute proof, with the upshot of the latter being that one who denies the proof is regarded as intellectually dishonest or as a slave to his passions. I also know R. Elchanan Wasserman’s strong argument in favor of the viewpoint expressed by my interlocutor (see Kovetz Ma’amarim ve-Iggerot, pp. 1ff.), but before then had never actually found anyone who advocated this position, lock, stock and barrel. So the question to my learned readers is, is there a kiruv “school” today which does outreach based on the “Judaism can be proven” perspective?
[7] See here.
[8] In his latest book, God According to God, Schroeder—who according to his website teaches at Aish ha-Torah— “goes off the haredi reservation” in a much more serious way than Slifkin. Here is how his website describes the book: “In God According to God, Schroeder presents a compelling case for the true God, a dynamic God who is still learning how to relate to creation.” See here. I daresay that one would be hard-pressed to find even a Modern Orthodox rabbi who would not regard this view of an imperfect God as a heretical position.

In a future installment I will deal with Aviezer who unlike Schroeder, has real Judaic learning. Unfortunately, despite his scientific expertise, Schroeder makes numerous errors when he deals with the Jewish side of things. From what I see on the internet, it appears that a majority of his readers are non-Jewish, so these errors will not be noticed by them. Yet they are bound to be annoying to educated Jewish readers. Let me give just a few examples from his new book, God According to God.

P. 11: “The Hebrew word for ‘slave’ is ‘worker’ with all the connotations that differentiate the modern concept of slave from that of a worker.” He then apologetically describes the laws of slavery without distinguishing between the Hebrew slave and the Canaanite slave, and apparently without realizing that the latter was indeed a real slave. See Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 158:1, where R. Moses Isserles writes:


מותר היה לנסות רפואה בעבד כנעני אם תועיל
P. 11: “Returning an escaped slave to the master was absolutely forbidden (Deut. 23:15-16).” Yet we are not Karaites and a glance at Rashi will show that this is not as “liberal” a law as he makes it out to be.

P. 22: [T]he ancient biblical commentators, those whose writings predate by many centuries the discoveries of modern science (writers of the Talmud, ca. 400; Rashi, ca. 1090; Maimonides, ca. 1190; Nahmanides, ca. 1250), learned from the detailed wording of Genesis that the universe is young and old simultaneously. These ancient commentators actually discuss what science has only recently discovered, that the flow of time is flexible.”

P. 23: “Moses Maimondes refers to a madah teva, the science of nature.”

P. 195: “The [biblical] Hebrew word le’olam has three root meanings: “forever,” “hidden” and “in the universe”.

Nothing I have said should be taken to imply that Schroeder does not have what to offer. However, before he publishes anything it should be reviewed by a Torah scholar, much as I would expect a talmid chacham writing on science to have his writing reviewed by a professional scientist.
[9] See Iggerot la-Re’iyah, vol. 1, no. 108. Seidel would later teach at Yeshiva College where some of the Roshei Yeshiva were upset with his views. See Ari Shvat, “Hahlatato shel ha-Rav Kook le-Tzamtzem et Hazono le-Limud Mehkari-Madai bi-Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav,” Talelei Orot 15 (2009), pp. 149-174.
[10] In a recent issue of Iturei Yerushalayim (Sivan 5769, pp. 9-10), R. Shlomo Aviner responds to a soldier who in all seriousness wanted to apply the law of yefat toar today with regard to Palestinian women. The soldier had in mind the understanding that rape of a yefat toar is permitted during battle.
Complete details can be found in the Encyclopedia Talmudit entry for yefat toar. There is a lot in this entry which will distress any reader, and according to the Sages, that is the way people should feel, for the entire law was a concession to human weakness. That is, it was a necessary evil, not something that people should strive for or feel proud of. This is how the entry in the Encylopedia Talmudit begins:

היוצא למלחמה וראה בשביה אשה נכרית וחשק בה, מותר לו לבא עליה – על כרחה.

In other words, it is permitted to rape a captive woman, and it was based on this understanding that R. Aviner was asked the question. Yet it is probably also the case that this view is not held by all. I say this since the Encyclopedia Talmudit entry itself records that there are those who require the woman to be converted before sex, and there are also those who state that the woman cannot be converted against her will. Although I haven’t compared all the positions, it is likely that there is some overlap here, i.e., authorities who require the woman to be converted and also hold that the conversion has to be an act of her free will.

Yet it is also the case that plenty of authorities do permit rape of a yefat toar (including a married woman), either on the battlefield or later. In his commentary to Gen. 34:1, Nahmanides writes:

כל ביאה באונסה תקרא ענוי, וכן לא תתעמר בה תחת אשר עניתה.

I have no doubt that today, when everyone would be horrified by this behavior, and it is forbidden in all civilized societies (and even uncivilized ones), such an action would not be permitted even as a concession to human weakness. I can’t imagine that anyone in our day would condone rape, no matter what the circumstances, and certainly no one would defend the following opinion quoted in the Encyclopedia Talmudit:

היתה השבויה קטנה, כתבו אחרונים שביאה ראשונה – לסוברים שהיא לפני גירות – מותרת אף בקטנותה.

From R. Aviner’s reply we see that he doesn’t believe that the yefat toar law has any applicability today:

בוודאי שאין דין יפת תואר נוהג בימינו, ואני תמה על השאלה הזאת שהנך שואל למעשה, שכידוע לא דיברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע, והרי אדם צריך להלחם ביצר הרע ולא לחפש היתרים ליצר הרע. וכבר כתב רבי יהודה החסיד בספר חסידים [סי’ שעח] שיש דברים שהתורה התירה אבל אם יעשה אותם האדם הוא יבוא לדין עליהם שהרי התורה רק התירה בגלל יצר הרע. ואם אדם נותן שחרור ליצר הרע, הוא ייתן את הדין . . . לגופו של עניין, כל הדין הזה הוא בשביה, ולא שאדם ילך לבתים של אויבים ויעשה שם נבלות, והרי נשים אינן שבויות צה”ל, וגם אם יש שבויה, בוודא שצה”ל לא ירשה כזו נבלה . . . בסיכום, זה לא שייך כלל וכלל. הרחק ממחשבות אלו, אלא אדרבה למד הרבה בספר מסילת ישרים.

In this, R. Aviner is following the approach of R. Kook who speaks of the need to rise above the law of yefat toar. In my previous post dealing with developing morality, referred to in the text, I quoted R. Kook as follows:

כל לב יבין על נקלה כי רק לאומה שלא באה לתכלית חינוך האנושי, או יחידים מהם, יהיה הכרח לדבר כנגד יצר הרע ע”י לקיחת יפת תואר בשביה באופן המדובר. ומזה נלמד שכשם שעלינו להתרומם מדין יפת תואר, כן נזכה להתרומם מעיקר החינוך של מלחמת רשות.

Note that R. Kook speaks of תכלית חינוך האנושי and not Torah education.

We have recently seen the publication of Torat ha-Melekh (which I will discuss in a future installment of this post). When I told a friend about the question of the soldier to R. Aviner, he commented, only half-jokingly, that we will probably soon see a book on how Israeli soldiers can institute the law of yefat toar in modern times.

Finally, I would be remiss in not mentioning that R. Meir Simhah of Dvinsk basically turns the entire law of yefat toar into something completely theoretical, much like ben sorer u-moreh. I say this because R. Meir Simhah assumes that the law is not applicable in a war where the enemy could be holding Jewish prisoners, which in the real world is always the case. Here are his words in Meshekh Hokhmah, Deut. 21:10:

נראה דהוא תנאי בהיתר יפת תואר, שדוקא אם ה’ נותן האויב ביד ישראל. אבל כדרך המלחמות שאלו שובים מהם, והאויב שובה מהם, והדרך כשעושים שלום או בתוך המלחמה, מחליפים שבויים שאינם ניאותים עוד למלחמה. אם כן יתכן כי עבור היפת תואר שמגיירה ונושאה לאשה בעל כרחה, יעכבו ישראל חשוב ונכבד, על זה לא הותר היפת תואר.

[11] The exact same point is made by the Gaon R. Shlomo Fisher, Beit Yishai (Jerusalem, 2004), p. 361:
. . . העיקר גדול שהשרישו לנו הקדמונים שדברה תורה כלשון בני אדם. והכונה היא לאותו לשון שדברו בו בני אדם באותו הדור שבו נאמרו הדברים.

Fisher uses this insight to explain Zechariah 4:10: שבעת אלה עיני ה’ המה משוטטים בכל הארץ

According to Fisher—and this is an incredible insight for a traditional interpreter (although it is already noted in the International Critical Commentary)— this verse alludes to the שבעה כוכבי לכת. These are the seven heavenly bodies identified already by ancient Babylonian astronomers: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, moon, and sun. Yet with the invention of the telescope we now know that there are more planets, meaning that Zechariah’s prophecy was based on a scientific error. But as Fisher explains, this is not a problem because as mentioned, prophecy is given in accord with the knowledge of the generation. Fisher adds that prophecy is also given in accord with the knowledge of the prophet, which in this case as with Ezekiel was based on a scientific error.
כי הנבואה תבא לו לנביא לפי תמונת העולם שבלבו

As an aside, I wonder why no one has tried to put Fisher’s book under a ban. While Slifkin stated that the Sages didn’t know everything about science, Fisher goes further and says that even the prophets didn’t know it all. He adopts the same approach to explain why classic Kabbalistic texts are based on outmoded scientific assumptions:

שחכמת הקבלה מיוסדת על תמונת העולם וחוקי הטבע שלפי חכמי יון, כגון, מציאות הגלגלים, ז’ כוכבי לכת, וד’ יסודות, וחומר וצורה. וההנחה שכל דבר נמשך למקורו.

Since I deal with R. Eleazar Ashkenazi ben Nathan ha-Bavli in this post, it is worth calling attention to his original understanding of the word שבועה. He sees it as related to the word seven, meaning that one who breaks an oath sins against God who controls the seven heavenly spheres. See Tzafnat Paneah, ed. Rappaport (Johannesburg, 1965), p. 69 (I think he means the seven spheres each of which contains a heavenly body, as opposed to the eighth sphere which contains the so-called כוכבי שבת, or fixed stars):

כי שם נשבעו בשבועת האלה. כי מי שיעבור על הברית ירבצו בו אלות מכח השבעה הגלגלים וזה סוד שם שבועה כי חלל שם ה’ המנהיג השבעה הגלגלים.
[12] Fisher, Beit Yishai, p. 361, accepts this interpretation of Maimonides. Ibn Caspi, Commentary to Guide 2:8, does not believe that Ezekiel’s actual prophecy could contain error. Rather, the error came during a dream of Ezekiel, not an actual prophecy. He also distinguishes between Sages who can err, as they are using their wisdom, and prophets who during actual prophecy do not err. However, when they are not prophesying they are susceptible to error like anyone else.
[13] Shalom Carmy took note of R. Kook’s comments and raised the following questions, without offering any answers:
It seems obvious that Rabbi Kook doesn’t advocate wholesale rejection of biblical statements. To do so would render Tanakh useless as a source of history. Under what circumstances would he countenance “deconstruction” of the text? Only where biblical texts contradict each other or rabbinic statements? Whenever the text appears to contradict well-attested Near Eastern documents? When the exact historicity is immaterial in the judgment of the exegete, to the import of the text? When the exegete detects rhetorical elements in the biblical text itself that point toward such interpretation?
See “A Room With a View, but a Room of Our Own,” in idem, ed., Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah (Northvale, 1996), pp. 23-24.
[14] As Epstein, Mi-Kadmoniyot ha-Yehudim, pp. 125ff., has shown, Abarbanel used R. Eleazar’s commentary, even though he does not mention him by name (a characteristic that Abarbanel shows at other times as well).
[15] Tzafnat Paneah, p. 46.
[16] Ibid., p. 36. I think one can call this a conservative position with regard to biblical interpretation, but the language he uses to reject the aggadic view, הבל הוא, is quite provocative.
[17] In Guide 2:47 Maimonides says that the people mentioned in the Bible who lived so long were exceptional in this respect, either because of their diet, mode of living, or due to a miracle. R. Eleazar obviously does not see this as reflecting Maimonides’ true view.
[18] He writes (p. 30):

ואל תתמה על זה ואל יקל בעיניך זאת התחבולה הנכבדת שנתכוון אליה כדי לאמץ האמנת החדוש . . . ולזה הוצרך ע”ה לספר לנו חשבון השנים שעברו מזמן חדוש העולם עד זמננו, וזה היה עיקר גדול וצורך נפלא.
[19] Livyat Hen, ed. Kreisel (Beer Sheva, 2004), pp. 324ff. Here is the place to congratulate Howard Kreisel on the publication of the two volumes of Livyat Hen as well as R. Nissim of Marseilles’ Maaseh Nissim. As long as people study Jewish philosophy, they will use these editions. R. Joseph Kafih spent the last night of his life studying Ma’aseh Nissim. See Avivit Levi, Holekh Tamim (n.p., 2003), p. 226.
[20] R. Eleazar Ashkenazi, Tzafnat Paneah, p. 29, cites this approach in the name of Ibn Ezra, but he does not tell us where it is to be found in Ibn Ezra’s Torah commentary or other works.
אבל המשמע מדברי החכם ראב”ע ז”ל שהזקנים היו ראשי האבות לא שחיו המה כל כך.



Rambam The Poet?

Rambam The Poet?

Ovadya Hoffman

Most readers are familiar with the general character and productivity of Maimonides, I will therefore keep the preamble to a minimum. The indelible legacy left by Maimonides is that of a legalist and thinker, not of a poet or a preacher. That’s not to say that Maimonides lacked the poetic skill. In fact, even from his purely legal works one can detect his elegant tongue and imaginative faculties, never mind the many missives, introductions and intermittent non-legal material included in his Code which exhibit overt tones of a skillful mouthpiece characterized by his eloquent and passionate appeals, charming metaphors and moving rhetoric.[1] And yet, not much –if any- of his authentic, complete pieces of poetry survived.[2]

One poem ascribed to Maimonides was composed in Arabic depicting the story of Purim. Recently, a dear friend, Jacob Djmal of The Jewish Bookery, showed me a book containing this poem declaring it to be of Maimonidean authorship. I will use this source as my point of departure.

R. Yosef Shabbtai Farhi published a book titled Nora Tehilot in Livorno 1864.[3] On the title page the author states he has translated the book of Esther into colloquial Arabic (“ולכן נתתי אל לבי… להעתיקה בלשון ערבי”) and included a piyyut in Arabic authored, so he claims, by Maimonides (“ונפך שפי’ר[4] פיוט בל’ צח ערבי מהרמב”ם ז”ל יפה אף נעים”). However, Farhi provides no information as to the piyyut’s provenance. One wouldn’t be afoul to suspect that, regardless of the piyuut’s origin, its attribution to Maimonides could easily garner sales. Who would pass up a book containing a rare glimpse of the great Maimonides’ poetic creativity? Again later on (31a) the author titles the aforementioned piyyut “בלשון ערבי מהרמב”ם ז”ל מיוסד על פי מאמרי רז”ל על סדר א”ב… לחן אימפיסאר קירו קונטאר”. So what are we to make of this piyyut? Where did Farhi get it from?

A manuscript housed at the Ben Zvi institute (MS. 1327), dating from a year before Farhi’s book was published, is a handwritten copy of what alleges to be an Arabic translation of Esther authored by Maimonides (“ספר מג'[ילת] אס'[תר] מלערבי הנקרא שרח אל מגלה להר’ משה בר מימון זלה”ה”).[5] At the end of the manuscript (beginning on p. 76) the same piyyut which appears in Farhi’s book is produced here except it lacks any attribution.[6] It could be fair to assume that the copyist only naturally considered the piyyut to be of the same authorship as the translation, Maimonides, although he didn’t state as much. He may have chosen to include it in the manuscript on the belief that it was from Maimonides or he may have harbored doubts as to its authenticity and therefore left it unattributed. In any case, where did this copyist get it from?

