Review of Ma'amar al Yishma'el

Review: Ma'amar al Yishma'el
by Eliezer Brodt & Ish Sefer  Solomon Ibn Aderet, Ma'amar al Yishma'el, Bezalel Naor ed., Spring Valley, NY, 2008, 178 pp.
Bezalel Naor, Mitsvat Hashem Barah, Spring Valley, NY, 2008, 220 pp.
  R. Bezalel Naor, who has published a host of translations and explanations of R. Kook's writings, as well as Post Sabbatian Sabbatianisms, discussing Sabbatean works, has published two works in a single volume. The first, Ma'amar al Yishma'el, is a critical edition of R. Solomon Ibn Aderet's (Rashba) discussion of Islam.   This work was printed from manuscript (which today is lost) for the first time in 1863 by Y. Perles. Most recently it was printed in the new Shut ha-Rashba by Machon Yerushalayim in their last volume (siman 367). At first it was not accepted that Rashba authored this work but today it is accepted that  he is indeed the author. Naor's edition begins with an excellent introduction dealing with amongst many things the authorship of this work, Naor raises the possibility that R. Dovid who was a talmid of the Ramban was the author. Throughout the text he brings various proofs about the authorship from other writings of the Rashba. As an appendix Naor printed a copy of a manuscript of Steinschneider where he deals with the authorship of this text.   The main topic of this work is about the Rashba defending the Torah from an Islamic attack. Although much has been written on Jewish Christian disputes, when it comes to Jewish Islamic disputes, much less is written or known. Indeed, most are probably unaware that the Rashba wrote this work defending Judaism against Islam. Naor's edition begins with an excellent introduction discussing the work generally and specifically providing background materials on exactly what the Rashba was responding to.  Naor discusses both the Jewish as well as Islamic sources in all languages. It is pretty incredible to see his command in both these groups of sources, it is clear that much time and hard work went into preparing this work.   The main topic which the Rashba deals with is defending that the Torah which we have is 100% accurate and was never tampered with. The Rashba deals with many specific examples in a very orderly fashion. Specifically, the Rashba elaborates why the torah publicized what seems to be sins of Reuven (p.74) and Yehudah (pp. 73-74). The Rashba also deals with why the torah had to include the story of Lot and his daughters (pp. 72-73). Another issue that the Rashba defends is proving that the numbers of the Jews given by the Torah was 100% accurate (pp. 63-71). Additionally, the Rashba deals with the famous incident of the finding of the Sefer torah in Yoshiayhu's time. There are also many Chidushim with regard to the seven Noachide commandments.   Regarding why Hashem chose to give the Torah publicly the Rashba writes (p. 90):והתבונן כי בשתי תורת האלו, רוצה לומר, תורת בני נח ותורת משה עליו השלום לא רצה השם יתברך שיקבל אותם ממנו נביא, ויקבלו אותם מן הנביא שאר העם. וזה לשתי פנות גדולות האחד: כדי שלא יוכל אחד ממי שנתחייב באורה התורה, להסתפק בקבלתה, ולחשוד מי שקבלה, שבדה מלבו, או ששבש בם קצת… והשניה, כדי שלא יוכל לשבש בדת ובאמונה לאחר זמן, ויטעון שהשם יתברך נתן עתה על ידו תורת כן וכן, כמו שנתן תורה ראשונה מתחלה עד יד הנביא פלוני אשר קדמו. אלא קבץ כל הנמצא באותו זמן ונתן רוחו עליהם והתנבאו…   Naor already points out that although this is similar to the proof offered by the Kuzari, however, this proof has a new addition to it as it includes the notion that the ז' מצות בני נח were also directly and publicly given by God!    Besides for the actual main topics that the Rashba deals with and its great importance (as he is one of our most important Rishonim) there is also a wealth of interesting side points and discussions in this work.   Amongst the many important points that the Rashba writes is that although we find many times about the Torah that the Gemarah says שכחה התורה וחזרה ויסדה (one of example of this is by with Ezra). The Rashba explains at great length that it does not mean the Torah was almost completely forgotten at these times. Rather all of torah is connected and if one thing is forgotten it is as if everything is forgotten so Ezra prevented this from happening (pp. 100-05). With this the Rashba explains many things amongst them the famous Gemarah in Pesachim (66b)תנו רבנן: הלכה זו נתעלמה מבני בתירא. פעם אחת חל ארבעה עשר להיות בשבת, שכחו ולא ידעו אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו. אמרו: כלום יש אדם שיודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו? אמרו להם: אדם אחד יש שעלה מבבל, והלל הבבלי שמו, ששימש שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון ויודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו. שלחו וקראו לו. אמרו לו: כלום אתה יודע אם הפסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו? אמר להם: וכי פסח אחד יש לנו בשנה שדוחה את השבת? והלא הרבה יותר ממאתים פסחים יש לנו בשנה שדוחין את השבת. אמרו לו: מנין לך? אמר להם: נאמר מועדו בפסח ונאמר מועדו בתמיד. מה מועדו האמור בתמיד – דוחה את השבת אף מועדו האמור בפסח – דוחה את השבת. ועוד, קל וחומר הוא: ומה תמיד שאין ענוש כרת דוחה את השבת, פסח שענוש כרת – אינו דין שדוחה את השבת. מיד הושיבוהו בראש ומינוהו נשיא עליהם, והיה דורש כל היום כולו בהלכות הפסח. התחיל מקנטרן בדברים, אמר להן: מי גרם לכם שאעלה מבבל ואהיה נשיא עליכם – עצלות שהיתה בכם, שלא שמשתם שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון. אמרו לו: רבי, שכח ולא הביא סכין מערב שבת מהו? אמר להן: הלכה זו שמעתי ושכחתי. אלא, הנח להן לישראל אם אין נביאים הן – בני נביאים הן. למחר, מי שפסחו טלה – תוחבו בצמרו, מי שפסחו גדי – תוחבו בין קרניו. ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה, ואמר: כך מקובלני מפי שמעיה ואבטליון. Many people have discussed this Gemarah throughout the ages (its was a popular derasha topic for Shabbat HaGadol) how could they forget such a thing? The Rashba explains it with his same theme. Here to Naor includes an excellent lengthy footnote dealing with this Gemarah providing many sources.  Another important statement of the Rashba (pp. 116-17) is:כל שכן ספר כולל מה שהוא ומה שהיה ועתיד להיות כתורתנו השלמה והתמימה שכוללת מן החכמה כל מה שהיה מן הבריאה הראשונה עד תכלית כל חכמה. ואפילו בא נביא מן הנביאים לכתוב בפרטי כל מה שתרמוז בה לא יכיל גליון וכן בפירושי מצותיה.    When talking about Rabbenu Hakodesh role in the writing of the Mishna he writes (p. 119): והודיעונו יתרון חכמת רבינו הקדוש בסדור ספרו סדר המשנה חברו בתכלית החכמה בקצור ובסדור בסתם ואחר כך מחלוקת ומחלוקת ואחר כך סתם וכולל ענינים גדולים בדברי קצתם.   Although, as mentioned above, the notes are generally excellent there is comment that deserves to be discussed. The Rashba referring to a Gemrah in Mesectas Pesachim calls (p. 103) it מסכת פסח שני. Here, Naor does not explain what the Rashba meant. The intention of the Rashba is that many rishonim called the part of Pesachim which deals with Korbon Pesach, Pesach Shenei, and referred to the first part of Pesachim that deals with Chametz and perek Arvei Peachim as Pesach Rishon. This fact was not known to everyone see for example Hagadah Shelemah (p.197) where it is pointed out that the Abarbanel was not aware of this and made a mistake because of this. [See also R. N. Rabonowitz, Mamar Al Hadfosass Hatalmud, p.27]. The Merei writes (Peachim 57b):אמר מנחם בן שלמה לבית מאיר י"א זאת המסכתא ר"ל מסכת פסח שני היא מסדר מועד וכבר ביארנו בפתיחת החבור שבסדור רבינו הקדוש ע"ה היו מסכת פסח ראשון וזאת המסכתא חוברות אשה אל אחותה נכללות במסכתא אחת נקראת פסחים ופרק ערבי פסחים היה אחרון לכל פרקיה ובימי הגאונים ז"ל חלקוה . לשתים וקראו הראשונה פסח ראשון והעתיקו פרק ערבי פסחים ממקומו וסדרוהו בסוף פסח ראשון וקראו שם המסכתא הזאת פסח שני ועל זה הצד הורגלנו בלמודה אחר מסכת פסח ראשון על הדרך שסדרנו בפתיחת החבור והיא כוללת חמשה פרקים וסדרם לפי שיטתנו…
Another nice piece is (p. 67): יש לנו להשיב ולומר שלא כל התולדות אשר היו להם זכר הכתוב רק מקצת מהם או מקצת מן הנזכרים ואף על פי שהיו להם או למקצתם בנים אחרים רבים מאלה, אלא שלא זכר כאן רק אותם שהיה הצורך מביא לזכרם, מפני שאלה היו ראשי בית אבות למשפחותם והאחרים בלבד יקראו על שמם כאשר קרה ליוסף שלא זכר הכתוב מכל בניו רק מנשה ואפרים…   The text of Ma'amar also contains extensive footnotes which provide the sources for the Rashba's statements as well side discussions. In the final section of this work, Naor explores, in greater detail, some issues he raised in passing in his notes. Just to mention a few of the many topics he deals with in the notes and appendixes (with just a few additional sources). These topics are rather eclectic ranging from the Ramban's position regarding the Ibn Ezra (pp. 136-143). In the introduction Naor has another nice discussion about the Ibn Ezra's position regarding the authorship of the Torah (pp. 23-28) although many deal with this topic Naor has some new important points based on some manuscripts showing what R. Ezra of Gerona, the Rebbe of the Ramban, thought of the Ibn Ezra. Other issues he deals with in regard to the Ibn Ezra are with his work the Iggeres ha-Shabbat (p. 141 n.578) [see also Ohr Yisrael 54:238] and additions which were put in by others in his works (p.142 n.582) [see also my Bein Keseh Lassur (Jerusalem, 2008), p. 53]. Others issues Naor deals with: did the Rashba know Arabic (p.21 n.24), the authorship of the classic Kabbalah work Mereches Aleokus (pp. 53-55). It is interesting that the Rashba always refers to Muchamed as Meshugah (see the note on p. 61-62 about this) [One can add to this Marc B. Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters (Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 2008), 151-52]  Another great note is about R. Abraham Ben Ha-GRA whose usage of very rare editions of the Talmud (pp. 72-72 n.236), and also about Ba'al Tosef on Taryag Mitzvot and the seven Noahide Laws (pp. 86-90). These are but a few samples.In the introduction Naor writes that only after he completed working on this sefer did he find out that Chaim Zalman Dimitrovsky printed it already with notes – had he known he never would have bothered working on it. As is obvious, Naor has a tremendous command of the sources in Hebrew and academic world and he did incredible research for this work yet he never discovered the well known source where most should begin with when working on the Rashba – Dimitrovsky's works. It was good that he only found it at the end as he did a beautiful job dealing with many many things which Dimitrovsky did not, making it very worth while that he too worked on this sefer.   One minor piece of criticism is that Naor makes paragraph divisions between each section giving each chapter a heading.  While this is very useful, Naor does not explain that these are his creation and not the Rashba's and thus can cause some confusion.  For example, on page 120 he quotes a piece from Yigdal which would be a nice early source but after checking it out with other versions of the Mamar its clear that Naor himself added this in -to be helpful.  The second book included in this volume is Mitzvat Hashem Barah. This book deals with the seven Noahide commandments. Rather than dealing with the actual commandments – i.e. a mere list – this book delves into rather interesting issues that surround these laws. For example, Naor has a fascinating discussion regarding R. Hayyim Hirschensohn's opinion that all commandments can be adduced logically. This discussion implicates what obligations there are in absence of specific commandments or, in the classic parlance, what happened before Matan Torah (pp.72-83). As an aside although it is very useful that he quotes the exact lengthy pieces of Hirschensohn he says he is doing so as they are very rare seforim. Although it is true that a hard copy of the seforim are hard to get but anyone can access them today thanks to Hebrew books.

Naor also presents the controversy between R. Jacob Emden and Moses Mendelssohn regarding the Noachide laws (pp. 16-34). While some maybe aware of the correspondence R. Emden had with Mendelsshonn regarding determining the time of death (see Moshe Samat's article in Hadash Assur min ha-Torah (Jerusalem: Dinur Center & Carmel Publishing, 2005), 157-227), most are not aware of this important philosophical debate. For two additional scholarly sources to this topic not mentioned by Naor, see the important unpublished paper of Professor Lawrence Kaplan, "On the Boundary between Old and New: The Correspondence Between Moses Mendelssohn and R. Jacob Emden," delivered at the Jewish Thought in the Eighteenth Century conference, Harvard University (Spring 1984), and the extensive discussion in chapter seven of Jacob J. Schacter, "Rabbi Jacob Emden: Life and Major Works," (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1988), 661-747 ("The Emden-Mendelssohn Correspondence"), and see esp. 720n3 for citations to previous descriptions of the correspondence, and also 725n37, 726n48, 742n150, 743n165, 744n168, where he discusses Kaplan's paper. Naor adds much to this topic. After these discussions, Naor then provides insights on the various Parshiyot ha-Torah that implicate Noahide laws especially before Matan Torah. Again the topics covered and, more importantly, the manner in which they are covered are terrific in scope and depth. His command of the "Yeshivish" sources along with Kabbalah (pp.97-102) and hasidut is excellent. Although much has been written on this topic of seven Noahide commandments especially before Matan Torah including a massive sefer (in size) called Birkot Avot and a recent pamphlet Mebei Medrasha from R. K. Redisch, Naor brings many new things to the table not dealt with before.
Here to he has many great footnotes scattered throughout the sefer some strictly for the sake of a very side footnote one such example is on pp. 5-6 about the Tosafot Yom Tov which writes (Nazir 5:5):והכוונה בודאי ממאמר מי שלא נתקיימו דבריו הוא מה שאמרנו עכ"ל. ונתקיימו דבריו. אע"פ שבגמרא לא פירשו כן. הואיל לענין דינא לא נפקא מינה ולא מידי. הרשות נתונה לפרש. שאין אני רואה הפרש בין פירוש המשנה לפירוש המקרא שהרשות נתונה לפרש במקראות כאשר עינינו הרואות חבורי הפירושים שמימות הגמ'. אלא שצריך שלא יכריע ויפרש שום דין שיהא סותר דעת בעלי הגמ':   He brings a few sources that a סברא is דאורייתא (p.78 n.180) Just to add one obscure source to his list see R. Avraham Grodzensky in Torat Avraham (p.264) who writes:גם סברת האדם ושכלו הפשוט כמקרא מפורש הוא, ואדרבה כל סברא פשוטה ביותר מפורש הוא ביותר כאשר נבאר איתא בב"ק (מו:) מניין להמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה… מתקיף לה רב אשי הא למה לי קרא סברא הוא… קושיא זו של רב אש אינה על סברא שדעת התורה והשקפתה כלולה בה, אלא על סברא פשוטה שהולה מבקש את הרופא מפני שמרגיש את כאביו ואל סברא זו מקשה…
One point of interest although this could really be nothing when Naor quotes Mendelssohn (pp.16-34) and Weisel (p. 19 n. 48, 200-203) in the text of the sefer he brings there name in abbreviation one suspects it has to do with fear for citing their names openly only in the notes (p.22 n.51) which much less people read does he quote Mendelssohn by full name.

