Mysteries of the Magical Fifth Passover Cup (II): The Great Disappearing Act

By Leor Jacobi

Years ago, as a Yeshiva Bochur, a Rabbi explained to me that, according to the GRA, the Cup of Elijah at the Passover Seder is really the Fifth Cup mentioned in the Talmud which there is a doubt about  Thus, it is Elijah’s cup because when he returns to herald the redemption, every Talmudic tequ will be solved. I found that the elusive Fifth Cup is not actually mentioned in the Talmud as we have it, but by most of the Rishonim, who all had a textual variant.

Later, as a Junger Mann, I found R. Menachen Mendel Kasher’s pamphlet on the Fifth Cup, also published in his Haggadot (generally abridged). Despite some intrinsic flaws, it is a masterful and ingenious integration of traditional and modern methods.

A few years ago, groundbreaking publications by my teacher, David Henshke, and my colleague, Eliezer Brodt, inspired me to build upon their foundation, concentrating on points which remain obscure or unsolved.

As there are quite a few of these, I divided up the study into seven chronological and thematic parts which I hope will evolve into book chapters eventually but also stand alone as they are. The first part of the envisioned series, on the magical genesis of the fifth cup, was accepted by a prominent journal that graciously agreed to have an early draft distributed here. Part four, on 19th century scholarship post-Levinsohn was recently submitted to another leading academic journal.

With the current social upheavals due to the Coronavirus pandemic in mind, thanks to the generosity of the editors of the Seforim Blog, we can forego delays and release a draft of part two in time for Passover. Hopefully, the virus will disappear faster than the fifth cup did! Please favor me with your feedback towards advancing the project and I will do my best to acknowledge any and all contributions.

In a previous study on the genesis of the Fifth Cup, a primary textual variant of the Babylonian Talmud (Pesachim 118a) was identified as the source, an original teaching from the Talmudic Sages. Following the compilation of the Talmud, Babylonian Geonim not only received this textual variant, but actually drank the fifth cup themselves, with the apparent exception of Rav Hai Gaon, who also had the fifth cup Talmudic variant, but interpreted it as an optional practice, one which he did not follow. If the fifth cup was ordained in Babylon due to zugot, concern for even pairs arousing evil spirits, as explained in the prior study, perhaps Rav Hai inherited the original Palestinian custom of only four cups (zugot was only an issue in Babylon), as the Sages of Erez Israel did not believe in zugot. Alternatively, perhaps Rav Hai rejected the fifth cup as far as his own practice but not to the point of speaking out against it.

The fifth cup was widely observed among the Babylonian Geonim, and subsequently mentioned by Alfasi, Maimonides, and by Tur (14th century), the latter at length, with an entire siman (OḤ 481) devoted to it. 

However, if we fast-forward to the 16th century, we find that, despite an extensive discussion in R. Joseph Karo’s monumental Bet Yosef the fifth cup disappeared completely in his Shulḥan Arukh. Following the order of Tur, R. Karo gave names to all of the simanim. Here, he adopted a side issue of the siman and made it the focus and new title: “Not to drink after the fourth cup”. 

Furthermore, none of the principal commentators on the Shulḥan Arukh (“nose kelim”, 16th-17th centuries) even noted its disappearance. Explaining the magical disappearing act of the fifth cup during the Middle Ages will be the focus of this study.

The disappearance has bothered modern scholars of rabbinic literature, who struggled to explain it, most notably R. Menahem Kasher. Several factors have been suggested to explain the elimination of the fifth cup. They include: 1) Deletion of the Talmudic text mentioning the fifth cup due to homoteleuton (skipping text from one similar word to another)[1], 2) Endorsement of this variant by Rashi and Rashbam, 3) Application of this variant by subsequent Ashkenazi scribes,[2] 4) Circulation of an abbreviated version of Rav Hai Gaon’s responsum (in Tur) which suggests that Rav Hai Gaon also received the “Rashbam’s” version of the Talmud which does not mention the fifth cup,[3] 5) A statement at the beginning of Tur that the fifth cup should not be drunk, probably explaining Rashbam’s opinion, but ambiguously stated, 6) the development of a stringency in Medieval Ashkenaz to refrain from all drinking after the fourth cup, with some including even water in the prohibition (see below) and 7) The publication of the Venice edition of the Talmud, in 1520-23 following Rashbam’s textual variant, with no mention of the fifth cup, all subsequent editions following in kind, almost certainly the edition consulted by R. Joseph Karo.

Despite this multitude of factors, they don’t adequately explain R. Joseph Karo’s editorial decision to completely delete such a well-entrenched custom as the fifth cup, mentioned by all three of his pillars, Alfasi, Maimonides, and Rosh.[4] I propose that an additional factor, barely recognized previously and never noted in this context, was the one that settled the matter conclusively in the mind of Maran.

Rabbenu Yonah Girondi (13th century) maintained that one should refrain from drinking extra wine so as to be able to study the laws of Passover and the story of the Exodous all night, as the Sages did in Bne Braq. Maharil cites Rosh (Asheri) as adding that the fifth cup was permitted due to the verse v’heveiti. However, our standard printed text of Rosh states that the fourth cup is permitted due to the verse v’laqaḥti. 

(אבל בכוס רביעי התירו שיש לו סמך מן הפסוק כנגד ולקחתי אתכם. (סימן לג…

Rabbi Alter Hilewitz (1906-1994, author of halakhic works and editor of Encyclopedia Talmudit)  objected that the printed text makes no sense and must have become corrupted.[5] There is no reason to permit the fourth cup after it has already been mandated in the Mishnah. The special dispensation must have been for the fifth cup and Maharil cited the genuine text version of Rosh.[6] R. Hilewitz’s hunch was correct, as we find in an early manuscript of Rosh (Asheri) written in Spain in 1325 during the lifetime of Rosh (from middle of 3rd line from bottom):[7] 

Rabbi Hilewitz

The corruption was a by-product of proliferation of the Rashbam’s text of the Talmud eliminating the fifth cup entirely. It probably represents an unintended stringency in interpretation of the prohibition on drinking excessively. Another correction we find in the manuscript is the attribution of the opinion. The manuscript attributes it to Rabbenu Yonah, corresponding to the attribution in Tur. However, the printed edition misattributes it to ר”מ, R. Meir of Rothenburg, master of Rosh.

The text of Rosh which R. Joseph Karo relied upon was almost certainly that of the famous aforementioned Venice edition of the Talmud.[8] It reads:

.אבל בכוס רביעי התירו שיש לו סמך מן הפסוק כנגד והבאתי אתכם…

The text does not make sense. It is conflated. Either the fourth cup was permitted by the verse v’laqaḥti (as in the modern printed editions), or the fifth cup was permitted by the verse v’heveiti (as in the manuscript). The fourth cup could not have been permitted by the verse v’heveiti. The development was apparently a two-stage process and the Venice Edition represents the “missing link”, an intermediate stage in which the fifth cup was changed to the fourth cup but the verse remained intact. At this point, R. Joseph Karo or the later publishers could have corrected the text back to “the fifth cup”, restoring the original version in the manuscript. However, the tide was already turning towards the fourth cup Talmudic textual variant in Bet Yosef, with his decision to read Rashbam’s Talmudic textual variant into Rav Hai Gaon’s responsum.[9] R. Joseph Karo decided to keep “the fourth cup” and to ignore the word v’heveiti, or to mentally “correct” it to v’laqaḥti, exactly how the later printers chose to emend the text of Asheri.

One can speculate as to why Kasher, Benedict and subsequent Rabbinic scholars did not discover this source. R. Hilewitz’s observation was published in a 1945 newspaper article in Palestine. At the time, war was raging and R. Kasher was in America. Manuscript variants of the text of the Talmud have been studied and published on for years[10] and the last generation has brought us two editions of Tur prepared using manuscripts.[11] Even Tosafot Rosh is published from manuscripts in critical editions.[12] However, for some reason, manuscripts of Rosh are relatively uncharted territory, despite the centrality and rabbinic authority of the work. Perhaps (similar to Rashi’s Talmudic commentary, up until the groundbreaking work of my teacher, Aaron Ahrend) it is this very centrality that led its manuscripts to be ignored, as it was printed so early on, in the Venice Talmud, and so many times. 

Most significantly, the text is hidden from view. Tur clips off this section of the discussion and Bet Yosef does not cite it. However, once we return to the textual version that laid open before R. Joseph Karo on his desk, which he certainly meditated on, we can understand how he interpreted the abbreviated text of Tur and why he decided to delete the fifth cup.

Addendum: The Power of Piyyut

Shmuel of Evreux adopted a stringency not to drink even water after the four cups.[13] His source was the piyyut composed by R. Yosef Tuv Elem for a qerova recited on Shabbat ha-Gadol.[14] The last two stanzas at the end of the piyyut are the most famous today, for they are recited almost universally at the end of the Haggadah: “Hasal siddur Pesah”. The stanza preceding it is one mentions the fifth cup. There are two textual variants of this line interpretations of the piyyut. Three manuscripts read as follows:[15]

According to this text, line 3 states that it is permitted to drink water absolutely, in accordance with normative halakhah. Line 4 adds conditions for drinking wine, being sick or finicky, as described in line 5 with the recitation of Hallel ha-Gadol in line 6.

Medieval piyyut commentaries also follow this text, for example, the commentary by Samuel b. Salomo of Falaise:[16]

…קמעא, מעט, לשתות מים יכנס, לאחר סעודתו אם ירצה לשתות, ואם חולה הוא או אסטניס ובעי למשתי חמרא ואינו יכול לשתות מים, לומ’ בה’ על שם ‘ה הלל הגדול, ישתנס, יאזור

However, the textual variant followed by the Tosafot (Pesahim 117b) omits the vav at the beginning of line 4. Now the conditions of line 4 apply to line 3 as conditions for drinking water. Apparently from this piyyut, R. Shmuel of Évreux derived the stringency against drinking water after the Seder.[17] Tosafot for chapter Arvei Pesahim were based upon the Tosafot of R. Yechiel of Paris or a student of his, such as Rabbenu Peretz (Shalem Yahalom). R. Yechiel was in contact with R. Shmuel. R. Yechiel would attempt to refute R. Shmuel’s novel stringencies. Sometimes the refutation was accepted, such as cited by R. Peretz in his gloss to Smak 93, and sometimes not, as found in Orhot Hayyim, Hilkhot Tum’ah, vol 2, p. 602, and apparently in our case regarding the stringency of not drinking water. In this case, the development of a stringent shitta forbidding even the drinking of water likely shifted the goalposts of halakhic discussion away from the option of the Fifth Cup of wine. 

