Daily Birkat Cohanim in the Diaspora

Daily
Birkat Cohanim in the Diaspora *
By Rabbi Daniel
Sperber
Question: May
Cohanim outside the Land of Israel give the priestly blessing (Birkat
Cohanim
, or Nesiat Kapayim) on weekdays and on regular Shabbatot?
Answer: The
Torah explicitly requires the Cohanim to bless the people (Numbers
6:23), but does not tell us where or when they should do so. Rambam (Sefer
ha-Mitzvot
, Mitzvat Assei 26) who gives no details, but refers us to
B. Megillah 24b, Taanit 
2b, and Sotah 37b, to work out the details. However, there are
versions of the Rambam’s text (edited by R. Hayyim Heller and R. Yosef Kefir)
when there are the additional words “every day”, and this, indeed, is
his ruling in the heading of his Hilchot Tefillah and Birkat Cohanim;
and see further ibid chapter 14, and this also is the ruling in Sefer
ha-Hinuch
, Mitzvah 367. However, there we find the additions that
“the Mitzvah applies in all places at all times…” Hagahot
Maimoniyot,
to Rambam Hilchot tefillah 15:12 note 9 writes, on the
basis of R. Yehoshua ha Levi’s statement in B. Sotah 38b, that any Cohen
who does not bless the people transgresses three commandments, splitting as it
were the biblical verse in Numbers ibid. thus: “So shall you bless
the children of Israel/ say unto them”, adding verse 27 ibid., “And
they shall put my name upon the children of Israel…” The Hagahot
Mordechai
modifies this by adding that if the Cohen has not been summoned
to bless the people, he does not transgress by not doing so, referring to the
Yerushalmi text, and this view is accepted by the Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim
128. There is also a minority view, rejected by mainstream authorities, that of
Rabbenu Manoah, that even if the Cohen was not called, if he did not bless the
people, he transgresses at least one commandment.
Outside
Israel it is the practice for the Cohanim not to give the priestly blessing, even
though the mitzvah clearly applies abroad (see R. Hayyim Hezkel Medini, Sdei
Hemed
vol.3, p.271, vol.8 pp.177 and 381), and for the congregation not to
request that they do so, – this with the exception of musaf on the
foot-festivals and Yom Kippur – even during Neilah. The Beit Yosef was very
perturbed by this practice. He writes (Orah Hayyim 128):
The Agur wrote that Mahari Kolin [the Maharil] was
asked why the Cohanim do not give the priestly blessing every day, since it is
a positive commandment. And he answered that it was the custom of the priests
to make a ritual ablution [in the Mikvah] before blessing,
* This is
an expanded version of an article published under this title in Conversations
20, 2014, pp.150-155.
as is recorded in Hagahot Mordechai, and to do so
every day in the winter would be very difficult for them.
Hence, the custom evolved to do so only on the
festivals. Furthermore, [doing so] would curtail the business activities (mi-taam
bitul melachah
), and in any case if the Cohen is not summoned he
does not transgress.
However,
the Beit Yosef continues:
He forced himself to justify his local custom; but the
reasoning is insufficient. For that which he said that they were accustomed to
make a ritual oblution every day, this is a stringency – i.e. it is not really
required – which leads to leniency… Since ritual ablution as a requirement for
the priestly blessing is not mentioned in the Talmud. And even if they took
upon themselves this stringency, why would they cancel three commanments, even
if they were not transgressing since they had not been summoned. Surely it
would be better that they carry out these three commandments clearly and not
make the ritual ablutions, since there are not required, and by not doing so
they could fulfill the three commandments.
He ends
by saying:
And praise be to the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael and
all Egypt who give the priestly blessing every day, and do not make ritual
oblutions for it.
Indeed
there are some congregations that still follow the Beit Yosef’s position. Thus,
the Syrian community has birkat Cohanim every day, (see H.C. Dobrinsky, A
treasury of Sephardic Laws and Customs
, Hoboken N.J., New York 1986, p.168).
This too was the Amsterdam custom of the Portuguese community, (Shemtob
Gaguine, Keter Shem Tov, vol.1, Kédainiai 1934, pp.222-227 note 268, who
also quotes Even Sapir, that this was the practice in Yemen, and
possibly in some Moroccan congregations), while in Djerba they did it on
Shabbatot and festivals, (R. Moshe HaCohen, Brit Kehunah, Orah Hayyim,
pp.101-102, and note 30). Thus, there are several precedants for this practice.
However,
the Ashkenazi Rema, R. Mosheh Isserles, in his Darkei Mosheh ibid. 21,
seeks to justify the Ashkenazi custom. He writes:
Because [doing so] would curtail business activities
for the people in these countries, for the Cohenim are struggling to support
themselves in the exile, and they can barely support their families, other than
the bread they gather by the sweat of their brows daily, and they are not
happy. And it is for this reason that they do not carry out the priestly
blessing, which leads to bitel melachah la-am. And even on Shabbat they
do not do so, because they are troubled and concerned about their future…, and
they are only joyful on the festivals. And thus the custom evolved only to
bless the people on the festivals. So it would appear to me.
The
notion that the Cohen must be joyful when blessing the congregation has its
roots in the early Rishonim, (in Rash’s teacher, R. Yitzhak ben Yehudah).
The Mateh
Efraim
, of R. Efraim Zalman Margaliot, added that this was an ancient
practice, even more than five hundred years old, going back to the Tashbetz
ha-Katan, a disciple of the Maharam Mi-Rothenburg, and the Kol Bo
sect.128, and accepted by the Maharit, the Agur, the Darkei
Mosheh
etc., “and one may not stir from this custom” . He also
gives additional reasons to support this custom.
R. Efraim
Zalman Margaliot (1760-1811) in his response, Beit Efraim, Orah Hayyim 6,
Lvov 1818, also suggested that the reason for the absence of birkat Cohanim
abroad is because in our days the pedigree of Cohanim is questionable, and a Zar,
non-Cohen, may not bless the people (see B. Ketubot 24b), and doing so
several times every day would be making a berachah le-vatalah – an idle,
that is to say, unnecessary, blessing, which is forbidden – on numerous
occasions by many people. However, since birkat Cohanim is a mitzvat
aseh
, a positive commandment, and we rule that even in questions of
uncertainty – safek -, when we are dealing with a mitzvat aseh,
we rule le-humra, stringently; and certainly it is superceded by the
seriousness of the mitzvah. Furthermore, if the Beit Efraim‘s
argument were correct, how come the Cohanim abroad do bless the people
on festivals during musaf?  [1]
The
Sefardi Kaf ha-Hayyim, R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, on the other hand (Orah
Hayyim
ibid note 16), cites French R. Yaakov of Marvege, (in his Shut
Min-ha-Shamayim
no.38), who writes that:
In a place where there are suitable Cohanim to bless
the people, and they do not do so even once a year, both the congregation that
do not call them to do so, and the Cohanim themselves, who do not make the
blessing, transgress, also because they seem not to be relying on their Father
in Heaven.
This was
cited by the Egyptian Radbaz, R. David ben Zimra, and especially  the Hesed le-Avraham of R. Avraham
Azulai, who writes at length censuring those who do not bless the people, enumerating
the negative effects of their flawed thinking, concluding that “it be
proper to do so in every place, and not to seek out strategies to avoid doing
so.”
And even
the Ashkenazi Hafetz Hayyim, in his Mishnah Berurah 128:12 in the
Beur Halachah wrote:
It is only because of weekness that the Cohanim can go
out and not go up [to bless the people. For if not so, certainly they are not
acting well to needlessly nulify a positive commandment.