On page 69 he deals with a Rambam who says יראה לי explaining that when ever the Rambam uses such language he is saying his own hiddush. It is surprising that although through out  this work Naor demonstrates great bekiyut in the works of the Aderet here he does not mention in the notes that he composed a work on all the Rambam's that say יראה לי recently reprinted by Ahavat sholom called Teshuvah Meyerah and more importantly he deals with this Rambam. One weakness is neither of these two works in the volume have an index which would have been rather useful as there are many many topics of interest in this sefer and one can not find them easily.   

Finally, it is worth noting that the book itself is rather nice to look at in part due to the color cover depicting a Spanish synagogue scene from the period of the Rashba. All in all this work is well worth owning and reading carefully.

The book is available in Jewish bookstores in Baltimore, Boston, New York and Pittsburgh or via the Orot website, with a special offer here.  




Moshe Idel — Kabbalistic Manuscripts in the Vatican Library

Professor Moshe Idel is Max Cooper Professor in Jewish Thought, Department of Jewish Thought at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Senior Researcher at the Shalom Hartman Institute.

This post at the Seforim blog by Prof. Moshe Idel, about Kabbalah manuscripts kept in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana (Vatican Library), is an expansion of remarks delivered at the February 2009 symposium hosted at the National Library of Israel, in Jerusalem, to honor the publication of the catalog by Benjamin Richler, ed., Hebrew Manuscripts in the Vatican Library (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2008); 791 pages, available here.

This is his first contribution to the Seforim blog.

 

On Some Unique Kabbalistic Manuscripts in the Vatican Library and Their Contribution to the Scholarship of Kabbalah in Jerusalem

Prof. Moshe Idel
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

I. The Beginnings of Christian Kabbalah and the Vatican Library

In the summer of 1280, Abraham Abulafia (1240- c. 1291), a Kabbalist who founded the special prophetic or ecstatic version of the Kabbalah, attempted to meet Pope Nicholaus III in Rome. This special effort came as the result of a revelation he had ten years earlier in Barcelona, which presumably consisted in a command to go to Rome at the eve of the Jewish New Year, in a mission reminiscent of Moses’ encounter with Pharaoh: namely to discuss issues related to redemption. From the scant information we have, it seems that though Abulafia was not shy to compare himself to Moses, he was more interested in discussing his belief about the nature of authentic Judaism with the Pope, than in the national rescue of the Jews from the burden of Christendom, or in an attempt to convert the Pope, as some scholars have claimed.  He believed Judaism to be a mystical religiosity based on pronouncing divine names in order to reach a mystical experience, understood in spiritual redemptive terms. He took a spiritualized Judaism — constituted by inner experiences which are achieved by a mystical technique – to be a higher form of religion than any of the three monotheistic religions. The Pope was reluctant to see the Kabbalist and retreated for a rest to the beautiful family castle of Soriano nel Cimini, north of Rome. The stubborn Abulafia, who was informed he would be burned if he insisted on following the Pope, nevertheless arrived at the castle, only to learn that the Pope had died of apoplexy that same day.     This non-encounter of a Kabbalist actually eager to see the Pope, and a Pope who otherwise took a keen interest in the spiritual Franciscan faction known as the Minorites, is however not the end of this story. After two weeks of arrest in the house of the Minorites in Rome, Abulafia was released and made his way to Messina, Sicily, then part of the kingdom of Aragon. There he remained active for more than a decade, writing a variety of Kabbalistic books and teaching several Jewish intellectuals, and probably also some Christians, his Kabbalah. This openness by a Kabbalist, who deliberately ignored the interdiction against revealing the Kabbalah even to most Jews, is an important development that should be taken seriously when discussing Jewish esotericism and its vicissitudes. The prophetic Kabbalistic trend remained part and parcel of the Jewish mystical literature in Italy, and a significant component of the nascent Christian Kabbalah in late 15th century Florence.       The translation of some of Abulafia’s writings from Hebrew to Latin by Flavius Mithridates was one of the most important factors in the impact of ecstatic Kabbalah on the Italian Renaissance. Mithridates, who called himself inter alia also Guillelmus Raimundo Moncada, was a convert to Christianity, who delivered a lecture in the presence of Pope Sixtus IV. Of Sicilian extraction, Mithridates, the son of a Syrian Jew called Nissim Abul- Faraj, presumably studied Abulafia’s Kabbalah in his youth in the island. The special place the ecstatic Kabbalah enjoys in his Latin translations must have something to do with his ability to fathom the rather difficult Hebrew treatises he so skillfully translated. However, his concentration on Latin translations of books of Kabbalah started in a later period of his life — in 1486 in Florence, years after he left Rome — and after his visit to the Holy See. Those translations are the fountainhead of the first most important piece of Christian Kabbalah, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Conclusiones, which include dozens of theses based on Kabbalistic views. Those 900 Conclusiones were condemned immediately by the Pope, and the young count had to flee Italy.  He returned to Florence only when the next Pope, related to the Medici family, was elected. However, most of Flavius Mithridates’s Latin manuscripts, which played such an important role in the emergence of Christian Kabbalah, and thus Abulafia’s Kabbalistic treatises (in Latin and in a slightly Christianized form)  have found their way to the Vatican Library, arriving more than two centuries after their composition. Today they are catalogued as MSS 189-191, together with the Hebrew manuscripts, and a fourth one, as Vatican, Cod. Chigi A. VI.190.      Those are unique manuscripts, autographs of Mithridates. They testify to his sophisticated translations, mistranslations and deliberate glosses and interventions which sometimes change the intention of the Hebrew original, in order to look closer at Christian tenets. They remained there for more than four centuries, before a serious study of their content and an analysis of their impact on Giovanni Pico was undertaken by Prof. Chaim Wirszubski, of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. His groundbreaking inquiry, Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism (Harvard University Press  1987), opens the way for a much more profound understanding of the precise sources of some important aspects of Pico’s thought. Wirszubski’s fine scholarship (done in Jerusalem under the auspices of the Israeli Academy for Sciences and Humanities) brought some of Abulafia’s Kabbalistic visions as mediated by Mitridathes to the attention of the scholarly community. In fact he discovered in the Latin translation an Abulafia work, that had been preserved only in a poor and quite fragmentary form in the original Hebrew.     Let me point out that in addition to the rich material belonging to Mithridates’s Latin translations from Abraham Abulafia and his circle, the Vatican collection contains several important treatises of this Kabbalist in their original Hebrew (e.g., Sefer ’Or ha-Sekhel, Sefer ha-’Ot, Sefer Hayyei ha-‘Olam ha-Ba’). Even more importantly, the collection houses the lengthiest extant part of one of Abulafia’s earliest books, Sefer Mafteah ha-Re‘ayon, (Heb. 291), a book not found in this form in any other manuscript. This fragment, written originally in 1273, is quite important for understanding the earliest phase of the thought of this ecstatic Kabbalist.  In this sense it is similar to the above-mentioned Latin translation that preserved another book of Abulafia’s written in the same year.  If we add to the presence of these manuscripts in the Vatican Library the fact that Abulafia’s prophetic books, (some containing quite enigmatic forms of spiritual apocalypses, found in very few manuscripts) are found in the Angelica library – which is outside the scope of Benjamin Richler, ed., Hebrew Manuscripts of the Vatican Library (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2008) – it seems that the written voice of Abulafia’s Kabbalah found its way to the Vatican libraries in quite an impressive manner. The recent project of a critical edition of those translations, undertaken by Giulio Busi and Saverio Campanini among others, brings scholarly attention to the basic sources of early Christian Kabbalah.

II. Vatican MS Heb. 202 and the Beginning of Jewish Kabbalah

The Vatican collection contains an important and unique manuscript compiled sometime in the 14th century and copied in a Spanish hand. This manuscript contains a variety of Kabbalistic material stemming from several schools: Provencal, Catalonian, and Castilian forms of Kabbalah. Some of the traditions found there are related to the beginnings of some historical phases of Kabbalah (especially in early decades of the thirteenth century) and served as building stones for the scholarly edifice regarding this period by Prof. Gershom Scholem of the Hebrew University, the famed pioneer of the study of Kabbalah. In this codex Scholem discovered quite early in his career an epistle that was the most important single document supporting his reconstruction of the relations between the Provencal school as represented by Rabbi Isaac Sagi-Nahor, the so-called “father of Kabbalah,” and two important younger Rabbis, active in the Catalan city of Gerona, Rabbi Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides) and his cousin Rabbi Jonah Gerondi. The exchanges between these rabbis concern the disclosure of Kabbalistic issues by other Kabbalists; and the scant data found in the epistle are indispensable testimonies in any attempt to describe the dissemination of Kabbalah from Provence to Catalonia and from there to Castile. This epistle exists in a unique manuscript, and since its publication by Scholem in the thirties and its more detailed analyses in the forties and sixties —  especially in his Origins of the Kabbalah, trans. R.J. Zwi Werblowsky (Princeton University Press, 1989) — no other similar manuscript of this epistle has been identified. As in the case of the beginning of Christian Kabbalah, here too our understanding of the beginning of the Jewish Kabbalah owes much to unique Vatican manuscripts.

III. Rabbi David ben Yehudah he-Hasid’s Hebrew Translations of the Zohar

The most important documents of Kabbalistic literature are indubitably the Zoharic literature. The Zoharic literature, which was written between the late seventies of the 13th century and the early decades of the 14th century in Castile, mostly in Aramaic, was immediately canonized and became the cornerstone for a variety of Kabbalistic schools, especially the mid-16th century Kabbalists who were active in Safed. The processes involved in the emergence of this literature, its authors, its canonization and its various kinds of reception still need extensive research. The Hebrew manuscripts found in the Vatican library may help illuminate some aspects of those processes. Let me offer a major example in this direction.     Two anonymous manuscripts in the Vatican collection, Heb. 62 and 168, contain a Hebrew translation of some Aramaic parts of the Zoharic commentaries on the Pentateuch.  Though similar in many ways, each the two manuscripts is also unique. An analysis of the style of the translation and a comparison to segments of other Hebrew translations of Zoharic passages found in the Hebrew writings of Rabbi David ben Yehudah he-Hasid, led me to identify the anonymous translator as this Kabbalist. A late 13th or early 14th century Kabbalist, Rabbi David may well be not only one of the first commentators on this book, but quite plausibly its first translator ever. This means that these two codices can aid us to conjecture about the Aramaic versions underlying the translation. We thus have here the earliest extensive testimonies about the nature of the text of the third most important book in Judaism. Moreover, in some cases in those two manuscripts, the version of the Hebrew translation is accompanied by lengthy Aramaic passages, which may constitute the earliest extensive excerpts from the Zoharic literature to have reached us in the original language. Though some short quotes from this Hebrew translation are found in 16th century Kabbalists, it is only in the two above-mentioned manuscripts that dozens of pages are found.     However, let me point out that there are also other codices in the Vatican collection which may turn into a mine of important information related to the history of the text of the Zohar. Two examples are the anonymous Hebrew translation of the Zohar in Heb. 226 and the texts found in the first part of MS Heb. 203.  Both of these deserve special attention by the scholars of the Zohar.

IV. The Byzantine Kabbalah in the Vatican Library      

We mentioned above the main Kabbalistic codices in the Vatican that represent developments that in Sicily, Italy, and the Western Europe. However, several important manuscripts found in this library, may contribute to a future history of a rather neglected center of Kabbalistic literature, the Byzantine one. Compared to the Provencal and the Spanish centers, the Byzantine Empire was a relatively late center; and, from the mid-14th century a different form of Kabbalah emerged there.. Its precise conceptual contours, as well as the treatises that were written there, slowly emerge as the scholarship of Kabbalah is advancing. It has become more and more plausible in the last decades that important Kabbalistic treatises were written in the Empire, rather than in Spain or Italy as scholars previously believed. This is the case of some classics of Kabbalah like Sefer ha-Temunah, Sefer ha-Peliyah and Sefer ha-Qanah but there is a plethora of related smaller treatises that were also written in the Byzantine Empire. The Vatican holds several important manuscripts that may fruitfully serve as the starting point for a study of this Kabbalistic center. MSS Heb. 188, 194, 195, 218, 220, 223, are outstanding examples of the arrival of all the major pieces of Byzantine Kabbalah to Italy and the impact this arrival on the nature of Italian Kabbalah during the late 15th century, and also of the Christian Kabbalah since the beginning of the 16th century.      In this context, let me mention two other unique Kabbalistic manuscripts. These relate to a dispute regarding the belief in metempsychosis that took place in the city of Candia, in Crete in the second part of the 15th century. Two lengthy codices, MSS 105 and 254, contain the documents listing the pros and cons of this belief and against it, as reflecting the views of, respectively, Rabbi Michael ha-Kohen Balbo and Rabbi Moshe Ashkenazi. The vast majority of the arguments in this sharp controversy are unknown from any other manuscript. Thus only the Vatican manuscripts may enable a reconstruction of the various debates related to this important type of Kabbalistic belief. This reconstruction was done by a third important Hebrew University scholar, Prof. Efraim Gottlieb. It has been continued more recently in a Ph. D. thesis of Dr. Brian Ogren at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

We may conclude that the variety of the various manuscripts found in the Vatican collections reflects the variety of Kabbalistic literature since its inception up to its peak in the mid-16th century. In short, I offered above several examples for the indisputable contributions the Kabbalistic manuscripts found in the Vatican collection did contribute in the past for understanding major phases in the history of Kabbalah. The present Catalogue, an excellent example of what a catalogue of Hebrew manuscripts should be, will certainly facilitate the study of additional manuscripts and will enrich our understanding of the evolution of the various forms of this vast literature. We may hope, in an era less interested in philological studies than earlier, that the tradition of close reading of manuscripts in a serious manner, which was a vital part of scholarship at the Hebrew University, will remain a vital component of the future studies of Kabbalah; and the Vatican codices will continue to yield new findings for a better understanding of a vital aspect of medieval Judaism.