Finally, on the topic of piyyut, Leon J. Weinberger described a poem from R. Binyamin which mentions the fifth cup as a basic custom, an integral part of the Passover Seder. The piyyut was later published in its entirety by Ezra Fleischer.[18] According to Weinberger, it provides a messianic interpretation of the fifth cup, an aspect of the fifth cup that will become more evident during later periods to be discussed in chapters of this study yet to come. 

Editor Note: please see Eliezer Brodt’s earlier post on this subject: https://seforimblog.com/2013/03/the-cup-for-visitor-what-lies-behind/

[1] Henshke; also see here for another possibility and analysis of Talmudic manuscripts here.
[2] Kasher noted Rabbenu Tam’s fierce opposition in general to applying proposed emendations into the text of the Talmud itself, blaming Rashbam (his older brother) in particular. See Spiegel, Soloveitchik, briefly reviewed in my Jewish Hawking in Medieval France.
[3] Rav Kasher advanced this claim convincingly to explain the deletion by R. Joseph Karo. R. Avraham Benedict also advanced this claim, without crediting Kasher. As far as rendering a legal decision, Benedict took a diametrically opposite position. According to Kasher, now that we possess the full version of Rav Hai Gaon’s responsum, we see that R. Joseph Karo was led astray by an ambiguous text. Benedict considers R. Karo’s decision binding and the presence of the abbreviated version is ample justification.
[4] Noted especially by Kasher, also by Henshke.
[5] ‘Kos shel Eliahu’, Bamishor 245-6 (25.3.1945), p. 5.
[6] This version is also found in Abudraham (Seder ha-Haggadah u’Perisha, ed. S. Kroizer, Jerusalem 1963, p. 234), citing Rabbenu Yonah. Abudraham’s source was probably Asheri, but he did not generally cite secondary sources, as he himself stated in his introduction (p. 6.). See: L. Jacobi, “Talmudic Honey”, Fragments of the Novellae of R. David ben Saul of Narbonne”, Giluy Milta B’alma, 2/17/2016.
[7] British Library Add. 27293 f. 131v.
[8] Bomberg: Venice 1520-1523, p. 138b.
[9] Kasher, Benedict.
[10] Diqduqe Sofrim, Lieberman Instritute, Friedberg.
[11] Shirat Devorah; Ma’or.
[12] Mossad Ha-Rav Kook, Ofeq Institute.
[13] Cited by Mordechai, Hagahot Maimoniot (Ed. Constantinople, 6:11, “gedole Evreax”), Agur. Tosafot Pesachim 117b.
[14] See a letter from Pinchas Eliyahu Lawee in Kobetz Beit Aharon 15:5 (89, 1998), pp. 135–136.
[15] With only minor variants irrelevant for our purposes. Gabriel Wasserman shared with me his pilot edition of variants and Abraham Levine provided me with expert guidance in this study.
[16] Parma – Biblioteca Palatina Cod. Parm 3000 (de Rossi 378), f. 30a-35b. I was aided in locating piyyut commentaries by Elisabeth Hollender’s monumental Clavis.
[17] Another later piyyut follows this strict opinion, recently published by R. Jacob Israel Stal. See his note at page 33.
[18] Kobez al Yad 21 (1985), p, 31.

Abraham Rosenberg, R. Chaim Heller, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach on Conversion, Abortion, Mercy Killings, and new pictures and videos of R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg

Marc B. Shapiro

1. In my post here I discussed the enigmatic plagiarizer Abraham Rosenberg. As we saw, in 1923 and 1924 Rosenberg published articles on the Jerusalem Talmud in the Orthodox journal Jeschurun, and he later published Al Devar Tikunei Nushaot bi-Yerushalmi. In this last work, Rosenberg refers to R. Chaim Heller as his friend. I and so many others assumed that “Rosenberg” was a pseudonym, but Moshe Dembitzer, the expert on everything related to R. Heller, has pointed out to me that this appears not to be the case. Here is a letter Dembitzer found in the JDC archives from R. Heller to Cyrus Adler. As you can see, R. Heller mentions A. Rosenberg—the letter that is unclear must be an “A”—and one of his essays on the Jerusalem Talmud. He also mentions that Rosenberg “is considered only one of the ordinary students.”

Dembitzer also found another connection between R. Heller and Rosenberg. Here is a note from R. Charles B. Chavel’s edition of Hizkuni’s commentary on the Torah, p. 525.

Here is Rosenberg’s Al Devar Tikunei Nushaot bi-Yerushalmi, p. 102, where he cites the same explanation that Chavel cited in the name of R. Heller (but Rosenberg takes credit for it himself).

Regarding the plagiarisms of Rosenberg, I must also thank Gershon Klapper who alerted me to other examples. He wrote to me:

Rosenberg’s first article (לחקר תלמוד הירושלמי) opens אין מן הצורך לשנות את הידוע כי תלמוד הבבלי שנחתם לא זזה ידם של חכמי ישראל ממנו, very similar to how R. Heller’s ע”ד מסורת הש”ס בירושלמי begins, אין מן הצורך לשנות את הידוע כי תלמוד הירושלמי הוא עדין כשדה שאין עובד בו. But the next part of his introduction to that article is taken, slightly rearranged, from Steinschneider’s ספרות ישראל vol. 2, p. 103 (it reappears at the beginning of ע”ד תקוני נוסחאות בירושלמי, which includes most of this article’s content), as is the line beginning פעולתם של הגאונים. He does paraphrase some other language from R. Heller in the introduction, but again it isn’t word-for-word.

His second article (פסוקי המקרא שבתלמוד) opens

כי חכמי התלמוד היו בקיאים בכל ספרי התנ”ך עד להפליא, – דבר זה ידוע לכל מי שלמד גמרא, ואפילו למי שהצליף בה סקירה שטחית. כמעט מכל דף ודף שבתלמוד נראה, כי פסוקי התנ”ך, ואפילו המקראות “האובדים והנדחים” שברשימות השמות בעזרא ובדברי הימים היו שגורים על פי התנאים והאמוראים בתכלית הדיוק. בעלי התוספות (ב”ב ד’ קי”ג בד”ה תרוייהו) לא חששו להחליט, שהאמוראים פעמים שלא היו בקיאים בפסוקים. אבל כבר הודו שם בעלי התוס’ עצמם שאין החלטה זו מוכרחת וכמו שכתב הרשב”ם שם. וגם הראיה שהביאו מדברי ר’ חייא בר אבא, שאינו יודע אם נאמר בי’ הדברות טוב או לא (ב”ק נה.) אינה מוכרחת שהרי ברור הדבר, כי דברי רחב”א, אינם אלא דברי בדיחותא, כדי לדחות את השואל.

Almost every word of this comes from an article of the same title by Yisrael Chaim Tawiow which appeared in HaShiloach 29 (July-Dec. 1913). The rest of the second article is taken from Baer Ratner, סדר עולם רבא pp. 103ff. and Samuel Rosenfeld, משפחת סופרים pp. 98, 100, 105, etc.

Klapper also called my attention to Rosenberg’s plagiarism of part of a paragraph in R. Heller’s article that appears in Le-David Zvi (David Zvi Hoffmann Jubilee Volume, Hebrew section). Compare p. 56 there with Rosenberg, Al Devar Tikunei Nushaot bi-Yerushalmi, p. 11. As Klapper notes, it is quite ironic that Rosenberg leaves out the following sentence from R. Heller that occurs in the middle of the passage he plagiarizes:

ויש שיועיל לנו הציון לברוח מן העבירה ולעשות מצוה לאמר דבר בשם אומרו

While on the topic of R. Chaim Heller, first let me share this wonderful picture from R. Ahron Soloveichik’s wedding in which one can see the Rav, R. Heller and R. Yaakov Kamenetsky. As far as I know, this picture has never appeared online. I thank Yoel Hirsch for providing me with the picture.

From R. Kamenetsky’s recently published Emet le-Yaakov al Nakh, vol. 1, p. 185 n. 2, we learn that in 1937 R. Kamenetsky visited Boston to discuss with R. Soloveitchik opening a yeshiva together.

In 1924 R. Heller published his study of the Samaritan version of the Torah, Ha-Nusah ha-Shomroni shel ha-Torah (Berlin, 1924). In 1972 Makor, which published so many valuable reprints of old seforim, decided to also reprint R. Heller’s Ha-Nusah ha-Shomroni. The problem was that R. Heller had an heir, and she was the only one with the legal right to reprint his books. This led to the following letters sent by Miriam Heller’s attorney (the letters are found in the Israel State Archives, 14924/3, available here [before the recent cyber attack on the archives], pp. 35ff.). From these letters, we learn that there were other unauthorized reprints of R. Heller’s works.

One final point about R. Heller is the following: In 1912 he was appointed rav of the city of Lomza. Here is a report on his appointment from the newspaper Ha-Mitzpeh, March 29, 1912.

The writer is simply amazed that a Polish city, full of Hasidim, would hire as its rav a “Rabbi Dr.” Of course, R. Heller was a very unique “Rabbi Dr.”

2. Because I discussed conversion in the last post, I would like to call attention to R. Yoel Amital’s discovery of how R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s view on the matter has been presented.[1] The issue R. Amital focuses on is whether a conversion for someone who does not observe mitzvot takes effect. I am referring to one who tells the beit din at the time of conversion that he accepts the mitzvot, but we see later that this was not the case.

In his letter in R. Zvi Cohen’s Tevilat Kelim (1975), R. Auerbach is clear that ex post facto such a conversion is still valid.

The crucial words are:

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף שבדיעבד הם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

According to R. Auerbach, because be-diavad such converts are Jewish, to convert them is a violation of lifnei iver. As R. Auerbach explains, before conversion, these people could work on Shabbat and eat non-kosher, but now that they are Jewish they are forbidden to do so. By converting people who will be committing these and other sins, the beit din has violated the prohibition of lifnei iver.

As R. Amital shows, in subsequent printings of R. Cohen’s book, R. Auerbach’s letter is printed with a significant addition (here underlined):

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף שהם טועים לחשוב שבדיעבד הם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

And

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף אם הם טועים לחשוב שבדיעבד הם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

When this letter was printed in R. Auerbach’s Minhat Shlomo, vol. 1, no. 35:3, the wording was altered further:

בכגון דא נלענ”ד שכל המסייעים לגירות כזו, אף דהם טועים לחשוב שהם גרים גמורים, אפי”ה גם לשטתם המגיירים אותם עוברים בלאו של לפני עור וגו’

In Ha-Ma’yan 56 (Nisan 5776), p. 89, in response to R. Amital’s article, R. Aharon Goldberg, a grandson of R. Shlomo Zalman, published a picture of R. Auerbach’s original letter. The wording is identical to what appears in the first edition of R. Cohen’s book. So how to explain the later additions? R. Goldberg states that it is possible that the later changes were made with the consent of R. Auerbach. Although there is no evidence of this, I find it unlikely that R. Cohen would have altered R. Auerbach’s letter while R. Auerbach was still alive. A general rule of censorship and alteration of texts is that it is done after the author is no longer alive.