Indeed,
there are some Ashkenazi congregations where they do carry out the priestly
blessing at least once a month, as we learn from the Sefer ha-Miktzoot,
or even every Shabbat, as is mentioned in the Mateh Efraim.
Finally,
we may cite the words of R. Yehiel Michel Epstein, in his Aruch ha-Shulhan,
Orah Hayyim
128:4, who writes:
And behold, it is certainly the case that there is no
good reason to nullify the mitzvah of birkat Cohanim the whole
year long, and [it is] a bad custom. And I have heard that two great
authorities of former generations – probably the Gaon Eliyahu of Wilna and R.
Hayyim of  Volozin – each one wished to
reestablish birkat Cohanim daily in their location, and when they
decided on a given day [to begin], the issue become confused and they did not
succeed, and they said that from Heaven it was thus decreed.
In view
of all the above we may state that Birkat Cohanim does not require
ritual oblution, and in present day diaspora countries, blessing the people
will not effect or curtail any business activities, and people in the diaspora
are not downtrodden nor do they live in permament misery, so that they cannot
be joyful enough to bless the congregation. And according to some opinions
(e.g. the Pri Hadash) even if they are not called to give the blessing,
they may/should do so, (see e.g. Piskei Maharitz, Orah Hayyim vol.1,
Bnei Brak 1987, pp.259-260, with the note of R. Yitzhak Ratzabi ibid. Note 7,
ibid. Beerot Yitzhak). Thus, the reasons given for avoiding giving the
priestly blessing are for the main part largely irrelevant in present-day diaspora
conditions.
On the
other hand, not doing so means not carrying out three positive biblical
commandments, and according to some ,albeit minority, opinions this is also the
case when the congregation does not summon the Cohanim. Some, somewhat mystical
sources also stress the great spiritual benefits of the priestly blessing, and
the considerable negative effect of their absence. Furthermore, we have seen
evidence that in some Ashkenazi communities Birkat Cohanim was practiced
on Shabbatot or monthly, and not merely on the festivals.
Taking
into account all of the above, I would think that nowadays, there is little
justification for not carrying out the priestly blessing daily in our diaspora
congregations.
I would
like again to refer to the Hesed le-Avraham:
מי שאינו
מברך מאבד טובה הרבה ומראה שאינו חפץ במצות ולא חפץ בברכה, ובז לדבר יחבל לו, לכן
הכהן הירא את דבר ד’ ובמצותיו חפץ, לא יעבור מלברך לעשות נחת רוח ליוצרו, כי טוב
בעיני ד’ לברך את ישראל ומה טוב ומה נעים מנהג איזה מקומות, שהכהנים נושאים כפיהם
בכל יום וכן ראוי לנהוג בכל מקום, שלא לבקש תחבולות לבטל מ”ע מן התורה.
To
summarize:
This is a
biblical commandment obligating the Cohanim to bless the people.
Not doing
so means not fulfilling that biblical commandment, and, according to some
authorities, even transgressing three biblical commandments.
Here we
may add yet another element to our discussion. There is a well-known opinion of
R. Eliezer Azikri, in his Sefer Haredim chapter 4 (with the commentary
of R. Yitzhak Leib Schwarz, Kunszentmiklos 1935, p.19), that “those who
stand before the Cohanim in silence and direct their hearts to receive the
benedictions as the words of God, they too are included in the mitzvah
as parts of the 613 [mitzvot]”.
The
commentator, ad loc. (note 18-19) discusses this opinion, printing out that it
is a subject of considerable controversy among the greatest of authorities, but
he quotes the author of the Haflaah, R. Pinhas ha-Levi Horowitz, (in his
notes to Ketubot 24b and Rashi ibid.), that just as there is a
commandment to the Cohanim to bless Israel, so too is there a commandment to
Israel to be blessed by the Cohanim. He states that there are other examples
where the torah, explicitly commands only the active partner and not the
passive recipient, but nonetheless both are obligated. He brings as one example
to mitzvah of yibum which devolves both on the levir (yavam)
as well as the sister-in law (yevamah), even though the Torah
commandment is directed towards the levir alone. The Haredim‘s novum was
widely accepted, even though his source remained to many unclear.
Furthermore,
the Gemara in B. Sotah 38b states in the name of R. Yehoshua ben Levi, that God
Himself yearns to hear Birkat Cohanim, basing himself on the verse in Numbers
6:27, “And they shall put My name upon the children of Israel; and I will
bless them”, further adding that “Every Cohen who blesses [the
people] is blessed”, and he that does not do so is not blessed”, as
it is written, “And I will bless them that bless thee” (Genesis
12:3).
This view
is already found in a statement of the Tosafist R. Yaakov of Mervege,
Sheelot u-Teshuvot min ha-Shamayim
(ed. R. Reuven Margaliot, Jerusalem
1957, no.37, p.69), already briefly 
cited above, who writes as follows:
I was also uncertain as to those places where there
are Cohanim who are suitable to carry out birkat cohanim and were
accustomed not to do so even once a year. And I asked [advice] concerning this
issue, whether [in their not doing so] there is a transgression, or whether one
can rely upon R. Yaakov who said that the Cohanim are not obligated to bless
other than when the people tell them to do so.
And they [i.e. from Heaven] replied: Both these and
these transgress; namely, the people (literally: Israel who do not tell  them [to bless], and appear not to be  fearful of [the requirement to receive] the
blessing of  Father in Heaven, and the
Cohanim, who do not bless on their own accord the nesiat kapayim, for is
it not written, “And I will bless those that bless thee” (Genesis
12:3), and from the positive [statement] we may deduce the negative, (i.e. that
from the positive statement that God will bless the blessers, we may deduce
that he will curse them that do not bless).
Admittedly
this is an opinion of a Kabbalistic nature, and we do not necessarily rule
accordingly when there is an opposing view of the niglah (the
rationalist position), as is well known. However, this same view was also
indicated in the commentary attributed to the Raavad to Tamid 33b, [2] but
which is actually by the rationalist Tosafist R. Baruch be-R. Yitzhak Vermaiza,
[3]  the 
author of Sefer ha-Terumah. This commentary in this instance
bases itself on (the largely lost) Sefer Miktzoot. [4]  The editor of this commentary pointed out (in
note 48) that this was the view of the Haredim, adding that it was also
noted by R. Zeev Pomeranchik, in his Emek Berachah, Jerusalem 1948,
sect.7, further cited by R. Pinhas Horowitz, in his Sefer Haflaah (to Ketubot
24b), and so also in Hagahot R. Akiva Eiger to Shulhan Aruch, Orah
Hayyim
128:1, and similarly in the Beur Halachah ibid.
It should
however not be overlooked that this point of view was not accepted by all
authorities. Thus, it was questioned by R. Yosef Babad, in his Minhat
Hinuch, Mitzvah
378, (ed. Machon Yerushalayim, vol.3, Jerusalem 1991, p.66)  [5],
basing himself on the Ritba to Sukkot 31b,  [6]  who writes explicitly that there is no
obligation on the part of “Yisrael to be blessed. [7]
Nonetheless,
considering the gravity of the iussue, [8] we
should surely take servious account of the Haredim’s view, appearing as
it does in a number of significant rishonim and aharonim, and not
deprive Am Yisrael in the diaspora from having opportunity to participate in
this important mitzvah.
