Jews, Drinking & Kiddush Clubs

The popular press, in this case Newsweek, does not always get Jewish practices correct. Newsweek just published a short piece on Jewish drinking and specifically mention “Kiddush clubs.” While the article makes it appear that this is a new problem, (and to be fair, it seems that is what they were erronously told by those they spoke with), in fact, as is almost always the case, ain hadash tachas ha-shemesh – there is nothing new under the sun. First, the article claims that “Jews don’t drink – much. Historically, Jews have not had alcohol problems to the extent as some other religious groups.” This claim, that Jews don’t drink, echos the erroneous assertions of some non-Jews, especially during the temperance movement of the 19th and early 20th century in the United States. Much of the temperance movement was lead by certain Christians and pointed to Jews or more specifically the Old Testament in suport of banning alcohol. One particularly egregious mistake in doing so was to misinterpret the prohibitions of Passover. That is, the problem that some in the temperance movement were required to deal with is if Jesus drank wine at the Last Supper, then how can wine be bad? To answer this, some pointed to “Jewish” practice. Specifically, they noted that the Last Supper took place on Passover, “and we know that the Jews were scrupulous in using at this ceremony none but unleavened bread and unfermented wine.” Of course, while leavened bread is prohibited there is no related prohibition on fermented wine.[1] Professor Hayim Solovetick has shown that historically Jews were involved in the wine business and drank as much as their non-Jewish neighbors. These facts may have affected certain halachik rulings. This does not mean that Jews must drink alcoholic beverages. Although wine is mandated for numerous rituals, according to most, grape juice suffices. For this point we again turn back to the temperance movement and this time the effect of the 18th Amendment. The 18th Amendment prohibited the consumption of alcohol. However, the National Prohibition Act carved out an exemption that allowed for consumption for “religious rites.” As a consequence, there was a market for fraudulent rabbis and other religious figures that would permit the otherwise prohibited. To counter these scofflaws, R. Levi Ginzburg,[2] penned a responsum arguing that grape juice sufficed to Jewish religious purposes. This responsum remains the most comprehensive discussion of grape juice in Jewish law. Isaac Wise, authored an essay discussing the topic of how Judaism views being a teetotaler. Wise rejects this practice. Wise notes that “Isaiah, upbraiding the weakness of his people says: ‘Thy wine is adulterated with water.’ and the Psalmist sings: ‘And wine gladdens the heart of man.'” Wise continues and highlights the use of “mishteh, ‘a drinking occasion.” Accordingly, Wise explains that since “Moses and the Talmud are not opposed to the use of wine or strong drink. The Jew might consider it superfluous to be more orthodox than Moses, the prophets, or the rabbis of old.” Wise further argues that if the reason for prohibiting drink is due to the harm that may come from overindulging, there is a much more pernicious “evil” that of the amassment of wealth. Wise claims that “the wildest imagination [is] too feeble to depict a mere fraction of the woes and crimes caused by money. It makes rogues of honest men, and villains of generous souls . . . Money makes slaves, hypocrites, gamblers, thieves . . . [it] ruins virtue, beguiles innocences.” Thus, Wise concludes that “the use of wine or strong drink as a beverage is no moral wrong . . . the abuse of religion and prayer is worse than the abuse of liquor, [and] the present crusade [of temperance] will not remedy the evil; it is contrary to law and liberty, and it makes us ridiculous in the eyes of the civilized world.” As was the case with Wise, there can be no doubt that drinking has been a controversial topic for one reason or another. One of the more well-known cases of censorship relates to a ruling on wine. The Rama’s responsum on the consumption of ya’yin nesach was removed in most of the editions of his responsa. This responsum was so unknown that some charged the Rama never authored it and it was a forgery.[3] But we need not go so far afield as ya’yin nesach to find controversy. As is mentioned in the article, there are those who participate in Kiddush clubs and, (as would be expected), there are those who question such gatherings. What no one appears to mention is that the Kiddush club is not a recent invention. Instead, from at least mid-sixteenth century, such gatherings took place. Specifically, R. Moshe Yitzhak M’zia (1530-1600, most of his responsa were authored between 1560-80) in his Yefeh Nof was asked About the custom of the bachurim on Shabbat to leave the synagogue after the Torah is removed from the ark to drink whisky before the mussaf, is this permitted? If they do not sit down for a meal this is permitted because the law does not follow Rav Huna who prohibits tasting prior to mussaf.[4] According to this responsum, groups would leave to drink during the prayers.[5][5] From this responsum we can glean a few important facts about the custom during that period. First, such gatherings probably would not be called Kiddush clubs because they did not make Kiddush at all. Second, R. M’zia does not condemn the practice and expresses no outrage or suggestion that it stop. Instead, it appears so long as it was halachikally ok, R. M’zia was unwilling to challenge this practice.

[1] For more on the topic of unfermented wine (raisin wine) on Passover and its connection with the temperance movement see Jonathan Sarna, “Passover Raisin Wine, The American Temperance Movement, and Mordechai Noah,” HUCA, 59 (1988), 269-88. Additionally, see the fascinating article by Hannah Sprecher, “‘Let Them Drink and Forget Our Poverty’: Orthodox Rabbis React to Prohibition,” American Jewish Archives 43:2 (Fall-Winter, 1991): 134–179. Sprecher discusses the one Orthodox response to Ginzberg. Id. at 158. See, as well, Marni Davis, “‘On the Side of Liquor’: American Jews and the Politics of Alcohol, 1870-1936,” (PhD dissertation, Emory University, 2006), esp. chap. five (“‘A House Divided Against Itself’: American Jews Respond to Prohibition”), 190-250. Finally, see J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. V, 2005, chap. viii, “The Whiskey Brouhaha,” where he takes issue with the monkier used by a drinking club – the Glatt Cigar Society. Aside from actually drinking, Jews also authored parodies on drinking. One such parody is devoted to prohibition Gerson Kiss, Massekhet Prohibishon (Brooklyn, 1929), a description of which is found in in Sharon Liberman Mintz & Gabriel M. Goldstein, eds., Printing the Talmud: From Bomberg to Schottenstein (New York: Yeshiva University Museum, 2005), 300. And, Y. Friedlander, the possible author of the well-known forgery Yerushalim on Seder Kodshim, also authored a drinking parody. This parody, however, focused on the hassidic custom of drinking for the purposes of tikkun. The parody is titled Sefer ha-Tikkun and is a “Shulhan Orakh” on all the various times and occasions to make a tikkun. See Baruch Oberlander, “Ha-Yerushalmi le-Seder Kodshim vehaMotzei le-Or Shelo,” Or Yisrael 15 (1999), 174-75; see also Boaz Haas, Ke-Zohar ha-Rakiyah, Jerusalem, 2008, 353 n.330 who also discusses the Sefer ha-Tikkun. For other examples of parodies see Eliezer Brodt’s post on the topic here. [2] As an aside, it worth noting that Ginzburg was originally a student of Telz Yeshiva and later in life went on to teach at JTS. However, after Telz relocated to the United States, he helped with the publication of the Teshuvot R. Eliezer from R. Eliezer Gordon, Rosh ha-Yeshiva of Telz. Ginsburg was thanked in the back of this edition in a full page, it appears that in some copies, (perhaps those disturbed to Telz students) Ginzberg’s name was pasted over. Additionally, on the topic of Ginzburg and Telz Yeshiva, Ginzburg authored an excellent five volume work on the Yerushalmi, Pirushim ve-Hiddushim al ha-Yerushalmi. R. Gifter and Ginzberg carried on a correspondence regarding this work which still remains in manuscript – but is facinating in its content.[3] See Y.S. Speigel, Amudim be-Tolodot Sefer ha-Ivri Ketivah ve-haTakah, Ramat Gan, 2005, 273 and the notes therein.[4] This responsum was first published by Assaf in his Mekorot l’Tolodot ha-Hinukh be-Yisrael, (in the original version it appears in vol. 4. no. 39:6, p. 43 and in the latest version, edited by Shmuel Glick, Jerusalem, 2002, it appears in vol. 1. P. 111). R. M’zia’s responsa remained in manuscript until 1986 when Mechon Yerushalim published them. This edition includes a biography of R. M’zia by Professor Eric Zimmer. Additionally, Zimmer authored an article on M’zia. See E. Zimmer, “The book Yefeh Nof of R. Yitzhak M’zia,” Kiryat Sefer 56 (1981), 529-545; E. Zimmer, Gahalaton shel Hakhamim, Jerusalem, 1999, 84-105.[5] This is distinct from the custom of stopping the prayers and everyone, not just the bachurim, going home to eat a snack and then study prior to the start of the Torah reading; this custom is discussed at length by R. Y Goldhaver. See R. Y. Goldhaver, Minhagei ha-Kehilot, Jerusalem, 2005, vol. 1, 200-208. R. Goldhaver’s work includes notes by the prolific and encyclopedic R. Shmuel Ashkenazi. On this topic of taking a break during services, Ashkenazi notes that Goldhaver made a common bibliographic mistake of attributing the Shu”t Hut ha-Meshulush to the author of the Tashbetz, R. Shimon b. Tzemach Duran, because both works were published together. See R. Shmuel Ashkenazi comments id., vol. 2, 316.




Purim roundup

Since Purim is almost upon us, here are some older Seforim Blog posts dealing with Purim themes (arranged chronologically):
Purim, Mixed Dancing and Kill Joys (3.06.2006); Mahar”i Mintz permitted cross dressing and mixed dancing on Purim. Also discussed are other rabbinic reactions to Purim merrymaking.
Review of Reckless Rites by Elliott Horowitz (4.07.2006). This controversial book subtitled “Purim and the Legacy of Jewish Violence” discusses incidents of Jewish violence toward non-Jews on Purim and the way Jewish historians sometimes downplayed these incidents.
Tussle Over Horowitz’s Book (10.11.2006) discusses the resulting fallout of this book, whose thesis was disliked by Hillel Halkin in Commentary.
The Origins of Hamentashen in Jewish Literature: A Historical-Culinary Survey (2.28.2007), a classic post by Eliezer Brodt on this relatively recent Jewish custom.
Judah Wistinetzky and Mishloach Manot to his American friends (3.02.2007); Menachem Butler points out a post by Ari Kinsberg about a sefer distributed as a mishloach manot gift to the author’s friends.
Purim and Parodies (3.17.2008) by Eliezer Brodt. Eliezer discusses everything from a humorous Purim piyut included in Mahzor Vitry, to Kalonymus ben Kalonymus’s Massekhet Purim to the very rare Sefer Ha-kundas, a 19th century parody of the laws of trouble-making in the style of the Shulhan Aruch.
The Origins of Hamentashen in Jewish Literature: A Historical-Culinary Survey Revisited by Eliezer Brodt (3.18.2008). Eliezer revisits his post, updated with many additions and corrections.
“‘Most of all you’ve got to hide it from the kids…’ Reading Esther before Bed” by Elliott Horowitz (2.25.2010). This post discusses bible tales adopted for children in softened form.
The Origin of Ta’anit Esther by Mitchell First (3.3.2011). In this recent post, it is argued that this fast’s origin is even later than the original She’iltot (8th century).
***
Also, here are a few Purim posts from fellow-traveller On the Main Line:
A duel fought with swords on Purim, 1891 a duel fought with swords on Purim, between a Jew and a modern-day Haman.
How Moses Montefiore spent his time on Purim – giving matanot la-evyonim.
1841 Purim in New York, to bang at Haman’s name or not to bang?



“Is taking my husband not enough?” (Gen 30:15)

“Is taking my husband not enough?” (Gen 30:15)
Rabbi Nathan Kamenetsky of Jerusalem
Rabbi Nathan Kamenetsky is the author of the much-talked-about-book, Making of a Godol: A Study of Episodes in the Lives of Great Torah Personalities. A Hebrew version of this essay for Parashat Va-Yetze was first published last week at the Seforim blog [here] and the translation was prepared by Rabbi Daniel Tabak of New York.
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If we study the Bible without the words of Hazal, we may think that Leah was on the level with Jacob when her father hoodwinked him and swapped her with her sister. That is, Leah was in the dark about the agreement between her father and his nephew that the latter would marry “Rachel, his younger daughter.” The agreement was then breached by Laban, and Leah believed that she had been chosen from the outset to be Jacob’s wife. Therefore, when Rachel entered Jacob’s tent after her own week of celebration, Rachel was an interloper. And so, some years later, when Rachel requests the jasmine that Reuben found, Leah protests: “Who asked you to marry my husband? And now you want my son’s jasmine? Sister, I’ve had it up to here with you.” That is how the story goes without the words of Hazal.
I recall that in the beginning of 5708 [late 1948], World War II had ended even in the Pacific Theater with Japan’s defeat, and hundreds of Mirrer Yeshiva students in Shanghai were already permitted to emigrate to the United States. They settled in a Jewish neighborhood in Brooklyn called “East New York.” A spacious synagogue on Ashford Street was transformed into their study hall, where they continued to study Torah diligently and the legendary mashgiah R. Yechezkel Levenstein of blessed and saintly memory delivered his ethical talks.[1]

In the first decade of 5700 I was a young student learning in Mesivta Torah Vodaas, and on the sabbath of Va-Yetze I was a guest at my sister and brother-in-law, Rabbi Yisroel and Malka Shurin, may their repose be in Eden. I went to see with my own eyes what a European yeshiva was. A common saying of Rabbi Avrohom Kalmonovitch, the dean of the Mirrer Yeshiva who carried it as a caregiver cradles an infant through its long exile in Shanghai, had echoed in the yeshiva world during that period. He asked: is it possible that after Noah had fed the ark’s lion day-in and day-out at great personal risk, bringing the food late once warranted such a bite that left him with a limp? He answered that the lion was not any old lion, like the ones we see in the zoo, but the last lion in the entire world, and one cannot delay in feeding such a lion even once. Rabbi Avrohom spoke figuratively of the Mirrer yeshiva, the only European yeshiva to survive a destroyed world, a yeshiva that needed to be cherished. For a yeshiva student like me, it was appropriate to travel a great distance to see this singular yeshiva and become aromatized by its atmosphere.

As the sky grew dark on that sabbath in the dim, crowded study hall, the mashgiah delivered an ethical sermon that has been seared into my memory for more than sixty-six years. He based his talk on the words of Rabbi Joshua b. Levi in tractate Yoma (72b): ‘What is the meaning of ‘this is the Torah that Moses placed (śam)’? If one is worthy, it turns into an elixir (sam hayyim) for him; if unworthy, it turns into poison (sam mita).’ He explained that if we do not study biblical verses as Hazal interpreted them, then the Torah itself becomes poisonous. He exemplified the matter in that week’s Torah reading, saying that without the words of Hazal we believe that after Jacob was well-on in years he decided that the time to marry had arrived, looked at both of Laban’s daughters – each with their own appearance – and chose one of them, after which he said ‘when will I be able to work for my household etc. etc.’ What was Jacob our forefather’s intention? To settle down and raise a family like everyone else. Such an understanding, however, is venomous. When is the Torah an elixir? When we comprehend the verses as Hazal did when they explained ‘and Laban had two daughters’ (29:16) as two beams stretching from one end of the world to the other (meaning, don’t read ‘daughters’ [banot] but rather ‘builders’ [bonot], along the lines of ‘don’t read it as your sons [banayikh] but your builders [bonayikh], for these are the two sisters who built the world), one raising kings and the other raising kings […] to this one were given two nights and to this one two nights, to Leah the night of Pharaoh and Sennacherib, to Rachel the Night of Gideon and the night of Mordechai (Yalqut Shim’oni #124 [end]). In other words, Jacob viewed both of them as architects of the Jewish people and that people’s perpetuity, so everything that he did was with the establishment of the Jewish people in mind. If we look at every step that Jacob took in this light, then our Torah study becomes an elixir. When the mashgiah expounded in this manner to the students of the Mirrer Yeshiva, who had no longer been young for quite some time, whose families had perished in Europe, who were exhausted from the many years of wandering in far-flung locales, he was saying that they should not cook up fresh plans in this new land such that every man would become engrossed in tending his field or vineyard, as poison was in that pot (per II Kings 4:40), but they should take stock as to the best way to build their lives in a way that would contribute to the general good of the Jewish people and its endurance. Notwithstanding the fact that I am a fan of the text’s simple meaning and love the literal-contextual meaning of the text, I have carried with me until today the mashgiah’s admonition to study the Bible in a way that makes it an elixir.
Here, too, if we study the narrative of the two sisters as Hazal did, we can imagine how Rachel, after believing for seven years that she would marry Jacob and planning to do so, could not stand — even in that happiest of moments before the wedding — her older sister being ashamed, and she decided to teach her the secret code. We are impressed by Rachel’s sensitivity, which seems like something humanly unattainable! Hazal had good cause for saying that it was our matriarch Rachel who will persuade God (as it were) not to jealously punish the Jewish people when they worship foreign gods and “the bed is too short to stretch oneself out” (Is 28:20)[2] because she patiently brought a co-wife into her house without jealousy, and through this merit God will return his children to their borders (the end of petihta 24 of Lamentations). Leah knew full well that she was deceiving Jacob by taking her sister’s place; moreover, her sister helped her pull it off. Is there any header student who doesn’t know that Rachel gave her sister the secret code? Only then does Leah’s charge “is taking my husband not enough?” become so difficult to comprehend – did Rachel forfeit her right to Jacob because she heroically facilitated Leah’s marriage to him? On the contrary, according to Hazal Rachel brought her co-wife into her house, unlike Leah’s claim that Rachel was crashing her party. I know full and well that this difficulty forced two commentators – Nahmanides and the Or ha-Hayyim – to posit that Leah was complaining that Rachel was supplanting her in their relationship with Jacob. Nahmanides explains that Leah alleged that Rachel was acting as the mistress and making Leah the maidservant, but such behavior on Rachel’s part is absent from the Torah, making this a difficult position to take. Perhaps one can point to Rachel’s answering first when Jacob requested his wives’ consent to leave Aram for Canaan (31:14) as a sign that she felt dominant over Leah. The opinion of Rabbi Jose, however, is that Rachel could speak before her older sister because Jacob had called her first (31:4; Midrash Rabba 74:4). Furthermore, none of this appears until after the request for the jasmine. The Or Ha-Hayyim argues that Leah was upset that Jacob’s fixed bed was with Rachel, which is also difficult since the proximity of Rachel’s tent to Jacob is not mentioned until Laban chased Jacob and searched for his idols, according to Rashi (commentary on 31:13), and Nahmanides completely disagrees with his interpretation of that verse (see there). Rashi on 31:4 does note before Jacob’s flight from his father-in-law that Rachel – not Leah – was the mainstay of the house, and Hazal find evidence of this in Simeon ’s birth where “and Rachel was barren (aqara)” (29:31) is taken to mean “foundation of the house (‘iqqaro shel bayit),” which should have been a grievance directed not at Rachel but Jacob since the husband decides which of his wives will predominate. Our teachers Nahmanides and the Or Ha-Hayyim of blessed memory both interpreted the verses in their own way, because it never occurred to them to take Leah at her word.[3] I have found an interesting interpretation in the widespread contemporary series Da’at Miqra, which usually understands the verse in its literal-contextual meaning, that agrees that Leah took part in the deception with Rachel’s knowledge (as above), and even depicts an imaginable scene where Leah sits in a dark corner of Rachel’s wedding party wearing a bride’s veil as her disguise, and at the critical moment her father brings her to Jacob in lieu of his wife (“Laban took his daughter Leah and brought her to him”). Regarding Leah’s subsequent charge “is taking my husband not enough?” Da’at Miqra says laconically “here Leah was ungrateful for Rachel’s kindness,” but nothing more. In my humble opinion this approach is unacceptable: God forbid that we should describe one of our matriarchs as having poor character. Da’at Miqra depicts Rachel and Leah, who
together formed the Jewish people, as respectively sensitive to a fault and lacking basic human decency. It is bewildering! Now, it is true that there is an approach among medieval commentators which disagrees with Rabbenu Behayye’s opinion that “the matriarchal prophetesses had nothing ugly about them nor any moral failing” (commentary on 29:20), and so Nahmanides can write about the Torah’s statement that “Sarah oppressed” Hagar (16:6) that “our matriarch sinned in this oppression” (and Da’at Miqra agrees with Nahmanides there and also cites Radak who says “Sarah did not act in accordance with ethics or piety in this matter”), but why, then, did Nahmanides not write here what he did regarding Sarah, for here too “Leah sinned in speaking to her sister thus,” instead of twisting Leah’s words to fit a forced interpretation? We must conclude that Nahmanides knew that if we take Leah’s words in the simplest way, as the author of Da’at Miqra did, we would end up with not just a failing of morality or piety but a basic lack of humanity (as mentioned above), and Leah’s sin would be so egregious to an extent that we cannot suspect of our matriarchs. God forbid that we should even entertain such a notion about these great women.