Another book titled “פירוש מגלת אסתר בלשון ערבי הנקרא שרח אל מגלה להנשר הגדול ארך הכנפים ורב הנוצה הרמב”ם ז”ל” was published in Livorno 1759 at the behest of Abraham b. Daniel Lombroso.[7] At the end of the first paragraph (2a) it reads: “ואל שרח משחר אליה מלקוטין מן כלאם רבותינו ז”ל ואל תלמודיין אל בבלי ואל ירושלמי” (loosely translated: a translation based on an anthology of both Talmuds). At the conclusion of the translation a number of piyyutim by various authors are produced. One of those piyyutim are evidently of anonymous authorship and simply titled “פיוט בלשון ערבי מיוסד על פי מאמרי רז”ל לחן אינפיסר קיירו אקונטאר” (p. 46a).

With no older documentation of this piyyut, I can only guess that one -possibly Farhi himself- hastily assumed an Arabic poem, appended to an Arabic translation authored, allegedly, by Maimonides belonged to him as well and consequently formalized the attribution.

Addendum

In 1845 Michael Sachs wrote that he was skeptical about Maimonides’ involvement and authorship of poetry.[8] About a year later, in a letter to Sachs upon receiving his book, Samuel D. Luzzatto argued with one of Sachs’ points regarding a particular piyyut ascribed to Maimonides and then marshaled evidence from R. Shimon b. Tsemaḥ (Duran) in his Magen Avot p. 84[a] where it is evident that Maimonides wrote two other piyyutim. However, Luzzatto added, the word “הרמב“ן” in Magen Avot is a printing error and should read “הרמב“ם”; [9] more on this below. Years later, in 1854, Shneur (Senior) Sachs repeated the notion of Maimonides’ aversion to composing poetry and maintained that all which we have from him is a single piyyut.[10] Eliezer Landshuth further attempted to set the record and addressed the later Sachs in his book, quoting Shadal and his emendation to the text of the Magen Avot.[11] I won’t go on to list a record of all the authors who followed suit in quoting the Magen Avot as a source for Maimonides’ authorship of a couple other piyyutim and will suffice to say that as late as the early 1900s Meir S. Geshuri asserted the same claim[12] and he was likewise cited by the celebrated Hayyim Schirmann.[13]

The Magen Avot was first published in Livorno 1785. Here[14] is the page:

Alternatively, here is the text:

כבר כתבתי כי הן הם דברי הרמב”ן בה’ יסודי התורה וכן כתב בתשובה שהנפש צורה בלא גולם ולא גוף אבל זוהר וגזרה ומקור הדעת ואינה צריכה לגוף לפי’ … אבד הגוף לא תאבד היא אלא עומדת בעצמה וקיימת כמו מלאך ונהנית באורו של עולם והוא עה”ב וכן יסג הוא ז”ל במחרך א’ בך רוח בשם נקבה חיה כשגל נצבה. ממקור החיים חוצבה. מידעה שגבה. מגלגל שכל שאבה. חכמתה כים רחבה. ייהי הגיית איש לראש. נשמה שרי דרוש. אכן רוח היא באנוש. וכן יסד בגאולה המתחלת אמרו בני אלהים כמה אתן לפועלי צדק וגם אני מכם מה לבני שאול ולי. וכן בפיוט יפתה עלמת לא נודע מי יסדו אבל אומר כי המיסד סוח יענים יסדו שאומר כי ירמיה יסדו אכל נראה שחכם גדול היה דבר באותו פיוט בסוד הנשמה ובבית א’ אומר על הנשמה שאלה חופש מאשר עובר בה יחלה יום להנפש בו ואל תכבד העבודה כי יסוד נפש חי כלי אובד יום פרידה כאשר קדמת הגוף יהי נמצא הוא קדומה אך לפי תומת מעשיה נרצה או זעומה

Besides for the unintelligible sentences and typos, the most glaring error is, as Shadal and others called attention to, the printing error of רמב”ן instead of רמב”ם. Now, if that’s all one corrects it is now conceivable that Duran ascribed to Maimonides the piyyutim which he mentioned. Somewhat surprising, or not, is that the same errors appear exactly so in the newer edition of Magen Avot published by Mechon HaKtav in Jerusalem 2007, despite the publisher’s claim of it being critically edited.[15]

Of the different manuscripts I consulted in determining the original text only one had a different and coherent read. This manuscript is estimated to be from 15th-16th century and is housed in The Royal Danish Library.[16] In order to grasp the flow of the material it is necessary to include the preceding paragraph (in the image above, it begins four lines above the yellow box). Following, is my transcription of the manuscript:

וכן החכם ר׳ אברהם ז״ל כתב בפי׳ קהלת כי מה שאמ׳ והרוח תשוב אל האלהים אשר נתנה סותר דברי האומרים שהנפש מקרה שהמקרה לא ישוב וכן נראה שזה הוא דעתו כי כתב בפי׳ תלים כי הנפש והנשמה והרוח שם אחד לנשמת האדם העליונה העומדת לעד ולא תמות ונקראה נפש גם רוח בעבור שלא תראה לעין כי אם אלה וכן כת׳ בפרש׳ כי תשא ובכל מקום קורא אותה נשמה עליונה כמו שכתב בפרש׳ ואלה המשפטים ר״ל כי היא אינה מושגת אלא מצד פעולותיה הנקראים נפש ורוח רואה החכם ז״ל כי הנשמה יצאו ממנה כח ההזנה הנקרא נפש וכח ההרגש הנקרא רוח אבל הוא עצם אלהי לפי הנראה מדעתו ולא הכנה לבד. וכן יסד הוא ז״ל במחרך אחד בך רוח בשם נקבה חיה כשגל נצבה ממקור אור יוקבה מצור החיים חוצבה מי דעה אותה שגבה מגלגל שכל שאבה חכמתו היא רחבה ויהי בגויית איש לראש נשמה שדי דרוש וכן רוח היא באנוש. וכן יסד בגאולה המתחלת אמרו בני אלהים במה אתן לפועלי צדק וגם אני מכם מה לבני שאול ולי. וכבר כתבתי כי כן הם דברי הר״ם במז״ל בהלכות יסודי התורה. וכן כתב בתשובה שהנפש צורה בלא גולם ולא גוף אבל טהר וגזרה ומקור הדעת ואינה צריכה לגוף לפי׳ כשיאבד הגוף לא תאבד היא אלא עומדת בעצמה וקיימת כמו מלאך ונהנית באורו של עולם והוא עולם הבא וכן בפיוט יפתה עלמת לא נודע מי יסדה אבל אומרי׳ כי המיסד סורו יענים יסדו אשר אומרים כי ירמיה הנביא יסדו אבל נראה שחכם גדול היה דבר באותו פיוט בסוד הנשמה ובבית אחד אומר׳ על הנשמה שאלה חופש מאשר עובד בה יחידה יום להנפש בו ואל תכבד העבודה כי יסוד נפש חי בלי׳ אובד יום פרידה באשר קדמת גוף יהי נמצא היא קדומה אך לפי תומת מעשים נרצה או זעומה

As observed by others, we see that the correct reading is רמב”ם instead of רמב”ן. But most significantly, we see that some lines from Duran’s discussion of Abraham ibn Ezra’s view [regarding the nature of the soul] were transposed to after the mention of Maimonides, giving the impression that “וכן יסד הוא ז”ל” and “וכן יסד” refers to Maimonides, thereby leading scholars to believe that Duran attributed these piyyutim to Maimonides. Indeed the quoted muḥarrakh[17] “בך רוח” and the geulah[18] “אמרו בני אלהים” are both compositions of ibn Ezra.[19] In conclusion, the basal support, which for years scholars have pointed to for evidence of Maimonides’ rôle as a poet, is negated.

At this point we should make mention of the last piyyut which Duran notes that “some say Jeremiah authored, nevertheless it’s apparent a great sage spoke it”. This piyyut, also of the muḥarrakh genre, has since been identified as being authored by R. Joseph ibn Zaddik (11-12th century) and subsequently published in a collection of his piyyutim.[20]

As I attempted to have this brief essay completed in time for Purim I lay here the pen and hope to return to a discussion of a perplexing and elusive piece quoted by Duran.

[1] See, however, Isadore Twersky, Introdution to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven & London 1980), 250 fn. 29.
[2] Cf. Hayyim Schirmann, Toldot HaShirah Ha’Ivrit BeSfarad HaNotsrit Ubederom Tsarfat (Jerusalem 1997), 280 fn. 6 for bibliographical references. See also addendum below.
[3] https://hebrewbooks.org/34131
[4] A play-on-words of Ex. 28:11 “והטור השני נפך ספיר”; with ‘שפיר’ meaning ‘good, fine’.
[5] See the journal Sarid U’palit (R. Yaakov Moshe Toledano, Tel Aviv n.d.), i p. 65 and Perush Megilat Esther LeHanesher HaGadol Rabbenu HaRambam (trans. Yosef Yoel Rivlin, Jerusalem 1952 [in a note to the latter’s preface 1943 is given as the publication year for Toledano]). Toledano believed this to be an original translation by Maimonides and only alluded to anonymous gainsayers. See however Hartwig Hirschfeld’s critical analysis of the translation in his essay Notiz uber einen dem Maimuni untergeschobenen arabischen Commentar zu Esther (Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut, Berlin 1897) 248ff. Per Toledano’s dismissal of the translation belonging to Rabbi Maimon, Maimonides’ father, on account of a quote not found in the respective translation, cf. Tiferet Yisrael (R. Shlomo b. Tsemaḥ Duran, Venice c. 1600) 118b, quoting an Arabic translation, which according to his father, was authored by Rabbi Maimon.
[6] https://www.nli.org.il/en/manuscripts/NNL_YBZ000115506/NLI#$FL31920894
[7] https://www.nli.org.il/en/books/NNL_ALEPH001773455/NLI . Cf. above, fn. 5.
[8] Die religiöse Poesie der Juden in Spanien (Berlin 1845), 204.
[9] Ozar Nechmad (Vienna 1857), vol. 8 p. 27. Shadal’s letter is dated 26 Kislev 1846. Leopold Zunz likewise suggested the correction, Literaturgeschichte der synagogalen Poesie (Berlin 1865), 478.
[10] Kerem Hemed (Berlin 1854), viii p. 30.
[11] Amude Ha-Aboda (Berlin 1857), 230.
[12] Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon, ed. J.L. Fischman (Tel Aviv 1935), 289.
[13] Toldot HaShirah Ha’Ivrit BeSfarad HaNotsrit Ubederom Tsarfat (Jer. 1997), 281 fn. 9; see also Yosef Tobi in Ben ‘Ever La’arav (Tel Aviv 2014), vii 83 fn. 148. Regarding the halachic texts of Maimonides and the Geonim which Tobi cites to demonstrate Maimonides’ assailment of poetry, cf. Boaz Cohen’s Law and Tradition in Judaism (New York 1959), 167ff.
[14] https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=9446&st=&pgnum=171&hilite=
[15] https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=39932&st=&pgnum=552
[16]  http://www5.kb.dk/manus/judsam/2009/sep/dsh/object21822/en/#kbOSD-0=page:174
[17] Arabic for ‘mover’; alternatively, ‘prompter’. Of Spanish style, and often employed by ibn Ezra, the muḥarrakh was usually recited before a reshut for Nishmat Kol Ḥai. On the reason for the given name, cf. Ezra Fleischer’s Shirat Hakodesh Ha’ivrit Beyeme Habenaim (Jerusalem 1975) 399-400, Leon J. Weinberger’s Jewish Hymnography (London & Oregon 1998) 436, Peter Cole’s The Dream of the Poem (Princeton University Press 2007) 537 and an original theory suggested by Ephraim Hazan in Tarbiz (Jerusalem 1977) xlvi 323.
[18] The concluding piece of a Yotser sequence.
[19] The former was published in toto in Jacob Egers’ Diwan LeRabbi Avraham ibn Ezra (Berlin 1886), 21 fn. 67 [beginning “אל מתנשא על כל לראש”], but confused, and thence omitted, by Israel Davidson in Otsar HaShirah VeHapiyyut (New York 1970), i n. 3854 with another “אל מתנשא” incorrectly supplying Egers as a source. Davidson’s reference to David Rosin’s Reime und Gedichte des Abraham ibn Esra (Breslau 1887) “ב 16”, does not yield our piyyut and appears to be incorrect. The latter was published, most recently, in Avraham ibn Ezra – Shirim, ed. Israel Levin (University Tel Aviv 2011), 191; here and other editions have “במה אתן לפועלי חסד ואם אני…” unlike Magen Avot. Cf. Egers, ibid., 165 n. 198; translated into English in Leon J. Weinberger’s Twilight of a Golden Age (University of Alabama Press 1997), 246ff.
[20] Yonah David, Shire Yosef ibn Zaddik (Israel 1982), 55 and elegantly translated into English by Peter Cole, ibid., 139.




The Rav as a Mechadesh Halacha: One Small Example From Shabbat Rosh Chodesh

The Rav as a Mechadesh Halacha: One Small Example From Shabbat Rosh Chodesh
Michael J. Broyde
In the Koren Rav siddur, in the minhagim of the Rav, in the section dealing with the halachic rules of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, זצ”ל it is written:
The Rav posited that if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo on Rosh Hodesh during Shaharit, one should not repeat the Amida, but should rather rely upon the reference to the holiday that will be made in the Musaf prayer. The Gemara in Shabbat (24a) states that one who forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo must indeed repeat the Amida and include Ya’aleh VeYavo in that second recital; but the Gemara in Berakhot (30b) qualifies this ruling, teaching that it is not necessary if one intends to recite Musaf subsequently, since the required reference to the special status of the day will take place during Musaf. Even though Rashi there (s.v. betzibbur) cites those who maintain that this dispensation applies only to the Leader in order to avoid any unnecessary delay to the start of the Repetition of the Amida, the Rav felt that we should follow the opinion of the Magan Avraham (Orah Hayyim 126:3) that even an individual should not repeat the Amida of Shaharit and should rely on his subsequent recitation of Musaf.
The rationale behind this view is as follows: When one forgets to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo, the need to repeat the Amida is only in order to be able to make reference to the special day within the context of the prayer. The obligation to recite the Amida per se, however, has in fact already been fulfilled. This second Amida therefore has the status of a tefillat nedava – a voluntary prayer, as it is recited not to fulfill any obligation to pray, but rather only to provide the needed context for the reference to the special day made through Ya’aleh VeYavo. Since it has become the practice to refrain from offering this form of voluntary prayer nowadays, Rav Hayyim Soloveitchik ruled that it is preferable not to repeat the Amida, but to rely upon the recitation of Musaf, if it will be done at the proper time. In light of this understanding, the Rav suggested that when Rosh Hodesh falls out on Shabbat, it would actually be prohibited to repeat the Amida if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo, since it is prohibited to offer a tefillat nedava on Shabbat. [Eretz HaTzvi, pp. 43-44.] (Emphasis added)
And one is not surprised to find that this exact recitation is found in R. Tzvi (Hershel) Schachter, Eretz HaTzvi (Yeshiva University Press: New York, 1991).
While at first glance this note is not surprising – it appears that the Rav and his grandfather are adopting the ruling of the Magen Avraham over his peers — upon further examination it is clear that this is an exceptionally innovative ruling, in fact.  Furthermore, the expansion of this ruling by the Rav himself (“the Rav suggested that when Rosh Hodesh falls out on Shabbat, it would actually be prohibited to repeat the Amida if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo”) is unprecedented, but logically compelling. A review of the sources is needed.
The Talmudic Sources, the Rishonim and the Codes.
 
