Truth be Told[1] Comments on Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro

Truth be Told[1] 
by Aryeh A. Frimer*
Comments on Changing the ImmutableHow Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro (Oxford – Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2015).
*Rabbi Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer holds the Ethel and David Resnick Chair of Active Oxygen Chemistry at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel; email: Aryeh.Frimer@biu.ac.il. He has lectured and published widely on various aspects of “Women and Halakha;” see here. His most recent paper is: “Women, Kri’at haTorah and Aliyyot (with an Addendum on Partnership Minyanim),” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 46:4 (Winter, 2013), 67-238, available online here.
            I found R. Prof. Marc Shapiro’s new book Changing the Immutable a fascinating read and very hard to put down. The first seven chapters deal with censorship of halakhic and philosophical works, while the eighth focuses on lying and misrepresentation in pesak. As we know from his previous works, Shapiro has a very fluid writing style and the subject matter is always well researched. He does his best to be honest, unbiased and complete in his presentation. He is, moreover, intrigued with exploring the limits of the traditional consensus, which makes for some captivating reading. Yet, despite all these wonderful qualities – or perhaps, because of them, I found the present volume particularly unsettling and disconcerting.
R. Jacob J Schacter’s classic article “Facing the Truths of History” had already sensitized me to the fact that publishers censor and even rewrite portions of the books they bring to press.[2] They do so because they find some of their author’s positions “unacceptable” – views which don’t fit the publishers’ or the intended reader’s “party line.” That such censorship continues unabashedly in the 21st century is disappointing, but then “there is no shame anymore.” But these are, by and large, sins of omission; somehow, with that I could live.
            But what I found particularly troubling with Changing the Immutable was the last chapter, which deals with lying in pesak. After going through the many examples Shapiro cites, the reader is left with one clear impression. One sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek, since he may well be misrepresenting something in his ruling. It could be the source and authority of the prohibition. For example, is the prohibition based on a biblical commandment (positive or negative), rabbinic edict, custom or mere public policy (slippery slope) considerations? Alternatively, the expressed reason may not be the real grounds for the prohibition. In addition, the application may be much broader than halakhically permitted. To my mind these are shocking revelations: these are not sins of omission but commission; the perpetrators are scholars and religious leaders; and these deviations constitute intellectual dishonesty at its worst.
Our author is not insensitive to this dissonance. In an attempt to explain how these scholars justify not being fully honest in pesak, Shapiro writes in the last two pages of the book (pp. 284-285) about “redefining truth.” He indicates that these decisors see nothing wrong in what they are doing, since their ultimate goal is the “higher good”. As they see it, they have ultimately prevented their respective communities and congregants from sinning and deviating from the proper path of shemirat mitsvot. The fact that these scholars have bent the truth, and distorted Jewish law in the process, is of lesser importance. The ends in these cases, justify the means.
It is with these jarring observations that the book comes to an abrupt end, without any further comment or soul-searching. This is despite the fact that on page 239ff, Shapiro brings one citation from Hazal after another about the centrality of truth, and the seriousness of the sin of lying. After all, the Torah itself commands us: “mi-Devar sheker tirhak” – “From untruthfulness, distance thyself” (Exodus 23:7). If what the author writes in the last chapter is true, then Hazal’s eloquent statements about the importance of honesty have become nothing but a mockery. It raises serious moral questions with insufficient and unsatisfying answers. How are we now supposed to educate our children and talmidim as to the cardinal nature of truth and truthfulness?! How are we to live with such a clash between theory and practice?
In the course of our own study of Women’s Tefilla Groups, my brother R. Prof. Dov Frimer and I researched misrepresentation in pesak in the context of women’s issues.[3] Many leading Rabbis were deeply and justifiably concerned that some of the feminist practices introduced were ultimately “bad for the Jews” on public policy grounds.[4] But instead of saying so clearly, some rabbis adduced reasons that were not halakhically sound. Our own research has led us to the clear conclusion that the vast majority of the gedolim do not condone this type of misrepresentation or that discussed in the last chapter of Changing the Immutable. Giving an erroneous ruling – despite one’s good intentions, or even misstating the reason or source for a prohibition, violates the prohibition “mi-Devar sheker tirhak“, if not a variety of other issurim.
We begin our discussion of this issue with the famous Pesak Din (halakhic ruling) promulgated by a conference of rabbis who met in Michalowce Hungary in 1865. This edict initially signed by twenty-five leading rabbinic figures and subsequently by many more, ruled that nine practices (including, inter alia, synagogue choirs, sermons in the vernacular, synagogues weddings, absence of a central bima, canonical robes for the Hazan) were halakhically forbidden. Leading rabbis Moses Schick and Esriel Hildesheimer and many of their colleagues refused to sign. The fundamental claim of Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer was that, contrary to the impression given by the Pesak Din, the only grounds for some of the edicts were public policy (mi-gdar milta) – not halakhic – considerations.[5] The term “Pesak Din” (legal ruling) was in fact a conscious misnomer, an attempt to hide the truth, and, hence, a flagrant deviation from Jewish law with which they could take no part. R. Schick also argued that, since the Pesak Din was promulgated by a Jewish court, it violated bal tosif, adding a mitsva to the Torah.[6]
Similarly, R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes[7] argues that it is forbidden to call a rabbinic edict a biblical prohibition because it violates not only bal tosif but also mi-devar sheker tirhak. Similarly, R. Chayim Hirschensohn[8] charges those rabbis who forbid women to become involved in politics with violating both bal tosif and lying. R. Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk[9], maintains that both Ra’avad and Rambam agree that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” forbids a posek from claiming that a rabbinic injunction is biblical. R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky,[10] refuting the suggestion that it is forbidden to take part in elections in the secular State of Israel, writes: “…And your Honor should know that even to be zealous, it is forbidden to teach Torah not according to the halakha (Avot V:8), and that which is not true will not succeed at all.” R. Haim David Halevi[11] prohibits a posek from misrepresenting halakha and/or giving an erroneous reason for a prohibition for two basic reasons: (1) the biblical prohibition of “mi-devar sheker tirhak” and (2) a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority would result should the truth become known (see more below). [See also the related opinions of Rabbis Ehrenberg, Rogeler and Sobel cited below.]
As Prof. Shapiro documents in Changing the Immutable, some posekim dissent. They argued, on various grounds, that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” is not applicable to cases where halakha is misrepresented so as to prevent future violations of Jewish law. Other scholars argue that the dispensation to modify the truth in order to maintain peace (me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalomYevamot 65b) also applies to misrepresenting halakha in order to maintain peace between kelal Yisrael and the Almighty. Yet others maintain that if a posek believes an action should be prohibited because of mi-gdar milta, he may misrepresent the reason for or source of a prohibition; since there will be no change in the legal outcome, mi-devar sheker tirhak does not apply.[12] Finally, some have argued that mi-devar sheker tirhak only refers to lying in court.[13]
But these arguments have been seriously and vigorously challenged. Thus, R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg[14] demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose (ve-afilu li-devar mitsva). Similarly, R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin[15] chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble. R. Ovadiah Yosef[16] discusses at length whether a judge, maintaining a minority position on a three judge panel, can lie and say “I do not know what to rule,” – so that two more judges will be added to the panel and his minority opinion will have a chance to become the majority view; he concludes that it is forbidden. R. Solomon Sobel[17] explicitly states that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom only allows one to change the facts, not the halakha. Both R. Jacob Ettlinger and R. Reuben Margaliot[18] maintain that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom allows one only to obfuscate by using language which can be understood in different ways, but not to lie; hence, misrepresenting halakhic reasons or sources would also be forbidden.
Also unmentioned is the long list of posekim (including the Radba”z)[19] who maintain that even if one is theoretically permitted to misrepresent Halakha, under certain unique circumstances – one is nevertheless forbidden to do so in practice. This is because “the truth will out.”   Not only will this revelation ultimately lead to a terrible hillul Hashem, but it will undermine peoples’ trust in the rabbinic establishment. In this regard R. Benjamin Lau has observed:[20]
The rabbi is expected to know and present the various aspects of each issue and not to conceal those aspects that are inconsistent with his own point of view. If a rabbi is untrue to the sources and reaches his decision without taking account of conflicting views, he will be seen to be untrustworthy. And a lack of trust between a rabbi and his community of questioners will drive a wedge between that community and the Torah overall. Stating the truth, of course, does not require the decisor to remain neutral; his role requires him to reach a decision one way or the other. But the decision must be reached through disclosure, not concealment, of the alternatives….. Now, when everyone has access to the [Bar Ilan] Responsa Project data base and Google provides answers to all imaginable questions, everyone can check every responsum and examine its trustworthiness. A rabbi who rules in an oversimplified way, whether strictly or leniently, in a area of halakhic complexity will be caught as untrustworthy.
Having lived through the crises and confrontations of women’s prayer groups, women on religious councils, women in communal leadership roles and women’s aliyyot – I can testify that there is great need for both in-depth knowledge and truthfulness. The “hillul Hashem and loss of trust” argument is not just hype – but painfully all too accurate! Many of the rabbis in the 1970s lost control of the religious leadership of their communities because they were unprepared or unwilling to deal with the challenges honestly and head on. Many rabbis simply tried to stonewall the situation, while others were not forthright about the real reason for forbidding such practices. As previously noted, the Rabbis may well have been correct that many of the feminist practices introduced were halakhically unsound or “bad for the Jews” on a variety of public policy grounds.[21] But instead of saying so clearly (as Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt”l had urged and himself practiced), some rabbis waffled, while others prevaricated. But the halakhic truth quickly became known – a consequence of the “information age.” And as a result, many balebatim lost trust in the religious leadership as a whole. For them the conclusion was simply: “Everything boils down to politics.” 
            It is, therefore, critically important to reiterate that the cases cited by our author, exemplify neither pesak in general, nor the consensus view of the posekim. It is forbidden to misrepresent in halakhic rulings as a matter of law and policy.  In essence, then, Prof Shapiro’s scholarly and well-documented book presents the reader with a most fascinating review of an approach within halakhic decision making, which has been rejected by mainstream pesak. Indeed, such cases need to be actively addressed if they are to be uprooted.
Response by Marc B. Shapiro
I understand why Professor Frimer is troubled by what I wrote, and to a large extent my conclusions diverge from his own. All I would say is that the matter is complex, and rather than attempt to simplify matters, as I feel Frimer has done, we must attempt to understand how the same Sages who spoke about the importance of truth could at times countenance departure from it. This is a challenge that requires sensitivity and nuance, and appreciation of changing times and values. When Frimer sees a text that permits false attribution, he sees prevarication and hypocrisy. But a historically attuned outlook would seek to understand rather than condemn. Ironically, it is Frimer who is judging the Sages and decisors, because if their ideas do not conform to his understanding then these ideas are regarded by him as problematic.
Thus, Frimer cites the famous 1865 pesak din of Michalowce and tells us that R. Moses Schick and R. Esriel Hildesheimer opposed it since they saw it as departing from the truth. While their position is certainly significant, what about the fact that among Hungarian rabbis they were a minority, and most of the leading Hungarian rabbis supported the pesak? How is my argument refuted by citing Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer if they were opposed by most of their colleagues? Doesn’t the fact that most of the Hungarian rabbis opposed Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer support my position? 
As for the various rabbinic opinions cited by Frimer, I don’t deny that these opinions exist, and in my book I refer to Frimer’s famous article on women’s prayer groups in which he cites these opinions. But I also make the point that there is an alternative tradition which allows much more leeway for authorities to at times diverge from the truth. I also believe, contrary to Frimer, that this is a mainstream position. Since this position is held by R. Ovadiah Yosef and R. Hayyim Kanievsky, I don’t see how it is possible for one to state that it is not a mainstream position.
The point of the chapter, however, was not to advocate for one position or the other, but to focus on the alternative tradition, the existence of which is more or less suppressed today. I was explicit that my aim was to show how far some were willing to go in sanctioning deviations from the truth, and I indicate that there are views in opposition to these. However, my intent was to study the views of those with a “liberal” perspective on the importance of truth. It is this tradition that I wished to explore, and to rescue it, as it were, from the well-intentioned apologetics. I never state that this is the only authentic position. On the contrary, one can find the opposite perspective presented in numerous articles. This is why I thought it was important to present alternative views, from the Talmud until the present, views which I think show that there is a rabbinic conception of the Noble Lie.
I also must dispute the following statement by Frimer: “R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose.” How can Frimer state that R. Ehrenberg “demonstrates” such a thing? What R. Ehrenberg does is present an argument, and everyone can evaluate its cogency. The fact is that numerous authorities do not accept R. Ehrenberg’s position, which means that they would not agree that he has proven his case.
To Frimer, and others like him who have the same reaction after reading chapter 7, I can only say that modern views of how to understand texts, and what we today regard as truth, cannot be used as a measure with which to judge people who lived in a very different time and had a very different understanding of these sorts of matters. It is their understanding that I seek to explore, rather than foisting my own value judgments upon them. Unlike Frimer, who is involved in halakhic writing and attempting to influence the community in religious matters, I write from a more “objective” perspective, without such concerns. As such, while Frimer wishes to “uproot” what he regards as unacceptable views of certain poskim. I seek to understand the phenomenon and to describe it.
When, on p. 284, I speak about redefining truth, I am not speaking about poskim per se but about how to understand the entire phenomenon that I have documented in the book. The question is how does the importance of truth coexist with what we have seen, and it is in this context that I discuss how truth need not be seen as equivalent to factual or historical truth.
I agree with Frimer that none of the great poskim supported lying in pesak as a normative option on a regular basis. Yet as I have already indicated,  I believe that there is a tradition that allows for not being frank at certain times, when it is thought that other values are at stake. In the book I state that we should understand this position in a sympathetic fashion even if it is at odds with how today we generally approach matters.
Frimer asks how are we supposed to educate our children and students as to the importance of truth and truthfulness if what I say is correct. This is a good question with which educators need to struggle, but it is not a refutation of what I have written. If my position is correct, the world will not collapse. It will just be one more Torah matter, alongside Amalek, yefat toar, slavery, homosexuality, etc., that at certain times is not in line with contemporary values.
Here are some more comments relevant to the issue of truth.
1. Amichai Markowitz called my attention to a talmudic text that I overlooked. Nedarim 23b states: “The Tanna has intentionally obscured the law, in order that vows should not be lightly treated.” This relates to the issue of the truth not being made available to all. See also Kovetz Iggerot Hazon Ish, vol. 2, no. 78, that one should not reveal to the masses that the Sages forbade things that the Torah permitted.[22]
2. R. Joseph Ibn Caspi writes that at times it is appropriate for members of the intellectual elite to lie.[23] This explains how Joseph lied to his brothers when he accused them of being spies (Gen. 42:9). In support of this view Ibn Caspi cites both Maimonides and Aristotle.[24] The mention of Maimonides no doubt refers to the latter’s notion of “necessary beliefs”, but it is not clear where Ibn Caspi got his quote from Aristotle, since as far as I can determine Aristotle says no such thing.[25]
3. R. Abraham Arbel writes as follows[26]:
ואם מצא לנכון המגדל עז לשבח חכם כהרמב”ם שלא שקר והיה אמיתי, משמע דפשיטא ליה שגם אצל חכם בדרגתו אפשר למצוא שישקר משום כבודו.
R. Arbel also adds the following passage which I am sure will be very troubling to Frimer (as Frimer rejects the notion that “one sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek”). R. Arbel’s words should be understood in line with the many sources I cite in the last chapter of my book.
וע”ע טהרת ישראל (סי’ קפה אות סו) בדין אשה שאמרה שהחכם טהר לה הכתם ועתה מכחיש אותה החכם לומר שלא שאלה אותו, דחישינן שהחכם רואה עתה שטעה שטהר, ובוש לומר שטעה, ולכן משקר עתה לומר שלא שאלה אותו. וכ”כ בהפלאה (קונ’ אחרון סי קטו סק”א( שהחכם לא נאמן להכחיש אשה, שאומרת שהחכם טהר, כשהכתם לפנינו והוא טמא, שהרי הוא נוגע בדבר שהרי טעה.
4. R. Ovadiah Yosef stated that if X tells you something he wrote, you can tell others that you read it in X’s book, and this is not considered a lie.[27]
5. In Changing the Immutable, p. 253, I cite a passage from Devarim Rabbah which states that for the sake of peace, even “Scripture itself” recorded something false. I should have also cited Midrash Tanhuma 96:7, which is even more striking, attributing the falsehood directly to God (as opposed to merely speaking of “Scripture”):
ארשב”ג גדול הוא השלום שהכתיב [שכתב] הקב”ה דברים בתורה שלא היו אלא בשביל השלום.
6. Let me offer another example of censorship in halakhic matters, the sort of thing that Frimer claims must be battled against and “uprooted” for the sake of Torah truth.[28] Here is page 141 from R. Yitzhak Zilberstein’s and R. Moshe Rothschild’s Torat ha-Yoledet.

The matter dealt with is whether a husband can be in the delivery room. The authors quote the opinion that if there is a need the husband can be in the room. In note 2, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah II, no. 75, is quoted as follows:
הנה אם יש צורך, איני רואה איסור. אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .
However, if you look at the actual text of Iggerot Moshe, what he says is something different.
הנה אם יש צורך איני רואה איסור ואף בלא צורך איני רואה איסור, אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .
I have underlined the words that are deleted by Torat ha-Yoledet. This deletion allows them to present R. Moshe Feinstein as saying that only if there is a need for the husband to be in the room can be there. Yet R. Moshe explicitly states that even if there is no “need”, he can still remain with his wife.

I know that there are some who are thinking that I am making a big deal out of nothing, and that it must have been an accident that the words were deleted as that no one would dare to purposely alter what R. Moshe wrote. I am sorry to say that this is not the case. Here are two pages from R. Pesach Eliyahu Falk’s Levushah shel Torah.[29]

From it we see that someone asked R. Zilberstein about the words that were deleted, and R. Zilberstein did not say that they were deleted in error. On the contrary, he tells the questioner that the words were deleted on purpose, after consultation with “gedolei ha-poskim”. In other words, these poskim disagreed with R. Moshe and therefore instructed R. Zilberstein that when he quoted Iggerot Moshe he should censor R. Moshe’s words so that people should not learn the extent of R. Moshe’s lenient view. After all that I have written in my book, I don’t think people will be surprised by this. Frimer, however, who has assured us that this sort of thing is not “mainstream”, and indeed is “forbidden”, will have to explain how it is that a respected posek like R. Zilberstein, acting on the instruction of other great poskim, could adopt such an approach, an approach which stands as a refutation of Frimer’s point.
As I have said already, I am not claiming that this sort of distortion is an everyday phenomenon. But I do claim that many poskim believe that they have the authority to alter the truth when they think that this is necessary. We can’t pretend that the texts I have cited don’t exist.
7. In his post Frimer writes: “R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin  chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble.” I don’t think the word “chastises” is appropriate in this case. R. Elijah disagrees with the other rabbi, but the disagreement is not strident. For example, R. Elijah writes as follows in Yad Eliyahu, no. 62:
ע”ד אשר האריך רום מעלתו בלשונו בשפת אמת להעמיד שפת שקר במקומי אני עומד שאינו כדאי להיות רגיל בכך ואף שמותר בו מאיזה טעם שיהיה.
8. In the next issue of Masorah le-Yosef my article on “necessary beliefs” will appear. In this article I discuss how Maimonides and other figures say things that do not reflect their true opinion, but are merely “necessary beliefs”, i.e., “beliefs” that the masses should accept but which are not really true at all. If these authorities think that the masses can be fed false ideas when it comes to theology, why should halakhah be any different?

9. See R. Mordechai Eliasburg, Shevil ha-Zahav (Warsaw, 1897), p. 27-28, who claims that both Nahmanides and R. Jacob Emden recorded things in their writings that they did not really believe.

10. R. Chaim Sunitzky called my attention to R. Israel Weltz, Divrei Yisrael, vol. 3, no. 170, who doesn’t see such a problem with false stories if they lead people in a good direction.

.אין זה נורא כ”כ בספורי מעשיות כאלה כשהכוונה היא לטובה ללמוד ממנה מוסר ודרכי הי”ת
And now for some comic relief. A few weeks ago Ezra Glinter reviewed my book for the Forward. See here.
He used this opportunity to take some hits at the haredi world, focusing on matters that are not mentioned in the book. Rabbi Avi Shafran, who is paid to respond to this sort of thing, penned his own piece for the Forward available here.
The comedy starts in the first two paragraphs which read:
Psst! I’ve got a secret to share. It’s from deep inside the Orthodox Jewish world. Come closer… Okay, here it is: Orthodoxy changes!
It’s not much of a secret, actually. At least in these here parts. But it seems to be an unfamiliar concept for Marc Shapiro, a University of Scranton professor and author of the recent book, “Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History.”
It is obvious that Shafran has never even looked at my book and is only basing his comments on what appears in Glinter’s review. Those who have read the book know that a major theme of it is precisely how Orthodoxy changes. In fact, there is no one in the world today whose scholarship is more associated with the thesis that Orthodoxy changes than me. Much of the criticism of me is on precisely this point, that I have exaggerated the amount of change. Yet here Shafran comes and says that I am ignorant about how Orthodoxy changes. This is what I mean by comic relief.
Shafran then writes:
If a biography of Bertrand Russell can choose to elide the great philosopher’s serial marital infidelities and not be accused of rewriting the past, a hagiography of a great rabbi should certainly be permitted to overlook judgments he made with the best of intentions that in retrospect might seem misguided to some today. Such acts of civility are at times portrayed as scandalous by Shapiro and his reviewer.
A biography of Russel that chooses to omit his marital infidelities would indeed be rightly accused of rewriting the past. As for the second part of the sentence, I agree that a hagiography can leave out material of the sort Shafran mentions, but that is because it is a hagiography! If it intended to be a biography, then no, it cannot overlook mistaken judgments made by the subject, or else it ceases to be biography. I also do not think that it is an act of civility to refrain from writing about such mistaken judgments (as for example, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg’s early misjudgment of the Nazi regime).
Shafran provides a few examples of how practice in Orthodoxy has changed, none of which I disagree with. But then again, my book has nothing to do with this. He writes:
One opinion in the Talmud, for example, permits fowl and milk to be cooked together and eaten. Just try ordering milk-braised chicken in your local kosher eatery these days; they’ll sic the mashgiach on you in a Borough Park moment. Men using mirrors was once forbidden as a “womanly” act, a once-true assessment that, for most Orthodox men today, is no longer considered applicable.
Let us say that a new edition of the Talmud was published that deleted the lines that tell us that one opinion permitted fowl and milk to be cooked and eaten together? Would Shafran be OK with this? I assume not, and it is thus unfortunate that he doesn’t know that it is precisely this sort of censorship that my book is focused on. What we have here is not only criticism without having read the book, but criticism without having any clue as to what the book is about. 
And then, to top off the comic relief, Shafran ends his piece as follows:

“Why is that so hard for Orthodoxy’s critics to understand?”

I have been called some different things in my life, but this is the first time I have been referred to as one of “Orthodoxy’s critics”.

Let me also add that Changing the Immutable has sold very well in the haredi world, and this is not surprising since it is not an anti-haredi book at all.

[1] AAF would like to thank Dov I. Frimer, Shael I. Frimer, David A. Kessler and Joel B. Wolowelsky for their insightful comments and suggestions on previous drafts.
[2] R. Jacob J. Schacter, “Facing the Truths of History,” Torah u-Madda Journal, 8 [1998-1999]: pp. 200-273.
[3] Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women’s Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 – Theory,” Tradition, 32:2 (Winter 1998), pp. 5-118. PDF available online
here. See in particular Addendum, part 6.
[4] See our discussion in Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Section E therein.
[5] R. Moses Schick in Likutei Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, R. Israel Stern, ed. (London, 1965), sec. 82, pp. 73-75; Meir Hildesheimer, “She’eilot u-Teshuvot Maharam Schick,” Tsefunot, 2:2(6) (Tevet 5750), pp. 87-95, at p. 93; Yona Emanuel, “Me’a Shana lePetirat haRav Azriel Hildesheimer Zatsal,” haMa’ayn, XXXIX, 4 (Tammuz 5759), pp. 1-7, “Al Kinus haRabbanim be-Mikhalovitch” pp. 2-4; Michael K. Silber, “The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Invention of a Tradition,” In The Uses of Tradition, Jack Wertheimer, ed. (New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1992), p. 23-84; Mordechai Eliav, “Mekomo shel Rav Azriel Hildesheimer be-Ma’avak al Demutah shel Yahadutr Hungariah,” Zion 27 (1962), 59-86; Nethanel Katzburg, “Pesak Din shel Michalovitch 5726,” in Perakim be-Toldot ha-Hevrah ha-Yehudit be-Yemei ha-Beinayim u-be-Et ha-Hadashah, Emanuel Etkes and Yosef Salmon, eds. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1980), 273-286; Jacob Katz, The Unhealed Breach: The Secession of Orthodox Jewry from the General Community in Hungary and Germany (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1994 – see especially Chapter 8.
[6] See Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Addendum, part 5.
[7]  R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Darkei Hora’asiman 6, first footnote,
[8]  R. Chayim Hirschensohn Resp. Malki baKodesh, II, sec. 4, p. 13.
[9] Cited in R. Zvi [Hershel] Schachter, Nefesh haRav (Jerusalem: Reishit Yerushalayyim, 1994), p.178.
[10] R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky, Keraina deIggarta, letter 203, pp. 219-220.
[11] Responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 and published in RespMayyim Hayyim, III, sec. 55.
[12] R. Chaim Kanievsky, Masekhet Kutim, 1:14, Me-taher, note 30, and conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer (February 20, 1995),
[13] R. Zelig Epstein, in a conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Noach Dear (March 8, 1996). R. Jerucham Fishel Perlau, Commentary to Rav Sa’adia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvot, I, p. 156b.
[14] R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg, Resp. Devar Yehoshua, I, addendum to sec. 19, no. 6 (see also V, Y.D. sec 12). See also R. Nahum Yavruv, Niv Sefatayyim (Jerusalem, 1989) Niv Sefatayyim, kelal 1; R. Eliezer Judah Waldenberg, Resp. Tsits Eliezer 15:12:2.
[15] R. Elijah Rogeler, Resp. Yad Eliyahu, sec. 61 and 62
[16] R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, II, H.M., sec. 3
[17] R. Solomon Sobel, Salma Hadasha, Mahadura Tinyana, Haftarat Toledot; cited in R. Jacob Yehizkiyah Fisch, Titen Emet leYa’akov (Jerusalem, 1982), sec. 5, no. 36.
[18] R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh leNer, Yevamot 65b, s.v. she-Ne’emar avikha tsiva” and “Ko tomeru leYosef,” and R. Reuben Margaliot, Kunteres Hasdei Olam, sec. 1061, at the end of his edition of Sefer Hasidim (Mossad haRav Kook: Jerusalem, 5724). See also R. Moses David Maccabbi Leventhal, “Shinui beDevar haShalom,” Zohar, 3 (Spring 5760), pp. 49-64.
[19] R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Resp. Benei Vanim, I, sec. 37, no. 12, argues that such misrepresentation most often results in gossip, hate, unlawful leniencies in other areas, hillul Hashem, and a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority should the truth become known. (This despite the fact that R. Y.H. Henkin maintains that when a posek upgrades a prohibition for a just cause, there is no prohibition of either bal Tosif or lying). Similar views are expressed by Resp. Torah liShma, sec. 371; R. Moses Jehiel Weiss, Beit Yehezkel, p. 77; R. Abraham Isaac haKohen Kook, Orah Mishpat, no. 111 (pp. 117-120) and 112 (pp. 120-129); R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, Teshuvot Ivra, sec. 52, no. 3 (in Kitvei haGri Henkin, II); R. Haim David Halevi, responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 – published in Resp. Mayyim Hayyim, III, sec.55; and R. David Feinstein, conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, March 19, 1995. See also the commentary of Radbaz to M.T., Melakhim 6:3, where even normally permitted lying is forbidden lest it result in hillul Hashem should the truth be discovered. Similarly, in discussing Sanhedrin 29a and the cause of Adam and Eve’s sin, R. Hanokh Zundel, Eits Yosefad loc., s.v. Ma,” comments that one must be particularly careful how a stringency and its rationale are formulated, for if no distinction is drawn between a stringency and the original ordinance, any error found in the stringency may lead the masses to believe that there is an error in the original ordinance itself.
[20] R. Benjamin Lau, “The Challenge of Halakhic Innovation,” Meorot 8 Tishrei 5771, pp 43-57 at pp. 45-46, available online here.
[21] See our discussion in Section E of Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3.
[22] It could be that the Hazon Ish would not be opposed if this information was revealed in a responsible way. I say this since his language is
והבא להכריז בין המון העם כי חכמים גזרו עלינו דברים שהתורה לא אסרתן כונתו ידועה . . . והתוצאות ידועות
(Emphasis added) This might mean that it is only objectionable if someone makes a big deal out of the fact that a certain prohibition is only rabbinic
[23] Mishneh Kesef (Cracow, 1906), vol. 2, to Gen 42:12 (pp. 93-94).
[24] His quote of Aristotle is: נכון לגדול הנפש שיכזכ בהיות זה הכרחי
[25] See Jane S. Zembaty, “Aristotle on Lying,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993), pp. 7-29.
[26] Ahoti Kalah (Jerusalem, 2007), p. 149.
[27] Eliyahu Sheetrit, Rabbenu (Jerusalem, 2014), p. 266.
[28] This example, and also R. Falk’s Levushah shel Torah, were called to my attention by R. Yonason Rosman.
[29] (Jerusalem, 2007), vol. 2, pp. 783-784.



Rabbi Joseph Hertz, Women and Mitzvot, Antoninus, the New RCA Siddur, and Rabbis who Apostatized, Part 1

Rabbi Joseph Hertz, Women and Mitzvot, Antoninus, the New RCA Siddur, and Rabbis who Apostatized, Part 1

Marc B. Shapiro

1. In my last post here, in discussing R. Joseph Hertz’s suggested alternative text for Maoz Tzur, I wrote that this suggestion “was simply made up by Hertz or perhaps suggested by an unnamed collaborator on his siddur commentary.” At least one person wondered if I had anything in mind when I wrote about “an unnamed collaborator.” Indeed, these words were chosen deliberately. I do not know anything specifically about collaborators on the siddur commentary. However, we do know about the collaborators on his famous Torah commentary. This Chumash used to be found in every Modern Orthodox synagogue, and now, just like the Birnbaum siddur, it is missing from most of these synagogues.[1]

When it comes to what I will describe about the Hertz Chumash, it is possible that we are dealing with a great injustice. At the very least, it was a great misunderstanding between Hertz and his collaborators. Here are the Hebrew and English title pages of the Hertz Chumash.