Leaving aside the updated version of the letter, there is still a problem that R. Amital confronts. According to R. Auerbach’s original letter, those who convert but do not become religious, their conversion is still valid. However, R. Auerbach also signed a public letter together with the Steipler, R. Shakh, and R. Elyashiv, which states that such a conversion has no validity. So which is it?

R. Mordechai Halpern has shown that R. Auerbach sometimes presented a “public” halakhah that was stricter than his true opinion, but which for some reason he did not wish to publicize.[2] R. Amital suggests that in this case we have a similar example where R. Auerbach publicly advocated a “strict” position regarding conversion that was not in line with his true opinion. (I put “strict” in quotes because while this position is strict in not regarding a conversion as valid, it is also “lenient” in that it tells someone who converted and did not intend to become religious that she can leave her husband without a get, does not need to fast on Yom Kippur, etc.)

R. Amital also claims, implausibly in my opinion, that the public letter R. Auerbach signed does not really stand in contradiction to the letter he sent to R. Cohen. How so? The public letter speaks of people who convert without accepting to observe mitzvot, while R. Auerbach in his letter to R. Cohen is referring to people who in front of the beit din do accept to observe mitzvot, but in their inner heart do not really have such an intention.

Contrary to R. Amital, this is clearly not what the public letter means. It is referring to people who converted in a beit din, but never intended to follow halakhah. It is simply impossible to read this public letter as referring to, in the words of R. Amital: גרים שלא קיבלו עליהם כלל בבית דין לקיים תורה ומצוות. There is no beit din in the world that does not require converts to accept Torah observance. The issue the letter was addressing is converts who, despite their verbal acceptance of mitzvot, do not follow through in practice. According to the letter, such a conversion is not valid. This is so obvious that one wonders how R. Amital could have ever offered his suggestion to explain the contradiction.

R. Halpern himself notes that he knows that R. Auerbach never backed away from his earlier position, as seen in his letter to R. Cohen, that someone who was converted by a proper beit din, but did not intend to observe mitzvot, ex post facto the conversion is still valid. Yet he states that R. Auerbach later concluded that this liberal approach should not be publicized.[3]

Even with the initial two “corrected” versions of R. Auerbach’s letter, R. Auerbach mentions that rabbis who convert people who have no intention of observing Torah violate the prohibition of putting a stumbling block before the blind. R. Auerbach states that until now the person converting violated Shabbat and ate non-kosher food and these were not sins. But now, after the conversion, he is violating the Torah. R. Auerbach concludes his letter as follows:

נמצא שכל המגיירים והמסייעים לכך הו”ל כגדול המחטיאו, ועוברים בלאו של ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול

The implication of this is that ex post facto the conversion is indeed valid, as otherwise there would be no sin committed by the convert and there would be no issue of putting a stumbling block before the blind. In the words of R. Yisrael Rozen:[4]

למדנו מדבריו שהגירות חלה, דאי לאו הכי אין כאן מכשול, שהרי נשאר בגיותו

In fact, we find many poskim who say that we should not convert people who do not intend on observing mitzvot, because then they will be punished for their sins. This shows that these poskim regard a conversion without intent to observe mitzvot as valid ex post facto. In a previous post here I cited a number of examples of this, and here is one more.

R. Raphael Shapiro, Torat Refael, vol. 3, no. 42, has a short responsum about whether to convert a woman who will not be observant. It was sent to R. Mordechai Klatchko of Volozhin, who would later come to the U.S. and serve as a rav in Boston.[5] R. Klatchko was clearly a fine talmid hakham, as can be seen from the two volumes of his Tekhelet Mordekhai. R. Klatchko wrote to R. Shapiro arguing that the woman should be converted even if she was not going to be observant so that her intended husband (or perhaps current husband) could fulfill the mitzvah of procreation (which he could not do if his children would not be halakhically Jewish). R. Shapiro disagrees and states that it is forbidden to convert her, as she will certainly not observe the niddah laws, and this will cause them both to violate a Torah prohibition.

What is important for our purposes is that both R. Klatchko and R. Shapiro assume that one who converts without intending to observe Jewish law is regarded as a valid convert. As long as the person goes through a halakhically proper conversion ceremony, that is what activates the conversion. It is hard for people today to understand how R. Shapiro never even raises the possibility that a conversion is invalid if the person converting intends to routinely violate fundamental Jewish laws by living an irreligious lifestyle. But as can be seen in so many different examples, a widespread view in prior generations—I don’t know if it was the majority view or not—was that as long as the conversion is carried out properly, what happens later, and what is in the convert’s heart at the time of the conversion ceremony, have no legal significance.[6]

Here is one further example of this approach, Be-Mar’eh ha-Bazak, vol. 4, no. 96.[7]

As you can see, the approach of Kollel Eretz Hemdah is that there is no possibility of voiding a conversion carried out by a proper beit din, even if the people converting had no intention of observing mitzvot. At the beginning of the volume, it states that the responsa were reviewed by R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, R. Nachum Rabinovitch, and R. Yisrael Rozen, all significant figures in their own right.

Finally, it is also worth noting that no less a figure than R. Isaac Jacob Weiss refused to void a conversion even though the woman who converted never observed mitzvot. See Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 1, nos. 121-123.

I have a good deal more to say about conversion, but in the interest of space, let me just call attention to a couple of interesting things I recently saw. The first is that R. Moses Sofer states that non-Jews are rewarded in this world if they convert to Judaism.[8] I do not know of anyone else who says that there is a divinely ordained reward for one who converts.

The second interesting discussion about conversion I recently saw is R. Aviad Sar Shalom Basilea, Emunat Hakhamim, ch. 24 (pp. 264-265 in the Jerusalem, 2016 edition). Adopting the type of anachronistic explanation that some commentators have been fond of, R. Basilea assumes that Mahlon converted Ruth and married her with huppah and kiddushin. But this creates a problem, because if Ruth was Jewish, why did Naomi push her away? R. Basilea offers a possible answer: Naomi held like the Rif and the Rambam that since Ruth’s immersion in the mikveh was not before three men, it was invalid even be-diavad. However, Mahlon held like the other poskim that be-diavad, tevilah by oneself if valid.

והנה נעמי היתה סוברת כרי”ף והרמב”ם שאפילו בדיעבד אינה גיורת ולכן השתדלה להרחיקה, ומחלון היה סבור כאותם הפוסקים הסוברים כי גיורת גמורה היתה ולכן נשאה

Does anyone, even from the most traditional communities, still offer explanations along these lines? Here is what R. Shimon Shkop wrote in a different context, and you can see that he was not a fan of this type of explanation.[9]

ודבר זה מביא לידי גיחוך, כעין הפלפולים אם פרעה היה סובר שעבודא דאורייתא

Some time ago I was looking at Abba Appelbaum’s book Rabbi Azariah Figo (Drohobycz, 1907), and he offers the following examples of anachronistic explanations (p. 54):[10]

R. Gershon Ashkenazi (1618-1693), one of the greatest halakhists of his day, also wrote a work of homiletics, Tiferet ha-Gershuni. In his derashah for parashat Mas’ei (p. 236 in the 2009 edition) he portrays the daughters of Zelophehad as arguing from halakhic logic.

In his derashah for parashat Va-Yera (p. 48), in discussing the descendants of Ishmael, R. Ashkenazi suggests that they held that the law of ketubah is rabbinic.

אם כן בני ישמעאל היו סבורים כתובה מדרבנן

Appelbaum also calls attention to R. Meir Schiff’s elaboration at the end of his commentary to Bava Kamma (found in the Vilna Shas). He portrays the incident of Esau selling his firstborn status from a halakhic angle. As such, Jacob’s thoughts were no different than those of a later halakhic scholar:

ונסתפק יעקב באומרו כיום מחמת שני דברים, שגריעותא דבכורה מחמת דבר שלא בא לעולם ומחמת אונאה . . . ויעקב נתיירא או למד הפשט כרש”י ולזה אמר ויאמר השבע לי כמ”ש בח”מ סי ר”ט ס”ד בהגה”ה

Another example, not mentioned by Applebaum, is R. Samuel Edels (Maharsha) in his aggadic commentary to Sanhedrin 57b. R. Edels wonders why Pharoah commanded the Hebrew midwives to kill the newborn Hebrew children, as it would have made much more sense to have Egyptian midwives do this. He explains that the children were to be killed before birth and for non-Jews this would be regarded as murder, which Pharoah wanted to avoid.[11] He thus turned to Hebrew midwives as for them it is not murder to kill an unborn child.

Quite apart from the far-fetched nature of the explanation, as well as its assumption that even before the giving of the Torah the Israelites were bound by Jewish law, not Noahide law, I don’t think any reader of the biblical story would find it reasonable that Pharoah was concerned about anyone violating the commandment against murder. However, the passage is also of interest in seeing how Maharsha regarded the prohibition against abortion.[12] He even portrays Pharoah as thinking that there is no prohibition for Jews to abort a fetus, including right before birth.

דודאי פרעה לא שאל מהם להרוג הזכרים בידים דבן נח מוזהר על שפיכות דמים ולכך לא אמר כן למילדות המצריות שהוזהרו על שפיכות דמים אפילו בעוברים אבל למילדות העבריות אמר שהותר לכם להרוג עובר במעי אמו וראיתם על האבנים קודם שיצא לאויר העולם אם בן הוא וגו’ וכיון שאי אפשר בהם לפטור משפיכות דמים רק בתחילת יציאת הולד קודם שיצא ראשו או רובו הוצרך לתת להם סימנין כמו שכתוב בפרק קמא דסוטה [יא ע”ב]

There has been a good deal of discussion as to how to understand the Maharsha’s words שהותר לכם. Some assume that he meant that Pharoah was in error in thinking that there is no prohibition for Jews to abort a fetus.[13] It is also possible to explain that the prohibition against abortion for Jews is only rabbinic,[14] so at that period of time there was no prohibition. R. Yaakov Farbstein states flatly:[15]

ומבואר במהרש”א דאין איסור לישראל בהריגת העוברים

This notion, that the Maharsha is saying that there is no prohibition for Jews to abort a fetus, is not in line with the overwhelming majority view beginning with the rishonim. However, in one Tosafot, Niddah 44a-b, s.v. ihu, it does state that abortion is permitted for Jews, and it does not mention that there needs to be a good reason for this or provide a timeline after which abortion is not allowed.