The Gemera in Shabbat 24a recounts rather directly:
דתני רבי אושעיא: ימים שיש בהן קרבן מוסף, כגון ראש חודש וחולו של מועד – ערבית ושחרית ומנחה מתפלל שמונה עשרה, ואומר מעין המאורע בעבודה, ואם לא אמר – מחזירין אותו
R. Oshaia taught: On those days when there is a mussaf, such as Rosh Chodesh and Chol Hamoed at the Evening, Morning and Afternoon services, the shemona esrai is recited, and the nature of the day is inserted in the avoda blessing [ya’aleh veyavo] and if one does not insert it, one repeats the Shemona Esrai.
And the gemera in Brachot 30b recounts rather directly what appears to be a slightly different rule.
והתניא: טעה ולא הזכיר של ראש חודש בשחרית[1] – אין מחזירין אותו מפני שיכול לאומרה במוספין, במוספין – אין מחזירין אותו מפני שיכול לאומרה במנחה! – אמר ליה: לאו איתמר עלה, אמר רבי יוחנן, – בצבור שנו.
If one forgot and did not recite yaaleh veyavo in the morning [tefillah], he is not made to repeat [the prayer], because he can say it in mussaf if he forgot it in musaf, he is not made to repeat, because he can say it in mincha? — He said to him: Did you not leave out the rule of Rabbi Yochanan: This applies only to prayer said in a congregation?
Rashi (aware of the possible contradiction between these two sources) seeks a simple resolution with his two sided comments. Rashi in Brachot 30 b states:
בצבור שנו – דאין מחזירין, משום דשמע ליה משליח ציבור, ואיכא מקצת הזכרה, אבל ביחיד צריך לחזור, ובהלכות גדולות מפרש לה בשליח ציבור משום טירחא דצבורא, אבל יחיד הדר.
In a Congregation: One does not repeat davening, since one can hear it from the chazzan, and that is some partial recitation, but an individual must repeat; The Bahag explains that the chazzan is different since otherwise the community will be delayed, but other than the chazzan, one must repeat.
And one of these two resolutions of the contradiction (or both) is – as far as I can see – accepted by every single rishon who comments on
the gemera.  Rambam (Tefillah 10:10-12) states directly:
טעה ולא הזכיר יעלה ויבא אם נזכר קודם שישלים תפלתו חוזר לעבודה ומזכיר, ואם נזכר אחר שהשלים תפלתו חוזר לראש,* * * *. במה דברים אמורים בחולו של מועד או בשחרית ובמנחה של ראשי חדשים, אבל ערבית של ראש חדש אם לא הזכיר אינו חוזר.כל מקום שהיחיד חוזר ומתפלל ש”ץ חוזר ומתפלל אם טעה כמותו בעת שמתפלל בקול רם, חוץ משחרית של ראש חדש שאם שכח ש”ץ ולא הזכיר יעלה ויבא עד שהשלים תפלתו אין מחזירין אותו מפני טורח ציבור, שהרי תפלת המוספין לפניו שהוא מזכיר בה ראש חדש.
Rambam Tefillah 10:10-12
 
If one errs and forgets to mention Ya’aleh veyavo — if one remembers before one has finished one’s amidah, one should return to retzey, and recite it. If one remembers after one has concluded one’s amidah, one must repeat the amidah from the beginning.  * * *When does this rule apply? On Chol Hamo’ed or in the morning or Mincha amidah of Rosh Chodesh. However, in the evening service of Rosh Chodesh, if one failed to mention it one need not repeat one’s prayers. In every case in which an individual is required to repeat his prayers, the chazzan is also required to repeat his prayers if he made that mistake while praying out loud, with the exception of the morning service of Rosh Chodesh, where if the chazzan failed to mention Ya’aleh v’yavo before completing the amidah, he is not required to repeat the amidah because of the delay this would cause the congregation, since the Musaf service is still to be recited and Rosh Chodesh will be mentioned there.
And the same rule is codified in the Shulchan Aruch, with the addition that one can also adopt the approach of the Bahag as quoted by Rashi and instead of praying again, one can hear the prayers from the chazzan.  Shulchan Aruch OC 124:10 codifies the rule in Shabbat 24a and Shulchan Aruch OC 126:3 codifies the exception in Brachot 30b.
שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות תפלה סימן קכד סעיף י מי ששכח ולא אמר יעלה ויבא בר”ח או בחולו של מועד או בכל דבר שצריך לחזור בשבילו, יכוין דעתו וישמע מש”צ כל י”ח ברכות מראש ועד סוף כאדם שמתפלל לעצמו; ולא יפסיק ולא ישיח
Shulchan Aruch OC 124:10
One for forgets and does not recite yaaleh veyavo on Rosh Chodesh or chol Hamoed or any other cases where one must repeat the amidah due to the omission, he can focus himself during the repetition and hear the words from the chazzan of all Eighteen blessings, from beginning to end, like a person who is himself praying without interruption or digression.
שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות תפלה סימן קכו סעיף ג כל מקום שהיחיד חוזר ומתפלל, ש”צ חוזר ומתפלל, אם טעה כמותו כשמתפלל בקול רם, חוץ משחרית של ר”ח, שאם שכח ש”צ ולא הזכיר יעלה ויבא עד שהשלים תפלתו, אין מחזירין אותו, מפני טורח הצבור, שהרי תפלת המוספין לפניו שהוא מזכיר בה ר”ח.
Shulchan Aruch OC 126:3
In every case in which an individual is required to repeat his prayers, the chazzan is required to repeat his prayers if he made that same mistake while praying out loud, with the exception of the morning service of Rosh Chodesh, where if the chazzan failed to mention Ya’aleh v’yavo before completing the amidah, he is not required to repeat the amidah because of the delay this would cause the congregation, since the Musaf service is still to be recited and Rosh Chodesh will be mentioned there.
So far, the halacha is clear and simple.  One must repeat the amidah if one forgets yaaleh veyavo (either by actually repeating it or through listening to it recited by another) except for the rare situation of the Shacharit chazzan who forgets during his repetition.
The Alternative of the Rama MePano: A Different Rule
Rama MePano 25:5 understands the basic flow of the sources in a different way and adds something quite new to the codification of the halacha.  He states:
יחיד ששכח ולא הזכיר קדושת היום בתפלת שחרית ואחר שהתפלל מוסף חזר והתפלל שחרית, ודאי אינו צריך לחזור ולהתפלל מוסף, שאפי’ בקרבנות גופייהו אם הקדים את שאינו תדיר מה שעשה עשוי. ואי לאו דמסתפינא אמינא דלא אמרו בגמרא להחזיר את היחיד שטעה אף על פי שיש לפניו תפלת המוספין אלא קודם שהתפלל מוסף כיון שבידו לתקן יתקן לגמרי, הא אם התפלל מוסף הרי הזכיר קדושת היום ואין צורך לחזור ולהתפלל שחרית, דלא גרע דיעבד ליחיד ממאי דשרינן לכתחלה לרבים, ודברים של טעם הם להלכה מהתם, הגע עצמך שש”צ יהא נזקק להוציא עשרה שאינן בקיאין ידי חובתן ושכח ולא הזכיר שחרית מעין ר”ח ועם תפלת מוסף פוטר עצמו וחבריו לכתחלה ולא אחד בהם חוזר ומתפלל שחרית, לא יהא יחיד הבקי בדיעבד אלא כעשרה שאינן בקיאין ולכתחלה.
An individual, who forgets and does not recite the mention of the day in the Shacharit amidah and then he recites musaf, returns to recite Shacharit.  Certain he does not have to return to recite musaf again, since even with the Bet Hamikdash sacrifices themselves, if one did them out of order, and sacrificed the infrequent first, that which was done, was done.  If I were not uncertain, I would say that that the gemera does not direct an individual who errors to repeat the amidah, only before he has recited musaf, since he can fix this matter, he should do so completely.  But, if he already recited musaf, he has already recited the proper sanctification of the day and he does not have to recite Shacharit again, since the after the fact rule for a single prayer is no worse than that which we permit ideally for the many.  This seems logical and normative as a matter of halacha: Consider for yourself that the chazzan who is connected to the obligation to fulfill the obligation for ten who cannot pray when they are not experts, and yet when he forgets to recite yaalah veyavo in Shacharit, he can fulfill his and others obligations in musaf perfectly. And not of them have to go back and recite Shacharit again.  A single person who can pray for himself after the fact, is no worse than ten who are not experts ideally.
The Rama mePano understand the sources in a new and novel way: really according to the formulation in Brachot 30b (which the halacha follows) one can rule that if one already prayed the proper mussaf before one realized that one forgot to recite ya’aleh vehavo in Shacharit, one need not pray again, since one can be no worse that the chazzan mentioned in the gemera above. And this view is adopted by the Magen Avraham (OC 126:3) as well, who states:
כל מקום – כ’ מ”ע סי’ כ”ה אי לאו דמסתפינא הייתי אומר יחיד שלא הזכיר ר”ח בשחרית והתפלל מוסף אין צריך שוב להתפלל שחרית דלא גרע דיעבד ליחיד מלכתחלה לרבים ודברים של טעם הם להלכה ע”כ, ול”נ דנכון למעשה שלא יתפלל דלא יהא אלא ספק [כ”ה סימן תכ”ב]:
3            Any place.  It is written in the Rama Mepano 25 that if he were not so uncertain he would say that a person who forgets to recite yaaleh veyavo in Shacharit and then recites musaf he does not have to again go back and recite shacharit another time, since the after the fact rule for a single person is not worse that the ideal rule for the many.  This approach has much merit as normative halacha.  In my view, it is proper lemaseh that one should not recite shacharit again, since the matter is in doubt.
Magen Avraham seems to agree with the tentative rule of the Rama mePano and thus decides that if one already recited musaf, then one does
not have to say shacharit again.  Magen Avraham, however, does not claim that one can decide not to recite Shacharit again and intend it rely on this subsequent recitation of musaf.
An Explanation of the Rav’s View
As quoted above, this was not the Rav’s view.  Rather (as the Koren siddur notes) “the Rav posited that if one forgot to recite Ya’aleh VeYavo on Rosh Hodesh during Shaharit, one should not repeat the Amida, but should rather rely upon the reference to the holiday that will be made in the Musaf prayer.” Notice the incredible chiddish the Rav puts forward.  He expands the Rama mePano and Magen Avraham to include the case where one is eventually going to recite musaf, but has not yet done so, and he adds to this that on Shabbat one must adopt this rule, since a teffilat nedava is prohibited.  This chiddish – which to the best of my knowledge is completely unfound in any Rishon at all — is I think built on a totally different approach to the two Talmudic sources from any Rishon and even quite distinct from the Magen Avraham and Rama mePano, although related and derived from it.
Consider how to explain the three basic views adopted:
All Rishonim: Either Brachot 30b is addressing the unique situation of the chazzan or is because one can hear it correctly from the chazzan, but it never applies in the case of a person who is davening alone without a minyan present.  Shabbat 24a is the rule – one who leaves out Ya’aleh VeYavo has to repeat the amida.  No distinction is made between weekday and Shabbat.
 
Rama MePano and Magen Avraham: Shabbat 24a is the rule, but Brachot 30b is the exceptional rule for the chazzan in order to not delay the community.  One who is not the chazzan cannot rely on Brachot 30b.  If one has already prayed mussaf, then one has no choice but to follow the Brachot 30b rules, since he has already after the fact fulfilled his obligation.  Again, no distinction is made between the weekday and Shabbat.
Rabbi Yosef Dov Halevi Soloveitchik: Brachot 30b and Shabbat 24a are in tension since one directs one to repeat amida and one directs one not to.  The halacha follows the rule of Brachot 30b in that one who skips Ya’aleh VeYavo in Shacharit never really has to repeat the amida, except as a voluntary prayer, and when voluntary prayer is prohibited (such as on Shabbat), such a repetition is prohibited too.  This is based on the insight of the Rama MePenao, but is quite an expansion of it.
Allow me to suggest, as a proof to Rabbi Soloveitchik’s understands of the basic Talmudic sources, that one can focus on three basic aspects of the two sugyot to support this chiddish.  First is the fact that that the gemera in Shabbat can reasonably be limited to weekdays (chol) cases where 18 blessings is said, which is why it used the language of shemonah esrai – and on such days, a tefillat nedavah is possible.[2]  Second, the Brachot sugya can reasonably be limited to Shabbat, since it discusses forgetting that it is Rosh Chodesh but yet reciting musaf: when can one forget that it is Rosh Chodesh and yet still recite musaf?  Almost never during the weekdays (since if one did not remember it was Rosh Chodesh, one would not say musaf as a factual matter) but only on Shabbat, when no tefillat nedavah is possible, and yet musaf is recited, even if it is not Rosh Chodesh![3]  Parsing the two sources in their context allows one to see that Shabbat 24a directive is the suggestion for a tefillat nedava and the Brachot 30b rule is actually the rule – no repetition is permitted when no tefillat nedavah is possible.[4]
Finally, it is not difficult to divide the Brachot sugya into two thoughts along a line similar to the Rama MePano (but not identical). The first is the general rule that no repetition for ya’aleh veyavo is needed when one says a subsequent amidah (musaf), and the second view is that of Rav Yochanan that in a tzibbur is different, since one does not actually have to wait until the next amidah to fulfill one’s obligation, but one can fulfill it by listening to the chazzan repeat this davening (as per the main view of Rashi).  Of course, this view concedes, according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, that when one cannot hear it from the chazzan, one still does not repeat the amidah, except when a teffilat nedavah is acceptable (which nowadays is never).  In fact, the Rav must have ruled that whether or not the halacha adopts Rav Yochanan’s view, the rest of the Brachot sugya is correct.  This also makes the Brachot sugya (the “on topic” gemera) normative (lehacha), and the Shabbat sugya (the “off topic” gemera) not normative (shelo lehalacha) – a more compelling read of the sugyot.
It is worth noting that if this explanation of the Rav’s view is correct, another chiddish seems also to be correct.  On Shabbat Rosh Chodesh, when one is davening by oneself without a minyan, and one forgets that it is Rosh Chodesh for both Shacharit and Musaf, and remembers after mincha, one does not repeat musaf again, since one can follow the formulation of Brachot 30b thatבמוספין – אין מחזירין אותו מפני שיכול לאומרה במנחה! and a tefillat nedava is not possible.  The same is true if one forgets it is Rosh Chodesh on Shabbat mincha, but had previously remembered at shacharit and mussaf.

 


[1] I have deleted the words “בערבית – אין מחזירין אותו מפני שיכול לאומרה בשחרית” since nearly all the rishonim do not have them in their gemera and this makes more sense given the flow of the sugya.
[2] The Gemera in Shabbat 24a states מתפלל שמונה עשרה, ואומר מעין המאורע בעבודה.
[3] Of course, one could also read the Gemera in Brachot as speaking about a case during the weekday when one forgot ya’aleh veyavo in shacharit but recited musaf – but then the sugyot are in flat out conflict.  The approach, which also notes that the term shemona esrai (the weekday amidah) is in Shabbat 24a and not is Brachot 30b, eliminates the ccore onflict between the two sugyot.
[4] This approach has the additional advantage of making the Brachot Talmudic source superior to the Shabbat one, which is more reasonable and in line with the general rule, in that the Brachot source is directly on the topic of ya’aleh veyavo and the Shabbat source is off topic and incidental, following the general Talmudic rule that when Talmudic sources conflict, we prefer to follow the one that is central and not the one that is incidental.