V. Thanks for the Free Access  

Let me turn to another dimension of the Vatican collection, which is not related to the content of manuscripts but with the politics of access to the Hebrew manuscripts found in this library. When the Institute of Hebrew Manuscripts — whose researchers were the main contributors to the Catalogue that is celebrated here — was founded at the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, many libraries over the world agreed to have their manuscripts microfilmed and consulted free by scholars. However, most of them required researchers to request permission in writing before allowing their manuscripts to be copies or published. Only three libraries out of dozens — the Vatican in Rome, the Escorial in Spain, and the Cambridge University Library in England — were ready to give scholars free automatic permission to microfilm, photocopy or publish their manuscripts. For persons acquainted with the inevitable vicissitudes involved in correspondence with libraries in general, (including to be sure the Italian ones), this automatic permission constituted a special act of encouragement to engage these manuscripts. This kind renouncement of the legitimate rights of these libraries facilitated a much easier access to some Kabbalistic manuscripts.  That in turn was especially helpful for scholars who — like myself in the initial stages of my study of Kabbalistic manuscripts — did not live in Jerusalem,. This explains why in some of my writings I relied upon Vatican manuscripts, even when there are also other manuscripts containing a certain Kabbalistic treatise. Abulafia’s major treatise Sefer ’Or ha-Sekhel, found in the Vatican Library Heb. 233 is one case in point. I take this opportunity to thank the Vatican Library, late as these thanks may be, for the generosity that contributed not only my modest studies of the Kabbalistic material, but also of many other scholars, who also benefited from the liberal approach of the directors of the that Library.

 




The Pew Report and the Orthodox Community (and Other Assorted Comments), part 1

The Pew Report and the Orthodox Community (and Other Assorted Comments), part 1
Marc B. Shapiro
1. Here is a short piece I wrote a right after the appearance of the Pew Report. (The endnote is not part of the original article.)
There has been a great deal of discussion in the wake of the recent release of the Pew Research Center’s “Portrait of Jewish Americans.” Some have focused on the report’s evidence of increasing intermarriage and lack of any Jewish connection of many in the younger generation. Others have zeroed in on some of the survey’s anomalies and results that are simply not correct. For example, the survey informs us that 1% of Ultra-Orthodox Jews had a Christmas tree last year. I would be willing to bet that in the entire world there isn’t even one Ultra-Orthodox Jew with a Christmas tree, and 1% means at least a few thousand Ultra Orthodox households have Christmas trees. After adding in the Modern Orthodox, we are told that 4% of Orthodox Jews have Christmas trees. Being that the survey places the Orthodox at 10% of the Jewish population, and also tells us that there are 5.3 million adult Jews (another one the survey’s surprises), this leads to the result that more than 21,000 adult Orthodox Jews have Christmas trees in their homes.Since these results are not just improbable, but impossible, it raises the general question of how reliable the survey is when it comes to the Orthodox. Can anyone believe the survey when it tells us that in the 18-29 age bracket the Modern Orthodox only account for 1% of the country’s Jews while the Ultra-Orthodox account for 9%, or that in the 30-49 age bracket, the Modern Orthodox are 3% and the Ultra Orthodox 10%. We are also are told that 24% of Ultra-Orthodox Jews handle money on Shabbat but only 19 percent of Modern Orthodox Jews do so. (Who was it that said the Ultra-Orthodox are frummer than the Modern Orthodox?!)

When you read results like these you can only wonder what went wrong, and I hope we get some explanation as to how such results were generated. (Professor Jonathan Sarna has written to me that all surveys have absurd results for various reasons, and “one is to look at broad trends and ignore absurdities.”) Perhaps there was confusion about the way the questions were asked. Such confusion is the only way I can explain that only 64% of the Ultra-Orthodox agree that a person can be Jewish if he works on the Sabbath. The truth is that every Ultra-Orthodox Jew knows that a person who works on the Sabbath is still Jewish (albeit a sinning Jew). I presume that those who answered “no” to the question understood it to be asking if one can be a “good Jew” and work on the Sabbath. (In case anyone has been wondering, I use the term “Ultra-Orthodox” since that is what the survey uses. I don’t know why no one told the survey directors that this term is no longer regarded as appropriate.)

The sort of anomalies I have mentioned appear to be confined to matters of religious life, and other areas seem more believable. For example, we are told that 37% of Modern Orthodox households have incomes in excess of $150,000, which places them in the top ten percent of Americans. This strikes me as on the mark and illustrates one of the great problems with Modern Orthodoxy in the United States. Anyone who has been to Israel knows that there are non-haredi Orthodox Jews in all areas of life. You see men with kippot who are bus drivers, security guards, and doing every other job imaginable. Yet in the United States, Modern Orthodoxy has become largely an upper middle class phenomenon. The cost of a Modern Orthodox lifestyle, which includes expensive schools and camps, is simply beyond most people’s reach. I believe that this cost is a major reason why the Modern Orthodox camp has not picked up much in the way of ba’alei teshuvah.[1]

I have no doubt that many of the non-Orthodox admire the Modern Orthodox lifestyle, and would be willing to try it out, before learning the cost. Many non-Orthodox would also be happy to send their kids to Modern Orthodox schools, but they are not going to sacrifice a middle class lifestyle for this. Those who grow up Modern Orthodox and remain in the community are prepared to make the financial sacrifices (as well as limiting how many children they have). But for those who are not part of the community, the entry fee is simply too high. Needless to say, there are also those among the Modern Orthodox who drift away because of the financial cost, and this drifting often begin when the first child is enrolled in public school. As I see it, the financial burden is the great Achilles’ heel of Modern Orthodoxy, and what prevents it from any real growth. By the same token, those of us in the Modern Orthodox world must recognize that one of the great strengths of the haredi community is that there is room in it for everyone, from the wealthy real estate developer to the blue-collar worker. If, as so many predict, the future of American Orthodoxy is with the haredim, money (or lack of it) will play an important role in this story.

* * * * * *
The Pew Report reported very high levels of intermarriage in the Jewish community.[2] Yet even among those who would never dream of intermarrying, we know that some engage in sexual relations with non-Jews. There is an interesting responsum in this regard by the late R. Moshe Stern, the Debrecener Rav, Be’er Moshe, vol. 4 no. 141.
R. Stern testifies to receiving numerous questions regarding this matter by the very people engaged in such behavior. For those who don’t know anything about R. Stern and who asked him questions, I can tell you that these were definitely not Modern Orthodox people or members of the Lithuanian yeshiva world.[3]
This volume of Be’er Moshe was reprinted in 1984 without any changes. However, sometime after that the volume was reprinted again. There is no indication of when this took place, as the title page is the same as the 1984 edition. (Presumably, the reprint was after R. Stern’s passing in the summer of 1997.)
Someone called my attention to how the responsum appears in this most recent reprint.
The censorship of this responsum can only have one purpose, namely, so that people don’t learn about how some members of R. Stern’s community were having sexual relations with non-Jewish women.
What is the remedy for these men who are intimate with non-Jewish women? Repentance, of course. Yet there is a very strange opinion as to how to go about this repentance. R. Solomon Ephraim Luntshitz, in his Keli Yekar[4] to Numbers 19:21, says something which is so “out of the box” that I am shocked that it has not yet been censored from the Mikraot Gedolot. (Yes, I realize that it is just a matter of time.)

R. Luntshitz is discussing the statement in Yoma 86b: “How is one proved a repentant sinner? Rav Judah said: If the object which caused his original transgression comes before him on two occasions, and he keeps away from it. Rav Judah indicated: With the same woman, at the same time, in the same place.” In context, this means only what it says, but not that someone should actually put himself in this situation. Yet this is exactly the lesson R. Luntshitz derives.
He refers to Berakhot 34b, “In the place where penitents stand even the wholly righteous cannot stand.” R. Luntschitz cites an opinion that the ba’al teshuvah (penitent) of a sexual sin has to put himself in the exact same situation as he was before, that is, to be alone with the very same woman and overcome his inclination. This is not permitted to one who is “wholly righteous” since he is forbidden to put himself in this situation. But the penitent needs to do this in order for his repentance to be complete, and this explains how a wholly righteous one cannot stand where the penitent stands, since the penitent has to put himself in a situation that would be forbidden for the righteous one. R. Luntshitz explains that the very act of repentance, i.e., being alone with the woman, “makes the pure [the tzaddik] impure and the impure [the sinner] pure.”
This is a strange passage for any number of reasons, not least of which that the action of being alone with the woman is itself sinful, even if it never leads to any sexual activity. Yet R. Luntshitz tells us that in this case we have an exception, and true repentance requires intentionally putting oneself in the exact same situation one was beforehand and this time overcoming one’s inclination. Of course, there is no guarantee that the person will emerge successfully from this self-imposed test. R. Israel Isserlein reports such an occurrence, where an individual put himself in this situation in order to achieve proper repentance, but ended up sinning again![5] Sefer Hasidim earlier warned against falling into precisely this trap.[6]
R. Luntschitz’s point is also found in his Olelot Ephraim, vol. 2, no. 228, showing that he was entirely convinced of his position.
R. Luntschitz was the rabbi of Prague, yet a later incumbent of this position, R. Ezekiel Landau, strongly rejects R. Luntschitz’s point. He acknowledges that many shared R. Luntschitz’s error, which I think is interesting since I can’t imagine anyone having such an opinion today.[7] R. Landau doesn’t tell us who else advocated R. Luntschitz’s view, but R. Mordechai Harris,[8] R. Dovid Yoel Weiss,[9] R. Yaakov Levi,[10] and Nahum Rakover[11] provide sources. Among these sources are R. Joseph ben Judah Loeb Jacob, Rav Yevi (Netanya, 2012), to Psalms 36:3, who quotes the Baal Shem Tov as offering the same approach as R. Luntschitz.
Jewish men getting together with non-Jewish women is, of course, not a new thing. The Talmud, Sanhedrin 82a, already refers to this possibility with regard to Torah scholars (!), concluding: “If he is a scholar, he shall have no awakening [i.e., teaching] among the sages and none responding among the disciples.”[12] Avodah Zarah 69b-70a deals with the status of kosher wine on the table when Jewish men are sitting together with a non-Jewish prostitute. Yom Tov Assis, in his article “Sexual Behaviour in Mediaeval Hispano-Jewish Society,”[13] discusses the situation in Spain where it was not uncommon for Jews to have non-Jewish mistresses.[14] Avraham Grossman also deals with this matter and his discussion includes other parts of medieval Europe as well.[15]
In R. Judah ben Asher’s responsa (Zikhron Yehudah, no. 91), we are told about the problem of Jews having sex with their non-Jewish slave girls (and also having impregnating them). A few centuries later, R. David Ibn Zimra testifies that there were men, learned in Torah, who even thought it was permissible for them to have sex with their slaves.[16]
The fact that the prohibition on occasional sexual relations (דרך זנות) with non-Jewish women is only rabbinic[17] no doubt contributed to many not taking it very seriously.[18] Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:2, writes:
אבל הבא על הגויה דרך זנות מכין אותו מכת מרדות מדברי סופרים גזירה שמא יבוא להתחתן. ואם ייחדה לו בזנות חייב עליה משום נידה, ומשום שפחה, ומשום גויה, ומשום זונה. ואם לא ייחדה לו אלא נקרית מקרה אינו חייב אלא משום גויה. וכל חיובין אלו מדבריהן.
R. Moses Isserles [19] even mentions the view of the Tur that intermarriage itself (דרך אישות) is only a rabbinic prohibition.[20] The Bah explains the Tur’s view, Even ha-Ezer 16, as follows, leaving no doubt as to the matter:

אבל בשאר אומות . . . אין בהן איסור כלל מן התורה ואפילו בא עליהן דרך אישות אלא גזירה דרבנן.
This approach, incidentally, could explain how Esther married Ahasuerus, as the prohibition on intermarriage was not yet established.
Maimonides disagrees with the Tur and assumes that there is a biblical prohibition to marry any non-Jew (דרך חתנות), not simply the seven Canaanite nations. Therefore, he claims that Solomon converted all the women he married.[21] However, R. Raphael Berdugo disagrees, and states that there was no halakhic problem with Solomon marrying these women without converting them.[22] This leads him to discuss the story of Pinhas killing Zimri and the whole concept of kana’in pog’in bo. R. Berdugo explains that kana’in pog’in bo only applies when dealing with sexual relations that are public, promiscuous, and the woman is an idolator.[23]
ולא אמרו קנאין פוגעין בו אלא דרך הפקר ועובדת ע”ז ובפרהסיא.
According to R. Berdugo, following the Tur, Jews who are married to non-Jews are only violating a rabbinic prohibition. I mention this since I recently met someone who thought that in messianic days intermarried Jews will be subject to kana’in pog’in bo. I originally thought that this was a clear error. If you look at Maimonides’ formulation, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:4, you find that contrary to R. Berdugo he indeed includes all non-Jews, not just idolators, as subject to kana’in pog’in bo. (And see his very strong words against Jewish-Gentile sexual relations in Hilkhot Issure Biah 12:6-7.) Yet he is just as explicit that the sexual intercourse has to be public, just like with Zimri.
כל הבועל גויה בין דרך חתנות בין דרך זנות אם בעלה בפרהסיא, והוא שיבעול לעיני עשרה מישראל.
Based on this, it was clear to me that according that according to Maimonides (following Avodah Zarah 36b) an intermarried Jew is not subject to kana’in pog’in bo, as living together is not the same thing as שיבעול לעיני עשרה. Even if one were to reject this point, in the very next halakhah Maimonides states:
ואין הקנאי רשאי לפגוע בהם אלא בשעת מעשה כזמרי . . . אבל אם פירש אין הורגין אותו.
This means that the act of zealotry must take place during the actual sexual act, or at least this is what I thought. But when I investigated a bit I learnt that while my understanding is shared by many, there are also many who assume otherwise. For example, the always interesting R. Shemariah Menasheh Adler states that an intermarried man is indeed subject to kana’in pog’in bo.[24] He claims that Maimonides’ statement just quoted only refers to one who is engaged in an act of promiscuous sex in public. With such a man he can only be killed in the act, but Maimonides is not referring here to a man who is publicly living with a non-Jew. In such a case, R. Adler claims, there is no need for the zealotry to be בשעת מעשה. As for Maimonides’ explicit words כל הבועל גויה בין דרך חתנות R. Adler claims that this only refers to the first act of marital sexual intercourse, and that it needs to be in public for kana’in pog’in bo to be applicable, but not once they have already established a home and are living together. R. Adler also quotes R. Solomon Kluger[25] as agreeing with his basic point, and I have found others as well.[26]
We have seen lots of strange stuff in recent years. Is it only a matter of time before someone disgusted with the high rate of intermarriage decides to act the part of kana’in pog’in bo?
It is also worth noting that most commentators and halakhists assume that kana’in pog’in bo only applies when there is a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman, not the reverse. Despite this, we indeed have some examples in Jewish history of “honor killings”. For example, in 1311 a Jewish woman who married a Christian and became pregnant was killed by her brothers.[27]
In 1557 an Italian Jew killed his sister because her alleged sexual activity embarrassed the family. Elliot Horowitz, who mentions this case, adds: “Azariah Finzi, the girl’s father, saw fit to defend this action by his only son, asserting that it was ‘inappropriate for one calling himself a Jew, especially a member of one of the best families, to suffer a veil of shame upon his face, being mocked by all who see him for the blemish attached to his family’s reputation.’”[28]
In Teshuvot Hagahot Maimoniyot to Sefer Nashim, no. 25 (found in the standard printings of the Mishneh Torah), there is a responsum which describes how a woman cheated on her husband, apparently with a local non-Jew, and became pregnant. According to her father, she also killed her baby (“the mamzer”[29]) after it was born. Her father, worried that she would apostatize, asked, indeed pleaded with, the local rabbis to permit him to kill his daughter by drowning her in the river. The rabbis turned the request down.
בא אביה של שרה לפני שנים ממנו החתומים למטה ובא לימלך בנו להורות לו אם מותר להרוג בתו לטובעה בנהר ולאבדה מן העולם . . . [אמר אביה] אני מבקשכם בכל מיני תחינה שתתירו לי להורגה.
The case is actually quite sad since she was probably a teenager in over her head. The responsum describes how she would run away from home but her mother would convince her to come back. When her father rebuked her for her behavior, her reply was, “I am not the first woman who did something bad.”R. Asher Ben Jehiel, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rosh 18:13, deals with a case of a woman who was intimate with a non-Jew and became pregnant from him. R. Asher affirms the local rabbi’s decision to cut off her nose. (See also R. Matityahu Strashun, Mivhar Ketavim [Jerusalem, 1969], p. 158 n. 3.)

