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Chaim Rapoport Review

In response to a request from the editorial board of the Seforim blog, we are pleased to present a monograph-length review essay of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman, The Rebbe: The Life and Afterlife of Menachem Mendel Schneerson (Princeton University Press, 2010), by Rabbi Chaim Rapoport, who is a frequent contributor to the Seforim blog (see here for his earlier essays at the Seforim blog).
We believe that Chaim Rapoport, “The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life,” the Seforim blog (14 June 2010), available here (http://seforim.blogspot.com/2010/06/chaim-rapoport-review.html) greatly contributes to the growing study of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement during the latter half of the twentieth century.
The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life
Two Books for the Price of One
‘The Rebbe: The Life and Afterlife of Menachem Mendel Schneerson’ by Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman (Princeton University Press, 2010), 382 pages.
This book is comprised of two studies.
Firstly, we have a sociological study of the Lubavitch ‘mission establishment’ (shlichus); a layman’s guide to the now global phenomenon of shluchim,[1], shluchos and their Chabad Houses – at least as they have become consolidated over the last two or three decades. The authors describe the dedication of these emissaries; their ambitions, achievements and the (messianic) ethos that spurs them to work tirelessly with the aim of drawing the hearts of all Jewish People closer to their Father in Heaven.
In this section they speak, often quite fondly, of the sterling work performed by the shluchim and their families who go and live in small towns, far-flung cities and secular university campuses in order to re-ignite religious life; providing Jewish amenities for both residents and itinerants, observant or otherwise, across the globe. They emphasize the novelty of this phenomenon, in contradistinction to other chasidic and haredi groups who tend to retreat into their insular communities, shunning exposure to the outside world and its religiously threatening elements. They depict the ‘equal rights’ and privileges of women on shlichus, describing the uniqueness of this somewhat ‘egalitarian’ phenomenon within an otherwise ultra-traditional group. They explore the motives that they believe drive so many young, talented and charismatic couples to choose such a challenging life-long career, and describe how they maintain the high level of inspiration, stamina and perseverance that are essential for success in this vocation. Finally, they demonstrate how such families see themselves, as astonishing as this may seem, to be acting as emissaries of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902-1994), the seventh Rebbe of the Chabad Lubavitch dynasty [henceforth: ‘the Rebbe’]; who passed away in 1994.
Secondly, and most importantly, we have an attempt to present the life-story of the Rebbe, the man who created this mission, and the one who, to this day, inspires those who have embraced it. The authors do not merely endeavor to reconstruct the factual data of his life, much of which, they allege, is shrouded in mystery, but they also venture to penetrate the deepest recesses of his psyche. They purport to reveal his unspoken thoughts, feelings, incentives, and they sometimes even second guess his actions or reactions at any given time of his life. As Sue Fishkoff has put it, Heilman and Friedman “take a psycho-bio approach to Schneerson’s life, trying to get inside the man’s head to uncover his motivation” [2] – a tall order indeed!
The Focus of This Review
Although the biography of the Rebbe and the history of his movement are presented as intrinsically intertwined, the critical analysis I offer hereby, will focus primarily on the biographical section of the book. I propose to appraise the methodology of its authors, their sources, inferences, pre-suppositions and conclusions, and ultimately judge the quality of this biography as a work of scholarly research. At the conclusion, however, I will also make some remarks that are relevant to the work of the Chabad emissaries and the future of their mission, inasmuch as these are related to the concept of the Messiah and Redemption, subjects that are central to both the biographical and sociological sections of Heilman and Friedman’s work.
A reliable biography of a 20th century figure usually relies on several sources of information: (a) hard documentation; (b) autobiographical testimony of the subject; (c) [interviews with eye] witnesses; (d) anecdotal evidence and hearsay: “mi-pee ha-shemuah”; (e) the objective, un-prejudiced analysis and interpretation of a, b, c and d.
The subject of the biography will be ‘constructed’ by the reasonable and balanced usage of these five construction tools. This equilibrium requires that priority is given to (a) over (b) and (c) over (d) etc. [To an extent, the credentials of the biographer as a historian in general can be tested by the way he utilizes these five informants].
It is, working from this vantage point that I proceed to explore the work of Heilman and Friedman. But before I commence this task, a preliminary remark is called for. [3]
To read the entire (forty-five page) review essay, click here (PDF).
Notes:
[1] In their first endnote on the book Heilman and Friedman express surprise that Lubavitch emissaries are referred to as shluchim: “The precise Hebrew or Yiddish word for emissaries would be ‘shlichim,’ but for whatever reason, Lubavitchers have chosen to use the term ‘shluchim,’ perhaps to distinguish themselves from all other types of emissaries, religious or otherwise.” Heilman and Friedman, chapter 1, note 1. This comment bespeaks ignorance in the Hebrew language. Whilst it is true that in Modern Hebrew (the Ivrit of Ben Yehudah) the plural shlichim is used, in rabbinic Hebrew (and therefore Yiddish) it is virtually unused. The term shluchim and its derivatives are found in hundreds of places in rabbinic writings.
[2] Sue Fishkoff, “New bios of Lubavitcher rebbe dig for the man behind the myth,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (17th May 2010), available here (http://www.jta.org/news/article/2010/05/17/2394846/new-bios-of-lubavitcher-rebbe-dig-for-the-man-behind-the-myth).
[3] There are those who would have it that only non-Israeli’s can pass judgment on the Arab-Israeli conflict; only indifferent Jews can assess the qualities of Jewish Orthodoxy; only atheists can write impartially about religion; and only academic sociologists can write objective history. I disagree.
I am an orthodox Jew. I consider myself to be a disciple of the late Lubavitcher Rebbe, and although I studied in other Yeshivot (Manchester and Gateshead), and I am familiar with a broad array of orthodox theologies, my main training was in Lubavitch. Nevertheless I consider myself to be a fair and reasonable thinker, even with regards to matters that relate to Judaism, orthodoxy, and, yes, Lubavitch. I acknowledge that I may not be able to achieve the maximum possible degree of objectivity with regard to any of the above, but on the other hand, I believe that my first-hand experience of Jewish, Orthodox and Chasidic life affords me advantages that outside scholars often lack.
Moreover, as many recent studies have demonstrated, the vantage point of the outsider is not always free from bias and prejudice. All too often, the so-called detached scholars have their own axes to grind. Not all ‘external’ expertise is objective, and, not all insiders are blind. I therefore appeal to readers to avoid pre-judging the value of my essay, by resorting to the knee-jerk: “Well, he is a Lubavitcher; what else do you expect him to say?!” Rather, listen to my argumentation, look up the sources, and judge for yourself with the maximum possible degree of objectivity that you are able to achieve.
Chaim Rapoport, “The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life,” the Seforim blog (14 June 2010): 3, available here (http://seforim.blogspot.com/2010/06/chaim-rapoport-review.html).