The Yeshivah and the Academy: How We Can Learn from One Another in Biblical Scholarship

Hayyim Angel’s latest book, Peshat Isn’t so Simple,
has just been published. The Seforim Blog is happy to present this excerpt.
The Yeshivah
and the Academy:
How We Can
Learn from One Another in Biblical Scholarship
I
The study of
Tanakh is an awesome undertaking, given its infinite depth. This chapter will
explore the approaches of the yeshivah and the academy to Tanakh study. We will
define the yeshivah broadly to include any traditional religious Jewish
setting, be it the synagogue, study hall, adult education class, seminary, or
personal study. In contrast, the academy is any ostensibly neutral scholarly
setting, primarily universities and colleges, which officially is not committed
to a particular set of beliefs.
In theory, the
text analysis in the yeshivah and the academy could be identical, since both
engage in the quest for truth. The fundamental difference between the two is
that in the yeshivah, we study Tanakh as a means to understanding revelation as
the expression of God’s will. The scholarly conclusions we reach impact
directly on our lives and our religious worldview. In the academy, on the other
hand, truth is pursued as an intellectual activity for its own sake, usually as
an end in itself.
Over the
generations, Jewish commentators have interpreted the texts of Tanakh using
traditional methods and sources. Many also drew from non-traditional sources. To
illustrate, Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra (twelfth-century Spain, Italy) frequently
cited Karaite scholarship even though he was engaged in an ongoing polemic
against them. Rambam (twelfth-century Spain, Egypt) drew extensively from
Aristotle and other thinkers in his Guide for the Perplexed. Rabbi Isaac
Abarbanel (fifteenth-century Spain, Italy) frequently cites Christian
commentaries and ancient histories. In the nineteenth century, rabbinic
scholars such as Samuel David Luzzatto (Shadal) and Elijah Benamozegh in Italy;
and Meir Leibush ben Yehiel Michel (Malbim) and David Zvi Hoffmann in Germany,
benefited significantly from academic endeavors.
Many other
rabbis, however, have opposed the use of outside sources in explicating Tanakh.[1]
These rabbis did not want assumptions incompatible with Jewish tradition
creeping into our religious worldview. This tension about whether or not to
incorporate outside wisdom into Tanakh study lies at the heart of many of the
great controversies in the history of Jewish tradition.
II
In analyzing
the respective advantages and shortcomings of the approaches of the yeshivah
and the academy, it is appropriate to pinpoint the biases of each. The yeshivah
community studies each word of Tanakh with passionate commitment to God and
humanity, and with a deep awe and reverence of tradition. These are biases
(albeit noble ones) that will affect our scholarship, and it is vital to
acknowledge them. Less favorably, it is possible for chauvinism to enter
religious thought, with an insistence that only we have the truth. Our belief
in the divine revelation of Tanakh should make us recognize that no one person,
or group of people, can fully fathom its infinite glory and depth. Finally, our
commitment to Tanakh and tradition often makes it more difficult to change our
assumptions with new information than if we were detached and studying in a
neutral setting. Thus, academic biblical scholarship gains on the one hand by
its ostensible neutrality. It may be able to see things that one in love with
tradition cannot.
However, those
professing neutrality may not always acknowledge that they too are biased.
There is no such thing as purely objective, or infallible, human thought. For
example, Julius Wellhausen, a liberal Protestant scholar of late
nineteenth-century Germany, is often considered the most important architect of
the so-called Documentary Hypothesis. Building on earlier nineteenth-century
scholarship, he asserted that different sections of the Torah were composed
over several centuries, long after the time of Moses. He argued that some of
the narratives comprise the earliest layers of the Torah. Then came the
classical prophets, and only then were most of the legal sections of the Torah
added. These strands were redacted by later scholars, he believed, into the
Torah as we know it today.
Although many
were quick to accept this hypothesis, Professor Jon D. Levenson (Harvard
University) has demonstrated that it is an expression of liberal Protestant
theology that goes far beyond the textual evidence. By arguing that later
scholars and priests added the Torah’s laws, Wellhausen and his followers were
suggesting that those later writers distorted the original religion of the
prophets and patriarchs. According to Wellhausen, then, the Torah’s laws were a
later—and dispensable—aspect of true Israelite religion. Instead of Paul’s related
accusations against the Pharisees, these liberal Protestant German scholars
dissected and reinterpreted the Torah itself in accordance with their own
beliefs.[2]
The foregoing
criticism does not invalidate all of the questions and conclusions suggested by
that school of thought. Many of their observations have proven helpful in later
biblical scholarship. We need to recognize, however, that the suggestions of
Wellhausen’s school reflect powerful underlying biases—some of which go far
beyond the textual evidence.[3]
The traditional
Jewish starting point is rather different: God revealed the Torah to Moses and
Israel as an unparalleled and revolutionary vision for Israel and for all of
humanity. Its laws and narratives mesh as integral components of a
sophisticated, exalted, unified program for life. The later prophets came to
uphold and encourage faithfulness to God and the Torah.
In Tanakh,
people who live by the Torah’s standards are praiseworthy, and people who
violate them are culpable. So, for example, the Book of Samuel extols David for
his exceptional faith in battling Goliath, and then mercilessly condemns him
for the Bathsheba affair. This viewpoint reflects the singular philosophy of
Tanakh—profoundly honest evaluation of people based on their actions. It would
be specious to argue that the first half of the narrative was written by
someone who supported David, whereas the latter account was authored by someone
who hated David. Rather, the entire narrative was written by prophets who loved
God and who demanded that even the greatest and most beloved of our leaders be
faithful to the Torah.
Of course,
truth is infinitely complex and is presented in multiple facets in Tanakh.
Additionally, our understanding is necessarily subject to the limitations of
human interpretation. Nevertheless, the text remains the standard against which
we evaluate all opinions. Religious scholarship admits (or is supposed to
admit!) its shortcomings and biases while relentlessly trying to fathom the
revealed word of God.
III
The ideal
learning framework espouses traditional beliefs and studies as a means to a
religious end, and defines issues carefully, while striving for intellectual
openness and honesty. Reaching this synthesis is difficult, since it requires
passionate commitment alongside an effort to be detached while learning in
order to refine knowledge and understanding. When extolling two of his great
rabbinic heroes—Rabbis Joseph Soloveitchik and Benzion Uziel—Rabbi Marc D.
Angel quotes the Jerusalem Talmud, which states that the path of Torah has fire
to its right and ice to its left. Followers of the Torah must attempt to walk
precisely in middle (J.T. Hagigah 2:1, 77a).[4]
Literary tools,
comparative linguistics, as well as the discovery of a wealth of ancient texts
and artifacts have contributed immensely to our understanding the rich tapestry
and complexity of biblical texts. The groundbreaking work of twentieth-century
scholars such as Umberto (Moshe David) Cassuto, Yehudah Elitzur, Yehoshua Meir
Grintz, Yehezkel Kaufmann, and Nahum Sarna has enhanced our understanding of
the biblical world by combining a mastery of Tanakh with a thorough
understanding of the ancient Near Eastern texts unearthed during the previous
two centuries.
At the same time, it must be recognized that our
knowledge of the ancient world is limited. We have uncovered but a small
fraction of the artifacts and literature of the ancient Near Eastern world, and
much of what we have discovered is subject to multiple interpretations. We
should be thrilled to gain a better sense of the biblical period, but must
approach the evidence with prudent caution as well.[5]
To benefit from
contemporary biblical scholarship properly, we first must understand our own
tradition—to have a grasp of our texts, assumptions, and the range of
traditional interpretations. This educational process points to a much larger
issue. For example, studying comparative religion should be broadening.
However, people unfamiliar with their own tradition, or who know it primarily
from non-traditional teachers or textbooks, will have little more than a
shallow basis for comparison.
Religious
scholarship benefits from contemporary findings—both information and
methodology. Outside perspectives prod us to be more critical in our own
learning. On the other side of the equation, the academy stands to benefit from
those who are heirs to thousands of years of tradition, who approach every word
of Tanakh with awe and reverence, and who care deeply about the intricate
relationship between texts.[6]
The academy also must become more aware of its own underlying biases.
IV
Ultimately, we
must recognize the strengths and weaknesses in the approaches of the yeshivah
and the academy. By doing so, we can study the eternal words of Tanakh using
the best of classical and contemporary scholarship. This process gives us an
ever-refining ability to deepen our relationship with God, the world community,
and ourselves.
Dr. Norman Lamm
has set the tone for this inquiry:
Torah is a
“Torah of truth,” and to hide from the facts is to distort that truth into
myth.… It is this kind of position which honest men, particularly honest
believers in God and Torah, must adopt at all times, and especially in our
times. Conventional dogmas, even if endowed with the authority of an
Aristotle—ancient or modern—must be tested vigorously. If they are found
wanting, we need not bother with them. But if they are found to be
substantially correct, we may not overlook them. We must then use newly
discovered truths the better to understand our Torah—the “Torah of truth.”[7]
Our early morning daily liturgy challenges us: “Ever
shall a person be God-fearing in secret as in public, with truth in his heart
as on his lips.” May we be worthy of pursuing that noble combination.
NOTES

[1] See, for example, the essays in Judaism’s
Encounter with Other Cultures: Rejection or Integration?
ed. J. J. Schacter
(Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1997). See also the survey of opinions in
Yehudah Levi, Torah Study: A Survey of Classic Sources on Timely Issues
(New York: Feldheim, 1990), pp. 257-274. This survey includes traditional
approaches regarding exposure to sciences, humanities, and other disciplines.
[2] Jon D. Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, the Old
Testament, and Historical Criticism
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox
Press, 1993), pp. 1-32. See also Levenson, Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the
Jewish Bible
(San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1985, paperback
edition), pp. 1-4, where he shows how many prominent Christian Bible scholars
after Wellhausen continued with these Pauline doctrinal biases in the name of
“objective” scholarship.
[3] For a thorough discussion of the Documentary
Hypothesis, critiques of that theory, and traditional responses to the genuine
scholarly issues involved, see R. Amnon Bazak, Ad ha-Yom ha-Zeh: Until This
Day: Fundamental Questions in Bible Teaching
(Hebrew), ed. Yoshi Farajun
(Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2013), pp. 21-150.
[4] Introduction to Exploring the Thought of Rabbi
Joseph B. Soloveitchik
, ed. Marc D. Angel (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1997), p.
xvi; Loving Truth and Peace: The Grand Religious Worldview of Rabbi Benzion
Uziel
(Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1999), pp. 69-70.
[5] For a discussion of the broader implications of this
issue and analysis of some of the major ostensible conflicts between the
biblical text and archaeological evidence, see R. Amnon Bazak, Ad ha-Yom
ha-Zeh
, pp. 247-346.
[6] Cf. the observation of William H. C. Propp:
“Generations of Bible students are taught that the goal of criticism is to find
contradiction as a first not a last resort, and to attribute every verse, nay
every word, to an author or editor. That is what we do for a living. But the
folly of harmonizing away every contradiction, every duplication, is less than
the folly of chopping the text into dozens of particles or redactional levels.
After all, the harmonizing reader may at least recreate the editors’
understanding of their product. But the atomizing reader posits and
analyzes literary materials whose existence is highly questionable” (Anchor
Bible 2A: Exodus 19-40
[New York: Doubleday, 2006], p. 734). At the
conclusion of his commentary, Propp explains that he often consulted medieval
rabbinic commentators precisely because they saw unity in the composite whole
of the Torah (p. 808). See also Michael V. Fox: “Medieval Jewish commentary has
largely been neglected in academic Bible scholarship, though a great many of
the ideas of modern commentators arose first among the medieval, and many of
their brightest insights are absent from later exegesis” (Anchor Bible 18A:
Proverbs 1-9
[New York: Doubleday, 2000], p. 12).
[7] R. Norman Lamm, Faith and Doubt: Studies in
Traditional Jewish Thought
(New York: Ktav, 1971), pp. 124-125. See also R.
Shalom Carmy, “To Get the Better of Words: An Apology
for Yir’at Shamayim in Academic Jewish Studies,” Torah U-Madda
Journal
2 (1990), pp. 7-24.



The Anatomy of a Mystery: Kohanim, Dissection, and Medical Training Throughout History

The Anatomy of a Mystery: Kohanim, Dissection, and Medical Training Throughout History

Rabbi Edward Reichman, MD

In September of 2024, I accidentally opened the portal to a priestly mystery. While searching for references to the first Jewish students to attend the University of Gottingen Medical School, I came across an antisemitic work published in 1753 about the general dishonesty of Jews and Jewish oaths.[1] Therein were a few disparaging references to Jewish physicians,[2] one of whom was named Lehmann Isaac Kohen. A parenthetical footnote,3 likely precipitated by the student’s last name, caught my attention. The author references an entry in a German newspaper from 1750 regarding Jewish members of the tribes of Aaron and Levi, ritual defilement upon exposure to the dead, anatomical dissection, and the training and practice of medicine.

Further research revealed that the antecedent to this 1750 reference was a brief entry in an earlier issue of the same German newspaper, Braunschweigische Anzeigen, from 1748,[4] posing a query for the readership:

Can one prove from the Old Testament, as well as from the Talmud, or other Jewish scribes, that a Jew from the tribe of Levi or Aaron cannot or may not become a doctor? And whether God has expressly forbidden this in the Old Testament?

It would be eighteen months until a response to this query was published:[5]

In chapter 21, verses 1-11 of the second book of Moses, it is written: The LORD spoke to Moses saying: Tell the priests, Aaron’s sons, and say to them: A priest shall not defile himself by contact with the dead among his people. If, therefore, the Levites are not permitted to approach any dead person and defile themselves thereby, it follows that they are not allowed to observe dissections of corpses or participate in such procedures. And since they are thus prevented from studying anatomy, which is the very foundation of medicine, it also follows that they cannot properly learn medicine and become true medical practitioners.

Brückmann. D.

As to the precipitant for this query, I can only conjecture. Was it perhaps an encounter of the editor with a Kohen who informed him of this idiosyncratic Jewish law as he contemplated attending medical school? I suspect not, and there is no evidence of such. While the city of Braunschweig (AKA Brunswick) did not have a medical school, there were numerous medical schools in Germany where, by this period in history, hundreds of Jews were attending.[6] More likely, it was a hypothetical academic theological question, albeit with some confusion and conflation of the tribes of Kohen and Levi, untethered to any specific reality.

Introduction to a Priestly Mystery

You may wonder why I draw your attention to this passage, which hardly seems novel. Anyone remotely familiar with medical halakha, or Jewish law in general, is certainly aware of the basic laws of purity as they relate to a Kohen. Yet, what is most extraordinary about these few lines, buried in an obscure German eighteenth century local newspaper, is that as far as I was aware at the time, this was the only reference to the issue of Kohanim, anatomy, and medical training in the pre-Modern era. Prior to the discovery of this passage, I had not encountered a single discussion specifically addressing Kohanim training in medicine in either Jewish or non-Jewish sources prior to the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.

The issue of anatomical dissection in medical training is a staple of contemporary medical halakhic discourse.[7] The first halakhic references to general anatomical dissection are in the late eighteenth century, with the famous responsa of the Nodah biYehuda and Rabbi Yaakov Emden, yet they contain no discussion about Kohanim.[8] I have recently uncovered clear evidence that the Jewish community of Padua was dealing with the halakhic issue of cadaveric dissection already since the very time of Andreas Vesalius (16th century), long before the days of the Noda biYehuda, but also no specific reference here to Kohanim.

The question of Kohanim, dissection and the practice of medicine has been amply discussed in modern rabbinic literature.[9] Male members of the priestly tribe (Kohen-singular, Kohanim- plural) are proscribed from exposure to ritual impurity, the human corpse being the archetypal example. The prohibited exposure entails not just direct contact, but even being under the same enclosure as a corpse (tumat ohel). As hands-on human anatomical dissection, involving direct and prolonged exposure to a corpse, is a sine qua non of current medical training, the anatomy lab serves as a potential impediment for a Kohen interested in becoming a physician.[10]

Due to these halakhic concerns, numerous rabbinic authorities prohibit outright a Kohen from entering the medical profession, though others offer halakhically acceptable options. Indeed, when the Albert Einstein College of Medicine was established by Yeshiva University, the issue of offering admission to Kohanim was raised.[11] In an article written on the occasion of the first graduating class of Einstein, Myron Kolatch addressed the complex interplay of religion and medicine at the institution:

Frequently cited as an example of how the medical school violates the Torah is its willingness to accept students of priestly descent, kohanim. Leviticus, 21: 1-4 states: “And the Lord said unto Moses: Speak unto the priests the sons of Aaron and say unto them: There shall none defile himself for the dead among his people…

Clearly, the issue has never been settled beyond dispute, and Yeshiva’s policy that each kohen who wants to take up medicine must determine his own course, certainly does not indicate a blatant disregard for the Torah.