I will now speak my piece about this, and I hope that Heaven has left me enough room to make a contribution. At the end of Toledot, Rashi admitted ‘I do not know what it is teaching us’ regarding the final words of the verse ‘Isaac sent Jacob and he went towards Padan Aram to Laban son of Bethuel the Aramean, brother of Rebecca, the mother of Jacob and Esau (em Ya’akov ve-‘Esav)’ (28:5). Rashi found the words difficult because we already know the identity of Rebecca’s children, so why did the Torah need to add these three words? The question can be answered by way of the cantillation. One would have thought that the etnahta should have been placed under ‘Jacob,’ as the words that follow ‘and he went towards Padan Aram’ lead into the rest of the verse ‘to Laban son of Bethuel…’ to mean that Jacob went to Laban in Padan Aram. The Masoretes, however, placed the etnahta under ‘Aram,’ implying that they understood the rest of the verse beginning with ‘to Laban’ as referring back to the sending off, i.e. Isaac sending Jacob to Laban, and the words ‘and he went towards Padan Aram’ constitute a parenthetical statement letting us know that Jacob did indeed fulfill this mission. This would be similar to what it says further on (verse 7) about Esau observing Jacob’s actions — ‘Jacob listened to his father and to his mother and went to Padan Aram’ — namely that Esau saw that Jacob listened to his parents and left Beersheba, and in the end, in fact, went to Padan Aram (see Rash ad loc.). The Masoretes took the verse to be speaking not about Jacob’s arrival in Padan Aram but about the separation from Isaac for a simple reason, namely, if the verse wanted to convey Jacob’s arrival in Padan, then it would be anatopistic, as the proper place is later when the Torah narrates Jacob heading eastward (29:1). It was therefore preferable to construe the words ‘to Laban…’ as referring back to the sending off. We still need to comprehend, however, what all of verse 5 teaches us, because (1) it already says above in verse 2 that Isaac commanded his son to go to Padan Aram to take one of Laban’s daughters as a wife, so what is this verse adding, and (2) it says in verse 2 that he sent him to the house of Bethuel and in verse 5 no house is mentioned, only Laban’s name. We are forced to propose that aside from Isaac blessing Jacob with the Abraham’s blessing and commanding him what to do in a general sense (verse 2), Isaac subsequently had parting words for Jacob when the latter was actually ready to leave: ‘now, my son, I will explain in more detail what you need to do when you get to your destination of Bethuel’s house. Speak to Laban, who will certainly be instrumental in helping you settle in, because you are his nephew. He will agree to give you one of his daughters as a wife, and given that I now knew that you purchased the birthright from my older son Esau, remember that when you arrive there, because you are now the ‘older’ son and Esau the ‘younger.’’ The order in ‘mother of Jacob and Esau’ fits perfectly. What did Isaac intend by telling him this just as he set out to fulfill his charge? He meant to tell him that until then he had only outlined the general intention of marrying one of Laban’s daughters without specifying which one to take, whereas now he is saying outright that since Jacob was “eldest,” he needed to marry Leah, eldest of Laban’s daughters. That is the purpose of verse 5.[4]

The Torah only hints at this new command of Isaac’s for a simple reason. When Jacob reached Haran and saw Laban’s two daughters, it was specifically the younger one who found favor in his eyes. The Torah emphasizes more than once Jacob’s deep love for Rachel[5] to justify disobeying his father Isaac’s command to marry Leah, because our forefather Jacob followed the law as codified in Shulhan ‘Arukh (Yore De’a, end of no. 240) that a son does not have to obey his father’s command not to marry a specific woman, and the same goes for a command to marry a specific woman that the son does not want to marry. Instead of the Torah stating explicitly Jacob’s command to marry Leah, a hint sufficed, because although Jacob was in the right about not listening to one’s father in choosing a spouse, there was no need to draw attention to his disobedience, and just as it is inappropriate for a son to broadcast the permissibility of not listening to one’s father, so the Torah concealed the matter. Lest the reader respond with Rabbi Judah b. Bathayra’s remark to Rabbi Akiva when the latter revealed that the wood-gatherer was Zelophehad (a baraita on Shabbat  96b) “you will have to answer for this: if it is as you say, the Torah hid it and you revealed it,” note the continuation of the Talmud there (at the top of 97a) that says “but he [R. Akiva] derived it from a gezera shava,” with Rashi’s comment “and if so, the Torah did not hide it for it is practically explicit.” If a derivation by means of a gezera shava is not considered hidden, then certainly something derived from the literal and contextual reading of the text is not. More generally, what I am conveying about our forefather Jacob is that he followed the Torah’s laws — since the Torah did not say outright that Jacob did not listen to his father but said it allusively, i.e., in a manner that requires a kind of discovery, one does not find Jacob defying his father. Note this well.[6]
When dawn broke the morning after Jacob’s wedding and “behold, it was Leah,” the couple had a conversation. Jacob reproached Leah for deceiving him and here is her riposte: “I learned to do this from you, because you hoodwinked your father when he intended to bless Esau and you took his place. There is no master without students” (Bereshit Rabba 70:19). In my humble opinion I would like to lengthen and fill out this conversation. Leah did not have the last word or parting shot; Jacob continued the conversation. “You should know that when I arrived in Haran seven years ago, I told your sister that I wanted to marry her, but she warned me that her father would try to deceive me and replace her with her older sister. I responded that he would not succeed in tricking me because ‘I am his brother in deception’ (Megilla 13b). Now know this, Leah, what I told her is true that no-one can pull one over me, even if my new father-in-law is the son of swindlers and from a place of skullduggery (Bereshit Rabba 63:3). Ask, then, how did you succeed last night? Well, when I was about to leave my righteous father for Beersheba, he confirmed that the birthright I purchased from my brother Esau many years prior, when I was only fifteen years old (Bava Batra 16b), was a transaction with everlasting force, making me – and not Esau – the firstborn. He therefore commanded me to marry you, the older sister. Although I did not want to obey and marry you, and notwithstanding that I was not obligated to heed his command, nevertheless it constituted a decree by a righteous person about which it is said that ‘what you decree, will be done’ (Job 22:28, see, inter alia, Shabbat 59b). That is to say, you and your father did not succeed in cheating me, but my father (may he live a long, good life) triumphed in compelling me to marry you just as he wanted.” In that way Jacob demonstrated to Leah that he was a man of Truth and not full of deceit as she had thought.[7] He was not a Rav-sheqer; he did not have proteges in the art of lying. He hadn’t tricked his father at all in taking the blessings intended for Esau forty-eight years after he purchased the birthright, because Isaac intended to bless his firstborn and believed that Esau was the firstborn, when in reality Jacob was already the true firstborn. Only then did a lightbulb go off in twenty-two-year-old Leah’s head (Sefer ‘Olam Rabba, ch. 2) since she now realized that her lifelong worry about marrying Esau had been in vain; all those years of crying (Bava Batra 123a) had been for naught. Forty-seven years before she was born Jacob took Esau’s place as firstborn, and at the moment of her birth she was already destined for Jacob and not his wicked brother. In the wake of this conversation Leah already knew enough that when the first of Jacob’s vigor was born, her son Reuben, she could say “see the difference between my son and my father-in-law’s son […] After my father-in-law’s son Esau sold the birthright and it was my husband’s for some time, Esau protested so strongly that my entire life I mistakenly thought that Esau was the firstborn, as did all of my contemporaries, until my father-in-law had to reiterate in Jacob’s presence, before their parting, that Jacob was the firstborn, and he decreed by the decree of the righteous that he should marry me, the firstborn.”
Do not let my novel understanding that Isaac wanted his son to marry Leah put you off on account of its absence in the literature of Hazal, for I have found the following in Rabbenu Behayye (commentary to 28:5). He asked why Jacob was punished for absenting himself from his parents’ residence for twenty-two years with the absence of his own son Joseph for the same number of years (Megilla 16b-17a), when in fact Jacob was sent to Padan Aram by his parents, in which case how could his absence constitute a violation of the commandment of honoring one’s parents for twenty-two years? Rabbenu Behaye answers: “they thought that he would take Leah and return as soon as they sent for him, but he set his eyes on the younger Rachel for her beauty.” This implies that Rabbenu Behayye believed that had Jacob married Leah upon arriving in Haran, Laban would not have expected him to work for him at all, and it was only because Jacob wanted Rachel that he was forced to obligate himself to work for her father for seven years. He seemingly derived this from what Jacob said to Laban – “I will work seven years for Rachel, your younger daughter” – which he took to mean that since she is young and unfit for marriage, I will work for seven years so you will be willing to marry her off before the older daughter. Rabbenu Behayye’s comment appears slightly difficult given Isaac’s explicit command to “marry one of the daughters of Laban, your mother’s brother” (28:2), which implies that he could choose whichever one he wanted to marry, the corollary being that if his choice required him to be absent from his parents’ home, it should not constitute a negation of the imperative to honor one’s parents. Why, then, did he deserve punishment for being absent from his father’s house?[8] In addition, the first part of Rabbenu Behayye’s comment, in which he writes that “they thought he would take Leah,” makes it seem as if Jacob had no choice whatsoever in choosing his wife, which is hard to fathom. It must be the case that Rabbenu Behayye understood verse 5 — “Isaac sent Jacob…” — in accordance with my innovative approach that at the moment of departure from his parents Jacob was given a hint about his new charge, that he would not choose his wife but would marry Leah specifically, which makes Rabbenu Behayye’s comment harmonious. Rabbenu Behayye’s innovative understanding that Jacob would not have had to work to marry Leah appears contradictory to Nahmanides’ understanding of the words “complete this week,” meaning complete the time period that you are still obligated to work for Leah (see there), yet he should not have had to work for Laban’s older daughter at all! Moreover, why was Jacob unable to use the seven years he had worked for free to get Rachel? Why did he have to work another seven years for her? And if we say Laban only required it because Jacob wanted to marry the younger daughter before the older was married, why did he have to work for Rachel after Leah was already married? Perhaps Laban originally intended to deceive Jacob and give him his oldest daughter (just as Rachel had warned Jacob immediately upon meeting him, as noted above), but he also knew that Jacob had a special divine providence watching over him as in his statement “I have observed the signs and God has blessed on account of you” (30:27). After seeing that Jacob was prepared to work seven years for Leah, he decided that Heaven was showing him that he should demand seven years of work for Rachel as well, so he asked for seven years of work for Rachel even after it was her turn to marry. It’s obviously hard to know exactly a swindler is thinking. I should add parenthetically that the explanation appearing in the continuation of Rabbenu Behayye’s comment, that Jacob’s parents thought he would immediately return when they sent for him, notwithstanding Rabbenu Behayye’s terseness clearly means that Rebecca had sent a messenger immediately upon his arrival at Laban’s house to inform him that the danger posed by Esau had evaporated and he could return home at once, in which case his entire twenty-two-year stay was against the wishes of his father and mother. I found as much in the Hiddushei Haggadot of the Maharsha (end of the first chapter of Megilla, 16b, s.v. gadol talmud Torah) who wrote: “Why was Jacob punished for those twenty-two years given that he left at their will and command, which means that ostensibly they forewent their honor? The author of the Imrei No’am answered in the name of the Ri of Paris that at the end of the fourteen-year stint in the house of Eber, Esau’s anger subsided and Rebecca sent her wetnurse Deborah after him to Laban’s house, but he stayed there for twenty-two years.” I checked the Imrei No’am, an anthology of medieval commentaries on the Torah reprinted in Jerusalem in 5730 (1970), for his exact phrasing and found the following: “R. Judah of Paris responded that by the end of the fourteen years during which Jacob served in the house of Eber Esau gave up hope of finding him, and afterward he arrived in Haran. When Rebecca found out that Esau’s anger had subsided she sent her wetnurse Deborah after him, as Rashi explained in Va-Yishlah on the phrase ‘Deborah died.’ It turns out that when Deborah came to Jacob he had only been at Laban’s house for a year but he did not want to return and was therefore punished for remaining there twenty-two years after his mother’s command.”[9] R. Judah explained at length what Rabbenu Behayye wrote concisely, “that he would return as soon as they sent for him.”[10] Taking R. Judah’s answer on its own (as it
is in fact cited in the Maharsha) proves quite difficult, for only Rebecca was told that Esau was looking to kill Jacob and so sent Jacob to Haran to deliver him from Esau’s hand (27:43-45), whereas Isaac was wholly unaware that Jacob was fleeing from Esau and his command to Isaac was to go to Bethuel’s house to marry one of Laban’s daughters. Even if one could argue that his mother’s command lapsed after his extended underground stay in the house of Eber, his father’s remained in force, so why would he punished for his absence from his parents’ house? We can resolve this by positing that the two answers complement each other. Rabbenu Behayye explains why honoring his father through the command to marry did not entail remaining in Haran because he was to marry Leah and return forthwith, and R. Judah clarifies why honoring his mother by fleeing from Esau also did not force him to remain in Haran because Esau’s anger had subsided. This is truly wonderful, thanks to God’s help.[11][12]
With this new understanding of verse 5 we can appreciate Leah’s words to Rachel anew, “is taking my husband not enough?” Leah is not referring to Rachel’s marriage to Jacob after having given her the secret code and helping her marry him, because Rachel would not have lost her right on account of that, as we mentioned above. Rather, Leah is referring to Rachel stealing Jacob’s heart at their first meeting, when Jacob the “firstborn” was not meant for her, Laban’s younger daughter, but for Laban’s older daughter. That was Leah’s contention against her sister. Yet, Leah could not have had any grievance against her sister about this, because Rachel had believed throughout her life that she was designated for Jacob, just as Leah herself mistakenly believed that she was to marry Esau and even weeped so much that her eyelashes fell out (Bava Batra 123a). Leah puts it to Rachel simply: “is it not enough to unwittingly take the man designated for me that now you want to knowingly take my son’s jasmine?” This resolves the difficult language of taking (qiha) used here, for the Torah more generally puts the man in the active role. It says “when a man takes (yiqah) a wife” and not “when a woman (tiqah) takes a husband,” as a wife is acquired by her husband and not a husband by his wife. It does not even write “when a wife is taken (tillaqah) by a man” (see Tosafot Ri Ha-Zaqen in the margins of the Vilna Talmud at Qiddushin 5b) because the man is the active one. If it were putting things as they seemingly should be put, Leah should have told her sister “is giving yourself to my husband not enough?” and not “is taking my husband not enough?” which would have blunted her conclusion “that you need to take my son’s jasmine too,” seeing as Rachel had not  taken anything at all. According to the new interpretation, however, the use of ‘taking’ here works out, because the attraction – witting or unwitting – generated by a woman to draw a man close is called “taking (qiha), as the sage cautioned his son about being ensnared by a wicked woman by saying “Do not covet her beauty in your heart, and do not let her take you (tiqahekha) by her eyes” (Prov 6:25). The development of a relationship between a man and woman is as follows: after the woman “takes” the man, so that she becomes desirable and he loves her,[13] the curse of Eve kicks in, “your desire will be to your husband and he will rule over you” (Gen 3:16), which was said to Eve after she had already “taken” her man (“your husband [ishekh]”). The next stage has the man marrying her as she becomes passive. We can perhaps include within this Rashi’s brief statement on this verse, “it is all from him and not from you,” which says that the husband takes a wife and not vice versa (see Qiddushin 5b-6a where even the betrothal formula “I am now your husband [hareni ishekh]” is unequivocally invalid, because it can be construed to mean that she stole his heart as a prelude to the transaction even though he was the active party in the transaction in giving the monies, and the same implication of attraction by the word ishekh is true in our verse as well). When Leah asks “is taking my husband not enough?” she is talking about the earlier stage in which Rachel actively attracted Jacob, by which she “took” Jacob when he was designated for Leah.
Let me conclude this devar Torah by adding that it is superfluous for a ben Torah who grew up in the yeshiva world, which brings this full circle to my introduction that the Torah is an elixir only when studied in the appropriate way, and if we study it any other way it transmogrifies into, God forbid, a poison. When we speak about our ancestors, and it goes without saying our patriarchs and matriarchs, and their emotions and behaviors, be they Jacob’s love for Rachel leading him to disobey his father or Rachel’s “taking” of Jacob, we are not speaking about feelings that normal people of our generations feel but about matters that are the secret of this world’s foundation and endurance, along the lines of my citation at the beginning of the piece of Reb Chatzkel’s quote from the Yalqut that “Laban had two daughters” means two who built an everlasting nation. It is possible that with Isaac’s trait of Fear (Pahad), he would consider together with what “they used to say at the crossroads”: such were the stipulations (between Rebecca and Laban according to the Matnot k’hunah, or from God implanting it in their natures according to the explanation of the Maharzu), the older [daughter] for the older [son] and the younger for the younger” (Bereshit Rabba 70:16 and Bava Batra 123a), whereas Jacob as man of Truth did not have to adopt what “everyone used to say” (Rashi on 29:17). On the contrary, given his trait of splendor, he chose Rachel and her patience over Leah. When we say that our matriarch Rachel “took” Jacob, we are simply expressing what Hazal taught us in Bereshit Rabba (17:7) that everything comes from one’s wife, in which case Jacob’s utter righteousness developed through her as well, causing Leah to complain to her sister that she had inspired Jacob’s service of God when it had been Leah’s right, and, as such, we are talking here about the sublimest matters.
[1]
It is well-known that it did not take long for Reb Chatzkel to detest America
and make aliyya to the Mirrer Yeshiva in Jerusalem, and after the passing of R.
Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler he moved to Bnei Brak to fill his post in Ponevezh
Yeshiva.
[2]
See Rashi on Yoma 9b, s.v. shenei re’im.
[3]
The Seforno apparently did take her
at her word.
[4]
Perhaps Rashi’s masoretic tradition had the etnahta
under ‘Jacob,’ and the latter part of the verse would be taking about his
arrival in Padan Aram and not his mission, which is why Rashi did not know what
the Torah intended. The Torah records that he eventually arrived in Haran after
spending several years in the tents of Eber as background for the later verse
in which Esau saw that Jacob had listened to his parents and went to Padan
Aram.
[5]
See Da’at Miqra, pp. 402-405, where
R. Yehuda Kiel of blessed memory presents the idea that Jacob’s love for Rachel
hovered in King Solomon’s mind as a template for love when writing Song of
Songs.
[6]
Parenthetically, I should explain the second part of R. Judah ben Bathayra’s
remark to R. Akiva in that baraita
“if not, you are spreading lies about that righteous man” (in the Sifrei on the episode of the
wood-gatherer in Shelah, we do not
have this reading at all). He was telling R. Akiva that even if his colleagues
challenged the identification of Zelophehad and R. Akiva ended up agreeing, his
statement about Zelophehad would remain on record and the sin he would have to
answer for was baselessly suspecting a righteous person.
[7]
In Bereshit Rabba (50:3) a man named Rav-Sheqer (full of deceit) is
enumerated as one of the five chief justices of Sodom.
[8]
We must perforce deduce from Rabbenu Behayye’s words what later commentators
did (whom I will mention in footnote 12 below) that Jacob was punished for
violating the nuance of honoring one’s parents. Even though his father gave him
permission to choose, he should have specifically chosen the option that would
allow him to return home as soon as possible, i.e. Leah, and God is exacting
with those closest to him unto a hairsbreadth.
[9]
The Maharsha omitted what the Ri of Paris wrote — “It turns out that when
Deborah came to Jacob he had not even been at Laban’s house for a year” —
because it is in fact difficult to discern R. Judah’s intent. If I were not
afraid to do so I would suggest an emendation from ‘year’ to ‘month,’ as R.
Judah would be saying that Deborah arrived after Jacob had resided with Laban
for a month (29:14) and not more, i.e., before Jacob was obligated to work for
seven years and could still return without reneging on any sort of obligatory
arrangement with Laban.
[10]
What Ri of Paris cites from Rashi on Va-Yishlah
(which Rashi claimed to have learned from R. Moses the Darshan), that Deborah
was the messenger telling Jacob to return home, and upon which he bases the
idea that Deborah was sent as soon as Jacob arrived in Haran, is not
universally agreed upon. In Moshav
Zeqenim
, another collection of Tosafist comments on the Bible, I found the
following on the verse “I will send and take you from there” (Gen 27:45): “It
is perplexing. We do not find that she [Rebecca] sent or who the messenger was.
It appears to me that God was the messenger as it says ‘God said to Jacob:
return to the land of your forefathers and your birthplace’ (31:3). See how
great the righteous are that God himself mobilizes on their account to do their
bidding, in fulfillment of the verse ‘he completes the counsel of his mal’akhim’ (Is 44:26).” But if the
command of God was Rebecca’s messenger, why do we find God speaking to Jacob
about returning to Israel only after staying at Laban’s house for twenty years
(31:41), after Joseph’s birth (30:25), after becoming wealthy (31:2-32:2), and
not immediately after his arrival in Haran.
[11]
Regarding the Maharsha who cited R. Judah of Paris without connecting his ideas
to Rabbenu Behayye, the question of Jacob’s necessary stay in Haran to marry
remains in force. An even more troubling aspect is the Maharsha’s mention of
Jacob’s departure at the will and command of his parents, whereas the answer
only relates to his mother’s desires. This requires serious investigation.
[12]
See the Ben Ish Hai’s Ben Yehoyada’
on Megilla (ad loc.) and the Keli Yaqar
at the beginning of Va-Yetze, who
answer the question of why Jacob was punished. They say that although Jacob’s
activities in Haran were worthwhile, he intention was not. In other words, God
was extremely exacting with Jacob. The Ben
Yehoyada’
writes that Jacob staying for six more years after finishing his
seven for Rachel created an opening for Satan to claim that the entire
twenty-two year stint in Haran was not a fulfillment of his parents’ mission
but of his own (and the entire punishment of his beloved son Joseph’s absence
was to quiet Satan). The Keli Yaqar
believes that Jacob did not just “go” to Haran as his father said “arise and go
towards Padan Aram” but he “left” Beersheba, meaning that he forgot about his
father’s house, and for that he was punished.