Sale: Databases of Hebrew Books

As in past years, in honor of Shavua ha-Sefer, there is a 30% sale on electronic databases of Hebrew books, including Otzar ha-Chochmah ver. 8, Otzrot ha-Torah ver. 6, Bar Ilan Responsa Project ver. 18 and DBS ver. 15.  All of which have been upgraded this year, some siginficantly.  30% Sale will be ending on June 13. Purchases can be made in installments. For more information please contact Moshie Flohr at (732) 363-4941 or (917) 456-7855.  Shipping, via USPS, is free for Seforim Blog readers.




Review: Bekurim with the Gra’s Commentary

Review: Bekurim with Gra’s Commentary
by: Eliezer Brodt
One of the most famous gedolim who lived in the past few hundred years was R. Eliyahu of Vilna, the Vilna goan, or Gra. Gra was known for his expertise in all areas of Torah literature including all of Tanach, Bavli, Yerushlami and the rest of Chazal. Additionally, he was an expert in dikduk, Kabbalah and Halacha. Gra did not print anything in his lifetime; however, shortly after his death, his works began to be printed and have been and continue to be until today. Not only has an incredible amounts of his own material been printed but dozens of seforim, books, and articles have been devoted to him, some devoted to his torah others to his life. Bibliographies have been written collecting everything related to Gra. The most recent listing of his work’s was from Yeshayahu Vinograd in his Otzar Sifrei ha-Gra. This bibliography was printed in 2003 and contains 1,630 entries of materials related to Gra.From 2003 until today, many more could be added to this collection. Many people have worked on different aspects of Gra’s works specifically explaining what he meant etc. As is well known Gra wrote very concisely and many of his manuscripts were his personal notes not intended to be published making it very hard to understand what he was getting at. This is true for most of what he had written such as his Biur ha-Gra on Shulchan Orach which has been worked on by many like the Demsek Eliezer, as well as R. Kook and more recently R. Rakover. These works are extensive commentary to explain exactly what Gra meant. His notes on Shas have been worked on and collected by many different people as has been many of his other works. In this post I would like to focus on recent project and organization called Mechon Maatikei Hashemua. This project is devoted to printing all Gra’s Torah on Seder Zeraim. Recently this Mechon released their first publication, the works of Gra on the first Perek of Yerushalmi Bikurim.

Many years ago, a small team of people headed by R. Yedidah Frankel, began studying Seder Zeraim. There is no Bavli devoted to Seder Zeraim only Yerushalmi which makes studying this seder more difficult as we are accustom to the Bavli.  [Regarding the question of if a Bavli on Zeraim existed but is no longer extant, see the  incredible doctorate of Yakov Zussman.] One of the reasons why Yerushalmi in general is very hard to learn is because our printed editions contain numerous textual errors. Aside from lacking the Bavli, Zeraim is more difficult to study because it has only a handful of the commentaries of the Rishonim and Achronim. One of the reasons for it not having some many commentaries was because Seder Zeraim contains little in the way of practical halacha. During the Middle Ages, the main focus of learning was on practical halacha. Thus, Seder Zeraim, among othes, was rarely studied during this period.  Another reason for the dearth of commentaries is that the Yerushalmi was simply not available – many cities during Middle Ages did not have even a single copy. However, in the past century aside from the Yerushalmi becoming more available, this part of Torah became much more relevant in light of it becoming practical halacha. Thus, many more people are studying the Yerushalmi today.