Some sixty years hence the halakhic landscape regarding Kohanim and medical school remains largely unchanged. There have been and continue to be Kohanim who attend medical school under halakhic guidance, with varied unique modifications.

Here I do not revisit the detailed halakhic analyses but address the historical contours of the discussions. According to Rabbi Bleich, one of the first halakhic authorities to raise the issue of Kohanim physicians and the prohibition of tumah was Rabbi Isaac Shmuel Reggio in 1854.[12] The context of the case was a Kohen physician who was tasked with confirming the death of a patient who was previously pronounced dead by another physician.13] This particular query was made in the historical context of a Western society that collectively questioned the ability of physicians to accurately diagnose death. As such, it was legislated in many European countries that after the initial preliminary diagnosis of death, a physician was legally required to confirm the diagnosis with serial exams over the next few days prior to burial. [14] In the aforementioned case, the physician chosen for this job happened to be a Kohen.[15]

In addition to this unique case, halakhic discussions regarding Kohanim and medicine have largely addressed two issues: 1) The propriety of a Kohen physician attending to a critically ill patient (gosses)[16] given the high probability of the patient’s demise and subsequent conveyance of impurity. 2) The permissibility of a Kohen physician, who in the course of his practice violates the prohibitions of tumah exposure, to participate in Kohen-specific religious ceremonies, such as bestowing the priestly blessing (nesiat kapayim). Even these discussions only begin in the halakhic literature of the 19th and 20th centuries, with nary a trace prior, and are limited to Kohanim who were practicing physicians. Contemporary halakhic discussions on the Kohen in medical training proceed with an analysis of primary sources and do not cite any responsa or any other references from the premodern era about a Kohen medical student.

If Jews have been training as physicians for millennia, with presumably many Dr. Cohens among them, how could it be that this halakhic topic seems to have escaped serious rabbinic or any historical treatment until so recently? How do we explain the conspicuous silence in the historical record?

As this source from the Braunschweigische Anzeigen seemed purely academic, is found in a non-Jewish secular periodical, and provided no additional references, it contributed little to our mystery. The portal to the priestly mystery had opened a crack, but no wider.

While this source was discovered serendipitously (i.e., hashgachah), surely a fresh dissection of the halakhic and historical literature today, given the expansive and easy access, would reveal many previously unknown sources addressing Kohanim, dissection, and medical training in the premodern era. Or perhaps not. After an extensive search, to date, I have identified exactly one single additional relevant source before the nineteenth century, albeit of significance.

This passage also derives from a non-Jewish source, the work of Carl Wilhelm Friedrich Grattenauer (1770-1838), a German lawyer and anti-Semitic publicist, though it records a Jewish exchange.

In 1817 Grattenauer published a work devoted entirely to the tribe of Aaron,[17] where in the context of ridiculing the archaic Jewish laws related to Kohanim, and lamenting the “obscurantism” of the Rabbis, we find the following passage:

The previous Chief Regional Rabbi Joseph Jonas Frånkel in Breslau, a generally recognized learned and scientifically educated man, had heard that the medical student HI, who also came from the tribe of Aaron, was preparing anatomy here[18] and was thereby contaminating himself according to the ritual law. He therefore summoned him and asked him whether he wanted to give up this anatomical activity, which was contrary to ritual law, or renounce his privilege as a Kohen to give the blessing. The student replied: I renounce this privilege. I would rather acquire a thorough knowledge of medicine and become a sufficient member of civil society. The Rabbi dismissed him… For 20 years, Mr HI has been one of the most skilled local doctors and he is still a Jew [despite the pronouncements of a fanatical Rabbanite].

Rabbi Joseph Jonas Frankel (1721-1793) served as the Silesian district rabbi. Assuming the veracity of the story, this remarkable exchange raises a number of questions: Was this a rare encounter, or did other rabbis engage in the same practice? Does this reflect Rabbi Frankel’s unique opinion, or the halakhic consensus of the time? Was there any room for leniency with respect to Kohanim training in medicine? HI was approached by Rabbi Frankel to address his halakhically concerning practice. Were there other Kohanim who proactively sought rabbinic consultation before applying to, or attending medical school? Was the response of HI typical of other Kohanim who encountered potential halakhic obstacles to medical training, or perhaps a reflection of the cultural milieu of his time.

All told, we have a grand total of two sources before the nineteenth century referring to Kohanim, dissection and medical training, both found in non-Jewish sources, and one of which is essentially irrelevant. I have yet to find any Jewish historical or halakhic sources. The priestly mystery thus still remains- How do we explain this historical “anatomical” anomaly? In this “priestly offering,” I suggest historical and halakhic reasons for this lacuna. I hope my offering will be accepted.

A Suggested Historical Solution

An understanding of the history of medical training, and in particular, of the training in human anatomy throughout the centuries, might assist us in providing an explanation for this glaring omission.

Apprenticeship versus University Training

Universities developed as educational institutions in Europe in the Middle Ages. With respect to medical training in general, in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Jews were generally barred, with few exceptions, from admission to European universities, which were under Catholic auspices. Jewish physicians were therefore trained almost exclusively through apprenticeship. Postmortem dissection was not a part of apprenticeship training. As such, there would have been no specific halakhic problem for the Kohen medical trainee, and we would not expect to find any such reference in the literature.

Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, in his discussion of medical training for the Kohen, posits a similar, though variant, explanation of the training of the Kohen physician in the past.[19] Rav Moshe prohibited the medical training of Kohanim today, unexceptionably, is it involved required exposure to tumat met. One parenthetical line in his responsum sheds light on our discussion.

ולא יקילו ממה שמצינו מרבותינו הראשונים שהיו כהנים והיו רופאים שהם בכוחותיהם הגדולים למדו כל חכמת הרפואה במסירת כל דבר בעל פה אף בלא שום ראיה והסתכלות במתים ולא נגעו במת מעולם ולא היו באהל אחד עם מתים, אבל בזמננו שא”א זה לכן ודאי אסור

And do not think to be lenient based on the fact that we find among our rabbis of earlier generations those who were both Kohanim and physicians; their exceptional powers enabled them to learn the entirety of medical knowledge orally without the necessity of even gazing upon a human corpse (i.e., practical anatomy lab). They never touched a corpse nor were they ever under the same enclosure as one. Today, however, when it is impossible to train in medicine [without the direct exposure to a human cadaver] it is prohibited.

Rav Moshe preemptively addresses a possible refutation of his position. If it is prohibited for a Kohen to train in medicine, how is it possible that we have a record of Kohen physicians in the past? Rav Moshe suggests that these Kohanim possessed exceptional abilities which allowed them to study medicine without resorting to the dissection or observation of human cadavers (and its resultant tumah exposure). Medical history supports this general idea. Indeed, all Jewish physicians through the Middle Ages, whether Kohanim or not, studied medicine through apprenticeship, without the need to dissect or even be under the same enclosure as a human cadaver.[20]

Priestly Physicians Throughout the Centuries- The Many Dr. Cohens

Who were these Kohanim physicians that Rav Moshe references? Zimmels[21] and Jakobovits[22] identify numerous Kohanim physicians throughout history, starting from Talmudic[23] times. Some of these priestly physicians provided medical care for kings, doges and popes. In fact, we have ample historical evidence of numerous Kohanim who practiced medicine over the centuries. Nathan Koren in his expansive registry of Jewish physicians has over fifty entries with the names Cohen, Coen, Cohn, Katz, Kohen, Kohn, Kahn, or Sacerdote (priest) ranging from the 15th to early 19th centuries.[24]

How did these Kohanim navigate their medical training? A simple explanation is that the majority of Kohanim, along with other Jews who were barred from the universities, trained through apprenticeship, effectively bypassing any halakhic concerns for anatomical dissection. Though there are no available statistics, despite the increasing acceptance and attendance of Jewish students at universities beginning in the sixteenth century, apprenticeship likely remained the predominant mode of medical training for Jewish physicians until the mid-seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries. As apprenticeship training involved no dissection, this would account for the absence of halakhic queries in the literature for this group.

Some Jews however elected to pursue a university education. Jews occasionally attended universities from the Middle Ages onwards, usually requiring special Papal or governmental permission.[25] While anatomy was clearly always part of medical education to varying degrees, and anatomical dissection was performed sporadically across the centuries, the introduction of systematic dissection of the human body as a required part of medical training fully developed only in the sixteenth century. Until this time, even if a Kohen wished to attend medical school, there would have been little halakhic concern.

The status quo would change in the sixteenth century under the guidance of Andreas Vesalius, a young Professor of Human Anatomy at the University of Padua. As divine providence would have it, the very university at which Vesalius established the field of anatomy was the first institution to officially allow, beginning even before the times of Vesalius, Jewish students to train in medicine. By the sixteenth century hundreds of Jews flocked there for this historically unprecedented opportunity.

Given the introduction of systematic anatomical dissection into the medical school curriculum in the 16th century, how could a Kohen now navigate a university medical education? From this point in history, we would expect to see halakhic discussions about Kohanim attending medical school.

One might suggest that Kohanim, being knowledgeable in the potential halakhic pitfalls, simply refrained from becoming physicians once dissection became an unavoidable aspect of medical training. Indeed, Rabbi Jakobovits maintains that less Kohanim entered the field of medicine in the eighteenth century, a statement he buttresses with reference to articles about the matriculation records of some German universities (Frankfurt and Duisburg), and the low number of those with a priestly name as compared to the percentage of Kohanim in the general population: “Even today, the usual proportion of Jews bearing the name “Cohen” alone (others, too, may be of priestly descent) is at least 2-3%.” He adds that this lower percentage of Kohanim in medical school “can only be explained as reflecting the growing misgivings with which the choice of medical career by students of priestly descent was generally viewed.”[26]

While this may have been true in Germany in later centuries, the archives of the University of Padua reveal a different statistical reality. The archival record of Jewish graduates of the University of Padua from the early 16th to the early 19th centuries includes nineteen graduates with the last name of Coen or Sacerdote.[27]

Even if we concede that not all those named Coen, or derivatives thereof, were necessarily Kohanim, many certainly were. Below is the family crest of Samuele Coen as it appears in his Padua medical diploma from 1702.[28] Notice the image of the hand configuration used by the Kohen during the Priestly blessing.

In addition, there are eleven members of the Cantarini family, a family of Kohanim, who graduated as physicians from the University of Padua during this period. Below is the front page of the medical diploma of Grassin Cantarini (1703),[29] here again we find the Kohen’s symbol.

The percentage of Kohanim who attended Padua’s medical school, roughly thirty out of a total of some 350 for this period, is significantly higher than the average percentage of Kohanim in the general Jewish population.[30] How then do we explain the absence of discussion in the literature? It is certainly possible that these relatively few Kohanim, despite their high percentage of the total, simply did not inquire of rabbinic authorities. Alternatively, the few inquiries that did occur where not committed to writing, or did not survive the ravages of time.

More problematic is that some of the Kohen Padua graduates were outstanding Torah scholars and prolific authors, such as Isaac Hayyim Cantarini,[31] Tuviya HaRofe (AKA Tuviya haKohen),[32] and Abraham Sacerdote (AKA Avraham HaKohen).[33] Oe mnight have expected at least one of these scholars to address this issue somewhere in their writings. Yet, there is no mention in any of their extensive writings of any concern with their participation in the anatomy course. Indeed, while Tuviya fondly recalls his medical training in Padua in the introduction to his Ma’aseh Tuviya, there is no mention of any challenge with performing dissection as a Kohen. Cantarini, in his Pahad Yitzhak, devotes a section to a tragic case where a Jewish body was kidnapped by non-Jewish students for the dissection table. Again, no mention of any concern about Kohanim and dissection. In addition, we have an account of Cantarini bringing Abraham Levi, a visiting scholar to Padua, to see the anatomy theater to showcase the highlights of Padua.[34]

 

While we may not find the names of these three Kohen student scholars etched into the wooden planks of the structure, they all likely took their seats,[35] along with their other non-Kohen Jewish classmates, in the famous anatomical theater at the University of Padua, which was inaugurated in 1595 as the first permanent structure devoted to anatomical dissection, and is still standing to this day.

I suspect that the answer to the conspicuous omission lies elsewhere, based on the history of anatomical training in general, and at the University of Padua in particular.

The Nature of Anatomical Teaching in the Pre-Modern Era

A mention of anatomy lab today evokes an image of a small group of students huddled over a body with dissecting instruments in hand. We also often find reference to the anatomy students designating a name for their cadaver, as they dissect one body for the entire course. Unlike the anatomy labs of today, in pre-Modern times body preservation technologies were not available, and a corpse was only usable for a few days to weeks. The dissections or yesteryear were held in an “anatomical theater.”[36] The format of anatomy teaching involved the professor alone performing the dissection and teaching over the body while others merely observed. Students did not perform any hands-on dissection, partially because there was little time until the decomposition of the body, and thus had no direct contact with the corpse. This can be seen in the frontispiece of Vesalius’ classic work:

This is also reflected in the design of the anatomical theater in Padua, which was built shortly after the tenure of Vesalius, and can be visited today.

There is a central oval table surrounded by coliseum-like concentric rows of progressively elevated platforms. This basic architectural design was copied for other anatomical theaters across the world, such as those below:

University of Bologna: Anatomical Theater (est. 1636)

University of Leiden: Anatomical Theater (est. 1594)

This illustration is from 1610. Parenthetically, the Keeper of the Anatomical Theater of Leiden from 1617-1650 was Professor Otto Heurnius.[37] Heurnius was the promoter for the medical graduation of David de Haro,[38] the first Jewish medical graduate of the University of Leiden.

By the mid 1600’s Jews started attending the University of Leiden in higher numbers. We have numerous matriculation records of Jews with the name Cohen.[39]For example:

Samuel Cohen from Hamburg matriculated to the medical faculty (M) in September 1646.

A Pure Solution

As a medical student in the anatomical theater served only as an observer, and performed no actual dissection, there would have been no concern for impurity conveyed through direct contact with a corpse. The only potential concern for a Kohen in the anatomical theater would have been tumat ohel, whereby impurity is conveyed by being under the same enclosure as a cadaver. While there is general halakhic consensus that impurity conveyed by direct contact applies to the bodies of both Jews and non-Jews, there is a halakhic debate regarding whether a non-Jewish corpse conveys tumat ohel.[40] It is certainly possible that the Kohanim who attended the lectures in the anatomical theater of Padua (and in anatomical theaters at other universities at this time) relied on the permissive position that a non-Jewish corpse does not convey tumat ohel. This would have allowed them to attend dissections without violating any halakhic precepts.

However, there still remained at least a theoretical possibility that the cadaver would be Jewish, in which case the permissive option would no longer apply. For a unique historical reason, this concern was non-existent for the anatomical dissection course at the University of Padua. In fact, the university struggled to provide cadavers for the course and turned to each community represented on campus, including the Jewish community, to provide bodies for the dissection table. However, the Jewish community adamantly refused, citing religious concerns with postmortem dissection. While there was continuous tension about this issue, the Jewish community arranged an agreement to provide large sums of money annually to the university for the privilege of releasing the Jewish community of this obligation. This general agreement, with periodic reassessments and renegotiations, essentially remained in force for some two hundred years.[41] Thus, all the Coens and Cantarinis who attended the University of Padua did not have to worry about the possibility that the cadaver under the scalpel of Vesalius or Fallopius was Jewish.