 

[13]
Through this “taking” she takes him as a prince and king over her (see
Maimonides, Hilkhot Ishut 15:20),
that is, she coronates him.



Review of Jay R. Berkovitz’s The Pinkas of Metz

Review of Jay R. Berkovitz’s The Pinkas of Metz

By Eliezer Brodt & Dan Rabinowitz

Jay R. Berkovitz, Protocols of Justice: The Pinkas of Metz Rabbinic Court 1771-1789, (2 vol., 222 pp. +1084 pp.), Brill 2014

Jay R. Berkovitz, Law’s Dominion, Jewish Community, Religion and Family in Early Modern Metz,(404 pp.) Brill 2022

A decade ago, Professor Jay Berkovitz, a Professor and Chair of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, published the Pinkas (record book or register) of the Rabbinic Court in Metz. Jews began living in Metz, a town in Northeast France near the Moselle River, in the 16th century. These records require a reassessment of the Jewish legal process and procedure, especially concerning the secular legal system. In 2022, Berkovitz published a self-standing monograph, Law’s Dominion, to fully describe and explicate the impact of the Pinkas. Both works mark significant advancements in modern Jewish history and the theory of the Jewish legal system. Yet, they have not received the proper attention they deserve in the Hebrew book world. The lack of recognition can partially be attributed to the publisher, the distinguished publishing house of Brill. Brill’s publications are not generally available for sale in local Seforim stores, and many are priced outside the reach of laymen (or even scholars). Nonetheless, both are worth seeking out, and we intend to bring these vital works to the attention of Seforimblog readers and describe their significance.

The Pinkas of the Metz Rabbinic Court covers just 18 years, 1771-1789, yet it is a massive amount of material. Berkovitz’s transcription (albeit with notes) is over one thousand pages. This is truly what one would call a labor of love. Not only did he publish a huge manuscript (over one thousand pages) with valuable indices, but he also mined the work extensively. In 2014, he wrote a volume (222 pp.), in English, dealing with many aspects of the Pinkas (as I will elaborate on below), demonstrating his command of everything possibly imaginable related to this work.

A few years later, in 2022, Berkowitz revisited the Pinkas and published another book, Law’s Dominion, Jewish Community, Religion and Family in Early Modern Metz, updating his previous book with a few more hundred pages.[1]

Berkowitz describes his project as follows:

Though certainly never intended to become a complete history of the Jews of Metz, Protocols of Justice grew to become much larger in size and complexity than originally expected. Despite its expanding into a self-standing monograph, I am very much aware that work on this project is still in its early stages. I present these volumes as an invitation to scholars to continue what has commenced here (p. 25).

Introduction: Pinkasim and their Historic Value

By way of introduction, many people seek out new niches where they can contribute valuable studies about otherwise unknown topics. One such untapped area is the world of Pinkasim. Over the years, numerous kinds of Pinkasim have been published, some in extensive critical editions. But there remains plenty of work in this “field.”

What is a Pinkas?

These records, typically in the form of a notebook or book, transcribe the materials of a particular group, society, or entity. They can be marriage or divorce records, Synagogue protocols, or numerous “Chevrah books.” Even though many have been lost or destroyed, numerous volumes have survived in libraries worldwide. In recent years, some have even ended up in private collections. (After the Holocaust, “Pinkas” is also used to describe a different form of communal books. Survivors from towns in Europe published “memorial books” to document their history and memorialize the murdered Jews. Many of those use Pinkas in the title, for example, Pinkas Zetel, Pinkas Galicia. Although collectively, the genre is referred to as “Yizkor books. New York Public Library collected these, and they are available on its site: Yizkor Book Collection.)

Historians have long recognized the value of Pinkasim generally. When reading the works of various prominent historians before World War Two, they often cite something like this: “In the Pinkasim of the town or city, I found…” One of the more well-known examples of a Pinkas is the Pinkas of the Vilna Gaon Kloyz. This manuscript is currently in New York and has a fascinating story regarding its survival (See David Fishman, The Book Smugglers, 52-55 for more details). R. Shlomo Zalman Hevlin published of the text of this Pinkas in the journal Yeshurun. Shlomo Zalman Hevlin, “The Pinkas of the Gaon’s Kloyz,” Yeshurun 16 (2005), 746-60; “The Kloyz of the Gaon of Vilna Zts”L, Ketayim me-Pinkas ha-Kloyz,” Yeshurun 6 (1999), 678-85.[2]

This Pinkas provides invaluable information regarding ownership of one of the homes where the Vilna Gaon resided. After his death, his children claimed it was part of the estate, while his students argued that it belonged to the community. After some machinations, including changing the board composition that held the property in trust, the court ruled in favor of the children. Some scholars view this property dispute as an attempt to resolve a larger issue of whether Gaon’s children or his students would control his intellectual legacy. After this decision, the children determined which Gaon’s manuscripts would be published rather than the students. (See Dan Rabinowitz, The Lost Library, Brandeis University Press, Massachusetts, 2019, 55-58.)

The Significance of the Bet Din Pinkas.

A subset of Pinkasim are those of Be’tai Din, taking the form of a register of the various disputes and decisions. These, too, are of critical importance. These documents shed light on individuals’ relationships to communal takanot, the power and authority of the Bet Din, and many other areas.

Yet, today, many of the Pinksim no long survive. Sometimes this was deliberate as in the case in the 1600’s of the Frankfurt Bet Din.

כתוב ביש נוחלין… וזה לשונו, קבלה ישנה מאבותי ז”ל שלא להשליך שום חשבון ישן אף על פי שנחשב הכל, כי אולי תבוא עת להוכיח דבר מה מאותו. עד כאן ולדידי הכותב הוה עובדא בזה כמה פעמים שבא לי לאחר ההשלכה לכלל היזק, כי כמעט הייתי מוכרח בכל פסח לשרוף כתבים ופתקאות, לפי שריבויים מפסקי דינים והשלישות וכיוצא ישתרגו עלו על צוארי, שלא היה המועט מחזיק את המרובה. וגם מפני שלא יהיה לי הטורח גדול ביותר בחפשי בחפש מחופש אחר כתב אחד, כאשר גם עתה אחר כל שריפת הכתבים נלאיתי עד כמה שעות בחפשי אחר איזה כתב [יוסף אומץ סי’ שע, עמ’ קח]

Rabbinic scholars eventually recognized the significance of pinkasim.[3] For example, the Nodeh BeYehudah uses one to determine the spelling of names in a get:

הנה אהוביי להיות שאין הגדול מעיד בגדלו על מה שראה בקטנו כ”א דברים ידועים שחשבו רז”ל ולכן אין אני יכול להעיד. אבל אעפ”כ אני אומר לכם נהירנא כד הוינא טליא כבר תשע או כבר עשר ראיתי אצל אא הרב זל פנקסאות של הגליל קראקא וראיתי פנקסאות משנים קדמוניות היו חתומים בו גאוני עולם זקני הגאון רשכב”ה מוהר”ר העשיל זצ”ל ואחריו דודי זקני הגאון המפורסם מוהרר”ל וגם ראיתי חתימת הגאון בעל תוספות י”ט שמה וכמדומה שבכל מקום שנרשם שם השומא חדשה שעשו שמאים באסיפת הגליל היה נכתב פילטץ עם טי”ת, ואף שאין אני יכול להעיד בבירור כי טליא הוינא וגם מלתא דלא רמיא וכו’ אבל תדעו שהפנקסאות הנ”ל דומה אני שהיה אח”כ ביד המאוה”ג מוהר”ר שלמה ז”ל אב”ד דק”ק פינטשוב שהיה סופר הגליל דרשו שם בק”ק הנ”ל ותמצאו אבל עכ”פ המפורסמות א”צ ראיה וזה דבר ידוע ששם העיר בכל מדינת פולין קורין פילטץ עם טי”ת וכן כותבים בכל האגרות והרי הוחזק שם העיר בלשון היהודים עם טי”ת. [נודע ביהודה, קמא, אבן העזר, סי’ פז].

Basically, one man’s junk became another’s treasure.

At first glance, a Pinkas of the Bet Din might appear to be dry material only of interest to specialists and technicians. But in reality, these contain information that can elucidate and enrich larger Jewish history. Nonetheless, little work has been done with the Pinkasim of rabbinical courts. Recently, however, some have begun publishing and analyzing these records to great effect. Edward Fram’s book, A Window on Their World: The Court Diaries of Rabbi Hayyim Gundersheim Frankfurt Am Main 1773-1794 (2012), inaugurated this approach.

A more focused usage of a Bet Din Pinkas is an article by Moaz Kahana. He identified a short and somewhat cryptic entry in the Pinkas of the Bet Din of Prague regarding a fine levied on two people. From that citation Kahana provides a sweeping exposition on Jewish coffee culture in Prague in the 18th century. Among other details, in 1765 (during the period that R. Yehzkel Landau was the Chief Rabbi), there were at least six coffee houses in the Jewish quarter, owned by Jews, open on Shabbos, that Jews frequented and sanctioned by the Rabbinate. (Moaz Kahana, “Shabbos be-Beyes ha-Kaffe shel Kehilah Kedosha Prague,” in Zion, 2013 (78), 5-50).

A few years ago, in the prominent journal Yeshurun (24 (2011), pp. 235-297), R’ Dovid Kamenetzky published material from the Pinkas of Frankfurt from the Haflah.[ Avalaibel here and here] R’ Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg commented to the volume editors that he was so excited to read this material. In the course of this post, we hope to explain what his excitement was about. It is safe to imagine that had he seen this material from the Pinkas of Metz, he would have been beyond excited.

What can we learn from this Pinkas?

This Pinkas of the Bet Din of Metz is of especial importance. Berkowitz cites Anthony Grafton that “…courtroom and the lawyer’s study have turned out to be historical alembics where the methods of social and intellectual historians can be mingled in new forms, producing results of unsuspected richness.” that “In the last quarter-century, especially, the courts have been identified as a dynamic arena of social change and as a valuable source for understanding economic history and the changing function of law in society.” Recognizing this value, many scholars have used medieval Jewish records to elucidate those periods’ history. Yet there is a lacuna when it comes to the early modern era. Consequently, the potential of beit din records remains largely untapped (p.3).[4]

Berkowitz acknowledges that, in part, the lack of use of bet din records is due to the many technical challenges, including “proficiency in Hebrew paleography and expertise in the largely unfamiliar territory of Jewish civil and family law. As a result, we know virtually nothing about the kinds of cases that came before rabbinic courts and even less concerning jurisprudence and dispute resolution methods employed there. This is rather ironic in light of the heightened interest in law shown by historians working on late medieval and early modern Europe.” (p. 3)

As mentioned, Berkowitz did two important things: he transcribed this massive work carefully and studied it as a historian of Halacha; he “mined” this work very carefully.

The transcription alone is not a small feat; we are talking about a volume that, in print form, is almost 1000 pages of Hebrew text! The Pinkas also includes obscure words in French and Yiddish, which Berkowitz also deciphers, provides a useful glossary of foreign terms.

An important feature of Berkowitz’s edition of the Pinkas is the extensive indices based on topics, names, and places.

Berkowitz writes:

The economic data contained in the proceedings of the Metz Beit Din will doubtless prove invaluable in gauging the range and intensity of Jewish commercial activity in the pre-revolutionary era… (p. 30)

Then Berkowitz elaborates on this, listing out what exactly one can learn from this Pinkas:

The Metz court records are also filled with resources for investigating the economic complexities of marriage, family, and kinship relations. A profusion of details concerning the social and economic importance of betrothal agreements, dowries, marital property division, and inheritance arrangements represent a treasure trove of historical data. Particularly fascinating are cases that reveal the degree to which law, family, property, and business interests were tightly interwoven. On occasion, the human story comes into view with unusual poignancy, especially in cases of abandoned wives, young widows, and tales of deprivation… Legal mechanisms that came into play in response to evolving social and economic trends in the eighteenth century produced a measure of equality between husbands and wives that is apparent in quite a number of cases that came before the Beit Din. Accordingly, the picture that emerges… to the work women performed beyond their domestic responsibilities. There is abundant evidence suggesting that wives borrowed and extended loans, occasionally without their husbands’ authorization, to help support their families… (pp. 30-31)

Sources for the Law

What do we Know about the Jewish Community of Metz at the time?

Berkowitz writes:

Metz was the western-most outpost of Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazic Jewry in the early modern era (p. 7) With a population of over 46,000, Metz was the tenth largest city in France. During the seventeenth century the Jewish population in Metz increased dramatically and by the end … it numbered nearly 3000 individuals. Slightly less than seven percent of the city’s total population, it constituted the largest Jewish community in France prior to the Revolution (p.8).

In general, there is also great significance to Metz in the world of Halacha at this time, as Berkowitz writes:[5]

The major halakhic works that were produced in Metz or in nearby communities in the eighteenth century and were significant from a regional standpoint include Yaʾir Ḥayyim Bacharach, Resp. Ḥavvot Yaʾir (Frankfurt, 1699); Jacob Reischer, Resp. Shevut Yaakov, pts. 1–3 (Halle, 1710), pt. 2 (Offenbach, 1719), and (Metz, 1789); Joseph Steinhardt, Resp. Zikhron Yosef (Fürth, 1773)[6]; Gershon Coblentz, Resp. Kiryat Ḥannah (Metz, 1789); and Aaron Worms, Meʾorei Or (Metz, 1790–1793) (p. 25)[7]

Why was this Pinkas written in the first place?