The
reasons given by the various authorities for not fulfilling this mitzvah
regularly in the diaspora, are, of themselves problematic, but in any case
quite irrelevant to present day diaspora communities. There exist precedents in
different congregations, even outside Eretz-Israel, for daily, weekly or
monthly priestly blessings. [9]
In
Jerusalem and in some parts of Eretz Yisrael the priestly blessing is carried
out daily.
This
being the case, why should we deprive Am Yisrael in the diaspora and its
Cohanim, and even, as it were, God Himself, from the opportunity to participate
in this all important mitzvah?
In view
of all of the above, I see no reason why the daily, or at least weekly,
blessing on the part of the Cohanim not be reinstated in diaspora communities.

[1]  R. Shaar
Yishuv Cohen, Shai Cohen vol.1, Jerusalem 1997, pp.54, discusses this
issue in detail, showing that the view of that a Zar is forbidden to
bless was not mentioned in the Rambam, the Rif and the Rosh,
and that there is no issue of a berachah le-vatalah, etc. We shall not
repeat his detailed argumentation, which is beyond the scope of this study.
[2] Ed. Yair
Goldstoff, Jerusalem 1989, p.131.
[3] See E. E.
Urbach, Baalei ha-Tosafot: Toldotehem, Hibburehem, Shitatam, 2nd
edition, Jerusalem 1980, vol.1, pp.346-361, on this personality. He was a disciple
of Rabbenu Tam (ibid. p. 347 note 13), and definitely of the rationalist
school.
That this commentary is by R. Baruch be.R. Yitzhak was
demonstrated by A. Epstein, in his pamphlet on Sefer Yihusei Tannaim
ve-Amoraim
p.16; Poznansky, Anshei Kairuwan, (Harkavy Festschrift
, Petersburg 1909), p.22; Hayyim Michel, Or ha-Hayyim 2nd
edition, Jerusalem 1965, p.28; M.M. Kasher and Y. Mandelbaum, Sarei ha-Elef
2nd edition, Jerusalem 1979, vol.1, p.330 no.4; vol.2, p.629,
referring also to Eliav Schochetman, Alei Sefer 3, 1979, p.83.
Goldstoff, in his introduction seems to have been quite unaware of all of the
above.
[4]  Ed. Simhah
Assaf, Jerusalem 1947, pp.39-40, no.47. In his note at the end of the passage,
he brings a wealth of bibliographic references, which supplements that which
was cited in the preceding note.
[5]  For some
reason that sentence is bracketed in that edition.
[6]  Ed. Eliyahu
Lichtenstein, Jerusalem 1975, p.97. And see editor’s note 319 ibid.
[7]  The editor
also refers us to R. Avraham Dov Shapira, Dvar Avraham, vol.1,
Warsaw-Pietrokow 1906, sect.31, basing himself on Yerushalmi Megillah
4:8, and cited by the Tosafot in Hagigah 16a, s.v. be-Cohanim,
and the Shiyarei Korban to Nazir 7:1, R. Reuven Margaliot, in his
note ibid., also refers to the Rashba to Sukkah ibid. However,
here I think his albeit (prodigious) memory failed him, since there is no
Rashba to Sukkah, and no doubt he really meant the Ritba. And
perhaps his mistake came about because the Ritba to Sukkah was
first published in Sheva Shitot la-Rashba, Berlin 1757, so that many
authorities mistakenly attributed it to the Rashba. See Lichtenstein’s
introduction, ad init and his note 1.
[8]  We may
further note that this has a lively current discussion in Habad circles. See,
for example, Hearot Ha-Temimim ve-Anash, published by Yeshivat
Tomchei Temimim Lubawitz
ha-Merkazit, Kfar Habad, issues 219-221,
224, 233, 239, and in Pardes Habad 15-18. There the discussion is
primarily directed to Eretz Yisrael. And the case for Eretz Yisrael was argued
very persuasively and in great detail by R. Shaar Yashuv Cohen, in his Shai
Cohen
, vol.1, Jerusalem 1997, pp.3-79. And on p.24 he brings a letter from
the Lubawitch Rebbe, in which he mentions that the Baal ha-Tanya
expressed his desire to reinstitute the daily birkat Cohanim, especially
since in his words this blessing “is rapidly drawn throughout all the worlds,
without prevention or hiderance and with no examination of the forces of
stringency” (Likkutei Torah, Korah ad fin.).  However, despite this, he did not do so for
some unknown reason. And it was for this reason that the Rebbe preferred to let
the existing situation be, rather than reactivating the daily blessing. Very
recently this subject has also been discussed in Mosheh Rahamim Shayo’s Mehkerei
Aretz: Hilchot Birkat Cohanim
Jerusalem 2015, chapter 10, pp.128-129, who,
however, makes no significant novum to the whole issue.
A more comprehensive discussion may be found in Eitan
Shoshan, Minhat Eitan, vol.1, Bnei Brak 2003, sect. 7 note 1, pp.141-144.
He refers us to Hatam Sofer, Orah Hayyim sect.22, who seems to find
support for this view from the Tosafot to Rosh ha-Shanah 16b,
s.v. ve-Tokin; but he notes that in a different responsum, (sect. 167),
he wrote that most decisors are of the opinion that there is no obligation upon
the Yisrael to be blessed. The problem of this apparent contradiction is left
unsolved. The Maharsham, R. Shalom Mordechai Schwadron, vol.8, Satmar
1910, sect.25, cites the view of the Ritba, but concludes that,
nonetheless, there is an obligation on the part of the Yisrael, since he
is assisting the Cohen to carry out the mitzvah. (See Bentzion A.
Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot, vol.2, Jerusalem 2002, p.2, note 4.)
Shoshan brings a number of additional sources supporting this view, but also
the opposing position, e.g. Mahari Assad (R. Yehudah Assad) Yehudah
Yaaleh
, Lvov-Petersburg 1873-1880, sect.46, Aruch ha-Shulhan, Orah
Hayyim
128:4; and that this was apparently the view of the Hazon Ish,
according to R. Hayyim Kanievsky, (referring to R. Shalom Yuda Gross, Nesiat
Kapayim ke-Hilchata
p.14). (Incidentally, his references are not altogether
reliable, and his attributions likewise.) Finally, he examines the implications
(nakfa mina) of these two opposing views. And see his summarizing
remarks on p.611.
[9]  Indeed, this
is exactly what R. Y.M. Tycocynsky wrote concerning Eretz Yisrael…”for the
reasons given by the Poskin for abolishing a positive mitzvah
outside Israel every day, and the reasons… because of the need for ritual
ablution and also the problems of livelihood that cause them to be without
being joyful, and birkat Cohanim has to be [carried out] with joy and
good will, since we end the blessing ‘be-ahavah‘, ‘with love’ – [these
reasons] were not sufficient for the greatest of Poskim to abolish a
great mitzvah that [actually] comprises three mitzvot, and
[consequently] they praised the people of Eretz Yisrael who keep this positive
commandment…, (cited by Shaar Yiashuv Cohen, ibid. pp.16-17).



Ha-Osek be-Mitzvah Patur min ha-Mitzvah: The Case of Prayer and Torah Study

Daniel Sperber has just published a new book, On the Relationship of Mitzvot Between Man and His Neighbor and Man and His Maker. The Seforim Blog is happy to present chapter 4 from the book. 