The Architectural Design of the Padua Anatomical Theater

Moreover, a unique structural feature of the Padua anatomical theater may have further mitigated any potential halakhic concern for a Kohen wishing to study medicine at Padua. The original anatomical theater had a retractable roof[42]  which was opened during dissections to release or eliminate the foul odors of a progressively decaying cadaver. Thus, even tumat ohel may have been a non-issue as in the absence of a roof there would have been no halakhic enclosure to convey impurity. This would have virtually eliminated the halakhic obstacle for a Kohen medical student.

An Alternate Solution for Kohanim

What of a Kohen desirous of a university medical education who would not rely on a permissive ruling regarding tumat ohel and the non-Jewish cadaver? By the 17th century, medical schools struggled to acquire enough cadavers to meet the growing demand of anatomy students. The need to provide a nonperishable substitute led to the production of highly accurate anatomical wax models that were sculpted through direct observation of dissected cadavers. Such models had distinct advantages, as they neither decomposed nor emitted foul odors and were continuously available. They proved essential to the education of generations of medical students who would otherwise, due to the short supply of cadavers, not have access to the anatomical education gleaned from human dissection.[43]

Spectacular wax models were produced throughout Europe, especially in Italy and England, from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, some of which can be seen to this day in Museums in Florence (La Specola), Bologna and London.[44]

This seems to me to be an ideal solution for a Kohen who wished to train in medicine in the Early Modern period. The use of wax models, with no human cadavers involved at all, would pose no halakhic problem whatsoever. While I am unaware of any Kohen medical student who ever took advantage of this option, the modern iteration of this concept, as we discuss below, may entirely replace cadaver dissection.

Kohanim in Medical School from the Eighteenth Century Onwards

From the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, apprenticeship became less accepted and university training was often required for licensure. As a result, Jewish admission to medical schools increased exponentially throughout Europe and the United States. In addition, the anatomy labs began to transition to hands-on dissection for all students. This was simultaneously accompanied by a major cultural movement in Germany, the main location of Jewish medical training at this time, known as the Haskala. This movement was associated with the decreasing religiosity of at least a percentage of the Jewish university students, not to mention the conversion of some to Christianity. A family name of Cohen on a matriculation record in this period, even if identified, is certainly no guarantee of a student knowledgeable or concerned with the issues of tumah.

How would a Kohen navigate medical training in this milieu? The student encountered by Rabbi Frankel in Breslau was training precisely in this context, at the end of eighteenth century. Was the student known by his initials “HI” training in a medical school where he was required to perform hands-on dissection, and this is perhaps why Rabbi Frankel ruled as he did; or perhaps the medical school still had an anatomical theater, as many still did, and Rabbi Frankel did not accept the permissive ruling that tumat ohel does not apply to a non-Jewish cadaver. Was “HI” influenced by the newly forming Haskala movement in Germany at that time, which led him to be less deferential to rabbinic authority?

Two additional examples of Kohanim and medical training from the nineteenth century are illustrative. We have at least one record of a “Cohen” in the early nineteenth century refusing to go to medical school because of the required anatomical dissection. A young Albert Cohen, originally from Paris, describes his initial encounter with anatomical dissection in Vienna in the early nineteenth century:[45]

I went to Vienna, where I pursued my studies at the grammar school and university from 1826-1834. Being now nineteen years old, it became necessary to decide what profession I would adopt. Hitherto all young people of my native place who devoted themselves to literature studied medicine; this was then the only profession open to me. To please my parents, I would have followed the same career, had I ever been able to prevail upon myself to dissect a corpse. Several times I entered the anatomical theatre, but each time I was seized with unconquerable disgust. I therefore requested my parents to allow me to follow my own taste. Henceforth I devoted myself to the study of Oriental languages.

I suspect the parental conversation about his career change may have been a bit more dramatic than reflected in this passage. Nonetheless, we learn that it was anatomy that turned this young Jewish Kohen student away from a career in medicine, though it does not appear to have been halakhically motivated.

Around the same time, Sigismund Cohen, a native of Lower Silesia, the area of modern-day Poland and the rabbinic domain of Rabbi Joseph Jonas Frankel a few decades earlier, attended the University of Viadrina (Frankfurt), graduating in 1846. The topic of his dissertation- Talmudic Medicine:

For a Jewish medical student to write a medical dissertation on a Jewish topic was quite uncommon, to say the least.[46] It is somewhat ironic that a thorough analysis of Biblical and Talmudic law might have led Cohen to the realization that there was a potential halakhic issue with his training and may have preempted the necessity for Cohen to write this dissertation in the first place. Nevertheless, as this dissertation is remarkable on many levels, I offer a few comments.

From a medical and medical historical perspective, Cohen acknowledges his professors by name, one of whom was Jan Evangelista Purkinje, who taught him human physiology. Purkinje, a Czech anatomist and physiologist, was one of the most famous scientists in Europe and his discoveries included the so-called Purkinje Cell in the cerebellum and the so-called Purkinje fibres in the electrical system of the heart, structures familiar to any medical student today.

This dissertation also has great significance in the field of Jewish medical history. While we do not know with certainty the nature of Cohen’s Jewish knowledge and religious observance, the dissertation includes a brief biography as an appendix. An excerpt about his early education is below:

While we find reference to the study of “Pentateuchi origine” and “grammatice Hebraica,” Talmudic study is not specifically mentioned, and there is clearly a strong educational focus on secular studies. The 28-page dissertation itself however contains a wealth of Talmudic references.

I also draw attention to three specific sources cited by Cohen, one from a century earlier, the others contemporary.

1) Benjamin Wolff Gintzburger, Medicina ex Talmudicis, inaugural Dissertation 1743

Benjamin Wolff Gintzburger was one of the first Jewish graduates of the University of Gottingen. It was my search for references to Gintzburger that precipitated this contribution.[47] His medical dissertation, referenced by Cohen, is one of the first works written on Biblical and Talmudic medicine.[48]

Apropos our discussion about dissection, Gintzburger is better known in the halakhic world as the questioner of a (now famous) teshuva to Rabbi Yaakov Emden about performing anatomical dissection on Shabbos.[49]

2) Abraham Hartog Israels, Tentamen hist.-med. Exhibens Collectanea Gynaecologica ex Talmude Babylonica (Grongen, 1845)

Israels graduated from the University of Groningen in 1845, just a year before Cohen, and the topic of his dissertation was obstetrics and gynecology in the Babylonian Talmud.

This dissertation gained notoriety for its fourth chapter, on Cesarean section, which suggests that the rabbis of the Mishnah were able to perform cesarean section with maternal survival, something not recorded in secular medical history until around 1500. This was based on an interpretation of a Mishna in Bechorot.[50]  Cohen discusses this chapter in his dissertation.

3) Eliakim Carmoly, Histoire des Médecins Juifs, Anciens et Modernes (1844)

Carmoly served as the major work of reference in Jewish medical history for this period. Selections were translated into English just one year after publication.[51] While the reliability of Carmoly’s work was called into question by critics,[52] it nonetheless contains a wealth of valuable information.

Returning to our student, regarding Cohen’s presumptive status as a Kohen training in medicine, he devotes a chapter of his treatise to anatomy and cites a passage in the Talmud where dissection was performed.[53] More relevant, in his bio, he includes mention and thanks to those who assisted him during his studies in the anatomical theater:

Anatomical dissection did not appear to be an impediment for this Cohen. However, there is one observation, admittedly a possible over-read or mistranslation, which may indicate specific accommodations for Sigismund in his dissection course.[54] In his lengthy list of professors, Cohen simply mentions the subject and the professor. In his mention of the anatomical theater, he adds, “in the anatomical theater there were guides for me….” Could this possibly be an allusion to specific accommodation provided to Sigismund? Perhaps his professors performed the dissection while he observed but did not touch the corpse directly.

Conclusion: The Opening and Reclosing of the Priestly Portal

Halakhic references to a Kohen attending medical school are noticeably absent from rabbinic literature before the nineteenth century. We have suggested plausible explanations for this anomaly. For much of history, Jewish physicians trained through apprenticeship where formal anatomical instruction was not required. As such, there would have been no halakhic issues for a Kohen, as noted by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein. When Vesalius introduced the comprehensive anatomy course into the medical school curriculum, dissections were performed in anatomical theaters, where students never touched the cadavers. At least some Kohanim may have relied on the permissive ruling that non-Jewish cadavers do not convey tumat ohel. When hands-on dissection became the norm, as Rabbi Lord Jakobovits suggested, it is certainly possible that many religiously observant Kohanim elected to bypass medicine as a career choice, or were perhaps discouraged to do so by local rabbis like Rabbi Frankel. Of the Kohanim who opted for a medical career, some may have sought rabbinic approval, though no records exist. Others, whose priestly-sounding names appear in university matriculation records of the period, may have been less Jewishly educated or less religiously observant. Hence no halakhic questions would have been generated from this latter group.

The portal to rabbinic discussion on this topic only fully opened in the twentieth century. In the modern era we have a diverse halakhic landscape regarding the training of Kohanim in medicine, including discussion about the permissive ruling of tumat ohel, as well as creative solutions to potentially allow direct dissection. I leave these discussions to each Kohen student and his posek but leave you with a final thought.

Given current advances and changing perspectives in anatomical training, we may again soon see the portal close to the corpus of responsa related to the Kohen medical student. Some five hundred years after Vesalius introduced anatomical dissection into medical training, which was accompanied by the exhumation of bodies from their graves, we are now on the cusp of the (re)burial of human anatomy lab and its associated cadavers. With advances in imaging technology and simulation, coupled with the ethical re-evaluation of body procurement methods and preservation, the expansive year-long anatomy course with full body dissection is rapidly becoming a relic of medical history.[55] The classic dissection table is gradually being replaced with the likes of the digital Anatomage table:

If this is not sufficient, it is now possible to produce life-like anatomical models with the use of 3D printing.[56] Even dissection of the model may be possible.

These conceptual descendants and updated versions of the Florentine wax models may soon replace cadaveric dissection altogether.[57] The list of medical schools eliminating or significantly curtailing human anatomy lab courses is continually expanding.

While the impact of the diminution of human dissection on medical education remains to be determined, if phased out, it will certainly have a significant halakhic impact and it may return us to the days of the earlier generations mentioned by Rav Moshe Feinstein when students “learn the entirety of medical knowledge without the necessity of gazing upon a human corpse.” This would potentially open the door for Kohanim to attend medical school (at least for the pre-clinical years) with halakhic impunity.[58] We may notice a commensurate rise in the number of Dr. Cohens in hospital registries. The medical halakhic textbooks may no longer include a chapter on “The Kohen in Medical School,” and the halakhic discussions on this topic may again fall silent. If future scholars at some later stage of history ponder the priestly mystery of the intermittent silence of the historical record on Kohanim, dissection and medical training, I suspect their search engines will direct them to this article.

Appendix:

The Importance of the Study of Broadsides in Jewish (Medical) History – The Kohen Physician Today and the Diagnosis of Death

In June of 2024, I participated as a speaker in a conference entitled, “The Role of Broadsides in Jewish Ritualistic and Cultural Space,” organized by Professor Avriel Bar-Levav of the open University of Israel and held at the new National Library of Israel. It was the first conference of its kind, dedicated solely to the integration of Broadsides into the study of Jewish history. Taking a single printed page (the definition of a Broadside) out of Avriel’s playbook, I briefly share an example of the value of Broadsides for the study of Jewish medical history, as it relates to our topic.

As mentioned in the article above, one of the earliest halakhic sources relating to a Kohen and the practice of medicine addresses the case of a Kohen physician who was asked to confirm the death of a patient in order to facilitate burial. The question was asked in the nineteenth century, in the medical historical context of a generation concerned about the misdiagnosis of death and the resultant institution of a three-day delay in burial to medically confirm a patient’s demise.

While the prolonged delay in burial may be a relic of the past, the necessity to confirm death remains a part of modern medical practice. As such, similar halakhic cases of a Kohen physician involved in the confirmation of death occur to this very day. I share one example here which reflects yet another fascinating and complex chapter in Jewish medical history, evidenced by a broadside found in a miscellaneous collection of broadsides in the Library of Congress.

In 1976 Rabbi Moshe Lemberger was asked about the case of an observant Kohen physician who witnessed a cardiac arrest of a man on the street.[59] The person did not survive. While it is generally prohibited for a Kohen to come in contact with a corpse, if this physician were to officially declare death of the person on the scene, and attest to the absence of foul play, the deceased would be transferred directly to the funeral home for immediate burial.

As per the questioner, if the Kohen physician refused to intervene, the patient would be transferred to the hospital. Burial would certainly be delayed, and in addition, there would be a high likelihood of autopsy, with organs often removed from the deceased without consent. Rabbi Lemberger concluded that this would constitute a case of met mitzvah (a deceased person with no one to attend to their burial), and due to these extenuating circumstances, the Kohen could expose himself to impurity to prevent the delay of burial and likely desecration of the body.

This comment “and often organs are removed from the deceased without consent” reflects a reality in Israel at this time.[60] When Israel established its own hospitals and medical system in the early twentieth century, it struggled to navigate a halakhically acceptable path for the allowance of autopsies, an integral part of standard medical practice. While detailed guidelines for the performance of autopsies were established with rabbinic guidance, many members of the medical community rejected any restrictions on their practice. Despite the legislation, the medical establishment flagrantly disregarded the laws and were known in many cases to perform autopsies, including organ removal, without patient or family consent. This evolved into a notorious autopsy scandal in the young State of Israel, which shattered faith in the medical establishment, with reverberations felt to this day. This ultimately resulted in the reformation and greater enforcement of the law.

I recently discovered a lone broadside buried in a miscellaneous collection housed in the Library of Congress,[61] which though undated, was likely printed around the time of the above responsum.

This Broadside was clearly intended to be posted in a cemetery and is divided into two sections.

On the left side is an accusation that the deceased more likely than not underwent an autopsy upon their death, and that the remaining relative, the likely reader of the broadside, did nothing to prevent it.

Dear Brother,
You are now standing beside the grave of your relative who was dear to your heart and whose flame of life was suddenly extinguished.
We wish to ask you if you have considered the possibility that your loved one has undergone extensive dissection [autopsy] and while the body is here, who knows the location of the internal organs of the body. Perhaps they never merited to a proper burial (more than 50% of bodies are dissected in Jerusalem).
What did you do to prevent this from happening?
As you stand beside the grave, the deceased beseeches you to repent for this. How will you answer?
The answer:
Accept upon yourself to protect your loved ones in the future. With all your power and capability seek to prevent the forced dissection by pathologists done merely for personal advancement.
Do this for the honor of both the living and the dead.
Committee for the protection of the honor of man

On the right side of the broadside is a text to be recited by the remaining relative asking forgiveness from their deceased loved one for allowing them to undergo an autopsy.

This unique broadside contributes to the study of the history of autopsies in Israel, provides valuable information possibly not attainable elsewhere, and adds to the relatively few items of material culture in Jewish medical history.