Also relevant is a very strange story recorded in Ta’anit 24a. It begins by telling us that R. Yose ben Abin left his teacher, R. Yose of Yokeret. His reason was, “How could the man who showed no mercy to his son and daughter show mercy to me?” Let’s leave aside the story of R. Yose of Yokeret and his son. Here is what the Talmud records about him and his daughter.
He had a beautiful daughter. One day he saw a man boring a hole in the fence so that he might catch a glimpse of her. He said to the man, “What is [the meaning of] this?” The man answered: “Master, if I am not worthy enough to marry her, may I not at least be worthy to catch a glimpse of her?” Thereupon he exclaimed: “My daughter, you are a source of trouble to mankind, return to the dust so that men may not sin because of you.”
Although he did not physically kill his daughter, he did express the wish that she die (according to some it was an actual curse), and in the opinion of many commentators this is exactly what happened (see Hagahot ha-Bah, ad loc.). What makes this text so shocking is that the daughter was entirely innocent of any improper behavior. In other words, it was her very existence as a beautiful woman that created the problem, and as such it was better that she simply exit this world before any more men were led into sinful thoughts. I see no way that this story can be brought into line with mainstream rabbinic thought, despite many attempts to do so.[30] (At a future time I can present some lessons that contemporary moralists have derived from this story, which also are quite shocking.)
Returning to the matter of Jewish-Gentile sexual relations, while the Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 16:1, following Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:2, tells us that occasional sexual relations (i.e., no marital relationship) with a non-Jewish woman is only rabbinically prohibited,[31] R. Nissim of Gerona disagrees. Yet if we are indeed dealing with a Torah prohibition then what does the Talmud[32] mean when it states that the Hasmonean Beit Din decreed against sex with a non-Jewish woman? If it was already forbidden according to the Torah, there would be no need for such a decree.
R. Nissim suggests that the Hasmonean Beit Din’s decree was designed to add an additional penalty onto an already existing prohibition. It is not that occasional sex with a non-Jewish woman was banned by the Hasmonean Beit Din, but they merely added the penalty of lashes. The reason for this, R. Nissim points out, is that sometimes people are not concerned about heavenly punishments like karet, but they are concerned with an earthly punishment.[33]
Yet this is a minority view, and the standard approach is that there is no biblical prohibition on occasional private sex with a non-Jewish woman. Here is how the Encylopedia Talmudit sums up the matter[34]:
הבא על הגויה דרך זנות, איסורו מדברי סופרים, גזרה שמא יבוא להתחתן.
(In case people are wondering, I don’t think that this is the sort of information that should be spread among the masses, precisely because that some people might decide that violating a rabbinic prohibition is not such a big deal.)
I keep stressing Jewish men and non-Jewish women, since the situation of Jewish women and non-Jewish men has its own issues that should be postponed to another post. But with regard to Jewish women who are intermarried, let me note that according to R. Ovadiah Yosef, such a woman should be told to go to the mikveh. He also adds that she should not tell the mikveh lady about her situation (I assume because she might then be refused entry).[35]
To be continued.

* * * * * *

 

In an earlier post here I mentioned some of the shocking things said by R. Chaim Kanievsky about R. Shmuel Auerbach. Someone asked me if I could put together a list of the harshest things said by Torah scholars about their contemporaries. This would be an interesting project, and we can also find some very harsh things in this regard in talmudic and midrashic literature. I must stress, however, that often these shocking (to our ears) statements are not as harsh as they sound, since they were not meant to be taken literally. Some rabbis use figures of speech that everyone understands are simply part of a literary genre.
Here is one such example. R. Abba Mari of Lunel, in his attack against the Jewish rationalists, tells us that if he had the power he would do as follows to his opponent[36]:
אקרע סגור לבו להיות בדמו ממרס.
This means “I will cut open his heart so as to stir his blood.” I am sure people in medieval times would also be offended by such a statement. Yet its meaning then was far removed from what it would mean today, and if any of our contemporaries spoke like this we would assume he needed to be institutionalized.
After reading the post, some also wrote to me to express dissatisfaction with the rabbinic leadership in the haredi world. Contrary to what some think, this sort of feeling is not new, and in every generation people have been disappointed with the rabbinic greats. Here, for example, is what appears in the anonymous letter printed at the beginning of R. Mordechai Benet’s Parashat Mordechai.
ואף הגדולים וחכימי דרא לא משגיחים רק לעצמם בלחודוהי לזכות עצמם בלחוד אבל לא לזכות דרא לעורר תשובה בעלמא.
Finally, a couple of people corresponded with me regarding the stories of great rabbis who had totally sublimated their emotions. There are other stories that could be told of rabbis who were not even (at least outwardly) emotionally affected by the death of a child. This is sometimes held up as an example of piety and acceptance of God’s decree. Yet R. David Ibn Zimra (Radbaz) had an entirely different perspective.[37] Regarding one of the “gedolei ha-dor” who when his son died did not shed a tear, Radbaz was asked if this is a good characteristic or not. In his reply, Radbaz does not mince words about how wrong this is, seeing such “piety” as cruel, un-Jewish, and evidence of a psychological problem (to use a modern formulation):
זו מדה רעה מורה על קושי הלב ועל רוע תכונת הנפש והיא מדת אכזריות והוא דרך הפילוסופים האומרים כי זה העולם הכל הוא מעשה תעתועים
[1] Alan Brill has recently written as follows:
Centrism requires its members to live in the top six percent of U.S. income. The community is known for kitsch engagements and weddings, and other signs of conspicuous consumption in the name of religion. In the face of the recent economic downturn many will remain in the community and follow whatever guarantees survival in suburbia.
“The Emerging Popular Culture and the Centrist Community,” in Yehuda Sarna, ed., Developing a Jewish Perspective on Culture (New York, 2014), p. 30. As with everything else Brill writes, this essay is well worth reading. On this same page he refers to the fact, noted by others, that for most Centrist Orthodox Jews, their Orthodoxy has nothing to do with doctrine but is about lifestyle and family values.
Being Orthodox is about family on Shabbat, shiva calls, hospital visits, sharing simchas, and helping others. They consider the warmth of the community as their Orthodox Judaism, yet are oblivious to doctrine and practice demarcations. . . . Many define faith as “everyday morality” rather than institutional commitment or theological Orthodoxy.
I would add that not only is this not new, I believe it is how traditional Judaism has always functioned and is applicable to much of the haredi world as well. In other words, many in the Orthodox world would agree with the Reconstructionist saying, “Belonging is more important than believing.” See Mel Scult, The Radical American Judaism of Mordecai M. Kaplan (Bloomington, 2014), p. xiii.
From Brill’s article I learnt that Aish Hatorah put on a recent Purim megilah reading “that featured as emcee and guests of honor the non-Jewish Chris Noth, who played Mr. Big on Sex and the City, and Snooki, of the MTV show Jersey Shore.” See also here. Brill uses this example, and others, to show the influence of contemporary culture.
I am fascinated by how the haredi world tolerates this sort of thing in the name of kiruv. I personally am very turned off by this, but am apparently in the minority. When I told a couple of twenty-somethings that I think that the following Aish video, with almost three millions hits, makes a mockery of what Yom ha-Din is all about, they thought I was simply out of touch. Yet as I noted to them, contrary to the implication of the video, Rosh ha-Shanah is indeed about spending the day in synagogue in prayer, not about having fun and breakdancing to non-Jewish music.
[2] See my earlier discussions of intermarriage here and here.
Regarding another type of “intermarriage”, see Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers (New Haven, 2009), p. 94, that Sephardim in seventeenth-century Amsterdam were forbidden by their community to marry Ashkenazim. (Poor Sephardim were also given a higher charity subsidy than Ashkenazim.)
[3] See Be’er Moshe, vol. 4, no. 146:26-27, where R. Stern speaks very strongly against the practice in Boro Park and Willamsburg of  men and women going for walks on Shabbat on Yom Tov, as this leads to a mingling of the sexes.
[4] For some reason the title of this commentary is almost always written as Keli Yakar, yet the second word should be Yekar, as appears in Prov. 20:15.
[5] Leket Yosher, ed. Kinarti (Jerusalem, 2010), Hilkhot Yom ha-Kippurim, p. 304.
[6] Sefer Hasidim, ed. Margaliyot, no. 167. While preparing my Torah in Motion classes on R. Joseph Hayyim I found a strange passage in his Ben YehoyadaSotah 36b. Although the Talmud, ibid., records the view that Joseph intended to sin with Potiphar’s wife, R. Joseph Hayyim says that this is not to be taken literally. Rather, Joseph’s intention was to inflame his lust for her so that would then be able to overcome it which would be a great spiritual victory. He says the same thing about King David and Abigail. Although the simple meaning of the Talmud, Megillah 14b, is that David wished to have sex with her, R. Joseph Hayyim states that here, too, all David wished was to arouse his lust in order to then overcome it.
וכן היה הענין אצל דוד הע”ה, בענין אביגיל כשתבע אותה דודאי חלילה לנו לחשוב על אותו צדיק אשר לבו חלל בקרבו, שביקש לחטוא בא”א, אלא כוונתו היתה לעורר התאוה בקרבו, ולהעביר אש החשק בלבבו, כדי שבעת שיגיע לנקודת המעשה ינתק עבותות התאוה, ויכבה אש החשק כרגע, ויחדל ויפרוש מעשות רע
(R. Luntshitz, in the passage from Keli Yekar I cited, specifically states that only one who has already sinned in such a fashion and is engaged in repentance can put himself in this situation, but a tzaddik is absolutely forbidden to do so).
R. Joseph Hayyim’s comment reminds me of the notion that one who has not sinned, and thus has nothing to repent for, should purposely commit a sin. This will then allow him to fulfill the mitzvah of teshuvah, which he would otherwise not be able to do. In a future post I will discuss this.
Regarding King David, I found something quite strange in Etan Levine, Marital Relations in Ancient Judaism (Wiesbaden, 2009), p. 129. Levine writes: “And though the sages hardly regarded extramarital affairs as meritorious, their antipathy to divorce led some of them to opine that extra-marital relations with an unattached, sexually-permitted female was preferable to terminating a marriage.” This might be true, but no valid source is cited to support this idea.. In his note to the quoted passage, Levine writes: “King David’s case was interpreted as proof: it was to prevent his divorcing any of the 18 wives permitted to a king that he was allowed to sexually tryst (יחוד) with Abishag without marrying her (I Ki. 1:1f.). See the Babylonian-born Simeon bar Abba (d. ca. 310CE), a disciple of Rabbi Johanan whose homily he cites in Tb Sanhedrin 22a.” To begin with, R. Shaman (שמן) bar Abba is not quoting R. Johanan in Sanhedrin 22a. What he says is that the fact that David was permitted yihud with Abishag shows how much divorce was disapproved of, for otherwise he would have divorced one of his wives and married Abishag. But where does Levine get the notion that yihud means “sexually tryst.” The Bible itself (!) is explicit that David “knew her not.”
[7] Derushei ha-Tzelah (Warsaw, 1886), derush 1, no. 11.
[8] Yad Mordechai (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 43-44.
[9] Megadim Hadashim: Berakhot (Jerusalem, 2008), pp. 360-361.
[10] Gan Naul (n.p., 2009), pp. 108ff.
[11] Takanat ha-Shavim (Jerusalem, 2007), pp. 588ff., 595ff.
[12] The Talmud’s teaching (quoted by Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 16:2) is very clear, and events of recent years have shown us that even Torah scholars are not immune to such behavior. Yet I can’t say I was surprised to find that even these clear words are distorted. R. Gedalyah Axelrod, Migdal Tzofim, p. 148 (parashat Pinhas), states that the Talmud and Shulhan Arukh couldn’t really mean that a Torah scholar might have sexual relations with a non-Jew. Therefore, he explains that they really mean that the Torah scholar causes others to do so, by performing fraudulent conversions, and these “converted” women (who are still halakhically non-Jewish) then marry Jews. This is very nice darshanut, but how can anyone take this seriously as an actual explanation of the Talmud and Shulhan Arukh? The Maharal knew better, and in Derekh Hayyim 4:4 he gives the following example:
עשרה תלמידי חכמים יושבים ואחד נכנס לבית זונות ולא נודע איזה שזה מחלל שם שמים בסתר.
See also R. Hayyim Vital, Sefer ha-Hezyonot, ed. Eshkoli (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 33: 

ליל שבת שעברה שכב תלמיד חכם הנקרא בעדת הספרדים “חכם” עם גויה אחת

[13] In Ada Rapoport-Albert and Steven J. Zipperstein, ed., Jewish History: Essays in Honour of Chimen Abramsky (London, 1988), pp. 25-59.