וא”ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן . . . וי”ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע”ג דמותר להרגו

Pretty much every halakhist who deals with abortion struggles with this Tosafot, as they have found it very hard to accept that any rishon could permit abortion without restrictions. One approach offered is that Tosafot is saying that there is no Torah prohibition, but there would still be a rabbinic prohibition.[16]

R. Moshe Feinstein, in his classic responsum on abortion, claims that there is a mistake in Tosafot, and instead of the two appearances of דמותר it should instead say דפטור ההורגו in both places.[17] This is in line with the phenomenon I have discussed on a few occasions, where R. Moshe is prepared to deny the authenticity of problematic texts. R. Eliezer Waldenberg offered a strong rejoinder to R. Moshe.[18]

והנה עם כל הכבוד, לא אדוני, לא זו הדרך, וחיים אנו עפ”ד גאוני הדורות, והמה טרחו כל אחד ואחד לפי דרכו לבאר ולהעמיד כוונת דברי התוס’ בנדה וליישבם, ואף אחד מהם לא עלה על דעתו הדרך הקלה והפשוטה ביותר לומר שיש ט”ס בדברי התוס’ ובמקום מותר צריך להיות אסור [צ”ל פטור]

While no other authorities agree with R. Moshe that the Tosafot contains a mistaken text, many regard the language of Tosafot as not exact.[19]

Returning to R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, I know of another example where he did not want a view of his to be widely shared. R. Amit Kula discusses R. Avigdor Nebenzahl’s argument that according to a variety of sources one who is suffering greatly is allowed to commit suicide. He further adds that it would be permitted to kill another in this circumstance (active euthanasia), for if you are allowed to kill yourself for a good purpose, you can do it to another as well. R. Nebenzahl adds that some of what he says comes from R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. He also quotes R. Auerbach that one can take medicine to reduce pain even if it will shorten one’s life.[20]

This information, which appeared in the first edition of R. Nebenzahl’s Be-Yitzhak Yikare, is not found in subsequent editions. R. Kula tells us that in these editions R. Nebenzahl inserted a note that the section was removed at the instruction of an unnamed scholar, and R. Mordechai Halpern quotes R. Nebenzahl that this scholar was none other than R. Auerbach.[21]

I find this of interest because if there is one thing that everyone knows, it is that Judaism does not allow active euthanasia (mercy killing). As is usually the case, matters are more complicated as has recently been shown by R. Yitzchak Roness in an article in Ha-Ma’yan.[22] He notes that R. Moshe Sternbuch does not believe that there is any prohibition for non-Jews to engage in mercy killing, since it is carried out for a good purpose. R. Yitzhak Zilberstein also inclines towards this position, and R. Moshe Feinstein suggests this as well, writing:[23]

אפשר שבן נח אינו אסור ברציחה שהוא לטובת הנרצח ושאני בזה האיסור לישראל מהאיסור לבן נח

R. Moshe and others specifically have in mind a non-Jew engaging in mercy killing of a Jew. The proof brought is the famous story of the death of R. Hanina ben Teradyon (Avodah Zarah 18a) where R. Hanina permits the executioner to raise the flame and remove the wool from his heart, thus actively hastening his death. R. Shaul Yisraeli goes the furthest, and for someone suffering greatly, and near death, he thinks that active euthanasia is permitted even if performed by a Jew.

R. Roness then notes that there is a dispute if one suffering great pain is allowed to commit suicide. For the side that permits this, R. Zilberstein adds that if it is permitted for the suffering individual, it will also be permitted for another to assist (active euthanasia). R. Roness also cites R. Hershel Schachter who states that active euthanasia, with the agreement of the patient, is not to be regarded as murder. He even suggests that for one suffering greatly, active euthanasia should be permitted:[24]

ההורג את חברו ברשותו יש לומר דאין בו לאו דרציחה אלא רק לאו דאך את דמכם, דלא גרע הורג חברו ברשותו מההורג את עצמו . . . ולמנוע א”ע מלסבול ייסורים דינו כפקו”נ, וכמשמעות התוס’ הנ”ל. ואם באמת כ”ה גדר היתר זה, א”כ אף בחולה הסובל יסורים קשים ומתחנן לאחרים ליטול את נפשו, אם נאמר כנ”ל, דבכה”ג אין לומר דבטלה דעתו וכו’, ג”כ הי’ צ”ל מותר מטעם פקו”נ ועיין בזה

And finally, here is what R. Chaim Kanievsky responded when asked if a Jewish patient near death could allow a non-Jew to end his life. R. Chaim does not say this is murder. On the contrary, he is inclined to permit it.[25]

אם שוהה אדם בבית חולים דעכו”ם ויש לו יסורים רבים במחלתו האנושה, ורוצה הרופא לחסוך לו היסורים ולקרב מותו ושואל ממנו רשות, האם מותר לו להסכים לזאת. והשיב רבנו שליט”א “יתכן שיש ללמוד זה ממעשה דרחב”ת” . . . והיאך הסכים רחב”ת שהעכו”ם יקרב מותו, והשיב רבנו: “איפה שהחולה מרגיש שזה טובתו יתכן שמותר כמו שמותר להתפלל עליו שימות.”

My question is, how come the “liberal” views I have mentioned are not better known?

7. In my last post here I included the first-ever color pictures of R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg. These went around the world very quickly, and as is the nature of the internet, where the pictures came from was soon forgotten. In fact, within 24 hours someone who does not read the Seforim Blog sent them to me as a great new discovery. When I told him that I am the one who published the pictures he was at first incredulous, stating that he just got them from his cousin.

Here are two more pictures of R. Weinberg that he sent to his family. They are from before World War II when he was still in Germany. In the picture where he is lying the ground, I do not know who the couple next to R. Weinberg is.[26]

And for an extra treat, here are the only known videos of R. Weinberg, and one of them is in color. I thank Noam Cohn for putting this together, at my request, from his family’s collection. The first part has R. Weinberg with R. Arthur Ephraim Weil, the rav of Basel, and R. Leo Adler who succeeded Weil as rav of Basel in 1956. The second video, in which you can see R. Weinberg in color together with R. Samuel Brom, the rav of Lucerne, is from winter 1958-1959 at the Silberhorn kosher hotel in Grindelwald. The hotel had just inaugurated its new mikveh, and it was important to the family who owned the hotel that R. Weinberg give his approval to the mikveh.[27] At 1:12 and 3:20 you can also see the famed educator and student of R. Weinberg, Dr. Gabriel H. Cohn. Here is a picture from the event and you can see R. Brom and Dr. Cohn standing next to R. Weinberg.

Regarding R. Adler, before coming to Basel he studied ten years at the Mir Yeshiva, including in Shanghai. After the war he was in New York where he taught Torah at Yeshiva University.[28]

8. In my last post here I had the following quiz questions.

Please identify the following and email me your answers:

1. There are two se’ifim in the Shulhan Arukh that only contain two words.

2. There is one siman in the Shulhan Arukh whose number is the gematria of the subject of the siman.

The answer to no. 1 is Yoreh Deah 65:6: נוהג בכוי, and Even ha-Ezer 126:42: מותרת בויו

The answer to no. 2 is Orah Hayyim no. 586. This is the laws of shofar, and the gematria of shofar is 586. This was noted by R. Jacob Emden and I mentioned this in my article “‘Truth’ and Authorial Intent in the Study of Torah,” available here.

A number of people provided the correct answers for no. 1 and no. 2, but no one got both of my intended answers. However, Moshe Schwartz got no. 2 right with a different answer than I was thinking of (meaning he answered both questions correctly). He noted that Yoreh Deah 107 speaks about cooking eggs, and the gematria of ביצה is 107.[29] Also, shortly before this post was completed, Sol Reich provided another example: Yoreh Deah 334 is about הלכות נידוי וחרם and the gematria of נידוי וחרם is 334.

9. Information about my summer tours with Torah in Motion to Central Europe and Spain is available here.

* * * * * * *

[1] “Ha-Im Giyuram shel Gerim she-Einam Shomrim Mizvot Hal Be-Diavad? Berur Da’at ha-Gaon Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ZTL,” Ha-Ma’yan 56 (Tishrei 5776), pp. 43-46.
[2] Halpern, Refuah, Metziut ve-Halakhah (Jerusalem, 2011), pp. 35ff.
[3] Amital, “Ha-Im Giyuram,” p. 45.
[4] Ve-Ohev Ger (Alon Shvut, 2010), p. 161 n. 1.
[5] See R. Hayyim Fischel Epstein, Teshuvah Shelemah, vol. 2, Even ha-Ezer, nos. 29-30, and R. Elijah Klatzkin, Hibbat ha-Kodesh, no. 11, where they respond to R. Klatchko’s question about a get written in Roxbury (a neighborhood in Boston), but the get only mentioned “Boston”. This is mentioned by Hayyim Karlinsky, Rabbi Hayyim Fischel Epstein (New York, 1963), pp. 26-27.

This R. Klatchko should not be confused with an earlier R. Mordechai Klatchko of Lida who also wrote a book titled Tekhelet Mordekhai. It is noteworthy that R. Klatchko of Lida wrote a lengthy haskamah for the Mishnah Berurah. Regarding R. Klatchko of Lida, see here.[6] For another example, see R. Dov Cohen, Va-Yelkhu Sheneihem Yahdav (Jerusalem, 2009), pp. 333-334. Here R. Cohen describes how, at the direction of R. Isser Yehudah Unterman, he converted a woman intent on marrying a completely irreligious Jew. This is the sort of conversion that today would not be allowed in Israel or in any of the batei din recognized by the Israeli Chief Rabbinate. See also R. Avraham Shapiro, Kuntres Aharon in his edition of R. Isaac Jacob Rabinowitz, Zekher Yitzhak (Jerusalem, 1990), p. 396, who suggests that according to Maimonides, when it comes to conversion and acceptance of mitzvot,  כיון שקבל בפה אין דבריו שבלב דברים.