[1] Johann Georg Estor, Des Marburgischen Vicecanzlers Herrn Johann Georg Estors academische Abhandlung von der Misslichkeit derer Judeneide: aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt (Verlegts Johann George Trausold, 1753).
[2] Pgs. 13-14.
[3] p. 14, n. 12.
[4] Braunschweigische Anzeigen (October 5, 1748), section 80, p. 1608.
[5] Braunschweigische Anzeigen (April 8, 1750), Section 28, column 564.
[6] See Monika Richarz, Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678-1848 (Schriftenreihe Wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck: Tübingen, 1974; now available in English translation, German Jews and the University, 1678- 1848, by Camden House, 2022.
[7] Avraham Steinberg, HaRefuah KiHalakhah (Jerusalem, 5777), section 10, chapter 3.
[8] Edward Reichman, “The Anatomy of an Auction: A Previously Undissected Body of Literature on the History of the Jews and Postmortem Dissection,” Seforim Blog (https://seforimblog.com), June 13, 2023.
[9] For English language references, see, J. David Bleich, “Kohanim as Medical and Dental Students,” in his Judaism and Healing (Ktav Publishers, 2002), 37-42; Fred Rosner, “Priests’ (Kohanim) Studying and Practicing Medicine,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 8 (Fall 1984), 48-61; Alfred S. Cohen, “Tumeah of a Kohen: Theory and Practice,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 15 (Spring 1988), 25-49; Avraham Steinberg, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, trans. F. Rosner (Feldheim Publishers, 2003), s. v., “Kohen.”
[10] To be sure, the potential halakhic concerns do not end there, and a Kohen physician would continually need to navigate potential exposure to a deceased body. Today, this might lead a Kohen to limit his choice of specialty to one with minimal exposure to the critically ill patient. But even this is not sufficient, as the prospect exists of encountering a deceased patient in a hospital setting. Specialties with predominantly outpatient focus might be preferred, and consultation with a competent rabbinic authority should be encouraged.
[11] Myron Kolatch, “The Yeshiva and the Medical School,” Commentary (May, 1960).
[12] J. David Bleich, “Kohanim Studying in Medical School,” (Hebrew) Moshe Hershler, ed., Halakha U’Refuah 3 (Machon Regensburg: Jerusalem, 5743), 199-210, citing Kerem Chemed 8 (5614). This case is not widely known, I suspect because it appeared in a journal article as opposed to a traditional work of responsa.
[13] The Hatam Sofer famously addressed a virtually identical case around the same time. Y. D., 338.
[14] Much has been written about this halakhic chapter regarding delayed burial. For example, see R. Moshe Samet, “Delaying Burial: The History of the Polemic on the Determination of the Time of Death,” (Hebrew) Asufot 3 (1989/1990), 613–665, for an expansive study of this halakhic chapter; Michael Panitz, Modernity and Mortality: The Transformation of Central European Jewish Responses to Death, 1750-1850 (PhD Dissertation, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1989). Rabbi Yehiel Goldhaber has recently added expansive research to this topic.
[15] While the governmental authorities refused to declare such patients dead until the presence of visible external signs (such as gangrene or rigor mortis), they would have already met the halakhic criteria for death according to poskim such as the Hatam Sofer. It thus became a question of a kohen exposing himself to a halakhically dead body, and whether this encounter would be justified under the principle of met mitzvah (a deceased person with no one to attend to their burial).
[16] Shulhan Arukh, Y. D., 370.
[17] Vom Stamme Aaron und dessen angeblichen Vorrechten: ein Beytrag zum Judenwesen. David and Son: Jerusalem,1817), 27-29.
[18] There was no medical school in Breslau at this time though there may have been anatomical training. HI could also have lived in Breslau but trained elsewhere such as at the University of Prague.
[19] Igrot Moshe, Y. D., 3:155.
[20]  Zimmels erroneously assumed that it was not an obligatory part of training. Zimmels, op. cit., 19. He also cites sources that dissection became part of university training only in the eighteenth century, when in fact it began centuries earlier. Not as much was known about the history of the University of Padua in the time of both Zimmels and Jakobovits.
[21] H. J. Zimmels, Magicians, Theologians and Doctors: Studies in Folk Medicine and Folklore as Reflected in Rabbinical Responsa (Goldston and Sons: London, 1952), 178, n. 64.
[22] Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics (Bloch Publishing: New York, 1959), 355-356, notes 26 and 27.
[23]  One of the Kohen physicians of the Talmudic period was Rabbi Yishmael. It is his students who performed one of the earliest anatomical dissections in history, and the only one mentioned in the Talmud (Bekhorot 45a). In fact, Preuss suggests that it was specifically Rabbi Yishmael’s students who performed the dissection, as their teacher, being a Kohen, absented himself from the cadaveric examination. See. F. Rosner, trans. and ed., Julius Preuss’ Biblical and Talmudic Medicine (Hebrew Publishing Company: New York, 1978), 43.
[24] Nathan Koren, Jewish Physicians: A Biographical Index (Israel Universities Press: Jerusalem, 1973). His separate list of Jewish doctors in Modern times, not our concern here, has many more priestly names.
[25] See H. Friedenwald, “The Jewish Medical Student of Former Days,” Menorah Journal 7:1(February, 1921), 52-62; Cecil Roth, “The Medieval University and the Jew,” Menora Journal 9:2 (1930), 128-41; idem, “The Qualification of Jewish Physicians in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 28 (1953), 834-43.
[26] Jakobovits, op. cit., 241. Jakobovits relied on scholars such as Lewin, who explicitly mentioned Kohanim in his essay: “Nur vereinzelt findet sich 1738 ein Artz aus priesterlichem Stamme” (Only a few doctors from priestly lineage can be found in 1738.) See Louis Lewin, “Judische Aerzte in Grosspolin,” Jahrbuch der Jüdisch-Literarischen Gesellschaft 9 (1911), 395.
[27] Most of them are not listed by Nathan Koren. Abdelkader Modena and Edgardo Morpurgo (with editing and additions done posthumously by Aldo Luzzatto, Ladislao Munster and Vittore Colorni), Medici E Chirurghi Ebrei Dottorati E Licenziati Nell Universita Di Padova dal 1617 al 1816 (Bologna, 1967).
[28] University of Padua Archives, Raccolta Diplomi, 33 (n. 3841).
[29] Penn Libraries Judaic Collection, Call number Mapcase CAJS Rar Ms 531, identifier 9978072224103681. I thank Arthur Kiron for bringing this diploma to my attention. While the cartouche in this diploma is blank, it was often filled with either text or the student’s portrait.
[30] While the Kohanim represent a high percentage, their objective numbers are still low. While one must also concede that any lists of Jewish physicians we possess are far from complete, the numbers of Kohanim are not likely to vary significantly.
[31] On Cantarini, see, Harry A. Savitz, Profiles of Erudite Jewish Physicians and Scholars (Spertus College of Judaica Press, 1973), 25-28; C. Facchini, “Icone in sinagoga: emblemi e imprese nella predicazione barocca di I.H. Cantarini”, in Materia Giudaica, 7 (2002), 124–144. I thank Professor David Ruderman for this last reference. Cantarini’s Jewish legal responsa were published in both Yitzḥak Lampronti’s Paad Yitzak and Samson Morpurgo’s Shemesh Tzedakah. For his correspondence with the Christian intellectual Theophilo Ungar, see Y. Blumenfeld, Otzar Nehmad 3 (Vienna, 1860), 128-50. For the definitive work on the Cantarini family, see Marco Osimo, Narrazione della Strage Compiuta nel 1547 Contro gli Ebrei d’Asolo e Cenni Biografici della Famiglia Koen-Cantarini (Casale-Monferrato, 1875). For a comprehensive bibliography on Cantarini, see Asher Salah, La Republique des Lettres: Rabbins, Ecrivains et Medecins, Juifs en Italie au XVIIIe Siecle (Brill: Leiden, 2007), 120-124.
[32] Much has been written on Tuviyah. For the most recent contribution, see Kenneth Collins and Samuel Kottek, eds., Ma’ase Tuviya (Venice, 1708): Tuviya Cohen on Medicine and Science (Jerusalem: Muriel and Philip Berman Medical Library of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2021). See also A. Levinson, “A Medical Cyclopedist of the Seventeenth Century,” Bulletin of the Society of Medical History (January, 1917), 27-44; D. A. Friedman, “Tuvia HaRofeh,” (Hebrew) (Palestine Jewish Medical Association, 1940); M. J. Mahler, A Precursor of the Jewish Enlightenment: Dr. Tobias Cohen and his Ma’aseh Tuvia (unpublished thesis for ordination, Hebrew Union College, NY, 1978); N. Allan, “Illustrations From the Wellcome Institute Library: A Jewish Physician in the Seventeenth Century,” Medical History 28(1984), 324-328; D. Ruderman, “On the Diffusion of Scientific Knowledge Within the Jewish Community: The Medical Textbook of Tobias Cohen,” in his Jewish Though and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1995), 229-255; S. G. Massry, et. al., Jewish Medicine and the University of Padua: Contribution of the Padua Graduate Toviah Cohen to Nephrology,” American Journal of Nephrology 19:2(1999), 213-21; E. Lepicard, “An Alternative to the Cosmic and Mechanic Metaphors for the Human Body? The House Illustration in Ma’aseh Tuviyah (1708),” Medical History 52(2008), 93-105; Koroth 20(2009-2010) where five articles are devoted to Tobias Cohen and his work Ma’aseh Tuvia. On the relationship of Cohen with the Jerusalem physician Rabbi Dr. David De Silva, as well as for information about the death of Cohen, see Z. Amar, Pri Megaddim by Rabbi David de Silva Physician of Jerusalem (Yad Ben Tzvi Press: Jerusalem, 2003), 41-45.
[33] See Meir Benayahu, “Rabbi Avraham Ha-Kohen Mi-Zanti U-Lehakat Ha-Rof ’im Ha-Meshorerim Be-Padova,” Ha-Sifrut 26 (1978): 108-40.
[34] See Shmuel Feiner, The Jewish Eighteenth Century: A Jewish Biography, 1700-1750 (Indiana University Press, 2020), 242.
[35] Technically not seats, as they stood in the amphitheater.
[36] See G. H. Schumacher, “Theatrum Anatomicum in History and Today,” International Journal of Morphology 25:1 (2007), 15-32.
[37] Heurnius also spent large sums of money on mummies, idols, stuffed crocodiles, Nile-reed and so on, “with the explicit aim of re-telling the story of the life of Israel’s children under the wise Pharoah.” This would have been exhibited in the anatomical theater. See Klaas van Berkel, et. al., eds., The Book of Nature in Early Modern and Modern History (Peeters Publishers, 2006), 51.
[38] See Edward Reichman, “A ‘Haro’ing Tale of a Jewish Medical Student: Notes on David de Haro (1611-1636): The First Jewish Medical Graduate of the University of Leiden,” Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana 48:1 (2022), 30-52.
[39] These entries are found in the matriculation records of the University of Leiden, Album Studiosorum Academiae Lugduno Batavae 1575-1875.
[40] For recent treatment of this topic, see the works of Tzvi Ryzman, Ratz KaTzvi: Inyanei Kehuna (3 volumes) (2 Adar, 5782); idem, “Kohanim studying medicine,” (Hebrew) in Ratz KaTzvi: Refuah- Pikuah Nefesh (Shevat, 5784), 218-233.
[41] For further discussion of this historical chapter, see Edward Reichman, “The Anatomy of an Auction: A Previously Undissected Body of Literature on the History of the Jews and Postmortem Dissection,” Seforim Blog (https://seforimblog.com), June 13, 2023. Regarding the possibility of their being a Jewish cadaver at other medical schools, I am aware of at least one case, albeit rare, of a Jewish criminal sentenced to death in Amsterdam whose body was transferred to the medical school in Leiden for dissection. See Tzvi Malahi, biNoam Siah (Makhon Haberman: Israel, 5743), 275-276.
[42] https://alcmaeon.pixel-online.org/DM_page3.php?sid=118.
[43] Francesco Galassi, et. al., “Marvels of the Bologna Anatomical Wax Museum,” HAPS Educator 19:2 (Spring 2015), 4-9; R. Ballestriero, “Anatomical Models and Wax Venuses: Art Masterpieces or Scientific Craft Works?” Journal of Anatomy 216:2 (2010), 223-234; A. W. Bates, “’Indecent and Demoralizing Representations’: Public Anatomy Museums in mid-Victorian England,” Medical History 52 (2008), 1-22.
[44] Galassi, op. cit.
[45] Jewish Chronicle (December 23, 1861), 7.
[46] See Edward Reichman, “The History of the Jewish Medical Student Dissertation: An Evolving Jewish Tradition,” in in J. Karp and M. Schaikewitz, eds., Sacred Training: A Halakhic Guidebook for Medical Students and Residents (Ammud Press: New York, 2018), xvii- xxxvii.
[47] An expansive essay on Gintzburger is forthcoming.
[48] For a review of the literature on this topic see Edward Reichman, “Biblical and Talmudic Medicine: A Bibliographical Essay,” The Anatomy of Jewish Law: A Fresh Dissection of the Relationship of Medicine, Medical History and Rabbinic Literature (OU/Maggid/Yeshiva University Press, 2022), 511-521.
[49] She’ilat Ya’avetz 1:41.
[50] For further discussion, see Edward Reichman, “A Matter of Life ‘in’ Death: Postmortem Cesarean Section in Jewish Law,” in The Anatomy of Jewish Law: A Fresh Dissection of the Relationship of Medicine, Medical History and Rabbinic Literature (OU/Maggid/Yeshiva University Press, 2022), 477-508.
[51] History of the Jewish Physicians, from the French of E. Carmoly, by John R. W. Dunbar (J. Murphy: Baltimore, 1845).
[52]  See, for example, “Carmoly, Eliakim” in Singer, Isidore; et al. (eds.), The Jewish Encyclopedia (Funk & Wagnalls: New York, 1901-1906).
[53] Bekhorot 45a.
[54] I thank my dear wife Sara for this observation.
[55] See, for example, Bahar Gholipour, “Med School without Cadavers?  Some medical schools are turning to virtual reality instead of dissection,” Scientific American (October 1, 2019).
[56] Companies like Anatomy Warehouse and GT Stimulators produce such models.
[57] Surgical subspecialties will likely continue to require cadaveric dissection for training.
[58] There would remain potential halakhic issues with clinical rotations, residency, and the continued practice of medicine, which typically necessitate training in hospitals, where the encounter with dying patients would be a certainty. Rabbi Chaim Dovid Halevi provided a nuanced response to a Kohen in medical training even with the elimination of cadaver dissection (Asei Lekha Rav 3:22):

It is clear beyond doubt that even though we all have a status of tamei met (corpse impurity), Kohanim are nonetheless proscribed from any additional exposure to tumah. Therefore today, when the study of medicine is coupled with cadaveric dissection, I do not see a path to permit a Kohen to study medicine. Even if one is able to find a way to study medicine without cadaver dissection (as I understand is done in universities in France and Italy, where they use plastic models to teach anatomy) I still do not see how one could serve as a physician in modern times. Today, in large hospitals, not a day passes without the death of a patient, who would convey impurity. How then could a Kohen work in such a hospital? Theoretically, one could learn anatomy without cadaver dissection and then practice in outpatient clinics as opposed to hospitals. However, there still remains a challenging problem- residency or specialty training. This part of one’s education would surely require training in large hospitals.

Rabbi Halevi’s analysis assumes a Kohen training in an Israeli medical school, where the majority of patients in the hospitals would be Jewis,h and who upon death would unequivocally convey tumat ohel. For a Kohen training in the United States, or anywhere outside Israel, where the majority of patients are not Jewish, the different approaches to the application of tumat ohel to a non-Jewish corpse would apply.
[59] Ateret Moshe Y. D., 244.
[60] Fred Rosner, “Autopsy in Jewish Law and the Israeli Autopsy Controversy,” in Fred Rosner and J. David Bleich, eds., Jewish Bioethics (New York: Hebrew Publishing Company, 1979), 331-348; Zev Farber and Irving Greenberg, “Autopsies I: A Survey of the Debate,” in Zev Farber, ed., Halakhic Realities (Maggid Books: Jerusalem, 2017), 323-417.
[61] Karp Collection of Broadsides, 1307_001. I thank Sharon Horowitz, Reference Librarian of the Hebraic Collection, for furnishing me a copy of the broaside.