Berkowitz explains:

Precious little is known about the production of the Metz Beit Din records. We cannot state with certainty under whose direction these records were produced, for whom they were intended, and toward what end they were preserved in written form. Nevertheless, there was nothing novel or uncommon about providing litigants with written copies of its rulings. Documents issued by the court were intended to confirm an admission of debt, the withdrawal of a claim, the exoneration of an individual from unsubstantiated accusations, or the severance of a widow from her husband’s estate, to name only several of the more common types of validation provided by the Beit Din. In some instances, the court was asked to issue a maʾaseh beit din (a formal judgment) that confirmed ownership over property or established the legality of a particular transaction. Written rulings of this sort were frequently produced as evidence in cases that continued over the course of months or even years. Although the communal register does not contain an explicit directive concerning the actual preservation of judicial records, article 109 of the 1769 community bylaws stated that “every ruling of the Beit Din must be written and signed… It was stipulated, further, that “it is prohibited for either of the litigants to pay the other even a perutah until they have seen the written and signed judgment. (p. 39)

While there is little doubt about the value of the Pinkasim, especially as they relate to the Jewish legal system, they do not offer a complete record of the judicial process. Despite containing hundreds of legal decisions predicated on Jewish law, the Pinkasim do not provide the underlying rationale of those decisions. The decisions distinguish between those based on Jewish law, internal takanas, and custom. But the specifics of the which sources and rationales are compelling are left unsaid. This, however, is unsurprising as most Bet Din decisions, whether recorded in Pinkasim or other sources, seemingly rely upon Rema’s statement that “there is no need to write the rationales and proofs, we only write for them [i.e., for the litigants] the claims and the ruling.”

Who transcribed the Pinkas?

Precisely what role scribes played in determining the content, form, and language of the cases they recorded is unclear. Variations in handwriting, in addition to the assorted signatures affixed at the ends of collations of cases, reveal that several different court stenographers were commissioned to record the judicial proceedings during the eighteen years chronicled in the Pinkas. The largest number of entries appears to be in the hand of a single scribe, Juspa Katz, whose name is recorded in seven cases that span fifteen years (pp. 43-44).

Elaborating on this, Berkowitz adds:

In each of these instances, the document was approved by the av beit din, by the judges, or in some instances by the presiding syndic (parnas ha-ḥodesh). Overall, the stylized prose used in recording the proceedings, which are punctuated by the inclusion of biblical phrases and technical expressions drawn from talmudic and halakhic literature, suggest that the text of the Pinkas was the product of meticulous preparation by erudite scholars and well-trained scribes.

The function of the Beis Din

Berkowitz describes: “As a communal institution, the Metz Beit Din filled three principal functions. First and foremost, it was a judicial body that represented the primary, though certainly not the exclusive, public venue for the resolution of disputes among residents of the greater Metz community. Litigants regularly came from the towns and villages of the Moselle countryside as well, and in some instances from more distant localities when business dealings brought them into contact with Moselle residents. Second, as in the case of the French lower courts, the Beit Din performed bureaucratic functions that included the confirmation of legal documents and contracts, the execution of wills, and the appointment of guardians. Third, it enjoyed certain institutional powers related to social control and supervision. Although this range of functions may have resembled the merging of judicial, legislative, and executive tasks in early modern French courts, the Beit Din acted more as an arm of the Kahal executive and coordinated itself with the general policy guidelines set forth by the community’s governing body. Furthermore, on a much smaller scale, the centralized authority of the Kahal was more pronounced than that of the state and, as a result, the independence of the rabbinic court could be expected to be more narrowly circumscribed (pp. 65-66).

Who were the Dayanim on this Beis Din?

One of the critical insights of this volume is the identification of the dayanim of the Beis Din. These are generally not recorded elsewhere. Berkowitz identifies:

Rabbis Moses Narol Cohen, Gershon Ashkenazi, Jacob Reischer, Abraham Broda, Joshua Jacob Falk, Jonathan Eibeschütz, Shmuel Hilmann, and Aryeh Loeb Günzberg. Günzberg… best known as a renowned Talmudist and author of the celebrated Shaʾagat Aryeh (p. 14)

The Shagas Aryeh is well-known as a posek, but this identifies in a lesser-known role, Av Beis Din. (See Oriel Touitou, The Methods of Rabbi Pinhas Ha-Levy of Horwitz and Rabbi Aryeh Leib in Talmud Study and Halachic Decisions, (PhD) Bar Ilan University 2012; R. Peretz Risenberg, Yeshurun 30 (2014) pp. 772-824; Eliezer Brodt, Yeshurun 24 (2011), p. 463.

How many cases did this Beis din Deal with?

Berkowitz writes:

Serving as the primary communal forum where legal disputes were adjudicated, the Beit Din typically met two or three times a week and averaged roughly sixty cases per year. In accordance with standard procedure in Jewish law, three judges (dayyanim) heard each case; in virtually every instance the tribunal consisted of the av beit din (Günzberg) together with two adjunct dayyanim. In the course of the eighteen years that are chronicled in the Pinkas, fifteen rabbinic judges rotated on the Beit Din alongside the chief justice. Of these sixteen judges, four sat on the bench for the entire period and several others performed their duties for most of those years (p. 15).

Methods of the Beis Din

They did not just give verdicts. They personally investigated the facts.

Concerning a dispute over the suitability of the living space in which an orphan resided together with his uncle, the Beit Din decided to pay a visit to investigate whether the physical conditions in the home were as required. It also hired a nurse to provide a medical perspective, and two more to corroborate the opinion of the first. After taking these steps the Beit Din was persuaded that the orphan was not mistreated and there were no grounds for legal action against the guardians (p. 70)

What do we know about the “reach of this Beis din”?

Berkowitz writes:

These are strong indications of the stability and continuity that characterized the work of the court during nearly two decades of service to the community. Equally impressive is the long geographical reach of the Metz Beit Din. Litigants came from near and far, from Augny located just 8 kilometers southwest of Metz and as far as Frankfurt, which was a distance of 260 kilometers. To accommodate individuals who were unable to travel to Metz from distant communities in the Moselle, the rabbinic court occasionally made special arrangements… In order to reduce expenses, the local cantor was deputized by the Metz Beit Din to administer the widow’s oath… in the presence of one witness. Altogether, more than one hundred villages throughout the Moselle countryside and beyond are mentioned in the court proceedings. These distances reveal much about the far-flung commercial and financial dealings of Metz residents and the centralization of authority in the Moselle region and in areas of Lorraine (pp. 15-16).

The Metz Beis Din and Secular Law

Berkowitz writes:

Without surrendering its own authority, the Beit Din regularly acknowledged the interdependence of cases brought before the rabbinic judges and those taken to the French civil court system. But on numerous occasions the Beit Din made it clear that it would need to await the judgment of the French court before it could issue its own ruling. In a case concerning the division of living space, it declared that its decision was valid “so long as the gentile courts do not object.” It is striking that even in matters that were presumably of minimal interest to the authorities, the Beit Din was hampered by contingencies of this sort… the Metz Beit Din enjoyed substantial independence from state interference and control. Whether they were considering contractual matters, offenses against the public order, or the civil consequences of strictly religious affairs, municipal and royal courts firmly imposed their jurisdiction and exercised the right to overturn the decisions of the ecclesiastical courts when there was evidence of a procedural irregularity. Moreover, the powers of ecclesiastical courts were limited to canonical penalties. The Beit Din, with the full support of the Kehillah leadership, was granted greater latitude by the state to resolve internal differences on the basis of Jewish legal traditions that extended primarily to civil matters. Nevertheless, neither the Kehillah nor the Beit Din was able to ignore pressures to coordinate with and adapt to general law…. How the Metz Beit Din functioned alongside the French civil courts may be the crucial question, but, as will become apparent, it is exceedingly difficult to answer. Complicating the issue is the fact that recourse to French civil courts appears to have accelerated as the eighteenth century wore on. Individuals who took their disputes to gentile courts, known in rabbinic and halakhic literature as ʿarkhaʾot shel goyim, were consistently denounced by medieval and early modern rabbinic authorities (pp. 107-108)

Berkowitz continues:

The present study addresses a different set of questions: How did jurists within the rabbinic court system respond to the challenges to Jewish law that were posed by non-Jewish legal systems? Is there any evidence that judicial procedure in the Beit Din, or the interpretation of the law itself, was influenced by French law or by the possibility of recourse to French civil courts? How did the phenomenon of legal pluralism influence the methods of adjudication and jurisprudence employed in the Metz rabbinic court? The impact of legal pluralism may be discerned in the court’s adoption and adaptation of legal perspectives and mechanisms from general jurisprudence, both in the realm of procedure and in substantive areas of law such as the division of marital property. Invariably, the Beit Din’s method of adjudication reveals tensions between its role as guardian of communal autonomy and the political demands imposed by legal centralism—tensions between its role as arbiter of Jewish law and agent of the Kahal, on the one hand, and its awareness of the contingent nature of the relationship between Jewish law and general law, on the other (pp. 109-110).[8]

Power of the Jewish courts in Early Modern France:

The proceedings of the Metz Beit Din provide elaborate details concerning Jewish civil autonomy. Under the aegis of the governing authority of the Kehillah, the Beit Din was authorized by the state to resolve differences among members of the community on the basis of Jewish customs and legal traditions. In this respect the Beit Din enjoyed a level of authority that far exceeded that granted to the ecclesiastical courts… Overall, the Metz proceedings contain little evidence, either direct or indirect, of resistance to its juridical authority (p.53)

Related to this, a case in the Pinkas is worth citing. As Berkowitz summarizes:

In Metz, as in other communities, the authority exercised by the Beit Din and the scope of its jurisdiction were a reflection of the latitude extended to it by royal and municipal authorities. Owing to limitations on the power of the Kehillah to enforce judicial rulings, the Beit Din found it necessary on certain occasions to caution recalcitrant litigants that failure to respond to a summons carried severe consequences. In the case of Gershon Coblentz, who refused to appear before the Beit Din to settle a dispute with Yozel Cahen, the Beit Din threatened to serve him with a contempt of court order (pequdat ḥerem) and to employ “other forms of coercion.” How effective these threats could have been without the backing of the state is questionable. Coblentz remained adamant in his “rebellion and refusal, holding up the words of the rabbis to ridicule,” whereupon Yozel proceeded to seek authorization from the Beit Din to bring his claim to the French court. The Beit Din informed Gershon that it had approved the transfer of the case to the civil court, and following their response that they did not object, the rabbinic court authorized Yozel to take hold of the written documentation, in French, so that he could sue in the civil court (p. 54).

Who represented the people for the Beis Din?

In more than a third of the cases that were brought to the Metz Beit Din, litigants were represented by their own attorneys. This is likely to have been a (sic) commonplace in rabbinic courts in other communities as well. The scope of legal representation in rabbinic courts had widened considerably in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries (p. 60)

Implications for Jewish History from the Pinkas

Knowledge of French

Berkowitz writes:

Although the foregoing examples suggest that French literacy was more prevalent among Metz Jews than has been generally assumed, there is little doubt that facility in French was far less extensive in the countryside than among the urban elite. Even fifty years after the Revolution there were still Jews in the small towns and villages of Alsace and Lorraine who could not speak French. The records of the Beit Din suggest that although the scribes who had been assigned the task of recording the case summaries were familiar with a wide range of technical French vocabulary pertaining to judicial procedure and financial instruments, their fluency may have been limited to oral proficiency. (pp. 93-94)

In addition to gleaning information regarding the legal and judicial practices, the Pinkas also provide information regarding the day-to-day life of the Jews in Metz and beyond. Some of these lead to the important conclusion that “confirm[s] that even prior to the Revolution, cultural influences transcended social barriers, and this appears to have been true for a larger segment of the Jewish population than is commonly assumed.” (p. 95). Others, however, point to more prosaic elements of the lives of the Jews. Nonetheless, the Pinkas is a primary source for assessing their lifestyle and everyday trials and tribulations, and is essential to paint objective picture of their lives.

Some Interesting cases which show life was rather colorful:

On one occasion, when informed that a woman who was engaged to be married had become pregnant, the Beit Din summoned her and her fiancé in order to ascertain whether he was the father and, assuming he was, to ensure compliance with Jewish law if the couple intended to marry. According to Talmudic law, a man is forbidden to marry a woman who was either pregnant by another man or who is nursing another man’s child until the child is twenty-four months old. In response to a husband’s claim that his wife’s pregnancy was not his doing, the Beit Din proceeded to investigate the matter thoroughly. Based on the wife’s acknowledgment of her extra-marital affair, as well as the testimony of witnesses confirming the utter lack of affection between husband and wife, the Beit Din absolved the husband of all financial responsibility for the child and ordered him to divorce his wife; she, in turn, was required to accept the get, even against her will, on account of her confession. Because marriage and sexuality were matters of vital interest to the public, the Beit Din acted swiftly, in some instances before litigants came forward (pp. 68-69)[9]

Another colorful case discussed by Berkowitz regarded:

Reichle Cahen… approached the Kahal in its meeting room and openly accused Hirtz Oulif of fathering her child; she demanded that he marry her and provide birth expenses and child support. Initially heard by the Kahal, the case caused something of a furor because of the public nature of the young woman’s accusation and owing to her family’s elevated status within the community. The Beit Din was invited to join the Kahal in its effort to stave off the worrisome trend, and the head of the rabbinic court, R. Günzberg, was asked to lead the new initiative. Although ill-health prevented Günzberg’s participation, members of the Beit Din proceeded, together with several syndics, to examine the arguments and testimony presented by Reichle and Hirtz… the Beit Din demanded that Reichle and Hirtz address each other directly, without legal representation. Hirtz proceeded to deny each of Reichle’s claims as utterly false. Aiming “to uphold the bylaws of the community,” the Beit Din responded by imposing the ḥerem on both the young woman and the young man, undoubtedly to convey the message that promiscuous behavior would not be tolerated under any circumstances. But when it came out that there were witnesses willing to testify that the young man was heard boasting of his exploits, the Kahal and the Beit Din altered their approach. They recorded the statements in writing, assembled additional oral testimony attesting to the accuracy of the earlier statements, and subsequently set about to erect “a fence and barrier against the promiscuity of the generation and so that daughters will not act wantonly or be treated as such.” At this point the Beit Din imposed the ban directly on Hirtz until such time as he had appeased Reichle by agreeing either to marry her or present her with monetary compensation. It further required him to deposit 1200 livres with the Kahal until the birth, at which point it would be determined whether Reichle’s paternity claim was plausible. If it was, then the money would be turned over to Reichle; if not, the money would be returned to him. In any event, the Beit Din required him to pay a fine of three hundred lives that would be distributed to the poor…(pp. 147-148)[10]

Seats in Shul

In one instance, the Beit Din authorized a widow to sell two synagogue seats and to collect the total value of her ketubah, even though a lien had been placed on the property of the orphans, earmarking it as a charitable bequest. Selling the seats enabled the widow to remove the lien on her ketubah and tosefta, in accordance with both Jewish and general law. (p. 71)[11]

Looking at the index will show that the Beis Din had to deal with many issues with seats in shul.

Gorel: Lotteries

Numerous cases were resolved via lotteries, as listed in the index. These provide additional materials related to lotteries in Jewish culture. See Yechiel Lash, The Attitudes of Halachic Decisors to the Casting of Lots Within a Decision-Making Process and Their Implications, (Ph.D. Bar Ilan Talmud Department 2012); Shraga Bar-On, Lot Casting, God and Man in Jewish Literature: From the Bible to the Renaissance (heb.), Ramat Gan 2020; Eliezer Brodt, Likutei Eliezer, pp. 56-58; Fram, pp. 47-49.

We learn about the Beis Din’s involvement in helping people experiencing poverty:

… details of charitable giving, including laws regulating confraternities and poor relief, particularly when complications demanded the court’s legal expertise. In nearly a dozen cases, the Beit Din was approached concerning the practice of supplying the itinerant poor with billets, known in Yiddish as pletten. Each Metz householder, in proportion to his wealth, was required by communal law to deposit pletten, inscribed with their names, in a chest. Poor travelers would then draw tickets in order to secure meals and a night’s lodging offered at the homes of community members. Questions ranged from the basis upon which the pletten obligations were to be determined for each resident to how to contend with individuals who refused to share the responsibility… (p. 72)

Another interesting case:

In a parallel dispute concerning the administration of a charitable gift bequeathed by an estate, the Beit Din was asked to decide whether the Kahal had the right to exercise control against the wishes of the heirs. Ẓadok Grumbach objected to the Kahal’s insistence that one of twelve rooms in the beit midrash established with funds donated by his grandfather, Abraham Grumbach, ought to be designated for elementary instructional purposes. His attorney argued that this would violate the will of the deceased and contradict prior judgments of the court. It had been understood that the rooms in the upper level were intended for lomdim (scholars) who had been appointed through the generosity of the benefactor and in whose merit they dedicated their efforts; the noise caused by younger students would arguably create a disturbance for the lomdim. Grumbach therefore sued the Kahal for breach of contract.

The attorney for the Kahal responded that the placement of a teacher and students in the room in question would be preferable to leaving it empty, and that in so doing the Kahal would remain in compliance with previous agreements and legal rulings. As a matter of policy, he argued further on the basis of talmudic law that the seven tovei haʾir (the talmudic term used to refer to the lay communal executive council) had the authority to alter a communal ordinance if the intent was to increase learning and expand Torah instruction. The Beit Din upheld the position of the Kahal, arguing that the placement of a teacher and five students in a room on the first level was consistent with the original intent of the testator. It maintained that it was fair to assume that Abraham would have wished the room to be used for instructional purposes rather than to remain empty and that such use would be in the merit of the soul of the deceased… (pp.76-77)

Sins and daily life:

Berkowitz writes:

As traditional barriers separating Jews and non-Jews began to fall after midcentury, communal leaders responded with new attempts to slow the pace of acculturation. Their efforts, though perhaps not religiously motivated, recognized the dangers implicit in excessive exposure to French culture. Games of leisure and chance had become so popular that any person found engaged in these pastimes without the authorization of the community council could be barred from attending synagogue for three years. Paternity suits and extramarital pregnancies were routinely recorded in the communal register and in the protocols of the Beit Din, and the repeated condemnation of extravagance over the course of the eighteenth century suggests that these trends were on the rise. (p.13)

Card Playing & Gambling

There are numerous sources of this kind in various documents throughout Jewish history. One of the most well-known personal accounts appears in R. Yehudah Areyeh Modena’s autobiography. (See generally, Yitzhak Rivkin, Der kamf kegn azartshpiln bay Yidn, (YIVO, 1940).

In the Pinkas we find:

שאמת הוא שהי׳ עובר חרם ע״י שחוק רק שאין כוונתו כמו עוברי חרמים המשחקי׳ בקובי׳ וקארטין רק שהי׳ משחק שחוק אחר שקורין לאדי אצל חתן אחד ושחוק זה ג״כ חרם וב״ח הנ״ל השיב שאין חוששין ללעז ורבי׳ הי׳ אומרי׳ לו שרגיל בעיני המון עם לשחוק [שחוק 192 ] זה אצל חתנים [עמ’ 514]

Other kind of cases which demonstrate a bit about daily life:

In the same vein, the numerous disputes brought before the Beit Din that pertained to building construction and repairs, water damage, and privacy concerns bring to light otherwise hidden aspects of everyday life in the eighteenth century. In a case that concerned the management of public space, residents of a building were fined by the civil court for failing to keep the rear of the property free of litter; the court instructed them to hire a non-Jewish gardener to keep the property clean in accordance with the requirements of the law.