Ha-Osek be-Mitzvah Patur min ha-Mitzvah: The Case of Prayer and Torah Study
Daniel Sperber
We find in Sefer ha-Rokeah, section 369 ad fin., that a person who is sitting in the synagogue, wrapped in his talit and with his tefillin on his head and is reciting liturgical songs, must, nonetheless, rise up before his teacher, since he can carry out both actions and he will receive fine rewards in both worlds. Now there are early authorities who hold that the principle that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from another is also the case when both could be carried out. (See Shulhan Aruch Orah Hayyim 38:8, and in the Beur Halachah, ibid., and also R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, Brit Yaakov [Jerusalem: 1985], section 2, 36; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Hazon Ovadiah: Sukkot [Jerusalem: 2005, 167].) The author of the Rokeah, R. Elazar of Germaiza, was a disciple of R. Yehudah (b. R. Shmuel) he-Hasid, the author of Sefer Hasidim. And it is the view of R. Yehudah he-Hasid that even if one can carry out both mitzvot, one is exempt from doing so, if one is engaged in a prior mitzvah; and this, indeed, is the view of R. Elazar Rokeah himself (Rokeah, Hilchot Sukkah, section 299; see Sofer). Why then should one who is engaged in praising the Lord in the synagogue, have to rise up before his teacher? Surely he is already engaged in a mitzvah, and therefore exempt from others! The answer, I suggest, is because ritual synagogue worship is directed towards God, but respect for one’s teacher is a mitzvah between man and his fellow, and he is therefore not exempt from it. So too the Hida, R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai, rules, that even in the hour of prayer one rises before a Torah scholar, (Birkei Yosef Orah Hayyim, section 244:1; and see Sofer, note 8 on page 37; and see most recently the discussion of R. Yitzchak Eliyahu Stessman, Kimah ve-Hidur [Jerusalem: 2011, 88–91], with additional references).
Indeed, the severity of not rising before one’s teacher is expressed by R. Eleazar in very extreme terms in BT Kiddushin 33b:
Any scholar who does not rise before his teacher is called a wicked person (רשע), and will not live long and will forget his learning.
(See also R. Yaakov Hezkiyahu Fisch, in his Ve-Haarachta Yamim, ed. Y.M. Sofer, [Jerusalem: 2010, 71–72].)
To this we may add what we are told of the Arizal, by his disciple R. Hayyim Vital, that he was very particular in paying his workers exactly on time and without delay. And if he did not have the money with which to pay these wages, he would delay his afternoon prayer (minhah) until close to sunset in order to search out a loan with which to make the payment. Only afterwards would he hurriedly daven minhah. He would explain himself by saying: “How can I pray to the Lord, may He be blessed . . . , when such an important mitzvah is incumbent upon me, and I have not carried it out?” (See R. Hayyim Vital, Shemonah Shearim: Shaar ha-Mitzvot [Jerusalem: 1872], Parshat Tetzeh; Avraham Tobolsky, Hizaharu be-Memon Haverchem, vol. 2, [Bnei Brak: 1981, 211–212].)
In a somewhat different vein, but with much the same principle as its basis, we read in Niflaot Beit Levi, by A. Kleiman (Pietrokov: 1911, 32, [Yiddish]), cited in Louis I. Newman and Samuel Spitz, The Hasidic Anthology: Tales and Teachings of the Hasidim (New York: 1944, 178:2, 480) as follows:
A teamster (=wagon driver) sought the Berditchover’s (Reb Levi Yitchak of Berditchov’s) advice as to whether he should give up his occupation because it interfered with regular attendance at the synagogue. “Do you carry poor travellers free of charge?” asked the Rabbi. “Yes,” answered the teamster. “Then you serve the Lord in your occupation just as faithfully as you would be frequenting the synagogue.”
(However, see A.Y. Pfoifer, Ishei Yisrael [Jerusalem: 1998, 104, section 11, and notes ad loc].)
And indeed, the Rambam in Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:4, followed by the Shulhan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 246:8, rules:
If there came before him [the choice of performing] a mitzvah and (i.e., or continuing) learning Torah, if that mitzvah could be carried out by another, he should not interrupt his learning; but if not, he should carry out that mitzvah and then return to his study. And when it comes to giving charity, one should always give charity first.[1]
This indeed is the conclusion to be drawn from the sugya in Yerushalmi Pesahim 3:7 (and parallel to JT Hagigah 1:7). There we read that R. Abahu, who lived in Caesarea, sent his son R. Haninah to study in Tiberias, in the Yeshiva of R. Yohanan.
They came and informed him that [his son] was engaged in charitable activities (i.e., in the burial of dead). He sent him a message, saying to him: “Are there no graves in Caesarea that I sent you to Tiberias?” (i.e., for such activities you could have stayed at home).
The Talmud continues that it was already decided at Beit Nitzeh in Lod that “study is greater for it leads to deeds,” (see below). However, the rabbis of Caesarea qualified this by saying:
This is the case when there is someone else to carry out the deeds. But if there is not anyone else to carry them out, the deed comes before [the study], (i.e., has precedence).
We then are told a tale:
R. Hiyya, R. Yosi [and] R. Ami were late coming to R. Eleazar [for their lesson with him]. He asked them, “Where were you?” They replied, “We were involved in charitable activity” (meaning in the burial of someone). “Was there no one else [who could do this?]” he asked of them. They replied, “He was a neighbor [according to the Pnei Moshe, or a proselyte – according to the Korban ha-Edah,” i.e., and there was no one else to deal with his burial.]
Incidentally, we may add here that the interpretation of the Pnei Moshe is supported by a passage in Sefer Haredim, (by R. Eleazar Azikri, [Safed: 1533–1600]), Mitzvot Aseh . . . ha-Teluyot be-Lev 22, which states that:
A person is obligated to act charitably towards his neighbors and his relations more than to other people, as is clearly stated in the Bavli and the Yerushalmi.
(See S. Lieberman, HaYerushalmi Kiphshuto [Jerusalem: 1934, 426] and his other comments.) And the parallel text in JT Hagigah 1:7., begins with an additional passage, namely:
R. Yehudah, when he would see a dead person (i.e., a burial) or a bride (i.e., a marriage procession), [and people] praising them (i.e., honoring them in the processions), he would turn to his students (נותן עיניו בתלמידים), and say: “The [dealing with] the dead precedes the study of Torah (תלמוד).”
And a somewhat similar notion, but expressed in a Hassidic vein, may be found in a story related in Yehezkel Shraga Fraenkel’s Rabbenu ha-Kaddosh mi-Shinyeve (Ramat Gan: 1992, 256–257). He relates that once the Rabbi of Warsaw came to visit the Divrei Hayyim, R. Hayyim of Sanz. The Sanzer Rebbe asked him, “Do you learn?” “Yes,” the Warsaw Rabbi replied. The Rebbe repeated, “Do you always learn?” The reply was, “When someone who is embittered and needs help comes to me, I close my gemara and deal with him, to help and encourage him.” “This is what I wanted to hear,” said the Sanzer, “whether you have the good sense to close your gemara when someone needs your help,[2] both in word and in deed, and in any case to encourage him and bolster his spirit.”[3]
Here we must make something of a digression, which is not really a digression, as this touches upon a very important point. For the Mishnah in Peah 1:1 states that: “the study of Torah is equal to all of them,” i.e., even to those mitzvot listed in the Mishnah which are social ones, such as honoring one’s parents, doing charitable deeds, bringing peace between rival individuals, etc. The question we ask ourselves is: is the study of Torah (תלמוד תורה) a ritual or a social mitzvah? Into which category does it fall? For if the former, according to our suggestion how can it be superior to those other social mitzvot?