 

The English title page refers to the Chumash as edited by Hertz. The Hebrew title page, which most people don’t even bother looking at, even if they understand Hebrew, refers to a commentary that is the work of a group of Torah scholars headed by Hertz. These are quite different formulations.

Most people who have used the Hertz Chumash, even those who have used it for many years, will not know anything about this group of Torah scholars. Indeed, when people quote from this Chumash, Hertz is given exclusive credit for everything in it. Thus, when citing this Chumash’s commentary, people will say, “Hertz writes.” Yet is this correct?

If we turn to the Chumash’s preface, we learn that Hertz was assisted by J. Abelson, A. Cohen, G. Friedlander and S. Frampton. The first three individuals prepared the commentary to sections of the Torah (the exact sections are listed), and Frampton prepared the commentary to the Haftorahs. Hertz writes: “In placing their respective manuscripts at my disposal, they allowed me the widest editorial discretion. I have condensed or enlarged, re-cast or re-written at will, myself supplying the Additional Notes as well as nearly all the introductory and concluding comments to the various sections.” We see from this that Hertz had an important role, not just as editor, but in contributing content to the Chumash. Yet the commentary itself was not the product of Hertz. He was simply the editor of the material provided by the men mentioned above. In this role, he performed the regular task of an editor who takes texts and condenses and enlarges, re-casts or re-writes, but this editorial involvement does not make the editor the author.

We therefore have to wonder why it is that the men who labored so hard in creating the commentary are given no recognition, apart from the mention of their names in the preface which virtually no one bothers to read. As I already noted, the commentary to the Chumash is universally understood to have been written by Hertz when in fact most of it – other than the “introductory and concluding comments to the various sections” – is not his at all.

Now that the facts have been laid out, I don’t think anyone will be surprised to learn that Abelson, Cohen, and Frampton were not at all happy when the Chumash appeared and they were given no recognition for their labors on the title page. (Friedlander was no longer alive.) They thought that on the title page, following the mention of Hertz as the editor, it should have said something like, “With the collaboration of the Revs. Dr. A. Cohen, Dr. J. Abelson, the Rev. S. Frampton and the late Rev. G. Friedlander.” Hertz responded to their complaint that it had already been established at the initial stages of the planning of the Chumash that the contributors’ names would not appear on the title page.[2] In fact, this a major reason for R. Salis Daiches[3] withdrawing from collaboration on the project. (Obviously, Abelson, Cohen, and Frampton had a different understanding of how Hertz was supposed to acknowledge their work.) Daiches was also unhappy with Hertz’s “editorial policy of extensively rewriting and revising the installments submitted to him by the various annotators.”[4] Hertz later implausibly claimed that his revisions were “an incredible amount of labor, easily ten times the amount of my collaborators.”[5]

Another matter that must be noted is that in the preface found in the first volume of the first edition of the Chumash—it originally appeared in five volumes—Hertz writes that he supplied “nearly all the Additional Notes.” Yet in the one volume edition this sentence has been changed and the word “nearly” has been deleted, making Hertz the only author. Harvey Meirovich has called attention to this, and shows that the Notes dealing with evolution and sacrifices came from R. Isidore Epstein.[6]

I do not know why the following paragraph, which explains the method of the commentary and appeared in the preface to volume 1 of the first edition, was deleted from the preface of the one volume Chumash. This is exactly the sort of explanation of the commentary that the reader would find helpful.

Method of Interpretation: A word must be added as to the method chosen for leading the reader into what the Jewish Mystics called the Garden of Scriptural Truth. The exposition of the plain, natural sense of the Sacred Text must remain the first and foremost aim in a Jewish commentary. But this is not its only purpose and function. The greatest care must be taken not to lose sight of the allegorical teaching and larger meaning of the Scriptural narrative; of its application to the everyday problems of human existence; as well as of its eternal power in the life of Israel and Humanity. In this way alone can the commentator hope not merely to increase the knowledge of the reader, but to deepen his Faith in God, the Torah and Israel.

Also of interest is that the first edition of the Hertz Chumash includes maps which are not found in the one volume edition.

2. In my post here I mentioned that R. Shmuel Wosner defends the practice of women saying שלא עשני גוי and שלא עשני עבד instead of substituting the words גויה and שפחה. R. Yehudah Tesner agrees with R. Wosner and adds the following: If a woman would say שלא עשני גויה this would only mean that she does not want to be a non-Jewish woman. However, she might still prefer to be a non-Jewish man instead of a Jewish woman. Also, if she said שפחה it might only mean that she does not want to be a female maidservant, as this has two negative things, namely, that she is both a woman and enslaved.

שאין רצונה להיות שפחה, שיש בזה תרתי לריעותא, גם אשה וגם משעובדת

However, it might imply that if she could get rid of one of these negative things, i.e., the female, and be a male slave, that this might be acceptable to her. In order to prevent these misunderstandings, R. Tesner says that she must keep the standard text which includes women as part of גוי and עבד. This way she is thanking God that she is not a non-Jew, male or female, and that she is not a slave, male or female.[7]

There is no question in my mind that R. Tesner’s approach is somewhat convoluted and would never represent the thinking of any woman who recited the prayer. I only mention it because R. Tesner takes it for granted that it is better to be born as a Jewish man than a Jewish woman. Yet he also sees as obvious that it is still better to be a free Jewish woman than a male slave.

With regard to this latter point, it is of interest that R. Joseph Teomim states that there are a few things in which a male slave has an advantage over a woman:

עבד חשוב לענין קצת דברים . . . במקצת דברים עדיף מאשה

One of the things he mentions is that a male slave is circumcised, and circumcision is a great mitzvah given to men that women do not have the opportunity to fulfill.[8] This perspective is obviously very different than the outlook advocated by various kiruv speakers that while women are created perfect, men are created defective and thus need a berit milah to get them up to the level of women.[9] I have no doubt that if this argument was first made by someone who identified with Open Orthodoxy, that it would have been regarded as blasphemous for denigrating the commandment of circumcision.

Regarding women not having the opportunity to fulfill the great mitzvah of circumcision (and other mitzvot), I was surprised to find that R. Leon Modena, who was quite “modern” for his time, explains that this is because they do not rank very high in God’s eyes, which is another way of saying that women are simply unworthy of these mitzvot. Here are his misogynistic words:[10]

ומצינו שלא החשיב השי”ת בתורתו הנשים בשום אופן, ולא נתן להן אפי’ אות ברית במילה, ולא רוב מצוות עשה.

Apart from circumcision, it is a popular kiruv perspective that in general women are created with more spiritual perfection, and thus do not need all the mitzvot of men. R. Meir Mazuz attacks this position which he sees as absurd.[11]

דוגמא אחת  מהסילופים: המקשים מצביעים על ברכת “שלא עשני אשה”, והמתרצים מתפלפלים להוכיח שהאשה איננה צריכה כל כך סייגים וגדרים, כי מטבעה דיה במספר מועט של מצוות, ולכן היא מברכת בשמחה רבה “שעשני כרצונו” – שהקב”ה ברא אותה תמימה ושלימה שאיננה צריכה כל כך מצוות, והאיש מברך “שלא עשני אשה” – הוא על דרך שמברכין על הרעה כשם שמברכין על הטובה . . . [ellipses in original] ואילו היה כדבריהם, למה מברכין הנשים ברכת “שעשני כרצונו” בלי שם ומלכות . . . והאנשים מברכים “שלא עשני אשה” בשם ומלכות, ואדרבא איפכא מסתברא?! ובטור א”ח (סימן מ”ו) כתב שנהגו הנשים לברך שעשני כרצונו, ואפשר שנהגו כן כמי שמצדיק עליו את הדין על הרעה . . . ולדעת המתרצים הנ”ל אפשר לומר ג”כ שהגוים עדיפי מישראל, שאינם צריכים לתרי”ג מצוות רק לשבע דוקא, אתמהה.

To R. Mazuz’s words I would only add that if people find it problematic to say that men are created more perfect than women, why do they not find it also problematic to say that women are created more perfect than men? Should I have been offended when a woman once said to me that she is exempt from a number of mitzvot because women are on a higher spiritual level than men, as they are naturally more connected to God, while men can only achieve this connection through mitzvot? I am sure she would have been offended if someone said to her that women are on a lower spiritual level than men, as they are naturally less connected to God, and the evidence of this is that do not have as many mitzvot as men.[12] And what about Torah study? Can we say that men are only commanded to study Torah because they are not at the same spiritual level as women? This would be a complete inversion of the value traditionally assigned to Torah study.[13]

Yisrael Ben Reuven’s book, Male and Female He Created Them (Southfield, 1995), devotes a good deal of discussion to the kiruv perspective. On pp. 132, 133, he writes:

A number of recent books in English propose this idea of women’s spiritual superiority over men, and reportedly, the idea is taught as well in numerous schools for women. The reader should note that none of the books in question offer a classical source for the idea, and none of several teachers of the idea have been able to supply a source when interviewed by this author and numerous individuals known by the author. . . . [T]he teaching contradicts a principle from the Gemara that commandments are placed on a person as a result of his having spirituality (as opposed to his lacking it).

I believe that Ben Reuven is correct in noting that attributing this notion to the Maharal is a mistake. Yet I disagree with his discussion of the view of R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, as Hirsch indeed suggests that women are not commanded in the positive time-bound commandments because they do not need them, for they, by nature, have “greater fervour and more faithful enthusiasm for their God-serving calling.” Contrary to Ben Reuven, doesn’t this mean that they are created with a superior innate spirituality? Men, on the other hand, according to Hirsch, can only reach their spiritual potential through the mitzvot. Hirsch includes circumcision as one of the commandments that men need because they are by nature on a lower spiritual plane then women.[14]

R. Zvi Yehudah Kook also thinks that women are inherently spiritually superior to men. The problem is that men don’t realize this. However, R. Zvi Yehudah claims that in Messianic days when men will understand the truth, they will no longer be able to able to make the blessing שלא עשני אשה, as they will see that women are superior to them.[15]

במצב העכשווי האיש יותר חזק בגופו, ומתוך כך בפרקטיקה האנושית. הוא אקטיבי יותר בכל החיים המעשיים. יש הרגשה שהוא תופס יותר מקום. הרגשה זו היא לפי המדריגה האנושית, והברכות נקבעו על פי ההרגשה האנושית היחסית. זאת התפיסה האנושית הרגילה, והברכה מתייחסת למציאות זו. משום כך אומר האיש כהרגשתו “שלא עשני אשה”, שהרי זו האמת היחסית, והאשה מברכת “שעשני כרצונו”. אך, כאמור, זו תפיסה אנושית חלקית, וההרגשה היא רק עניין יחסי של מצב עכשווי נתון, אמת נוכחית.

לעומת זאת, ההשקפה האלהית, האמת המוחלטת, אינה ענין של הרגשה חולפת, אלא האמת הנצחית מראשיתה ועד סופה. לעתיד לבוא, כאשר גם האדם יכיר את האמת, ויהיה כולו מבחינת “הטוב והמטיב”, לא יוכל לברך “שלא עשני אשה”, שהרי אז יכיר שבניינה של האשה יותר רם, יותר אלהי ופחות אנושי, ממצבו הוא.

For virtually all, the approaches suggested by Hirsch and R. Zvi Yehudah Kook in which women are created more perfect than men would have been inconceivable in pre-modern times. One possible exception, and the only exception I know of, was the sixteenth-century R. Gedaliah Ibn Yahya, author of Shalshelet ha-Kabbalah. He actually enumerates numerous ways in which women are superior to men. He also claims that women are not intellectually inferior to men, and they can thus understand all the wisdoms of the world. In the sixteenth century, this was a very radical position.[16]

Regarding women, R. Yonason Rosman called my attention to the following. The ArtScroll Chumash, p. 1086 (beginning of parashat Nitzavim) states:

On the last day of his life, Moses gathered together every member of the Jewish people, from the most exalted to the lowliest, old and young, men and women, and initiated them for the last time into the covenant of God. What was new about this covenant was the concept of ערבות responsibility for one another, under which every Jew is obligated to help others observe the Torah and to restrain them from violating it. This is why Moses began by enumerating all the different strata of people who stood before him, and why he said (v. 28) that God would not hold them responsible for sins that had been done secretly, but that they would be liable for transgressions committed openly (Or HaChaim).

According to the ArtScroll summary, R. Hayyim Ben Attar, the author of Or ha-Hayyim, states that women are obligated in ערבות. But is this really what he says? Here is his commentary to Deuteronomy 29:9:

R. Hayyim ben Attar actually says the exact opposite of what appears in the ArtScroll summary, in that he states that women are not obligated in ערבות, and they are grouped together with children and proselytes. R. Ben Attar tells us that children are not obligated because they do not have the requisite understanding for such an obligation. Proselytes are not obligated because it is not their place to be rebuking, and thus exercising authority over, those who were born Jewish.[17] Why are women not obligated? R. Ben Attar writes:

ואין הם נתפסים על אחרים שהטף אינם בני דעה והנשים כמו כן הגרים גם כן אין להם להשתרר על ישראל

The sentence is ambiguous, and it all depends on where you put the comma. Here is one way to read the sentence:

ואין הם נתפסים על אחרים שהטף אינם בני דעה והנשים כמו כן, הגרים גם כן אין להם להשתרר על ישראל

If you place the comma after the words והנשים כמו כן, the sentence seemingly means that women are just like children in not having the requisite understanding of the various sins to be obligated in ערבות. R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer finds it incomprehensible that R. Ben Attar would say that women’s level of understanding is comparable to that of children.[18] He therefore explains that when R. Ben Attar says והנשים כמו כן, he only means to say that the law for women is like the law for children, but not that the reason is the same.

You can also place the comma after the words אינם בני דעה so that one reads the sentence this way:

ואין הם נתפסים על אחרים שהטף אינם בני דעה, והנשים כמו כן הגרים גם כן אין להם להשתרר על ישראל

Now the sentence means that children do not have the requisite understanding to be obligated in ערבות, and women are like proselytes in that it is not their place to be rebuking, and thus exercising authority over, Jewish men. Although this is how R. Avraham Sorotzkin understands the Or ha-Hayyim,[19] I find it difficult as the second half of the sentence does not read well this way.

3. In my post here I referred to Nero and Antoninus and their supposed conversions to Judaism. The Talmud, Gittin 56a, indeed states that Nero converted, and it adds that R. Meir was descended from him. Soncino’s note to the passage reads: “This story may be an echo of the legend that Nero who had committed suicide was still alive and that he would return to reign (v. JE IX, 225).” The Koren Talmud’s note, which is a translation of what appears in Steinsaltz, states that the talmudic story cannot be referring to the famous Nero: “The Roman emperor Nero was killed under strange circumstances and after his death rumors circulated that he was not actually killed but had taken refuge elsewhere.” The note continues that even though Nero is referred to in the passage in Gittin 56a as ,נירון קיסר the story actually refers to another person who was an officer in the Roman army in the campaign against Judea. This person’s name was also Nero, and since he was from the larger Caesar family, he too was called Nero Caesar. This explanation apparently first appears in Seder ha-Dorot.[20]

Graetz thought that the story of Nero converting was part of a rabbinic polemic against Christianity, while Bacher “attributed the origin of the legend to the view which considers the power of Judaism to be so great, that even its greatest enemies become converts either themselves, or, at any rate, their descendants.”[21]

Let me offer another way of explaining the story of Nero’s conversion, which I have not seen anyone else suggest. Josephus tells us that the Jews put up a wall in the Temple to prevent King Agrippa from viewing the sacrificial service. This upset both Agrippa and the Procurator, Festus, and Festus ordered that the wall be torn down. The Jews decided to go over Festus’ head and turned to Nero. Nero’s wife, Poppaea Sabina, pleaded their case, and as a favor to his wife, Nero ordered that the wall should stay.

Why would Poppaea plead the case of the Jews? Josephus tells us that she was a “God-fearer.”[22] Whatever the exact connotations of this term, which has been greatly discussed, she was clearly a sympathizer of the Jews. Josephus tells us that on another occasion she helped secure the release of some Jews who had been placed in prison in Rome. He also tells us that that Poppaea gave him many presents.[23] Could it be that originally the story about the conversion of Nero was said about his wife, and that in the hundreds of years before it was recorded in the Talmud, it was transferred to Nero himself?

As for the Emperor Antoninus, who was friends with R. Judah ha-Nasi, we do not know who this refers to as the title Antoninus was used for various emperors.[24] However, I want to call attention to a different point. In Sefer Yuhasin ha-Shalem, ed. Filipowski, p. 115, in listing the talmudic sages, R. Abraham Zacut includes a “Rabbi Antoninus”. Where does he get such a name? As he indicates, it comes from Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, and there are actually two separate references there to R. Antoninus.[25] The first reads:[26]

[א”ר אנטונינוס למלך שהוא דן על הכימה [הבימה

The second reads:[27]

…ר’ אנטונינוס אומר ג’ היו והוסיף עליהם עוד אחד והיו ד’

R. Antoninus is being cited as the source for halakhic teachings. Yet the text is corrupt, as was already pointed out by the Vilna Gaon. He emended both passages so that while Antoninus is mentioned, he is not identified as a rabbi.[28]Thus, in the first passage the Vilna Gaon emended it to read:

 [אמר רבי אנטונינוס המלך שהוא דן על הכימה [הבימה

The second passage he emended to read:

רבי אומר ג’ היו הוסיף עליהם עוד אחד והיו ד’ הוסיף אנטונינוס עוד אחד והיו ה’

While the Vilna Gaon may have only sensed intuitively that the text was corrupt, manuscript evidence exists that offers versions similar to or identical with that suggested by the Vilna Gaon.[29]

As for the conversion of Antoninus, R. Solomon Judah Rapoport argues that this is a late, and non-historical, aggadah.[30] He points to a passage in the Jerusalem Talmud, Megillah 1:11, which shows that it was not clear whether Antoninus converted.

אית מילין דאמרין דאתגייר אנטונינוס ואית מילין אמרין דלא אתגייר אנטונינוס

Nevertheless, despite these words, the continuation of this talmudic passage records that he did in fact convert. This is also the conclusion in the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 10:5. However, the matter is still not clear, since regarding the Megillah text the Leiden manuscript has a different version which leaves the matter of Antoninus’ conversion undecided.[31] Furthermore, as Shaye J. D. Cohen writes, “the Bavli clearly implies that Antoninus was not a convert, unlike the Roman dignitary Qetia who was.”[32] Cohen also calls attention to Yalkut Shimoni: Isaiah, no. 429, which states that Antoninus was one of the tzadikei umot ha-olam, that is, not a convert.

R. David Zvi Hoffmann examined the various aggadot regarding R. Judah ha-Nasi and Antoninus. With regard to most of them he concludes that they arose in Babylonia long after the events described, and that “it is difficult to find a historical core to them.”[33]He does not tell us whether he regards these stories as simply legends that arose from the people or if they should be seen as didactic tales no different than the numerous other aggadot that describe actions and dialogues of various biblical figures, matters that were also never intended to be taken as historical. R. Hoffmann also discusses how the notion of Antoninus actually converting to Judaism developed from earlier sources that only regard him as a “God fearer.”[34]

Regarding referring to people as rabbis when they do not deserve the title, such as Rabbi Antoninus, here is another interesting example that I believe was pointed out to me many years ago by Prof. Shnayer Leiman. When R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz’s Luhot Edut was reprinted in 1966, the publisher helpfully added an index of names at the back. What seems to have happened is that he went through the index putting “Ha-Rav” before all the names, and mistakenly added this title before Shabbetai Zvi’s name.

When the book was reprinted again by Copy Corner in the 1990s, they fixed this mistake and added שר”י.

It is interesting that in Solomon Zeitlin’s review of Gershom Scholem’s biography of Shabbetai Zvi, he criticizes Scholem for referring to Nathan of Gaza as “Rabbi Nathan.”[35] Had Scholem wished to defend himself from an Orthodox perspective, he could have pointed to the fact that decades after Nathan’s death (and also after Shabbetai Zvi’s death), one of the leading rabbis in Salonika, R. Solomon ben Joseph Amarillo (died 1722), refers to Nathan as הרב הקדוש מהר”ר נתן [36].אשכנזי ז”ל R. Joseph Molho (1692-1768), another leading rabbi in Salonika, refers to Nathan as הרב נתן ז”ל.[37] This positive reference to Nathan is found in R. Molho’s response to R. Solomon ben Isaac Amarillo, who also referred to Nathan this way.[38] In his famous work, Shulhan Gavoah, R. Molho refers to Nathan as follows: וכן קבלו מהרב נתן אשכנזי ז”ל המקובל האלהי.[39] I was surprised to see that in the new edition of Shulhan Gavoah (Jerusalem, 1993), this appears without any censorship, which presumably means that the editor did not know who R. Nathan Ashkenazi is. One final example: The famed R. Moses Zacuto (c. 1620-1697) refers to Nathan as הרב המופלא כמהר”ר נתן הידוע זלה”ה.[40]

Those who are interested in rabbinic history are familiar with R. Naphtali Yaakov Kohn’s nine volume Otzar ha-Gedolim. In vol. 4, p. 125, we find an entry for none other than the notorious Spanish apostate, Joshua Lorki, and his name is followed by שר”י ימ”ש.

Why is such a person included in a book of “gedolim”? The author explains that before he apostatized, he was a rabbi. (I do not believe this is correct. I have never before seen him described as a rabbi and know of no evidence to support such an assumption.) One can easily understand that even if someone was a rabbi, if he later converted, or became a Reform rabbi for that matter, including him in a book of “gedolim” is not going to sit well with many. This is so even though most of the rabbis included in the book are far from what one can consider “gedolim” in the way the term is used today.

Kohn did not print any letters or haskamot in the first four volumes of his work. These first appear in volume 5, and are from such varied figures as R. Joel Teitelbaum and the Chief Rabbis of Haifa. Kohn also includes a four-page letter from R. Yekutiel Yehudah Halberstam, the Klausenberger Rebbe. R. Halberstam saw the entry for Lorki and was very upset. He writes that just as no one would dream of including Dathan and Abiram among the great Jewish leaders, all the more so one should not include Lorki among the rabbis of Jewish history. He further asks, rhetorically, if אותו האיש ימ”ש שר”י   should also be included because he was a student of R. Joshua ben Perahiah?

R. Halberstam is even upset that the book includes an entry for Lorki’s father, and unfairly wonders what type of man he must have been if his son turned out this way. (I say “unfairly” since there are many examples of pious people whose children ended up very differently.) Finally, R. Halberstam makes the following strong point to Kohn: If you are going to sayyemah shemoafter someone’s name, then it has to actually mean something. By including an entry for Lorki in the book, not only are you not blotting out his name, but you are doing the exact opposite by preserving his name for all to see.

ובאמת שאצל המומר לורקי כתב כת”ה בתר שמו ימ”ש שר”י. אבל זה לא רק להלכה אלא גם למעשה ואם אומרים ימח שמו א”כ איך חוקקים שמו להזכירו בזכרון קדוש אחרי שבע מאות שנים?

Kohn thought that it was OK to include an entry for Lorki because he was a rabbi before he apostatized. With this logic it would be OK to also study the Torah works of rabbis who later apostatized, since these works were written before their apostasy. (In part 2 of this post I will deal with rabbis who published seforim and then apostatized.)

5. In my last post here, I wrote that the new RCA siddur will come to be the standard siddur at hundreds of synagogues for decades to come. This was a reasonable conclusion to reach, since ArtScroll is no longer allowed to sell the RCA ArtScroll siddur which has become the standard at Modern Orthodox synagogues. Thus, when these synagogues need to purchase new siddurim – and these siddurim must have the prayers for the State of Israel and the IDF – they would naturally buy the new RCA siddur. Yet it seems that I was mistaken, as I did not anticipate ArtScroll’s response to its anticipated enormous loss of revenue. Here is the ad that many of you have already seen.

ArtScroll is continuing to sell the RCA siddur, minus the name “RCA” on the cover and Rabbi Saul Berman’s introductory essay. Instead of being the RCA edition, this siddur is now called the “Synagogue Edition.” This is designed to ensure that Modern Orthodox synagogues, when they need to buy new siddurim, continue purchasing the ones congregants are used to.

This move by ArtScroll is obviously a serious threat to the success of the new RCA siddur, as the typical Modern Orthodox synagogue will probably find it easier just to buy the new “Synagogue Edition.” It is going to take a lot of effort from the RCA to ensure that the new siddur becomes accepted across America, and only time will tell who will win the battle for the loyalty of the Modern Orthodox synagogues. I don’t know the details of ArtScroll’s contract with the RCA, so I can’t say if what ArtScroll has done is illegal. It certainly appears unethical.

When the original ArtScroll siddur appeared some thirty-five years ago, it immediately caught on, so much so that today it is hard to find an English-speaking Orthodox home that does not have an ArtScroll siddur. This is an enormous historical achievement. However, there was an obvious lack in that the classic ArtScroll siddur did not include the prayers for the State of Israel and the IDF. This meant that it could never be adopted as the siddur for Modern Orthodox synagogues. There were many people who were upset with ArtScroll for not including these prayers. Would it have been so difficult for ArtScroll to have included them with the note that “Some congregations recite these prayers”? In a siddur that found room to include Gott fun Avrohom at Havdalah, for the tiny population of ArtScroll siddur-users that says it, why could it not include prayers recited by many thousands every Shabbat? They could also have put these prayers in the back of the siddur, with the Yotzerot that today hardly anyone says. These steps would have made for an inclusive siddur, and there never would have been a need for the RCA ArtScroll Siddur.

We were led to believe that as a matter of principle, as dictated by ArtScroll’s gedolim, the prayers for the State of Israel and the IDF could not be included. It was thus a surprise that ArtScroll agreed to include these prayers in the RCA edition of the ArtScroll Siddur. The RCA recognized that everyone was moving over from Birnbaum to ArtScroll, and therefore it made sense to produce a Religious Zionist version of ArtScroll. How was ArtScroll able to include the religiously objectionable prayers? Obviously, the reason was money, but there was also deniability, as people could say that it wasn’t actually an ArtScroll siddur. Rather, it was an RCA siddur using the text of ArtScroll, so in this way ArtScroll wasn’t implicated as a partner in religious Zionism and its objectionable prayers.

With the publication of the new “Synagogue Edition” siddur, we now have a situation where ArtScroll itself is publishing a siddur with the prayers for the State of Israel and the IDF. In other words, ArtScroll is publishing a Religious Zionist text. This is definitely news. You can be as cynical as you wish in explaining why when it comes to making lots of money from Modern Orthodox synagogues, Daas Torah can be pushed aside, but it is significant that a so-called haredi publishing house has broken with haredi standards in such a significant way. Nevertheless, I hope that Modern Orthodox synagogues will realize that there is a great difference between the old RCA ArtScroll siddur, which is just the standard ArtScroll siddur with a few extra pages, and the new RCA Siddur which, in its ideological outlook and historical sophistication, is a siddur perfectly suited for today’s Modern Orthodox community.

6. Rabbi Pini Dunner recently publishedMavericks, Mystics and False Messiahs, and I know readers of the Seforim Blog will find it a wonderful read. If you have ever watched any of Dunner’s videos, you know that no one can tell a story like him. The figures and events he discusses (Samuel Falk, Emden-Eybeschuetz dispute, ClevesGet, Lord George Gordon, R. Yudel Rosenberg, Ignatz Timothy Trebitsch-Lincoln) are ones that are perfectly suited for his skill in this area. Readers should not go to this book looking for new discoveries of the sort that he has spoken about in some of his online lectures. Some people will have even read the published works upon which the chapters are based (e.g., Scholem, Leiman, Wasserstein). These sources are discussed in the concluding chapter which is itself fascinating, especially for those who love books. I heartily recommend the book even for those who know the original sources, because no one can bring a story to life quite like Dunner.

There is one thing, however, that I wish had been explained by Dunner. In the longest chapter of the book, dealing with the Emden-Eybeschuetz dispute, there are lengthy dialogues recorded between different people. We also read about when individuals smiled, when they gasped, when they turned pale, when their voice was shaky, when tears flowed down their cheeks, when they sat upright in bed, etc. Occasionally, we find this also in other chapters. Since all this is made up by Dunner (and with regard to the Emden-Eybeschuetz dispute could even be the beginnings of a movie storyline), it would have been helpful for some discussion as to why he decided to spice up the book this way. The most we get is that in the concluding chapter (p. 172), Dunner tells us that portions of the book “have been written in a style that has much more in common with dramatic fiction than with non-fiction history, including details of private conversations, and descriptive elements that may cause readers to wonder about their accuracy.” Yet the reader is never told why Dunner sometimes adopts this approach and at other times he sticks to the facts.

The chapter on the Emden-Eybeschuetz dispute includes as part of the story the legendary account of how R. Emden, on his deathbead, said, “Barukh haba, my revered father, barukh haba, Rabbi Yonatan.”[41] This was understood to mean that he was finally reconciled with his longtime adversary, and explains why they were buried in the same row. Unless one reads the concluding chapter of the book, which deals with the sources, the reader will have no way of knowing that there is no historical basis for this tale. It is attributed in the original source to R. Abraham Shalom Halberstam of Stropkov (1857-1940), though he presumably was repeating a tradition he had heard. The story was obviously invented to create a posthumous peace between the two great rabbis.

I realize that what I have described is part of the liberties taken by any good storyteller. However, anyone who reads the book will wonder why the Emden-Eybeschuetz chapter in particular, which freely mixes fact with fiction, is written in such a different style than the other chapters, which stick much more closely to what the evidence tells us. Dunner has shown that he can be both expert storyteller and historian, but speaking as a fellow historian, my preference would have been not to mix these genres in one book.

[1] Regarding the Hertz Chumash, see the articles by Mitchell First here, and Yosef Lindell here.

[2] See Harvey Meirovich, A Vindication of Judaism: The Polemics of the Hertz Pentateuch (New York and Jerusalem, 1998), pp. 187-189.

[3] Unlike the other contributors, Daiches was actually a rabbi (something not so common in Britain at the time). He received semikhah from the Rabbinical Seminary of Berlin as well as from his father, the great R. Israel Hayyim Daiches, R.  Solomon Cohen of Vilna, and R. Ezekiel Lifshitz of Kalisz. See Hannah Holtschneider, “Salis Daiches –  Towards a Portrait of a Scottish Rabbi,” Jewish Culture and History 16 (2015), p. 4. Holtschneider’s biography of Daiches will be out later this year. See here. The famous author David Daiches was his son, and his book Two Worlds (Edinburgh, 1997) has a lot about Salis Daiches. Here are some passages that I think readers will find of interest, as it speaks to the differences between what it meant to be an Orthodox rabbi in Britain a century ago vs. today.