A dispute regarding the relocation of an outhouse, specifically concerning the claim that the work was not performed correctly, was brought to the police-court and was subsequently resolved to the satisfaction of the residents. In a similar case, the placement of an outhouse adjacent to a separation wall between two properties became a contested matter; in this instance it was the Beit Din that was asked to settle the question of the potential physical harm that might result. Disputes pertaining to construction, plumbing, and shared space reveal that it was quite common for Jews to hire non-Jewish workers and to seek the opinion of non-Jewish experts. Such patterns ought to be viewed as a natural consequence of the dependence of the Jewish community on the larger French population to help meet its ordinary, everyday needs… (p. 96)

Jewish Financing of the Military.

Another interesting tidbit found in the Pinkas described by Berkowitz is typical of other Rich Jews:

A probate inventory detailing the property left by Rabbi David Hertzfeld in 1776 lists among those who owed money to the deceased seven heads of military regiments: Orléans, Poitou, La Couronne, Royal Roussillon, Touraine, Auvergne, and Navarre. Although the total amount still owed was modest—approximately 12,000 livres—the lending network had a long reach and its success no doubt demanded extraordinary efforts in earning and maintaining the trust of this specialized clientele (p. 103).

Commercial enterprises at the time in Metz:

In the Pinkas, we find:

For sources in the Beit Din records on commercial enterprise, see the following: Horse trade… sheep trade… cows… Forage… partnership for forage, straw, and oats… Wax… Brokerage… Gems…Cheese: Vol. 1, pt. 2, 30b, no. 122; in Vol. 2, 46b, no. 149, the sale of cheese beneath a shop prompted the storeowner to complain that the pungent smell was harming his business; he asked the Beit Din for a restraining order on the cheese maker. For partnerships with non-Jews, see Vol. 2, 28b, no. 194 (p.11)…

Material Culture & Contemporary style in Metz

Fabrics, clothing, jewelry and valuable gems, as listed in various types of registers, particularly collateral and probate inventories, provide strong indications of the affinity of Metz Jews with French culture. An impressive variety of fabrics is recorded in the Pinkas; these include drap d’or (cloth woven with gold) and drap d’argent (cloth woven with silver); drap d’Elbeuf (fabric produced in Elbeuf, a town in Normandy specializing in weaving wool); drap de Sicile (a silk fabric produced in Sicily); gros de Tours

And Berkowitz’s list goes on for a while (p. 94)

Berkowitz then adds an essential point to the significance of all this:

The numerous references to luxurious fabrics, ornate clothing, housewares, and precious stones that punctuate cases throughout the Pinkas reveal a strong attraction to contemporary styles. Jewish merchants who imported fine fabrics to Metz from various producers in northern and central France were responsible, at least in part, for the sophisticated taste in the Jewish community, as were pawnbrokers who accumulated and sometimes sold silver and gold tableware received in pledges. These examples confirm that even prior to the Revolution, cultural influences transcended social barriers, and this appears to have been true for a larger segment of the Jewish population than is commonly assumed. The allure of fine fabrics, clothing, dinnerware, and jewelry is recorded in extraordinary detail throughout the Pinkas. Taken together in its totality, the fascination with luxury assists in sketching the portrait of an acculturated minority… (p. 95)

As mentioned, the Pinkas has material related to the related to the Shages Aryeh. It even provides a list of the seforim he owned. (p. 270).

רשימה מהספרים שהמה למשכון ביד פו״מ הקצין כ׳ שמואל לוי מהרבנות של אדמ״ו הגאון אב״ד דקהילתינו מיץ יע״א זצ״ל
ספר רב אלפס ד׳ אמשטרדם פ״ד ליוור
יוד זוהר סמך ליוור
מדרש רבה ד׳ אמשטרדם י״ב ליוור
טורים ד׳ ווילמרשטארף ך״ד ליוור
טורי׳ ד׳ וויניציאה ח״י ליוור
יוד פרי חדש על א״ח י״ב ליוור
רמב״ם ד׳ אמשטרדם עם הלחם משנה סמך ליוור
אשלי רברבי ח״י ליוור
פני יהושע על סדר נשים ד׳ אמשטרדם טית ליוור
מכלל יופי

הספרים אלו כפי הרשימה הנ״ל המה למשכון ביד פו״מ הנ״ל מהרבנות הנ״ל. וכפי מאמרו מגיע לו מן הרבנות הנ״ל סך שלשה מאות שלשים וחמשה ליוור י״ד סוא ו״ד. ונישום המשכון הנ״ל עפ״י בקיאין בעד סך שלשה מאות ליוור. ועפ״י הבירור שנתברר ע״י עדים כשרים שהזוהר ופרי חדש שנתנה הרבנות הנ״ל לפו״מ הנ״ל שייכי׳ לחתנה מו״ה ליב כאשר כבר יצא מפי ב״ד מקדמת שפו״מ הנ״ל מחויב להחזיר לאשת מו״ה ליב הזוהר ופרי חדש

It should not be strange to see the Zohar listed among his books. Although not as well known, he was also an expert in Kabbalah.

Elsewhere we find about his seforim (p. 911):

לפ״פ דמיין ומשם לקיניגשבערג. ומספר הספרים שבתוך ארגזי׳ הנ״ל המה קכ״ה שו״ת שאגת ארי׳ וארבעה מאות ועשרים טורי אבן שחבר המנו׳ זצ״ל. ושני מאות ושמני׳ ספרי רשב״א על נדה שנדפסו פה. נמצא לאחר נכוי מדמי מכירה הנ״ל שעולה שבעה אלפים וששה מאות ותשעים וששה ליוור ד״י סוא כנ״ל את מה שהחזיק מו״ה יצחק

Today it is commonplace for everyone to acquire their own esrog. Yet, historically, it was very difficult and expensive to obtain an esrog. In the Pinkas, we find:

… גם לא באתרוג… וע״ד דמי האתרוג השיב כ׳ מאיר באשר שהי׳ מתיירא שידחו אותו חוצה ולא יתנו לו חלק באתרוג של הקהל הי׳ מוכרח לקנות לו לעצמו אתרוג מיוחד בכן אינו מחויב ליתן כלום לדמי אתרוג של הקהל… ((pp.471-472

In the Pinkas of Cracow, we find the same:

הסופר בפקודתם כל ההכנסות מכל בתי כנסיות ומן כל החברות דפה… גם החשבונות מכל ההוצאות שהוציאו מקופת הצדקה… וכן לקנות אתרוגים לחלקם לכל בתי כנסיות…” [כלילת יופי, ב’ דף סז ע”א]

R’ Dovid Nieto in his Kuzari Hasheni (p.25), writes related to this:

“בחג הסוכות אמר הכתוב ולקחתם… פרי עץ הדר… ואפשר שהכוונה היא על רמון נאה… אבל הם ז”ל פירשו שהוא אתרוג דווקא ופסלו כל מה שאינו אתרוג ממש כפי הסימנים אשר מסרונו אף על פי שיהיה מאותו המין, וזה גורם הוצאה רבה ועגמת נפש גדולה ליושבי ארצות ואקלים הקרים לפי שצריך שיביאו להם אתרוג מארץ הרחוקים לחוג בו את חג הסכות בהוצאה רבה. ולא עלתה תלונותי כי אין ציבור עני, אלא שלפעמים יש להם ההוצאה אבל לא השבח של המצוה כגון כשלא הגיע לידם אלא בתוך ימי החג או אחריו התאמין אדוני המלך שאנשים חכמים ונובנים בדו כל זה מלבם טעם ויסוד אחר אלא להתשרר על הצבור”.

A Possible Alternative Use of the Pinkas: Testing Rabbinical Candidates

As mentioned above, while the Pinkas is an invaluable source of Beis Din decisions, the rationale of those decisions is left unstated.

Fram writes:

Even in communities where such records do exist, such as Metz, whose rabbinic court records have recently been published in a monumental volume by Jay Berkovitz, there are over a thousand rulings but no rationales for judgments. This is not surprising. Ashkenazic tradition did not require rabbinic courts to rationalize their decisions. As Rabbi Moses Isserles expressed it in Shulhan `Arukh, basing himself on an earlier source: “There is no need to write the rationales and proofs, we only write for them [i.e., for the litigants] the claims and the ruling.”

Berkowitz writes:

The Beit Din was guided in its rulings by several types of law of Jewish and general provenance. Jewish law comprised talmudic principles… Traditional Jewish law, based on the Talmud and medieval / early modern codes, is the legal foundation of the Pinkas. However, no texts of the Jewish legal tradition are ever referenced by name in the rabbinic court proceedings, and even oblique references to the views of poseqim or to rabbinic responsa are extremely rare. Nevertheless, the occasional use of a talmudic phrase or of a halakhic argument that presumably guided judges in their decisions offers unmistakable clues as to the sources upon which the Beit Din relied (p. 57)

Earlier Berkowitz writes:

To appreciate the interaction of Metz Jews with French law and society will require a careful examination of the legal discourse that is submerged deeply in the rabbinic court records. That goal is not readily within reach, however, owing to the Beit Din’s routine omission of the sources upon which it relied and because of its failure to indicate the reasoning that informed its decisions. This was standard practice in cases reported by rabbinic courts in almost every locality. In sharp contrast with rabbinic responsa, no effort was made by rabbinic courts to document their engagement of earlier and contemporary sources or to define the technical-legal issues under review… (p.33)

The lack of rationale provides for a creative usage of these Pinkasim for pesak. They can be used as a “Jeopardy-type” test for future Dayanim, and similar to a modern law school exam where one is only presented a fact pattern but is required to elucidate the rationale and law behind those. Examiners could provide the Pinkas ruling and require students to articulate the reasoning. Let them read the case, etc., and the conclusions and try to document, as a test of their knowledge, the possible sources that they would suggest could be the rational for the Dayanim’s pesak.

Indeed, there are historical antecedents to this form of examination. For example, R’ Efrayim Zalman Margolis describes in his youth what his father did with him:

זכורני כשהייתי תינוק שהגיע לעונת הפעוטות לקחני אבי מורי הגאון ז”ל וחינך אותי לשעות… וכשהייתי כבן תשע היו עמי שעשועי… אשמורת הבוקר יעיר לו משנתי ולפניו שניתי כמה סדרים עד שהיו בפי שנונים ושגורים ובידי סדורים והגעתי ליותר מחצי הש”ס בזמן קצר וכמעט לאומרם בע”פ ממני לא יבצר ובכל זמן ועידן עמי היו מתעדן לטייל עמי בהלכות ושמעי לאזני חדושים באגדות ומדרשים… היה עורך דין דאיתא בשאלה בספרי שות ודרש ידרוש מעמי אם אשמע לפתור על אתר… [בית אפרים, על הלכות טריפות הריאה, בסוף הקדמה שניה].

 

There are also a number of seforim that are composed of riddles to sharpen the student’s mind.

In 1545 R’ Yakov Landau published one in the back of his Sefer HaAgur called Sefer Chazan. R’ Efrayim Heksher published another one called Divrei Chachamim VeChedusim in 1743. Another one worth mentioning is in the excellent work Kerem Shlomo published in 1840. One last one to mention is R’ Yosef Zechariah Stern in Shut Zecher Yosef, Orach Chaim 2, at the end has two pages with an introduction of earlier sources for this. This is part of his much larger work on the subject, which was not published. Most recently, they published R’ Chaim Kanievsky’s Tests that he gave on Shas; the questions are also like riddles [See, for example, Kovetz Eitz Chaim 37 (2022), pp. 393-433]. These riddles are very unique in their approach. Of course, similar to the Metz Pinkas, R. Kanievsky provided little in the way of the underlying rationale his pesakim. (See also Yakov Shmuel Spiegel, “Academies in Italy and the Permission to hold Academia on Shabbos Day: The Responsa of R. Isaac Ben Asher Pacifico,” in Mekhilta, 3, 79-124).

In conclusion, Berkowitz’s work is a tour de force. The transcription, notes, and excurses provide a unique window into the judicial process and have implications beyond the law. While the contents are not a complete record of Metz, it is a sufficiently large data set that provides a wealth of avenues for exploration. All of these volumes are worth reviewing in-depth and, no doubt, will considerably enrich Jewish scholarship on Jewish courts and related subjects.

[1] Berkowitz also devoted numerous articles to this work many of which are available here.
[2] See also R. Dovid Kamentsky Toras Hagra, pp.134-137, 183-199.
[3] See Refael Kroizer, The Literature of “Shemot Gittin”: Formation, Meaning and Implication, M.A. TAU University (2019), pp.6-20.
[4] On Beis Din in Germany in the Middle Ages see: Moshe Frank, KeHilot Ashkenaz Ubatei Dinahen, Tel Aviv 1938: For a General overview of the Topic of Beis din See the Classic work of Louis Finkelstein, Jewish Self Goverment in the Middle Ages, (1964). See R’ Chaim Benish, השיפוט היהודי בראי ההיסטוריה מבית שני ועד ימינו. On Going to Non-Jewish courts see R. Uri Teiger, Kuntres Mishapat Aseh; R’ Chaim Benish, Arkot BeHalacha.
[5] Another collection of Metz rabbinic discussions, including those of the Sha’gas Areyeh was published in 2013. See Sefer Toras Chachmei Metz, (Jerusalem, 2013).
[6] For an excellent collection of material regarding Steinhardt, see Binyamim Hamburger, HaYeshiva ha-Ramah vi-Fyorda: ‘ir Torah vi-derom Germanyah u-Ge’oneha, vol. 2, (Bene Berak, 2010), 127-238).
[7] On this fascinating person, see earlier studies by Berkowitz (here) and Yakov Shmuel Speigel, “`Al ha-Yehus le-Chiburav shel R’ Ahron Vorms,” in Yerushaseinu 3 (2009), 269-309.
[8] See also, pp. 123-134 for Berkowitz’s careful documented discussion.
[9] See also p.119 for another similar such case. See Fram, p. 43 for similar kind of cases.
[10] These kind of “issues” can be found in numerous Teshuvah literature for example see R. Joseph Steinhardt, Zichron Yosef which was published in 1773:

א. נשאל נשאלתי על איש אחד רך בשנים מבלי בנים פה במדינות עלזוס סמוך לנהר רינוס שכבר נודע ונתפרסם שזינתה אשתו עם בחור אחד ואח”כ המירו שניהם ונשאו זה לזו היוכל בעלה הראשון לקחת אשה אחר’ עלי’ בלתי זיכוי גט לאשתו הראשונ’ שהמירה יען כי כבד עליו הדבר לעשותו לזכות לה גט מכמה טעמים ידועים והעיקר מפאת דאגתו כי יהי’ מוכרח לפיזר ולהוציא הון רב אחרי עשותו כן לזכות לה גט: נער אחד שהתקשר לישא נערה אחת שהי’ מצוי ורגיל עמה תמיד שנתעברה היא אמרה ממנו והוא כפר מתחלה ולבסוף הודה האם רשאי רשאי לקחתה תוך ימי ההנקה: [סי’ א]

ב. שאלה נער אחד הי’ רגיל ומצוי תמיד אצל בתולה אחת ולבסוף נעשה קישור תנאים ביניהם ואח”כ בא עליה נער החתן בזנות ונתעברה ממנו וכאשר הגידה לו פסולה הנ”ל שהיא מעוברת הבטיחה כי ח”ו לא יבגוד בה רק ישאנה כדמו”י. אכן אחרי בואו לאחיו ובית אביו סיפר להם איך כי כלתו לפ”ד מעוברת מן איש אחר בלעדו ושהוא לא בא עליה מעולם [סי’ ב]

ג. שאלה נער אחד בשמו ראובן העיד לפני הב”ד על פלונית א”א בפני’ ובפני בעלה איך שביקש’ ממנו לבוא לביתה בליל שלמחרתה הוכנס לברית בן זכר שנולד לאחיו וכן עשה ובבואו לביתה ונתיחד עמה הרגילתו ממש ותובעתו לבוא עלי’ וכן עשה שבא עלי’ אמנם האשה הכחישתו ואמרה מעולם לא נגעת בי ואפי’ באצב’ קטנה. ואח”כ בא הנער שמעון והעיד גם הוא איך שפעם אחת ביקשה ממנו האשה שיבוא לביתה בליל שבועות וישכוב שם ובאשר שבעלה איננו בביתו ורק אצל הח”ק ישכוב עמה והוא שמע אלי’ ובא ושכב עמה והאשה הכחישה גם אותו בפנינו ואמרה מעולם לא נגעת בי ועוד עברו ביניהם שם במעמד הב”ד דברים מכוערים רבים כהנה ויען כי לפ”ד אין נפקותא בהם לענין דינא לא העתקתים… [סי’ ז]

[11] See also Fram p. 47.




The Anatomy of a Mystery: Kohanim, Dissection, and Medical Training Throughout History

The Anatomy of a Mystery: Kohanim, Dissection, and Medical Training Throughout History

Rabbi Edward Reichman, MD

In September of 2024, I accidentally opened the portal to a priestly mystery. While searching for references to the first Jewish students to attend the University of Gottingen Medical School, I came across an antisemitic work published in 1753 about the general dishonesty of Jews and Jewish oaths.[1] Therein were a few disparaging references to Jewish physicians,[2] one of whom was named Lehmann Isaac Kohen. A parenthetical footnote,3 likely precipitated by the student’s last name, caught my attention. The author references an entry in a German newspaper from 1750 regarding Jewish members of the tribes of Aaron and Levi, ritual defilement upon exposure to the dead, anatomical dissection, and the training and practice of medicine.

Further research revealed that the antecedent to this 1750 reference was a brief entry in an earlier issue of the same German newspaper, Braunschweigische Anzeigen, from 1748,[4] posing a query for the readership:

Can one prove from the Old Testament, as well as from the Talmud, or other Jewish scribes, that a Jew from the tribe of Levi or Aaron cannot or may not become a doctor? And whether God has expressly forbidden this in the Old Testament?

It would be eighteen months until a response to this query was published:[5]

In chapter 21, verses 1-11 of the second book of Moses, it is written: The LORD spoke to Moses saying: Tell the priests, Aaron’s sons, and say to them: A priest shall not defile himself by contact with the dead among his people. If, therefore, the Levites are not permitted to approach any dead person and defile themselves thereby, it follows that they are not allowed to observe dissections of corpses or participate in such procedures. And since they are thus prevented from studying anatomy, which is the very foundation of medicine, it also follows that they cannot properly learn medicine and become true medical practitioners.

Brückmann. D.

As to the precipitant for this query, I can only conjecture. Was it perhaps an encounter of the editor with a Kohen who informed him of this idiosyncratic Jewish law as he contemplated attending medical school? I suspect not, and there is no evidence of such. While the city of Braunschweig (AKA Brunswick) did not have a medical school, there were numerous medical schools in Germany where, by this period in history, hundreds of Jews were attending.[6] More likely, it was a hypothetical academic theological question, albeit with some confusion and conflation of the tribes of Kohen and Levi, untethered to any specific reality.