Just to cite a simple example demonstrating this phenomena.  Two hundred years ago there was almost no works devoted to Shevius  (Shmitah), today with each shmitah dozens of works have been written perhaps in the hundreds already. Now that Zeraim is more relevant and more are studying it, the periush of anyone, and more so a super star like Gra, is extremely important. This organization took upon themselves to print Gra’s commentary on Zeraim. This work is not merely a reprint Gra’s commentary on Zeraim, rather it contains much more. Frist, they found the Yerushalmi that the Gra actually used and wrote notes in when learning Yerushalmi! After carefully going through it they mapped out a plan how to go about printing it. In the past few years both the methods and benefits of this find have been written up in various Torah publications amongst them Yeshurun and Moriea. A very in-depth article was printed in the book released from Bar Ilan on the Gra a few years back, HaGra Ubeis Medraso. In each of these articles R. Frankel shows the importance of this find and how it enlightens our understanding of complex Sugyos in Seder Zeraim.

The manuscript was authenticated by experts in Gra’s handwriting. The significance of this is we now more material to help us understand this complex seder which lacks seforim compared to other areas of Torah.

This beautiful edition is composed of many parts. First, they printed the Mishana with the Pirushim of the Rambam’s Pirish Lemishna, Rash mi-Shantz, and Rosh. To ensure accuracy of these texts, all known manuscripts of these commentaries were used, in a critical edition, with many excellent and useful footnotes. Additionally, in this section they also included the perush of Gra on Zeraim – Shenoes Eliyahu reworking it with new additions from manuscripts including notes.

For the second section they use the type from the Yerushalmi printed in Amsterdam that contains R. Eliyhu Mifulda’s work because this is the edition of the Yerushalmi that Gra used and wrote his notes on. In the footnotes, the editors compared this text of the Yerushalmi to other manuscripts. They also reworked the commentary of R. Eliyhu Mifulda adding in many notes to the text. This section also includes a commentary, Biurei ha-Gra. This commentary is from notes of students of Gra which had been printed before. Again, as with the other sections, there exists a few manuscripts of this work, all of which were used for this section. The editors also include many notes to explain this part. Additionally, this section also includes the complete version of Gra’s notes based on the manuscript of his Yerushalmi. These notes were printed a few times but only partially. However, in this edition each one is put in its proper place with different fonts to make it less confusing. This part also has notes to explain what Gra meant. However, not to confuse the user, Gra’s notes appear on the page in their proper places and an in-depth explanation is included after each daf.

After this section they have a part which is composed of in-depth discussion of Gra. For example, Gra, as mentioned above, wrote rather crypitically, and at times, at first glance when one looks at it you no idea what he was trying to say. This is especially true in Gra’s own notes as they was not meant for anyone other than himself. At times, the commentary contains no words just lines, circles, dashes which, as one would imagine, are especially difficult to decipher. The only way one can properly understand  Gra is to have a great understanding of the whole sugyah. Now the whole sugyah means the comparative texts of  other sifrei chazal such as Bavli, Sifra, Sifri, and Mechilta. One also has to have a command of all the Rishonim on the particular Sugyah. This team spent a very long time going through each sugyah with great depth they presented their finds in this section. They did a excellent job of presenting the material they found in a clear and concise manner. The use charts at times and as many works as necessary to get to the bottom of the issues whether it means consulting critical editions or manuscripts of Chazal or Rishonim, dictionaries for the meaning of a word, rishonim and the works of the main achronim. After reading through each chapter in this section they explain exactly what Gra was trying to do, when one sees it one is just amazed to see what Gra meant with just a few words or dashes.

 

To explain what drives Gra to write in such a cryptic manner. The only reason why one is allowed to write Torah is because of a heter of עת לעשות לה’  that one will forget. Gra was not scared that he would forget so he just wrote very shorthand to remind him of what how he understand the Sugyah. I also assumed this was yet another legend that they say about Gra, but when one looks at this Yerushalmi where they reproduced the pages with Gra’s notes one can see this very clearly its no legend. The pages are full of dots, cross outs, circles, dashes and one word here and there. To the untrained eye it looks like nothing. This Mechon has shown the incredible wisdom behind each one of those markings. Another Godol who used this style of Gra was R. Nosson Adler. R. Auerbach famous for the Eshkol printed these notes also they were one word here and there lines dashes and he explained them. People accused Auerbach of forging this work too but I believe it has been proven that it is an Authentic work. See Hurowitz, Rabbanei Frankfurt (pp. 151-152). R. Chanoach Erentru brings from his Rebbe,  R. Fevel Palut, a student of the Chasam Sofer the following:

ר’ נתן אדלר אמר שהתירו לכתוב את התורה שבעל פה רק מפני החשש שמא תשכח התורה מישראל לפי זה אמר אין הוא רשאי להשתמש בהתיר זה כי אין הוא שוכח דבר. ואמר עליו שלא רק  שידע את כל התלמוד בעל פה אלא גם מעולם לא שכח דבר מכל ספרות הראשונים (עיונים בדברי חז”ל ובלשונם, עמ’ סו).