Pp. 29-30: The electric radiator – which did, I suppose, make some difference, though memory links it only with extreme cold – could be switched on and off on the sabbath, as the electric light also could, in accordance with a decision of my father’s which differentiated his position sharply from that of my grandfather, patriarchal rabbi of an orthodox Jewish congregation in Leeds, who would have been shocked if he had known how cavalierly we treated electricity. Gas light or heat, which required the striking of a match, was another matter that was clearly prohibited. But electricity was a phenomenon unrecognized by the Talmud, and my father felt free to make his own interpretation of the nature of the act of switching on the electric light or heat. He decided that it was not technically ‘kindling a fire’, which a biblical injunction prohibits in the home on the sabbath.”

Pp. 81-82: “For years we travelled with our own meat dishes (for we could not eat off the meat dishes of a non-Jewish house) and Mother had supplies of meat sent out by post from the Edinburgh Jewish butcher. Packing a trunk full of dishes was an arduous business, and eventually Mother gave it up and we went vegetarian throughout August – which was no hardship for Mother could do marvelous things with fish (the term vegetarian in our family meant simply eating no meat but did not exclude fish). Slowly and gradually, and I am sure never consciously on my parents’ part, we relaxed a bit in the matter of diet. When she was first married Mother baked all her own bread, but ceased to do this after her illness in 1919. And on holiday one found oneself going a little further than one would have done in the city. In Edinburgh, we usually ate bread from the Jewish bakery, but occasionally we would get a loaf from a non-Jewish shop. Cakes and biscuits we regularly got from non-Jewish sources. But though Mother would buy ordinary cakes from a non-Jewish baker, she would always make her own pastry, for pastry from a gentile shop was liable to have been made with lard. On holiday, however, pastries started to creep in among the cakes bought for tea, and nobody raised the question of what they were made with.”

I am certain that Daiches is mistaken in his last sentence, and that his father confirmed with the bakery that there were no non-kosher ingredients in these pastries.

Pp. 92: “At home we always covered our heads to pray, and to say grace before and after meals, but we were never expected to keep our heads covered continually. My father wore a black skull cap when receiving members of his congregation in his study, but as the years went by he developed the habit of keeping it in his pocket throughout much of the day and diving hastily for it when the bell rang. In his father’s presence he wore it continually.”

Pp. 174, 176: The rabbi did not believe in a literal personal Messiah; he believed in historical movements, in progress, in amelioration, and in the acceleration of movement in the right direction by the actions of individuals. . . . The Messiah was not a person, but a historical ideal. God, the rabbi was in the habit of telling his congregation, works in history.”

Pp. 175-176: “The priestly benediction recited on High Festivals, when all the Cohens assembled to bless the congregation in the old biblical words of benediction, had been abolished by the rabbi in his Sunderland synagogue and he would not allow it in Edinburgh either.”

[4] Meirovich, A Vindication of Judaism, p. 31.

[5] Meirovich, A Vindication of Judaism, p. 33.

[6] Meirovich, A Vindication of Judaism, pp. 41ff.

[7] Siah Tefilah (Ofakim, 2003), p. 361.

[8] Mishbetzot Zahav, Orah Hayyim 46:4.

[9] See Excursus which will be in part 2 of this post.

[10] Magen ve-Herev, ed Simonsohn (Jerusalem, 1960), p. 47.

[11] See his derashah in R. Rephael Kadir Tsaban, Nefesh Hayah (Bnei Brak, 2007), vol. 2, pp. 269-270.

[12] See e.g, Derashot Rabbi Yehoshua Ibn Shuaib (Cracow, 1573), p. 48a:

כי נשמתן של ישראל הן קדושות יותר מן האומות ומן העבדים הכנעניים הפחותים ואפילו מן הנשים ואם הם שייכי במצות והן מזרע ישראל אין נשמתן כנשמת הזכר השייך בתור’ ובכל המצות עשה ולא תעשה.

[13] R. Shlomo Aviner, in discussing this matter, does not go so far as to say that men are obligated in Torah study because they are not at the same spiritual level of women. However, he comes close, and he is led to this approach because of his understanding of Torah study as leading to devekut, a position which is at odds with the Lithuanian perspective on Torah study. See Aviner, Bat Melekh (Jerusalem, 2013), p. 104:

שאלה: מדוע האשה, שניחנה בבינה יתרה, אינה מחוייבת בלימוד תורה?

תשובה: האיש, שאין בו בינה יתרה, דווקא הוא צריך להרבות בלימוד, אך האשה, שיש לה בינה יתרה, מבינה גם ללא הלימוד הרצוף והממושך. המהר”ל מסביר, שמי שיש לו נטיה טבעית לדבר, הוא משיגו בנקל. ללא נטיב טבעית יש צורך בעמל רב. לאשה באופן טבעי יש נטיה, שהאיש צריך לעמול עליה קשה (מהר”ל, דרוש על התורה עמ’ כז-כח). אלא, עמל לימוד התורה אינו איסוף ידיעות, בעומק הנפש, ודבקות בתורה. האיש הוא קשה עורף, מתקשה לשמוע לכן יש להכותו בגידים (שמות רבה כח ב. רש”י, שמות יט ג), בשוט השכלי של הלימוד. מי שניחן בנטיה טבעית לתורה אינו זקוק ל”גידים” כדי שתחול בו אותה תמורה פנימית, והיא מגיע אליו ביתר קלות . . . זו נטיה עמוקה באישיות האשה, לכן היא מגיעה לדבקות וקישור והתמלאות בתורה בנתיבים שונים מן האיש. האיש מגיע לדבקות זו בנתיב הלימודי, והאשה בנתיב ספיגת הדברים מן החיים.

See here from a Chabad site where we are told that “the female child inherently carries a higher degree of holiness, due to her own biological, life creating capability.” Would anyone today write the same sort of comment, but instead state that the male child has a higher degree of holiness? Faced with a situation where many people believe that women are regarded as inferior in traditional Judaism, defenders of Judaism are often led to offer apologetic answers that argue the reverse, namely, that it is actually women who are more special, spiritual, holy, etc. than men.

In my experience, men never seem to be offended when they hear this. One haredi friend explained to me that this is because the men do not believe it to be true, and thus no reason to be offended if it makes the women feel better. This is a cynical answer, but can anyone come up with a better reason? Imagine the scenario: A Shabbat meal with many guests and the father offers a devar Torah whose upshot is that men are more holy and spiritual than women. This will not go over well and the women (and some men also) will be offended. Yet if the message of the devar Torah is that women are more holy and spiritual, no one will take offense. Why not? And my more basic question is, why we can’t just say that men and women are equally holy and spiritual (albeit with different roles)? Why do people feel a need to say that one is more special than the other?

All this is in the realm of Jewish thought. However, when it comes to explaining halakhic matters in which women might be portrayed in a way that they would take offense at, here too new approaches must be offered. For example, can anyone imagine explaining to modern women why they cannot perform shechitah by telling them what R. Joseph Messas quotes from manuscript from the nineteenth-century R. Jacob Almadyoni (spelling?) of Tlemcen, Mayim Hayyim, vol. 2, Yoreh Deah no. 1?

אין להניח הנשים לשחוט ואפי’ בדיעבד ראוי להחמיר שאף המכשירין יודו האידנא שאין דעת נשי דידן מכוונות כדעת נשי דידהו. ואם על נשיהם אמרו אין חכמה לאשה אלא בפלך [יומא דף ס”ו ע”ב], קו”ח לנשי דידן

[14] See Hirsch’s commentary to Lev. 23:43, and regarding women and circumcision, see also Hirsch to Gen. 17:15. The most comprehensive discussion of Hirsch’s view of women and Judaism is found in Ephraim Chamiel, The Middle Way (Brighton, MA, 2014), vol. 2, pp. 152ff. On p. 153 he titles the section of a chapter: “Revolution: Women are Superior to Men.” Hirsch obviously opposed the notion found in R. David Abudarham that the reason women are not obligated in positive time-bound commandments is because they are “enslaved” to their husband to do his will, and if they were busy performing these commandments they could not serve him properly and this would create marital discord. See Abudarham ha-Shalem (Jerusalem, 1963), p. 25:

והטעם שנפטרו הנשים מהמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא לפי שהאשה משועבדת לבעלה לעשות צרכיו. ואם היתה מחוייבת במצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אפשר שבשעת עשיית המצוה יצוה אותה הבעל לעשות מצותו ואם תעשה מצות הבורא ותניח מצותו אוי לה מבעלה ואם תעשה מצותו ותניח מצות הבורא אוי לה מיוצרה לפיכך פטרה הבורא ממצותיו כדי להיות לה שלום עם בעלה.

The same reason is offered by R. Jacob Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim (Lyck, 1866), pp. 15b-16a:

לפי שהנקיבה היא לעזר הזכר ואל אישה תשוקתה והוא ימשל בה להנהיגה ולהדריכה בדרכיו ולעשות מעשה על פיו והיותה על הדרך הזה הוא גם כן סבה שהיא פטורה מכל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא כי אלו היתה טרודה לעשות המצות בזמן היה הבעל בלא עזר בזמנים ההם והיתה קטטה נופלת ביניהם ותסור הממשלה המכוונת שהיא לתועלתו ולתועלתה.

R. Ahron Soloveichik adopted an approach similar to that of Hirsch. He claimed that Judaism “recognizes the feminine gender as possessing an innate, unique spiritual blessing as compared with the male gender. . .  [T]he woman has innate spiritual advantage as compared with men.”Logic of the Heart, Logic of the Mind(Jerusalem, 1991), p. 93.

[15] Itturei Kohanim, no. 167 (5759), 4-5; R. Aviner, Panim el Panim (Jerusalem, 2008), p. 194. Significantly, R. Zvi Yehudah’s explanation acknowledges that the blessing שלא עשני אשה implies male superiority. While this was a common understanding in pre-modern times, in recent generations this interpretation was usually rejected. Yet R. Zvi Yehudah claims that the blessing’s formulation was a concession to human feelings. Does this then mean that if a contemporary man recognizes the superiority of women, or even just that they are equal to men, that according to R. Zvi Yehudah he can stop saying this blessing?

[16] See Avraham Grossman “Ma’alot ha-Nashim ve-Adifutan be-Hibur shel R. Gedaliah Ibn Yahya,” Zion 72 (2007), pp. 37-61.

[17] R. Simhah Bunim Lieberman raises a strong objection to Or ha-Hayyim‘s position. See Bi-Shvilei Orayta al Kol Yisrael Arevim Zeh la-Zeh, p. 124:

אבל האמת דעצם דברי האור החיים צ”ע, דאטו מוכיח יש בו שררה, וכי מצאנו איסור לגר להוכיח ישראל שחטא

[18] Edut be-Yaakov, vol. 2, p. 164.

[19] See R. Avraham Sorotzkin, Rinat Yitzhak, Deut. 29:10.

[20] R. Yehiel Heilprin, Seder ha-Dorot (Bnei Brak, 2003), vol. 1, p. 251.

[21] Naomi G. Cohen, “Rabbi Meir, A Descendant of Anatolian Proselytes,” Journal of Jewish Studies 23 (1972), pp. 54-55. Cohen also provides the Graetz reference.

[22] Antiquities 20.8.11.

[23] Life of Flavius Josephus, ch. 3. See A. Andrew Das, Solving the Romans Debate (Minneapolis, 2007), pp. 77ff.; Louis H. Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World (Princeton, 1993), p. 351.

[24] R. Maimon ben Joseph (the father of Maimonides), Iggeret ha-Nehamah, trans. Binyamin Klar (Jerusalem, 2007), p. 38, states:

וכבר אמר פעם אחת אחד ממלכי רומי – קללה תבוא על כולם, חוץ מאחד רם המעלה המובדל מהם, הוא אנטונינוס שהיה בדורו של רבנו הקדוש ע”ה.

[25] R. Yehiel Heilprin, Seder ha-Dorot, vol. 2, p. 138, has a version of the Mekhilta that reads Antigonos, and he therefore identifies a “Rabbi Antigonos”.

[26] Beshalah, hakdamah. In the edition with the Netziv’s commentary it is on p. 79.

[27] Beshalah, parashah 1. In the edition with the Netziv’s commentary it is on p. 111.

[28] Surprisingly, Abraham Joshua Heschel did not take note of the Vilna Gaon’s emendation, and cited one of the Mekhilta texts as is. See Torah min ha-Shamayim be-Aspaklaryah shel ha-Dorot (London and New York, 1962), p. 183 n. 3.

[29] See the Horovitz-Rabin edition of the Mekhilta, pp. 82, 89.

[30] See Rapoport, Erekh Milin (Prague, 1852), p. 270.

[31] See the comprehensive discussion in Shaye J. D. Cohen, “The Conversion of Antoninus,” in Peter Schäfer, ed., The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture (Tübingen, 1978), pp. 141-171.

[32] “The Conversion of Antoninus,” pp. 164-165.

[33] “Die Aggadot von Antoninus in Midrash und Talmud,” Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums 19 (1892), p. 46.

[34] “Die Aggadot von Antoninus in Midrash und Talmud,” pp. 51-52.

[35] See Jewish Quarterly Review 49 (1958), p. 153.

[36] Penei Shlomo (Salonika, 1717), p. 43d.

[37] Ohel Yosef (Salonika, 1756), no. 14 (p. 13a).

[38] Devar Moshe (Salonika, 1750), vol. 3, no. 11 (p. 8a). The three sources just cited are mentioned by Meir Benayahu, Ha-Tenuah ha-Shabta’it be-Yavan (Jerusalem, 1978), pp. 191, 274-275.

[39] Shulhan Gavoah (Salonika, 1756), Orah Hayyim, vol. 2, Hilkhot Yom ha-Kippurim 620 (p. 68a). He also refers to Nathan this way ibid., Hilkhot Rosh ha-Shanah 584 (p. 35a).

[40] See Benayahu, Ha-Tenuah ha-Shabta’it be Yavan, p. 119. For sources regarding Zacuto, see Gershom Scholem, Mehkerei Shabtaut, ed. Yehuda Liebes (Tel Aviv, 1991), p. 528; Bezalel Naor, Post Sabbatian Sabbatianism (Spring Valley, 1999), p. 176 n. 8.

[41] The source of the story for Dunner is David Ginz, Gedulat Yehonatan, vol. 2, p. 286. Abraham Hayyim Simhah Bunim Michaelson, Ohel Avraham (Petrokov, 1911), p. 28b, also heard the story from R. Halberstam, but in his version R. Emden states simply, ברוך הבא אבא.




Rav Aryeh Tzvi Frommer HY”D: סנגורם של ישראל

 Rav Aryeh Tzvi Frommer HY”D: סנגורם של ישראל

A Closer Look At One of the Greatest Defenders of the Common Jew in Modern Times[1]
Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin, Av Beit Din of Kozoglov, Author of Responsa Eretz Tzvi, Siach Ha-Sadeh, Doreish Tov Le’amo[2]

     By Alon Amar

הכל מלמדין זכות” – משנה סנהדרין ד:א”

In the fall of 1933, immediately after the death of Rabbi Meir Shapira zt”l – Rosh Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin, an article appeared in the “Lubliner Tugenblatt” newspaper. The title reads “Who will be the next Rosh Yeshiva?” The article references multiple distinguished candidates for the prestigious appointment, including Rav Menachem Zemba hy”d and Rav Dov Berish Weidenfeld zt”l – The Tchebiner Rav. Interestingly enough, the eventual successor to Rabbi Meir Shapira, was not even mentioned in the article, though his greatness in Torah learning and piety was on par with those aforementioned geonim. Rav Aryeh Tzvi Frommer Hy”d (RATF), also known as The Kozoglover Gaon, was chosen as the next Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin and served at its helm until it’s closure during World War II. His unique legacy expanded beyond the four walls of the yeshiva where he inspired and taught students. Through his responsa he engaged real-life issues creatively defending many customs of questionable halachic standing and created the mishna yomi program allowing all Jews, both scholars and laymen, to complete the entirety of Torah Sheb’al peh. His preoccupation with the spiritual needs of the full spectrum of jewry, and the creativity he employed for this task remain defining hallmarks of his inspiring legacy.

Brief Biography

RATF was born in Czeladź, Poland in the year 1884[3]. His father Hanoch-Hendel made his living as a tailor[4] and RATF’s mother Miriam-Kayla passed away when he was three years old.[5]He was sent to study in heder in the town of Wolbrum, residing by relatives of his mother. Some of his formative years of development in Torah learning occurred after leaving Wolbrum to study in the Yeshiva Ketana of Amstov, Poland[6]. The dean of the yeshiva, Rabbi Efraim Tzvi Einhorn zt”l recognized the unique abilities and challenges of the young orphan and took great care in supporting the young boy’s spiritual & physical development.[7] [8]

Rabbi Efraim Tzvi Einhorn Zt”l – Rosh Yeshiva Amstov, Poland

At the age of thirteen, RATF made his way to the court R’ Avraham Borenstein known as the “Avnei Neizer”[9] in Sochaczew (Sochatchov), Poland. Reb Leib Hirsch as RATF came to be known (Yiddish translation of Aryeh Tzvi), studied assiduously under the Avnei Neizer for five years developing a reputation as notable young Torah scholar in Poland and a close student of the venerable Avnei Neizer.[10] RATF was exposed to the unique combination of halacha, gemara, kabbalah and chassidut interwoven in the thought of the Avnei Neizer. At the time the Avnei Neizer was one of the leading poskim of the generation. RATF subsequently married Esther Shweitzer and spent the next eight years studying in the home of his father-in-law. Despite moving  away from his beloved rebbe, RATF maintained close ties with the Avnei Neizer, visiting on holidays as well corresponding on Torah topics.[11]

When the Avnei Neizer passed away in 1910, his son R’ Shmuel Borenstein[12], the “Shem Mi’Shmuel” was crowned the heir to his father’s chassidic court; becoming the second scion of the Sochatchov dynasty. On his father’s first yahrzeit, the Shem Mi’Shmuel established Yeshivat Beit Avraham in his memory. The Shem Mi’Shmuel appreciated the unique talents of RATF, and invited him to be the Rosh Yeshiva of Beit Avraham at the age of 27[13]. It was during this period of learning & teaching that RATF published his first work; Siach Ha’Sadeh. In it, RATF dealt with various talmudic topics with central themes of hilchot berachot & tefillah. The work came with laudatory approbations from leading scholars of the time including: Rav Meir Arik,[14] Rav Yosef Engel[15] and others.[16]RATF remained the Rosh Yeshiva of Beit Avraham, until the city of Sochatchov was destroyed in World War I.

Rabbi Shmuel Borenstein Zt”l – (Shem Mi’Shmuel) The second Sochatchover Rebbe

Cover page of Siach Hasadeh; Pietrikov 1912

The Frommer family had grown to a total of six children, relying on RATF as he sought his next job opportunity. His uncle, Rabbi Yitzchak Gottenstein, the rabbi of a small town in Poland, Koziegłowy (Kozoglov), had passed away and the community needed a new Rabbi. The community was small, and the financial opportunity was no greater. However, due to lack of alternatives this would be RATF’s next stop. There, RATF established a small yeshiva and continued his learning and teaching, jump-starting an environment of Torah learning and scholarship in the small town. Although his tenure there did not last particularly long, he would be forever known by the appellation; “The Kozoglover Gaon”.

After leaving Kozoglov[17], RATF headed to Zbeirtza, Poland. The community of Sochatchover chassidim that lived in the city of Zbeirtza, were “laymen” of an extraordinary caliber. Many of them students of the Avnei Neizer, providing context to appreciate the uniqueness and caliber of RATF and his erudition. RATF had developed into a combination of a classical scholar, chassid and tzadik that made him such a sought-after leader. He was knowledgeable in all areas of the revealed Torah as well as kabbalah and chassidut as is evident from his works. Additionally, he would arise at midnight to recite “tikkun chatzot” and study kabbalah late into the night away from the public eye. It was in Zbeirtza that his students began to compile notebooks with the teachings that RATF would share on shabbat & yom tov.[18]

Once again, the time came for RATF to migrate to the nearby town of Sosnovitz[19]continuing to gain admirers and students. It was at this time that Rabbi Meir Shapiro zt”l, founder of Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin and Rav of Lublin, expressed an interest in having RATF join the faculty of the yeshiva[20]. RATF deflected the requests due to his desire to remain close to his existing students and admirers. However, after Rabbi Meir Shapiro’s untimely death in October 1933, Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin was left without a leader. RATF decided to move to Lublin and became the second Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin.

The funeral of Rabbi Meir Shapiro Zt”l at the Yeshiva of Chochmei Lublin

In a fascinating interlude in RATF’s life, he witnessed one of his lifelong dreams materialize; visiting Eretz Yisrael. RATF had a great yearning for the land of Israel.[21]He once remarked to his confidant and host in Tel Aviv, Rabbi Dovid Landa, that “a regular day in Eretz Yisrael contains the same holiness as yom tov sheni shel galuyot in the diaspora”.[22] His trip lasted four months while he visited Jerusalem, Meiron[23], Tel Aviv & Bnei Brak.[24] Afterward, he returned to his new position at the Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin. RATF experienced some of his most productive years of Torah learning & creativity at the helm of the yeshiva. After many years of narrowly avoiding personal financial collapse and constantly being forced to migrate throughout Poland, he had finally arrived at a place where his only concern was Torah.

It was during his tenure as Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin that he published his second work, Responsa Eretz Tzvi,[25]in 1938. Eretz Tzvi, is a work of collected responsa, mostly concentrated on the orach hayim section of the Shulchan Aruch with certain discussions regarding Yoreh Deah and Even He’ezer as well. The volume was first published in Lublin, at a printer only steps away from the Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin.[26] A second printing was done in America in 1963 and a third re-printing by RATF’s nephew, Rabbi Dov Frommer in 1975 in Tel Aviv[27]. It is worth noting that a fourth edition including never before collected writings, as well as Siach Hasadeh, became the “second & third cheilek” of the responsa Eretz Tzvi as separate volumes. The collection includes responsa, letters &  glosses on various masechtot, and was printed in 2000 by Rabbi David Abraham Mandelbaum[28] [29]. Throughout Eretz Tzvi, RATF corresponds with many scholars including The Gerrer Rebbe, The Shem Mi’Shmuel of Sochatchov, Rabbi Meir Arik and the Bianer Rebbe on various topics of halacha. It is in this work that his unique approach combining halacha, aggadah and kabbalah is showcased. His creative methodology allowed for uncovering defenses of questionable customs, providing a limud zechut for the masses in many cases. In this way he served as a “Defender of Israel”[30].

Cover page of Responsa Eretz Tzvi; Lublin 1938

In 1938, on the occasion of the second completion of the Daf Yomi cycle, RATF introduced a study program that would complement Daf Yomi: Mishna Yomi[31]. Two mishnayot studied every day; enabling a participant in the Daf Yomi program to finish the entirety of the mishnah, even those tractates which did not include bavli commentary.

The second world war began, and Poland was overrun by the Nazi army. In 1939 RATF together with his family were forced to relocate to the Warsaw Ghetto[32]. It was reported[33] that RATF was leading Torah learning initiatives for the younger students in the ghetto. Additionally, even while in the ghetto he continued to comprise Torah novella as many of his glosses on his own responsa Eretz Tzvi were written during his time in the Warsaw Ghetto.

RATF was forced to take a job making shoes for the German soldiers on the Russian front provided by the “Shultz” company.[34] He worked alongside the third Sochatchover Rebbe – Rabbi Dovid Borenstein and the  Piasetzna Rebbe Rabbi Kalonymus Kalman Shapira[35] along with other great rabbis and scholars .[36]

RATF alongside his Rebbe. Rabbi Dovid Borenstein Zt”l – The third Sochatchover Rebbe

After the liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto in the spring of 1942 the Frommer family was sent to the Majdanek death camp in Lublin, Poland only 123km away from his beloved Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin. It is documented that as he entered the gas chambers, the holy Kozoglover Gaon exclaimed “Thank G-d, for I am included in the sanctification of G-d’s great name!”.[37]

A newspaper article describing the experiences of Torah scholars in the Warsaw Ghetto.

Key Themes In The Thought of The Kozoglover Gaon

  1. הכל מלמדין זכות – סנגורם של ישראל 

The central theme in the halachic thought of RATF, is his focus on defending existing customs which are at odds with normative practice, often utilizing various non-traditional halachic arguments. RATF not only included kabbalistic and chassidic sources in normative talmudic & halachic discussions, but even allowed them to inform practical decisions in the realm of halacha. Eretz Tzvi strives to support rather than tear down shaky customs. RATF notes in his introduction to Eretz Tzvi when discussing his approach:

“That which we observed, that the students of the Baal Shem Tov zt”l abolished the practice of fasting and self- affliction [to atone for sins], and I am not worthy to enter into this discussion. Rather, I base myself on the mishna ”All may argue in favor of acquittal”[38]

[From this example, one could suggest that RATF saw himself as a halachic expositor of the way of the Baal Shem Tov, utilizing his halachic knowledge to apply the chassidic outlook of focusing on positive actions, rather than becoming mired in the guilt of sin.] Naturally, the very first responsa in Eretz Tzvi begins with this exact objective, foreshadowing the central theme of his halachic work:

“In defense of the widespread custom of wearing a tallit kattan which is smaller than the halachic size delineated in the Shulchan Aruch[39] which ostensibly precludes any fulfillment of the mitzvah tzitzit as many great scholars have protested about…as well as providing a limud zechut regarding the required length of tzitzit”[40]

One common conflict between chassidim and mitnagdim is their opposing halachic attitudes within the area of zmanei hatefillah. Perhaps the most well-known example of RATF’s limud zechut is the defense of the custom of some chassidim for beginning shacharit after 4 halachic hours into the day. The problem being the recital of berachot kriat shema, after their preferred time.  This poses a potential transgression of beracha levatala[41]. RATF defends this custom with various arguments. In the first part of the responsa in Eretz Tzvi[42], RATF begins by neutralizing the potential issue of beracha levatalah by positing that the prayer is considered a tefillat nedava, a voluntary prayer similar to the voluntary offering in the beit hamikdash. A voluntary tefilla is not bound by the common restrictions of an obligatory tefilla.

However, RATF is challenged to explain how one could put aside the halachically preferential time for praying and engage in a seemingly lesser level of voluntary prayer [chovah vs. nedavah]? To answer this secondary question, RATF utilizes the Shulchan Aruch Harav of Rav Shneur Zalman of Liadi – The Ba’al Hatanya.[43] The gemara[44]states that someone who is constantly engrossed in Torah learning (Torato um’nato [Rashbi V’chaveirav]) is not obligated to stop at the proper time and pray shemoneh esreih while engrossed in learning. Additionally, the Ba’al Hatanya adds that praying with the highest level of deveikut (divine cleaving) would take precedence over Torah learning, even for those who are described as torato um’nato.

RATF points out that from the Shulchan Aruch Harav we see that only a prayer with extraordinary intent and focus [A] trumps the Torah learning of someone who’s primary occupation is Torah learning [B] while an ordinary tefillah [C] would not obligated him to interrupt his studies to pray. ([A]>[B]>[C]) Utilizing a similar line of reasoning, we can assume that an individual who delays praying to attain the higher level of prayer will supersede the usual obligation of prayer service at the proper time. ([A]>[C])

Perhaps a more ambitious attempt at justifying the practice of some of the great chassidic masters with respect to zmanei tefillah, is another point in the same responsa. RATF quotes from the Ruzhiner Rebbe[45]who explains that prior to the sin of adam harishon in gan eden, the entire day was equally fit for prayer. However, the post-sin world is not fit for such a structure so the forefathers; Avraham (Shacharit), Yitzchak (Mincha) and Yaakov (Arvit) designated timeframes for each prayer. When the world reaches the ultimate redemption, the framework of zmanei tefillah will revert to their undefined framework similar to pre-sin existence. Utilizing a concept from the Rashba in Masechet Menachot[46] [regarding the halachic status of korban ha’omer], RATF suggests that since prayers of the tzadikim are focused on delivering the ultimate redemption (when the typical time boundaries will cease to exist) these prayers in and of themselves (even in our current pre-redemption era) are not bound by the usual rules and regulations.[47] Additionally, in two separate places RATF defends the practice of regular chassidim (not only great tzadikim as discussed above) who begin to pray Mincha in the time of bein hashmashot[48]employing the concept of safeik d’rabanan lkula.

Rabbi Avraham Mordechai Alter zt”l (seated)  – The “Imrei Emet” of Ger along with his grandson.. A common correspondent of RATF. (Hakira.org)

In another example of limud zechut RATF defends the custom of delivering mishloach manot late in the day of Purim such that it is already past nightfall. While this practice ostensibly has no grounds in halacha as the halachic day has ended, as RATF himself admits, he still uncovers a halachic reasoning for the custom.[49] RATF quotes an explanation from Rabbi Yaakov Yitzchak Rabinowitz, the Yid Hakadosh of Pshiske,[50] who defends the practice of beginning to pray mincha when the prayer will extend past the proper halachic time of shkiah. Rabbi Rabinowitz justifies it based on the gemara and Tosafot in Berachot[51]regarding the curse of Bilaam towards the Jewish people. It is mentioned in the Gemara that Bilaam knew the precise split-second at which Hashem became angry during the day and could fit in a quick curse at that opportune time. However, Tosafot asks “What curse could you fit in a split-second?” and answers that the word kalem (כלם) meaning “they should be cursed” could fit the time allotment. Tosafot offers a second explanation: “even if it was a longer curse, if Bilaam would begin his cursing of the Jewish people in the split-second that Hashem’s anger appears each day even if he would continue after that time it would take effect as well.” Therefore, proves the Yid Hakadosh quoted by RATF, we see from here that beginning a prayer or a mitzvah at the right time will allow one to finish after the allotted time.[52] [53]

RATF (Third from left) administering a bechina at Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin

A limud zechut which came in an alternate form is RATF’s insistence on separating the strict halacha from that of middat hassidut or virtuous behaviour. In a correspondence[54] between RATF and the Imrei Emet of Gur (Rabbi Avraham Mordechai Alter), RATF discusses a specific type of lashon hara treated by the Hafetz Hayim in his work Shemirat Halashon. The Hafetz Hayim discusses the prohibition of speaking negatively about a person “even if he [the speaker] himself saw him [the transgressor] from close proximity doing something that is inappropriate according to the law”.  As a source, the Hafetz Hayim cites Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaarei Teshuva[55]:

”…perhaps the transgressor already repented from his evil ways, is distressed in his thoughts, and the heart knows the bitterness of his soul, and it is incorrect to reveal it.”