For a convert who is not observant, there is one halakhic consequence, at least according to many authorities: When they divorce the get should not say ben (or bat) Avraham avinu, but ploni ha-ger. See R. Shimon Yakobi, Bitul Giyur Ekev Hoser Kenut be-Kabbalat ha-Mitzvot (Jerusalem, 2009), pp. 103ff. (This is an official publication of the Israel rabbinical courts.) See also ibid., p. 105, for the shocking statistic that from 1996-2008, 97% of converts who divorced in the State of Israel were irreligious. There is no reason to doubt that the number of non-divorced converts who are irreligious is similar. If only 3% of converts in Israel are religious, then, as Yakobi rightly notes, it raises serious concerns about the conversion process.
[7] A similar responsum dealing with the same case appears in Be-Mar’eh ha-Bazak, vol 3, no. 89.
[8] Derashot Hatam Sofer, vol. 2, p. 301c. s.v. yeshalem.
[9] Hiddushei Rabbi Shimon ha-Kohen (Jerusalem, 2011), vol. 4, p. 324 (Kuntres Likutim, no. 5).
[10] I can’t say whether there is any plagiarism in this book, but another publication of Appelbaum was plagiarized from Abraham Berliner. See Nehemiah Leibowitz, “Al Devar ha-Takanah be-Venetzia,” Ha-Tzofeh le-Hokhmat Yisrael 13 (1929), p. 90.

Regarding anachronistic explanations, I think most would also include in this category R. Moses Sofer’s statement that Joseph wished to pray with a minyan rather than pray vatikin by himself. See Hatam Sofer al ha-Torah, vol. 1, p. 227.
[11] The same approach is independently suggested by R. Judah Rosanes, Parashat Derakhim, Derush 17, and R. Pinhas Horowitz, Panim Yafot, Ex. 1:15.

R. Ishmael holds that abortion is treated as murder for non-Jews (Sanhedrin57b) and Maimonides rules this way (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim9:4). This halakhah has often been cited as proof that the crime of abortion is stricter for non-Jews than Jews, and that public policy should be in line with this. Yet in Sanhedrin 57b the Tanna Kamma disagrees with R. Ishmael and does not regard abortion as murder. In fact, according to the Tanna Kamma, abortion would seem to be permissible for non-Jews. R. Jeremy Wieder has raised the question, which I would like someone to offer a serious reply to, that while Maimonides and other authorities accept R. Ishmael as the binding decision, who says that non-Jews have to accept this? Why can’t non-Jews “poskin” like the Tanna Kamma? See here at minute 35:30.

R. Shneur Zalman Fradkin,Torat Hesed, Even ha-Ezer, no. 42:5 (in the note), suggests that Tosafot,Niddah 44a, that I discuss in the text, adopts the Tanna Kamma’s position, not the view of R. Ishmael. See Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 184. The implications of this with regard to non-Jews are obviously significant.

See also R. Jacob Emden, Em la-Binah (Jerusalem, 2020), p. 197:

בילדכן את העבריות: לא גזר על שפיכות דמים אלא על העוברים

R. Emden seems to be saying that abortion is not regarded as murder for non-Jews. Perhaps relevant to this, it is worth noting that R. Meir Mazuz states that one should encourage a non-Jewish woman pregnant by a Jewish man to have an abortion. SeeMakor Ne’eman, vol. 3, no. 1509. See also R. Hanan Aflalo,Asher Hanan, vol. 8, no. 74. R. Joseph Babad, Minhat Hinnukh, 296:7, states that abortion is not murder for non-Jews, and therefore there is no law of rodef when it comes to a non-Jew seeking to kill a fetus. (Since later in this post I mention suicide, it is worth noting that R. Babad also states that non-Jews are not prohibited from committing suicide. See Minhat Hinnukh 34:8.)

Regarding abortion for Jews, R. Hershel Schachter has an interesting shiur here. His approach is, I think, the most lenient among contemporary poskim, as he states that for the health of the mother abortion is permitted up until the end of pregnancy, which is long after the time that the fetus is viable.

R. Schachter’s approach might be identical with the very lenient perspective of R. Abraham Isaac Bloch. See R. Mordechai Gifter,Milei de-Iggerot, vol. 7, p. 341:

בגדר האיסור דהריגת עוברין בישראל, שמעתי מאדמו”ר הגאב”ד ור”מ דטלז ז”ל הי”ד, שהוא מגדר בל תשחית, אשר לפי”ז כל שהוא לצורך רפואה או פגם משפחה, אין בזה גדר האיסור דהשחתה

[12] I would have thought that the Maharsha’s words could have halakhic significance, but R. Nahman Yehiel Michel Steinmetz states otherwise, noting אין לומדים הלכה מדברי הגדה. See Meshiv Nevonim, vol. 6, p. 250. See also R. Weinberg’s comments regarding the Maharsha in Seridei Esh, vol. 3, no. 126.
[13] See e.g., Siftei Maharsha: Shemot, pp. 16-17.
[14] For opinions that the prohibition against abortion is only rabbinic, see R. Yishai Yitzhak Shraga, Torat ha-Ubar (Jerusalem, 2017), pp. 72ff.
[15] Ohalei Yaakov: Shemot, p. 1.
[16] See R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 9, p. 231, vol. 14, p. 184.
[17] Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 2, p. 295. There are a couple of strange things in this responsum, which first appeared in the R. Yehezkel Abramsky Memorial Volume. For example, see p. 298 how R. Moshe describes R. Joseph Hayyim’s responsum in Rav Pealim. (The word שהחכם in the bottom line right column should be שהתחכם, as it appears in the R. Abramsky Memorial Volume.) Yet as R. Waldenberg points out, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 186, R. Moshe’s summary of Rav Pealim is inaccurate and he also does not show much regard for R. Joseph Hayyim, leading R. Waldenberg to write: והוא פלאי, ושרי ליה מריה בזה. See Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 186. (R. Moshe actually ends his own responsum by saying ושרי ליה מריה בזה about R. Waldenberg.)

R. David M. Feldman wrote to R. Waldenberg that R. Moshe did not write the responsum on abortion, and that could explain what he saw as various problems in this responsum. SeeTzitz Eliezer, vol. 20, p. 140.

I find this approach completely untenable, although in conversation with me R. Feldman insisted on it. Some might suggest that others were involved in writing the responsum, and that explains the passage dealing with Rav Pealim. I find this impossible to accept, and would prefer to assume that at least with regard to the inaccurate Rav Pealim description, that R. Moshe did not have the text in front of him and was citing from memory from what had earlier been shown to him. As such, it is easy to imagine how he could have forgotten the details, as we have all had similar experiences. For more on this responsum, see my post here.
[18] Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 14, p. 183.
[19] See R. Zvi Ryzman, Ratz ke-Tzvi, vol. 2, p. 295.
[20] Tehumin 37 (2017), p. 124.
[21] Refuah, Metziut, ve-Halakhah, p. 28.
[22] “Ha-Im Muteret ‘Hamatat Hesed’ al Yedei Amirah le-Goy,” Ha-Ma’yan 62 (Tamuz 5782), pp. 54-64.
[23] Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 2, p. 313.
[24] Ginat Egoz, p. 74.
[25] R. Yosef Aryeh Lorintz, Mishnat Pikuah Nefesh, p. 26.
[26] The pictures in this post are now kept at Ganzach Kiddush Hashem in Bnei Brak.
[27] All the big rabbis stayed and ate at the Silberhorn hotel, and yet until 1975 it had no hashgachah. People knew the family that owned it to be absolutely reliable in matters of kashrut, and like the other kosher hotels in Switzerland, the kashrut was trusted without any hashgachah. In 1974 the Swiss rabbinate informed the various kosher hotels that they would need to acquire a hashgachah, thus ending the era of religious owners’ kashrut being trusted without any outside supervision. (Thanks to Dr. Joshua Sternbuch who passed on this information from the family who owned the Silberhorn hotel.)

Regarding the pious practice of eating eggs at seudah shelishit, see Kaf ha-Hayyim 289:12.

Jacob ben Elhanan Heilbronn – A Multi-faceted Erudite Scholar

By Marvin J. Heller[1]

Jewish history and literature is replete with individuals of stature, men of repute, leaders in their generation, whose memory has not fared well over time. Their reputations and accomplishments notwithstanding, they are not well remembered today, excepting in rabbinic or academic circles. This is, of course, not only a Jewish phenomenon, but our concern is with one individual in particular, prominent in his time in the Jewish community, justifiably so, but, outside of the aforementioned circles is, for the most, forgotten today. Among those who were prominent in their time but are not well known by the general public is R. Jacob ben Elhanan Heilbronn.

Heilbronn (or Halpron), a late sixteenth and early seventeenth century rabbi, was a highly regarded Talmudic scholar, evident from the esteem in which he was held by his correspondents and in the approbations to his work, as well as being a mathematician. Heilbronn was the author, compiler, and translator of several varied books on different subjects, indicative of his erudition. In this article we will briefly recount Heilbronn’s life and career and then, in somewhat greater detail, describe his literary works. Mordecai Samuel Ghirondi and Hananel Neppi, suggest that Heilbronn was a student of R. Samuel Judah Katzenellenbogen (1521-97) the son of R. Meir Katzenellenbogen (Maharam of Padua, 1473–1565).[2] Born in Italy to an Ashkenaz family, Heilbronn studied in Prague, afterwards traveling through cities in Germany and Italy, earning his livelihood from teaching. Heilbronn was also a tutor, among his students were the children of R. Nehemiah Luzzatto in Venice, for whom Heilbronn included a eulogy in his Nahalat Ya’akov (below).[3]

Jacob Heilbronn’s brother was R. Joseph ben Elhanan Heilbronn, who eventually settled in and became a resident of Posen. Also a person of repute, today Joseph Heilbronn is considered a German Jewish scholar. However, not only is he also poorly recalled, when Joseph Heilbronn is remembered, it is often as Jacob Heilbronn’s brother. Joseph Heilbronn was the author of Em ha-Yeled (Prague, 1597) a popular elementary Hebrew grammar, among the earliest of children’s grammar books, reprinted several times. The title-page of Em ha-Yeled informs that it is concerned with the grammar of words, for a child of seven, to familiarize him with word structure, the letters comprising word structure, tenses, future and past, singular and plural, male and female. The purpose is so that he will be able to speak the holy tongue (Hebrew) clearly and to write grammatically. Joseph Heilbronn’s other works are Me’irat Einayim (Cracow or Prague, c. 1600), an index of the taryag mitzvot according to Maimonides; and Kol ha-Kore (Cracow c. 1602), brief rules of grammar for schools based on the work of R. Elijah Levita (Bahur, 1469-1549).[4]

Jacob ben Elhanan Heilbronn, after teaching Torah in several communities, eventually settled in Padua where he was engaged as rabbi. Padua, a city of some distinction, counted among its residence such distinguished sages as R. Samuel Archivolti (Arugat ha-Bosem, c. 1515–1611), R. Simhah Luzzatto (1583–1663), and was home to a medical school which admitted Jewish students and therefore attracted Jews throughout Europe.[5]

I

Turning to Heilbronn’s literary activity. His works are in Yiddish (Judeo-German), Hebrew, and even in Italian, reflecting the composition and needs of contemporary Jewry. The Yiddish texts, three are noted here, were all printed at the press of Giovani di Gara. That press, active from 1564 to 1611, printed more than 270 books, primarily in Hebrew letters, and only infrequently in non-Jewish languages. Of that number, almost a third are seventeenth century imprints. Di Gara published a wide variety of books, encompassing liturgical works, Bibles, responsa, haggadot, and important first titles by authors. Given the positive reputation of the di Gara press it is not surprising that Heilbronn chose to print several of his titles with the di Gara press.