[14] See Sefer Hasidim, ed. Margaliyot, no. 701, that the level of Jewish sexual morality will mirror what appears in society at large.
כמו שמנהג הנכרים כן מנהגי היהודים ברוב מקומות כגון אם הנכרים גדורים בעריות כך יהיו בני היהודים הנולדים באותה עיר.
See also R. Solomon Ben Adret, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba, vol. 1, no. 1209:
ובנות ישראל צנועות הן אלא שהדור מנוולתן.
I was surprised to see Michael Satlow write: “There is no rabbinic law against intercourse with a prostitute.” Tasting the Dish: Rabbinic Rhetorics of Sexuality (Atlanta 1995), p. 166. This is incorrect, as Sanhedrin 82a explicitly states:
בית דינו של חשמונאי גזרו הבא על הכותית [ס”א הגויה] חייב עליה משום נדה שפחה וכו’
See also Geoffrey Alderman’s article, “It is Not a Sin to Visit a Prostitute,” in his The Communal Gadfly (Brighton, 2009), pp. 267-268. I don’t know how he can write such nonsense as the following:
As far as I am aware, there is no general halachic prohibition on Jewish men sleeping with prostitutes, unless the whore is herself Jewish. If not, then, according to the Talmud, a Jewish man who feels the need to visit a prostitute must simply take care to do so in a town in which he is not known – which strikes me as very sound advice.
If the whore is Jewish, however, we are faced with the certainty of multiple acts of adultery [!], all of which are prohibited. This is because intercourse is itself a form of marriage. So the first Jewish man a prostitute consorts with becomes her husband [!]; if she wishes to consort with anyone else, this first Jewish customer will have to give her a get [!]. So will the second, and so on. [!] (I am ignoring for my present purposes, considerations of mikveh, since I have yet to learn of any brothel that has one.)
It is actually a common kabbalistic view that one who has sex with a non-Jewish woman will be reincarnated as a Jewish prostitute. See e.g., R. David Ibn Zimra, Metzudat David, no. 612.
[15] Hasidot u-Mordot (Jerusalem, 2001), pp. 229ff.
[16] She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, vol. 1, no. 48.
[17] See Sanhedrin, 82a, Avodah Zarah 36b, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:1-2; Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 16:1, and the commentaries ad loc. R. Moses Isserles, Darkhei Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 34:4, writes:
בא על הגויה לא מיפסל רק מדרבנן דהא אינו אלא מגזירת בית דין של חשמונאי.
R. Shlomo Goren, Mishnat ha-Medinah (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 142, points out that sex with a non-Jewish woman does not fall under the category of arayot, even rabbinically.
ועל אף חומר האיסור אין זה מגדרי איסור עריות אפי’ מדרבנן.
R. Joseph Kafih, commentary to Mishneh TorahIssurei Biah 12:2, raises a problem with the standard understanding of Maimonides that occasional sex with a non-Jewish woman is only a rabbinic prohibition. Even though Maimonides, Issurei Biah 12:2, writes ולא אסרה תורה אלא דרך חתנות, what is one to do with halakhah 9 [no. 8 in R. Kafih’s edition] which implies the opposite? R. Kafih writes
ומה יעשה בדברי רבנו לקמן הל’ ח שגויה הנבעלת לישראל תיהרג מפני שבאה תקלה לישראל על ידה, ולדבריו [דברי המעשה רקח] שאין אסור דאוריתא איזה תקלה באה על ידה?
Presumably, Maimonides in halakhah 9 is only referring to a public sexual act, which would be regarded as a biblical violation.
[18] After writing this sentence I found that R. Solomon Ibn Verga said the same thing. See Shevet Yehudah (Jerusalem, 1955), p. 134: 

כבר התחילו בספרד לתת עיניהם בבנות הארץ מרוב ההרגל וקצתם לקחו היתר לאמר כי אין בו אלא מלקות

I don’t mean to imply that there wasn’t sexual immorality involving Jewish men and Jewish women, as there was plenty of this as well. R. Asher ben Jehiel, Teshuvot ha-Rosh, nol. 37:1, even speaks about the practice of engaged couples living together (לדור ביחד) before marriage. He tells us that the women did not go to the mikveh since they were embarrassed to do so before marriage. But they weren’t embarrassed to live together before marriage.

[19] Even ha-Ezer 16:1.
[20] Since the consequences of intermarriage are so devastating, one must wonder why there is no explicit biblical prohibition. Be that as it may, in coming years watch for the Conservative movement to halakhically legitimize intermarriage by relying on the view that it is only rabbinically prohibited. As with other rabbinic prohibitions previously abolished by the Conservatives, they will argue that this too can be set aside for important societal concerns.
Maggid Mishneh, Hilkhot Ishut 1:4, recognizes that one cannot logically explain why certain sexual acts are biblically prohibited and others had to wait for the Sages to prohibit them.
ואל תתמה היאך תהיה הישראלית ביאתה בזנות בלאו והגויה מדברי סופרים לפי שאיסור העריות הוא בגזירה ודבר שאין לו טעם בכל פרטיו. והנה תראה שאם חמותו היא בסקילה [צ”ל בשריפה] ואם אמו מדברי סופרים בלבד ונדות בישראלית הוא מן התורה בכרת ובגויה אין נדות כלל אלא מדברי סופרים.
Regarding the Tur’s assertion that there is no biblical prohibition to marry women who are not of the Canaanite nations, this has been hard for many to accept. The Arukh ha-Shulhan, Even ha-Ezer 16:2, states that “it appears to me” that even according to this opinion, if the Jewish man and non-Jewish woman actually live together there is a Torah prohibition. How could the Arukh ha-Shulhan say this when the Tur, Even ha-Ezer 16, states explicitly that contrary to Maimonides, sexual relations דרך אישות with contemporary non-Jewish women does not incur a biblical penalty? Is there a real distinction between sexual relations דרך אישות and living together as husband and wife?. Here are the Arukh ha-Shulhan’s words (following which he cites a talmudic proof for his understanding):
ומ”מ יראה לי דאפילו להחולקים על הרמב”ם מ”מ אם היא בביתו ובועל אותה תמיד כדרך איש ואשתו חייב עלה מדאורייתא
For others who argue that despite the simple sense of his words, the Tur must hold that there is still a biblical prohibition for a Jew to marry a non-Jew, see Otzar ha-Poskim, Even ha-Ezer 16:1. See also R. J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 2, p. 273.
Nevertheless, the severity of the stricture against intermarriage tends to indicate that, even according to the Tur, some form of biblical prohibition against intermarriage with non-Jews who are not members of the Seven Nations must exist. The question to be resolved is the nature of the biblical prohibition.
With reference to those who have argued that intermarriage (and even non-marital Jewish-Gentile sexual relations) violates Torah law, Shaye J. D. Cohen writes: “This may be good halakhah and good preventative medicine, but it is bad history and bad exegesis.” “From the Bible to the Talmud: The Prohibition of Intermarriage,” Hebrew Annual Review 7 (1983), p. 30.
[21] Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:2, 13:14.
[22] Mesamhei Lev (Jerusalem, 1990), commentary to ch. 1 (p. 229).
[23] See Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:5 that there is no kana’in pog’in bo when it comes to a ger toshav.
[24] See Geulat Yisrael (London, 1950), pp. 95ff.
[25] Commentary to Even ha-Ezer 16:2, in the standard eds.
[26] See also R. J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 2, pp. 275ff., who argues that intermarriage is the equivalent of a public act of sexual intercourse, and thus biblically forbidden according to all.
[27] See Renée Levine Melammed, “The Jewish Woman in Medieval Iberia,” in Jonathan Ray, ed., The Jew in Medieval Iberia 1100-1500 (Boston, 2012), p. 272.
[28] “Jewish Confraternal Piety in Sixteenth-Century Ferrara: Continuity and Change,” in Nicholas Terpstra, ed., The Politics of Ritual Kinship (Cambridge, 2000), p. 159.
[29] Although her father called the baby ממזר מן הגוי, the term was only being used colloquially, since a child of a non-Jew is not halakhically a mamzer.
[30] R. Samuel Edels, Maharsha, ad loc., states explicitly that R. Yose of Yokeret was wrong in cursing her so that she die. )How many other examples do we have of commentators criticizing talmudic sages?) However, I don’t think Maharsha’s approach will make matters much easier for many readers, because he suggests that instead R. Yose should have cursed her that she become ugly!
ולא יפה עשה לקללה שתשוב לעפרה בשביל כך אלא כי אם לקללה שתשוב לשחרוריתה.
R. Mordechai Karvalho of Tunis, Meira Dakhya (Livorno, 1792), ad loc., also wonders why the daughter had to die. After all, “are we commanded to kill everyone who is beautiful?” He suggests that R. Yose should have kept her inside the house so no man would ever see her.
ובתו ג”כ היא לא עשתה שום עבירה וא”כ היל”ל להחביאה בחדרי חדרים שלא יראה אותה שום אדם ולא ימיתינה וכי מי שהוא יפה תאר מצווין אנו להמיתו
This idea, of keeping unmarried women off the street, is found in various Jewish sources. In his recently published Asaf ha-Mazkir, p. 61, R. Meir Mazuz refers to R. David Kimhi’s commentary to 2 Sam. 13:2: 

ודרך הבתולות בישראל להיות צנועות בבית ולא תצאנה החוצה
R. Mazuz also refers to R. Asher ben Jehiel, Piskei ha-Rosh, Ketubot 7:15, who says that in Spain the בנות, which I assume also means unmarried women, would only go to the bathhouse in the middle of the night, since they were accustomed not be seen outside. In order to show that this was the practice of the pious women of medieval Spain, R. Mazuz cites another source, Tikunei Zohar, no. 58:
צריכא ברתא דאיהי בתולה למהוי סגורה ומסוגרת בבית אביה

With reference to my question at the beginning of this note, R. Mazuz, Asaf ha-Mazkir, p. 128, cites the great R. Raphael Joseph Hazan, Hikrei Lev, vol. 1, Yoreh Deah, no. 26 (p. 29b), that R. Simeon ben Yohai was mistaken in thinking that animals are subject to individual providence:

 

דרשב”י לא ידע . . . אבל האמת אינו כן
R Mazuz cannot accept this sort of language when dealing with R. Simeon ben Yohai:
דמה כוחנו לחלוק על רשב”י בסברא בעלמא, ומה ידענו ולא ידע

Not noted by R. Mazuz is that R. Hayyim Palache cites R. Hazan without objection. See Amudei Hayyim (Izmir, 1875), p. 101a.
[31] In Hilkhot Issurei Biah, 12:6 (followed by Shulhan Arukh 16:2), Maimonides writes that if one who had sex with a non-Jewish woman is not killed by kana’im or given lashes by beit din עונשו מפורש בדברי קבלה שהוא בכרת. The context of this halakhah, and the previous ones, is an act of public sexual relations, the sort that is a Torah violation and subject to kana’in pog’im bo. Yet some understand Maimonides to be also referring to private sexual relations דרך זנות. See Beit Shmuel, Even ha-Ezer 16:4. This position is hard to understand, since as has been pointed out by others, how can there be karet on a rabbinic prohibition? A punishment of karet would seem to imply that we are dealing with a Torah violation, yet Maimonides is explicit that this is not the case with non-public and non-marital sexual relations with a non-Jewish woman. This problem leads R Yosef Rein, Penei Yosef: Sanhedrin (Bnei Brak, 2009), p. 648, to offer the original suggestion that Maimonides is talking about כרת מדרבנן. To complicate the matter even more, in Sefer ha-Mitzvot, neg. com. no. 52, Maimonides indeed states that there is karet for non-public sexual relations with a non-Jewish woman, which contradicts his position in the Mishneh Torah. R. Kafih, in his commentary on Sefer ha-Mitzvot, explains:

כלומר שעונשו חמור כחייבי כרתות
Needless to say, this is a very unlikely explanation, and if Maimonides wanted to say what R. Kafih writes, he could have easily done so instead of speaking of actual karet.
[32] Sanhedrin 82a, Avodah Zarah 36b.
[33] See Hiddushei ha-Ran, Sanhedrin 82a, and also R. Aryeh Leib Heller, Avnei Miluim, Even ha-Ezer 16:1:3. R. Simhah Lieberman, Bi-Shevilei ha-Amim, no. 14, has a very good discussion of the matter. See also the sources showing the seriousness of the offense in R. Michael Bacharach, Arugat ha-Bosem, Even ha-Ezer 16:2. R. Aviad Sar Shalom Basilea also argues against those who claim that occasional sexual relations with a non-Jewish woman is only rabbinically prohibited. See Emunat Hakhamim (Mantua, 1730), ch. 29. Among the points he makes is if occasional sex with a non-Jewish woman is only rabbinically forbidden, then what is the point of the yefat toar law? This is a special law that permitted what otherwise was already forbidden. He also quotes R. Judah Briel that sex with a non-Jewish woman is included as part the prohibition of wasting one’s seed. (It is not clear if R. Briel is speaking homiletically or halakhically. See also Torah Shelemah, Ex. 20, no. 334, for the midrashic statement that one who has sex with a non-Jewish woman violates fourteen [!] separate Torah prohibitions. Regarding this statement, see also Louis Epstein, Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism [New York, 1967], p. 176.)
R. Basilea’s point about yefat toar can easily be refuted. See e.g., Mizrachi to Deut. 21:11 who suggests that the entire point of the law is to permit sex with a married non-Jewish woman, something that otherwise would be forbidden. It implies nothing about occasional private sex with an unmarried non-Jewish woman, which was permitted in the days of the Torah.
כיון שבבית שהוא בצינעה בא עליה הביאה ראשונה למה לי קרא להתירה הא לא אסרה תורה אלא דרך חתנות אבל דרך זנות בביאה ראשונה שאינה אלא מפני יצרו הרע אין איסורה אלא מדברי סופרים ולמה לי קרא למשרייה ושמא יש לומר דמשום אשת איש איצטריך קרא להתירה וצ”ע . . . כל הפרשה הזאת לא נכתבה אלא באשת איש . . . מדאצטריך קרא להתירה בשעת שביה מכלל שבאשת איש דאסירא בעלמא קמיירי, דאי בפנויה [שריא] אפילו בעלמא, כ”ש בשעת שביה, וזהו הנכון אצלי
According to some, another novelty of the yefat toar law is that it also permits rape, which otherwise is forbidden.See also James Diamond, “The Deuteronomic ‘Pretty Woman’ Law: Prefiguring Feminism and Freud in Nahmanides,” Jewish Social Studies 14 (Winter 2008), pp. 61-85.

I previously discussed yefat toar here and here.
To the sources I cited, add R. Eliezer of Metz, Sefer Yereim, ed. Schiff, no. 20, who specifically states that a yefat toar cannot be raped ([called to my attention by R. Chaim Rapoport], and see Toafot Re’em, ad. loc., note 13, that this is already a talmudic dispute).
On the other hand, Maggid Mishneh, Hilkhot Ishut 14:17, states:
וענין יפת תואר חדוש הוא ולא התירה אותה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע . . . ובעלה בעל כרחה
R. Pinhas Horowitz, Ha-Makneh, Kiddushin 22a, understands Rashi to permit rape of a yefat toar (I haven’t seen others who agree with this).
מה שפירש”י ז”ל דקידושין תופסין בה אין לפרש שיכול לקדש אותה בע”כ דלא מצינו קידושין בע”כ כי אם ביבמה אלא דע”כ הכי קאמר קרא דלאח’ הגירות בת ליקוחין היא אם מתרצית להתקדש לו ואם לא מתרצת יבא עלי’ בע”כ דהיינו שהתירה התורה נגד היצה”ר
It is precisely with these sorts of passages in mind that, as I have quoted on a number of occasions, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg states that when there is a dispute among the early authorities, we should decide the halakhah in accord with contemporary sensibilities.
ואגלה להדר”ג [הגרא”י אונטרמן] מה שבלבי: שמקום שיש מחלוקת הראשונים צריכים הרבנים להכריע נגד אותה הדעה, שהיא רחוקה מדעת הבריות וגורמת לזלזול וללעג נגד תוה”ק (כתבי הגאון רבי יחיאל יעקב וויינברג, חלק א סי’ לב).
See also my post here.There are a number of laws in the Torah that are not in line with modern conceptions of morality (the one most in the news these days deals with homosexuality). But I think yefat toar is unique in that I have never seen an English language discussion of the law in an Orthodox publication that actually deals with its parameters in any detail, and cites what the rishonim say about the law. (Searching on the internet I found Jacob Bernstein, “Eshet Yefat To’ar: A New Look” here, but this too does not elaborate in sufficient detail on the morally difficult aspects of the matter.) Could it be that this law is more morally problematic for moderns than the laws dealing with homosexuality and slavery of which we have seen endless discussions? And if so, why?