Introduction to a Priestly Mystery

You may wonder why I draw your attention to this passage, which hardly seems novel. Anyone remotely familiar with medical halakha, or Jewish law in general, is certainly aware of the basic laws of purity as they relate to a Kohen. Yet, what is most extraordinary about these few lines, buried in an obscure German eighteenth century local newspaper, is that as far as I was aware at the time, this was the only reference to the issue of Kohanim, anatomy, and medical training in the pre-Modern era. Prior to the discovery of this passage, I had not encountered a single discussion specifically addressing Kohanim training in medicine in either Jewish or non-Jewish sources prior to the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.

The issue of anatomical dissection in medical training is a staple of contemporary medical halakhic discourse.[7] The first halakhic references to general anatomical dissection are in the late eighteenth century, with the famous responsa of the Nodah biYehuda and Rabbi Yaakov Emden, yet they contain no discussion about Kohanim.[8] I have recently uncovered clear evidence that the Jewish community of Padua was dealing with the halakhic issue of cadaveric dissection already since the very time of Andreas Vesalius (16th century), long before the days of the Noda biYehuda, but also no specific reference here to Kohanim.

The question of Kohanim, dissection and the practice of medicine has been amply discussed in modern rabbinic literature.[9] Male members of the priestly tribe (Kohen-singular, Kohanim- plural) are proscribed from exposure to ritual impurity, the human corpse being the archetypal example. The prohibited exposure entails not just direct contact, but even being under the same enclosure as a corpse (tumat ohel). As hands-on human anatomical dissection, involving direct and prolonged exposure to a corpse, is a sine qua non of current medical training, the anatomy lab serves as a potential impediment for a Kohen interested in becoming a physician.[10]

Due to these halakhic concerns, numerous rabbinic authorities prohibit outright a Kohen from entering the medical profession, though others offer halakhically acceptable options. Indeed, when the Albert Einstein College of Medicine was established by Yeshiva University, the issue of offering admission to Kohanim was raised.[11] In an article written on the occasion of the first graduating class of Einstein, Myron Kolatch addressed the complex interplay of religion and medicine at the institution:

Frequently cited as an example of how the medical school violates the Torah is its willingness to accept students of priestly descent, kohanim. Leviticus, 21: 1-4 states: “And the Lord said unto Moses: Speak unto the priests the sons of Aaron and say unto them: There shall none defile himself for the dead among his people…

Clearly, the issue has never been settled beyond dispute, and Yeshiva’s policy that each kohen who wants to take up medicine must determine his own course, certainly does not indicate a blatant disregard for the Torah.

Some sixty years hence the halakhic landscape regarding Kohanim and medical school remains largely unchanged. There have been and continue to be Kohanim who attend medical school under halakhic guidance, with varied unique modifications.

Here I do not revisit the detailed halakhic analyses but address the historical contours of the discussions. According to Rabbi Bleich, one of the first halakhic authorities to raise the issue of Kohanim physicians and the prohibition of tumah was Rabbi Isaac Shmuel Reggio in 1854.[12] The context of the case was a Kohen physician who was tasked with confirming the death of a patient who was previously pronounced dead by another physician.13] This particular query was made in the historical context of a Western society that collectively questioned the ability of physicians to accurately diagnose death. As such, it was legislated in many European countries that after the initial preliminary diagnosis of death, a physician was legally required to confirm the diagnosis with serial exams over the next few days prior to burial. [14] In the aforementioned case, the physician chosen for this job happened to be a Kohen.[15]

In addition to this unique case, halakhic discussions regarding Kohanim and medicine have largely addressed two issues: 1) The propriety of a Kohen physician attending to a critically ill patient (gosses)[16] given the high probability of the patient’s demise and subsequent conveyance of impurity. 2) The permissibility of a Kohen physician, who in the course of his practice violates the prohibitions of tumah exposure, to participate in Kohen-specific religious ceremonies, such as bestowing the priestly blessing (nesiat kapayim). Even these discussions only begin in the halakhic literature of the 19th and 20th centuries, with nary a trace prior, and are limited to Kohanim who were practicing physicians. Contemporary halakhic discussions on the Kohen in medical training proceed with an analysis of primary sources and do not cite any responsa or any other references from the premodern era about a Kohen medical student.

If Jews have been training as physicians for millennia, with presumably many Dr. Cohens among them, how could it be that this halakhic topic seems to have escaped serious rabbinic or any historical treatment until so recently? How do we explain the conspicuous silence in the historical record?

As this source from the Braunschweigische Anzeigen seemed purely academic, is found in a non-Jewish secular periodical, and provided no additional references, it contributed little to our mystery. The portal to the priestly mystery had opened a crack, but no wider.

While this source was discovered serendipitously (i.e., hashgachah), surely a fresh dissection of the halakhic and historical literature today, given the expansive and easy access, would reveal many previously unknown sources addressing Kohanim, dissection, and medical training in the premodern era. Or perhaps not. After an extensive search, to date, I have identified exactly one single additional relevant source before the nineteenth century, albeit of significance.

This passage also derives from a non-Jewish source, the work of Carl Wilhelm Friedrich Grattenauer (1770-1838), a German lawyer and anti-Semitic publicist, though it records a Jewish exchange.

In 1817 Grattenauer published a work devoted entirely to the tribe of Aaron,[17] where in the context of ridiculing the archaic Jewish laws related to Kohanim, and lamenting the “obscurantism” of the Rabbis, we find the following passage:

The previous Chief Regional Rabbi Joseph Jonas Frånkel in Breslau, a generally recognized learned and scientifically educated man, had heard that the medical student HI, who also came from the tribe of Aaron, was preparing anatomy here[18] and was thereby contaminating himself according to the ritual law. He therefore summoned him and asked him whether he wanted to give up this anatomical activity, which was contrary to ritual law, or renounce his privilege as a Kohen to give the blessing. The student replied: I renounce this privilege. I would rather acquire a thorough knowledge of medicine and become a sufficient member of civil society. The Rabbi dismissed him… For 20 years, Mr HI has been one of the most skilled local doctors and he is still a Jew [despite the pronouncements of a fanatical Rabbanite].

Rabbi Joseph Jonas Frankel (1721-1793) served as the Silesian district rabbi. Assuming the veracity of the story, this remarkable exchange raises a number of questions: Was this a rare encounter, or did other rabbis engage in the same practice? Does this reflect Rabbi Frankel’s unique opinion, or the halakhic consensus of the time? Was there any room for leniency with respect to Kohanim training in medicine? HI was approached by Rabbi Frankel to address his halakhically concerning practice. Were there other Kohanim who proactively sought rabbinic consultation before applying to, or attending medical school? Was the response of HI typical of other Kohanim who encountered potential halakhic obstacles to medical training, or perhaps a reflection of the cultural milieu of his time.

All told, we have a grand total of two sources before the nineteenth century referring to Kohanim, dissection and medical training, both found in non-Jewish sources, and one of which is essentially irrelevant. I have yet to find any Jewish historical or halakhic sources. The priestly mystery thus still remains- How do we explain this historical “anatomical” anomaly? In this “priestly offering,” I suggest historical and halakhic reasons for this lacuna. I hope my offering will be accepted.

A Suggested Historical Solution

An understanding of the history of medical training, and in particular, of the training in human anatomy throughout the centuries, might assist us in providing an explanation for this glaring omission.

Apprenticeship versus University Training

Universities developed as educational institutions in Europe in the Middle Ages. With respect to medical training in general, in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Jews were generally barred, with few exceptions, from admission to European universities, which were under Catholic auspices. Jewish physicians were therefore trained almost exclusively through apprenticeship. Postmortem dissection was not a part of apprenticeship training. As such, there would have been no specific halakhic problem for the Kohen medical trainee, and we would not expect to find any such reference in the literature.

Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, in his discussion of medical training for the Kohen, posits a similar, though variant, explanation of the training of the Kohen physician in the past.[19] Rav Moshe prohibited the medical training of Kohanim today, unexceptionably, is it involved required exposure to tumat met. One parenthetical line in his responsum sheds light on our discussion.

ולא יקילו ממה שמצינו מרבותינו הראשונים שהיו כהנים והיו רופאים שהם בכוחותיהם הגדולים למדו כל חכמת הרפואה במסירת כל דבר בעל פה אף בלא שום ראיה והסתכלות במתים ולא נגעו במת מעולם ולא היו באהל אחד עם מתים, אבל בזמננו שא”א זה לכן ודאי אסור

And do not think to be lenient based on the fact that we find among our rabbis of earlier generations those who were both Kohanim and physicians; their exceptional powers enabled them to learn the entirety of medical knowledge orally without the necessity of even gazing upon a human corpse (i.e., practical anatomy lab). They never touched a corpse nor were they ever under the same enclosure as one. Today, however, when it is impossible to train in medicine [without the direct exposure to a human cadaver] it is prohibited.

Rav Moshe preemptively addresses a possible refutation of his position. If it is prohibited for a Kohen to train in medicine, how is it possible that we have a record of Kohen physicians in the past? Rav Moshe suggests that these Kohanim possessed exceptional abilities which allowed them to study medicine without resorting to the dissection or observation of human cadavers (and its resultant tumah exposure). Medical history supports this general idea. Indeed, all Jewish physicians through the Middle Ages, whether Kohanim or not, studied medicine through apprenticeship, without the need to dissect or even be under the same enclosure as a human cadaver.[20]

Priestly Physicians Throughout the Centuries- The Many Dr. Cohens

Who were these Kohanim physicians that Rav Moshe references? Zimmels[21] and Jakobovits[22] identify numerous Kohanim physicians throughout history, starting from Talmudic[23] times. Some of these priestly physicians provided medical care for kings, doges and popes. In fact, we have ample historical evidence of numerous Kohanim who practiced medicine over the centuries. Nathan Koren in his expansive registry of Jewish physicians has over fifty entries with the names Cohen, Coen, Cohn, Katz, Kohen, Kohn, Kahn, or Sacerdote (priest) ranging from the 15th to early 19th centuries.[24]

How did these Kohanim navigate their medical training? A simple explanation is that the majority of Kohanim, along with other Jews who were barred from the universities, trained through apprenticeship, effectively bypassing any halakhic concerns for anatomical dissection. Though there are no available statistics, despite the increasing acceptance and attendance of Jewish students at universities beginning in the sixteenth century, apprenticeship likely remained the predominant mode of medical training for Jewish physicians until the mid-seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries. As apprenticeship training involved no dissection, this would account for the absence of halakhic queries in the literature for this group.

Some Jews however elected to pursue a university education. Jews occasionally attended universities from the Middle Ages onwards, usually requiring special Papal or governmental permission.[25] While anatomy was clearly always part of medical education to varying degrees, and anatomical dissection was performed sporadically across the centuries, the introduction of systematic dissection of the human body as a required part of medical training fully developed only in the sixteenth century. Until this time, even if a Kohen wished to attend medical school, there would have been little halakhic concern.

The status quo would change in the sixteenth century under the guidance of Andreas Vesalius, a young Professor of Human Anatomy at the University of Padua. As divine providence would have it, the very university at which Vesalius established the field of anatomy was the first institution to officially allow, beginning even before the times of Vesalius, Jewish students to train in medicine. By the sixteenth century hundreds of Jews flocked there for this historically unprecedented opportunity.

Given the introduction of systematic anatomical dissection into the medical school curriculum in the 16th century, how could a Kohen now navigate a university medical education? From this point in history, we would expect to see halakhic discussions about Kohanim attending medical school.

One might suggest that Kohanim, being knowledgeable in the potential halakhic pitfalls, simply refrained from becoming physicians once dissection became an unavoidable aspect of medical training. Indeed, Rabbi Jakobovits maintains that less Kohanim entered the field of medicine in the eighteenth century, a statement he buttresses with reference to articles about the matriculation records of some German universities (Frankfurt and Duisburg), and the low number of those with a priestly name as compared to the percentage of Kohanim in the general population: “Even today, the usual proportion of Jews bearing the name “Cohen” alone (others, too, may be of priestly descent) is at least 2-3%.” He adds that this lower percentage of Kohanim in medical school “can only be explained as reflecting the growing misgivings with which the choice of medical career by students of priestly descent was generally viewed.”[26]

While this may have been true in Germany in later centuries, the archives of the University of Padua reveal a different statistical reality. The archival record of Jewish graduates of the University of Padua from the early 16th to the early 19th centuries includes nineteen graduates with the last name of Coen or Sacerdote.[27]

Even if we concede that not all those named Coen, or derivatives thereof, were necessarily Kohanim, many certainly were. Below is the family crest of Samuele Coen as it appears in his Padua medical diploma from 1702.[28] Notice the image of the hand configuration used by the Kohen during the Priestly blessing.

In addition, there are eleven members of the Cantarini family, a family of Kohanim, who graduated as physicians from the University of Padua during this period. Below is the front page of the medical diploma of Grassin Cantarini (1703),[29] here again we find the Kohen’s symbol.

The percentage of Kohanim who attended Padua’s medical school, roughly thirty out of a total of some 350 for this period, is significantly higher than the average percentage of Kohanim in the general Jewish population.[30] How then do we explain the absence of discussion in the literature? It is certainly possible that these relatively few Kohanim, despite their high percentage of the total, simply did not inquire of rabbinic authorities. Alternatively, the few inquiries that did occur where not committed to writing, or did not survive the ravages of time.

More problematic is that some of the Kohen Padua graduates were outstanding Torah scholars and prolific authors, such as Isaac Hayyim Cantarini,[31] Tuviya HaRofe (AKA Tuviya haKohen),[32] and Abraham Sacerdote (AKA Avraham HaKohen).[33] Oe mnight have expected at least one of these scholars to address this issue somewhere in their writings. Yet, there is no mention in any of their extensive writings of any concern with their participation in the anatomy course. Indeed, while Tuviya fondly recalls his medical training in Padua in the introduction to his Ma’aseh Tuviya, there is no mention of any challenge with performing dissection as a Kohen. Cantarini, in his Pahad Yitzhak, devotes a section to a tragic case where a Jewish body was kidnapped by non-Jewish students for the dissection table. Again, no mention of any concern about Kohanim and dissection. In addition, we have an account of Cantarini bringing Abraham Levi, a visiting scholar to Padua, to see the anatomy theater to showcase the highlights of Padua.[34]

 

While we may not find the names of these three Kohen student scholars etched into the wooden planks of the structure, they all likely took their seats,[35] along with their other non-Kohen Jewish classmates, in the famous anatomical theater at the University of Padua, which was inaugurated in 1595 as the first permanent structure devoted to anatomical dissection, and is still standing to this day.

I suspect that the answer to the conspicuous omission lies elsewhere, based on the history of anatomical training in general, and at the University of Padua in particular.

The Nature of Anatomical Teaching in the Pre-Modern Era

A mention of anatomy lab today evokes an image of a small group of students huddled over a body with dissecting instruments in hand. We also often find reference to the anatomy students designating a name for their cadaver, as they dissect one body for the entire course. Unlike the anatomy labs of today, in pre-Modern times body preservation technologies were not available, and a corpse was only usable for a few days to weeks. The dissections or yesteryear were held in an “anatomical theater.”[36] The format of anatomy teaching involved the professor alone performing the dissection and teaching over the body while others merely observed. Students did not perform any hands-on dissection, partially because there was little time until the decomposition of the body, and thus had no direct contact with the corpse. This can be seen in the frontispiece of Vesalius’ classic work:

This is also reflected in the design of the anatomical theater in Padua, which was built shortly after the tenure of Vesalius, and can be visited today.

There is a central oval table surrounded by coliseum-like concentric rows of progressively elevated platforms. This basic architectural design was copied for other anatomical theaters across the world, such as those below:

University of Bologna: Anatomical Theater (est. 1636)

University of Leiden: Anatomical Theater (est. 1594)

This illustration is from 1610. Parenthetically, the Keeper of the Anatomical Theater of Leiden from 1617-1650 was Professor Otto Heurnius.[37] Heurnius was the promoter for the medical graduation of David de Haro,[38] the first Jewish medical graduate of the University of Leiden.

By the mid 1600’s Jews started attending the University of Leiden in higher numbers. We have numerous matriculation records of Jews with the name Cohen.[39]For example:

Samuel Cohen from Hamburg matriculated to the medical faculty (M) in September 1646.

A Pure Solution

As a medical student in the anatomical theater served only as an observer, and performed no actual dissection, there would have been no concern for impurity conveyed through direct contact with a corpse. The only potential concern for a Kohen in the anatomical theater would have been tumat ohel, whereby impurity is conveyed by being under the same enclosure as a cadaver. While there is general halakhic consensus that impurity conveyed by direct contact applies to the bodies of both Jews and non-Jews, there is a halakhic debate regarding whether a non-Jewish corpse conveys tumat ohel.[40] It is certainly possible that the Kohanim who attended the lectures in the anatomical theater of Padua (and in anatomical theaters at other universities at this time) relied on the permissive position that a non-Jewish corpse does not convey tumat ohel. This would have allowed them to attend dissections without violating any halakhic precepts.

However, there still remained at least a theoretical possibility that the cadaver would be Jewish, in which case the permissive option would no longer apply. For a unique historical reason, this concern was non-existent for the anatomical dissection course at the University of Padua. In fact, the university struggled to provide cadavers for the course and turned to each community represented on campus, including the Jewish community, to provide bodies for the dissection table. However, the Jewish community adamantly refused, citing religious concerns with postmortem dissection. While there was continuous tension about this issue, the Jewish community arranged an agreement to provide large sums of money annually to the university for the privilege of releasing the Jewish community of this obligation. This general agreement, with periodic reassessments and renegotiations, essentially remained in force for some two hundred years.[41] Thus, all the Coens and Cantarinis who attended the University of Padua did not have to worry about the possibility that the cadaver under the scalpel of Vesalius or Fallopius was Jewish.

The Architectural Design of the Padua Anatomical Theater

Moreover, a unique structural feature of the Padua anatomical theater may have further mitigated any potential halakhic concern for a Kohen wishing to study medicine at Padua. The original anatomical theater had a retractable roof[42]  which was opened during dissections to release or eliminate the foul odors of a progressively decaying cadaver. Thus, even tumat ohel may have been a non-issue as in the absence of a roof there would have been no halakhic enclosure to convey impurity. This would have virtually eliminated the halakhic obstacle for a Kohen medical student.

An Alternate Solution for Kohanim

What of a Kohen desirous of a university medical education who would not rely on a permissive ruling regarding tumat ohel and the non-Jewish cadaver? By the 17th century, medical schools struggled to acquire enough cadavers to meet the growing demand of anatomy students. The need to provide a nonperishable substitute led to the production of highly accurate anatomical wax models that were sculpted through direct observation of dissected cadavers. Such models had distinct advantages, as they neither decomposed nor emitted foul odors and were continuously available. They proved essential to the education of generations of medical students who would otherwise, due to the short supply of cadavers, not have access to the anatomical education gleaned from human dissection.[43]

Spectacular wax models were produced throughout Europe, especially in Italy and England, from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, some of which can be seen to this day in Museums in Florence (La Specola), Bologna and London.[44]

This seems to me to be an ideal solution for a Kohen who wished to train in medicine in the Early Modern period. The use of wax models, with no human cadavers involved at all, would pose no halakhic problem whatsoever. While I am unaware of any Kohen medical student who ever took advantage of this option, the modern iteration of this concept, as we discuss below, may entirely replace cadaver dissection.