In the last section of this work they show exactly what Gra wrote and each of Gra’s notes, big or small, are reproduced in a high quality picture and blown up they than write underneath each photo exactly what they believe Gra was doing. This section at times due to spilling of ink and other problems they could not read some of the writing in the orginal manuscript they than consulted with the the Israeli police department to read some of the comments with infrared magnifiers. They even were helped by NASA to read some particularly difficult parts! I would assume this is the first time they were consulted for help in printing a rabbinical text.

This work is a labor of love as it is obvious from going through it. In the past bunch of years I do not recall any sefer that shows such meticulous preparation for publication. One can see how much the editor R. Frankel believes in the importance of his project. It is printed on beautiful paper, the the size of the volume is very tall making it very usable. The fonts and print of each page are also very well done making it not only beautiful in content but matching in looks. The editor was helped by a very small team of people who mastered Seder Zeraim over years of learning through it as did he. It took many years for this volume to be printed and it is a small part of the whole seder Zeraim very large sums of money were spent to get the project going but it still requires more to complete the project. For more information on purchasing this volume or helping with this project contact them at yedidiyah@hotmail.com. See also here.

I wish them much luck in completing this very special important project.




A Woman's Place Is In The Home

A Woman's Place Is In The Home

by: Yitzhak, of בין דין לדין

The Sons of Korah declare:כָּל-כְּבוּדָּה בַת-מֶלֶךְ פְּנִימָה; מִמִּשְׁבְּצוֹת זָהָב לְבוּשָׁהּ.[1][And see here for various nineteenth and twentieth century references to our titular aphorism, and see this essay.] But is the verse indeed a normative injunction toward modesty, for women in general, or at least Jewish women in particular, as it is commonly understood? And if so, exactly what standard of behavior is being enjoined?

Cultural Norms – Twelfth Century Egypt, Twentieth Century Jerusalem and Twenty First Century Kabul