Here is one final source regarding yefat toar. R. Reuven Katz, Duda’ei Reuven, vol. 2, p. 217, states explicitly that the heter of yefat toar is not proper or ethical, but nevertheless in necessary. While this is a quite provocative formulation, it really reflects the outlook of the Sages. Nevertheless, I don’t know if any contemporary halakhic authorities would write this way (emphasis added).
אמנם קיים בנסיבות מיוחדות היתר לדבר שאינו הגון ומוסרי, כיון שהתנאים אינם יכולים להתעלם מתופעה זה
Regarding rape, there is one other strange thing I would like to share. Maimonides, Hilkhot Ishut 15:17, forbids marital rape. In a case where a woman is in a situation of yibum, and she does not want the Levirate marriage, she is not forced and instead the man must take part in the halitzah ceremony (although according to Maimonides she is regarded as a moredet). See Hilkhot Yibum ve-Halitzah 1:2, 2:10. However, there is a special halakhah when it comes to yibum that even if the man forces her to have sex, it is still a valid yibum and she becomes his wife. (Hilkhot Ishut 2:3).
R. Isaiah of Trani (the Elder), Teshuvot ha-Rid, ed. Wertheimer (Jerusalem, 1987), no. 59, responds to an unnamed questioner who thought that it was permissible for a levir to force his sister-in-law to have sex with him (i.e., to rape her). R. Isaiah expresses his surprise that anyone could make such a mistake (although he acknowledges having heard of others who also erred in this way):
מה שכתבתה [!] למה אין כופין את היבמה להתייבם לא נכונו הדברים האלה לומר לאיש חכם, שלא עלתה על לב אדם שנכפה את היבמה להתייבם . . . אם היבמה אינה רוצה להתייבם והיבם רוצה שנכוף אותה לפניו לא היה ולא נברא
R. Isaiah then states that if the levir was chasing after the woman to rape her (in order to fulfill the mitzvah of yibum), we are commanded to save her from him, even if we have to kill him. (See R. Avraham Shapiro, Shiurei Maran Ha-Gaon Rabbi Avraham Shapiro: Yevamot, Gittin [Jerusalem, 1995] p. 170.)
So far we haven’t seen anything surprising. But in his note to R. Isaiah’s responsum, the editor, R. Avraham Yosef Wertheimer, writes as follows:
ומש”כ רבינו דמצוה להצילה מידו זה חידוש גדול דהא עכ”פ הוא מקיים מצות יבום ולמה עלינו למנוע ממנו אותה מצוה
Wertheimer doesn’t understand why R. Isaiah thinks it is necessary to stop the levir from raping the woman, since after all, he is intending to perform a mitzvah. How Wertheimer could write this after seeing what R. Isaiah explains in his responsum is beyond me.
In a future post I will discuss how the commentators deal with Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 4:4, which appears to be saying that the king may take women as his wives and concubines even against their will.
[34] Vol. 5, s.v. goy, col. 297. See also vol. 3, s.v. boel aramit.
[35] Ma’yan Omer, vol. 7, p. 26. See, however, ibid., p. 294, that on another occasion R. Ovadiah saw no need to instruct intermarried women to go to the mivkeh (and see ibid. for the editor’s explanation of the different answers). See also R. Rafael Evers, Va-Shav va-Rafa, vol. 3, no. 147, for R. Yitzhak Shmuel Schechter’s responsum stating that an intermarried woman should go to the mikveh. This is a very practical question today. Pretty much every outreach minyan has attendees who are intermarried or living with non-Jews. I have also come across people in such circumstances in regular Modern Orthodox synagogues.
When it comes to sexually active single women, both R. Ovadiah and R. Moshe Sternbuch believe that they should be allowed to use the mikveh if they so desire. See Ma’yan Omer, vol. 7, pp. 234, Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, vol. 1, no. 484. See also Ma’yan Omer, vol. 7, p. 261, that we should not advise women to do this (i.e., it is only if they come on their own that they should be allowed to use the mikveh).
[36] Teshuvot ha-Rashba, ed. Dimitrovsky, vol. 1, p. 639. See Neuman, The Jews in Spain (Philadelphia, 1944), vol. 2, p. 125.
[37] She’elot u-Teshuvot Ha-Radbaz, no. 985. See also R. Solomon Schueck, Torah Shelemah (Satmar, 1909), vol. 2, p. 114b-115a.



New Sefer Announcement: The Collected Writings of R’ Moshe Reines

New Sefer Announcement
by Eliezer Brodt

It is with great pleasure that I announce a sefer that I just printed, The Collected Writings of R’ Moshe Reines.

ר’ משה ריינס מבחר כתבים, אוסף חיבוריו מאמרים ואגרותיו, לג+ 640 +4 עמודים

The sefer will be available for purchase in the US shortly. (We will post that info soon).
A PDF of some sample pages are available upon request, for more information contact me at eliezerbrodt@gmail.com.
What follows is the English introduction to the book. This is an abridged version of the much longer Hebrew introduction included in the book.
A few years ago, while researching the history of the Lithuanian Yeshiva of Volozhin, I came across an article written by Reb Moshe Reines. His article included a few letters between his father, Rabbi Yitzchok Yaakov Reines, rabbi of Lida and leader of the religious Zionist movement, and Rabbi Naftoli Tzvi Yehuda Berlin (the Netziv), head of the Volozhin Yeshiva. These letters were not included in the recent collections of the Netziv’s writings. A short while later I read a small, rare book by Reb Moshe Reines called Dor VeChachomov; a collection of essays about various scholars of his generation. The quality of these writings piqued my interest in Reb Moshe Reines (RMR). I began researching the author and proceeded to search for his other writings. I soon discovered that this brilliant scholar died in 1891 at the very young age of twenty-one, and that precious little else is known about him.
I was introduced to the world of RMR’s father, Rabbi Yitzchok Yaakov Reines, by one of his descendants, my friend Rabbi Yisroel Gordon. As I began collecting RMR’s writings, I suggested to Rabbi Gordon that they are of significant historic interest and that they be reprinted in one modest volume. Rabbi Gordon’s mother, Mrs. Naomi Gordon, great granddaughter of Rabbi Y.Y. Reines, underwrote most of the costs of the project. Mr. Yosef Aronson, great grandson of Rabbi Y.Y. Reines, participated in the financing as well.
After further research, I discovered that RMR was such a prolific writer that the modest volume I had envisioned grew to a much larger size. 
My inquiries led me to uncover a significant correspondence between RMR and the renowned scholar Rabbi Shlomo Buber. Over twenty letters from RMR to Shlomo Buber are currently preserved in the Buber collection in the National Library of Israel in Jerusalem. I requested and received permission to copy, transcribe, and print these rare, personal documents. Also included in this collection are several letters by RMR to the writer Judah Leib Gordon.
In addition to this treasure located at the National Library, I discovered an additional thirty-seven letters from RMR to his friend, Micha Yosef Berdeshevsky. Professor Avner Holtzman graciously granted permission to copy, transcribe, and print these letters in this collection. This volume also includes some letters by Rabbi Yitzchok Yaakov Reines to Berdeshevsky, Shlomo Buber, and Shmuel Finn. All of these letters have never been printed before.
Over the course of my research, I discovered that some additional letters by RMR, written to Avrohom Dubsewitz, had been preserved at the New York Public Library. However, copies of those were located too late to be included in this volume.
From his letters it is clear that RMR was a remarkably prodigious scholar. He had expert knowledge of the Talmud. He published articles on Jewish history, and was also educated in other areas of secular knowledge. Further, his command of Hebrew was formidable. This combination of knowledge is quite remarkable, considering his youth.
In a letter to Shlomo Buber (included in this work), Rabbi Y. Y. Reines writes of his devastation after his son’s untimely death, and expresses his desire to write a book about him. Unfortunately, as far as we know, he never got around to doing so. 
Significance of this Volume
RMR’s articles were prominently featured in the important newspapers and journals of the day. Some of his essays sparked debates in the periodicals. These debates are included in this collection. His writings shed a light on Jewish life in Russia in the 1880s, dealing with many then-current issues such as Jewish education, yeshivos, and the rabbinate. Some of RMR’s ideas and thoughts on these topics are still relevant today. 
RMR writes clearly that he was his own person, presenting ideas that sometimes diverged from those of his father. Yet, his writings reflect his father’s influence, and they serve to illuminate the complex ideas and worldview of his father, the unique and often-misunderstood Rabbi Y.Y. Reines. 
This volume also includes numerous letters from RMR’s correspondence with various personages of the time. These letters, printed here for the first time, are autobiographical in nature. As with much autobiographic material, these letters are historical documents, offering an authentic glimpse into an era. 
Highlights
The first section of RMR’s collected writings is a small book entitled Dor VeChachomov. His original plan was to write essays on the lives of fifty Jewish scholars of the day. Twelve essays from this collection were printed in his lifetime; four more were printed after he died. His choice of subjects is explained in his letters to Shlomo Buber. Apparently, RMR was commissioned to write about living personalities about whom no biographies had yet been written, thus limiting his choice of subjects. He requested of his subjects that they send him a biography and a bibliography of their writings. Some of them did not respond. For those who did, he wrote up their information and added his own introductory paragraphs (some with highly interesting, tangential discussions). Among the more famous scholars he included in the book were: Binyomin Ze’ev Bacher, Avraham Berliner, Shlomo Buber, and Avraham Harkavi. These essays are the first biographies written about them.
Another essay is titled Achsanyah Shel Torah. This essay was supposed to develop into a small book, but sadly he never completed it. It deals with the yeshiva in Volozhin and the Kovno Kollel, and contains many fascinating details. Included in this section are six letters from the Netziv to Rabbi Y.Y. Reines.
Another noteworthy essay is Hasafrut Hatalmudut VeHamedrashit. This essay addresses different aspects of publishing seforim. One section deals with the challenges authors face getting their work printed and gaining proper recognition. One senses that this section reflects his and his father’s personal experiences. Another part of this essay is devoted to the importance of book reviews and the role of proper haskamos (approbations). A third part suggests creating a fund for poor writers. Many of the issues raised in this essay remain relevant for authors today. 
One of the longer essays in this volume is Netzach Yisroel, an in-depth treatment of a proposal to establish a genealogical museum in Jerusalem, housing family trees in an organized fashion, including pictures of family members. RMR encouraged sending the proposed museum any material of historical significance, including works published or unpublished. One section of RMR’s essay focuses on the importance of pictures, another on the importance of family trees. The last section is devoted to the importance of living in Eretz Yisroel. In it, RMR included a beautiful letter from his father on the subject. 
Some of the essays deal with the need to establish a curriculum for the education of a rabbi, detailing what subjects, besides the requisite Torah knowledge, a rabbi needs to know. The issue of educating rabbis in areas other than Torah, without compromising their Torah studies, is discussed. This subject was very important to Rabbi Y. Y. Reines, who opened more than one yeshiva with that challenging agenda. 
Related to this is an essay about the pilpul method of learning. Much has been written and continues to be written on this subject. In this essay, RMR analyzes the pilpul method, listing the issues that have been raised about it, and demonstrating its weaknesses. He advocates a method based on rules of logic, a method advanced and written about by his father. 
RMR wrote many times and at great length about haskalah, the Jewish enlightenment movement. His approach to haskalah was that one should “accept the truth from whoever says it,” as did the tanna Rabbi Meir (Chagigah 15b), whose approach to the impious teacher Acher was to take the good and leave behind the bad. 
Thus, in a letter to Judah Leib Gordon, he writes: 

“Although from a religious perspective you and I are as far apart as are Lida and Pressburg, for you are utterly irreligious (as your demands for “reformations in religion” prove!), and I am completely conservative in religious matters and in all my days have never transgressed even the slightest custom which has become sanctified in the course of time (save foolish and deviant customs, such as spitting during the recitation of alienu l’shabeiach, which from my youth has aroused in me repulsion and is intolerable to me); however with regard to haskalah, my views are exactly like yours and my heart identical to yours.”

RMR’s letters are vastly informative regarding his special relationships with Shlomo Buber, Shmuel Finn, and Micha Yosef Berdishevsky. They also include tidbits about his parents, his brother, pen names he used, and other articles he planned on writing. 
One last interesting, bibliographical piece we learn from the letters regards the anonymous work Hakolos Yechdalun (Bardichov, 1887), an attack on Rabbi Y.Y. Reines’ work and new method of learning. In various letters we read about RMR’s strong reaction to the work. We also learn that he showed it to his father. Until now, bibliographers were not certain who the author was, suggesting it was one Rabbi Yaakov Tzvi Yanovski. From RMR’s letters, it appears clear that indeed Rabbi Yanovski is the author.
Aside from presenting the writings of a brilliant young scholar, this volume opens a window into the intellectual ferment of the Jewish world in the late nineteenth century. 

Here are the table of contents:




A Knife, Is it A Dangerous Gift for Rosh haShana?