RATF points out that the exact words of Rabbeinu Yonah namely, “It is incorrect”, smack of middat chassidut and not strict halachic prohibition, and therefore takes issue with the Hafetz Hayim supporting his halachic decision on such grounds. RATF continues and writes “And since many people fail in this, one ought to find them a defense”.

It is interesting to note, that the work of Rabbeinu Yonah being discussed is the Shaarei Teshuva – a work not typically categorized as halachic. RATF did not object to the use of Rabbeinu Yonah’s “Shaarei Teshuva” on the grounds that it is a mussar work as opposed to a halachic one. One possible explanation is that RATF himself relies on and includes non-halachic sources to inform halachic decisions. RATF employs the full gamut of Torah thought in order to come to the defense of common practices and customs even if they infringe on pietistic sensibilities.[56]

Limud Zechut in Other Writings

As a young Rabbi, RATF published a short letter delineating the basic requirements of hilchot tefillah enabling his fellow Jews to fulfill the obligation of daily prayer. He published this letter anonymously, seemingly to avoid the appearance of haughtiness in a younger scholar lecturing the public.

Part of the letter that RATF published anonymously to remind the general public about the basic requirements of Teifillah in hopes  of zikui harabim

Lastly, in addition to his published works RATF published a kuntres or small pamphlet called Doresh Tov le’amo[57]. The work remained in manuscript and included a defense of “most Jews” who don’t have the requisite intent during the opening birchat avot of shemoneh esreih.  RATF writes that even if a person doesn’t understand the meaning of the words, if they are aware of the fact that they are praying “in front of Hashem” bedieved they fulfill their obligation. [RATF’s position is seemingly in opposition to the well-known position held of Rabbi Chaim Brisker[58]that in the first beracha of shemoneh esreih both the intent of standing in front of Hashem as well as the meaning of the words are necessary even bedieved.]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  1. Innovation Through Connecting all Areas of Torah

RATF utilized existing logic and concepts while applying them to previously unexplained passages and problems providing a framework of creativity that remains in line with tradition. We have already seen from the above mentioned responsa that RATF was open to utilizing kabbalistic and chassidic concepts in order to provide a limud zechut. RATF’s works do indeed draw from chassidut, kabbalah as well as gemara and rishonim. RATF describes his philosophy regarding new interpretations in Torah and their purpose: [59]

“As it is explained in the work Maayan Chaim as he discusses at length to provide support to those who produce Torah novella although it is not clear whether they are true & correct which would be a transgression according to the Zohar. In my humble opinion, the Zohar prohibits writing such novella only in a case where the logic being applied is not true, however if the logic and approach is true and found in earlier works, even if it is being applied in a novel way to explain a certain passage, even if the explanation is not correct this is not a transgression. For this is the honor of Torah and to demonstrate that there is nothing that is not hinted to in the Torah and everything can be “clothed” in Torah.”

RATF in his later years

A great example of his propensity to cross-pollinate between disciplines is a discourse on Sukkot[60]. Regarding the libations of wine and water that took place on Sukkot he writes:

“One could suggest that the libations of wine and of water represent two separate ideas, oneg & simcha. The water libations represent oneg, as the concept of water is the source of all enjoyment as explained in Shaarei Kedusha[61]while wine represents simcha as [the Talmud] says “ein simcha ela b’yayin”. Additionally, we know that oneg & simcha are two separate ideas as explained in the Chatam Sofer’s novella (Shabbat 111a)[62] that on Shabbat there is an obligation of oneg while on Yom Tov there is an obligation of simcha…it would seem that the difference between these two emotions is that oneg involves the five senses while simcha involves only the heart/mind [lev]…and from simcha one arrives at dancing as is written in the Sefer Hakuzari, and the Maharal explains that our custom to raise our feet during Kedushah is to show that our soul naturally longs to take flight and similarly dancing which is initiated by simcha…on the other hand oneg is specifically in the engagement of the five senses as it says in Sefer Yetzira[63] which corresponds to oneg…and this is why all year round the only libation is that of wine representing simcha in the heart/mind however specifically on Sukkot after the forgiveness of sins [Yom Kippur] the body [and senses] are purified we are then given the libations of water representing the enjoyment of the senses as now these too can be used in cleaving to Hashem.”

In this passage RATF quotes from Talmud and a classical commentary as well as kabbalistic and chassidic sources interchangeably and unapologetically. The breadth and depth of RATF’s references adds a layer of relevance as he finds common themes in sifrei kabbalah along with classical rishonim and achronim. [64] In another passage, RATF describes his affinity for combining the hidden and revealed disciplines of Torah learning. He states:[65]

“It is my “way”, myself the pauper, to uncover (l’hamtzi) a source in the revealed Torah for the hidden…”

The word he uses is l’hamtzi which has double connotation of uncovering & creation. Through utilizing the spectrum of Torah literature RATF essentially creates new sources previously unrelated to the topic at hand through exposing them to his unique thought process.

See Responsa Eretz Tzvi[66] where he was asked by someone who accidentally turned on a light on shabbat and wanted to understand how much money he should give for atonement (kaparah). At the end of the discussion, [after finding a lenient opinion in estimating the modern equivalent of the monetary sums discussed in the gemara] RATF adds a reminder lest the questioner miss out on the true purpose of giving the symbolic amount to achieve “kaparah”.

However, the crux (ikar) of teshuva is the remorse and humility and lowliness that a person should be heartbroken that he desecrated the holy Shabbos. Additionally, it would be appropriate to take up oneself to assist the “Chevra Shomrei Shabbos” …for this is considered a tikkun of desecrating Shabbos.”       

RATF’s halachic thought utilized a maximalist approach in finding prooftexts and sources. Besides for the revealed and esoteric areas of Torah, we see from this last example that his responsa took the full religious experience into account.

RATF (bottom right corner) at a an unspecified event in Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin. To his right, Rav M, Ziemba

  • Centrality of Torah for All Jews & Mishna Yomi

In a related theme to limud zechut & providing access to all areas of Torah, it is clear that RATF strived to include the full population of Jewry in his philosophy of learning Torah. It is interesting to note, as Rabbi S.Y. Zevin does in his review of Eretz Tzvi[67], that although RATF was the dean of a yeshiva which was typically focused on the abstraction of talmudic law, Eretz Tzvi is comprised entirely of questions that are practical in nature. He utilized his training in the disciplines of pilpul and sevara as a tool for dealing with everyday people & problems.

An initiative of RATF aiming to elevate the religious experience of common Jewry, was the Mishna Yomi program that he instituted. Upon the second inaugural Siyum Hashas in 1938, RATF created a new study program allowing every Jew to appreciate and complete the entirety of Torah. His initiative was both  complementary and supplementary to the Daf Yomi that was already instituted by Rabbi Meir Shapira zt”l. An adherent to the Daf Yomi schedule would complete the entire Talmud Bavli over the course of the seven-year cycle. However, there are many aspects of torah sheb’al peh left untouched due to the significant amount of mishnayot that have no Bavli commentary. RATF suggested that the geulah (ultimate redemption) is dependent on the Jewish people learning the entirety of the oral Torah. See below for his inspirational words when introducing the program explaining an interpretation provided by the gemara for a cryptic passage in Hoshea.[68]

“Though they hire among the nations, now I will gather them up” (Hoshea 8:10)

“Should they learn it all; then, “now I will gather them up” [the Geulah will come immediately]”(Bava Batra 8a)

One could understand the words of the gemara “It all” in two ways. Either A. All of Bnei Yisrael or B.  Each individual should learn all the mishnayot as they encompass all of the oral law. And there is support for this from the Zohar[69] that one of the methods of teshuva is to learn the entirety of Torah …as every part of Torah has a unique ability to offer salvation for a specific area in one’s life, however the ultimate geulah is the entirety of all individual salvations at once and therefore all areas of the Torah must be covered in order to glean all the unique salvations to arrive at the ultimate collective salvation [of the Jewish people]. It therefore says “אי תנא כולהו” [if they learn it all], utilizing both understandings [A. all of the Jewish people and B. the entirety of the oral Torah] …and this is the purpose of the “Mishna Yomi”, that every Jew young and old, scholar and layman, wealthy & poor can all take part in this great mitzvah.”

RATF felt that the geulah could be hastened through the entirety of the Jewish people learning all the mishnayot which encompasses the oral Torah.[70] It was seen as a great complement to the Daf Yomi, to the extent that there were printings of Talmud with both the Daf Yomi & Mishna Yomi schedule to allow for combined study.[71]

Although RATF conceived the Mishna Yomi prior to WWII, the concept needed a reaffirmation amongst post war Jews. Rabbi Yonah Stenzel, who was a student of RATF in the town of Sosnovitz and eventually emigrated to Tel Aviv and joined its rabbinate, re-instituted the concept of Mishna Yomi & Halacha Yomi in remembrance of those Jews that perished in the holocaust. In a few articles he is credited with creating the Mishna Yomi format, however RATF clearly introduced the concept before the war.

It is noteworthy that the specific vehicle chosen by RATF for bringing the ultimate redemption was Torah study. The gemara mentions other potential deeds that can bring the ultimate redemption in somewhat simpler ways.[72] The accessibility of Talmud Torah to the masses and the potential for each and every Jew to experience the entirety of Torah was RATF’s preferred initiative for bringing about greater spirituality in the community at large. It was through Torah that RATF saw his contribution in hastening the geulah.

Tamud Bavli, Tractate Hagigah and Mo’ed Katan and Mishnayot Shvi’it – special edition for the students of the Daf Yomi and the Mishnah Yomi – Munich 1947

Conclusion

Halachically speaking, any city which is entirely idolatrous is classified in the gemara as an ir hanidachat and condemned to destruction. However, the gemara[73]mentions that if one of the houses within the city maintains a mezuzah on its doorpost the city should not be destroyed. An apocryphal story describes a city facing imminent destruction due to its idolatrous practices that had permeated every household. On the eve of the final verdict there was a Jew who arrived from another city and ran from door to door affixing mezuzot to all bare doorposts. I believe that on a symbolic level, one of the rabbis affixing figurative mezuzot to various embedded customs requiring limud zechut in the last century was the Kozoglover Gaon, Rabbi Aryeh Tzvi Frommer Hy”d.

The concept of limud zechut, that was RATF’s raison d’etre, allowed for needed leniency within the structure and framework of Orthodox Torah observance. At times, we need a limud zechut on our own individual behavior as well as for our various practices and customs as a community. Perhaps, even if the halachic conclusions of RATF aren’t the accepted practice, his willingness to defend questionable practices with the breadth of his learning utilizing both the revealed and esoteric sections of the Torah remind us the importance of limud zechut and our responsibility to engage others and ourselves through it’s lens.

**I would like to dedicate this article in memory of my grandparents:

    Norman Sebrow                                                              Jo Amar

יוסף בן מזל ז”ל                                               נחמן דוד בן צבי אייזק ז”ל

     Jeanette Sebrow                                                    Raymonde Amar

רוחמה בת אסתר ז”ל                                             יוכבד בת אשר זעליג ז”ל

[1] I am grateful to Rabbi Hershel Schachter שליט”א, who introduced me to the Torah of the Kozoglover Gaon amongst a variety of unique thinkers as a student in his shiur. Additionally, I would like to thank the following people for their insight and help in bringing this project from idea to reality: Rabbis Dovid Bashevkin, Yaacov Sasson, Danny Turkel as well as Moshe Rechthand. Lastly, R’ Eliezer Brodt for his insight and breadth of knowledge that he offered to help complete this project.

[2] RATF’s collected writings and teachings can also be found in Eretz Tzvi (Moadim & Al Ha’Torah)  compiled by Erlich, Yehuda; Tel Aviv, 1984. Additionally, his students in Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin compiled a collection of insights called Mekabtz’el.

[3] Frommer, Aryeh Tzvi. Eretz Tzvi, Bnei Brak, 1976, pp. 5–6.

[4] Soreski, Aharon. Geonei Polin Ha’achronim, Bnei Brak, 1982, pp. 182 According to other opinions his father was a coal salesman.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid. pp. 184 RATF’s personality is described as being exceptionally bright while at the same time a שובב or a bit of a “troublemaker”. It was in the yeshiva in Amstov that Rabbi Efraim Einhorn, paid special attention to the young orphan and provided him with the fundamentals for development in learning. It was this special attention that RATF attempted to repay when Rabbi Einhorn’s grandson, Rabbi Moshe Krohn came to study with RATF in Zbeirtza. RATF took extra care to attend to all of Rabbi Moshe Krohn’s physical and spiritual needs.

[7] Regarding the level of studies at the Amstov yeshiva – see Ibid. pp. 185-186 The day began with a shiur from 5AM until 10AM when the yeshiva would pray shacharit.

[8] Some of the other well-known students of the yeshiva; Rabbi Shlomo Stenzel and the Rebbe of Radomsk: Rabbi Shlomo Henich Hacohen Rabinovitz.

[9]1838 -1910. A chassid and son-in-law of the Kotzker Rebbe, after the Rebbe passed away he became a Gerrer chassid. In 1883 he moved to Sochatchov where he founded his own branch of chassidut named after the city, and which gave him the title of “the Sochatchover Rebbe.” His responsa were collected posthumously and published as the Responsa – Avnei Nezer hence his title. He published the sefer Eglei Tal as well, which covers the 39 melachot of Shabbat.

[10] Geonei Polin Ha’achronim, pp.182

[11] Ibid. – As a testament to the esteem regarded by the Avnei Neizer for his student, see Responsa Avnei Neizer, Orach Chaim, 109 where his teacher writes the following. “Greetings to my beloved student, the Harif and Baki our teacher, Rabbi Leib Hirsch. From your letter I see that you have been meditating on my work…You said well and spoke truth. Wishing you great strength and courage in Torah and G-d willing, may you develop into a vehicle for chassidut and fear of Heaven…Abraham”

[12] 1855-1926. Published the work “Shem Mi’shmuel”. The only son of the Avnei Neizer, was both a son and close student of his father and maintained an extremely close relationship with his father until his death. After his father’s death, he was accepted as the next Socatchover Rebbe. He published his father’s works and led Socotchov Chassidut. He died at the age of 70. He was brought to burial in the same ohel (covered grave) as his father, the Avnei Nezer, in Sochaczew. His son, Dovid, succeeded him as third Sochatchover Rebbe.

[13] Bergman, Ben-Tzion. Michoel B’Achat, pp.44 – RATF was not the only one asked to lead the yeshiva. Rav Michoel Forschlager another prized student of the Avnei Neizer was sought along with RATF to lead the yeshiva. It was RATF who served as the dean of the yeshiva while Rav Forschlager was more directly involved with directing the studies of the young students. Among Rav Forschlager’s students were Rabbi Avraham Aaron Price, Rabbi Mordechai Gifter, Rabbi Yitzchak Hoberman and Rabbi Pinchas Hirschprung. Additionally, see the newly reprinted Toras Michael (Machon Avnei Choshen, 2016) a collection of Rav Forschlager’s torah novella.

[14] 1855-1926 – One of the great galician Torah scholars with works such as Imrei Yosher, Tal Torah. His students include the prolific Rav Reuven Margolies and founder of Daf Yomi and Chochmei Lublin Yeshiva – Rabbi Meir Shapiro.

[15] 1858-1920 – Rabbi and Av Beis Din in Krakow, Poland. Author of Gilyonei Ha’Shas, Beit Ha’Otzar. Himself a fascinating Torah scholar who utilized abstract thinking in his conceptual approach to Talmudic study. At the bris of RATF’s first born son, Rabbi Yosef Engel served as the sandak, while RATF himself was the mohel.

[16] Including Rabbi Moshe Nachum Yerushalimsk, 1855-1916. Another of the great Torah luminaries in Poland at the time.

[17] See “Rabbi Aryeh Tzvi Frumer From Kozhiglov: Head of the Rabbinical Court and Rosh Yeshiva: Center for Holocaust Studies” – the reason for his departure from the city as being due to a disgruntled wealthy man that RATF slighted by deciding against him in a din Torah. For another version of the story involving his neighbor being a priest see the introduction to the third printing of Reponsa Eretz Tzvi.

[18] Specifically, Rabbi Yitzchak Yaakov Erlich whose son R’ Yehuda ended up publishing the works of RATF Rav in Israel many years later.

[19] It is in Sosnovitz where Rabbi Yonah Stenzel (1904-1969) became a devoted student of RATF. Rabbi Stenzel, who also studied in Chochmei Lublin, eventually migrated to Tel Aviv where he re-stablished the study of Halacha and Mishna Yomit in memory of all those who perished in the Holocaust.

[20] It is important to emphasize the honor and prestige that even joining the student body of the yeshiva brought along with it. It was said that each student needed to know 200 folio of Talmud by heart to gain admission.

[21] See Responsa Eretz Tzvi I:25 in his letter to the Gerrer Rebbe “Who will give me wings of a dove, I will fly and settle (in the land of Israel), kiss its earth, embrace its stones may it be hastily in our days”

[22] See Geoneil Polin Ha’achronim pp.250

[23] See Eretz Tzvi I:27 where he mentions that a certain hiddush occurred to him in Meiron on Lag Ba’omer

[24] Geoneil Polin Ha’achronim pp.252: It is said that he after meeting with the Chazon Ish zt’l in Bnei Brak, the Chazon Ish praised his brilliant Torah mind saying that he had not met such a brilliant mind in many years.

[25] The name is used as a description of the land of Israel, in the book of Daniel for example (Chapter 11), from which he had recently returned. Additionally, Tzvi for his middle name.

[26] Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin was located at Lubitrovska 57, initially a vacant lot which Rabbi Meir Shapira secured from a wealthy donor. Eretz Tzvi’s first printing was at a press located footsteps away at Lubitrovska 62 as seen on the cover page.

[27] Geonei Polin Ha’achronim, pp 271. Reportedly, the copy used for the third printing was amongst many works that survived the destruction of the holocaust and arrived as part of a larger delivery to the misrad hadatot of Israel. It was this specific copy that had the glosses of the author in the margins. Among other works saved is RATF’s personal copy of Responsa Imrei Yosher with RATF’s glosses.

[28]Rabbi Mandelbaum is a notable scholar of all topics related to Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin and many of the great minds of Polish origin. Rabbi Mandelbaum added a new dimension to the Torah of RATF and many other geonim by collecting their dispersed writings and organizing them while also providing noteworthy glosses and footnotes in various reprintings. Rabbi Mandelbaum’s father was a student of RATF in Yeshivat Chochmei Lublin. Additionally, Rabbi Mandelbaum thanks Rav Shmuel Halevi Vozner Zt”l and other for sharing many of the items found in this second volume as he was in possession of various manuscripts and writings of RATF.

[29]  ‘ שו”ת ארץ צבי, חלק ב ה, Bnei Brak, 2000

[30] סניגורם של ישראל – This term is also used in reference to the great Rav Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev (1740-1809) who repeatedly strove to portray both Jews and Jewish issues in a positive light. For more on this topic see; Luckens, ‘Rabbi Levi Yitzhak of Berdichev’, Ph.D. thesis (Temple University, 1974) pp. 38 citing M. Wilensky, I, 122-131.

[31] His words were recorded and can be found in Eretz Tzvi Moadim pp. 276

[32] ארץ צבי עה”ת pp. 14

[33] Hidden in Thunder: Perspectives on Faith, Halachah and Leadership …, Volume 1, Esther Farbstein,

[34] ארץ צבי עה”ת pp. 14

[35] See http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/shoah/biton37.pdf  based on the daily journals of Hillel Zeidman

[36] [The Last Path for Torah Leaders in the Warsaw Ghetto]. Bais Yaakov (in Hebrew) (47): 7 – Testimony of Avraham Hendel. An additional story is told about Rabbi Aryeh Tzvi that he was desperately searching for someone to help him conduct a chemical experiment with the margarine that was given out at meals in the shoe factory – to test for any treif fat that could have been mixed in and thus prohibited to eat.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Reponsa Eretz Tzvi, Introduction

[39] Siman 17

[40] Eretz Tzvi,

[41] See Shulchan Aruch 58:6

[42] Responsa Eretz Tzvi I:36

[43] Talmud Torah 4:5

[44] Shabbat 10a

[45] Israel Friedman of Ruzhyn (1796 –1850), also called Israel Ruzhin, was a Hasidic rebbe in 19th-century Ukraine and Austria. Friedman was the first and only Ruzhiner Rebbe. However, his sons and grandsons founded their own dynasties, collectively known as the “House of Ruzhin”. These dynasties, which follow many of the traditions of the Ruzhiner Rebbe, are Bohush, Boyan, Chortkov, Husiatyn, Sadigura, and Shtefanesht. The founders of the Vizhnitz, Skver, and Vasloi Hasidic dynasties were related to the Ruzhiner Rebbe through his daughters.

[46] Menachot 4a

[47] It should be noted however, that RATF concedes that this line of reasoning would specifically apply to the great tzadikim whose prayers can be assumed bring the ultimate redemption closer vs. those of the typical petitioner.

[48] See Eretz Tzvi 1:1, 1:60

[49] 1:121

[50] Rabbi Yaakov Yitzchak Rabinowitz (1766–1813). A student of the Chozeh of Lublin (Ya‘akov Yitsḥak Horowitz) with whom he eventually parted ways. See Buber, Martin: Gog und Magog (1949; first published in English translation as For the Sake of Heaven, 1945). The Yid Hakadosh would become the teacher of Rabbi Simcha Bunem of Pshiskhe. See Rosen, Michael: The Quest for Authenticity.

[51] 7a s.a

[52] See Piskei Teshuvot, Purim, Siman 695:5 Note 24. Where this responsa of RATF is brought as an example of an opinion that defends the practice of starting the Purim feast close to the end of the day where most of it will take place after Purim although it was begun before the end of the day.

[53] Additionally, regarding the proof from Tosafot in Berachot referencing Bilaam. See Nefesh Harav (pp.114) that when Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik heard this proof he laughed and Rabbi Shachter שליט”א explains that it was evident that he was not comfortable with this type of proof.

[54] See “From Principles to Rules and from Musar to Halakhah: The Hafetz Hayim’s Rulings on Libel and Gossip”, for Rabbi Dr. Brown’s discussion the works of the Hafetz Hayim at length and who discusses RATF’s discussion as well.

[55] Shaarei Teshuva, Sha’ar 3

[56] See below for further examples (non-exhaustive list) of limud zechut:

1.See Eretz Tzvi 34 – in defense of the custom for women of the time that didn’t daven everyday, when seemingly this is against the clear gemara (Berachot 20b) & Shulchan Aruch (O”C – 106:2) that women are obligated in tefillah. Rabbi Aryeh Tzvi provides additional support via comparison of tefillah to korbanot thus re-affirming the position of magen Avraham (ibid.) that suggests that the women will at some point request something from G-d and therefore fulfill their Torah obligation according to the Rambam.

  1. See Eretz Tzvi 53 54 – in defense of the common custom to make a borei pri hagefen on wine that includes significant amounts of water which are 6x the wine although this is seemingly at odds with the normative halacha as both the Shulchan Aruch YOD (siman 134) & Rama (YOD 204:5) conclude that one should not make a borei pri hagefen on such a wine.
  2. Eretz Tzvi 75 – in defense of the common custom in an area without an eiruv on Shabbat to use a minor to perform hotzaah.
  3. See Eretz Tzvi 94-95 with respect to finding support for those kohanim who fly on an airplane which might fly directly over graves of Jews thus exposing them to tumas kohanim
  4. Eretz TZvi 96 – in defense of the common custom to make seltzer on Shabbos –
  5. Eretz Tzvi 97 – in defense of the custom of certain chassidim to sit in the sukkah and make a bracha on shmini atzeret – though ostensibly at odds with the gemara.
  6. Eretz Tzvi 125 – finding support for creating a mikvah using snow in a place that no other type of mikvah would be possible.
  7. Eretz Tzvi 30 – in defense of the custom of the Ashkenazim in the diaspora who refrain from reciting the daily birchat kohanim
  8. Eretz Tzvi 35 – in defense of the custom for those washing netilat yadaim and the water does not cover most of their hand

[57] See Geonei Polin Ha’achronim, pp. 262

[58] See Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Halevi al Harambam, Hilchot Tefillah as well as the he’arot of the Chazon Ish

[59] Eretz Tzvi (Torah commentary) Introduction

[60] Eretz Tzvi, Moadim, pp. 110, Sukkot תרפ”ה

[61] Kabbalistic work of the Ari’zal

[62] ד”ה ודע

[63] Chapter 2:7

[64] Another notable exchange is one that appears in the second volume of Eretz Tzvi where RATF engages in correspondence with none other than the Ishbitzer Rebbe, Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner zt”l. It was in 1934 that the Ishbitzer Rebbe sent a question that was bothering him regarding a specific comment of Maimonides related to Hilchot Shevuot. RATF goes on to cite various chassidic and Kabbalistic sources and their bearing on the halachic issues. Thank you to Rabbi Josh Rosenfeld for pointing out this source, in his Sunday Responsa Series.

[65] Responsa Eretz Tzvi, I:12

[66] Siman 62

[67] Sofrim U’Sfarim, Tel Aviv, 1959, pp.189.  [Thank you to Rabbi Eliezer Brodt who brought this source to my attention]

[68] The discourse can be found in it’s entirety in Eretz Tzvi Moadim pp. 276.

[69] Zohar Chadash, Rut

[70] See also Eretz Tzvi, II: 72, 73

[71] This unique edition was printed in the framework of daily Daf Yomi and daily Mishnah. A combined calendar of Daf Yomi and the daily Mishnah is printed at the beginning of the book for the years to come: 5767-1912. The tablet is spread over four columns. Beneath the calendar of Daf Yomi, a special prayer was printed “after the end of a chapter from a daily mishnah.” This prayer was composed by Rabbi Yonah Stenzel zt “l, in memory of the Holocaust victims” who were killed for the sanctification of God … by the German oppressors. [Seen at Tzolman’s auctions (Bidspirit.org)]

[72] See Shabbat 118a – “If only [Bnei] Yisrael would keep two consecutive Shabbatot they would be immediately redeemed”

[73] Sanhedrin, 71a




Saul Lieberman and his Ketubah, Driving on Shabbat, an Unusual Marriage Practice, Girls born on Friday, and More

Saul Lieberman and his Ketubah, Driving on Shabbat, an Unusual Marriage Practice, Girls born on Friday, and More

Marc B. Shapiro

For a long time, I have had an interest in Saul Lieberman. It has been almost twenty years since my book Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox appeared.[1] I have also dealt with Lieberman in many Seforim Blog posts. A few years ago, I did a series of eighteen classes on Lieberman on Torah in Motion. You can watch the classes on Youtube here or listen to the podcasts here. A letter from Lieberman that has recently come into my hands allows me to turn to Lieberman again. Yet before doing so, I must note at the same time that I was researching, writing, and teaching about Lieberman, Aviad Hacohen also published a number of works on Lieberman. His latest is a lengthy article on Lieberman and the Lithuanian Torah world that appeared in the recently published Rabbi David Golinkin Jubilee volume titled Shir ha-Ma’alot Le-David. It can be read here. In his article, Hacohen includes this nice photograph of Lieberman speaking with R. Aharon Lichtenstein.

We can also look forward to Hacohen’s forthcoming volume of Lieberman’s letters which will be vital for any future scholarship on Lieberman.

While Lieberman was always careful not to do anything that would be at odds with the Orthodox rabbis, there was one exception to this, and that was his ketubah. In order to help solve the Agunah problem, Lieberman proposed including in the ketubah a clause that the husband and wife authorize the beit din to award compensation if either party refuses to come to the beit din to halakhically end the marriage. For those married under Conservative auspices, the beit din mentioned in the ketubah would be the newly formed beit din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary.[2]

A lengthy letter from Lieberman to R. Isaac Herzog, dated November 22, 1954, was recently placed at auction, available here. I thank a student who purchased the letter and sent it to me, enabling me to see page 4 which is missing from the auction site. After this post appears, I will present the letter to a suitable archive for safekeeping. This letter is of great significance, as Lieberman explains what motivated him to develop his addition to the traditional ketubah. We are also given insight into how he viewed the Orthodox and Conservative rabbis. Those who wish can see the complete letter in one PDF here.

In the letter, Lieberman begins by saying that he had not written to R. Herzog—who was a very close friend[3]—because he did not want to create difficulties for R. Herzog by bringing him into the controversy swirling around his proposed ketubah. He explains that certain non-Orthodox rabbis had begun to perform marriages for women who were only divorced civilly. This led people to think that the obligation of a get was not a serious matter. Lieberman notes that in circumstances where the husband does not want to give a get, it is usually possible to convince him to do so. The problem is that these “menuvalim” demand so much money to issue the get, that the women are unable to pay this: ואין מי שיתבע את עלבון העלובות

Lieberman then turns to what in his time was a well-known agunah case. I do not wish to go into details but only mention that the woman involved was the famous Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, who after her experience became a critic of the Orthodox approach in Jewish marriage and divorce law. In Lawrence Grossman’s great new book, Living in Both Worlds: Modern Orthodox Judaism in the United States, 1945-2025, p. 204, he writes that Weiss-Rosmarin was “perhaps the first woman from an Orthodox background to publicly demand the wholesale revision of the system [of Jewish divorce law].” In Weiss-Rosmarin’s 1953 article, “Wanted: Equality for Jewish Women,”[4] and in her later article “The Agony of the Agunah,”[5] she called for batei din to assume the authority of issuing divorces instead of husbands. She further claimed that “Jewish law is male-made and inevitably the male prerogatives are protected at the expense of the rights of women. While Jewish law is chivalrous in certain areas, ‘chivalry’ is not enough for the modern woman.”[6] Because of her strong stand in the matter of agunah, Weiss-Rosmarin has even been called the “the first feminist Jew and the first Jewish feminist.”[7] You can read about her here.