To clarify this issue we must go back to a very ancient discussion that took place in the attic at Beit Nitzeh in Lod, between R. Tarfon and the Elders. For this question was put before them: which is greater, or more important תלמוד או מעשה, learning or deeds? R. Tarfon answered: Deeds are greater. While R. Akiva said study is greater. And they all replied: Study is greater for it leads to deeds (BT Kiddushin 40b).[4] That is to say the importance of study is in that it constitutes the key to the proper execution of the mitzvot. This is also the meaning of R. Shimon the son of Rabban Gamliel’s statement in Avot 1:17: Not the expounding of the law (midrash) is the chief thing, but the doing [of it] (maaseh). And this is amplified by Rabbenu Bachya in his commentary ad loc.: that the aim of man’s labor in Torah is not that he should just learn a lot, but that [his learning] should lead to deeds, as we have learned from the verse [in Deuteronomy 5:1], ‘and ye may learn them [i.e., the statutes and judgments], and keep and do them.’ And this is further amplified in Shulhan Aruch ha-Rav, by R. Shneur Zalman Mi-Ladi, in his Hilchot Talmud Torah 4:2, by telling us that “it is impossible to fulfill all the mitzvot in all their details without intensive study and knowledge of them. And for this reason it is equal to all of them,” i.e., not intrinsically, but as a means to their proper application.[5]
This issue has been analyzed recently by R. Yitzchak Shapiro, in his article in Hakirah 9, (2010), 221–243, entitled “To know the Forbidden and the Permitted: An Analysis of Rambam’s View of the Purpose and Goals of Talmud Study.” He shows that the Rambam’s view, as expressed in his letter to his disciple R. Yosef,[6] is that “learning Torah is a utilitarian endeavor, with extracting halachic conclusions its functional objective” (227).[7] He goes on to show that “the simplicity and obviousness [of this position] might go unnoticed if not for its staggering ramification and total incompatibility with contemporary realities in derech halimud ” (227–228). For as he earlier showed (223–224): “the Aharonim do identify an aspect of Torah study, unrelated to fulfillment of the other mitzvot, based on the verse והגית בו יומם ולילה – ‘but thou shalt meditate therein day and night’ (Joshua 1:8, cf. BT Menachot 99b). This mitzvah of ‘limud ha-Torah’ is distinct from the mitzvah of ‘yediat ha-Torah,’ and can be fulfilled regardless of the subject matter that is learned, whereas the mitzvah of yediat ha-Torah requires a curriculum that is limited to ‘halachah’ (or at least the sharpening of one’s mental acuity, which is necessary for accurate application of halachah). However, one may fulfill both facets of the mitzvah simultaneously only by learning halachic subject matter.”[8]
This is the view of the Meiri, as formulated in his commentary to BT Berachot 7b:
The knowledge of how the Torah actually expresses itself indeed requires serving or observing Torah scholars. While intellectual learning is the cause of wisdom, observing the Sages is the cause of knowing how the Torah manifests itself. This is both true for monetary matters as well as that which is prohibited and permitted.
Hence, we may well understand the statement of Rav in BT Megillah 3b, that Talmud Torah is greater than the sacrifice of the daily offerings (­temidin).
Here we may also call attention to R. Meir Triebitz’s insightful analysis (in his introduction to R. Daniel Eidensohn’s Daas Torah: A Jewish Sourcebook [Jerusalem: 2005, 31–35]). He begins by noting that God commands us twice to study Torah: once in Deuteronomy 11:19, and again in Deuteronomy 4:9–11. He analyzes the differences between these two formulations in all their details – e.g., one in the plural and the other in the singular; one talks of teaching, the other telling; one focuses on parents to children, while the other lists three generations. He concludes that “the two verses which obligate us to learn the Torah actually refer to two types of study. One refers to the study of the legal part of Torah, and the other to the study of Torah’s theology. Each form of study is deemed a separate scholarly enterprise.” He characterizes these two forms of study as “legal” (i.e., halachic) study, and “faith” study, which he states “deals primarily with Aggadic parts of the Torah.” But for our purposes it is important to emphasize that both verses, that is to say both classes of study, require the student also to be a teacher, and to pass on his learning to future generations. Hence, Torah study has a social aspect too.
This is a very broad subject that requires a study in its own right, and we cannot enlarge on it here. But what emerges very clearly is that the mitzvah of Torah study is in a very special category, for without it one would not know how to carry out ritual or social mitzvot correctly. Nonetheless, the Or Zarua and the Rav
Baal ha-Tanya agree that one interrupts learning Torah to fulfill other mitzvot, if both cannot be carried out at the same time, and one is not exempt because one is already involved in a prior mitzvah.[9]
This is clear from the baraita in BT Ketubot 17a (BT Megillah 3b, 29a) that we interrupt our study of Torah (מבטלין תלמוד תורה) not merely for a met mitzvah and to accompany the dead (הוצאת המת), but also for wedding ceremonies (הכנסת כלה) – all supreme social mitzvot.[10] And in this way, we may better understand the passage in Avot de-R. Natan, chapter 41, (ed. Schechter, Vienna: 1887, 133):
It once happened that R. Tarfon was sitting and teaching his disciples, and a bride went past him. He ordered that she be brought into his house, and told his mother and his wife that they should bathe her, anoint her, and decorate her with jewelry, and dance before her until she goes to her husband’s house.
Apparently, he interrupted his teaching in order to carry out the mitzvah of hachnasat kallah.[11] And indeed we read in the letters of the Hafetz Hayyim (Michtevei ha-Hafetz Hayyim he-Hadash, vol. 2, Bnei Brak: 1986) II, 86:
You occasionally see a Jew who [in a praiseworthy way] learns Torah [as much as possible] and values his time [not wasting a minute]. But if he does not set aside part of the day to do deeds of kindness, what a lack of intelligence!
And interestingly enough, this also becomes evidence from the commentary of R. David ha-Nagid, the Rambam’s grandson, to Avot 1:15. There Shammai is cited as saying: “Make thy [study of the] Torah a fixed
habit (קבע); . . . . And receive all men as its cheerful countenance.” And this is explained by the Nagid to mean that even when you are engaged in your fixed period of Torah study, you should not desist from receiving people cheerfully, thinking that in doing so you are “wasting” Torah-study time.[12] So apparently he regarded proper interpersonal relationship of such importance as even to override one’s involvement in Torah learning. And this presumably goes under the category of kevod ha-beriyot, respect for the individual. (Cf. below, sections 15 and 19.)
We are reminded of the statement of Reb Yisrael of Rizhyn (died 1850), who expounded the verse in Psalms 115:16, “the heavens are the heavens of the Lord; but the earth hath He given to the children of men.”
There are two kinds of tzaddikim. Those of the one sort learn and pray the livelong day and hold themselves far from lowly matters in order to attain holiness. While the others do not think of themselves, but only of delivering the holy sparks which are buried in all things back to God, and they make all lowly things their concern. The former, who are always preparing for Heaven, the verse calls “the heavens,” and they have set themselves apart for the Lord. But the others are the earth given to the children of men.
(Martin Buber, Tales of the Hasidim: The Later Masters, New York: 1948, 53–54)
Here, he is contrasting the Lithuanian mitnagdim’s way, (in a double-edged complementary fashion), with that of the Hasidim, while we well know with which way he personally sided.