A Knife, Is It A Dangerous Gift for Rosh Hashanah?
By: Bency Eichorn
I. R. Nachman of Breslov’s Position on Knife GivingAs Erev Rosh Hashanah approaches, let me remind you of a popular trend some people, prior to Rosh Hashana, buy knives for their households, or as presents for others. Why all this enthusiasm? Some will explain that buying a new knife for Rosh Hashana is a popular segulah for livelihood. This segulah is so powerful that many wives insist that their husbands buy a new knife each approaching Rosh Hashana. This custom will be discussed in length in a different article. The topic that I wish to discuss here is the other extreme, the widespread superstition that people should avoid buying knives as presents for others, in the belief that possible dangers linger with the giving of a knife. This once very popular superstition has not diminished through time. Recently, I experienced this belief during a simcha of mine. I received many interesting gifts, yet one stuck out. It was a beautiful silver knife, with a single dollar. The giver explained that the dollar was meant to thwart the dangers which linger with the giving of a knife.[1] Immediately a famous quote of Karl Goldmark[2] was whispered into my ears: “Civilized people lose their religion easily, but rarely their superstitions.”
The giving of gifts to friends, family members or the host of a happy occasion is part of our ancient customs. [3] It is found in the Bible as early as the story of Eliezer, the humble servant of Abraham, who is given gifts by his master to give when Eliezer finds a wife for Isaac. When Eliezer meets Rivka and realizes that she is the perfect wife for Isaac, he gives her gold, silver and garments, and to her mother and brother, precious things [Braishis 24:52].[4] This gift was a way of bridging a connection between two people who had no connection before. Then, soon after, Jacob gives Eisav a huge gift consisting of two hundred female goats, and twenty male goats, two hundred ewes, and twenty rams, thirty nursing camels with their colts, forty cows, and ten bulls, twenty female donkeys, and ten male donkeys [Braishis 32:13-20].‘The ritual of giving a present’ is a very integral part of the Jewish culture today as well. [5] Often, gifts are exchanged at family occasions, be it at a brit, bar mitzvah, or wedding. A knife is a very common wedding gift, given its practicality as a kitchen utensil, or its significance as a Judaic piece. However, this gift is often avoided by many people as it is considered a danger in the world of superstition. After much research on this topic, this superstition does not seem to have any concrete basis in central Jewish religious belief.The earliest Jewish source to mention the danger of giving a knife as a gift is an 18th century work, in the name of the great Chasidic Master, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov [1772-1810]. Reb Nosson, a disciple, recorded all the teachings which he heard directly from his teacher. In Sefer Sichot HaRan[6], R. Nosson quotes his teacher, R. Nachman, who in turn refers to a tradition from his great-grandfather, the Holy Baal Shem Tov [Rabbi Yisroel Ben Eliezer, 1698-1760, known by his acronym The Besh”t] and the founder of the Chasidic movement. “In the name of the Baal Shem Tov, that a knife should not be given as a present, which means one should not give his friend a knife for a present.”[7]
Rabbi Nachman did not provide an explanation for this belief. Rather, he refers to it as a tradition that should be guarded and accepted. The fact that his ultimate source is the Besh”t indicates that this belief was not known to the public at large; rather, it was a tradition solely of the Besh”t. Only much later, Rabbi Shabtzi Liphshutz writes in his Shemira Mealyah,[8] based on the Talmud in Baba Metzia 27b, “People do not generally lend a moneybag, a purse because people superstitiously believe [Rash”i there] that by doing so they transfer their good fortune to the borrower.” Rabbi Shabtzi Liphshutz[9] explains that “for the same reason I have a tradition that one should not give his friend a knife for a present.” An additional reason I recently saw states that knives are symbloic of one’s livelihood, therefore one can forfeit his livelihood by giving another a knife.[10] After quoting the tradition of not giving a knife as a present, Rabbi Shmuel Hakatan[11] cites a Midrash,[12] where Resh Lakish told R’ Yehudah, “take nothing from anyone, then you will not have to give anything to anyone.” While sitting there, a woman came and brought him a slaver with a knife on it. He took the knife and returned the salver. Subsequently, a royal courier saw the knife, took a liking to it, and carried it away.[13]
Rabbi Yitzchok Yosef Lerner shlita”h, in his amazing work, Shemiras ha-Guf veha-Nefesh, writes,“There are those that don’t give a knife as a gift to a friend.”[14] This same religious belief is cited in several other contemporary works.[15] II. Potential Problems with this CustomAs we have discussed, the main danger associated with giving a knife as a present is the belief that this action can transfer one’s good fortune, ‘mazal,’ from the giver to the receiver. However, it is difficult to apply the Talmud in Baba Metzia 27b, which appears to be limited to lending a purse or a money bag but not anything else. Assuming arguendo that this principle does apply to knives, the question that must be asked is why are knives singled out over any other present? It is worth stating at the outset that this entire belief regarding gifting knives may be nothing but a belief of the common folk, adapted from the gentiles of the times of the Talmud, who had an incredible influence on the Jews,[16] a point to which we shall return.
Another point to consider is that the earliest source for this belief is Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, who is claiming the source as the Besh”t. It is impossible that Rabbi Nachman heard about this belief directly from the Besh”t as he was not alive during the Besh”t’s lifetime. Therefore, it must be that Rabbi Nachman heard about this belief from a family member, as they were descendents of the Besh”t, or that he heard it from a non-relative in the name of the Besh”t. Because Rabbi Nachman did not hear about this belief directly from the Besh”t, this already casts some doubt on its authenticity, or, at the very least, something was lost in the transmission of this custom. For example, it’s possible that this belief was influenced by gentile practices that occurred in the Besh”t’s lifetime, and then attributed to the Besh”t[17]. Or, it’s possible that this belief is based on a one time occurrence, in which the Besh”t ruled not to give a knife as a present. This would explain why no other disciple of the Besh”t has recorded this belief.This leads us to the obvious problem of why no one else before Rabbi Nachman record this belief, including any of the other disciples of the Besh”t.For example, Rabbi Boruch of Mezhbizh (1753-1811), a grandson of the Besh”t, and, according to many, his supposed successor, does not mention this superstition. To the contrary, Rabbi Boruch of Mezhbizh practiced the opposite of this custom. In a letter to Rabbi Menachem Mendal of Vitebesk he writes, “Please accept from me a minor gift a silver knife and fork, and it should be accepted as a good offering.”[18] Another disciple, who lived a little while later, Rabbi Yaakov Yitzchak of Lublin, otherwise known as The Chozeh of Lublin, would distribute knives to his chasidim on Rosh Hashonah as a segulah for wealth. He is recorded as saying “he [God] ‘cuts’ life for all living beings and as it says he opens his hands and the last letter of each word is the Devine name of wealth.”[19]
Because of the previous point, Rabbi Pinchas Epstein zt”l, in his notes[20] on the Shemira Mealyah, limits the danger of giving knives as a present. He writes, “the reason that the Lubliner had no problem giving knives to his chassidim is because when the knives are brand new knives for the purpose of giving as a segulah, then there is no danger.” Rabbi Epstein zt”l makes an important distinction between giving new and used knives as a present.[21] Although Rabbi Epstien zt”l asserts that “this distinction is very logical” this distinction is difficult to accept as no one else, including Rabbi Nachman and the Shemirah Mealyah make such a distinction. III. Iron in Jewish Thought Perhaps, R. Nacham’s version of the Besh”t’s belief stems from the Biblical and Talmudic (mystical) concept that iron (and the like) should not be present in a place where blessing is found. This concept is based on a verse in Exodus (20:22) “And if you make for me an alter of stones, do not build it of hewn stones; for by wielding your tool you have profaned them,” and on another verse in Devarim (27:5) “An alter of stones, do not wield an iron tool over them.” The Mishnah in Midos (3:4) echoes this idea, “Brought thence whole stones upon which no iron (tool) had been wielded, for iron invalidates (the stones of the alter even) by contact …they did not plaster them with iron trowel lest it touch (the stones) and render (them) invalid…”The Torah does not explain how the alter is profaned by using iron to cut its stones. It was left to Chazal, who explained it in the Mishnah ibid. and Mechilta de-Reb Yishmael.[22] As the Mechilta explains, the alter has the ability to lengthen a man’s life (by way of atonement). It is therefore improper that iron, which is used to shorten man’s life (when used as weapons), come in contact with the alter.[23]That is was constructed without iron was the alter’s perfection. Therefore, there are Rishonim who expain that if the alter came in contact with iron, the material that contradicts its essence, it was deemed profane.[24] There are Rishonim, however, who understood that when iron coexists with the mizbeach, it brings negativity and actual danger into the world.[25]
For a long period of time, iron symbolized the sword, a weapon used to shorten man’s life. Therefore, people were careful not to associate iron with blessing, specifically with the blessing of long life. Many saw it as an actual danger.In the medieval times this concept was applied to a knife left on the table, specifically during Birchat Hamazon. The table which people eat on is considered an alter. As the Talmud[26] explains in the name of Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar, “when the Beis Hamikdash was around the alter would atone for Israel, but now the table of a person atones.” Therefore, many laws associated with the alter and the concept of the alter’s sanctity applies to today’s table,[27] including covering the knife during Birchat Hamozon.[28] A knife, made of iron, and the antithesis of blessing, should not be exposed at the “mizbeach table,” specifically during Birchat Hamazon, which is the epitome of blessing.In the same vein, we find that a sword should not be brought into a shul, as prayer lengthens life and a knife shortens life.[29] This concept seems far extended from the original concept which applies to iron on the mizbeach. However, as far extended as it may seem, the reality is that iron (sword/knife) is an antithesis to prayer and the two cannot coexist. It seems clear that the concepts of covering the knife during Birchat Hamazon, and not bringing a knife/sword into a shul, did not proceed medieval times.The Besh”t extended the original law of not placing iron on the mizbeach even further. For example, he preferred not to use an iron mezuzah cover. This is recorded by Rabbi Abraham David Wahrman (1770–1840) in his Da’as Kedoshim.[30] “I heard in the name of the Besh”t that it is better not to place the mezuzah in an iron holder. It is comparable to what Chazal reasoned that it is improper that a thing that shortens ones life should be placed with a thing that lengthens one’s life. The Torah states in the krias shema [Devarim 11:2] that it is in order to lengthen one’s life, and Chazal said this is going on the mitzvah of mezuzah. Also with regard to any metal, one should be careful not to use it as the mezuzah holder.”[31] The Da’as Kedoshim comments on this. “I don’t know if the person that heard this from the Besh’t added the part about all metal, for from Chazal it seems that only by iron do we apply the concept that it is something that shortens one’s life.”[32]
Later, the concept of not placing a mezuzah in an iron holder was recorded in R’ Shabtzi Liphshutz’s Segulas Yisroel[33] and R’ Matzliach Mazuz’s Abiah Segulos,[34] both in the name of the Besh”t.It seems that the Besh”t extended the prohibition of iron on the mizbeach to any circumstance involving iron and blessing (especially of lengthening one’s life), explaining that the two should not coexist.Therefore, one can understand why the Besh”t would prohibit giving a knife as a present. A knife, symbolic of shortening life, is not the ideal item with which to convey messages of love, peace, and blessing. As well, there is a concept of “al tiftach peh sattan.”[35] We do not want the exchange of knives to rouse the Satan to act morbidly. In addition, there may be intrinsic danger in a transaction involving an item which symbolizes death (such as a knife). According to this belief, there is no difference between a new and old knife.In conclusion, it would seem that Rabbi Nachman had a tradition (not to give a knife as a present) from the Besh”t that was unknown to the rest of his disciples.[36] What is certain is that this belief, as a Jewish custom, stems exclusively from the Besh”t. There is no mention of this belief, as a Jewish custom, prior to the Besh”t, and those that record it after his lifetime are all his disciples, or followers.[37]
IV. Non-Jewish Sources Regarding Gifting KnivesAmongst the non-Jews, the superstition of not gifting knives was very widespread and mention of it precedes the first Jewish source by a few hundred years. However, the reason given for this superstition differs from the explanations recorded in Jewish sources. Non Jewish sources, dating back to the year 1470, explain that if a knife is given as a present, it can “cut up,” or destroy love and friendship.The earliest non Jewish source to mention the already widespread superstition preceded Rabbi Nachman by over 300 years. The Gospelles of Dystaues records, “he that gyueth [gave] a payre [pair] of knues [knives] ti his lady paramour on newe yeres daye [on new years days] knowe that theyr loue shall ware colde [know[ing] that their love shall become cold [severed]].”[38] In 1578, Peter Bornemisza echoed this belief in his book, On the Temptation of the Devil, as he writes, “one ought not to give one’s financee a knife.”[39] Soon after ,in the year 1611, Francis Davidson in Peotical Rapsodi writes,“a paire of kniues: Fortune doth giue this paire of Kniues to you. To cut the thred of loue if ’t be not true.” [40]
From its earliest source in the year 1470, this belief could be found in many different parts of the world, especially in England and America.[41] Eventually, around the year 1654,[42] this belief extended not only to knives but to any sharp [metal] tool or object as well, such as pins and scissors. Giving sharp objects as gifts, just like knives, was believed to carry danger, and, it appers that people accepted these “prohibitions.”[43]
In the year 1707,[44] we find that the non-Jews thought up a solution to the danger of giving sharp items/knife as a present. This solution has been employed by both non-Jews[45] and by many Jews up to present day. [46] Specifically, the solution entails the recipient to give money or an item of value to the giver, in return for the knife. I assume that by giving money to the giver, it is considered as the recipient bought the knife, and the knife loses its status as a gift. There is no danger in buying a knife.It is interesting to point out that this non Jewish belief is recorded in the general beliefs of the Iraqi Jews. They believed that one should not give his friend a knife as a present [for the reason given by the gentiles]. However, if the recipient gives the giver a minimal amount of money, then it is permitted.[47] I would assume that the Iraqi Jews were influenced by this very popular belief of the non Jews.Although inconclusive, this widespread superstition of the Gentiles (not to give a knife as a present) may have played a role in the development of the Jewish belief. This claim is not definite; rather an assumption gleaned from the evidence at hand. Hopefully, with ongoing research on this topic, definite evidence will surface and prove the exact origins of this belief, practiced by many Jews.