Heilbronn’s Yiddish titles are set in Vaybertaytsh, a semi-cursive type generally but not exclusively reserved for Yiddish books, so named because these works were most often read by the less educated and women.[6] These books were clearly meant for an Ashkenazi audience, for books in Vaybertaytsh were certainly not directed or intelligible to a market outside that community, but also evidence that that market was sufficiently large enough to justify the publication of works for a particular element of rather than for the entire Jewish community.

Orech Yamim – We begin our review of Heilbronn’s literary activity with his translations into Yiddish of several short but substantial works. The first of these titles is Orech Yamim, an ethical work by R. Samuel ben Jacob Benveniste, one of the sages of medieval Spain. The words Orech Yamim appear in several biblical verses, but based on Benveniste’s references, the appropriate verse appears to be “With long life (orech yamim) I will satisfy him, and show him My salvation” (Psalms 91:16).

Orech Yamim is an ethical manual for parents and children emphasizing the education of children, as well as addressing the subjects of haughtiness and humility.[7] There is a dedication by Heilbronn to Rosa, wife of the official קצין R. Nehemiah Luzzatto of Venice.[8]

First printed in Constantinople (c. 1580), Orech Yamim has proven to be a relatively popular work; it has been reprinted several times in various locations and translated into different languages, most often Yiddish, beginning with this Venice edition in 1599. Approximately a year after this edition appeared a Hebrew edition was published, also in Venice.[9] The 1599 Yiddish edition was printed as an octavo (8⁰: 16 ff.) at the Venetian press of Giovanni di Gara. This is in contrast to the c. 1600 Hebrew edition, also printed in Venice, but at the press of Daniel Zanetti as a sixteenmo (16⁰: 7ff.).[10] There was, three centuries later, even an Arabic edition (Baghdad, 1929).

1599, Orech Yamim

1602, Dinnim ve-Seder

Courtesy of the National Library of Israel[11]

Keter Malkhut – In 1600, the di Gara press published Keter Malkhut, Heilbronn’s Yiddish translation of R. Solomon ben Judah Ibn Gabirol’s (Arabic Abu Ayyub Sulayman ibn Yahya ibn Gabirul; Latin Avicebron, c. 1021-1057) Keter Malkhut. issued in octavo format (8⁰: 24 ff.) Keter Malkhut has been described as,

rhymed prose dealing in high style with the essence of God, the work of the creation, with a description of the “spheres,” and a confession of the low condition of man, prone to sin. . . ;.

Keter Malkhut opens with praise for the Creator and an account of His attributes: His unity, existence, eternity, and life and His greatness, power, and divinity. God is also described as “Light,” according to the neoplatonic image of the deity, “Thou art the supreme light and the eyes of the pure soul shall see thee” (tr. Lewis, 31). Nevertheless, Gabirol stresses that God and his attributes are not distinguishable: we refer to attributes only because of the limited means of human expression.[12]

There is a dedication to Kilah, the wife of the official קצין R. Mendel Ottolenghi, presumably a member of the renowned Italian family of that name.[13]

Dinnim ve-Seder (Seder Meliḥah) – In 1602, Heilbronn published Dinnim ve-Seder (Seder Meliḥah), an important work on the principles of salting meat. This edition, in Yiddish, is based on R. Moses Isserles’ (Rema, c.1525/30–1572) Torat Hattat, which in turn follows the Sha’arei Dura of R. Isaac ben Meir Dueren (late 13th century) with additions according to the customs of Polish and German Jewry. The Rema, among the foremost halakhic authorities and the leading decisor for Ashkenazim, is best known for his Haggahot or ha-Mappah, glosses on the Shulhan Arukh. Dueren, a German halakhic authority, resident in Dueren in Germany, was an authority on the laws of issur ve-hetter (dietary laws)..

The Rema’s purpose in writing Torat Hattat was that due to the popularity of Sha’arei Dura, a work of considerable brevity, people wish to learn it while [standing] on one foot. Torat ha-Hattat is not, however, merely a clarification of Sha’arei Dura, although arranged according to and following the former work, but its purpose, as Rema writes, is not only to add contemporary customs, to which Rema placed great weight, but to teach practical halakhah. Furthermore, many of the laws, particularly in the area of issur ve-hetter, as explained by R. Joseph Caro (1488 –1575) in his Shulhan Arukh, which had become widespread, are not applicable in these lands, that is Poland and other Ashkenazi communities.

Torat Hattat was first printed in Cracow in 1569, and reprinted in 1577 and 1590. This, the first Yiddish edition, was published by the di Gara press in octavo format (8⁰: 8 ff.). It has a dedication to Moskita, daughter of R. Hezkiah Perinto. There is also a memorial address on the death of R. Avigdor Cividal (Zuidal, d. 18 Heshvan, [5]362 = November 18, 1601), rabbi in Venice.[14]

These three titles, translations of distinguished works into Yiddish by Heilbronn, are varied. Orech Yamim and Dinnim ve-Seder, while quite different in subject matter, the former an ethical manual emphasizing the education of children, as well as addressing the subjects of haughtiness and humility, the latter dealing with the principles of salting meat, are eminently practical works, addressing that part of the community that was less learned but had a serious need for the books’contents. In contrast, Keter Malkhut, while unquestionably a work of great value does not appear to fit the practical pattern of the two other works. Heilbronn’s motivation is publishing Keter Malkhut is unclear.

Even less clear is Heilbronn’s purpose in dedicating each of these works to apparently unrelated women, even if married and women of great virtue. That would appear, unless with good reason or of close relatives, to be inconsistent with Jewish values. One needs assume that Heilbronn, a respected rabbi, translator of an ethical work, had good reason for doing so, even if for reasons that are unclear, but were appropriate.

II

Kizzur Abrabanel – We turn now to Heilbronn’s Hebrew works.[15] The first of Heilbronn’s three Hebrew titles is Kizzur Abrabanel, an abridgement of Don Isaac ben Judah Abrabanel’s (1437–1508) commentaries on Pirkei Avot and the Pesah Haggadah. A noted statesman, biblical exegete, and philosopher, Abrabanel’s works encompass commentaries on the Torah, most books of the Bible, and philosophical works. Abrabanel served as an advisor and financier to kings in Portugal and Spain, electing to go into exile at the time of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. Among his books are these commentaries on Pirkei Avot, entitled Nahalat Avot, and on the Pesah Hagadah, entitled Zevah Pesah.

Kizzur Abrabanel is an abridgement of Nahalat Avot and Zevah Pesah; it was published in 1604-05 in Lublin at the press of Zevi ben Abraham Kalonymous Jaffe as a quarto (4⁰: 79, [1] ff.). Both titles, apart from the abridgement, were printed in Constantinople in 1505 and reprinted several times in the sixteenth century; Nahalat Avot was reprinted in Venice (1545, 1567) and Zevah Pesah was reprinted in Venice (1545), Cremona (1557), Riva di Trento (1561) and Bistrowitz (1592). Both works have proven popular, were republished several times, particularly Zevah Pesah.

Abrabanel’s style in those works, as in his other commentaries, is lengthy, deep and thorough, but eminently readable. Nevertheless, it is the length of his commentaries that made an abridgement attractive.

The title page describes Kizzur Abrabanel as having been written by Heilbronn, known by all as Hertzkes, who diligently sat in the tent of Torah where sat the sages full of mitzvot like a pomegranate and saw that lengthiness hindered others from doing so. Heilbronn, therefore, for the public good, abridged these works so that they could be quickly read. The title page is dated Wednesday, 25 Sivan 364 (June 2, 1604). The colophon dates completion of work to Friday, Rosh Hodesh Adar “and Jacob had scarcely gone out from the presence of Isaac ויהי אך יצא יצא יעקב מאת פני יצחק (365 = 30 Shevat = February 18, 1605) his father” (Genesis 27:30). On the verso of the title page is an approbation signed by eight geonim in Jaroslav. Next is Heilbronn’s introduction

the commentary of the great Rav, wonder of the generation [Don Yitzhak] Abrabanel on Avot and the Pesah Haggadah, a truly wonderful commentary, accepted by everyone, joining all the Mishnayot and ma’amarim together into one tent which was not done by other commentators, before and after. It was the desire of all to continually delve into and delight in it daily and “find rest for their souls” (cf. Jeremiah 6:16). . . .

1604, Kizzur Abrabanel

Courtesy of the National Library of Israel

Heilbronn continues that due to the lengthiness of Abrabanel’s commentary, perhaps excessively, people are unable to read and complete it, and therefore but “one from a city, and two from a family” (Jeremiah 3:14) even begin it and it lays in the corner of the house “all grown over with thorns, and nettles had covered it over” (Proverbs 24:31). He has therefore prepared this abridgement and taken the queries with which the Abrabanel customarily begins each section and placed them at the end of the work.

The text of Kizzur Abrabanel follows, in two columns, the text of each work in a square unvocalized font, followed by Abrabanel’s commentary in rabbinic letters. Kizzur Abrabanel is comprised of the commentary to Pirkei Avot, from 46b the commentary on the Pesah Haggadah, and at the end the queries with which the Abarbanel began topics in Avot (69a-75b) and the Haggadah (76a-79b).[16]

Despite being an attractive and functional volume, Kizzur Abrabanel has not, unfortunately, been reprinted, this being the only edition of Kizzur Abrabanel.

Nahalat Ya’akov – Our second Hebrew title is Nahalat Ya’akov, responsa and halakhic novellae. Nahalat Ya’akov was published in Padua in 1622 at the press of Gaspare Crivellari in quarto format (4⁰: 51 ff.).

The title page of Nahalat Ya’akov has a six-part frame comprised of floral patterns. The text states that Nahalat Ya’akov is responsa on halakhic matters (dinim) concerning monetary issues, dietary laws (issur ve-heter), and commentary on various subjects in Tosafot and Rashi. These were collected and assembled from “elderly rabbis רבנן קשישי (Berakhot 30a, 46b) who were in his days,” and to whom he submitted queries and received responses, טו”ב (17) in number and enumerated by name on the following page. The title page has the Hebrew date שפ”ג ([5]383) and the Arabic numeral date 1622, indicating that it was printed in the final months of 1622, when the new Jewish year has begun and the secular year had not yet concluded.