Rambam's rather extreme (by contemporary Western standards) formulation, directing a husband to "prevent his wife" from being a gadabout, and instructing him to "only allow her out around once or twice a month, as necessary", is well known: מקום שדרכן שלא תצא אשה לשוק בכפה שעל ראשה בלבד עד שיהיה עליה רדיד החופה את כל גופה כמו טלית נותן לה בכלל הכסות רדיד הפחות מכל הרדידין. ואם היה עשיר נותן לה לפי עשרו כדי שתצא בו לבית אביה או לבית האבל או לבית המשתה. לפי שכל אשה יש לה לצאת ולילך לבית אביה לבקרו ולבית האבל ולבית המשתה לגמול חסד לרעותיה או לקרובותיה כדי שיבואו הם לה. שאינה בבית הסוהר עד שלא תצא ולא תבוא. אבל גנאי הוא לאשה שתהיה יוצאה תמיד פעם בחוץ פעם ברחובות. ויש לבעל למנוע אשתו מזה ולא יניחנה לצאת אלא כמו פעם אחת בחודש או כמו פעמים בחודש לפי הצורך. שאין יופי לאשה אלא לישב בזוית ביתה שכך כתוב כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה:[2]Of course, this passage must be placed within the context of its author's milieu, a rigidly traditional Islamic society. Indeed, this attitude is still present in some modern day Muslim societies: KABUL — On a recent day when the sun was finally strong enough to dry the Afghan capital's muddy streets, Habiba Sarwe sought her husband's permission to visit a spot that her daughter and all the neighborhood wives were talking about: a park, with swings, benches, flowers and a gazebo. A park for women only. "Please, let me go," begged Sarwe, who is 44 but whose tired eyes make her look far older. "It's a good place." Her husband decided it would be okay. So that afternoon, Sarwe put on her favorite fitted gray wool suit under her shapeless, head-to-toe burqa and set out with three of her children for the dusty park on the edge of Kabul. "This is the one place that's ours," said an out-of-breath Fardia Azizmay, 19, Sarwe's older daughter, as she jumped off a swing and looked over a pile of a dozen blue burqas, tossed off by women as they entered. "For us, home is so boring. Our streets and shops are not for women. But this place is our own." The small park, protected by a half-dozen gun-toting guards, has become a favorite destination for Kabul women wanting a safe, quiet place to meet with friends, complain about their husbands, discuss their kids, line one another's eyes with black kohl or just shed their burqas and play, female activists here say. … Although women make up more than half of Afghanistan's population, fear of fundamentalist militant groups has caused them to nearly disappear from public life, especially in the rural south, where U.S.-led forces are trying to root out Taliban fighters. Some of those insurgents still pressure women to cover up and to avoid schools and workplaces, defying the Afghan constitution's guarantee of equal rights for both sexes. "I get threatening calls almost every day asking why I think I am important enough to work in an office," said Fouzia Ahmed, 25, a government secretary in Kabul. "The truth is, no women feel safe here. We are always threatened. That's why we need the eyes of the world." And the great Rav Ya'akov Yeshayah Blau gives us the not entirely dissimilar Yerushalmi perspective on women working outside the home. He takes a rather dim view of this modern trend, and maintains that the husband may not compel his wife to do so: [רוב] נשים העושות מלאכה הוא בפקידות או בהוראה, … דלא מסתבר שיוכל הבעל לכוף לאשתו לצאת לשוק בזמן שכל ההיתר לנשים לצאת לשוק אינו לפי רוח חכמים (עיין פרק ט הערה קכז מדברי הרמב"ם), ובפרט כשהרבה מלאכות כגון לעמוד בחנות או לעבוד בפקידות רחוק ממדת הצניעות, וידוע שבעוה"ר הרבה מכשולים יוצאים מזה, ובודאי שמצוה גדולה לאדם שלא יתן לאשתו להמצא בשוק כל כך, ודי לנו במה שהן מוכרחות (וזכורני שלפני עשרות שנים הרבה מנקיי הדעת בירושלים היו יוצאים בעצמם למכולת ולשאר דברים שהם צרכי הבית, וויתרו על כבודם וטרחתם משום צניעות), ועיין שו"ת רדב"ז ח"ג סימן תפ"א, ועל כן נלענ"ד שאין שום דין כפיה לאשה לצאת ולהרויח, ואדרבא, חייב למונעה מכך, ובעוה"ר נחשב הדבר כמעלה בשידוך שיש לאשה מקצוע, וכל שכן משרה שתוכל לצאת ולהרויח,[3]There are at least three Talmudic invocations of our verse as a basis for modesty, but their exact import, and even their very normativeness, are not entirely clear, as we shall see.

Talmudic Sources

Gittin

שאם ירצה שלא לזון כו': שמעת מינה יכול הרב לומר לעבד עשה עמי ואיני זנך הכא במאי עסקינן דא"ל צא מעשה ידיך למזונותיך דכוותה גבי אשה דאמר לה צאי מעשה ידיך במזונותיך אשה אמאי לא אשה בדלא ספקה עבד נמי בדלא ספיק עבדא דנהום כרסיה לא שויא למריה ולמרתיה למאי מיתבעיתא שמע עבד שגלה לערי מקלט אין רבו חייב לזונו ולא עוד אלא שמעשה ידיו לרבו ש"מ יכול הרב לומר לעבד עשה עמי ואיני זנך הכא במאי עסקינן דאמר לו צא מעשה ידיך למזונותיך אי הכי מעשה ידיו אמאי לרבו להעדפה העדפה פשיטא מהו דתימא כיון דכי לית ליה לא יהיב ליה כי אית ליה נמי לא לישקול מיניה קמ"ל ומ"ש לערי מקלט סד"א (דברים ד) וחי עביד ליה חיותא טפי קמ"ל והא מדקתני סיפא אבל אשה שגלתה לערי מקלט בעלה חייב במזונותיה מכלל דלא אמר לה דאי אמר לה בעלה אמאי חייב ומדסיפא דלא אמר לה רישא נמי דלא אמר ליה לעולם דאמר ליה ואשה בדלא ספקה והא מדקתני סיפא ואם אמר לה צאי מעשה ידיך במזונותיך רשאי מכלל דרישא דלא אמר לה ה"ק ואם מספקת ואמר לה צאי מעשה ידיך במזונותיך רשאי מספקת מאי למימרא מהו דתימא (תהילים מה) כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה קמ"ל[4]The Gemara states that we might have thought that the principle of כל כבודה prevents a husband from declaring צאי מעשי ידיך במזונותיך and thereby requiring his wife to work, but then concludes "קא משמע לן" that this is not the case. Why, indeed, is this not the case? There are various theories offered, as we shall see.