Review of Ma'amar al Yishma'el

Review: Ma'amar al Yishma'el
by Eliezer Brodt & Ish Sefer  Solomon Ibn Aderet, Ma'amar al Yishma'el, Bezalel Naor ed., Spring Valley, NY, 2008, 178 pp.
Bezalel Naor, Mitsvat Hashem Barah, Spring Valley, NY, 2008, 220 pp.
  R. Bezalel Naor, who has published a host of translations and explanations of R. Kook's writings, as well as Post Sabbatian Sabbatianisms, discussing Sabbatean works, has published two works in a single volume. The first, Ma'amar al Yishma'el, is a critical edition of R. Solomon Ibn Aderet's (Rashba) discussion of Islam.   This work was printed from manuscript (which today is lost) for the first time in 1863 by Y. Perles. Most recently it was printed in the new Shut ha-Rashba by Machon Yerushalayim in their last volume (siman 367). At first it was not accepted that Rashba authored this work but today it is accepted that  he is indeed the author. Naor's edition begins with an excellent introduction dealing with amongst many things the authorship of this work, Naor raises the possibility that R. Dovid who was a talmid of the Ramban was the author. Throughout the text he brings various proofs about the authorship from other writings of the Rashba. As an appendix Naor printed a copy of a manuscript of Steinschneider where he deals with the authorship of this text.   The main topic of this work is about the Rashba defending the Torah from an Islamic attack. Although much has been written on Jewish Christian disputes, when it comes to Jewish Islamic disputes, much less is written or known. Indeed, most are probably unaware that the Rashba wrote this work defending Judaism against Islam. Naor's edition begins with an excellent introduction discussing the work generally and specifically providing background materials on exactly what the Rashba was responding to.  Naor discusses both the Jewish as well as Islamic sources in all languages. It is pretty incredible to see his command in both these groups of sources, it is clear that much time and hard work went into preparing this work.   The main topic which the Rashba deals with is defending that the Torah which we have is 100% accurate and was never tampered with. The Rashba deals with many specific examples in a very orderly fashion. Specifically, the Rashba elaborates why the torah publicized what seems to be sins of Reuven (p.74) and Yehudah (pp. 73-74). The Rashba also deals with why the torah had to include the story of Lot and his daughters (pp. 72-73). Another issue that the Rashba defends is proving that the numbers of the Jews given by the Torah was 100% accurate (pp. 63-71). Additionally, the Rashba deals with the famous incident of the finding of the Sefer torah in Yoshiayhu's time. There are also many Chidushim with regard to the seven Noachide commandments.   Regarding why Hashem chose to give the Torah publicly the Rashba writes (p. 90):והתבונן כי בשתי תורת האלו, רוצה לומר, תורת בני נח ותורת משה עליו השלום לא רצה השם יתברך שיקבל אותם ממנו נביא, ויקבלו אותם מן הנביא שאר העם. וזה לשתי פנות גדולות האחד: כדי שלא יוכל אחד ממי שנתחייב באורה התורה, להסתפק בקבלתה, ולחשוד מי שקבלה, שבדה מלבו, או ששבש בם קצת… והשניה, כדי שלא יוכל לשבש בדת ובאמונה לאחר זמן, ויטעון שהשם יתברך נתן עתה על ידו תורת כן וכן, כמו שנתן תורה ראשונה מתחלה עד יד הנביא פלוני אשר קדמו. אלא קבץ כל הנמצא באותו זמן ונתן רוחו עליהם והתנבאו…   Naor already points out that although this is similar to the proof offered by the Kuzari, however, this proof has a new addition to it as it includes the notion that the ז' מצות בני נח were also directly and publicly given by God!    Besides for the actual main topics that the Rashba deals with and its great importance (as he is one of our most important Rishonim) there is also a wealth of interesting side points and discussions in this work.   Amongst the many important points that the Rashba writes is that although we find many times about the Torah that the Gemarah says שכחה התורה וחזרה ויסדה (one of example of this is by with Ezra). The Rashba explains at great length that it does not mean the Torah was almost completely forgotten at these times. Rather all of torah is connected and if one thing is forgotten it is as if everything is forgotten so Ezra prevented this from happening (pp. 100-05). With this the Rashba explains many things amongst them the famous Gemarah in Pesachim (66b)תנו רבנן: הלכה זו נתעלמה מבני בתירא. פעם אחת חל ארבעה עשר להיות בשבת, שכחו ולא ידעו אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו. אמרו: כלום יש אדם שיודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו? אמרו להם: אדם אחד יש שעלה מבבל, והלל הבבלי שמו, ששימש שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון ויודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו. שלחו וקראו לו. אמרו לו: כלום אתה יודע אם הפסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו? אמר להם: וכי פסח אחד יש לנו בשנה שדוחה את השבת? והלא הרבה יותר ממאתים פסחים יש לנו בשנה שדוחין את השבת. אמרו לו: מנין לך? אמר להם: נאמר מועדו בפסח ונאמר מועדו בתמיד. מה מועדו האמור בתמיד – דוחה את השבת אף מועדו האמור בפסח – דוחה את השבת. ועוד, קל וחומר הוא: ומה תמיד שאין ענוש כרת דוחה את השבת, פסח שענוש כרת – אינו דין שדוחה את השבת. מיד הושיבוהו בראש ומינוהו נשיא עליהם, והיה דורש כל היום כולו בהלכות הפסח. התחיל מקנטרן בדברים, אמר להן: מי גרם לכם שאעלה מבבל ואהיה נשיא עליכם – עצלות שהיתה בכם, שלא שמשתם שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון. אמרו לו: רבי, שכח ולא הביא סכין מערב שבת מהו? אמר להן: הלכה זו שמעתי ושכחתי. אלא, הנח להן לישראל אם אין נביאים הן – בני נביאים הן. למחר, מי שפסחו טלה – תוחבו בצמרו, מי שפסחו גדי – תוחבו בין קרניו. ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה, ואמר: כך מקובלני מפי שמעיה ואבטליון. Many people have discussed this Gemarah throughout the ages (its was a popular derasha topic for Shabbat HaGadol) how could they forget such a thing? The Rashba explains it with his same theme. Here to Naor includes an excellent lengthy footnote dealing with this Gemarah providing many sources.  Another important statement of the Rashba (pp. 116-17) is:כל שכן ספר כולל מה שהוא ומה שהיה ועתיד להיות כתורתנו השלמה והתמימה שכוללת מן החכמה כל מה שהיה מן הבריאה הראשונה עד תכלית כל חכמה. ואפילו בא נביא מן הנביאים לכתוב בפרטי כל מה שתרמוז בה לא יכיל גליון וכן בפירושי מצותיה.    When talking about Rabbenu Hakodesh role in the writing of the Mishna he writes (p. 119): והודיעונו יתרון חכמת רבינו הקדוש בסדור ספרו סדר המשנה חברו בתכלית החכמה בקצור ובסדור בסתם ואחר כך מחלוקת ומחלוקת ואחר כך סתם וכולל ענינים גדולים בדברי קצתם.   Although, as mentioned above, the notes are generally excellent there is comment that deserves to be discussed. The Rashba referring to a Gemrah in Mesectas Pesachim calls (p. 103) it מסכת פסח שני. Here, Naor does not explain what the Rashba meant. The intention of the Rashba is that many rishonim called the part of Pesachim which deals with Korbon Pesach, Pesach Shenei, and referred to the first part of Pesachim that deals with Chametz and perek Arvei Peachim as Pesach Rishon. This fact was not known to everyone see for example Hagadah Shelemah (p.197) where it is pointed out that the Abarbanel was not aware of this and made a mistake because of this. [See also R. N. Rabonowitz, Mamar Al Hadfosass Hatalmud, p.27]. The Merei writes (Peachim 57b):אמר מנחם בן שלמה לבית מאיר י"א זאת המסכתא ר"ל מסכת פסח שני היא מסדר מועד וכבר ביארנו בפתיחת החבור שבסדור רבינו הקדוש ע"ה היו מסכת פסח ראשון וזאת המסכתא חוברות אשה אל אחותה נכללות במסכתא אחת נקראת פסחים ופרק ערבי פסחים היה אחרון לכל פרקיה ובימי הגאונים ז"ל חלקוה . לשתים וקראו הראשונה פסח ראשון והעתיקו פרק ערבי פסחים ממקומו וסדרוהו בסוף פסח ראשון וקראו שם המסכתא הזאת פסח שני ועל זה הצד הורגלנו בלמודה אחר מסכת פסח ראשון על הדרך שסדרנו בפתיחת החבור והיא כוללת חמשה פרקים וסדרם לפי שיטתנו…
Another nice piece is (p. 67): יש לנו להשיב ולומר שלא כל התולדות אשר היו להם זכר הכתוב רק מקצת מהם או מקצת מן הנזכרים ואף על פי שהיו להם או למקצתם בנים אחרים רבים מאלה, אלא שלא זכר כאן רק אותם שהיה הצורך מביא לזכרם, מפני שאלה היו ראשי בית אבות למשפחותם והאחרים בלבד יקראו על שמם כאשר קרה ליוסף שלא זכר הכתוב מכל בניו רק מנשה ואפרים…   The text of Ma'amar also contains extensive footnotes which provide the sources for the Rashba's statements as well side discussions. In the final section of this work, Naor explores, in greater detail, some issues he raised in passing in his notes. Just to mention a few of the many topics he deals with in the notes and appendixes (with just a few additional sources). These topics are rather eclectic ranging from the Ramban's position regarding the Ibn Ezra (pp. 136-143). In the introduction Naor has another nice discussion about the Ibn Ezra's position regarding the authorship of the Torah (pp. 23-28) although many deal with this topic Naor has some new important points based on some manuscripts showing what R. Ezra of Gerona, the Rebbe of the Ramban, thought of the Ibn Ezra. Other issues he deals with in regard to the Ibn Ezra are with his work the Iggeres ha-Shabbat (p. 141 n.578) [see also Ohr Yisrael 54:238] and additions which were put in by others in his works (p.142 n.582) [see also my Bein Keseh Lassur (Jerusalem, 2008), p. 53]. Others issues Naor deals with: did the Rashba know Arabic (p.21 n.24), the authorship of the classic Kabbalah work Mereches Aleokus (pp. 53-55). It is interesting that the Rashba always refers to Muchamed as Meshugah (see the note on p. 61-62 about this) [One can add to this Marc B. Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters (Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 2008), 151-52]  Another great note is about R. Abraham Ben Ha-GRA whose usage of very rare editions of the Talmud (pp. 72-72 n.236), and also about Ba'al Tosef on Taryag Mitzvot and the seven Noahide Laws (pp. 86-90). These are but a few samples.In the introduction Naor writes that only after he completed working on this sefer did he find out that Chaim Zalman Dimitrovsky printed it already with notes – had he known he never would have bothered working on it. As is obvious, Naor has a tremendous command of the sources in Hebrew and academic world and he did incredible research for this work yet he never discovered the well known source where most should begin with when working on the Rashba – Dimitrovsky's works. It was good that he only found it at the end as he did a beautiful job dealing with many many things which Dimitrovsky did not, making it very worth while that he too worked on this sefer.   One minor piece of criticism is that Naor makes paragraph divisions between each section giving each chapter a heading.  While this is very useful, Naor does not explain that these are his creation and not the Rashba's and thus can cause some confusion.  For example, on page 120 he quotes a piece from Yigdal which would be a nice early source but after checking it out with other versions of the Mamar its clear that Naor himself added this in -to be helpful.  The second book included in this volume is Mitzvat Hashem Barah. This book deals with the seven Noahide commandments. Rather than dealing with the actual commandments – i.e. a mere list – this book delves into rather interesting issues that surround these laws. For example, Naor has a fascinating discussion regarding R. Hayyim Hirschensohn's opinion that all commandments can be adduced logically. This discussion implicates what obligations there are in absence of specific commandments or, in the classic parlance, what happened before Matan Torah (pp.72-83). As an aside although it is very useful that he quotes the exact lengthy pieces of Hirschensohn he says he is doing so as they are very rare seforim. Although it is true that a hard copy of the seforim are hard to get but anyone can access them today thanks to Hebrew books.

Naor also presents the controversy between R. Jacob Emden and Moses Mendelssohn regarding the Noachide laws (pp. 16-34). While some maybe aware of the correspondence R. Emden had with Mendelsshonn regarding determining the time of death (see Moshe Samat's article in Hadash Assur min ha-Torah (Jerusalem: Dinur Center & Carmel Publishing, 2005), 157-227), most are not aware of this important philosophical debate. For two additional scholarly sources to this topic not mentioned by Naor, see the important unpublished paper of Professor Lawrence Kaplan, "On the Boundary between Old and New: The Correspondence Between Moses Mendelssohn and R. Jacob Emden," delivered at the Jewish Thought in the Eighteenth Century conference, Harvard University (Spring 1984), and the extensive discussion in chapter seven of Jacob J. Schacter, "Rabbi Jacob Emden: Life and Major Works," (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1988), 661-747 ("The Emden-Mendelssohn Correspondence"), and see esp. 720n3 for citations to previous descriptions of the correspondence, and also 725n37, 726n48, 742n150, 743n165, 744n168, where he discusses Kaplan's paper. Naor adds much to this topic. After these discussions, Naor then provides insights on the various Parshiyot ha-Torah that implicate Noahide laws especially before Matan Torah. Again the topics covered and, more importantly, the manner in which they are covered are terrific in scope and depth. His command of the "Yeshivish" sources along with Kabbalah (pp.97-102) and hasidut is excellent. Although much has been written on this topic of seven Noahide commandments especially before Matan Torah including a massive sefer (in size) called Birkot Avot and a recent pamphlet Mebei Medrasha from R. K. Redisch, Naor brings many new things to the table not dealt with before.
Here to he has many great footnotes scattered throughout the sefer some strictly for the sake of a very side footnote one such example is on pp. 5-6 about the Tosafot Yom Tov which writes (Nazir 5:5):והכוונה בודאי ממאמר מי שלא נתקיימו דבריו הוא מה שאמרנו עכ"ל. ונתקיימו דבריו. אע"פ שבגמרא לא פירשו כן. הואיל לענין דינא לא נפקא מינה ולא מידי. הרשות נתונה לפרש. שאין אני רואה הפרש בין פירוש המשנה לפירוש המקרא שהרשות נתונה לפרש במקראות כאשר עינינו הרואות חבורי הפירושים שמימות הגמ'. אלא שצריך שלא יכריע ויפרש שום דין שיהא סותר דעת בעלי הגמ':   He brings a few sources that a סברא is דאורייתא (p.78 n.180) Just to add one obscure source to his list see R. Avraham Grodzensky in Torat Avraham (p.264) who writes:גם סברת האדם ושכלו הפשוט כמקרא מפורש הוא, ואדרבה כל סברא פשוטה ביותר מפורש הוא ביותר כאשר נבאר איתא בב"ק (מו:) מניין להמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה… מתקיף לה רב אשי הא למה לי קרא סברא הוא… קושיא זו של רב אש אינה על סברא שדעת התורה והשקפתה כלולה בה, אלא על סברא פשוטה שהולה מבקש את הרופא מפני שמרגיש את כאביו ואל סברא זו מקשה…
One point of interest although this could really be nothing when Naor quotes Mendelssohn (pp.16-34) and Weisel (p. 19 n. 48, 200-203) in the text of the sefer he brings there name in abbreviation one suspects it has to do with fear for citing their names openly only in the notes (p.22 n.51) which much less people read does he quote Mendelssohn by full name.

On page 69 he deals with a Rambam who says יראה לי explaining that when ever the Rambam uses such language he is saying his own hiddush. It is surprising that although through out  this work Naor demonstrates great bekiyut in the works of the Aderet here he does not mention in the notes that he composed a work on all the Rambam's that say יראה לי recently reprinted by Ahavat sholom called Teshuvah Meyerah and more importantly he deals with this Rambam. One weakness is neither of these two works in the volume have an index which would have been rather useful as there are many many topics of interest in this sefer and one can not find them easily.   

Finally, it is worth noting that the book itself is rather nice to look at in part due to the color cover depicting a Spanish synagogue scene from the period of the Rashba. All in all this work is well worth owning and reading carefully.

The book is available in Jewish bookstores in Baltimore, Boston, New York and Pittsburgh or via the Orot website, with a special offer here.