Kohanim in Medical School from the Eighteenth Century Onwards

From the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, apprenticeship became less accepted and university training was often required for licensure. As a result, Jewish admission to medical schools increased exponentially throughout Europe and the United States. In addition, the anatomy labs began to transition to hands-on dissection for all students. This was simultaneously accompanied by a major cultural movement in Germany, the main location of Jewish medical training at this time, known as the Haskala. This movement was associated with the decreasing religiosity of at least a percentage of the Jewish university students, not to mention the conversion of some to Christianity. A family name of Cohen on a matriculation record in this period, even if identified, is certainly no guarantee of a student knowledgeable or concerned with the issues of tumah.

How would a Kohen navigate medical training in this milieu? The student encountered by Rabbi Frankel in Breslau was training precisely in this context, at the end of eighteenth century. Was the student known by his initials “HI” training in a medical school where he was required to perform hands-on dissection, and this is perhaps why Rabbi Frankel ruled as he did; or perhaps the medical school still had an anatomical theater, as many still did, and Rabbi Frankel did not accept the permissive ruling that tumat ohel does not apply to a non-Jewish cadaver. Was “HI” influenced by the newly forming Haskala movement in Germany at that time, which led him to be less deferential to rabbinic authority?

Two additional examples of Kohanim and medical training from the nineteenth century are illustrative. We have at least one record of a “Cohen” in the early nineteenth century refusing to go to medical school because of the required anatomical dissection. A young Albert Cohen, originally from Paris, describes his initial encounter with anatomical dissection in Vienna in the early nineteenth century:[45]

I went to Vienna, where I pursued my studies at the grammar school and university from 1826-1834. Being now nineteen years old, it became necessary to decide what profession I would adopt. Hitherto all young people of my native place who devoted themselves to literature studied medicine; this was then the only profession open to me. To please my parents, I would have followed the same career, had I ever been able to prevail upon myself to dissect a corpse. Several times I entered the anatomical theatre, but each time I was seized with unconquerable disgust. I therefore requested my parents to allow me to follow my own taste. Henceforth I devoted myself to the study of Oriental languages.

I suspect the parental conversation about his career change may have been a bit more dramatic than reflected in this passage. Nonetheless, we learn that it was anatomy that turned this young Jewish Kohen student away from a career in medicine, though it does not appear to have been halakhically motivated.

Around the same time, Sigismund Cohen, a native of Lower Silesia, the area of modern-day Poland and the rabbinic domain of Rabbi Joseph Jonas Frankel a few decades earlier, attended the University of Viadrina (Frankfurt), graduating in 1846. The topic of his dissertation- Talmudic Medicine:

For a Jewish medical student to write a medical dissertation on a Jewish topic was quite uncommon, to say the least.[46] It is somewhat ironic that a thorough analysis of Biblical and Talmudic law might have led Cohen to the realization that there was a potential halakhic issue with his training and may have preempted the necessity for Cohen to write this dissertation in the first place. Nevertheless, as this dissertation is remarkable on many levels, I offer a few comments.

From a medical and medical historical perspective, Cohen acknowledges his professors by name, one of whom was Jan Evangelista Purkinje, who taught him human physiology. Purkinje, a Czech anatomist and physiologist, was one of the most famous scientists in Europe and his discoveries included the so-called Purkinje Cell in the cerebellum and the so-called Purkinje fibres in the electrical system of the heart, structures familiar to any medical student today.

This dissertation also has great significance in the field of Jewish medical history. While we do not know with certainty the nature of Cohen’s Jewish knowledge and religious observance, the dissertation includes a brief biography as an appendix. An excerpt about his early education is below:

While we find reference to the study of “Pentateuchi origine” and “grammatice Hebraica,” Talmudic study is not specifically mentioned, and there is clearly a strong educational focus on secular studies. The 28-page dissertation itself however contains a wealth of Talmudic references.

I also draw attention to three specific sources cited by Cohen, one from a century earlier, the others contemporary.

1) Benjamin Wolff Gintzburger, Medicina ex Talmudicis, inaugural Dissertation 1743

Benjamin Wolff Gintzburger was one of the first Jewish graduates of the University of Gottingen. It was my search for references to Gintzburger that precipitated this contribution.[47] His medical dissertation, referenced by Cohen, is one of the first works written on Biblical and Talmudic medicine.[48]

Apropos our discussion about dissection, Gintzburger is better known in the halakhic world as the questioner of a (now famous) teshuva to Rabbi Yaakov Emden about performing anatomical dissection on Shabbos.[49]

2) Abraham Hartog Israels, Tentamen hist.-med. Exhibens Collectanea Gynaecologica ex Talmude Babylonica (Grongen, 1845)

Israels graduated from the University of Groningen in 1845, just a year before Cohen, and the topic of his dissertation was obstetrics and gynecology in the Babylonian Talmud.

This dissertation gained notoriety for its fourth chapter, on Cesarean section, which suggests that the rabbis of the Mishnah were able to perform cesarean section with maternal survival, something not recorded in secular medical history until around 1500. This was based on an interpretation of a Mishna in Bechorot.[50]  Cohen discusses this chapter in his dissertation.

3) Eliakim Carmoly, Histoire des Médecins Juifs, Anciens et Modernes (1844)

Carmoly served as the major work of reference in Jewish medical history for this period. Selections were translated into English just one year after publication.[51] While the reliability of Carmoly’s work was called into question by critics,[52] it nonetheless contains a wealth of valuable information.

Returning to our student, regarding Cohen’s presumptive status as a Kohen training in medicine, he devotes a chapter of his treatise to anatomy and cites a passage in the Talmud where dissection was performed.[53] More relevant, in his bio, he includes mention and thanks to those who assisted him during his studies in the anatomical theater:

Anatomical dissection did not appear to be an impediment for this Cohen. However, there is one observation, admittedly a possible over-read or mistranslation, which may indicate specific accommodations for Sigismund in his dissection course.[54] In his lengthy list of professors, Cohen simply mentions the subject and the professor. In his mention of the anatomical theater, he adds, “in the anatomical theater there were guides for me….” Could this possibly be an allusion to specific accommodation provided to Sigismund? Perhaps his professors performed the dissection while he observed but did not touch the corpse directly.

Conclusion: The Opening and Reclosing of the Priestly Portal

Halakhic references to a Kohen attending medical school are noticeably absent from rabbinic literature before the nineteenth century. We have suggested plausible explanations for this anomaly. For much of history, Jewish physicians trained through apprenticeship where formal anatomical instruction was not required. As such, there would have been no halakhic issues for a Kohen, as noted by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein. When Vesalius introduced the comprehensive anatomy course into the medical school curriculum, dissections were performed in anatomical theaters, where students never touched the cadavers. At least some Kohanim may have relied on the permissive ruling that non-Jewish cadavers do not convey tumat ohel. When hands-on dissection became the norm, as Rabbi Lord Jakobovits suggested, it is certainly possible that many religiously observant Kohanim elected to bypass medicine as a career choice, or were perhaps discouraged to do so by local rabbis like Rabbi Frankel. Of the Kohanim who opted for a medical career, some may have sought rabbinic approval, though no records exist. Others, whose priestly-sounding names appear in university matriculation records of the period, may have been less Jewishly educated or less religiously observant. Hence no halakhic questions would have been generated from this latter group.

The portal to rabbinic discussion on this topic only fully opened in the twentieth century. In the modern era we have a diverse halakhic landscape regarding the training of Kohanim in medicine, including discussion about the permissive ruling of tumat ohel, as well as creative solutions to potentially allow direct dissection. I leave these discussions to each Kohen student and his posek but leave you with a final thought.

Given current advances and changing perspectives in anatomical training, we may again soon see the portal close to the corpus of responsa related to the Kohen medical student. Some five hundred years after Vesalius introduced anatomical dissection into medical training, which was accompanied by the exhumation of bodies from their graves, we are now on the cusp of the (re)burial of human anatomy lab and its associated cadavers. With advances in imaging technology and simulation, coupled with the ethical re-evaluation of body procurement methods and preservation, the expansive year-long anatomy course with full body dissection is rapidly becoming a relic of medical history.[55] The classic dissection table is gradually being replaced with the likes of the digital Anatomage table:

If this is not sufficient, it is now possible to produce life-like anatomical models with the use of 3D printing.[56] Even dissection of the model may be possible.

These conceptual descendants and updated versions of the Florentine wax models may soon replace cadaveric dissection altogether.[57] The list of medical schools eliminating or significantly curtailing human anatomy lab courses is continually expanding.

While the impact of the diminution of human dissection on medical education remains to be determined, if phased out, it will certainly have a significant halakhic impact and it may return us to the days of the earlier generations mentioned by Rav Moshe Feinstein when students “learn the entirety of medical knowledge without the necessity of gazing upon a human corpse.” This would potentially open the door for Kohanim to attend medical school (at least for the pre-clinical years) with halakhic impunity.[58] We may notice a commensurate rise in the number of Dr. Cohens in hospital registries. The medical halakhic textbooks may no longer include a chapter on “The Kohen in Medical School,” and the halakhic discussions on this topic may again fall silent. If future scholars at some later stage of history ponder the priestly mystery of the intermittent silence of the historical record on Kohanim, dissection and medical training, I suspect their search engines will direct them to this article.

Appendix:

The Importance of the Study of Broadsides in Jewish (Medical) History – The Kohen Physician Today and the Diagnosis of Death

In June of 2024, I participated as a speaker in a conference entitled, “The Role of Broadsides in Jewish Ritualistic and Cultural Space,” organized by Professor Avriel Bar-Levav of the open University of Israel and held at the new National Library of Israel. It was the first conference of its kind, dedicated solely to the integration of Broadsides into the study of Jewish history. Taking a single printed page (the definition of a Broadside) out of Avriel’s playbook, I briefly share an example of the value of Broadsides for the study of Jewish medical history, as it relates to our topic.

As mentioned in the article above, one of the earliest halakhic sources relating to a Kohen and the practice of medicine addresses the case of a Kohen physician who was asked to confirm the death of a patient in order to facilitate burial. The question was asked in the nineteenth century, in the medical historical context of a generation concerned about the misdiagnosis of death and the resultant institution of a three-day delay in burial to medically confirm a patient’s demise.

While the prolonged delay in burial may be a relic of the past, the necessity to confirm death remains a part of modern medical practice. As such, similar halakhic cases of a Kohen physician involved in the confirmation of death occur to this very day. I share one example here which reflects yet another fascinating and complex chapter in Jewish medical history, evidenced by a broadside found in a miscellaneous collection of broadsides in the Library of Congress.

In 1976 Rabbi Moshe Lemberger was asked about the case of an observant Kohen physician who witnessed a cardiac arrest of a man on the street.[59] The person did not survive. While it is generally prohibited for a Kohen to come in contact with a corpse, if this physician were to officially declare death of the person on the scene, and attest to the absence of foul play, the deceased would be transferred directly to the funeral home for immediate burial.

As per the questioner, if the Kohen physician refused to intervene, the patient would be transferred to the hospital. Burial would certainly be delayed, and in addition, there would be a high likelihood of autopsy, with organs often removed from the deceased without consent. Rabbi Lemberger concluded that this would constitute a case of met mitzvah (a deceased person with no one to attend to their burial), and due to these extenuating circumstances, the Kohen could expose himself to impurity to prevent the delay of burial and likely desecration of the body.

This comment “and often organs are removed from the deceased without consent” reflects a reality in Israel at this time.[60] When Israel established its own hospitals and medical system in the early twentieth century, it struggled to navigate a halakhically acceptable path for the allowance of autopsies, an integral part of standard medical practice. While detailed guidelines for the performance of autopsies were established with rabbinic guidance, many members of the medical community rejected any restrictions on their practice. Despite the legislation, the medical establishment flagrantly disregarded the laws and were known in many cases to perform autopsies, including organ removal, without patient or family consent. This evolved into a notorious autopsy scandal in the young State of Israel, which shattered faith in the medical establishment, with reverberations felt to this day. This ultimately resulted in the reformation and greater enforcement of the law.

I recently discovered a lone broadside buried in a miscellaneous collection housed in the Library of Congress,[61] which though undated, was likely printed around the time of the above responsum.

This Broadside was clearly intended to be posted in a cemetery and is divided into two sections.

On the left side is an accusation that the deceased more likely than not underwent an autopsy upon their death, and that the remaining relative, the likely reader of the broadside, did nothing to prevent it.

Dear Brother,
You are now standing beside the grave of your relative who was dear to your heart and whose flame of life was suddenly extinguished.
We wish to ask you if you have considered the possibility that your loved one has undergone extensive dissection [autopsy] and while the body is here, who knows the location of the internal organs of the body. Perhaps they never merited to a proper burial (more than 50% of bodies are dissected in Jerusalem).
What did you do to prevent this from happening?
As you stand beside the grave, the deceased beseeches you to repent for this. How will you answer?
The answer:
Accept upon yourself to protect your loved ones in the future. With all your power and capability seek to prevent the forced dissection by pathologists done merely for personal advancement.
Do this for the honor of both the living and the dead.
Committee for the protection of the honor of man

On the right side of the broadside is a text to be recited by the remaining relative asking forgiveness from their deceased loved one for allowing them to undergo an autopsy.

This unique broadside contributes to the study of the history of autopsies in Israel, provides valuable information possibly not attainable elsewhere, and adds to the relatively few items of material culture in Jewish medical history.