Yevamos

א"ל דואג האדומי עד שאתה משאיל עליו אם הגון הוא למלכות אם לאו שאל עליו אם ראוי לבא בקהל אם לאו מ"ט דקאתי מרות המואביה א"ל אבנר תנינא עמוני ולא עמונית מואבי ולא מואבית אלא מעתה ממזר ולא ממזרת ממזר כתיב מום זר מצרי ולא מצרית שאני הכא דמפרש טעמא דקרא (דברים כג) על אשר לא קדמו אתכם בלחם ובמים דרכו של איש לקדם ולא דרכה של אשה לקדם היה להם לקדם אנשים לקראת אנשים ונשים לקראת נשים אישתיק מיד ויאמר המלך שאל אתה בן מי זה העלם התם קרי ליה נער הכא קרי ליה עלם הכי קא אמר ליה הלכה נתעלמה ממך צא ושאל בבית המדרש שאל אמרו ליה עמוני ולא עמונית מואבי ולא מואבית אקשי להו דואג כל הני קושייתא אישתיקו בעי לאכרוזי עליה מיד (שמואל ב יז) ועמשא בן איש ושמו יתרא הישראלי אשר בא אל אביגיל בת נחש וכתיב (דברי הימים א ב) יתר הישמעאלי אמר רבא מלמד שחגר חרבו כישמעאל ואמר כל מי שאינו שומע הלכה זו ידקר בחרב כך מקובלני מבית דינו של שמואל הרמתי עמוני ולא עמונית מואבי ולא מואבית ומי מהימן והאמר רבי אבא אמר רב כל תלמיד חכם שמורה הלכה ובא אם קודם מעשה אמרה שומעין לו ואם לאו אין שומעין לו שאני הכא דהא שמואל ובית דינו קיים מכל מקום קשיא הכא תרגמו (תהילים מה) כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה במערבא אמרי ואיתימא ר' יצחק אמר קרא (בראשית יח) ויאמרו אליו איה שרה אשתך וגו'[5]

Shevuos

תניא אידך ועמדו שני האנשים בעדים הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בעדים או אינו אלא בבעלי דינין אמרת וכי אנשים באין לדין נשים אין באות לדין ואם נפשך לומר נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים מאי אם נפשך לומר וכי תימא אשה לאו אורחה משום (תהילים מה) כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים[6]