[1] See later in the article for a comparative study of non Jewish beliefs, which they believe by the receiver giving a dollar you can defend the dangers of such a present. It seems however this relative not only did she possess a non-Jewish superstition and protection(this way of protection does not have to be exclusive to non Jews for it just makes the knife as an acquisition instead of a present), she also mixed it up and gave me the dollar (I am not complaining!).[2] Karl Goldmark (1830-1915), Viennesse Jewish music teacher, composer, and conductor. His autobiography, was translated into English in 1927 under the title Notes from the Life of a Viennese Composer.[3] Whatever the origin of this tradition is, according to one scholar, giving presents is one of the oldest, universal, acts in human history. Horst A. Wessel, The Babylonian Laws, Oxford 1968, pp. 311-13, 343, 377. [4] See Richard Booker, Here Comes The Bride: Jewish Wedding Customs And The Messiah, (Houston: Sounds of the Trumpet, 1995), p. 78; Roni Weinstein, Marriage Rituals Italian Style, Brin: 2004, pp. 262-310. For the custom of the bride gifting presents to the groom see Hershavitz, Otzar kol Minhagai Yeshurun, p. 27; S. M. Lehrman, Jewish Customs and Folklore, London 1949, pp. 143, 149. On giving present upon attending a wedding, see Hershavitz, Otzer Kol Minhagai Yeshurun, p. 30. [5] For the custom of giving gifts on Purim, Chanuka, and marriage occasions to the Rabbi’s see Zohar Chai, Veyairah, Midrash Hanelam 115. For giving charitable gifts to poor by inviting them over Shabbos night, sponsoring candles and Torah covers to the synagogue, funding dowries, and hospital care see Chazeres Hoatoroh, Israel 2008, p. 48;, Hershavitz, Otzar Kol Minhagai Yeshurun, p. 449, . In the Cairo Geniza we find all types of gifts given. See S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, (University of California Press: 1993) vol. III, p. 22 (gifts from a brother to his sister); id. pp. 167-68 (gifts from husband to his wife); id. vol. I, p. 167 (gifts amongst friends). [6] Sichot Haran no. 9. First printed in 1798-99. Maaglei Tzedek pg. 3a. This tradition is also found in Baal Shem Tov al Hatorah, Parshas Re’ah in the Mekor Mayim Chaim, no. 6.[7] This is not to say that Rabbi Nachman held that a knife had no good usages the world of segulah’s. In Sefer Hamidos, Bayis II 8, R. Nachman is recorded as offering that upon entering a new house bring in a sword or knife. See also, id. segulah II 7, to one who got mute pass a knife… Ibid Segulah II 10, upon entering a new house bring in a knife or sword [See Shaul Mieslish, Sefer Ani Mamin,Israel 1996, pg. 9, brings the very same segulah]. Regarding iron being a positive source to fight off evil and evil spirits, see Joshua Trachtenberg, Jewish Magic and Superstition, New York: 1984, pp. 160, 258, 313 n.14. Frazer, Folklore in the Old Testament, vol. I, p. 521, (“It is said among high caste Hindoos of the Punjab, a Bridegroom on entering the bridal chamber always carries an iron weapon with him to drive away the evil spirits that haunt him.”). Similarly, Trachtenberg, id. p. 174, cites a similar belief by some Jews. Frazer, id. p. 521, records that some brought daggers to drive away evil spirits. [8] Notes on Sefer Shemiras Hanefesh,Yisroel Matisyahu Auerbach, Lemberg: 1871; Shemiras HaNefesh, New York 1992, Preisler ed. no. 153 p. 59.[9] Id. no. 85 p. 59.[10] Segulos Habaal Shem Tov Vetalmidov, Magen Yeshuos Yisroel, 1999, no. 81, in the name of the Sichos Hara”n, notes therein.[11] Rabbi Shmuel Hakatan, Tiferes Shmuel, grandson of Rabbi Shmuel Kaminikar, New York 1926, p. 216. [12] Braishis Rabbah, Vayishlach 87:12.[13] As I wrote it is only an allusion because you can’t prove from here that you should not give a knife as a present. [14] Shemiras Haguf VeHanefesh, Jerusalem 1987, p. 304 siman 243:2[15] Segulos Yisroel,[printed without name of author] Jerusalem 1998, p. 55. Segulos Habaal Shem Tov Vetalmidov, Magen Yeshuos Yisroel, 1999, no. 81. Mechon Zera Avraham, Chazeres Hoatoroh, Israel 2008, p. 344.[16] See Tosfos there that asks why you don’t transgress the prohibition of … c.f. Reshash and Maharatz Chayos, Pischei Teshuvah Y.D. 179:3, and the Toras Chaim. See, Rabbi Yehudah Yudel Rosenberg, Refael Hamalach, p. 14 sub. Hatzlocha, that brings the Gemarah that one should be careful not to lend to his friend his wallet or money belt because by doing so, he will sell or give away his mazel. See also Shaul Mieslish, Sefer Ani Mamin, Israel: 1996, p. 97 also records this precaution.[17] See Baal Shem Al Hatorah for many more segulos that originated from the Besh”t.[18]See Botzina Denehorah, Jerusalem: 2007; Igros Hakodesh, p. 176. Yitzchok Warfel, Sefer Hachasidus, Tel Aviv: 1957 p. 10. See also Aron Surasky, Israel 2000, II pp. 73-74. See also Siach Sarfie Kodesh, Bnai Brak 1989, part 4, pg 141, num. 51, a story “where a great holy Tzaddik sent Rabbi Menachem Mendal of Kotkz a knife as a present. The Kotkzer would not accept the present and said even a one time acceptance can ruin a friendship. It was assumed that he didn’t accept it because because it was not Toveled first. [However it could be explained that the reason he would not accept the present is because he knew of the danger of accepting a knife as a present].See also Yisroel Wasertil, Yeshua Verachamim, p. 19, also in Kovetz Ohr Yisreol, Monsey 1997, p. 128, that Rabbi Moshe Mordechai Bidderman of Lelov would go out on Erev Rosh Hashanah and buy lots of knives and give each of his sons a knife for Rosh Hashanah.[19] R. Mordechai Meneshchiz, Rishfai Aish Hachodosh, Jerusalem: 1997, Kuntres Zichron Tov, p. 72, no. 12. R’ Avraham Yitzchok Sperling, Israel 1982 ed., Shabbath, pg. 118, Num. 246 Notes there. [20] Shemirah Mealyah ibid. pg. 151.[21] It can be assumed that because the giver never used the knife, his mazel is not associated with it, and therefore cannot be transferred when given over to another person. [22] End of Parshas Yisro. See also Toras Kohanim, Kedoshim Perek 11 Halacha 9. Yalkut Shemoni, Kedoshim, no. 624. Midrash Aggadah, Jerusalem: 1971, p. 194 for a alternative reading. [23] See James George Frazer, The Golden Bough, New York 1966, III, Taboo And the Perils Of The Soul, pg. 230, in which he writes “Amongst the Jews no iron tool was used in building the Temple at Jerusalem or in making an alter.” See there in which he brings from early Gentiles sources that they too, held iron as a taboo.[24] As explained in length by the Ramba”n and Tur Ha’oruch Al Hatorah Shemos ibid they write, “Sherak lehidur hamitzvah.” [25] See Rabbeinu Ephraim Al Hatorah, Jerusalem: 1992, Shemos ibid., After writing that iron should not be in contact with the mizbeach because the mizbeach lengthens a man’s life and iron shortens ones life. Therefore one who brings weapons into a shul shortens his life. So it would seem that he connected these to rules for he saw an actual danger by iron being in contact with the mizbeach. See Joshua Trachtenberg, op cit., p. 298 n.5, where he gives a new reason for the danger of a knife and applies it to the covering of a knife by Brichat Hamozon and to the prohibition of bringing a knife into a shul.[26] Chagigah 27a, Menochos 97a. See also Zohar Shemos, Teruma, pg, 153b. [27] Brought by Rabbi Nachman, Sefer Hamidos, Jerusalem p. 52. For a lengthy discussion on this subject see Daniel Sperber, Minhagai Yisroel, Jerusalem: 1994, p. 161.[28] Rokeach no. 332, Shnersohn ed. Jerusalem: 1967, p. 230. Sefer Chasidim, Margolios ed. no. 102, p. 136. See also Minhag Yisroel Torah no. 167. For a lengthy discussion on this topic see the upcoming Yerushosainu. [29] See Kol Bo, Avraham ed. Jerusalem: 2007, p. 334. R’ Moshe of Pramamsla, Mateh Moshe, London: 1958 p. 118.[30] Hilchos Sta”m Hilchos Mezuzah no. 289:1.[31] The Daas Kedoshim ibid. concludes, “however, one does not have to be extra careful.” See R’ Dovid Sperber, Teshuvas Afrakasta Deanyah, Romania: 1940, p, 88, responsum no. 99 (explaining that this means that the proper thing is to be careful). The author asked Rabbi Chaim Kenevsky Shlita”h winter 2008, “Should one be careful not to have a mezuzah holder made of iron”? He answered “that there are those that are makpid, however I am not.”[32] The Magen Avraham end of siman 180, explictly writes that the whole hakpadah is with regard to iron. R’ Moshe Tzvi Landau, Mezusas Melochim, p. 42b, cites the Besh”t that one should be careful not to use a holder of iron, but is not clear that this custom should also apply to all metal and he continues that even regarding iron one does not have to be so stringent not to use it. See R’ Uri Fievel Halevi Braudstien, Mikdash Me’at, where he argues that one does not have to be careful not to have a holder of iron. R’ Yehuda Shienfeld, Osrei Legefen, Jerusalem: 2002, p. 393, responsum no. 551, asserting that the hakpadah is only with metal that you make a knife or sword, such as iron and even copper you should try to be careful not to use it, but other types of metal is fine to use. But see, R’ Dovid Sperber, Teshuvas Afrakasta Deanyah, who asks that it would seem from the poskim that it is not so clear that it doesn’t apply to the also to other metals and on the contrary it would seem it is also prohibited. See also Ohr Yisroel, Monsey N.Y. 2000, 5-1-(17), p. 147.[33] R’ Shabtzi Liphshutz, Segulas Yisroel, Jerusalem: 1993, p. 191.[34]R’ Matzliach Mazuz, Abiah Segulos, Tel Aviv: 2001, p. 19.[35] See Joshua Trachtenberg ibid. pg. 56-57 to what extent people took to be careful not to give any ideas to the Sattan.[36] An explanation to how the Lubliner and others had no problem to buy knives and give them out to others is because if it is for Rosh Hashanah or even a segulah or if it was a present to other for Shabbos Kodesh then there is no danger as the Mitzvah protects. Also it may be offered that if it was bought directly for others so it is like they bought it themselves. [37] We find many instances where Jews gave a knife as a present without hesitation. See Avraham Yari, Masoet Eretz Yisroel, p. 476; see also Hagar Salomon, The Hyena People, California: 1999, pp. 43-44; David Biale, Cultures of the Jews, New York: 2002, p. 984. The people of the Beth Israel are recorded as giving a gift of knives to their Christain friends at the occasion of a wedding. These gifts carried particular symbolic meanings charged with hidden messages. The Manestricher Rebbe, Rabbi Yitzcok Yoel Rabinowitz zt’l although knowing of the belief of the Baal Shem Tov he would still give silver challah knives as a present Lekovod Shabbos (as heard from his son). The present Belz Rebbi shlita”h often gives challah knives a gifts. [As heard from Chasidim]. When the author asked Rabbi Chaim Keneyevski Shlita”h Winter 2008 “Should one be careful not give a knife as a present and is there a source for this superstition “? He answered he never heard of such a thing.[38] Gospelles of Dystaues, pt. 2 xx. (quoted in A Dictionary of Superstitions, Opie & Tatem, Oxford: 1989, p. 217). The Gospel was written around 1470 is an anonymous work that appears to have many contributors, in 1507 it was translated into English a nd published by editor Wynkyn de Worde.[39] Quoted in Teklu Domotoc, Hungarian Folk Beliefs, Indiana: 1981 p. 62.[40] Poetical Rapsodie 6, F. Davidson, 1611, Minors Poems 91:11.[41] Notes and Queries Feb 8, 1890, p. 117, From Two Wise Men and All the Rest Fools, A Comicall Morall, 1619, attributed to George Chapman: Levita: ‘what! Knives? O, I will not take them in any wise: they will cut love.’ See also John Gay, Sheppards Week 26 [Tuesday II 101-102], quoted in a Dictionary of Superstitions and in N&Q Feb. 8, 1890 pg. 117, I quote ‘But woe is me! Such presents luckless prove, for knives; they tell me, always sever love. See Dictionary of superstitions ibid. with many source See North Carolina Folklore, Frank Brown, North Carolina 1961, vol. 6, pg. 632 num. 4650, pg. 473-4 num. 3578-80 [brings may different sources from north American recordings]. Also see Funks and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of Folklore, 1972, pg. 584. See also A Dictionary of English Folklore, Jacqueline Simpson & Steve Roud, Oxford University Press 2000, pg. 205. See Notes and Queries, Sept. 16, 1893. pg. 231. N&Q. July 22, 1893, pg. 78, Rev. Samuel Bishop, head master of Merchant Taylor’s School 1783-95. wrote the following line on the subject, on presenting a knife to his wife: ‘a knife, they say, dear girl, cuts love, mere modish love it may, for any tool of any kind, can separate what was never joined.’ [A very interesting exclusion to the superstition and a very light look by Bishop of such a known belief]. J.S.T.O.R., Superstition from Oregon, Donald M. Hines, pg. 6 of 14. giving a knife as a gift is bad luck as it cuts friendship. Also Superstition and Maxims from Dutchess Count, N.Y. by Gertuse Barnes 4 of 7, you must not thank any one when given a knife or a pin or anything sharp it will cut the friendship.[42] See Dorthy Osborne, letter 13-15 Jan. 1654, quoted in a Dictionary of Superstitions p. 345 (“Did not you say once you knew where good French tweezes were to bee had? Send me a prayer, they shall cut noe love”). Also in 1707, letters from Elizabeth Wentworth quoted id.(“Dearest brother, I give you a grate many thanks for the siszers you sent me by Mr. Shokman. I gave him six spences for fear that should not cute love one your side: but for mine ‘tis well grounded to fear ather siszers or knife cutting of it”). Also in 1711 in Spectator July 14, quoted in ibid pg. 309 I quote: ‘This very old women had a reputation of a witch… There was not a maid in the parish that would take a pin of her, though she should offer a bag of money with it. See Connoisseur 20 Feb.,1755, quoted in A Dictionary of Superstitions ibid I quote: ‘neither would on any account run the risk of cutting love, by giving or receiving such a gift as a knife or a pair of scissors.’ [43] See a Dictionary of Superstitions id. and p. 309, 345, with many sources. North Carolina Folklore ibid. pg 634, num 4651-4653, and pg. 474, num 3579-3580. N&Q Feb. 24., 1912, pg. 157. A Dictionary of English Folklore ibid, Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of Folklore ibid. [44] See Letter from Elizabeth Wentworth [Wentworth Papers ed. Cartwright, 76] Feb, 1707, quoted in A Dictionary of Superstition ibid pg. 345. I quote ‘Dearest brother, I give you a grate many thanks for the siszers you sent me by Mr. Shokman. I gave him six spences for fear that should not cut love one your side…See also Grose, Provincial Glossary, superstition 63. brought in a Dictionary of Superstitions ibid. pg. 217 and in a dictionary of English folklore ibid, I quote: ‘ it is unlucky to gift a knife, scissors, razor, or any sharp or cutting instrument, to one’s mistress or friend, as they are apt to cut love and friendship. To avoid the ill effects.. a pin, a farthing, or some trifling recompense, must be taken.’[45] See A Dictionary of Superstitions ibid. pg. 217 and pg. 345 pg. 309. North Carolina Folklore ibid. pg. 473 num 3578, a Dictionary of English Folklore ibid, Funk and Wagnalls standard dictionary of folklore ibid, N&Q May 15, 1858 pg. 391, and in Dec. 14, 1889 pg. 469. Feb. 24 1912 pg. 157. J.S.T.O.R. The Journal of American Folklore vol 36. by Martha Warren Beck [Superstitions collected from American College girls] pg. 4. num. 36, Some West Sussex Superstitions 1878 [lingering in 1860] collected by Charlotte Latham pg. 12 9th of 63, num. 43.[46] For an example, I saw brought down that Reb Tzvi Aryeh Rosenfeld said over that once he went to visit Reb Avraham Sthernhauz zt”l a previous leader of Breslov, and he gave Reb Avraham a challah board and knife. Reb Avraham agreed to accept the board but not the knife until he paid for it. [47] Otzar Hasegulot, Avraham Ben Yaakov, Jerusalem 1991, pg. 124.




Sale: Sefer on the Manna

Sale: Sefer on the Manna

By Eliezer Brodt

This week, we read Parshas Beshalach, and one of its key sections focuses on the Manna. As is well known, we live in a generation where there’s an explosion of information, and it’s simply impossible to know or read it all. Countless seforim have been written on virtually every topic, and the subject of the Manna is no exception.

In an upcoming podcast (to be released this week) from my Musings of a Book Collector Series, IY”H, I will delve deeper into the subject of the Manna and some of the recent literature about it.

One recent work I’d like to highlight is a remarkable sefer by Rabbi Abish Dachs, titled Otzar HaParshah: Parshas HaMan (Soft Cover, 435 pages), first published in 2024. This comprehensive, encyclopedic exploration covers every aspect of the Manna in great detail.

The sefer is currently available for purchase exclusively through me, while supplies last, as it has yet to be sold anywhere else. For more information or to order a copy, please contact me at Eliezerbrodt@gmail.com.

Below is the Table of Contents, which provides a glimpse of the vast range of topics addressed in the book.