[1] Johann Georg Estor, Des Marburgischen Vicecanzlers Herrn Johann Georg Estors academische Abhandlung von der Misslichkeit derer Judeneide: aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt (Verlegts Johann George Trausold, 1753).
[2] Pgs. 13-14.
[3] p. 14, n. 12.
[4] Braunschweigische Anzeigen (October 5, 1748), section 80, p. 1608.
[5] Braunschweigische Anzeigen (April 8, 1750), Section 28, column 564.
[6] See Monika Richarz, Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678-1848 (Schriftenreihe Wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck: Tübingen, 1974; now available in English translation, German Jews and the University, 1678- 1848, by Camden House, 2022.
[7] Avraham Steinberg, HaRefuah KiHalakhah (Jerusalem, 5777), section 10, chapter 3.
[8] Edward Reichman, “The Anatomy of an Auction: A Previously Undissected Body of Literature on the History of the Jews and Postmortem Dissection,” Seforim Blog (https://seforimblog.com), June 13, 2023.
[9] For English language references, see, J. David Bleich, “Kohanim as Medical and Dental Students,” in his Judaism and Healing (Ktav Publishers, 2002), 37-42; Fred Rosner, “Priests’ (Kohanim) Studying and Practicing Medicine,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 8 (Fall 1984), 48-61; Alfred S. Cohen, “Tumeah of a Kohen: Theory and Practice,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 15 (Spring 1988), 25-49; Avraham Steinberg, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, trans. F. Rosner (Feldheim Publishers, 2003), s. v., “Kohen.”
[10] To be sure, the potential halakhic concerns do not end there, and a Kohen physician would continually need to navigate potential exposure to a deceased body. Today, this might lead a Kohen to limit his choice of specialty to one with minimal exposure to the critically ill patient. But even this is not sufficient, as the prospect exists of encountering a deceased patient in a hospital setting. Specialties with predominantly outpatient focus might be preferred, and consultation with a competent rabbinic authority should be encouraged.
[11] Myron Kolatch, “The Yeshiva and the Medical School,” Commentary (May, 1960).
[12] J. David Bleich, “Kohanim Studying in Medical School,” (Hebrew) Moshe Hershler, ed., Halakha U’Refuah 3 (Machon Regensburg: Jerusalem, 5743), 199-210, citing Kerem Chemed 8 (5614). This case is not widely known, I suspect because it appeared in a journal article as opposed to a traditional work of responsa.
[13] The Hatam Sofer famously addressed a virtually identical case around the same time. Y. D., 338.
[14] Much has been written about this halakhic chapter regarding delayed burial. For example, see R. Moshe Samet, “Delaying Burial: The History of the Polemic on the Determination of the Time of Death,” (Hebrew) Asufot 3 (1989/1990), 613–665, for an expansive study of this halakhic chapter; Michael Panitz, Modernity and Mortality: The Transformation of Central European Jewish Responses to Death, 1750-1850 (PhD Dissertation, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1989). Rabbi Yehiel Goldhaber has recently added expansive research to this topic.
[15] While the governmental authorities refused to declare such patients dead until the presence of visible external signs (such as gangrene or rigor mortis), they would have already met the halakhic criteria for death according to poskim such as the Hatam Sofer. It thus became a question of a kohen exposing himself to a halakhically dead body, and whether this encounter would be justified under the principle of met mitzvah (a deceased person with no one to attend to their burial).
[16] Shulhan Arukh, Y. D., 370.
[17] Vom Stamme Aaron und dessen angeblichen Vorrechten: ein Beytrag zum Judenwesen. David and Son: Jerusalem,1817), 27-29.
[18] There was no medical school in Breslau at this time though there may have been anatomical training. HI could also have lived in Breslau but trained elsewhere such as at the University of Prague.
[19] Igrot Moshe, Y. D., 3:155.
[20]  Zimmels erroneously assumed that it was not an obligatory part of training. Zimmels, op. cit., 19. He also cites sources that dissection became part of university training only in the eighteenth century, when in fact it began centuries earlier. Not as much was known about the history of the University of Padua in the time of both Zimmels and Jakobovits.
[21] H. J. Zimmels, Magicians, Theologians and Doctors: Studies in Folk Medicine and Folklore as Reflected in Rabbinical Responsa (Goldston and Sons: London, 1952), 178, n. 64.
[22] Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics (Bloch Publishing: New York, 1959), 355-356, notes 26 and 27.
[23]  One of the Kohen physicians of the Talmudic period was Rabbi Yishmael. It is his students who performed one of the earliest anatomical dissections in history, and the only one mentioned in the Talmud (Bekhorot 45a). In fact, Preuss suggests that it was specifically Rabbi Yishmael’s students who performed the dissection, as their teacher, being a Kohen, absented himself from the cadaveric examination. See. F. Rosner, trans. and ed., Julius Preuss’ Biblical and Talmudic Medicine (Hebrew Publishing Company: New York, 1978), 43.
[24] Nathan Koren, Jewish Physicians: A Biographical Index (Israel Universities Press: Jerusalem, 1973). His separate list of Jewish doctors in Modern times, not our concern here, has many more priestly names.
[25] See H. Friedenwald, “The Jewish Medical Student of Former Days,” Menorah Journal 7:1(February, 1921), 52-62; Cecil Roth, “The Medieval University and the Jew,” Menora Journal 9:2 (1930), 128-41; idem, “The Qualification of Jewish Physicians in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 28 (1953), 834-43.
[26] Jakobovits, op. cit., 241. Jakobovits relied on scholars such as Lewin, who explicitly mentioned Kohanim in his essay: “Nur vereinzelt findet sich 1738 ein Artz aus priesterlichem Stamme” (Only a few doctors from priestly lineage can be found in 1738.) See Louis Lewin, “Judische Aerzte in Grosspolin,” Jahrbuch der Jüdisch-Literarischen Gesellschaft 9 (1911), 395.
[27] Most of them are not listed by Nathan Koren. Abdelkader Modena and Edgardo Morpurgo (with editing and additions done posthumously by Aldo Luzzatto, Ladislao Munster and Vittore Colorni), Medici E Chirurghi Ebrei Dottorati E Licenziati Nell Universita Di Padova dal 1617 al 1816 (Bologna, 1967).
[28] University of Padua Archives, Raccolta Diplomi, 33 (n. 3841).
[29] Penn Libraries Judaic Collection, Call number Mapcase CAJS Rar Ms 531, identifier 9978072224103681. I thank Arthur Kiron for bringing this diploma to my attention. While the cartouche in this diploma is blank, it was often filled with either text or the student’s portrait.
[30] While the Kohanim represent a high percentage, their objective numbers are still low. While one must also concede that any lists of Jewish physicians we possess are far from complete, the numbers of Kohanim are not likely to vary significantly.
[31] On Cantarini, see, Harry A. Savitz, Profiles of Erudite Jewish Physicians and Scholars (Spertus College of Judaica Press, 1973), 25-28; C. Facchini, “Icone in sinagoga: emblemi e imprese nella predicazione barocca di I.H. Cantarini”, in Materia Giudaica, 7 (2002), 124–144. I thank Professor David Ruderman for this last reference. Cantarini’s Jewish legal responsa were published in both Yitzḥak Lampronti’s Paad Yitzak and Samson Morpurgo’s Shemesh Tzedakah. For his correspondence with the Christian intellectual Theophilo Ungar, see Y. Blumenfeld, Otzar Nehmad 3 (Vienna, 1860), 128-50. For the definitive work on the Cantarini family, see Marco Osimo, Narrazione della Strage Compiuta nel 1547 Contro gli Ebrei d’Asolo e Cenni Biografici della Famiglia Koen-Cantarini (Casale-Monferrato, 1875). For a comprehensive bibliography on Cantarini, see Asher Salah, La Republique des Lettres: Rabbins, Ecrivains et Medecins, Juifs en Italie au XVIIIe Siecle (Brill: Leiden, 2007), 120-124.
[32] Much has been written on Tuviyah. For the most recent contribution, see Kenneth Collins and Samuel Kottek, eds., Ma’ase Tuviya (Venice, 1708): Tuviya Cohen on Medicine and Science (Jerusalem: Muriel and Philip Berman Medical Library of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2021). See also A. Levinson, “A Medical Cyclopedist of the Seventeenth Century,” Bulletin of the Society of Medical History (January, 1917), 27-44; D. A. Friedman, “Tuvia HaRofeh,” (Hebrew) (Palestine Jewish Medical Association, 1940); M. J. Mahler, A Precursor of the Jewish Enlightenment: Dr. Tobias Cohen and his Ma’aseh Tuvia (unpublished thesis for ordination, Hebrew Union College, NY, 1978); N. Allan, “Illustrations From the Wellcome Institute Library: A Jewish Physician in the Seventeenth Century,” Medical History 28(1984), 324-328; D. Ruderman, “On the Diffusion of Scientific Knowledge Within the Jewish Community: The Medical Textbook of Tobias Cohen,” in his Jewish Though and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1995), 229-255; S. G. Massry, et. al., Jewish Medicine and the University of Padua: Contribution of the Padua Graduate Toviah Cohen to Nephrology,” American Journal of Nephrology 19:2(1999), 213-21; E. Lepicard, “An Alternative to the Cosmic and Mechanic Metaphors for the Human Body? The House Illustration in Ma’aseh Tuviyah (1708),” Medical History 52(2008), 93-105; Koroth 20(2009-2010) where five articles are devoted to Tobias Cohen and his work Ma’aseh Tuvia. On the relationship of Cohen with the Jerusalem physician Rabbi Dr. David De Silva, as well as for information about the death of Cohen, see Z. Amar, Pri Megaddim by Rabbi David de Silva Physician of Jerusalem (Yad Ben Tzvi Press: Jerusalem, 2003), 41-45.
[33] See Meir Benayahu, “Rabbi Avraham Ha-Kohen Mi-Zanti U-Lehakat Ha-Rof ’im Ha-Meshorerim Be-Padova,” Ha-Sifrut 26 (1978): 108-40.
[34] See Shmuel Feiner, The Jewish Eighteenth Century: A Jewish Biography, 1700-1750 (Indiana University Press, 2020), 242.
[35] Technically not seats, as they stood in the amphitheater.
[36] See G. H. Schumacher, “Theatrum Anatomicum in History and Today,” International Journal of Morphology 25:1 (2007), 15-32.
[37] Heurnius also spent large sums of money on mummies, idols, stuffed crocodiles, Nile-reed and so on, “with the explicit aim of re-telling the story of the life of Israel’s children under the wise Pharoah.” This would have been exhibited in the anatomical theater. See Klaas van Berkel, et. al., eds., The Book of Nature in Early Modern and Modern History (Peeters Publishers, 2006), 51.
[38] See Edward Reichman, “A ‘Haro’ing Tale of a Jewish Medical Student: Notes on David de Haro (1611-1636): The First Jewish Medical Graduate of the University of Leiden,” Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana 48:1 (2022), 30-52.
[39] These entries are found in the matriculation records of the University of Leiden, Album Studiosorum Academiae Lugduno Batavae 1575-1875.
[40] For recent treatment of this topic, see the works of Tzvi Ryzman, Ratz KaTzvi: Inyanei Kehuna (3 volumes) (2 Adar, 5782); idem, “Kohanim studying medicine,” (Hebrew) in Ratz KaTzvi: Refuah- Pikuah Nefesh (Shevat, 5784), 218-233.
[41] For further discussion of this historical chapter, see Edward Reichman, “The Anatomy of an Auction: A Previously Undissected Body of Literature on the History of the Jews and Postmortem Dissection,” Seforim Blog (https://seforimblog.com), June 13, 2023. Regarding the possibility of their being a Jewish cadaver at other medical schools, I am aware of at least one case, albeit rare, of a Jewish criminal sentenced to death in Amsterdam whose body was transferred to the medical school in Leiden for dissection. See Tzvi Malahi, biNoam Siah (Makhon Haberman: Israel, 5743), 275-276.
[42] https://alcmaeon.pixel-online.org/DM_page3.php?sid=118.
[43] Francesco Galassi, et. al., “Marvels of the Bologna Anatomical Wax Museum,” HAPS Educator 19:2 (Spring 2015), 4-9; R. Ballestriero, “Anatomical Models and Wax Venuses: Art Masterpieces or Scientific Craft Works?” Journal of Anatomy 216:2 (2010), 223-234; A. W. Bates, “’Indecent and Demoralizing Representations’: Public Anatomy Museums in mid-Victorian England,” Medical History 52 (2008), 1-22.
[44] Galassi, op. cit.
[45] Jewish Chronicle (December 23, 1861), 7.
[46] See Edward Reichman, “The History of the Jewish Medical Student Dissertation: An Evolving Jewish Tradition,” in in J. Karp and M. Schaikewitz, eds., Sacred Training: A Halakhic Guidebook for Medical Students and Residents (Ammud Press: New York, 2018), xvii- xxxvii.
[47] An expansive essay on Gintzburger is forthcoming.
[48] For a review of the literature on this topic see Edward Reichman, “Biblical and Talmudic Medicine: A Bibliographical Essay,” The Anatomy of Jewish Law: A Fresh Dissection of the Relationship of Medicine, Medical History and Rabbinic Literature (OU/Maggid/Yeshiva University Press, 2022), 511-521.
[49] She’ilat Ya’avetz 1:41.
[50] For further discussion, see Edward Reichman, “A Matter of Life ‘in’ Death: Postmortem Cesarean Section in Jewish Law,” in The Anatomy of Jewish Law: A Fresh Dissection of the Relationship of Medicine, Medical History and Rabbinic Literature (OU/Maggid/Yeshiva University Press, 2022), 477-508.
[51] History of the Jewish Physicians, from the French of E. Carmoly, by John R. W. Dunbar (J. Murphy: Baltimore, 1845).
[52]  See, for example, “Carmoly, Eliakim” in Singer, Isidore; et al. (eds.), The Jewish Encyclopedia (Funk & Wagnalls: New York, 1901-1906).
[53] Bekhorot 45a.
[54] I thank my dear wife Sara for this observation.
[55] See, for example, Bahar Gholipour, “Med School without Cadavers?  Some medical schools are turning to virtual reality instead of dissection,” Scientific American (October 1, 2019).
[56] Companies like Anatomy Warehouse and GT Stimulators produce such models.
[57] Surgical subspecialties will likely continue to require cadaveric dissection for training.
[58] There would remain potential halakhic issues with clinical rotations, residency, and the continued practice of medicine, which typically necessitate training in hospitals, where the encounter with dying patients would be a certainty. Rabbi Chaim Dovid Halevi provided a nuanced response to a Kohen in medical training even with the elimination of cadaver dissection (Asei Lekha Rav 3:22):

It is clear beyond doubt that even though we all have a status of tamei met (corpse impurity), Kohanim are nonetheless proscribed from any additional exposure to tumah. Therefore today, when the study of medicine is coupled with cadaveric dissection, I do not see a path to permit a Kohen to study medicine. Even if one is able to find a way to study medicine without cadaver dissection (as I understand is done in universities in France and Italy, where they use plastic models to teach anatomy) I still do not see how one could serve as a physician in modern times. Today, in large hospitals, not a day passes without the death of a patient, who would convey impurity. How then could a Kohen work in such a hospital? Theoretically, one could learn anatomy without cadaver dissection and then practice in outpatient clinics as opposed to hospitals. However, there still remains a challenging problem- residency or specialty training. This part of one’s education would surely require training in large hospitals.

Rabbi Halevi’s analysis assumes a Kohen training in an Israeli medical school, where the majority of patients in the hospitals would be Jewis,h and who upon death would unequivocally convey tumat ohel. For a Kohen training in the United States, or anywhere outside Israel, where the majority of patients are not Jewish, the different approaches to the application of tumat ohel to a non-Jewish corpse would apply.
[59] Ateret Moshe Y. D., 244.
[60] Fred Rosner, “Autopsy in Jewish Law and the Israeli Autopsy Controversy,” in Fred Rosner and J. David Bleich, eds., Jewish Bioethics (New York: Hebrew Publishing Company, 1979), 331-348; Zev Farber and Irving Greenberg, “Autopsies I: A Survey of the Debate,” in Zev Farber, ed., Halakhic Realities (Maggid Books: Jerusalem, 2017), 323-417.
[61] Karp Collection of Broadsides, 1307_001. I thank Sharon Horowitz, Reference Librarian of the Hebraic Collection, for furnishing me a copy of the broaside.




Eliezer Brodt – A Lively History of Reprinting Rabbeinu Yeruchem

A Lively History of Reprinting Rabbeinu Yeruchem
Rabbi Eliezer Brodt

In recent years, a host of critical editions of works on various rishonim have been published on all topics – some seeing the light of day for the very first time – on topics related to halakha, kabbalah, and chiddushim on the Talmud. These works have been made available via the major printing presses such as Mossad HaRav Kook, Machon Yerushalyim, Machon Talmud Yisraeli, Machon Harry Fischel and others.[1] However, one very important work has noticeably been omitted from being reprinted, except for a photomechanical off-set of the second printing. This work is Sefer Toledot Adam ve-Chava and Sefer Meisharim, the halakhic works of Rabbeinu Yeruchem Meshullam (c. first half of the 14th century) who was a student of R. Asher ben Yechiel (Rosh), R. Shlomo ben Aderet (Rashb”a), and R. Abraham ibn Ismaeil – author of Chiddushei Talmid HaRashb”a on Baba Kamma. In this post I would like to discuss the story behind why it was never retype-set, until a few weeks ago.

Rabbeinu Yeruchem authored his works many years ago, in years of the range of צד (1334). He was a student of the Rosh and his works are quoted extensively by the Beit Yosef throughout Tur and Shulhan Arukh. The Maggid (an angel who learned torah with the Beit Yosef) of the Beit Yosef told him ואוף ירוחם טמירי רחים לך אע”ג דאת סתיר מלוי בגין דמלאכת שמים היא (מגיד משרים פרשת צו).

Rabbeinu Yeruchem’s work contains three parts one called Meisharim and the remaining two parts entitled Toledot Adam ve-Chava. The part Adam contains everything relating to the man from birth until marriage; whereas Chavah contains everything from after marriage until death. This work was first printed in Constantinople in רעו (1517) and is extremely rare; only two complete copies are known to be extant. It was reprinted a second time in שיג (1553) in Venice; this is the version available today in photomechanical off-set editions. But, the Chida already notes that “this edition is full of mistakes.”[2] He also writes that he saw a manuscript of this sefer and was amazed as to the large amount of missing text as well as gross errors in the printed edition. The question remains as to why this work was never retype-set as opposed to the works of other Rishonim?

The answer might be found in the words of the Chid”a[3] where he brings as follows:

שמעתי מרבנן קשישאי בעיר הקודש ירושלים שקבלו מהזקנים דספר העיטור וספר רבינו ירחום הם מבחינת סוד עלמא דאתכסיא וכל מי שעושה באור עליהם או נאבדו הביאור או ח”ו יפטר במבחר ימיו”

I have heard from old Rabbi in the holy city of Jerusalem that they have a tradition that the books, Sefer haIttur and Sefer Rabbeinu Yeruchum, they are a high secret and anyone who writes a commentary on these books either the work will be lost or they will die in the prime of their life.

He than goes on to list a few people who started working on expounding the sefer, and either died in middle or the work was lost. In a different place the Shem Hagedolim brings the words of the Maggid to the Beit Yosef in the Maggid Meisharim (end of parashat Vayakhel) where he writes as follows:

וכן במאי דדחית מילוי דירוחם טמירי שפיר עבדת וכן בכל דוכתא דאת משיג עליה יאות את משיג עליה וקרינא ליה ירוחם טמירי דאיהו טמיר בגינתא דעדן דאית צדיקייא דלא משיג זכותא דילהון למהוי בגינתא דעדן בפרסום אלא בטמירו אבל במדריגה רבא ויקירא איהו

This, says Professor Meir Benayahu, is the reason why there is a curse on retype setting the work. What is not understood is that this is a completely halakhic work, not kabbalistic in any way, so why was there such a curse?[4]

One such work, which the Chida already mentions, is R. Hayyim Algazi’s Netivot Hamishpat.[5] The title page already records with regard to R. Algazi, “תנוח נפשו בעדן” (may his soul rest in heaven) intimating he died in the process of writing this commentary.

Another work in this category is that of R. Reuven Chaim Klein’s Shenot Chaim.[6] Unfortunately, he also died amidst writing the sefer, at the age of 47. The title page also records that the author did not want his name to appear, one can suggest that perhaps he thought if his name did not appear, he would not be subject to the curse. What’s interesting to note is in the haskamah of R. Joseph Shaul Nathenson, author of Shu”t Shoel u-Meshiv, to R. Klein’s work, as he makes no mention of any cherem to this work, but does quote the Maggid Mesharim cited earlier. Additionally, R. Chaim Sanzer, in his haskamah to this sefer, makes no mention of any cherem.

The other work which the Chidah brings was under this curse was the Sefer HaItur. This sefer was privileged to be reprinted with a critical edition by the great R. Meir Yonah, who called the glosses ‘Shar Hachadash and Pessach Hadiveir.’ Dr. Binyamin Levine, author of the Otzar Hagaonim series, writes in his short biography on him – as he used this work in many his own seforim – that he also suffered many tragedies; i.e. he lost many children.[7]

Interestingly enough, I found a nice size work on Rabbeinu Yeruchem and the author did not die young. His name was R. Yehudah Ashkenazi (1780-1849) the work is called Yisa Bracha (available at HebrewBooks.org), printed in Livorno 1822. He authored many famous seforim such as the Geza Yeshai (klallim) (Livorno, 1842), Siddur Beit Oved (Livorno, 1843), Siddur Beit Menucha (Livorno, 1924), Siddur Beit HaBechirah (Livorno, 1875), and Siddur Shomer Shabbat (Livorno, 1892).

In spite of all the above, a portion of the Rabbeinu Yeruchum has now been printed based of the first printing as well as manuscript, by on R. Yair Chazan.

Based on the above, we find ourselves asking the question ‘why did this R. Yair Chazan decide to reprint this work?’

The answer is found in the haskamah to the sefer from R. Ovadiah Yosef, who wrote that the whole curse is only if one is writing a pairush/commentary – expository text – on the work. But if one’s whole intent is to just fix the printing mistakes, which is R. Chazan whole intention here, it’s not a problem. Besides for the haskamah of R. Ovadiah Yosef, there are a few other haskamot; amongst them R. Shmuel Auerbach and R. Chaim Pinchus Scheinberg.

Just to give a brief overview of this work, as mentioned before the earlier editions of the Rabbeinu Yeruchem are full of printing mistakes and is missing many pieces. What R. Chazzan did was to track down the existing manuscripts of the sefer and try to fix the mistakes and put in the missing pieces. He also puts in the sources of Rabbeinu Yeruchem and he brings down where it is quoted in various poskim. He retype-set it beautifully making it a pleasure to read and use in compared to the old print.

So far only the third volume (the חוה section) has been printed I hope to see the rest of R. Yerucham printed soon.

Notes:
[1] See here for Marc B. Shapiro’s appreciation for R. Yosef Buxbaum, founder and director of Machon Yerushalayim, posted at the Seforim blog.
[2] Shem Hagedolim, Mareches Gedolim, letter yud, number 382, quoting the Ralbach, (siman 109); see also R. Chaim Shabtai HaKohen, Shu”t Mahrch”sh, Even HaEzer p. 153,b (“it is already known that the book of Rabbenu Yeruchum has many errors and unnecessary wordage”); R. Y. Sirkes, Bach Y.D. no. 241 s.v. U’mah Sechatav Avor Aviv (“I have already studied this work [Rabbenu Yeruchum] and it is full of error – too many to count”); Y.S. Speigel, Amudim B’Tolodot Sefer HaIvri : Hagahot U’Magimim p. 247 n.121 for additional sources.
[3] idem.
[4] Pirush Sifri, Rabbenu Eliezer Nachum, Meir Benayahu, ed., (Jerusalem, 1993), Introduction.
[5] (Istanbul, 1669; reprinted by Pe’er HaTorah in Yerushalyim, circa 1975)
[6] (Lemberg, 1871; reprinted by Machon Yerushalayim, Jerusalem, 1985)
[7] Binyamin Levin, Mesivos: Talmud Katan leSeder Mo’ed, Nashim, u-Nezikin (Jerusalem, 1973), end of this book.