Lieberman says that when he saw how the rabbis did not do anything to help Weiss-Rosmarin, that he came to the conclusion that he must do something. His answer to the agunah problem was his ketubah. If the beit din orders payments based on the ketubah, he believed that this would be upheld by the secular court. Lieberman states that originally he wanted the beit din that would be in charge of this to have: רבנים יראי שמים ובקיאים בדיני גיטין וקדושין. He even reveals that R. Abraham Price of Toronto agreed to serve on this beit din, which means that R. Price accepted the halakhic legitimacy of Lieberman’s ketubah. However, the Rabbinical Council of America threatened to put the Orthodox rabbis in herem if they joined Lieberman’s proposed beit din.[8] Lieberman adds that since the RCA did not allow for Orthodox rabbis to join this beit din, there was no longer any possibility that the beit din would be able to write gittin. Rather, its only role would be to compel the man who refused to give a get to do so. He tells R. Herzog that he reformulated the ketubah, so that any recognized beit din can compel the man to issue a divorce and also require monetary payments.

Lieberman adds that the Orthodox assertion that Conservative rabbis wish to involve themselve in matters of gittin is laughable. It is of interest how Lieberman distinguishes between Orthodox and Conservative rabbis, something that only comes across in the Hebrew words he uses for “rabbi”:

כל הצעקה של הרבנים שהרבייס הקונסרבטיביים רוצים להכנס לענייני גיטין היא מצחיקה

Lieberman continues that the Conservative rabbis have no need for the income they could get from doing gittin, and they can make more money from other things. They have not gotten involved in kashrut, which is less complicated than gittin and has much more money in it. Lieberman adds that the fact that the Conservative rabbis accepted his proposal is a very positive thing, since if any of them now perform a wedding before the woman has received a get, they will be expelled from the Rabbinical Assembly. All Conservative rabbis are therefore forced to explain to their communities that civil divorce is meaningless and the woman is still regarded as married.

Lieberman then tells about the “young rabbis” who were in an uproar about his proposal. By this he means the rabbis of the Rabbinical Council of America. He says that they were claiming that it is forbidden to alter any of the formulations used in the ketubah, and that this is based on the fact that it is also forbidden to alter the text of a get from what the Sages have decreed.[9] Lieberman notes that he did not pay them any mind, and was happy to let them show their ignorance in public. He adds that the RCA rabbis have now begun screaming that the beit din of the Conservative rabbis has permitted kohanim to marry divorced women and to drive to synagogue on Shabbat.[10] Lieberman says that this is completely false. To begin with, they do not have a beit din. What this apparently means is that the Conservative movement does not have a national beit din that could issue rulings for the movement. Lieberman adds that a number of Conservative rabbis, mostly his students, demanded that any rabbi who performs a wedding between a kohen and a divorced woman, or permits his congregants to drive on Shabbat, should be expelled from the Rabbinical Assembly. Yet at the convention of the Rabbinical Assembly this proposal was rejected.

Already in 1952 the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards permitted Conservative rabbis to perform weddings between kohanim and divorced women.[11] As for driving on Shabbat, the famous responsum that permitted driving to synagogue, and only to synagogue, on Shabbat, was authored by Rabbis Morris Adler, Jacob Agus, and Theodore Friedman. It was reprinted in Mordecai Waxman, ed., Tradition and Change: The Development of Conservative Judaism (New York, 1958). Here is part of the preface to the responsum from which you see background:

The responsum printed below is the collective effort of three men who prepared it for the approval of the Law Committee of the Rabbinical Assembly. It secured the support of a majority of the Law Committee and it was subsequently presented at a convention of the Rabbinical Assembly (1950). However, in conformity with the policy of the Assembly not to give approval to legal provisions which have not been unanimously approved by the Law Committee, it was not voted upon. It thus remains as the opinion of a group of men, but has no official status.[12]

Although the responsum did not have official status as a ruling of the Conservative Movement, because of the support it received on the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards—the new name of the Law Committee beginning in 1948—it was regarded by the Conservative Movement as a halakhically acceptable option.[13] The way the Committee worked is that “a unanimous opinion is recorded as such and becomes binding upon every member of the Rabbinical Assembly. Where there is a difference of opinion, the opinion which dissents from the majority becomes a minority opinion, and the minority opinion also may be followed by the members of the Rabbinical Assembly.”[14]

In a 2023 article that appeared on the Rabbinical Assembly website here, it states that the responsum “was approved by the Law Committee,” which must mean “approved” as an acceptable option.

The halakhic position advocated by Adler, Agus, and Friedman is summed up in this paragraph from the responsum:

Refraining from the use of a motor vehicle is an important aid in the maintenance of the Sabbath spirit of repose. Such restraint aids, moreover, in keeping the members of the family together on the Sabbath. However, where a family resides beyond reasonable walking distance from the synagogue, the use of a motor vehicle for the purpose of synagogue attendance shall in no wise be construed as a violation of the Sabbath but, on the contrary, such attendance shall be deemed an expression of loyalty to our faith.[15]

Since we are dealing with a halakhic teshuvah, they also had to come up with a way to permit driving to synagogue that could be in line with halakhic sources. The way they did this was by asserting that driving a car is only a rabbinic prohibition. When it comes to the electricity that the car uses, that was not a difficult point to argue, but how could they assert that combustion of gasoline to produce power is also only a rabbinic prohibition? Their solution is to claim that burning is only a Torah-prohibited act when used for the purposes that the Sages recorded, such as cooking, heating, or lighting. “Burning for the sake of power was not included in this list” (p. 369). They also claim that any heat produced by the car’s combustion of gas is not intended or desired so it is a pesik reisha de-lo niha leh “which is permitted by the latest authorities” (p. 369). For good measure they add that the combustion is a melakhah she-einah tzerichah le-gufah according to the opinion of Tosafot, since the combustion is not for the purpose of burning but in order to cause the car to move.

After concluding that driving a car on Shabbat is only a rabbinic prohibition, they then claim that rabbinic prohibitions can be set aside when they prevent the fulfillment of a mitzvah, in this case the mitzvah being attendance at synagogue which is “indispensable to the preservation of the religious life of American Jewry.”[16] It is important to remember that the permission to drive on Shabbat was only for the purpose of attending synagogue. In 1961 Friedman clarified that the permission to drive on Shabbat was only intended to apply to the synagogue one normally attends, not to allow people to drive to a bar mitzvah at another synagogue. This outlook was affirmed in a statement adopted by the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards.[17]

It continues to amaze me that the majority of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, and no doubt the overwhelming majority of all Conservative rabbis, supported the Adler, Agus, and Friedman responsum. In the responsum it states: “To continue unmodified the traditional interdiction of riding on the Sabbath is tantamount to rendering attendance at the synagogue on the Sabbath physically impossible for an increasing number of our people.” This was always a foolish argument. In the 1950s there were plenty of Orthodox synagogues that had members who drove to synagogue on Shabbat. There were even Orthodox synagogues that left the parking lot open. But they never officially said that this was permissible. They just looked the other way, and many of the children of those who drove to synagogue became completely observant. In fact, over time, a number of those who drove to an Orthodox synagogue also became observant, precisely because they were never told that it was OK to drive on Shabbat and instead were given a religious goal—Shabbat observance—to strive for. This is the exact model today of Chabad synagogues.

In Rabbi Robert Gordis’ dissenting opinion from the majority of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, he wrote: “All experience teaches that the task of winning back the erring and the estranged, heartrendingly difficult as it is, is more often successfully achieved by traditional religion than by its non-traditional forms.”[18] Gordis also states: “To modify Jewish law in order to bring it into conformity with their [Sabbath violators’] way of life is tantamount to amending the Constitution of the United States so as to harmonize it with the viewpoint of an anarchist. . . . Had there been a large number of Elisha ben Abuyas or general Sabbath violators in their day, the Rabbis would not have consulted them as to how Sabbath observance should be conceived of.”[19]

Why couldn’t the Conservative movement simply ignore the fact that people in the synagogue had driven there on Shabbat instead of seeking to offer halakhic justification? Were they afraid that if congregants felt that the rabbi viewed them as sinning by driving to synagogue, that the congregants would be inclined to join a Reform temple where they wouldn’t be judged? Did they really think that people would stop coming to synagogue if they did not permit driving on Shabbat? The authors of the responsum were certainly aware that the people who drove to synagogue on Shabbat did not restrict themselves to only driving there, but they also drove throughout the Sabbath to wherever they wanted to go. So, what in the end did they think would be accomplished by this responsum? How did they not see that once the permission was granted, that even rabbis and cantors would avail themselves of it rather than moving within walking distance of their synagogues?[20] In 2003 Rabbi Ismar Schorsch, chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary, said that the decision to allow driving to the synagogue on Shabbat was a mistake,[21] but by this time, there were hardly any Conservative rabbis in the United States who would agree with him.[22]

Returning to Lieberman’s letter, he notes that “the rabbi from Boston,” by which he means R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, also attacked him—without mentioning Lieberman by name—regarding the proposed addition to the ketubah. This is interesting, as I am unaware of any public communication from the Rav in which he attacked Lieberman. However, in 1954 R. Emanuel Rackman, working “with the direction of” R. Soloveitchik, expressed opposition to the Lieberman Ketubah. Rackman would later claim that the Rav’s opposition was “mild” and that the Rav admitted that he would have been able to work out a mutually satisfactory version of the ketubah with Lieberman.[23] Also of note is that in 1959, R. Norman Lamm published a critique of the Lieberman Ketubah.[24] Knowing Lamm’s connection to R. Soloveitchik, it is hard to believe that he would have published this article without the Rav’s approval. It is noteworthy that at this point in the letter Lieberman also refers negatively to musmakhim of RIETS as רבייס.

Lieberman continues that he would never change a text established by the Sages, but there is no problem changing the ketubah’s language. He cites R. Simeon ben Zemah Duran that one is even allowed “to lie” in the ketubah (the quotation marks are found in the letter). The case of R. Duran is about a young woman who was not a virgin but they wrote “virgin” in the ketubah, and R. Duran says that there is no problem in doing this.[25][26]

Lieberman adds that the Rabbinical Council of America has an ally in their opposition to Lieberman’s ketubah, namely, Professor Mordechai Kaplan, who viewed Lieberman as more dangerous than all the Orthodox rabbis.

Lieberman concludes the main part of the letter that he is prepared to accept the ruling of a beit din in Israel. His condition is that the beit din be composed of R. Herzog, R. Isaac Zev Soloveitchik (the Brisker Rav), and a third rabbi that they would agree on. If they rule that his ketubah is forbidden, he will abandon it. Since the ketubah he prepared was for the Conservative movement, it mentioned that the parties have to come to the Conservative beit din. However, Lieberman says that one can insert the name of any beit din in the ketubah, “as longs as it is a beit din that does not accept bribery.”

The remainder of the letter contains comments on a Torah article of R. Herzog.

It is noteworthy that R. Herzog dealt with the Lieberman ketubah at a meeting of the Moetzet ha-Rabbanut ha-Rashit on March 10, 1955.[29]

In attendance at the meeting, representing the Rabbinical Council of America, were Rabbis David Hollander and Herschel Schacter. At the meeting, R. Herzog said that although Lieberman is a great Torah scholar, he is not a gadol ba-Torah that we are all obligated to listen to. He adds that he does not see Lieberman’s addition to the ketubah as halakhically problematic. However, he has strongly protested the notion that a Conservative beit din will have any involvement in this matter. In 1953 R. Herzog wrote to British Chief Rabbi Israel Brodie and mentioned that years before he had already suggested a proposal similar to that of Lieberman.

See also this 1953 letter to South Africa Chief Rabbi Louis I. Rabinowitz where he repeats what he told R. Brodie.

We see from both these letters that R. Herzog had no objection to Lieberman’s ketubah and even wondered if Lieberman’s proposal based on his own prior suggestion.[30]

Great Torah scholar that he was, the ability to stand up to voices on his right was not one of R. Herzog’s strengths. As such, it was not long before he was dragged into a strong condemnation of the Lieberman Ketubah. Here is how Amihai Radzyner sums up what happened:

It appears that Rabbi Herzog was not at all sure that the new clause in the ketubah posed a halakhic problem (unlike the Conservative rabbinical court issue) and therefore decided that the Rabbinate would discuss the matter further and consider issuing an official protest. Later, Rabbi Herzog formulated a relatively moderate objection, in which he expressed doubt regarding the halakhic claim that the new clause would inevitably lead to coerced (and thus invalid) divorce (גט מעושה). Herzog drafted a statement to this effect, which he sent to members of the Chief Rabbinate Council. The moderate nature of the statement did not please Rabbi Reuven Katz, who insisted that would “assist criminals, God forbid.” He demanded a stronger wording that would express solid opposition to this “serious matter.” His demands seem to have been heeded: the Rabbinate ultimately would issue a statement in which Rabbi Herzog would warn congregations in the U.S. of the grave danger posed by the Conservative ketubah, in accordance with the wishes of the American Orthodox leadership. This statement – an appeal to rabbis of the United States signed by Israel’s two Chief Rabbis – refers to the Conservative ketubah as the “defiant ketubah” (כתובה חוצפנית) and states that the amendment will not solve the problem of “chained women,” and also warns that the new language, in conjunction with the new rabbinical court, could lead to a rift within the Jewish people.[31]

Here is the statement of the Chief Rabbinate, which includes the attack on the Lieberman ketubah, that Radzyner refers to.

It would be great to see how R. Herzog explained to his good friend Lieberman why he was forced to issue the condemnation, complete with its derogatory description of the Lieberman Ketubah. Unfortunately, no such letter exists in the archive, but Lieberman well understood the pressures R. Herzog was under.

Here are some additional points relevant to my Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox.

1. Mesorat Moshe, vol. 3, p. 389: Someone asked R. Moshe Feinstein if you can rely on Lieberman’s Tosefta. R. Moshe replied that Lieberman is a religious Jew so there is no fear that he would alter the text of the Tosefta.

2. In September 2025 Legacy Judaica, see here, put this letter up for auction from R. Chaim Kanievsky.

He replies that there is no prohibition to use the works of Lieberman. Asked about purchasing works published by JTS, he replies that he does not know. See here where I published the letter from Lieberman recommending that R. Kanievsky receive the Rothschild Prize, and see also here.

See also R. Meir Mazuz, Makor Ne’eman, vol. 3, no. 1337, who permits use of Tosefta ki-Feshutah.

3. See Ha-Ma’yan64 (Tamuz 5784), p. 119 n. 27, that R. Amos Tabanchik reports that R. Elazer Shakh gave R. Noah Shimanovitz a copy of Tosefta ki-Feshutah as a present. Also of note is that the ArtScroll English translation of Mishnah, Kilayim 8:4 cites Tosefta ki-Feshutah.

4. In Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox, I mentioned that R. Shemaya Grunbaum, a Satmar hasid, published a letter from Lieberman in his book,Siyata di-Shemaya al Masekhet Shabbat (Jerusalem, 1970), pp. 159-160. He does not refer to Lieberman by name, but as “hakham ehad”. However, Lieberman’s identity is only slightly veiled, as R. Grunbaum leaves in the letter’s reference to Ha-Yerushalmi ki-Feshuto. He obviously intended that those “in the know” would recognize with whom he was corresponding.

After R. Grunbaum’s book appeared, he sent it to Lieberman and asked Lieberman to send him his recently published Sifrei Zuta/Talmudah shel Kesarin. R. Grunbaum also apologized that due to reasons beyond his control, he could not mention Lieberman by name and thus referred to him as “hakham ehad”.[32]

5. In Ha-Mashbir5 (2025), I published a few letters from Lieberman to Heschel. See here. In one of the letters, Lieberman offers some notes to Heschel’s Torah min ha-Shamayim. Here is Heschel’s reply to Lieberman’s letter.[33]

6. I am writing this right before Thanksgiving, so it reminded me that it is reported that Lieberman did not saytahanunon Thanksgiving. Shearith Israel in Manhattan also does not say tahanun on Thanksgiving. In fact, they say a partial Hallel, from הללו את ה’ כל גוים until the final הודו לה’ כי טוב.[34]

7. David Sarna reports that Lieberman did not accept the Manhattan eruv and that he would not allow a bat mitzvah girl to address the congregation at the JTS synagogue.[35]

* * * * * * * *

I want to call Seforim Blog readers’ attention to the wonderful Youtube channel of Kerem: Bein Torah le-Hokhmah here. The main feature is R. Yonason Marton’s daily daf yomi and other shiurim. While his shiurim are in Yiddish, the summaries available in the show notes on Youtube are in Hebrew. R. Marton’s shiurim are a unique combination of traditional lomdus and academic scholarship. In addition, Kerem has hosted numerous academic scholars whose videos are also on the Youtube channel. Kerem is a unique institution led by special people, and I wish it much success as it continues to grow.

Appendix

We routinely use the word “virgin” in the ketubah, together with the applicable monetary amount, unless the woman has been previously married. We even do so if the couple is living together. As mentioned, this is allowed because as long as the future husband knows the truth, it does not matter what is written in the ketubah. That this is the law has been affirmed in modern times by R. Moshe Feinstein[36] and many others. In fact, this is so well established that I think it is a “known truth” that before marriage the husband needs to know if his future wife is a virgin, and that the ketubah is invalid if he gets married without knowing the truth. Indeed, how could it be any different, as we see from Ketubot 11b that if the man marries a woman thinking she is a virgin and she is not, that it is a mekah taut?

It will therefore come as a surprise for many that this view is not accepted by all. For instance, R. Shalom Mordechai Schwadron[37] deals with a case of an orphan woman who not only was not a virgin, but who had a child out of wedlock. She later got engaged to a man who did not know about her past. R. Schwadron ruled that in the interests of peace they could write “virgin” in the ketubah and keep the husband in the dark. As for the incorrect monetary amount, R. Schwadron has a few suggestions on how to deal with this as well, including having the woman sign a document foregoing the extra ketubah money due a virgin. This document would have to be kept with the beit din as the husband would not be aware of it.

I think people will also be surprised by the following, not merely the ruling of R. Joseph Hayyim but the entire situation he describes, as it is so foreign from our experience. I apologize if what follows is a little too explicit, but everything comes directly from Rav Pealim, vol. 1, Even ha-Ezer, no. 2.[38] R. Joseph Hayyim describes the following case. A man betrothed a woman on the assumption that she was a virgin. At the time, her father, mother and all her relatives “knew” that she was a virgin. However, between the betrothal and the marriage her parents learned that she had been intimate a few times with another man.

The practice in Baghdad was that on the night of the wedding, after the bride and groom went into their room, female relatives of the bride and groom would sit outside the door. In addition, a few male relatives and friends of the groom would also be there. They were all waiting to see the dam betulim. After the husband finished his marital duty, he would get dressed, open the door, and leave.[39] The women would then come in to see the dam betulim. If they saw it, they would make the loud celebratory sound we have all heard from women from Arab countries, which is called zaghrouta. If they did not see the dam betulim, that meant the groom did not do his job properly, and he would come back to try again.[40]

In the particular case of the responsum, the parents of the woman came up with a trick to spare her embarrassment: The bride put blood on the sheet, but it was not her blood. However, someone who was close to the family of the bride knew the truth and was worried that the marriage was not halakhically binding. After all, the man married her under false pretenses as he thought she was a virgin, and so it was written in the ketubah.

R. Joseph Hayyim replies that the marriage is binding and the husband should not be told that he was fooled, as this will lead to great shame for the bride and her family. As for the matter of the ketubah, R. Joseph Hayyim says that the bride and her relatives must be told that in the event of her being able to collect the ketubah money, she can only claim that which a non-virgin is entitled to.

Both R. Schwadron and R. Joseph Hayyim are cited by R. Netanel Meoded in his own responsum where he concludes that one should not inform a man that the woman he is marrying, whom he thinks is a virgin, was sexually active before their engagement. See Mizrah Shemesh, vol. 2, no. 31.

R. Joel Roth, writing from a Conservative perspective, argues for removing the word betulta from the ketubah. See Roth, Hakol Kol Yaakov, ed. David Golinkin (Jerusalem, 2023), pp. 361ff.

Let me now turn to another strange thing. In previous centuries there was a belief among some that a girl who was born on Friday did not have betulim. Quite apart from the absurdity of the belief, the halakhic problem it would create is obvious, since as R. Abraham Zvi Klein notes, it would mean that with any woman whose birthday is unknown, there would be no ta’anat betulim because perhaps she was born on Friday. To this I would add, since there is no mention of this “medical” point in the Talmud or rishonim, it is shocking that anyone took it seriously. In R. Eliyahu Bar Shalom’s standard work, Mishpat ha-Ketubah,[42] he feels it necessary to write:

גם לנולדת ביום ששי יש כתובת בתולה ככל שאר הנישאות, אף שיש שמועה שאין לה בתולים

What is the origin of this belief? The first reference I found is in R. Isaac Lampronte of Ferrara’s (1679-1756) halakhic encyclopedia Pahad Yitzhak. R. Lampronte was also a doctor, so his recording of this medical legend is itself noteworthy.

In Pahad Yitzhak, s.v. na’arah, R. Lampronte mentions that in Italy the practice is that if a girl is born on Friday this fact is recorded, precisely in order to deal with the halakhic issue already mentioned. That is, if the husband will later assert that there was no dam betulim, this would not be regarded as a valid claim. R. Lampronte states that despite the Italian practice, he did not find any mention of the unique nature of girls born on Friday either in the Talmud or poskim, and that there is also no mention of it in scientific or medical works. He therefore claims that the assumption that girls born on Friday lack betulim should not be relied upon, as on the contrary, sometimes girls born on Friday indeed have belutim.

R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, who lived in Italy, also mentions the belief that girls born on Friday lack betulim. He says that he was told about this from distinguished people in Italy and Amsterdam. He also cites from the then unpublished section of Pahad Yitzhak just mentioned. As with R. Lampronte, R. Azulai is surprised by this biological assumption, because if it is true, the Sages would have mentioned something about it.[43]

Many people have cited the Pahad Yitzhak and Hida, however, the story does not end there. There was another great rabbi in Italy, R. Daniel Tierni of Florence (died 1814), author of the commentary on the Shulhan ArukhIkarei ha-Dat (הד”ט – playing on the abbreviation of his name). In his commentary to Yoreh Deah 21:10, he tells us that he saw additions that R. Lampronte made to the Pahad Yitzhak. These additions have not appeared in print, so we must be grateful for what R. Tierni preserved. Here R. Lampronte states that the entire matter is a complete falsehood, sheker gamur.[44] Yet R. Tierni adds that everywhere in Italy where he has lived, they are careful to record in the communal record whenever a baby girl is born on Friday to avoid problems when she later gets married. He notes that the non-Jews also do this. As for why there are girls born on Friday who have betulim, he explains this through astrology, and suggests that it depends when on Friday they are born, since only certain hours on Friday are under the rule of Venus.

As late as 1902, R. Isaac Raphael Ashkenazi (1826-1908), the rav of Ancona, writes that the practice of his city is to record the girls who are born on Friday, and he thinks this is what other communities should do as well.[45]

Riddles

It has been a long time since I included a riddle, and I now have a bunch of books that I can give away to those who get the right answers. If you have the answers, email them to me at shapirom2 at scranton.edu

1. Where do we find that Shammai not only disagrees with Beit Shammai, but also agrees with Beit Hillel?

2. In the days of the tannaim a certain item was unquestionablymuktzeh. However, in the post-talmudic period, some hold that this item is no longermuktzeh. What item am I referring to? Provide the actual source in the Talmud and later authorities to justify your answer.

I asked ChatGPT this question but the answer it provided was phony, complete with a non-existent citation from R. Moshe Isserles. I am sure ChatGPT will provide other answers, and perhaps one of them might be correct

* * * * * *

[1] This book began as an invited lecture in memory of Lieberman sponsored the Union of Traditional Judaism. One of the organizers of the event was Rabbi Ronald Price. I mention this because R. Price is the author of the newly published book, Divrei Halev: Thoughts of Rabbi Professor David Weiss Halivni on the Weekly Torah Portion. Here is part of the book’s description on Amazon:

Divrei Halev is the result of a multi-year collaboration between Rabbi Ronald D. Price and his teacher, the world-renowned Talmudic scholar Rabbi Professor David Weiss Halivni, of blessed memory. Nearly every week from 2008 to 2012, Rav Halivni shared a thought with Rabbi Price on the weekly Torah portion, which the student faithfully recorded. Divrei Halev includes over two hundred brief divrei Torah spread across all fifty-four parashiyot.

I was one of those privileged to write a blurb for the book, together with Professors Gershon Bacon Reuven Kimelman, David Novak, and Dr. Elana Stein Hain. In the interests of space, my blurb was edited, so here is a good opportunity to record my unabridged blurb.

Rabbi Halivni’s greatest contribution was of course his groundbreaking talmudic scholarship. Yet anyone who had the pleasure of davening with Rabbi Halivni on Shabbat, as I did in the late 1990s and early 2000s, saw a different side of him, that of a rav of a kehillah, a spiritual leader, whose spoken word on Shabbat was able to both enlighten and inspire. Those of us who were able to experience this, and those who never had the opportunity, owe a great debt to Rabbi Ronald Price for bringing the words of our teacher to life.

Regarding Halivni, see also what I wrote here.

Let me now share another story about Halivni. On Erev Pesah 2001 or 2002 I was walking to shul on the Upper West Side and I saw Halivni coming down the street. I asked what brought him to my neighborhood, as I knew he did not live in the area. He told me that he wanted to find a minyan that said Hallel after maariv. I took him to Ohab Zedek and was told that they do not say maariv. We started out in search of another shul and came upon the Chabad minyan on the Upper West Side, where we davened. I remember being very impressed by two things at this minyan. First, that the Chabad rabbi and at least a couple of other Chabad attendees knew who Halivni was. Second, how they treated him with the greatest respect.

[2] Subsequent to publication of my Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox, Monique Susskind Goldberg discussed Lieberman’s Ketubah in id. and Diana Villa, Za’akat Dalot: Pitronot Hilkhati’yim le-Be’ayat ha-Agunot bi-Zemanenu (Jerusalem, 2006), pp. 104ff. On p. 112, she also discusses a proposed adjustment to the ketubah by R. She’ar Yashuv Cohen.

Whether the Lieberman Ketubah could be civilly enforced was at the center of the famous 1980s N.Y. case, Avitzur vs. Avitzur. See here and here. Contrary to all the naysayers, the court upheld the legitimacy of the Lieberman Ketubah from the standpoint of American law. The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, an Orthodox organization, got involved with the case together with the Jewish Theological Seminary to support the plaintiff whose husband had refused to appear before the beth din of JTS and the Rabbinical Assembly in order to give her a get. Nathan Lewin told me that R. Moshe Sherer, the head of Agudat Israel, asked Lewin to become involved with the case. Even though it did not focus on the Orthodox community, Sherer—and the Agudah rabbinic leadership he must have consulted—thought it was important that the principle that the government could, in certain circumstances, require people to go to beit din be upheld.

[3] According to Chaim Herzog, Lieberman was his parents’ closest friend. See Elijah J. Schochet and Solomon Spiro, Saul Lieberman: The Man and His Work (New York, 2005), p. 53. On this page, Schochet and Spiro write that “Lieberman enjoyed the respect of R. Yosef Shalom Eliashiv, the av beit din of Jerusalem.” If one consults the source they offer for this sentence, Yitzhak Raphael’s eulogy for Lieberman in Sinai 93 (Nisan-Iyar 5783), p. 91, one finds that Raphael’s actually refers to R. Elyashiv’s grandfather, the kabbalist R. Solomon Elyashiv.

[4] Congress Weekly, Aug. 17, 1953, cited in Regina Stein, “The Boundaries of Gender: The Role of Gender Issues in Forming American Jewish Denominational Identity, 1913-1963” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1998), p. 319.

[5] Conservative Judaism 20 (Fall 1965), pp. 51-54.

[6] Stein, “The Boundaries of Gender, p. 320.

[7] See Naomi Salfati, “On Feminist Judaism, Jewish Feminism and the Advancement of Women’s Roles in Jewish Tradition” (unpublished master’s dissertation, Hebrew University, 2014), p. 16, available here. Salfati discusses Weiss-Rosmarin’s article, “The Unfreedom of Jewish Women,” which also deals with the “unfairness of Jewish marriage laws to divorced and abandoned women.”

Weiss-Rosmarin is also known for her book Judaism and Christianity The Differences. In Alan Brill’s newly published A Jewish Trinity: Contemporary Christian Theology through Jewish Eyes, Weiss-Rosmarin’s approach, which is the “standard” view Jews are taught, is specifically rejected throughout the book. In the very first paragraph of A Jewish Trinity, Brill writes: “For many Jews and Christians, Weiss-Rosmarin’s basic unbridgeable theological divide between the religions remains a truism. This book rejects Weiss-Rosmarin’s simple zero-sum declaration by asking whether the Jewish theological vision and the Christian theological vision are fundamentally irreconcilable, or can the positions be conceptually bridged.”

[8] In a December 3, 1954, statement, the RCA and the Rabbinical Alliance of America condemned the Lieberman ketubah, stating that it had “the gravest implications to the sanctity of Jewish family life and represents the most disastrous disavowal of the principles of Jewish law.” See Benjamin Steiner’s important article, “The Lieberman Clause Revisited,” American Jewish Archives 69 (2017), p. 54.

[9] For criticism of the Lieberman Ketubah from another angle, see R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 5, pp. 23ff., vol. 21, no. 62. See also R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, “Tikun o Harisah,” Ha-Pardes, Shevat 5755, pp. 20-22. R. Isaac Herzog responded to this article, see Tehukah le-Yisrael al Pi ha-Torah, vol. 3, pp. 208-209.

At a 1953 gathering of Conservative rabbis and JTS faculty, Lieberman discussed his proposal, which he referred to as a takkanah. He said as follows, clearly exasperated with the American Orthodox rabbinate.

I saw that some of you were accused of being frightened by the Orthodox rabbis. I want to tell you that I am not frightened by them at all.

I want, therefore, to give you a point of information. In truth, they were frightened, and I want you to know why they were frightened. They weren’t afraid that the בית דין would issue some תקנות. No, not at all. They were afraid that the בית דין will issue תקנות in accordance with the law.

As a matter of fact, one of the very important members of the Orthodox rabbis said so in so many words: If this בית דין of the Rabbinical Assembly will issue a תקנה, that will be תקנתו קלקתו. It will be a great misfortune because they will get authority and that is the reason why they oppose this. Many of them think that that בית דין will begin to move in this line, the movement can become strong and it will affect them.

Now about this תקנה. I would like to tell you that this תקנה has nothing to do with the בית דין that will be established—and I hope it will be established soon; but this I would like to see you adopt immediately because it has a tremendous practical value.

David Golinkin ed., Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement 1927-1970 (Jerusalem, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 810-811.

[10] These two points are mentioned by Rabbi Hollander at the meeting with the Moetzet Ha-Rabbanut ha-Rashit. See below. Hollander refers to Conservative rabbis permitting these matters, not a Conservative beit din.