At the same time we should recollect how Yehudah ha-Levi in his ­Kuzari, begins his definition of the religious man according to Jewish tradition with the negative statement that “in Jewish opinion, the religious man is not to be defined as one who cuts himself off from the world” (Book III, sect. I, ed. Hirschfeld, Leipzig: 1882, 140–141). Perhaps he was combating predominant contemporary Sufi views on extreme asceticism. (See Franz Rosenthal, “A Judaeo-Arabic Work under Sufic Influence,” HUCA XV 1940,
440, and cf. page 465 for an extreme view of this form of asceticism, and note 104.)

[1] See Le-Hair Hilchot Tzedakah be-Or Yekarot (Jerusalem: 2010, 6–7). And see below sect. 16 on the overriding importance of charity, and Appendix.
[2] See, for example, the practice of the Brisker Rav, Reb Hayyim Soloveitchik, as described in Aharon Sorasky, Marbitzei Torah u-Musar bi-Yeshivot Nusah Lita mi-Tekufat Volozin ve-ad Yameinu, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: 1976, 110).
[3] Cf. BT Shabbat 127a: Said R. Yohanan: Great is the hosting of guests as are those rising up early to the House of Study [of Torah], as we have learned: to make room for guests [to avoid] hindrance in the House of Study. But Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: It is greater than rising up early to the House of Study. For we learned: “for guests,” and only afterwards “to avoid hindrance in the House of Study.” And see below sects. 11 and 12 on hosting guests.
[4] On this text see Benedict Thomas Viviano, Study as Worship: Aboth and the New Testament (Leiden: 1978, 105–109). Directly related to this is the text in JT Pesahim 3:7, and JT Hagigah 1:7, cited above, from which the Rabbis learned that if others can carry out these charitable activities, a person should not interrupt his Torah studies. And this seems to be the dominant view among the poskim. See further BT Moed Katan 9a; Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 246:18; Meiri to BT Shabbat 9a and Moed Katan ibid.; Rabbenu Yeruham 22a in the name of the Ravad, etc. See R. Asi ha-Levi Even Yuli, Shulhan Aruch ha-Middot, vol. 2, Halachah u-Musar (Jerusalem: 2009, 243–244).
[5] See R. Mordechai Shmuel Ashkenazi’s magnificent commentary to Hilchot Talmud Torah Mi-Shulhan Aruch Admor ha-Zaken, vol. 5 [= ha-Rav] (Kefar Habad: 2000, 86).
[6] Ed. Y. Shilat, Iggrot ha-Rambam, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: 1987, 254–259); and see editor’s note on 257–258 to line 4).
 [7] At the simplest level, there is, in the Rambam’s view, an obligation upon one who has learned Torah,
also to teach it to others. See Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:2, and so too in the listing of the positive commandments at the beginning of his Mishneh Torah, no. 11. (This list is also that of the Rambam, as attested by the author of the Magid Mishneh in his introduction to Hilchot Eruvin, and the Kesef Mishneh in Hilchot Hannukah 3:6; Responsa Noda bi-Yehudah Kama, Orah Hayyim, sect. 29; Petah ha-Dvir, vol. 2, sect. 194, subsect. A. See R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, Drupteki de-Oraita, vol. 1 [Jerusalem: 1987, 45]. And see further his remarks, 68–69, on the need to teach others.) Of related interest is the article of Sarah Pessin, “Maimonides and the Sacred Art of Teaching,” apud Adaptations and Innovations: Studies in the Interaction between Jewish and Islamic Thought and Literature from the Early Middle Ages to the Late Twentieth Century, Dedicated to Professor Joel Kraemer, ed. Y. Tzvi Langermann (Paris & Louvin: 2007, 285–298). See also, most recently, the remarks of R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in H. Sabato and A. Lichtenstein, Mevakshei Panecha (Tel Aviv: 2011, 212–215).
[8] See the material R. Yitzchak Shapiro brings from the letters of R. Yisrael Salanter (no. 27), in this regard. See also Kuntres Aharon shel Shulhan Aruch ha-Rav, Talmud Torah 3:1, ed. Y.A. Lev (Ashdod: 1989, 39 et seq.). And see R. Aharon Lichtenstein’s very comprehensive study entitled “Does Involvement in Torah Study Exempt One from Mitzvot?”, which appeared in Alei Etzion 16 (5769 [2009]), 71–107, which examines this issue in depth, dealing with questions of delaying procreation, Megillah reading, prayer, all mitzvot, etc., and seeks to explain Rambam’s position that “ha-osek be-mitzvah patur min ha-mitzvah” theoretically applies to Torah study too, when “it is studied with the purpose of performing” (91); and cf. ibid., 105, for his suggestive interpretation of the view of the Maharach Or Zarua. His study of this very complex issue is extremely rich and requires intense study. See also Moshe Zvi Polin, Sefer ha-Mitzpeh al ha-Rambam, vol. 1, (on Hilchot Talmud Torah) (Jerusalem: 2005, 11–26), that studying (lilmod ) and teaching (lelamed ) are two interconnected mitzvot. See Ramban Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:1; Hilchot Hagigah 3:1: that anyone who is obligated to study is obligated to teach, and cf. ibid., 1:4. I think this is the meaning of the statement in Seder Eliyahu Rabba, ed. Friedman, p. 63 =Tanna Debe Eliyahu, transl. W.G. Braude & I.J. Kapstein (JPS, 1981, 183) that “one who toils in Torah is like a lamp which provides light for the eyes of many.” And in this connection, it is also worth reading Benjamin Blech’s article “Personal Growth or Communal Responsibility: A Question of Priorities,” The Torah U-Madda Journal 2 (1990), 134–142. However, to give a slightly different point of view, see Hatam Sofer to Nedarim 81a; R. Hayyim Volozin’s Nefesh ha-Hayyim, Shaar Dalet, sect. 3; Ruah Hayyim to Avot 6:1, and the introduction to Eglei Tal.
A very extreme expression of this view is to be found in R. David Baharan’s “Hanhagot u-Piskei Halachah,” in Otzrot Yerushalayim, vol. 13 (Jerusalem: [2010?]), 40, where he insists one must learn halachah every day, and it is not sufficient to learn merely Gemara. He goes on to say that one must learn Shulhan Aruch Orah Hayyim or Hayyei Adam, and he who does not do so will surely have no part in the World to Come. (See also ibid., 41–42.)
See further R.S.Z. Auerbach, Halichot Shlomo . . . al Moadei ha-Shanah, ed. Y. Terner and A. Auerbach (Jerusalem: 2007), 537–539, who also is of the opinion that there are two aspects to Torah study: the one being to study in order to learn how to act properly, and the other as an independent positive commandment which is not just in order to know how to act, but the actual practice of learning as an end in its own right. He expands on this position bringing biblical and rabbinic sources to bear out this point of
view. However, here too he agrees that ultimately this is in order “to purify his body through the light of Torah, in order to cleave to God . . . who orders the world (àùø äìéëåú òåìí ìå), and without which the world cannot subsist (åáìà ÷éåîí – àéï î÷åí ÷éåí ìòåìí)” so that in the final reckoning this non-action-orientated
study is nonetheless direct to úé÷åï òåìí, the betterment of our world, (see ibid., 536).
[9] See Kuntres Aharon ibid., in the editor’s Midrashei ha-Kuntres, 36; and also Kuntres Aharon, Talmud Torah 4:3, that one interrupts
learning for persuading others to give charity, where others are less
persuasive, or helping in burying the dead, etc. See R. Mordechai Shmuel
Ashkenazi, ibid., 87 et seq.