Blaming the Victim

Hasam Sofer has a remarkable responsum in which he classifies a wife who hypothetically lets herself get kidnapped as an עוברת על דת or a מורדת, since the abduction would not have occurred had she behaved properly and not wandered off alone into dangerous regions: שאלתו אודות איש א' אחר ב' שנים לנישואי אשתו ברחה מעמו ונעלמה מעין כל חי ולא מחמת קטטה כלל … רק בפתע פתאום נעלמה וזה חמש שנים לא נודע מה היה לה אחר כמה חקירות ודרישות בכל אופן האפשרי … על כן רוצה שנעיין בדינו למצוא היתר לישא אשה …תשובה. הנה אשה זו הנעלמה מעינינו יש להסתפק כמה ספיקות מה היה לה. א' אולי מתה כבר מדלא באה לביתה מקום חיותה ואם מתה הבעל מותר לישא אחרת בלי ספק:ב' אולי המירה דתה …ג' אולי נשטית מחמת שטות ברחה ולא חזרה …ד' אולי מחמת מרד ומעל ברחה ולא חזרה …ומעתה נבוא אל העיון הנה יש כאן כמה ספיקות וספק ספיקא להתיר ורק ספק א' לאסור דלמא אשתבאית … אלא שיש לומר נוקמא אחזקת חי ובחזקת צדקת שלא המירה ושלא תמרוד על בעלה בלי שום קטטה ובחזקת הגוף שלא נולד בה מום ובטלו כל הספיקות ונאמר אשתבאית בודאי ואף על גב דלכאורה שבויה על ידי אונס הוה מיעוטא דידיע הוא במדינתנו לא שכיחא שביה כלל ואפילו בשיש מלחמה בעולם ויש אלהים שופטים בארץ ואפילו באו קדרים מרחוק ונטלוה מכל מקום בעברה דרך עיירות ומקומות מדינתינו אם תזעק בחבליה יעשו לה דין ואם לא צוחה ושתקה היינו מומרת ברצון וכדאמרינן בגיטין כח: אין אנפרות בבבל ולא משכחת ליה אלא בדרך רחוקה ונפלאה וליכא אלא מיעוטא ומכל מקום נימא סמוך מיעוטא לחזקה ואיתרע ליה רובא והוה ליה פלגא ופלגא ומספיקא לא נתיר חרם רבינו גרשום:לזה נאמר שהאי ספיקא דשביה אפילו מיעוטא דמיעוטא לא הוה דודאי אם יצאה מדעת למקום יערות ושכיחא שיירות ושוללים שלא מדעת הבעל ויצאה מחזקת בנות ישראל הכשרים אשר כר' בני כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה דאף על גב דאמרינן בגיטין (יב:) [צ"ל יב.] מהו דתימא כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה קמ"ל משמע דלא אמרינן הכי ויש לומר לזה כתב רש"י כל ישראל בני מלכים הם ור"ל דהא תליא בשיטה דכל ישראל בני מלכים בשבת קכח. ולא קיימא לן כשיטה אבל כד מעיינת שפיר הא ליתא דסתמא דתלמודא דיבמות עז. קיימא לן הלכתא הך חזקה אפילו בנשי א"י הדיוטות שאינם בני מלכים כל שכן בנות ישראל הצנועות ודאמרינן בגיטין קמ"ל ר"ל דאפילו הכי מצי למימר צאי מעשי ידיך אבל האמת דכל כבודה בת מלך פנימה ודברי רש"י דתליא בשיטה צ"עולפי זה אם יצאה מדעת ונשתבאית אף על פי שעתה חזרה בה ורוצית לשוב לבעלה אלא שעומדת במאסרתה מכל מקום הוה ליה תחלתה בפשיעה ועדיין בתמרורתה עומדת ודינה כמורדת או כעוברת על דתולומר שבאו שבאים לביתה ושבוה היינו אונסא דלא שכיחא כלל שלא ידע אדם מזה דבר ולא צעקה בעיר ולא נודע מעולם שבאו שוללים לעיר ולוקחי נפשות במדינתנו ליכא ולומר שנשתטית ויצאה מדעתה והוציאה רוח רעה אל מקום לסטים ושבוה ועתה נתרפאית ועומדת בשביה אם כן היינו מיעוטא דמיעוטא דלא שכיחא כלל …[7]So Hasam Sofer, although initially suggesting that the Maskana in Gittin is that כל כבודה is not normative, ultimately concludes that it is, based on Yevamos, and explains the the former passage to mean merely that the כל כבודה imperative is not strong enough to deny the husband his right to say צאי מעשי ידיך במזונותיך. Rav Avraham Ya'akov Ha'Levi Horowitz rejects this position of Hasam Sofer, that a woman who leaves the safety of her house has necessarily acted improperly, and he argues that this is exactly the point of the Maskana in Gittin, that a woman who has a reason to leave her home, such as the need to support herself, is not violating כל כבודה:האמנם בשו"ת חת"ם סופר .. כתב דיצאה מחזקת כשרות במה שהרחיקה נדוד שאינה כבנות ישראל הכשרות דכל כבודה בת מלך פנימה לא כתב זה רק לסניף והערה בעלמא דאיך נוכל להוציאה מחזקת כשרות אולי יצאה לאיזה סבה ואפילו ביצאה לסבה לא טובה אולי אחר כך נולד לה אונס ודעתה לחזור.ובש"ס גיטין … הרי דמשום דצריכה לצאת למזונותיה לא שייך כל כבודה רק דסלקא דעתא דמשום דכל ישראל בני מלכים אפילו בכה"ג שייך כל כבודה כמו שכתב רש"י שם ולמסקנה קמ"ל דלא קיימא לן דכל ישראל בני מלכים דקיימא בשיטה בש"ס שבת (קכ"ח) ובש"ס יבמות (ע"ז) דאמרינן אפילו בעכו"ם כל כבודה כו' משום דשלא לצרכה אין דרכה לצאת ובחנם נתקשה בשו"ת חת"ם סופר שם בזה ולע"ד פשוט כמו שכתבתי: [ועיין שם עוד במה שהוכיח מעוד פוסקים שאין לדונה כמורדת בכה"ג.][8]