[11] See here. The basis for the Committee on Jewish Law and Standard’s ruling was the responsum of Rabbis Ben Zion Bokser and Theodore Friedman published in Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement 1927-1970, vol. 3, pp. 1459-1462.

[12] Waxman, Tradition and Change, p. 351.

[13] Regarding the change of name from Law Committee to Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, see here.

It is of interest that in 1992 the Conservative movement in Israel, known as Masorti, issued a ruling forbidding travel to synagogue by car on Shabbat in Israel. See here. See also Rabbi David Golinkin’s responsum on this matter here.

[14] Formulation of Rabbi Aaron Blumenthal in Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement 1927-1970, vol. 3, p. 1464.

[15] Waxman, Tradition and Change, p. 361.

[16] Waxman, Tradition and Change, p. 370.

[17] Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement 1927-1970, vol. 3, pp. 1186-1188.

[18] Waxman, Tradition and Change, p. 390.

[19] Waxman, Tradition and Change, p. 390. See also ibid., pp. 392ff. for Rabbi Ben Zion Bokser’s rejection of the permission to drive on Shabbat

[20] For the recent debate of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards regarding use of an electric car on Shabbat, see here. In this article, Rabbi Danny Nevins is quoted: “Those who accept the 1950 CJLS minority position permitting people to drive to synagogue in a gas-powered car would be justified extending this permission to electric cars.” Yet as mentioned above, the 1950 CJLS position permitting people to drive to synagogue on Shabbat was the majority position, not the minority.

[21] See here.

[22] Regarding driving to synagogue on Shabbat, I think many will be surprised by some of the lenient views that have been expressed. Following this paragraph is a responsum from Kollel Eretz Hemdah’s Be-Mareh ha-Bazak, vol. 3, no. 38, in which they rule that it is permitted for a non-Jew to drive a Jew to synagogue on Shabbat if this is vital to keep the person connected to Judaism. They also state that this should not be done every week. According to what is stated at the beginning of the volume, all responsa published in the book were approved by R. Shaul Yisraeli.

R. J. Simcha Cohen suggested that for people who could not walk to synagogue in Century Village in West Palm Beach, that they could get on the bus that transports people along set routes within the community’s confines. This would only apply if the driver was not Jewish. See Cohen,Shabbat: The Right Way(Jerusalem, 2009), pp 181ff. He also includes R. Moshe Dovid Tendler’s letter opposing this leniency. R. Tendler writes: “The heter would destroy the sanctity of the Shabbos. It would be extended to other ‘good deeds’ like visiting parents, hospital patients, attending rallies and even earning money on Shabbos to pay yeshiva tuition.” R. Yosef Carmell, the head of Eretz Hemdah, also replied, and he followed the approach already approved by R. Yisraeli.

If the bus is clearly labeled as a ‘Shabbat bus,’ is announced as appropriate only for those too weak to walk on their own, and even then only to be used for transportation to and from shul, it could be positive, provided that someone familiar with the community feels it would be necessary. (One must, of course, verify that only non-Jewish drivers are used.) However, we would recommend monitoring public impression (not only before implementation but also after) so as to gauge whether people view this as either a religious farce or a sweeping abrogation of hilchot Shabbat (in which case the service should be discontinued).

We would also like to suggest the aforementioned ruling of Rav Yisrael, zt”l (Be-mareh ha-bazak IIII:38) of having the Shabbat bus run only occasionally (or perhaps alternate weeks, etc.) so as to stress that we are dealing with a she’at ha-dechak.

R. Carmell understood R. Cohen to be referring to a special Shabbat bus run by the Jewish community. But what he was referring to was the already existing bus that transports people, free of charge, to different places within Century Village.

Significantly, when asked by the community of Century Village, Boca Raton, R. Hershel Schachter gave his permission for people who can’t easily walk to take the communal bus to synagogue. See here.

See also R. Schachter, Nefesh ha-Rav, p. 233, that R. Soloveitchik opposed having a “Shabbat bus”. The Rav noted that although this could be justified halakhically, since driving to synagogue on Shabbat had become a symbol of the Reform and Conservative movements, this means that even driving to synagogue in a halakhically permissible manner is now forbidden.

R. Ben Zion Uziel earlier gave permission for Jews to use public transportation to go to synagogue, but only in a place where the majority of riders are non-Jewish. SeeMishpetei Uziel, vol. 1,Orah Hayyim, no. 9, Mahadura Tinyana, vol. 1, Orah Hayyim, no. 32.

At the end of his book, R. Cohen offers a different suggestion, namely, a rickshaw attached to a bicycle. He writes:

Accordingly, a rickshaw bicycle driven by a non-Jew would also not be prohibited because of the concern that he might repair the bicycle on Shabbat, since a Gentile may repair anything he wishes on Shabbat. . . Using all the methods mentioned above, one could arrange, well within the bounds of Halacha, for a bicycle rickshaw to transport Jews who are unable to walk to and from the synagogue on Shabbat. This would involve no Biblical violations at all.

In Hakirah 37 (2025), Avi Kadish published a memoir which describes how he became religious. He reports that R. Moshe Feinstein permitted him to ride to synagogue on Shabbat in the car driven by his father. This only happened twice, as Kadish’s father realized that his son was uncomfortable using the car. From then on, every Shabbat they walked the two hours fifteen minutes each way to synagogue. What makes R. Feinstein’s ruling so interesting, is that Kadish was over bar mitzvah age. (Kadish notes that R. Avraham Pam had also given such a ruling with regard to a katan.) Kadish publishes the following comment from R. Shabbetai Rapoport:

I see no halakhic novelty here. If your father was going to shul anyway, why should there be any reason to forbid you to go with him? Rav Moshe’s opinion was that there is no difference between partnership with a Sabbath violator and partnership with a gentile. The ḥumra that a passenger in a car causes more fuel to be burned is mentioned in his writing, but only as a ḥumra. Therefore, this ruling fits his halakhic methodology quite well. The [real] novelty is that he did not fear any criticism that might have arisen, and this is indeed characteristic and correct [of Rav Moshe].

I don’t understand R. Rapoport’s point. The novelty is that Kadish was receiving benefit from a melakhah done on Shabbat by a Jew.

R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach has an interesting pesak in Minhat Shlomo, Orah Hayyim, no. 3 (end). He rules that one who accepts Shabbat early is able to be driven by a non-Jew, and in a “tzorekh gadol” can also be driven by a Jew. He says that there is no ziluta de-Shabbat involved.

הואיל וליכא בכה”ג זילותא דשבתא שהרי אצל כולם עדיין הוא חול

R. Yitzhak Yosef states that for someone who drives to synagogue on Shabbat, it is better that he arrange to be taken by a non-Jew, unless this will lead to communal problems (e.g., others who are currently walking to synagogue might now feel that it is OK to have a non-Jew take them). Thus, he requires a local rav who knows the situation to make such a decision. SeeYalkut Yosef, Hilkhot Shabbat, vol. 5, p. 61.

Regarding using an autonomous taxi on Shabbat, see R. Eitan Kupietzky in Ha-Ma’yan, Tevet 5784, pp. 35-42. According to R. Aharon Goldberg, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s grandson, R. Auerbach had no objection to use of a car on Shabbat if there are no halakhic violations with this car, and that this could actually enhance Shabbat observance. In response to the objection that use of such a car would destroy Shabbat as we know it, a concern that was at the center of the Hazon Ish’s approach to use of electricity on Shabbat, he replied:

ההלכה היא לא איך שנראה לנו, אלא אם זה מותר אז מותר!

See Aryeh Edrei and Amir Mashiah, “Arba Amot shel Halakhah: Ha-Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,” in Binyamin Brown and Nissim Leon, eds. Ha-Gedolim (Jerusalem, 2017), pp. 720-721. Along these lines, a new pesak has recently appeared from R. Menachem Perl, the head of the Tzomet Institute. According to him, one can make use of an iRobot vacuum on Shabbat as long as it is activated before Shabbat. See here.

Because the world is changing so much when it comes to technology, I think that due to pressing circumstances the future will bring a number of lenient rulings regarding Shabbat. For example, the day is not far off when in major cities one will not be able to enter an apartment building, or even a private apartment in such a building, without using an electronic keypad or key card. It is hard to imagine that poskim will rule that Jews are not allowed to live in these buildings, as that would mean the end of Orthodox communities in many places.

[23] Stein, “The Boundaries of Gender,” pp. 331, 338.

[24] Norman Lamm, “Recent Additions to the Ketubah,” Tradition 2 (Fall, 1959), pp. 93-118.

[25] The case R. Duran discusses is of a girl who might not have even been twelve years old. She was kidnapped by non-Jews and brought to Tunis where she was redeemed (“bought”) by a Jewish man who proceeded to have sex with her. Another man then removed her from Tunis—he must have paid the first man—to bring her to her father. On the way he married her, and that is when the ketubah was written stating that the young woman was a virgin. By this time, she was checked by women and showed signs of physical maturity, and the halakhic significance of this is discussed by R. Duran. The fact that the girl was raped by her first “redeemer” is not even discussed as it is not relevant to the halakhic issue R. Duran focuses on.

In general, when one sees responsa that refer to sexual relations with young girls, one need not assume that we are dealing with a case of rape, as it is possible that the husband was also very young. See e.g., Teshuvot Hakhmei Tzarfat ve-Lotir, no. 14:

בועל בעילת מצוה ופורש בתנוקת מפני צחצוחי זיבה

See also ibid., no. 52.

[26] See Appendix.

[27] See Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox, p. 20, where I discuss Lieberman’s relationship with Kaplan, and that it seems that after the Agudas ha-Rabbonim put Kaplan in herem, Lieberman observed the herem. See also my earlier post here. See also here where I discuss the burning of Kaplan’s siddur and show that contrary to what has often been said, this was not sanctioned by Agudas ha-Rabbonim.

[28] Regarding Lieberman and the Brisker Rav, see the passage from R. Mordechai Elefant’s memoir I posted here.

[29] Israel State Archives, Chief Rabbinate files, 15796/2-גל, new file locator: 000ier0.

[30] The letters to Brodie and Rabinowitz are found in Israel State Archives, Herzog files 4255/11-פ, new file locator: 000bvq8. There is another letter to Brodie in Herzog, Tehukah, vol. 3, pp. 201-202. See also Herzog, Tehukah, vol. 3, p. 201, from a 1954 letter to Haim Cohn, where he again mentions Lieberman’s ketubah with reference to his own suggestion. This last reference and the manuscript letter to Brodie published here are mentioned in Amihai Radzyner, “Reform or Necessary Change: The Attempt to Translate the Ketubah into Hebrew and the Reactions to It,” Hebrew Union College Annual 93 (2022), p. 176 n. 111. However, he does not mention R. Herzog’s letter to Rabinowitz.

[31] Radzyner, “Reform or Necessary Change,” p. 176.

[32] This letter is found in the Saul Lieberman Archives, Arc. 76/6, Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. I thank the Library for permission to publish this letter as well as the letter from Heschel to Lieberman below.

[33] This letter is found in the Saul Lieberman Archives, Arc. 76/6, Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

[34] This was confirmed by Zachary Edinger, Ritual Director at Shearith Israel.

[35] Sarna, Growing up Conservadox, pp. 30, 32.

[36] Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim, vol. 4, no. 118.

[37] Teshuvot Maharsham, vol. 7, no. 152.

[38] In some communities there was even a practice after the wedding night of a public recitation of a blessing known as birkat betulim. Maimonides, however, saw this as a disgraceful breach of modesty as well as a berakhah le-vatalah. See Ezra Brand’s post here.

[39] He would leave and not return to her, because the practice in Baghdad was that husband and wife did not sleep alone in the same room until after she had gone to the mikveh. This was also the practice in Djerba (it no longer is), and there is a source for this in the rishonim. See R. Meir Mazuz, Asaf ha-Mazkir, pp. 299-300.

Regarding the Baghdad practice described by R. Joseph Hayyim, see Ketubot 12a:

In Judea, at first they would appoint for them two groomsmen [shushvinin], one for him and one for her, in order to examine the groom and the bride at the time of their entry into the wedding canopy [and thereafter, to ensure that neither would engage in deception with regard to the presence or absence of blood from the rupture of the hymen]. . . . In Judea, at first the groomsmen would sleep in the house in which the groom and bride sleep, [in order to examine the sheet on which the marriage was consummated immediately following intercourse].

[40] See Tosafot, Kiddushin 12b. s.v. mishum, that according to R. Tam, this custom is to be regarded as peritzut.

דהיינו פריצותא לפי שצריך או עדי ביאה או עדי יחוד ודבר מכוער שמעמיד עדים על כך

[41] See Roth, Hakol Kol Yaakov, ed. David Golinkin (Jerusalem, 2023), pp. 361ff.

[42] Vol. 3, p. 124.

[43] Ayin Zokher, ma’arekhet bet, no. 3.

[44] See, similarly, R. Joshua Solomon Ardit, Hina ve-Hisda, vol. 1, p. 164a. I saw this reference in Zev Wolf Zicherman, Otzar Pelaot ha-Torah, vol. 3, p. 926.

[45] Va-Ya’an Yitzhak, Even ha-Ezer, no. 8.




The Writings of R. Hayyim Gulevsky, Part 2

The Writings of R. Hayyim Gulevsky, part 2
By Marc B. Shapiro

Many of the stories Gulevsky tells cannot be verified, and we have to take his word that he is faithfully recording that which he heard. Thus, he tells us about R. Abraham Eliezer Alperstein, who was an early rosh yeshiva at Yeshivat R Yitzhak Elhanan and the author of the first commentary on the Talmud published in the United States. It appeared in Chicago in 1887. Gulevsky tells the story of Alperstein’s move to Chicago, where, after arriving, he supposedly gave a speech in which he said the following (Du Yovlin, p. 30):
יהודי נוי יארק הם בעלי זדון ומשוגה ואינם שומעים לקול מורים, רק לקול מורדים. אבל את יהודים יקרים בשיקאגא כי לכל העם בשגגה, ואשר את המלה בשגגה חיריק תחת השין גימל הראשון פתח וגימל השני קמוצה, וזה נקרא שיגאגא.
(Alperstein’s pun, שגגה=Chicago, is also found in the introduction to the second edition of his commentary.)
Gulevsky claims that Alperstein left New York for Chicago because the people in charge of bringing a chief rabbi to N.Y. were not interested in a great scholar but in a fine speaker and that is why they chose R. Jacob Joseph, who was the leading preacher in Vilna. Although he was also served as a dayan, he was not esteemed as a halakhic authority. Gulevsky adds that when Yeshivat R. Yitzhak Elhanan was established, they didn’t consider R. Jacob Joseph worthy of being the head rosh yeshiva. According to Gulevsky, even though he was a great talmid hakham, he was not of the level that an important community in Europe would have picked him as its rav.
With regard to R. Jacob Joseph, let me point out an error I made in an earlier post.[1] I referred to the Aderet’s responsum attacking R. Jacob Joseph and I assumed that the publishers didn’t know who R. Jacob Joseph was or they wouldn’t have allowed this to appear. It was pointed out, however, that I was wrong as in the index at the back of the volume the editors indeed identify who R. Jacob Joseph was. This makes it even more unusual that the text wasn’t censored.
While Alperstein at first was very happy in Chicago, this did not last long, As Yosef Goldman points out, “Alperstein had only praise for his congregation in Chicago in the first edition [of his talmudic commentary]; in the second edition he referred to its members as ‘wild boars.’”[2]
Only a few years later R. Jacob David Wilovsky (Ridbaz) also came to Chicago and he too found a great deal of difficulty there. In particular, he was opposed by R. Zvi Simeon Album who saw Ridbaz as a threat to his own kashrut supervision. While today everyone knows the Ridbaz and no one has heard of Album, we shouldn’t let this prejudice us in this particular matter. After all, Album was also a fine talmid hakham, although obviously not at the Ridbaz’ level. He published two volumes detailing his terrible dispute with Ridbaz, in which aside from dealing with kashrut matters, he also accuses Ridbaz of plagiarism and of creating controversy where ever he goes. Here are the title pages.


While the history of kashrut supervision is a great interest of mine, I will leave that for another time. For now, let me just call attention to two interesting points he makes in his polemic against Ridbaz.
The Ridbaz’ attack on the Brisker method is well known. In the introduction to his responsa, Beit Ridbaz (Jerusalem, 1908), Ridbaz writes as follows:

A certain rabbi invented the “chemical” method of study. Those in the know now refer to it as “chemistry,” but many speak of it as “logic.” This proved to be of great harm to us for it is a foreign spirit from without that they have brought in to the Oral Torah. This is not the Torah delivered to us by Moses from the mouth of the Omnipresent. This method of study has spread among the yeshivah students who still hold a gemara in their hands. In no way does this type of Torah study bring men to purity. From the day this method spread abroad this kind of Torah has had no power to protect its students. . . . It is better to have no rosh yeshivah than to have one who studies with the “chemical” method.

In his ethical will, printed at the end of his responsa, Ridbaz returns to this criticism and directs his sons: “Be careful, and keep far away from the new method of study that has in recent years spread through Lithuania and Zamut. Those knowledgeable in Torah refer to it as ‘chemistry.'” [Just before this post appeared, R. Eliezer Katzman sent word that in his opinion, Ridbaz is not referring to R. Hayyim and the Brisker approach, but rather to Telz and its method of talmudic analysis. I don’t believe this is correct, and hope to return to this subject in a future post.]
In the first edition of Shaul Stampfer’s Ha-Yeshivah ha-Lita’it be-Hithavutah, p. 113 n. 29, he quotes Saul Lieberman’s opinion that Ridbaz’ words were directed against R. Isaac Jacob Reines. This is clearly incorrect. Reines’ method had no influence whatsoever, and Ridbaz is speaking about a method of study that was widespread in the yeshivot. It is obvious that he can only be referring to the method of R. Hayyim. Lieberman’s incorrect speculation was removed in the second edition of Stampfer’s book.
This new edition is of great importance for it contains the documents that reveal the true reason why Volozhin was closed. In fact, On the Main Line has recently printed a report from the Jewish Chronicle that shows that even in England they had heard that the reason for closing down the yeshiva had to do with the “nihilists.”[3] Incidentally, the report in the Jewish Chronicle’s second story (also cited by On the Main Line) that the Netziv went to Western Europe is incorrect. In fact, I found it quite strange, as it is well known that the Netziv never left Eastern Europe. I asked R. Nathan Kamenetsky about this, and he responded as follows:

They confused him with his son R’ Hayyim Berlin, who did travel to Western Europe to raise funds. In MOAG (p. 449) I quote part of a letter R’ Hayyim wrote FROM PARIS, four months after the closure of the yeshiva to the Rav of Tripoli, Libya . . . From the text of [R.] Berlin’s signature on that letter, I prove (among other proofs) that the Berlins expected the closure of the yeshiva to be temporary.[4]

He also wrote me that he finds the article on the closure significant as “this proves that even among Jews it was known that the yeshiva was closed for the actual reason that is set down in the government records that Stampfer discovered and publicized in his later edition of ‘Yeshivot Lita be’Hit’havutah’. . . . It is invaluable.”

Returning to the Ridbaz, it is not surprising that Album, Divrei Emet, vol. 2, p. 45, points to Ridbaz’ comments as proof that the latter had contempt for the Torah scholars of Eastern Europe. Ridbaz never responded to this volume, but in the introduction to Nimukei Ridbaz (Chicago, 1904), he had already given his view of Album (without mentioning him by name).[5] There was another attack on Album in the book Akhen Noda ha-Davar (n.p., n.d). This latter work is very rare and I have never seen a copy of it. Although its author is given as P. Gwirtzman, Album claims that it was really written by Ridbaz (Divrei Emet, vol. 2, pp. 3, 9, 31).
Needless to say, because of his attacks on R. Hayyim, Ridbaz did not endear himself to the Soloveitchik family. Once when a student referred to Ridbaz, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik became very angry and told the student never to mention his name again. He also said that some gedolim are always right, some are sometimes right, and some are never right, and the Ridbaz falls into the latter category![6]
Album also points to something else in order to attack Ridbaz. Here is the title page of Ridbaz’ Nimukei Ridbaz.

Look at how Ridbaz is described with such grandiose titles. Album picks up on this and writes (Divrei Emet, vol. 1, p. 34b):

עשה עטרה לעצמו בראשו וכתב על עצמו על פתח השער, ספר נימוקי הרידב”ז, מאת רבינו מאור הגולה שר התורה צדיק נשגב המפורסם בכל קצות תבל כק”ש מה’ יעקב דוד נ”י המפורסם בחיבורו הגדול על הירושלמי. כן כתב הרידב”ז על עצמו – ועשה נגד הירושלמי מפורש בפ’ ז’ דפסחים וז”ל הירושלמי ושנא את הרבנות מלמד שלא יניח אדם עטרה לעצמו בראשו שנאמר יהללוך זרים ולא פיך
He continues by mocking Ridbaz’ learning. Here is one example, where he picks up on something Ridbaz writes in Nimukei Ridbaz (ibid., p. 35a):
וכמה דברים אשר נמצאים בתוכו הוא אפס ואין – ואין זה כי אם ראות עין. כמו למשל כתב בפ’ וירא דלכך לא הכניס אברהם המלאכים לתוך האוהל משום דהצדיקים אין הקב”ה מביא תקלה על ידם, ואם הכניסם לתוך האוהל היה שרה רואה אותם, וקיי”ל דאשה נדה אסורה להביט על הס”ת ע”כ באם היו באוהל היתה בע”כ שרה רואה אותם ע”כ. והנה כל דבריו בזה דברים בטלים המה, ראשית שאין שום איסור על האשה להביט על הס”ת רק מצד מנהג וכבוד, עיין במג”א וגם אין צדיקים הקב”ה מביא תקלה על ידן לא שייך אלא במידי דאכילת איסור.
He continues the assault on this point in vol. 2, p. 39:
ומלבד שדבריו דברי ליצנות המה, ומה ענין מלאכים לס”ת, והיכן מצינו שיהי’ מלאכים בגדר ס”ת.
It is very sad to read how Ridbaz and Album speak about each other, and as more than a few have quipped, “There is no hatred like the hatred between rabbis.” Another version of the comment is that “There is no hatred like the hatred between rabbis, especially when money is involved.” Yet in this case, at least, I don’t know how significant the financial angle was. Album claimed that he never received remuneration for giving his hashgachah, and this isn’t something he could have put in print if it was not true. However, Harold Gastwirt assumes that Album was upset that Ridbaz had been chosen as chief rabbi of Chicago, instead of him, and this position certainly did come with a salary.[7])
In seeking to explain the phenomenon or rabbinic hatred, R. Jacob Eskolsky gives the following insightful answer (Taryag Mitzvot [New York, 1926], vol. 1, p. 32a.
פעם אחת השבתי לבעל הבית אחד בעיר סקרענטאן, אשר הייתי שם רב איזה שנים, אשר שאלני השאלה הנושנה של העם, מדוע נשתנו הרבנים מכל בני מלאכה אחרת, אשר הם יושבים זה בצד זה ברחוב אחד או בבית חרושת אחד ואינם שונאים זה לזה, והרבנים מכיון שנמצאים שנים בעיר אינם נוחין זה לזה, אדרבה שונאים הם זה את זה ומחרפים אחד את חבירו, היש איזו סיבה לפליאה זו? והשבתי לו בפשיטות, הלא אם יבואו איש לביתו ויבשר בשורה נעימה לאשתו, כי עזרהו ה’ בפרנסתו ויוכל להוסיף לה שפחה על שפחתה שתהיה עזר כנגדה ותוכל לישב בקתדרא, תגיע להגברת שמחה מזה, וגם השפחה היושבת בבית הבישול בשמעה זאת אחורי הדלת נתמלאה רצון משמועה הזאת, כי תהיה לה חברה לעבודתה ולא יפול משא כל הבית עליה. לא כן אם יבוא איש הביתה בבשורה נעימה ומספר לאשתו כי עזרהו ה’ בריווח גדול יוכל לקחת עוד אשה אחת על אשתו, כי יוכל לפרנס שתי נשים, אז תמלא קנאת עזה כמוה ותשפוך כל חמתה עליו ובקול רעש גדול תחיל הזעק עליו, כי איננה שפחה בביתו להיות שמח בחברתה, כי בעלת הבית היא ואינה חפצה בשום אופן להניח שניה לצוות ולהנהיג עניני הבית ורק קולה ישמע בכל ענין הנהגת הבית, ואם לא ישמע לה ויקח אשה אחרת עליה תהיה צרה לה. כמו כן אם הרבנים מקיימים מה שנאמר בהוריות (דף י’) לא שררות אני נותן לכם, עבדות אני נותן לכם, כי אז היו שמחים אם הקהל מקבל עליו עוד רב, ובקבלת עוד עבד לצרכי הקהל הוקל מעליו עבודת העיר, אך אם הרב מחשיב את עצמו לשר ושופט ונוהג נשיאותו ברמה וכל מילי דמתא יהיו נמתחים אך על פיו ובלעדו לא ירים איש את ידו, אז מביט בעין קנאה על רב השני ואינו מניחו להרים ראש. ועל זה אמרו חכמנו (יומא עא) אלו תלמידי חכמים שדומים לנשים ועושים גבורה כאנשים, כי דרך נשים להם להיות מתקנאות בירך חברתה ולהיות צרה להשניה.
Before coming to New York, Eskolsky had served as a rav in Scranton[8] and was no stranger to rabbinic disputes himself.[9]
Exalted egos from both sides also helps to explain rabbinic feuds. As the Maharal commented, this is a particular problem of Torah scholars, because they are aware of their own great scholarship (Netivot Olam: Netivot ha-Anavah, ch. 6):
כי הגאוה הוא על בעל תורה בטבע וכל זה מצד הגדולה והמעלה שיש לתורה . . . ומפני כך בעל התורה יש בו קצת גאוה שרואה עצמו ג”כ גבוה ונבדל משאר הבריות.
Sometimes these rabbinic disputes even reach the level of what R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg referred to as “murder.” Here is what he wrote in a letter to R. Joseph Apfel (Kitvei ha-Rav Weinberg, vol. 1 no. 3):
לפני שנתיים באו לכאן הרב גרוסנאס ביחד עם הפרופ’ דומב להתיעץ עם הגרי”א הרצוג ז”ל ששהה כאן והם הי’ גם אצלי ואני יעצתי להגריא”ה לבלי להורות הוראה בזה כי אם בהסכמת כל גדולי ירושלים כי . . . יש קנאים גדולים שאינם מודים על האמת אלא מחמירים עפ”י שיקול דעתם ורגשי לבם. ועמם אין להתוכח והם חשודים גם על שפיכת דם של המקילים וד”ל.
I published this volume as a sefer, to be used in the beit midrash, so I took out something which I didn’t think was proper to appear in such a work (as opposed to a scholarly book or blog where these considerations do not apply). In accordance with scholarly convention, I indicated this with an ellipses. Incidentally, when the late R. Joseph Apfel gave me the letters he received from R. Weinberg, there was only one place where he told me to omit a name. Other than that, he gave me permission to publish the letters in their entirety.
The complete sentence reads (and I have emphasized the deleted word):
כי אם בהסכמת כל גדולי ירושלים כי ביניהם יש קנאים גדולים שאינם מודים על האמת
In other words, R. Weinberg includes in his criticism even some people regarded as gedolim. This should not surprise us, and it doesn’t mean that these individuals are not, in fact, gedolim. Even well-meaning people can at times be led to extreme statements and “shefihut damim”. We have seen this in the last few years when rabbis, without any real knowledge of the facts, have declared that certain hashgachot are not reliable. We have seen gedolim declare that certain authors are dangerous without having even read their books (in the original or in translation) or spoken to them. I know from speaking to some of the mashgichim and the authors that they regard this as real “shefihut damim,” for they have been publicly condemned as either not reliable in matters of kashrut[10] or as destroyers of Torah society. If the accusations are true, then the rabbis have no choice but to speak out. But if the allegations are false, or even uncertain, is there any greater “shefihut damim” than this?
With regard to Weinberg’s comment, the late Yonah Emanuel wrote to me:
[תרשה] לי להתייחס לקטע הנ”ל, בו הרב ויינברג כתב שהקנאים חשודים על שפיכות דמים של המקילים. יש להביא אסמכתא מעדות אישה (!). רות בלוי בספרה “שומרי העיר” (י”ם תשל”ט) , פרק יז-יח, מתארת איך הקנאים רצו למנוע נישואי רבי עמרם בלוי איתה, בהיותה גיורת. אבל למה להביא ממרחק לחמנו? פעם הלכתי לשיעור אצל מו”ר הרב ש”ז אויערבך זצ”ל, ופתאום ראיתי במדרגות בית מו”ר זצ”ל קנאים רבים, חלק מהם דחפו עצמם לתוך הדירה, וחלק עמדו בחוץ. הם רצו ללחוץ בענין מסויים על מו”ר זצ”ל, והשיטה הבדוקה לבוא בהמונים, ללחוץ ולהפחיד. על זה התריע הרב ויינברג זצ”ל ממרחקים. על כגון זה נאמר “את בנציבין ומצודתך פרוסה בירושלים” (פסחים ג ע”ב).
Regarding rabbinic disputes, it is also worth recalling these memorable words, quoted by R. David Sperber (grandfather of Prof. Daniel Sperber)[11]:
מוטב להעמיד צלם בהיכל מלהחזיק במחלוקת
Returning to Ridbaz, all of the controversy in Chicago was too much for him and he left Chicago. Legend has it that he was locked in the freezer, in an attempt by his enemies to kill him, and upon being freed he immediately took his family and grabbed a train to New York. It was Friday night but he felt this was a case of was pikuach nefesh. I doubt that the story is true, although in a previous post I did mention a case where the mashgiach was locked in the freezer. We also have another recorded case where this happened. I refer to Rabbi Luntz of Paterson, N. J. who was locked in the icebox by one of the butchers he certified. This would have been bad enough, but Luntz also had to contend with R. Judah Leib Seltzer, who was later one of the leaders of Agudat ha-Rabbonim. He too was in Paterson and had a terrible feud with Luntz, which “climaxed by a public fight between the two rabbis in the synagogue.”[12]
Speaking of rabbis who were chased out of their communities, let me repeat what I heard from the late Rabbi Louis Jacobs.[13] This story is not documented anywhere, but is something that Jacobs no doubt heard growing up in Manchester. R. Abraham Aaron Yudelevitz was a rav in Manchester at the turn of the twentieth century. He would later come to the United States where he served as a rav in Boston and later in New York, and he was also a rosh yeshiva at Yeshivat R. Yitzhak Elhanan. As with a few others, while in N.Y. he even had the title “Rav ha-Kollel.”
Yudelevitz might have been the most brilliant Torah scholar in the United States. He was also prepared to stand up to anyone (including the Rogochover),[14] and is known for one incredible pesak that created enormous controversy: He permitted a woman to appoint another woman as her shaliah to carry out the halitzah ceremony. A short discussion of Yudelevitz’ life and the controversy is found in the second volume of Yeshurun,[15] the series which continues to publish massive volumes full of important and fascinating material. The typical haredi nonsense is, of course, to be found there, but since it is not so common it is no more than an unpleasant distraction.[16]
Here is a picture of Yudelevitz. He is on the right and the other rabbi is Gavriel Zev Margulies, whom I mentioned in my last post (see also note 12).[17]

Jacobs told me that when the machers had tired of Yudelevitz, they let him know it was time to leave in the following way. When his carriage pulled up one day, inside it were a couple of prostitutes waiting for him. This was the message to Yudelevitz to get out of town! Rather than stay and fight, he set his sights on the United States.