1622, Nahalat Ya’akov

Courtesy of the Fales Library and Special Collections, New York University

The verso of the title page is blank. Folio 2a has the names of the rabbis, all distinguished, with whom Heilbronn corresponded, and whose responses make up a substantial portion of Nahalat Ya’akov. Among them are R. Abraham Menahem Kohen Rapa Porto (Rapaport, Minhah Belulah), Judah Katzenellenbogen, Avigdor Cividal, Mordecai Jaffe (Levush), and Isaiah Horowitz (Shelah ha-Kodesh), the last, along with R. Kalonymus ben Samuel ha-Kohen, providing approbations. There is an introduction in a single column in rabbinic type from Heilbronn, who writes that “‘Nahalat Ya’akov (the heritage of Jacob, Isaiah 58:14) your father,’ this is my portion from all my labors and exertions.” There is a dedication to his benefactor R. Simḥah Luzzatto.

Heilbronn entitles it Nahalat Ya’akov for two reasons: it is all that he has accomplished to be an inheritance to the children of Jacob; and secondly, all will see that in it are “words of delight; [and words of truth] written in proper form.” (Ecclesiastes 12:10). The text is set in two columns in square type. The volume concludes with an index. This is the only edition of Nahalat Ya’akov.

Shoshannat Ya’akov – Our final Hebrew title, Shoshannat Ya’akov, Heilbronn’s introduction to arithmetic with mathematic puzzles. It was published together with R. Eliezer ha-Gadol’s (R. Eliezer ben Isaac of Worms, 11th cent.) Orhot Hayyim. The combined work, with the title-page heading Orhot Hayyim, was published in Venice at the press of Giovanni Caleoni in 1623 as a sixteenmo (16⁰: 12 ff.). Orhot Hayyim is a popular ethical will often erroneously credited to R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (1st-2nd cent.), but also appearing with R. Asher ben Jehiel (Rosh, c. 1250-1327as the author.

Shoshannat Ya’akov, our title of interest, is, as, noted above, an introduction to arithmetic with mathematic puzzles. The title-page emphasizes Orhot Hayyim, stating,

is the testament of R. Eliezer ha-Gadol, which he commanded his son Hyrcanus at the time of his passing. It was brought to press by R. Jacob Heilbronn for the public good. He has added at the end an addition of his own from his “wisdom and knowledge” (Ecclesiastes 1:16, 2:26) in arithmetic to be able to understand his fellow’s calculations and to write with allusions in the manner of esotery and appetizers of wisdom. This addition is entitled Shoshannat Ya’akov to instruct to teach the youth of the children of Israel knowledge and stratagem in concealed secrets. . . .

Shoshannat Ya’akov, includes, in addition to its arithmetic content, riddles and epigrams. Both works are set in a single column in rabbinic type, with Shoshannat Ya’akov beginning on 8a. It does not have a separate title page but rather a one-line header giving the title. At the end of the volume is verse by R. David ben Shemariah Morpurgo. An example of the contents in Shoshannat Ya’akov is the last entry (11a),

To speak in allusions so that those standing by the speaker will not understand except for his companion who knows the matter as do you but none other.

First, I will instruct you in the alef bet and afterwards how to arrange words with the five fingers of the right hand beginning with the thumb. . . .

1623, Orhot Hayyim / Shoshannat Ya’akov,

Courtesy of the Library of Agudas Chassidei Chabad Ohel Yosef Yitzhak

Moritz Steinschneider, likely referring to this work, writes informs that “arithmetical puzzles were framed in Germany by JACOB BEN ELIAKIM (613 [sic]) for primary instruction and an exercise of subtlety.”[17]

Orhot Hayyim has been frequently reprinted. This is, however, the only edition of Shoshannat Ya’akov.

III

Mitzvot Nashim – We conclude with Heilbronn’s most popular (successful) work, based on the number of times it was reprinted, that is, Mitzvot Nashim, or, in Italian,

Precetti da esser
imparati
dalle donne hebree

The above meaning precepts to be learned by Hebrew women, and continuing that it was composed by Rabbi Bini amin D’harodono (R. Benjamin Aaron ben Abraham Slonik, Solnik, c. 1550 – c. 1619) and that it was translated by Rabbi Giacob Halpron (Jacob Heilbron) into Hebrew for women with a fear of God. Precetti da Esser Imparati is a translation into Italian of R. Benjamin Slonik of Grodno’s (c. 1550 – c. 1619) Yiddish Seder Mitzvot Nashim (a lovely booklet for women). Precetti da Esser Imparati was published in Venice in 1616 at the press of Giacomo Sarzina as a 20 cm. book ( [10], 3-101, [11] pp.).

The title-page is followed by a dedication to Alla Molta Magnifica et Nobilissima Signora Osservandissima, La Signora Bona Consorte Delmolto Magnifico, & Nobelissimo Signor Lazero d’Italia Hebreo in Mantova (below, left). Again, a dedication to a woman, with the comment noted earlier.[18] It should be noted, however, that there is no impropriety suggested, as the dedications are not only done publicly but in books with approbations from highly regarded rabbis.

1616, Mitzvot Nashim – Precetti da esser imparati dalle donne hebree

Courtesy of the National Library of Israel

Mitzvot Nashim is on the three mitzvot specific to women, the laws of niddah, hallah, and lighting of Sabbath candles, which, if not observed, “are the three transgressions for which woman die in childbirth” (Shabbat 31b). The text, in Italian with occasional Hebrew, is comprised or one hundred thirty-seven chapters followed by a listing (below, right) of the mitzvot; 76 for niddah, 77-87 for hallah, and 88-101 for lighting Sabbath candles.

In his detailed work on Seder Mitzvot ha-Nashim, Edward Fram suggests Slonik’s efforts were educational rather than legislative in insuring proper observance of commandments. He had to consider that the book was for both readers and listeners, for both the pious and rebellious. Israel Zinberg, in his brief description of this title, describes it as being “in a tender, gentle tone ‘the little book for women’ teaches the Jewish wife and mother how she ought to conduct herself in her family life and religious-social life.” Most chapters are brief but several are quite lengthy and, in addition to the halakhic detail, include ethical, motivational and homiletic supporting material which certainly enhanced the books popularity.[19]

Slonik’s Mitzvot Nashim been a popular and much reprinted work. Four editions, beginning with a Cracow 1577 edition, are known for the sixteenth century, three printed in Slonik’s lifetime, and six are recorded for the seventeenth century, beginning with a Yiddish edition, Ein Schon Frauen Buchlein (Basle, 1602). Heilbronn’s Italian translation (Venice, 1616) has also proven to be popular and has been republished.[20]

IV

We began by noting that Jewish history and literature is replete with individuals of stature, whose accomplishments notwithstanding, are not well remembered today. Among those who were prominent in their time but are not well known by the general public today is R. Jacob ben Elhanan Heilbronn. A review of his life and accomplishments, particularly the books he authored and printed, suggests that he indeed was a person of accomplishment, deserving more than a passing glance. A peripatetic individual, Heilbronn appears in several locations in Europe before finally accepting a position as rabbi and settling in Padua.

It is his books that are of greatest interest and set him aside from many of his contemporaries. While his works, in most cases, are not original, they are of merit, being tri-lingual, in Yiddish, Hebrew, and Italian. They are generally adaptations of the successful and important works of others. In translating and abridging those works, Heilbronn has made them available to a much larger public, one that likely might not otherwise have had access to them. His books encompass ethical and halakhic subjects, even a mathematic work, in Yiddish, abridgements in Hebrew, and finally in Italian, making it clear that Heilbronn, in his selection of these works was erudite, and in his preparing them for a larger readership shows his concern for that public.

Admittedly, these books, abridgments and translations into Vaybertaytsh, are not such as to capture the imagination of intellectuals and academics, yet they demonstrate a concern and interest in the needs of the wider community that was, is often overlooked. Heilbronn did not do so. Indeed, Heilbronn, a rabbi in the fullest sense of the word, was, of a surety, a person of accomplishment and erudition, one concerned with the needs of his public.

Will the Real Shas Kattan Please Stand Up[1]
Shmuel Lubin

Shmuel Lubin is a doctoral candidate in biology and creator of “The Rishonim” podcast.

There is an old tradition commonly referenced in the yeshiva community that Masekhet Ketubot is the “Shas Kattan” of Talmud Bavli, that is, it contains ideas that connect to just about every other area of Shas (short for “Shisha Sidrei,” all six orders of the Mishnah). The source and importance of this idea is the subject of a nice article by R. Tovia Preschel, found here.[2]

Personally, I have long thought that this doesn’t really seem to be the case. While it is true that Ketubot includes lots of discussions of civil law (which connects it to many topics covered in tractates Bava Metzia, Bava Batra, and Shevu’ot), and one does encounter the laws of Shabbat and Yom Tov in the first 10 pages, it doesn’t contain much from Zera’im, Kodshim or Taharot (or Mo’ed really, after the beginning). It seems to me that if one truly considers “Shas,” that is, all six orders of the Mishnah, there are much better candidates for the title of “Shas Kattan,” such as Pesachim, which contains a good deal of material from Kodshim and Taharot.

Some time ago I realized that this question can be answered empirically, depending on how it is defined. Can one computationally determine which tractate is the real “Shas Kattan”; that is, which tractate of the Talmud Bavli is the best representative for the rest of Shas (all six orders)?

A map demonstrating the connections between each tractate of Shas. “Kol ha-Torah kulah ‘inyan ehad” (Tosefta Sanhedrin 7:6)

Approach 1: Unique Tractate Scoring

One simple approach is to count unique citations. For every tractate in Talmud Bavli, we can simply tally up how many unique tractates (whether it is a citation to the Mishnah, Bavli/Yerushalmi, or Tosefta) are cited within that tractate of Talmud, with the highest possible score of 62. Before you scroll down, here’s a challenge: there is only a single tractate of Talmud Bavli that contains at least one reference to every single tractate in Shas. Can you guess which one it is?

The obvious limitation to this approach is that as long as any tractate is cited at all, there is no difference between a single citation and one hundred citations to that same tractate, which is perhaps unfair (After all, should the “Shas Kattan” determination really hinge upon whether the tractate includes a single citation each to Parah, Yadayim, and Uktzin, instead of a hundred citations to Bava Metzia?). On the other hand, we could count up the total number of citations to other tractates, but this approach also suffers from the opposite problem (namely, that the presence of many citations to a single tractate does not demonstrate a representation for all of Shas).