See
further R. Ovadiah Yosef, Hazon Ovadiah: Sukkot
(Jerusalem: 2005, 168), on the special status of Talmud
Torah, because it is mandated at all times (îöåä
úîéãéú), and, hence, cannot exempt from other mitzvot, as this
would free us from all other mitzvot (citing the Birkei
Yosef of the Hida 38:7).
This
subject has most recently been examined in considerable detail, with a wealth
of sources, by R. Asi ha-Levi Even Yuli, in his Shulhan
Aruch ha-Middot, vol. 2, Halachah ve-Musar
(Jerusalem: 2009, 243–247). He shows that there are two opposing views. For the
Yosef Omez, by R. Yosef Juspa Kahn Neurelingen (c.
1639), (Frankfurt am Main: 1908, [reprint, Jerusalem: 1965] 316), writes that
the Rabbis said: Anyone who is involved in Torah learning and not in gemilut hasadim, acts of charity, is as one who has no
God. And therefore he wrote that a Torah scholar should make sure that every
day he should carry out one act of charity. And the Seder
ha-Yom (by R. Moshe ibn Machir [Venice: 1599], and numerous editions)
wrote that one must not interrupt the learning of Torah for any mitzvah which
can be carried out by another, with the exception of acts of charity. And
therefore the enthusiastic should take this to heart and pursue acts of charity
as one pursues life itself. (And see the continuation of this passage.) Even
Yuli further refers us to Responsa Aderet Tiferet
(by R. Avraham Dori, vol. 4, sect. 44), who following on the words of the Seder ha-Yom seeks to find additional support for this
view in the Rambam, citing the gemarot in BT Megillah 3b, 29a; BT Ketubot
17a as further proof, in that one interrupts Torah learning to accompany the
dead to his final resting place. (See below on this subject.) He then refers us
to the Sdei Hemed to which we referred earlier on.
However, this runs counter to the prevailing majority view found in a multitude
of rabbinic sources, to which he referred on 243–244, and therefore very
convincingly he rejects and refutes this argument on 246–247. See there in
detail. However, the above just underscores what we have tried to point out,
namely the complex ambiguity of the status of Torah study.
[10] See Rema, Even ha-Ezer 65:1; Ba”h
ibid., that even the leading Torah authority, Gedol
ha-Dor, does so. And even public learning is so interrupted, (Pnei Yehoshua to BT Ketubot
ibid., on the basis of Tosafot Megillah ibid.). However, see D. Friedman, Piskei Halachot, vol. 3 (Warsaw: 1901, 35), argues that
nowadays, that we are not intimately acquainted with the laws and our studies are directed to their correct understanding, therefore,
we do not interrupt Torah learning for wedding ceremonies. See, in detail, on
all the rules related to this subject, B. Adler, Ha-Nisuim
ke-Hilchatam, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Jerusalem: 1985, 394–395).
Clearly
hachnasat kallah is related to the mitzvah of procreation,
which is one of the paramount duties of a man, in Jewish halachic thought. See
my Netivot Pesikah (Jerusalem: 2008, 162–163, n.
251). (And cf. below, sect. 30.)
Here
we may add that a communal positive mitzvah always takes precedence and outweighs
a private individual’s positive mitzvah. A teacher sitting shiva is forbidden to learn and teach Torah. However, he
is permitted to do so if the community needs him (Shulhan
Aruch Yoreh Deah 384:1). See Tzvi Marx, Halakha
and Handicap (Jerusalem: 1992–1993, 228).
[11] See Schechter’s note
in his edition of Avot de-R. Natan, n. 24, and p.
131, n. 10.
[12] Midrash
R. David ha-Nagid to Avot, ed. BenTziyyon
Kipnis (Jerusalem: 1944). The Arabic original appeared in Na Amon 1901. However, there are some doubts as to the
attribution of authorship. See Milhamot Ha-Shem by
R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam, ed. M. Margaliot (Jerusalem: 1953, 38, n. 8); A.
Katz, JQR 48
(1957), 140–160; Midrash R. David ha-Nagid to
Genesis, ed. A. Katz (Jerusalem: 1964, 16–18). On R. David ha-Nagid himself,
see A. Strauss (Ashtor), Toldot ha-Yehudim be-Mitzrayim
ve-Suriah tahat Shilton ha-Mamelukim, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: 1944, 117–128).



The Kabbalat Shabbat Memorandum by Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber

The Kabbalat Shabbat Memorandum       Sivan 5773
by Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber
The recent rather
acrid debate on women leading the Kabbalat Shabbat service appeared, at first,
to be primarily a halachic one. But it soon overflowed into additional areas,
revealing it as a clearly political polemic. Indeed, I found the whole
discussion which appeared on a whole series of blogs, and a major published
article, most astonishing. We are not talking about women reading the Torah
and/or having aliyot. The criticisms raised against this practice I can well
appreciate, though I disagree with them and have sought to refute them.
But here we are
talking about a practice first established in the latter years of the 16th
cent., among a small group of people, disciples of the Ari ha-Kadosh in Safed,
which took place outside the confines of the synagogue looking over the hills
and watching the sunset, and reciting some psalms and piyyutim. It gradually
spread to other venues, first being practiced outside the synagogue in the
courtyard, and, later, when in the synagogue, recited at the bimah, rather
than the chazan’s lectern, clearly to emphasize its different status from the Maariv
service. In many communities there is no sheliah tzibbur leading the
service; rather the congregants sing the Psalms together. Indeed, in small
communities often the service begins even before there is a minyan of
ten men, and the congregation wait for the requisite number in order to say Barchu.
As to the argument that, as it is followed by Kaddish, it must
have the status of a tefillat tzibbur or teffilat rabbim, a
communal service which cannot be led by women, it should be noted that the Kaddish
Yatom
only comes after Mizmor Shir le-Yom ha-Shabbat, which is
already found in some Rishonim as part of the Maariv Shel Shabbat;
and therefore does not in any sense relate to the Kabbalists of Safed’s Kabbalat
Shabbat
. Furthermore, Kaddish Yatom itself may be recited by women,
as was ruled by R. Ahron Soloveitchik and others. But, in point of fact, this Kaddish
is not found in early sources, such as the Tur (Orah Hayyim 337).
 Indeed, the whole argument aimed to
give Kabbalat Shabbat this new status is far-fetched.
But the debate
about Kabbalat Shabbat was intended to have far broader implications,
for, by the same argument it would also disallow women to lead Pesukei
de-Zimra
, for example. Indeed, this tendentious aim is overtly revealed by
yet another argument put forward, namely that a Shaliah tzibbur must
have a full beard; something that obviously excludes women, (Shulhan
Aruch
53:6). The reason given is the dignity of the congregation, kevod
ha-tzibbur
, which is clearly irrelevant in present day society.  Both the Maharam Mi-Rotenberg and the Rashba
agree that the congregation can waive this requirement.  The original ruling applied only to
permanent shlichei tzibbur, not to occasional readers, and, on occasion,
even a thirteen-year old, who has reached maturity may lead the service.
Additionally, the Biur Halachah writes that this requirement may be
waived when there is no one else to fulfill this function. And finally, this
restriction referred to very specific prayers, such as Keriat Shema, on
fast-days in Eretz Yisrael because of drought, and The High Holidays. In any
case, nowadays hardly any synagogue requires its reader to be bearded; even
American Rabbis are often clean-shaven, because the plain meaning of that
ruling is that a service should be led by one who is mature, i.e.
post-bar-mitzvah. And a thirty-year old without a beard is fully eligible to
serve as a shaliah tzibbur. Indeed some of greatest hazzanim were
beardless, such as the Koussevitzky brothers, Mosheh, David, Jacob and Simhah,
Leibele Waldman, Leibele Glanz, Zavel Kwartin, Shmuel Malavsky, to list only a
few of the best-known names.