Returning to Gulevsky, in his book Du Yovlin (New York, 1988) he focuses on American Orthodoxy and its various rabbinic leaders. Since R. Emanuel Rackman recently passed away, let me quote a little of what he says (p. 45) about R. David Rackman, who was R. Emanuel’s father. He is the author of Kiryat Hanah David (New York, 1967), published by his son, and was a Rosh Yeshiva at RIETS for a couple of years beginning in 1907.

אחד מראשוני התלמידים שבאו ללמוד בישיבה ואחרי כן הרביצו תורה בישיבה, זה היה הרה”ג רבי דוד רקמאן. כפי ששמעתי מזקנים, הרה”ג מוהר”ר דוד רקמאן בא לארצות הברית עם סמיכת חכמים בידו. הרה”ג רבי נחום דן מסלוצק היה משגיח הראשון בישיבה, והוא לא היה קשור עם תנועת המוסר לגמרי. אבל היה אביהם של כל בני הישיבה, ויותר מזה אביהם ואמם. הוא יעץ להרה”ג דוד רקמאן שימשיך ללמוד ולא לרוץ אחרי הבלי עולם הזה . . . בשנת תרס”ז כבר נתן שיעורים בישיבה קרוב לשלש שנים. היה חכם מופלג ותמך בישיבה כל ימיו. כאשר באו לישיבה מאורי ישראל רבותינו העילוי ממיטשט ואחרי כן רבי משה הלוי סאלאווייציג עזב הרה”ג רבי דוד רקמאן כל עסקיו, וממש התאבק בעפר רגליהם. פעם ראיתי אותו בסביבת החכם השלם איש האשכולות מרן חיים העליר, ויבדל לחיים טובים “הרב” שליט”א. מעולם לא ראיתי פה במדינה הזאת רב שיעמוד ביראת הכבוד כלפי גדולי ישראל אמיתיים כרבי דוד רקמאן.
Gulevsky gives descriptions of other early students at RIETS. One of those he mentions is Moses Romm, who was later a rabbi in Minneapolis. I believe he is the grandfather of Rabbi Romm who taught at BMT for many years. He also mentions Henry Guterman, who was the rav of Scranton for half a century, and has recollections of Samuel K. Mirsky, Dov Baer Abramowitz, and many others. There is so much material here, for those interested in American Orthodoxy, that I can’t even begin to summarize it.
Regarding R. Benjamin Fleischer, many of whose books are now on HebrewBooks.org, Gulevsky says the following (p. 46):
טיפוס מיוחד במינו היה הרה”ג העצום רבי בנימין שלייפער [צ”ל פליישער] שהיה רב בבית מדרש הגדול במורד העיר. היה עילוי נפלא ובקיאותו בש”ס ופוסקים היה משהו מיוחד. ובגלל שהיה עילוי בכל המובנים לכן לא נעשה הפוסק במורד העיר. היה מחמיר גדול בשאלת נשים, אפילו בדרבנן. השיטה שלו היתה שבמדינה הזאת אין חשש מאכולת, הנשים נקיות ביותר וצריכים לבטל לגמרי כל הקולות של כתמים. התרעם הרבה על כמה פסקים של הרה”ג א. ה. בניו יראק, והרה”ג ח. מ. בשיקגא, לא רק בשאלת נשים.
The New York rabbi he alludes to is undoubtedly R. Joseph Elijah Henkin but I don’t know who the Chicago rabbi is. Maybe one of the readers can help out here. As mentioned before, Gulevsky uses this type of code throughout his works. With regard to his categorization of Fleischer as an “illui,” it is worth recalling R. Moshe Feinstein’s comment that: אין לנו הרבה נחת מהעילויים.[18
In the previous post I quoted the very harsh things Gulevsky had to say about YU. Yet Du Yovlin was written while he was still employed there, and from this book we get an entirely different picture. YU is referred to as “yeshivatenu ha-kedoshah”, and on p. 1 Dr. Norman Lamm is described as follows:
ידידי ורב חביבי וכו’, החכם השלם איש האשכולות כליל המדעים וכו’ וכו’ וכו’ הרה”ג נחום לאם שליט”א
At the beginning of this post I mentioned that Gulevsky is descended from both R. Hayyim of Volozhin and his brother R. Simcha. While everyone knows that R. Hayyim became the student of the Vilna Gaon, Gulevsky tells us the following about his forefather, R. Simcha, which is amazing in that it testifies to Lithuanian opposition to the Vilna Gaon (Du Yovlin, p. 2):
אאמו”ז רבינו שמחה התנגד לנסוע אל אדונינו הגר”א כפי שרמז מר זקני הגאון החסיד קדוש ישראל זצוק”ל הי”ד. זקנינו רבינו שמחה בתמימותו הכנה חשב שהגר”א הולך לשנות מנהגן של ישראל, והתנגד לזה הרבה. אדונינו בעל השאגת אריה לא שינה שום דבר מלבד שהכשיר מכה בדופן וכו’, אולם אדונינו הגר”א, שמעו עליו שאינו מניח תפילין בחול המועד וכדומה.
With regard to the Vilna Gaon, and why he never made it to the Land of Israel, Gulevsky writes as follows (Shabbat Shabbaton, p. 134):
ושמעתי מאאמו”ז הגאון החסיד קדוש ישראל עמוד ההוראה ואביר הרועים מרנא שמחה זעליג זצוק”ל הי”ד, ששמע ממרא דמתיבתא עלאה הגה”ח המובהק מרן רפאל מוואלאזשין ששמע מאביו רבינו אריה ליב שאפירא מקאוונא, היו הרבה טעמים שהגר”א חזר מדרכו לארץ ישראל. אבל רבינו אריה ליב סבר שאחד מהטעמים בנגלה היה שהגר”א סבר העיקר כהמבי”ט נגד הבית יוסף וכל חכמי הדור ההוא.
According to the Mabit all produce grown in the Land of Israel in the Sabbatical year, even on non-Jewish land, has sanctity and must be given special treatment. I assume that Gulevsky’s report means that the Gaon did not want to come to the land of Israel and create controversy by adopting a practice in opposition to R. Joseph Karo’s view, which was minhag Eretz Yisrael.[19] (In the twentieth century the Chazon Ish had no compunctions in advocating the Mabit’s opinion, especially as there are reports – hotly disputed, to be sure – that before his death R. Joseph Karo abandoned his position.[20])
An interesting comment which is not of a historical nature is found in Shabbat Shabbaton. p. 96. R. Moshe Feinstein states that anytime Rabad doesn’t express his disagreement with the Rambam, this shows that he agrees with him. R. Moshe is hardly the first to argue in this fashion,[21] yet Gulevsky points out that this is a methodological error and that there are numerous times that Rabad disagrees in his other works and doesn’t record this disagreement in his hassagot. R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, who has a bekiut unlike that of anyone alive today, has a very long list of such disagreements, and if all we had were the hassagot we would know nothing of this.[22] We can conclude, therefore, that Rabad’s hassagot were never intended to be a comprehensive list of all of his criticisms, but were written in an ad hoc fashion.
Quite apart from what appears in his books, there are some other interesting tidbits he told me which as far as I know do not appear in print.
1. The grandfather of the famous bibliographer, E. R. Malachi, was named Engleman, and he emigrated from Brisk to the Land of Israel in 1837.
2. R. Simcha Zelig Rieger was head of a kollel le-hora’ah in Volozhin. This kollel focused on practical halakhah.
3. R. Hayyim Soloveitchik and R. Velvel never preached to the community, not even on Shabbat ha-Gadol and Shabbat Shuvah.[23]
4. Although R. Velvel was officially rav of Brisk for twenty years, he only resided in the city for six and a half of these years. He was often ill and had to spend much of his time in places more congenial to his health. He was not living there during the 1937 pogrom, but after this event he returned to the city for two weeks.
5. In Kelm “they held of” Wessely’s Yein ha-Levanon.(I include this because I think Gulevsky meant the yeshiva as a whole, not simply R. Simcha Zissel. R. David Zvi Hillman has seen the manuscript essays of R. Simcha Zissel, and they contain references to Wessely. When these were published in Hokhmah u-Mussar [New York, 1957], Wessely’s name was deleted.[24])
6. Rabbi Rakefet has asserted on numerous occasions that as a young man R. Shneur Kotler attended R. Soloveitchik’s shiurim at YU. Gulevsky denies this. According to him, R. Shneur only went to hear the Rav at Moriah.[25]
7. R. Joseph Zekhariah Stern, Zekher Yehosef, Orah Hayyim no. 177, has a responsum addressed to ר’ מנחם שרגא רעוויל. This is Bernard Revel’s father (The first name was actually Nahum, not Menahem.)

I would be remiss in not mentioning that one has to question many of the stories Gulevsky tells, simply because they don’t agree with what we know from other sources. While he tries to be careful in his facts, some of his reports are no different than the typical “frum history” in which all sorts of stories get repeated as if they were facts. There are a number of examples of this but let me note one that doesn’t appear in his books, but which he told me. According to Gulevsky, the reason Yeshiva College did not offer a job to Saul Lieberman is because his father-in-law, Meir Bar-Ilan, almost bankrupted the institution when he served as temporary president during Bernard Revel’s leave of absence. Yet this is completely false. There are also times when Gulevsky writes things that are not merely incorrect, but downright foolish. See e.g., here.

The link just given refers to Gulevsky’s stringent view of eruvin. In this he is following not only the Brisker tradition but also that of his grandfather, who did not believe that an eruv could be established in the typical town. Yet Gulevsky has also noted that despite this opposition, there was an eruv in Brisk and his grandfather checked it every week.[26] (When the young Joseph Baer visited Brisk he checked it together with R. Simcha Zelig.[27] He also used to check the eruv in Chaslovitz, where his father was the rav.) Originally I thought that the presence of an eruv in Brisk was an example of R. Hayyim not wishing to force the community to adopt his stringent position. Yet from R. Moshe Sternbuch’s recently published Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 5, no. 101, we see that this was not the case. He heard from R. Velvel that R. Hayyim wanted to forbid the eruv, and even publicized this, but the people refused to listen to him. (You see, it is not only Modern Orthodox Jews who ignore what the rabbis tell them!) The people must have thought that if other cities with great rabbis can have an eruv, then why should they suffer because of R. Hayyim’s humra. Faced with this rejection, R. Hayyim told R. Simcha Zelig that the kashrut of the eruv was to be his responsibility. R. Hayyim wanted nothing to do with it. R. Velvel himself would only check the eruv once a year, before Rosh Hashanah, and it bothered him greatly that his own city was relying on what he regarded to be unacceptable leniencies.[28]
In Boston, as long as R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik was active, there was no eruv. The Rav publicly declared:
I am opposed to the establishment of eruvin. An eruv in American means the abolishment of the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat. Aside from certain [meta-halakhic] reasons, I also have halakhic reasons why I can’t give my approval to the establishment of eruvin. [29]
As soon as the Rav was no longer able to protest, an eruv was established in Brookline. I was in the Bostoner Rebbe’s shul when he spoke about how important the eruv was and that everyone should rely on it. He insisted that there must be no distinction between the “frum,” who don’t carry, and everyone else. It is interesting that the Modern Orthodox world, which places the Rav on such a pedestal, has not accepted one of his few public halakhic pronouncements.

[1] See here
[2] Hebrew Printing in America, p. 501.
[3] See here.
[4] In his e-mail to me Kamenetsky mistakenly wrote R. Meir Berlin. I have corrected it.
[5] The introduction to this book and also his Beit Ridbaz (Jerusalem, 1908), are fascinating, because he describes in detail many of the communal problems he saw. One wonders if he was writing his book today, which problems he would identify. I don’t think English sermons would still be an issue for him, although I think it is fair to say that advertising a “Pretty Woman” sheitl would definitely outrage hiim. After all, the sheitl is supposed to represent modesty, and Julia Roberts’ profession in that particular movie was not exactly tzniusdik. See here (Unfortunately, some of the comments to this post are inappropriate.)
[6] I heard this from an eyewitness. The event took place in the 1950s.
[7] See Fraud, Corruption, and Holiness (Port Washington, 1974), p. 91.
[8] Quiz question: Which contemporary gadol be-Yisrael was born in Scranton?
[9] See Gastwirt, Fraud, p. 145, that Eskolsky was expelled from Agudat ha-Rabbanim for giving a hekhsher on a plant that produced both kosher and non-kosher meat. This was in violation of the Agudat ha-Rabbanim takkanah. Those rabbis who opposed Agudat ha-Rabbanim’s policy formed the competing Kenesset ha-Rabbonim, which was led by R. Gavriel Zev Margulies.
[10] Experience has shown that a rabbi who is financially corrupt can easily win back his reputation (and in some circles financial corruption doesn’t affect his reputation to begin with). Yet if a rabbi is accused of not being reliable in matters of kashrut, even if the accusation is false, it is almost impossible for him to turn this around. Unfortunately, when it comes to kashrut supervision, American Orthodoxy has distorted our tradition. People are constantly told that if they see a hashgachah on a product or restaurant, that they cannot rely on it without investigating who the rav ha-machshir is. This is completely mistaken. According to halakhah every rav is regarded as trustworthy unless you have been reliably informed otherwise. Without receiving negative information, one should always assume that a rav is reliable. This is no different than if you arrive in a new city and go to shul on Shabbat and you are invited to someone’s house for lunch. One should assume, unless he has reason to think otherwise, that the person inviting him keeps kosher, as religious Jews have a hezkat kashrut. Certainly, if the rabbi invites you to his house you must assume this. The notion that is currently rampant, that we don’t trust a rav until we investigate him, is the exact opposite of what the tradition has always held. Rather, we are supposed to trust the rav unless we are given reason to think otherwise. Every rav, even a rav ha-machshir, has a hezkat kashrut and is assumed to be doing his job reliably.
To show how far this idiocy has gone, let me share something that happened a couple of years ago when I was visiting a city that shall remain nameless. Someone was eating with us and mentioned that he was going to be travelling to Elizabeth, New Jersey. He asked me if I knew about kosher food in the area. I told him that Elizabeth has a very nice Jewish community, with plenty of kosher food. He then asked who gave the hashgachah, and I replied that it is Rabbi Teitz. The man wasn’t happy with my answer, which troubled me since I had never heard of anyone question R. Teitz. In fact, in speaking to him it was apparent that he had never even heard of R. Teitz. Yet he announced for everyone that his family would have to avoid visiting any of the kosher eateries when he was in Elizabeth. I was really shocked and I asked him, “Why? What is wrong with R. Teitz?” I further asked him where he thinks the people he will be visiting in Elizabeth get their food. Yet he would only reply: “We only eat at places under the supervision of a Vaad.” I told him that I didn’t think that there was a Vaad in Elizabeth, and why in any case does he need a Vaad? A Vaad might be a good idea from a practical standpoint, in order to create one communal standard, yet there is nothing in the Shulhan Arukh about a Vaad, and R. Teitz is as reliable as anyone. Yet all I got from him was the same nonsense about how without a Vaad a hashgachah cannot be trusted. (I never asked him what he would do in a one-rabbi town.)
[11] Afarkasta de-Anya, vol. 1, no. 165:3. While Sperber later became a mainstream haredi posek, in his youth he was also exposed to Haskalah. See Joseph Ibn Kaspi, Asarah Kelei Kesef ed. Last (Pressburg, 1903), vol. 2, pp. 190ff. (Hebrewbooks.org for some reason splits up Asarah Kelei Kesef into separate volumes. If you search hebrewbooks.org under נקדות כסף you will find the Sperber letters.) Sperber, p. 193, asks Last, when he publishes his letters, to describe him as a hasid. His reason is incredible:
נא לתארינו [צ”ל לתאריני] בשם “חסיד” והיה אם לא ייטבו דברי בעיניהם ידינני לכ”ז, ויאמרו כי חסיד הוא וחכמה מה לו, ואם אולי ימצאו דברי נכונים, אז ירומם שם חסיד תחת לשונם ויאמרו הגם חסיד יודע ומבין דבר.
[12] See Gastwirt, Fraud, p. 93. Cf. Jenna Weissman Joselit, New York’s Jewish Jews (Bloomington, 1990), p. 62, regarding R. Moses Z. Margolies and his kashrut battles: “Determined to teach the Ramaz a lesson, a band of disgruntled butchers alledgedly banded together to poison the meat at his daughter’s wedding supper, sickening some 2000 guests, including the bride.” During his great dispute with R. Shalom Elhanan Jaffe, R. Gavriel Zev Margulies was physically attacked by shohatim who supported Jaffe. See Gastwirt, Fraud, p. 121.
[13] Since I mention Jacobs, I must also note the following. In a recent AJS Review (vol. 32, 2008), pp. 450-452, I reviewed Miri Freud-Kandel’s history of Orthodox Judaism in Britain. I mentioned the “Jacob’s Affair” and there is a note explaining what this was.
“The term ‘Jacobs Affair’ refers to the controversy surrounding the potential appointment of Rabbi Louis Jacobs as chief rabbi of England. In 1961, Rabbi Louis Jacobs, z”l, was nominated as the principal of Jews’ College, a position considered a potential way station for the chief rabbinate of the British Commonwealth. That appointment, however, was blocked by the then-chief rabbi Israel Brodie because of his published views. Brodie then prohibited Louis from returning to his post at the New West End synagogue in London, upon which a new congregation was established for him.”
This was added by the editor. I never would have referred to Jacobs as “Louis.” I have, incidentally, many letters from Jacobs that I hope to publish. Although we only met three times, we corresponded for almost twenty years. Only now do I realize how lucky I was, that this world-renowned scholar took the time from his busy life to correspond with a young student, especially a student who had no compunctions telling Jacobs when he disagreed with him. Occasionally, I would send Jacob’s material that I thought would interest him. One time I sent him R. Joseph Messas’ Mayim Hayim, and was surprised to later see that he cited this work in Beyond Reasonable Doubt (London, 1999), pp. 216-217. He showed great insight in describing Messas as follows: “As is evident from his responsa, Mashash, for a rabbi of the old school, was something of a modernist. But his historical sense was sufficiently acute not to allow him to read modern ideas into the sayings of the ancient rabbis.” I also sent him Haym Soloveitchik’s famous article, “Religious Law and Change,” AJS Review 12 (1987), pp. 203-221, which surprisingly he had never seen. When A Tree of Life was reprinted in 2000, he added a new introduction and cited this article as further support for the thesis of his book.
Regarding editors adding material to an author’s work without asking, see the recent comment by Haym Soloveitchik in “Mishneh Torah: Polemic and Art,” in Jay M. Harris, ed., Maimonides After 800 Years (Cambridge, 2007), p. 333 n. 25. (This is a truly wonderful article.) In referring to an entry he wrote for the Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, Soloveitchik notes: “The editors, wishing to improve upon my scant bibliography, added Shemuel Argaman, The Captivity of the Maharam: A Narrative of the Events Surrounding the Arrest and Captivity of the Maharam of Rothenburg (New York, 1990)—a children’s storybook published by the Lakewood Heder.”
[14] See here. This source does not give the book and page no. that is excerpted: It is Av be-Hokhmah (New York, 1927), pp. 85-86.
[15] R. Moshe Zvi Berger, “Av le-Hakhamim: Ha-Gaon R. Avraham Aharon Yudelevitz,” Yeshurun 2 (1997)), pp. 686-691.
[16] For an example from the most recent volume, see Yeshurun 21 (Nisan 5769) p. 417, where in discussing “Ha-Gaon R. Moses Aaron Poleyeff” we are told that he שימש אז כראש ישיבה באחד מהישיבות שבאמריקה. If this was someone who taught at RIETS for a short period of time, I might understand it, but Poleyeff spent his entire adult life teaching there. (He began teaching at RIETS in 1920.) He was also widely regarded as Yeshiva’s most beloved teacher. Poleyeff, more than anyone else, would be offended at this attempt to “kasher” him by hiding the fact that he taught at RIETS. (An outstanding talmid hakham recently commented to me that in his opinion Poleyeff was a greater lamdan than R. Moshe Feinstein!)
[17] I found the picture here.
[18] R. Michel Shurkin, Meged Giv’ot Olam ( Jerusalem, 2005), vol. 2, p. 23. He also quotes R. Leib Malin as saying that it is not good to be an illui.
[19] Eliezer Brodt called my attention to the fact that R. David Luria offered this reason as well. See Dov Eliach, Ha-Gaon (Jerusalem, 2002), vol. 3, p. 1286.
[20] See Dayan I. Grunfeld, The Dietary Laws (London, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 180-181
[21] R. Yitzhak Yosef, in his new work, Einei Yitzhak (Jerusalem, 2009), vol. 3, p. 439, also accepts this methodological rule.
[22] Keneset Hayyim (Jerusalem, 1993), pp. 9-12. See also Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 175-176.
[23] In the recently published Kol Brisk (Jerusalem, 2009), p. 20, it refers to R. Hayyim delivering words of Mussar on Shabat Shuvah. Gulevsky strongly denies this. The most that he would acknowledge is that perhaps in his first year or two he gave derashot, but never after that. (R. Chaim’s and the Brisker Rav’s way of “rabbinating” did not find favor in the eyes of all of Brisk’s citizens, ואכמ”ל.) In general, there are historical points in this book that are doubtful, leading me to question its reliability in such matters. Even if the historical information came from R. Aaron Soloveichik, it was not uncommon for R. Aaron to err in such matters, and again אכמ”ל. (Kol Brisk is authored by one of R. Aaron Soloveichik’s son. He doesn’t give his name on the title page so I will respect this.)
Let me give one example of the questionable material in this book. On p. 33 there is a whole story, seemingly legendary, to explain how R. David Feinsten, R. Moshe’s father, received the name Feinstein, since the family’s original name was not this. Yet in the introduction to vol. 8 of Iggerot Moshe, p. 6, the children of R. Moshe state that Feinstein was indeed the family name.
Perhaps in another post I will return to this book, as it has a number of what are certain to be controversial statements. For example, on p. 656 it blasts the OU for naming its Israel center after someone who, we are told, caused R. Aaron Soloveichik so much trouble:
בפעולה זו הם מבזים גדול בתורה שכל ימיו הרביץ תורה לאלפים.
[24] See Naftali Hertz Wessely, Yein ha-Levanon (Rishon le-Tzion, 2003), p. 28.
[25] Regarding R. Shneur, a recent article in Ha-Ma’ayan reveals that in the mid-1940’s he was involved in founding the first yeshiva in Palestine that taught secular studies. See R. Yoel Amital, “Sabi ha-Rav Zvi Yehudah Meltzer,” Ha-Ma’ayan 49 (Tamuz, 5769), p. 66.
[26] See R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 8, no. 128, vol. 15, no. 127 (responsum to Gulevsky; this last source quotes R. Moshe Feinstein as stating that there was also an eruv in Karlin, despite the fact that R. Yaakov of Karlin was the leading opponent of city eruvin). In his responsum to Gulevsky, Klein says some of the strangest things imaginable, which raise questions as to how he can be taken seriously as a posek in matters of eruvin. According to his calculations, and this is directly related to his halakhic understanding, in Second Temple days there were billions (!) of Jews in the Land of Israel, and roughly thirty million of them would descend on Jerusalem for the holidays. He concludes (vol. 15 p. 201):
והבוליווארדיס והמעטראפאליטין של קווינס וגרענד סענטאראל אף לא הגיעו לקרסולי ירושלים עיה”ק וזה לפענ”ד פשוט
In another responsum to Gulevsky dealing with eruvin (Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 8, no. 168), he says something equally strange:
גם מרן הח”ס נחשב מתלמידי בעש”ט שהי’ תלמיד מובהק של מרן בעל הפלאה
[27] Schachter, Nefesh ha-Rav, p. 170.
[28] R. Sternbuch adds:
ומאמר היה בפיו בשם אביו הגר”ח זצ”ל, “קשה למצוא עירוב כשר וקשה למצוא מקוה פסול”, וכוונתו שבעירוב נכנסים לדחוקים ומכשירים, ובמקוה אף שמדינא יש להקל מחמירים.
[29] Ha-Pardes (January, 1979), p. 26.



Rabbi Steinman and the Messiah, part 3

 Rabbi Steinman and the Messiah, part 3

Marc B. Shapiro

Continued from here

1. In the last post I wrote: “R. Hayyim Soloveitchik is reported to have said that if the messianic era will bring even one Jewish death, then he doesn’t want it, and if we had a choice in the matter the halakhah would require us to reject the Messiah in such a circumstance.” A perspective quite different than that of R. Hayyim was offered by R. Menahem Mendel of Rimanov. He thought that it would be good if Jews, even many Jews, were killed during Napoleon’s war against Russia, as he believed that this loss of life would bring the redemption.[1]

ואמר כי לדעתו טוב שישפכו דם ישראל ומפריסטיק עד רימנוב ילכו עד ארכבותיהם בדם ישראל כדי שיהי’ הקץ לגאולתנו

R. Moshe Sternbuch has an interesting passage, the upshot of which is that we shouldn’t be so anxious for the Messiah to come, as from at least one perspective, namely, the reward given those who observe the Torah in the pre-messianic era, it is better for us without the Messiah.[2]

וקבלה שמעתי שכמה צדיקים וקדושי עליון לפני פטירתם אמרו כשיעלו למרום לא ינוחו אלא יתחננו ויפצירו שמשיח יבוא ונזכה כבר לגאולה, ובאו אח”כ לתלמידיהם בחלום וגילו שבעולם האמת רואים את הכל אחרת, כשרואים את השכר הגדול הגנוז לעולמים למי ששומר אמונים כראוי לתורה ומצוות בסוף הגלות בזמן הסתר תוך הסתר, אינו [!] מפציר כ”כ לביאת המשיח שאז לא יהא כבר נסיונות ושכר רב, וכ”ש בני תורה בזמנינו שהם כצבא ה’, שכר כפול ומכופל

There are a few more things about the Messiah that I could not include in the last post. I mentioned reasons why rabbinic leaders offered dates for the Messiah’s arrival even though the Talmud, Sanhedrin 97b, states: “Blasted be the bones of those who calculate the end (i.e., the Messiah’s arrival).” I neglected to quote the even stronger passage in Derekh Eretz Rabbah, ch. 11:

רבי יוסי אומר הנותן את הקץ אין לו חלק לעולם הבא

An interesting perspective is suggested by R. Isaac Abarbanel who claims that the opposition to calculating the date of the Messiah was only directed against those who do it by astrological means. However, the talmudic sages did not oppose those who calculate the end by using biblical texts. He also adds that this lack of opposition is only when those who offer predictions are clear that their predictions are not absolute.[3]

I mentioned the concept of Messiah ben Joseph. It is worth noting that Samuel Feigenzohn argues that any passage in rabbinic literature that mentions Messiah ben Joseph, such as Sukkah 52a-b, is a heretical insertion by the early Christians and refers to Jesus (son of Joseph)![4]

Regarding R. Akiva and Bar Kokhba, it is significant that R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz writes that R. Akiva declared Bar Kokhba the Messiah, not because he really believed this – although presumably he had hope that it might be the case – but in order to give strength to the Jewish people, so that they not despair in the face of all their difficulties. In doing so, R. Akiva was following in the path of earlier sages and even prophets who also proclaimed that the Redemption was near even though they did not believe this, or at least were not certain of this. R. Eybeschuetz even sees the rabbinic obligation to observe certain agricultural laws in parts of the Diaspora as part of this plan to keep Jews believing in the soon-to-come Redemption.[5]

ואמר במדרש [איכה פ”א נד] קראתי למאהבי המה רמוני, הם נביאים שתקנו תרומה וחלה בבבל, וכי חייב חוץ לארץ בתרומה, אלא שרמוני. והקשה היפה ענף, ודאי שאמרו להם כי מהתורה פטור רק הם תקנוהו, כי ח”ו לומר להם דין שקר על דבר שמהתורה . . פטור, ולהורות שלא כהלכה, ועל כן תפוג תורה, וכמה מכשולים יבואו על ידי כך, ולאין ספק שאמרו להם שהוא רק חומרא וגזירה שלהם, וא”כ מה רמוני, ומה ערמה יש בזה . . .

אבל הענין, כי אילו ידעו ישראל ההולכים בגולה שיהיה קץ כל כך ארוך, וישבו זמן רב כזה בעוונותינו הרבים בגולה, היו מאבדים עצמם לדעת לרוב השבר, והיה נאבד שארית יעקב, ובפרט בזמן השמדות, בעו”ה לא היו אוזרים חיל כל כך לעמוד בנסיון. ולכך התחכמו תמיד לקרב הקץ, לומר חזו דאתא, חזו דאתא, ובזה חזקו ידים רפות וברכים כושלות אמצו. ותמיד בבוא עקא וגזירא לישראל, תלו אותו בחבלי משיח לומר, הנה מלכנו יבא ויושיענו. ולכך רבי עקיבא תיכף אחר חורבן התחיל לומר משיח על בן כוזיבא וכדומה, כולם כדי לחזק ומבלי להכניע לבבות בני ישראל. ולכך נסתם ונסתר הקץ, שלא ידעו אריכות הגלות.