A slightly more complicated way of scoring citations beyond simple counting methods would be to use a points system, whereby additional citations to the same tractate improves the score incrementally but by decreasing amounts. For example, if the first page of a tractate quotes from Shabbat, Eruvin, and Pesachim, that’s three points, and then the second page quotes Shabbat and Gittin, then it will get one more point for Gittin but only another fraction of a point for the additional Shabbat reference, since Shabbat was already cited on the previous page. My thinking is that scoring in such a matter should decrease geometrically: for the second time that tractate is referenced, add 0.5 points, then for the third time, allot 0.25, etc. (So, for example, if a tractate quotes Berakhot once and Shabbat thrice, it will have a score of 1 + (1 + 0.5 + 0.25) = 2.75). In the end, however, none of these alternative counting methods turned out to change the ranking very much.

Below, I used Sefaria’s list of its library connections to collect the number of times any tractate of Shas was quoted by each tractate of Talmud Bavli. Below is a table of how many unique other tractates are cited by each tractate of the Talmud Bavli. In this case, a ‘citation’ counts whether it is a reference to the Mishnah, Tosefta, Talmud Yerushalmi, or Talmud Bavli to any one of the 63 tractates in Shas. With both the highest “geometric decrease score,” the most citations overall, and the only tractate to cite all 62 tractates of Shas, the clear winner is…. Chullin! In all likelihood, this is simply due to the fact that Chullin is one of the largest tractates of Talmud Bavli.[3]

As an aside, we can use this database to ask of Masekhet Ketubot (or any tractate): does it have the most references to Nashim and Nezikin, compared to any other tractate? If not Shas Kattan, is it at least “Bas Kattan” (for ב סדרים)? The answer to that question is also no; all three “Bava”s beat Ketubot if you sum up citations to both Nashim and Nezikin. Here are some of the heavy-hitters in terms of “Bas Kattan”:

Approach 2: Balance Between “Six Orders” References

There is another possible way of interpreting “shas kattan”-ness, which would refer to how well ‘balanced’ all of the citations are relative to each other in terms of being a fairer representation of the six orders of the Mishnah. A perfectly ‘balanced’ tractate will have 1/6 of its references to tractates in Seder Zera’im, 1/6 of its citations would be to Mo’ed, and so on.[4] If we categorize each citation according to the six orders of the Mishnah, which tractate is closest to this idealized representation of Shas? 

Here too I used the cross-references (“link”) count from Sefaria’s github, and categorized the results based on Seder, which are color-coded differently in the bar graph below (click here for a colorblind friendly version). Although there are ways to put numbers on this dataset to calculate a “balance score,” from the figure below it seems like, once again, Chullin is in the running for the tractate of Talmud Bavli with the most evenly balanced set of references![5] In this case, we cannot simply blame it on the fact that Chullin is one of the longest tractates, since this is normalized to how many citations appear in total. (Numbers in parentheses reflect the fraction of citations to that Seder, if the number fits in the bar).

This dataset might indicate something interesting about Ketubot, which is that once you discount the self-references (that is, citations to other places in Masekhet Ketubot, or to its own Tosefta and Talmud Yerushalmi), Ketubot has more citations to Seder Nezikin than to Nashim. However, Ketubot is not at all unique in having more citations to tractates that are “out of order [seder]” than to its own. Berakhot, Avodah Zarah, Horayot, Arakhin, Keritot and Niddah all have more citations to Mo’ed than to their own order, Pesachim and Yoma both have more citations to Kodshim, and so on. On the other hand, it is worth noting that both Nedarim and Nazir, which might not seem like natural fits for Seder Nashim,[6] do both have more citations to Nashim than any other Seder.  

Approach 3: Diversity of Topics

Another legitimate approach would be to understand the term “shas kattan” as a non-literal reference to “all the topics in the Torah,” and ask the question: which tractate of Talmud Bavli covers the most unique topics? In the past, this question would have been much more difficult to answer simply because there were no tools which identified “topics” as they appear in the Talmud in the same way that people have been identifying talmudic cross-references since R. Nissim Gaon in the 11th century.

But today, we have Sefaria! Included in the Sefaria database and API docs is a way to identify which topics come up in any source which the Sefaria team (and users) culled from few sources to make something rather impressive. Of course, the reality is that the topic ontology is still kind of messy. For one thing, some topics are much broader than others, to the point where smaller topics might even be included in larger ones. (For example “Moses/Moshe” is a topic, but so is “Moshe’s Anger,” and most of the sources belonging to the latter also belong to the former). Additionally, because of how the topics list was built, there is an over-representation of topics belonging to Aggadah and the halakhot that appear in the Shulhan Arukh, as opposed to halakhot dealing with sacrifices and ritual impurity. With all its faults, the topics count still seems like it could be interesting, so I also used Sefaria’s API to count up all the unique topics that show up throughout each tractate of Talmud Bavli.

And the winner of the most unique Sefaria-topics referenced is… Shabbat! This is not so surprising, considering that Shabbat is the largest tractate by word count (Chullin, which won the last two rounds, is third-longest), and its central topic is one that takes up nearly 10% of the Shulhan Arukh, which is responsible for many of these “topic” identifications in Sefaria’s database. Likewise, the second-to-longest tractate by word count (Sanhedrin) takes second place in Sefaria’s topics count. 

As mentioned, this Sefaria-based topic count comes with many caveats as to how much it truly represents the number of topics discussed. Therefore, one more attempt in this vein is worth trying, in order to salvage the idea that Ketubot is “Shas Kattan.” After all, what people truly intend when using this term is probably not that Ketubot has quantitatively the most citations to elsewhere in Shas, or even that it has the most topics as would be defined by aggadic encyclopedias such as Aspaklaria or topics found in Tanakh. What they mean, surely, is that Ketubot is the most central location for the most topics frequently encountered in “real” Gemara learning, the study of halakha and its conceptual foundations.[7] Instead of using Sefaria’s topics, then, I tried to use the citations in the popular book Kovets Yesodot ve-Hakirot by R. Ahikam Keshet, which the author has conveniently made available online through a few websites. The version I used, from the “Wikishiva” website hosted on yeshiva.org.il, had 419 unique entries.[8]

Unfortunately, no edition of Kovets Yesodot ve-Hakirot has a clear way to identify the citation to a particular tractate, and so as a shorthand I simply counted up the number of entries containing the name of a tractate (e.g., ‘ברכות’, ‘שבת’, etc.). This is certainly not perfect,[9] but I believe it serves our purposes well enough. Using this tally, we come to the rather surprising conclusion that the tractate cited by the most entries in Kovets Yesodot ve-Hakirot is, once again, Shabbat! In this case, Ketubot at least does well for itself, ranking in fourth place after Shabbat, Kiddushin, and Bava Batra. 

As a final note, I’d like to mention an article I saw a few years ago by Daniel Boyarin about Rabbi Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky. Boyarin records how Rabbi Dimitrovsky helped prepare him for his doctoral exam in talmud: 

…he also wanted me to learn several whole mesechtas or sections of the Talmud. Kesubos was one of the mesechtas that he insisted I learn, because as the proverb goes: “Kesubos holds the shlisslokh,” the keys to the entire Talmud. It is sometimes called “Shas Katan” (“the little Talmud”) because it includes virtually all of the halakhic themes that the Talmud explores. He used to say, “In order to be a Talmid hakham, you have to know three massekhtas really well”—Kesubos was one of them, along with Baba Metzia, but now, after nearly 60 years, I can’t remember the third. He said, “If you know those three massekhtas”—and when he said know, he meant know, which included Rashi, the tosafot, all the rishonim, and selected aharonim—“then you will be a talmid hakham.” I never learned the third massekhet.[10]

When I originally read this, I was intrigued by the thought that there was a mysterious ‘third tractate’ that held the keys to becoming a talmid hakham, alongside Ketubot and Bava Metzia. After thinking about it for a little while, I speculated that the third tractate Boyarin couldn’t recall was Shabbat. Considering Rabbi Dimitrovsky’s own publications of Rashba’s commentary to tractates of Mo’ed, he was certainly not one to underestimate the importance of learning a large tractate from that seder, even if many yeshiva curricula today emphasize Nashim and Nezikin over the rest. Whether or not my guess is correct, it seems as though Shabbat and Hullin, in addition to being among the largest tractates, also have good claims to holding the keys to the rest of Shas.

[1] This article was expanded from a post on the website MiYodea, the Judaism StackExchange: https://judaism.stackexchange.com/q/141647/5083
[2] According to the website, the original article was printed in Ha-Tzofeh 21, Tishrei 5729 (1970).
[3] In theory, this can be corrected for by normalization, but because tractates of Talmud Bavli vary so widely in word count, simply using a tractate’s length as a denominator will provide a skewed picture; I believe that the approach taken in the next section is a better method of normalizing to ‘total citation count’.
[4] In reality, each Seder is a different size, and so an “ideal balance” would cite each Seder proportional to its size. I believe that this is not worth correcting for, because we would also need to correct for the fact that some tractates have two Talmuds, while some tractates only have a Talmud Bavli and others only a Talmud Yerushalmi or neither, and so a true correction would have to account for all the possible citation material of each tractate.
[5] Actually, to be precise, Chullin may come in second place to Bekhorot in terms of most balanced tractate. To calculate a “balance score”, I used a chi-square test to determine the extent to which the citation counts to each Seder deviates from an ideal ⅙ of the total citations. According to this calculation, Chullin is narrowly beaten by Bekhorot. However, because the six orders of the Mishnah are not equally large in ways that are not so easily accounted for (see previous footnote), this balance test (of expecting ⅙ of citations to refer to each Seder) is imprecise.
[6] See the discussion in Talmud Bavli Sotah 2a and Rambam’s observation in his Introduction to the Mishnah that the Torah’s presentation of vows is in the context of marriage.
[7] This statement is reflective of an attitude that is not necessarily shared by this author, but this is not the place to discuss the question of what constitutes the “true” or “primary” learning of Shas.
[8] Although there are many more unique titles, nearly a third of these are merely redirect pages to other entries.
[9] Importantly, it is possible that an entry might reference the concept of “Shabbat” without citing Tractate Shabbat. I mostly assume that citations to either the concept or the tractate of the same name will overlap, with one major exception: my guess is that the word תמיד likely appears in more contexts as a concept and not as a citation to a particular tractate. Since the tractate of Tamid is obviously not in the running for “Shas Kattan,” however, I believe it is safe to ignore.
[10] Walking and Learning on Shabbos with Prof. Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky – Tablet Magazine