Two additional
arguments were put forward. Firstly, that for Kabbalat Shabbat, the Shaliah
Tzibbur
wears a tallit. This, of course, is in the case where there
is a Shaliah Tzibbur. Now according to the Magen Avraham (Orah
Hayyim
18:1) citing the Bayit Hadash (Bah) one really should
remove the tallit one is wearing when one says Barechu since it is night
and one does not wear tzitzit at night. And so many Aharonim
specifically rebuked those who wore a tallit at night. However, those
who did so, did so because of kabbalistic reasons related to Kevod Shabbat,
and not kevod ha-tzibbur. Indeed, there were even those who wore a
tallit for kiddush at home, and kiddush at home is hardly a tefillat
tzibbur
or rabbim, (see J. Levy, Minhag Yisrael Torah 1,
Brooklyn 1994, pp.87-88).
The second point
raised was, curiously enough, from R. David Sperber, my grandfather’s Teshuvot:
Afrakasta de-Anya
, (3rd ed, Israel 2002, vol.4, p.215). There he
says that if one cannot find a minyan, at least try to pray with two
other people, since this would constitute a tefillat rabbim, which is
more readily accepted by God. He derives this from a passage in Hayyei Adam
(Klal 68:11) who says that every mitzvah which can be done be-haburah
in a group, should be so done, and not as an individual, because “the
greater the number of people, the greater is the honour to the king.” If
three people give tzedakah, does that make it a rabbim? If three
people declaim Psalms together does that make it a tefillat rabbim?
Surely the term my grandfather zt”l used was not intended to give a
special status to the group of three, but merely to say that such a mitzvah
or prayer is more acceptable before the Holy One Blessed be He, than that of a
single individual. (His other reference to vol.2 p.211 is quite irrelevant to
this issue.)
(On a personal
note, I might add, that in order fully to understand my sainted grandfather’s
ruling, one has to appreciate his particular brand of hassidic piety, which was
a blend of halachah, kabbalah and a special brand of hassidut. See my father’s
introduction in his Michtam le-David on the Torah.

His belief in the
efficacy of prayers was all so evident to anyone who saw him in prayer.  I served him in his latter years and
received my semichah from him.)
Now my learned
colleagues knew all these facts, which are plainly evident to anyone who is
conversant with the relevant sources. Nonetheless, they chose to disregard
them, or to reinterpret them in a forced fashion.
So looking more
closely at the discussion, it becomes evident that rather than this being a
genuinely halachic debate, it is more a socio-political polemic, built on shaky
grounds and dressed in the somewhat misleading garb of halachic disquisition.
(And see now the
very significant comments of Prof. Marc B. Shapiro, (link), and Rabbi Zev Farber’s responses to Rabbi R. Freundel’s articles.)
Another note on
Women’s aliyot.
One of the
central points of controversy between those who permit women’s aliyot and those
who do not, is the understanding of the critical text in B. Megillah 23a which
states that “all are counted among the seven aliyot, even women and
children. But the Rabbis said: ‘A woman should not read the Torah because of
the dignity of the community’ “. It is this final section that is the main
source of the controversy. Some have claimed that “But the Rabbis said: A
woman should not read…” is an absolute decree that cannot be changed.
Others – myself included – have argued that this is advice, rather than a
decree, limited by the principle of “the dignity of the community”.
That is to say, if there is no such slight on the community, the advice becomes
irrelevant. I argued that most of the places where the phrase “But the
Rabbis said” may be understood as “advice” and not
“decree”. Recently Ephraim Bezalel Halivni sought to show that in
many instances “But the Rabbis said” should clearly be understood as
a “decree” formulation. However, he himself (Studies in Liturgy
and Reading The Torah
, Jerusalem 2012, p.160) agrees that there are examples
where this phrase can be understood as “advice”. Hence, even
according to his position, he will have to agree that it is possible
that in our Megillah text “But the Rabbis said” may be advice. In
other words there is an element of uncertainty (safek) as to the precise
interpretation of that text.
And even if we
were to interpret it, as have some, as a decree, it is a decree with a reason.
Now there exists a well-known controversy between Rambam and Raavad as to
whether when the reason for a decree is no longer relevant the decree is still
in force; Rambam says yes, and Raavad disagrees. It is true that in such
controversies we follow the Rambam; however, it is equally true that it is not certain
that he is correct.  Perhaps the
Raavad’s position is more correct. In other words, there still exists an
element of uncertainty (a safek) as to who is right. It is just that in
accordance with certain pragmatic rules of halachic adjudications (pesak),
we follow the ruling of Rambam.
Moreover, R.
Yosef Messas added a further consideration, arguing that even according to the
view of Rambam, this principle only applies where there is a fear that the
original reason could be relevant in the future. But in a case where there is
little or no reason to think that the reason will resurface, the original
prohibitions may be disregarded, (Otzar Michtavim 1, 454; cf. Marc B.
Shapiro, Conversations 7, 2010, p.101). Here too, we may be fairly
certain that in our modern society the dignity of the community will not be
impugned by a woman’s aliyah even in the future, in addition to which, we have
already pointed out that a community can, according to both the Maharam
Mi-Rotenburg and the Rashba, forgo their dignity should they so wish.
Now, I cannot say
that R. Messas’ interpretation is necessarily correct.  There exists a safek, in fact, a
triple sfek sfeka: (i) what is the correct interpretation of B.
Megillah’s phrase, (ii) whether to rule like Rambam or the Raavad, and (iii) even
if one follows Rambam, should we accept R. Messas’ interpretation that it
applies even when there is little or no reason to think that the reason will
resurface.
Without going
into all the details of the very complex kuntres sfek-sfeka, surely here
we should rule: sfek sfeka le-kula, most leniently, admitting the
permissibility of women’s aliyot, especially when added to all our other
arguments.
Final Note
And finally, a
somewhat pedagogical comment. The Beit Yosef, of R. Yosef Caro in Yoreh Deah
242 writes:

It is forbidden for a hacham to give a ruling permitting
something which looks strange, for the masses will see this as permitting the
forbidden.

He bases himself
on Hagahot Maimoniyot to Rambam Hilchot Talmud Torah chapter 5 sect.6.  Now almost all innovations look strange, and
can easily be understood as permitting the forbidden . And indeed this is the
ruling in Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:10. (And see Beur ha-Gra ibid. sect. 21
for Talmudic sources.) But the Shach (Siftei-Chen) ad loc. sect.17 modifies
this statement as follows:

It would appear that this [refers to a case] where he permitted
[something] without any explanation [for his ruling] – setam – and
indeed so it appears from the proofs he brings from Hagahot Maimoniyot and B.
Sanhedrin 5ab… and B. Nidah 20a…, and the beginning of B. Berachot (3 b)…  But if he tells the questioner the reason
for his ruling, and explains to him his arguments (ומראה
לו פנים), or if he brings
evidence from the book, it is permitted.

And the Beer
Heiteiv brings this in abbreviated form. (See also note 8, ad loc. in Otzar
Mefarshim in the Machon Yerushalayim [Friedman] ed. of the Shulhan Aruch.)
This indicates to
us very clearly that all the changes that we are advocating must not only be
firmly based in our canonic sources, but also clearly presented to the general
public.