ועל זה צווח ירמיה (ירמיה יג, יז) במסתרים תבכה נפשי, וכוונתו על קץ שהוא נסתר כל כך עד שלבא לפומא לא גליא, על זה תבכה נפשי, כי זהו לאות שיהיה לזמן ארוך למאוד מאד. והנה לכך הנביאים וחכמי קדם התחכמו לתקוע בלבב ישראל כי קרובה ישועת ה’ לבוא, ובל יתייאשו מן רחמים, ולכך תקנו תרומות ומעשרות בחוץ לארץ באומרם הטעם, מחר ישובו לארץ ישראל ויאמרו כמו שאכלנו בחוץ לארץ בלי תרומה כן בארץ ישראל נאכל בלי תרומה, ושם חיוב גמור, ולכך תקנו אף בחוץ לארץ, והרגל נעשה טבע, וזהו אם הגאולה מהר מהר, אבל אם היא לזמנים ארוכים, ויעברו קרוב לב’ אלפים שנה, מה צורך לתיקון הזה, הלא דורי דורות לא יצטרכו לזה, והנח לחכמים שיהיו בדור אחרון, ואם כן ברואים ישראל שתיקנו כך, ישפטו לאות אמת כי תהיה מהר הגאולה, וזו היתה עורמת נביאים וחכמים.

וזהו אמרו, קראתי למאהבי המה רמוני, כי תקנו תרומות ומעשרות בחוץ לארץ, שאחשוב שישועה תהיה מהר, ובעו”ה עברו דורי דורות, ואין קול ישועה.

In terms of hoping for the Messiah’s arrival, R. Moses Sofer makes a fascinating point. He claims that to pray for the Messiah to come shows a lack of faith, because God has already promised that we will be redeemed. Therefore, he says that one should pray that the Messiah come speedily as this is something extra that has not been promised.[6]

אע”פ שבטוחים אנחנו בביאת המשיח והמתפלל עליו הוא מחסרון אמונה אבל מ”מ יתפלל שימהר ויחיש במהרה בימינו

Once the Messiah arrives, he stills needs to be accepted by the people. Thus, R. Yaakov Kamenetsky stated that the Messiah will have to be a real Torah scholar so that the Litvaks accept him, he will have to pray with enthusiasm so the hasidim accept him, he will have to fight against the evildoers so the zealots accept him, and he will have to rebuild the Land of Israel and work on its behalf so the Religious Zionists accept him.[7]

Let me make another point about the Messiah. The Jerusalem Talmud, Kilayim 9:3 states:

רבי מאיר הוה אידמך ליה באסייא אמר אימורין לבני ארעא דישראל הא משיחכון דידכון

ArtScroll translates:

R’ Meir was dying in Asia. He said [to those surrounding him], “Tell the residents of Eretz Yisrael, ‘This your great one [who has passed away here. Please assist in bringing him to Eretz Yisrael for burial].’”

The first thing I should mention is that there should have been a note on the word “Asia,” as most people who see this word this think about territory such as Russia or China. However, as Jastrow points out, when the word appears in rabbinic literature it usually refers to what we call Asia Minor, which is today part of Turkey.[8] Interestingly, Jastrow himself, following Adolphe Neubauer, assumes that in this case what the Talmud refers to is a town called Essa, east of the Sea of Galilee.[9] However, the commentators, both traditional and academic, generally agree that the Talmud here refers to Asia Minor.

The last part of the sentence has R. Meir saying הא משיחכון דידכון. What does this mean? The literal translation is “This is your Messiah.” Is it possible that R. Meir would refer to himself this way? ArtScroll thinks not and in its note justifies its translation as follows:

The term משיחה is used sometimes in the sense of authority and greatness [and not anointment] (Rashi to Exodus 29:29, from Sifri, Korach §2). That seems to be its sense here.

ArtScroll’s approach is found in the standard commentaries to the Yerushalmi, including that of R. Hayyim Kanievsky, but other approaches have also been suggested.[10]

2. Returning to the passage from R. Hayyim quoted at the beginning of this post, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik had a different perspective than his grandfather.[11] Here is what he writes in Kol Dodi Dofek, available here

Second, the knock of the Beloved was heard on the battlefield. The tiny defense forces of ‎‎[the ‎State of] Israel defeated the mighty Arab armies. The miracle of “the many delivered into ‎the ‎hands of the few” materialized before our eyes, and an even greater miracle happened! ‎God ‎hardened the heart of Ishmael and commanded him to go into battle against the State of ‎Israel. ‎Had the Arabs not declared war on Israel and instead supported the Partition Plan, the State ‎of ‎Israel would have remained without Jerusalem, without a major portion of the Galilee, ‎and ‎without some areas of the Negev.

R. Soloveitchik sees it as a positive thing that God hardened the hearts of the Arabs so that they went to war against Israel, allowing Israel to conquer more territory than it was given in the Partition Plan. Yet this war brought about many deaths, so wouldn’t R. Hayyim say, “How can we see this as a good thing, and a miracle no less, that God ‘hardened the heart of Ishmael’?”

In a talk after the Six Day War, R. Soloveitchik offers what appears to be a different perspective than what I just quoted, as he stresses the importance of human life over territory, including the Western Wall. The following appears on the Mesora.org website here and was originally posted here.[12] I have underlined the crucial words for the purposes of this post.

Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik on Territorial Compromise

[Translation of a five-minute segment of the Rav’s 1967 Teshuva drasha (although the drasha was summarized in “Al Hateshuva”, this portion never appeared. From Arnold Lustiger)

I don’t intend here to engage in politics, but this is a matter that has weighed heavily upon me since last June. I am very unqualified to assess the extent of the deliverance that the Ribono Shel Olam accomplished on behalf of Klal Yisrael and the Jewish victory over those who hate Israel. But in my opinion, the greatest deliverance, and the greatest miracle, is simply that He saved the population of Israel from total annihilation. Don’t forget that the Arabs were Hitler’s students, Amalek, and in regard to the Arabs there is a Mitzvah of utterly blotting out Amalek’s memory. Today, they are Hitler, they want to uproot the Jewish people, and it is possible that Russia is together with them in this regard, so the status of Amalek falls upon Russia as well. The blood congeals when one considers what would have happened to the Yishuv, to the hundreds of thousands of religious Jews, of gedolei Yisrael, or to all the Jews in Israel for that matter — “there is no difference” — all Jews are Jews. This is the greatest salvation — but also that the State itself was saved. Because even if the population would remain alive, but if God forbid the State of Israel would fall, there would be a wave of assimilation and apostasy in America as well as in all Western countries. In England I heard that Rothschild said that Israel’s victory saved Judaism in France. He is 100% correct — this was better articulated by him than many Rabbis in Israel regarding the ultimate significance of the victory.

But one thing I want to say. These reasons constitute the primary salvation behind the Six Day War. Indeed, we rejoice in the [capture of] the Western Wall, in the Cave of the Patriarchs, in Rachel’s tomb. I understand the holiness of the Kotel Hamaarovi. I studied Kodshim since I was a child: Kidsha le’asid lavo, kedushas makom, kedushas mechitzos, lifnei Hashem — these are concepts with which I grew up in the cradle. The Kotel Hamaarovi is very dear, and the Har Habayis is very dear to me: I understand the kedusha perhaps much more than many religious journalists who have written so much about the Kotel Hamaarovi. But we exaggerate its importance. Our Judaism is not a religion of shrines, and it seems from this that it lies in the interests of the Ministry of Religions to institute a [foreign] concept of holy sites in Judaism — a concept we never had.

We indeed have the concept of kedushas mokom, this is the Bais Hamikdash, [but] graves are not mekomos hakedoshim. As important as kivrei tzaddikim are, they are not holy. Perhaps there is a different halacha. To visit kivrei tzaddikim is important, like mekomos hakedoshim. I will tell you a secret — it doesn’t matter under whose jurisdiction the Kotel Hamaarovi lies — whether it is under the Ministry of Parks or under the Ministry of Religions, either way no Jew will disturb the site of the Kotel Hamaarovi. One is indeed on a great spiritual level if he desires to pray at the Kotel Hamaarovi. But many mistakenly believe that the significance of the victory lies more in regaining the Kotel Hamaarovi than the fact that 2 million Jews were saved, and that the Malkhut Yisrael was saved. Because really, a Jew does not need the Kotel Hamaarovi to be lifnei (in front of) Hashem. Naturally, mikdash has a separate kedusha which is lifnei Hashem. But there is a lifnei Hashem which spreads out over the entire world, wherever a Jew does not sin, wherever a Jew learns Torah, wherever a Jew does mitzvos, “minayen sheshnayim yoshvim ve’oskim beTorah hashechinah imahem” — through the entire world.

I want you to understand, I give praise and thanks to the Ribono Shel Olam for liberating the Kotel Hamaarovi and for liberating and for removing all Eretz Yisrael from the Arabs, so that it now belongs to us. But I don’t need to rule whether we should give the West Bank back to the Arabs or not to give the West Bank to the Arabs. We Rabbis should not be involved in decisions regarding the safety and security of the population. These are not merely Halakhic rulings. These decisions are a matter of pikuach nefesh for the entire population. And if the government were to rule that the safety of the population requires that specific territories must be returned, whether I issue a halakhic ruling or not, their decision is the deciding factor.

If pikuach nefesh supersedes all other mitzvos, it supersedes all prohibitions of the Torah, especially pikuach nefesh of the yishuv in Eretz Yisrael. And all the silly statements I read in the newspapers — one journalist says that we must give all the territory back, another says that we must give only some territory back, another releases edicts, strictures and warnings not to give anything back. These Jews are playing with 2 million lives. I will say that as dear as the Kotel Hamaarovi is, the 2 million lives of Jews are more important.[13] We have to negotiate with common sense, as the security of the yishuv requires. What specifically these security requirements are, I don’t know, I don’t understand these things. These decisions require a military perspective, which one must research assiduously. The borders that must be established should be based upon that which will provide more security. It is not a topic appropriate for which rabbis should release statements or for rabbinical conferences.

3. In the last post I mentioned a couple of great rabbis from earlier eras, and how the praise they were offered for mastering the Talmud is nowhere near what is said about great rabbis in more recent years. A few people emailed me with examples of how different rabbis in modern times are praised for having completed Shas twenty or thirty times. R. Kook’s father stated that when his son, R. Abraham Isaac Kook, was in Volozhin he completed 60blatta day be-iyun.[14] Chaim Meiselman, whose videos about seforim can be seen here, called my attention to R. Samuel Darmstadt of Mannheim (died 1782),[15] who is reported to have completed Shas 112 times.[16] But this is nothing compared to what R. Shlomo Lorincz writes about R. Moshe Feinstein. He reports in the name of R. Reuven Feinstein that R. Moshe completed Shas over two hundred times. (R. Reuven denies having said this.) If that is not enough to impress you, he also states that R. Moshe finished Tractate Shabbat every week, and he quotes an unnamed member of R. Moshe’s family who claims to have been at a siyum where R. Moshe completed Shabbat for the thousandth time.[17] One would think that a member of the Kenesset for over thirty years would know enough not to repeat such an obviously ridiculous and impossible story.

4. In June 2018 Yaacov Sasson published a letter, found in the Israel State Archives, from R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik to President Chaim Herzog dealing with R. Meir Kahane. See here. In two later posts it was claimed that this letter is a forgery. See here and here. After careful analysis, I, too, agree that the letter is a forgery. (I also know that had I discovered the letter, I would have been very excited to publish it and would have never considered the possibility of forgery.)

Sasson does not mention that the Chaim Herzog archive also contains Herzog’s reply to the Rav upon receipt of the letter. One can only wonder what the Rav’s reaction was when he received this correspondence responding to the forged letter.

I found an interesting letter from Kahane in the Israel State Archives.[18] R. Dov Katz’s reply to Kahane is from December 22, 1954, which means that Kahane’s letter was written when he was 22 years old. Kahane’s letter was not addressed to an individual chief rabbi, but the Chief Rabbinate as a whole. It deals with something he was concerned with his entire life, namely, the place of non-Jews in the State of Israel. In his later years, Kahane was adamant that it was against halakhah for non-Jews to have any political role in Israel, including serving in the Knesset. Here we see that he was not sure about the matter, and wonders if the Meiri’s more liberal view on these sorts of issues should be our guide. It is not surprising that in his response R. Katz dodges the issue.

Regarding Kahane, a few days before his November 5, 1990 assassination, he delivered a public lecture at Brandeis University. I uploaded the video to YouTube.

In 1985 Kahane debated Brandeis Hillel Director Rabbi Albert Axelrad. Only a portion of this debate survives, and I have uploaded it to YouTube.

For R. Shear Yashuv Cohen’s response to Kahane, referring to him as an am ha-aretz, see here. Among other things he writes:

כל מי שחושב, שאפשר לקחת את הסעיפים מ”משנה-תורה” לרמב”ם ולהפוך אותם לחוק המדינה כמות שהם, בלי להתחשב בנסיבות, הוא לא רק עם-הארץ, הוא יותר מזה, הוא טועה ומטעה את הרבים. משום שהרמב”ם לעצמו היה כותב את הלכותיו בפני המדינה, עם בעיותיה העכשוויות, אחרת מאשר הוא כתב אותן בזמנו. לא שהתורה משתנית, חלילה, אלא המושגים החברתיים הם אחרים ולכן הניסוח של ההלכה מוכרח להיות מחודש. ניסוח של הלכה נצחית צריך להתמודד עם בעיות חדשות שעולות לפני הפוסק. אי אפשר לפסוק היום על סמך ניסוח קדום ומבלי להביא בחשבון את השינויים שחלו מאז ועד היום

4. During the Rosh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur prayers there are times when we prostrate ourselves. Many people use a cloth for this even though technically, if the floor is not stone, there is no need. Where are people supposed to put the cloth, under their head or under their knees? I have looked around and also asked people from a variety of synagogues, including Modern Orthodox, yeshivish, and Hasidic. What I have learned is that while many put the cloth under their head, many also, in all sorts of Orthodox shuls, put it under their knees. In some shuls, almost everyone puts it under their knees.

The ArtScroll Machzors for Rosh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur state the following in Musaf before Alenu (and I have underlined the relevant sentence):

The Torah forbids one to prostrate himself (i.e., with outstretched arms and legs) on a floor of hewn stone (Leviticus 26:1). The Sages forbade complete prostration even on a floor not of hewn stone, and they forbade even kneeling (without outstretched limbs) on a stone floor. Therefore, if the synagogue has a stone floor, one must cover the surface upon which he will kneel (Rama, Orach Chaim 131:8; Mishnah Berurah §40). There are some views, however, that it is preferable to cover the floor no matter what it is made of. This is the source of the general practice to put something on the floor when kneeling, even if the floor is surfaced with linoleum or carpeting.[19]

ArtScroll states that if there is a stone floor then you must cover the surface upon which you kneel. It doesn’t say to cover the surface upon which you place your head. This means that according to ArtScroll the cloth should be under your knees.

Yet this is mistaken, and the sources ArtScroll cites do not support this claim. Rama, Orah Hayyim 131:8 states:

וכן אסור לכל אדם ליפול על פניו בפישוט ידים ורגלים אפילו אם אין שם אבן משכית אבל אם נוטה קצת על צדו מותר אם אין שם אבן משכית וכן יעשו ביו”כ כשנופלין על פניהם אם יציעו שם עשבים כדי להפסיק בין הקרקע וכן נוהגין

The Rama says nothing about covering the surface where you kneel, and neither does the Mishnah Berurah. The point of the Rama is that on Yom Kippur, when you bring your head entirely to the ground – he does not mention doing this on Rosh ha-Shanah – that you need to have something separating between your head and the ground. The Mishnah Berurah, in the section directly after the one referred to by ArtScroll, 131:41, is explicit that the issue is one’s head touching the floor not one’s knees.

ודוקא כשפניו דבוקים בקרקע אבל אם שוחה בתפלה אפי’ יש שם רצפה שרי

A complete discussion of this issue, with the point of correcting the widespread error, is found in R. Elhanan Printz, Avnei Derekh, vol. 4, no. 99.[20]

5. Since theMishnah Berurah just quoted mentions the word רצפה, let me say something about this as well. There is a common mistake that many readers of Megillat Esther make. From speaking to people, and watching online videos, it seems that at least 75 percent of Ashkenazim who read the Megillah make this mistake. Among Sephardim it is significantly less.

Esther 1:6 reads:

ח֣וּר ׀ כַּרְפַּ֣ס וּתְכֵ֗לֶת אָחוּז֙ בְּחַבְלֵי־ב֣וּץ וְאַרְגָּמָ֔ן עַל־גְּלִ֥ילֵי כֶ֖סֶף וְעַמּ֣וּדֵי שֵׁ֑שׁ מִטּ֣וֹת ׀ זָהָ֣ב וָכֶ֗סֶף עַ֛ל רִֽצְפַ֥ת בַּהַט־וָשֵׁ֖שׁ וְדַ֥ר וְסֹחָֽרֶת

The fifth word from the end of the sentence reads רִֽצְפַת. However, when the Megillah is read this word is usually pronounced as ritzpat. This is a real mistake, the sort that should be corrected. Since it is not pleasant to correct the Megillah reader during the reading, the best thing is to speak to him (or her) beforehand.

The reason this mistake should be corrected is that if you read the word as ritzpat, it is actually a different word, with a different meaning, than the word that appears in the Megillah: רִֽצְפַת. In the Bible, the word for floor or pavement is רִֽצְפָה. There is no dagesh in the פ. For example, II Chron. 7:3 reads:

וַיִּכְרְעוּ֩ אַפַּ֨יִם אַ֤רְצָה עַל־הָרִֽצְפָה֙ וַיִּֽשְׁתַּֽחֲו֔וּ

Ritzpah, with a dagesh in the פ, means glowing stone or hot coal. See Isaiah 6:6:

וַיָּ֣עָף אֵלַ֗י אֶחָד֙ מִן־הַשְּׂרָפִ֔ים וּבְיָד֖וֹ רִצְפָּ֑ה בְּמֶ֨לְקַחַ֔יִם לָקַ֖ח מֵעַ֥ל הַמִּזְבֵּֽחַ

People make the mistake in reading the Megillah since in modern Hebrew, unlike biblical Hebrew, “floor” is ritzpah, with a dagesh in the פ. Eliezer Ben Yehudah in his dictionary, s.v. רצפה, already noted the mistake of Hebrew speakers (כטעות המדברים) who put a dagesh in the פ of רצפה when saying “floor”. Languages change so today we would not say that this is a mistake, but when reading from the Megillah on Purim it certainly is an error, and one that should be corrected.

Some people who are careful readers see that there is no dagesh in the פ and therefore read the word in the Megillah as ritzfat. However, this is also incorrect. If you look in the Bible you will find that all the times the words רצפה and רצפת appear there is a gaya after the ר. You can also see this in the two examples given above. This indicates that the shewa under the צ is a vocal shewa. There are different traditions as to how exactly to pronounce the vocal shewa, but all are in agreement that pronouncing this word as ritzfat is a mistake (though it is not a mistake that needs to be corrected). You can hear the outstanding ba’al keriah R. Jeremy Wieder read the verse here.

6. Since the publication of Changing the Immutable, I have discovered many more instances of censorship, almost enough for a volume 2. Readers have also alerted me to a number of examples, and let me now share one that I was recently sent.

In the Ralbag’s commentary on the Torah, for each parashah he includes all sorts of lessons under the heading תועלת. Here is a page from parashat miketz (in the Birkat Moshe edition).

In no. 13 Ralbag states that the Torah teaches us to avoid inappropriate sexual relations, which only people lacking in intelligence fall into. He adds that Reuben, who slept with Bilhah, is portrayed in the Torah as a חסר דעת, which I guess could be translated as “imbecile.” He gives another example of Reuben’s foolishness in that when attempting to reassure Jacob that he would bring Benjamin back to him after taking him down to Egypt, Reuben states: “Thou shalt slay my two sons, if I bring him not to thee.” Ralbag sees this as unbelievable stupidity, since if Jacob were to lose Benjamin, how would he be comforted by killing two of his own grandchildren?

Here is the corresponding page from the work Toaliyot ha-Ralbag (Jerusalem, 2006). This volume is a collection of all the Ralbag’s “lessons” from the parashiyot of the Torah.

As you can see, lesson no. 13 has been deleted. I am actually surprised that the publisher did not simply renumber the lessons, so people would not realize that no. 13 is missing. The “problem” with what Ralbag wrote is not simply his judgment about Reuben’s intelligence, but that he also understands Reuben to have slept with Bilhah, following the simple meaning of Genesis 35:22 as opposed to the talmudic explanation (Shabbat 55b) that the verse is not to be understood literally.[21]

Once again, we can only wonder where a 21st century editor gets the idea that it is OK for him to censor the writings of one of the great rishonim.

7. In the past, I have shown how material I have posted on the Seforim Blog has appeared in other places, sometimes with acknowledgment and other times without. I also have shown how pictures posted here have become public domain and understandably no one even remembers where they first appeared, and this is indeed the case with all images posted online. Here is another example which I recently came across. In an earlier post I included this picture of myself with the late Rabbi Aharon Felder.

Both The Yeshiva World here and the Keystone-K Kashrus organization here have the following picture of R. Felder on their websites.

I am happy that in looking for a picture of R. Felder they thought that the one he took with me was nice enough to use. In a circumstance like this, there is nothing wrong with cropping the picture (unlike, for instance, in pictures of historical significance, like when R. Soloveitchik was removed from a picture with R. Aaron Kotler or the Hafetz Hayyim’s wife was removed from the famous picture of her standing behind her husband).

I had thought that in this post I would discuss R. Mordechai Elefant’s memoir and offer my take on it, but I see that the post is already long enough so I will return to this in the future.

***************

[1] R. Zvi Ezekiel Michaelson, Ateret Menahem, pp. 35b-36a (no. 182).
[2] Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 4, p. 206.
[3] Ma’aynei Yeshuah, printed in Abarbanel’s commentary to the Prophets, p. 283.
[4] Elbonah shel Torah (Berlin, 1929), pp. 24a-b. See similarly Joseph Judah Leib Sossnitz, Ha-Maor (Warsaw, 1889), p. 103.
[5] Ye’arot Devash, vol. 2, Derush 6 (p. 95 in the Jerusalem 1988 edition). See R. Chaim Rapoport, “Shitat ha-‘Ye’arot Devash’ be-Inyan Rabbi Akiva u-Ven Koziva,” Kovetz Divrei Torah 27 (5770), pp. 101-105. The words I have underlined were previously emphasized by R. Rapoport. Elsewhere, R. Eybeschuetz presents a different perspective and states that R. Akiva erred in declaring Bar Kokhba the Messiah. By saying that R. Akiva erred it means that R. Akiva really believed what he said. See Elyasaf Frisch in Ha-Ma’yan 57 (Nisan 5777), pp. 84-85. Because he views R. Eybeschuetz’s opinion as shocking, R. Yaakov Koppel Schwartz suggests that the passage, or at least the section dealing with Bar Kokhba, is not authentic but is either a “mistake” (whatever that is supposed to mean) or was inserted by an unknown heretic. See Yekev Efraim: Mikhtevei Torah, vol. 5, p. 215.

In discussing R. Akiva’s belief that Bar Kokhba was the Messiah, Maimonides writes (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 11:3):

והוא היה אומר עליו שהוא המלך המשיח ודמה הוא וכל חכמי דורו שהוא המלך המשיח עד שנהרג בעוונות

R. Zvi Yehudah Kook claimed that out of respect Maimonides did not use the wordטעהwith reference to R. Akiva and the other sages. Instead, he used the word דמה. See Yosef Badihi, Yosef Lekah (Jerusalem, 2012), p. 224. See, however, R. Chaim Rapoport, “Be-Inyan Ben Koziva ha-Melekh ve-ha-Lekah Mimenu le-Dorot,” Kovetz Hearot u-Veurim 920 (5766), pp. 11ff., who cites passages from the Mishneh Torah that show that when Maimonides uses the word דמה it means טעה.

One other point about the word דמה is worth noting. In the Bible you find this word, but you also find a similar word whose root is דמם. (There is a another word which also has the root דמה, and means “to cease”, see e.g., Lamentations 3:49. But I will not deal with it at present). The difference between דמה and דמם is seen clearly in a verse that we all know, as it is a part of the daily prayers (Exodus 15:16):

                          בִּגְדֹל זְרוֹעֲךָ יִדְּמוּ כָּאָבֶן

In this verse, the word ידמו comes from the root דמם. As noted by R. Seraya Deblitsky, in his haskamah to R. Yehudah Aryeh Gutman, Kelalei Ta’amei ha-Mikra (Brooklyn, 2001), it is vital that the ba’al keriah reads the word ידמו with a vocal shewa on the ד (indicated by the dagesh). The words then mean: “By the greatness of thine arm, they are as still as a stone.” If, however,  ידמו is read with a silent shewa, it means that the word comes from the root דמה. In that case, the verse means that the Egyptians “appear like a stone”. Correct me if I’m wrong, but it appears clear to me that if ידמו is read this way that the ba’al keriah should be corrected, as the word has a different meaning than what it should have.
[6] Torat Moshe ha-Shalem, vol. 2, p. 66 (parashat Be-Shalah, s.v. מה תצעק אלי). See R. Yaakov Koppel Schwartz, Likutei Diburim, vol. 3, p. 179.
[7] Emet le-Yaakov al Nevi’im u-Ketuvim (Jerusalem, 2015), p. 424 n. 4.
[8] Regarding this place, see Michael Guttmann, Mafteah ha-Talmud, vol. 3, s.v. אסיא.
[9] Neubauer, La géographie du Talmud (Paris, 1868), p. 38.
[10] See e.g., R. Zechariah Frankel, Darkhei ha-Mishnah (Leipzig, 1859), p. 155 n. 7, who suggests a textual emendation. For other suggestions, see R. Jacob Brill, Mavo ha-Mishnah (Frankfurt, 1876), pp. 162-163; R. Judah Leib Landesberg, Hikrei Lev (Satmar, 1909) vol. 4, p. 44; R. Hayyim Fishel Epstein, Teshuvah Shelemah, vol. 2, Yoreh Deah,no. 15.

R. Elijah ben Solomon ha-Kohen,Mizbah Eliyahu(Izmir, 1867), p. 229b, writes:

שרבי מאיר הכיר בעצמו שאם הדור היה זכאי היה ראוי הוא להיות משיח. וכשמת וראה שלא זכה הדור גילה להם הדבר ומה שגרמו עוונותיהם

Interestingly, in the days of R. Saadiah Gaon there was a Karaite scholar named Hasan ben Mashiah, who generally is referred to as simply בן משיח. Ibn Ezra mentions him in the introduction to his commentary on the Torah. In this case משיח must have been an actual name. The nineteenth-century rabbinic scholar R. Israel Moses Hazan, author of Kerakh shel Romi, would occasionally sign his name משי”ח (the letters of his name), but more often he would use המשי”ח (the ה standing for הרב). You also find him writing about himself: אמר המשי”ח


[11] Although he idealized his grandfather, R. Soloveitchik was not a blind follower. See Zorah Warhaftig, Hamishim Shanah ve-Shanah: Pirkei Zikhronot (Jerusalem, 1998) pp. 100-101, who reports that he was told by R. Soloveitchik that his grandfather made three mistakes: 1. He opposed the new aliyah to Eretz Yisrael, as he was worried that it would lead to a religious decline among the settlers. 2. He did not grasp the significance of Jewish immigration to America. 3. He thought that the religious life of Brisk would not be affected by the societal changes sweeping Europe.
[12] See also the recently published letter of the Rav to Prof. Ernst Simon in Yair Kahn and Kalman Neuman, “A Rabbinic Exchange on the Disengagement: A Case Study in R. Aharon Lichtenstein’s Approach to Hilkhot Tsibbur,” Tradition 47 (Winter 2014), pp. 161-162, 185-186, available here.
[13] The Rav has often been quoted as saying that it if it cost even one life to recapture the Kotel, it was not worth it.
[14] See R. Yehoshua Kaniel’s eulogy for R. Kook in Me-Avnei ha-Makom 11 (2000), p. 57. I wonder how many pages a day this amazing kid is doing? At age 11 he already knew the entire Mishnah by heart.

[15] See Isak Unna, Die Lemle Moses Klaus-Stiftung in Mannheim (Frankfurt, 1908), pp. 13-14.
[16] Unna, Die Lemle Moses Klaus-Stiftung in Mannheim, p. 63.
[17] Shlomo Lorincz, Bi-Mehitzatam shel Gedolei ha-Torah, vol. 2, p. 610. He also reports that R. Moshe reviewed fifty pages of Talmud a day, and that he had a siyum upon completing the Shulhan Arukh for the seven hundredth time.
[18] File 8564/4, new call no.: 000i8nt. The file can be seen here.
[19] Is this indeed the general practice? In my experience it seems that many people do not put something on the floor if there is a carpet. See also R. Aharon Leib Steinman’s Ke-Ayal Ta’arog be-Inyanei ha-Moadim, p. 423:

הרה”ג רבי דוד הילמן שלח לשאול את רבנו האם בבתי כנסת שהרצפה מעץ צריך לכרוע בהפסק על פניהם או לא, דהרי כל החסרון הוא באבן דמחזי כאבן משכית ולא בעץ. וענה רבנו שבעיר בריסק הרצפה היתה מאבן וע”כ כולם עשו כורעים עם הפסק, אבל במשך השנים יצא לו להתפלל גם בבתי כנסת מעץ ושם רוב האנשים עשו כורעים בלי הפסק מלבד כמה יחידים (מפי נכדו הרה”ג ר’ אשר שטינמן. ועי’ הליכות שלמה תפילה יט, ו [צ”ל ח] שבשטיח מחובר שהוא קבוע המנהג להחמיר, אם כי מעיקר הדין מותר

[20] Regarding ArtScroll, someone I know mentioned that he thinks it is surprising that ArtScroll does not have יתגדל ויתקדש with a tzere under the ד in accord with the Mishnah Berurah’s opinion (56:2), or at least mention that this is the opinion of the Mishnah Berurah. As he put it, in yeshivish circles, the Mishnah Berurah is king and ArtScroll comes from that world.

I don’t think it is surprising that they did not change the text (although I would have expected them to note the different vocalization in a note). ArtScroll is producing a siddur for the Jewish community as a whole, and the overwhelming majority of people pronounce the words with a patah under the ד. In fact, I am sure that there are a number of other examples where ArtScroll does not follow the Mishnah Berurah’s opinion. I found one such case: In 8:10 the Mishnah Berurah states that when putting on one’s Tallit, in the blessing להתעטף בציצית, there should be shewa under the ב in the word בציצית. Yet ArtScroll places a patah under the ב which is the standard Ashkenazic practice. In fact, other than Tehillat Hashem (Chabad), are there any other current Ashkenazic siddurim that have a shewa under the ב?
[21] For other rishonim who reject the talmudic reinterpretation of the verse, see Changing the Immutable, p. 5.