The Tosaphists as Pashtanim

Another application of כל כבודה appears in a number of commentaries of the Tosaphists, as well as that of the Tur, to Parshas Mishpatim, which explain the verse לא תצא כצאת העבדים, in the context of the אמה עבריה, to mean that it is inappropriate for her to work outside of her master's home, and that he may not demand that she do so: לא תצא. פירש רבי אברהם אבן עזרא ז"ל שאין האדון יכול לכופה לעשות מלאכה הצריכה לצאת חוץ, אלא בתוך הבית:[9]לא תצא כצאת העבדים. לפי פשוטו למדה תורה דרך ארץ שלא תהא יצאנית כמו העבד שרבו משגרו בשליחותו ביום ובלילה בעיר ובחוץ לעיר, וכל זה גנאי לאשה, רק שעבוד בית משום כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה, ועוד שהיא קטנה.[10]לא תצא [כצאת] העבדים. הפשט שאינו יכול להכריחה לעשות מלאכתו בחוץ כמו שהעבדים יוצאים בחוץ לשאוב מים או לטחון. או שאר מלאכות בחוץ כי אם בבית כי כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה.[11]לא תצא כצאת העבדים. … אי נמי כפשטיה, לא תצא כצאת העבדים שלא ישלחנה בחוץ לעשות לו מלאכתו אלא תשמשנו בביתו:[12]A correspondent of Rav David Menahem Manis Babad of Tarnipol was apparently bemused by this Tosaphist exegesis, presumably because the Talmud understands the verse differently, and does not mention such a restriction on the master of the אמה העבריה.  Rav Babad points out that this sort of thing is common enough for "the early commentators", and adds that this rule does actually have some basis in the standard Halachah:ומה שפלא בעיניו דברי הרבי אברהם שהביא בדעת זקנים … והוא פלא בעיניו. פליאות כאלה ימצא הרבה במפרשי התורה הקדמונים. אך באמת זה אינו פלא כל כך. כיון דהוזהרנו שלא לעבוד בעבד עברי עבודת פרך ועבודת עבד. וכיון דאשה כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה. אינו יכול לעבוד בה מלאכת חוץ שלא לרצונה:[13][On the issue of medieval atalmudic exegesis, I have elsewhere noted Rav Menahem Kasher's claim that it is actually Ibn Ezra, "the chief of the Pashtanim", who frequently insists that we explain Halachic Scriptural passages only in a manner consistent with the Talmud, while "the pillars of the Halachah", i.e., the Tosaphists, are often quite flexible in their exegesis – as we see here.]Rav Yisrael of Bruna considers this Tosaphist idea to be normative Halachah, but he distinguishes between married and single women (similarly to Hizkuni above, who suggests that we may be particularly concerned about the אמה עבריה, since she is a minor):נשאלתי השוכר משרתת אשה או נערה בתולה וראובן שולח אותה על השוק ובבתי הגויים יחידית והמשרתת אומרת השכרתני לשרת כדרך המשרתות בבית ולא כדרך האנשים היוצאים בחוץ:והשבתי כן הנשים דוברות. אין ראובן יכול לכופן ליכנס יחידית בבתי הגויים ואף יש איסור בדבר משום יחוד, ואף במקום שרבים רגילים ליכנס שם נהי דאיסור ליכא מכל מקום אינו יכול לכופן, דיש נשים צנועות נוהגות בצניעות או יראות מרוב שנאה שלא יטילו עליה שם רע או כהאי גוונא.אמנם על השוק בגילוי, רגילות הנשים לילך אבל הבתולות אין דרכן לצאת לשוק ואינו יכול לכוף, ונראה לי דאף איסור יש בדבר שנאמר לא תצא כצאת העבדים. וכתב בפירוש התורה לר' יעקב בן אשר ז"ל שנקרא נזיר[14] … והתורה בבתולה קאי ובבתולה מיירי אבל נשים לא כדפרישית,אף על גב דכתיב כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה מכל מקום אשכחן בפרק קמא דגיטין דשכיח כדאמרינן מהו דתימא כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה קמ"ל, ובפרק המוצא תפלין (ערובין ק:) אמר גבי יו"ד קללות שנתקללה חוה וחבושה בבית האסורים ואידך הנך שבח הוא לה דכתיב כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה, והטעם כל ישראל בני מלכים הם. ולית הלכתא הכי. דאמרינן בפרק המקבל (בבא מציעא קיג.) אמר אביי כולהו סבירא להו כל ישראל בני מלכים הם, וכל היכא דאמר אביי הכי כולהו בחד שיטה לית הלכתא כחד מינייהו, כדפסק האשירי בכמה דוכתין, ואף על גב דבפרק ח' שרצים (שבת קכו:) פסק רב הלכתא כרשב"ג דאמר הכי מפרש התם הלכתא כוותיה ולא מטעמיה ע"ש, וכן פסק האשירי בהדיא בפרק מפנין, נאם ישראל מברונא:[15]So while the Ashkenazic Rishonim that we have seen might be construed as supporting Rav Blau's position that a husband may not compel his wife to work outside the home, Rav Yisrael of Bruna limits their rule to unmarried women.Note that many of these sources are taken from a discussion of our topic by the erudite Rav Ze'ev Wolf Leiter in his מתורתן של ראשונים.‎[16]Although apparently unknown to all the aforementioned Rishonim and Aharonim, there is actually Medrashic support this interpretation of the verse לא תצא כצאת העבדים – the מכילתא דרבי שמעון בן יוחאי attributes such an explanation to R. Elazar (or Eliezer):לא תצא כצאת העבדים שלא תהא נוטלת אחריו דלאים ובלוריות למרחץ דברי רבי אל<י>עזראמר לו רבי עקיבא מה אני צריך והלא כבר כבר נאסר לא תעבוד בו עבודת עבד מה תלמוד לומר לא תצא כצאת העבדים שלא שלא תהא יוצאת על השן ועל העין כעבדים …[17]Below we shall see another possible Medrashic basis for this interpretation.

Ibn Ezra

A perplexing point is the attribution of this idea to Ibn Ezra (in the first of the Tosaphist paragraphs above).  As has already been noted by R. Ya'akov Gellis,[18] no such exegesis is found in our editions of Ibn Ezra.  We do, however, have this not atypically cryptic passage:וכי ימכור איש. זה האיש הישראלי. ואין משפט יציאתה לחופש כזכרים. ואין צורך לפירוש הגאון לא תצא לא תשב.[19]The reference to the “explanation of the Gaon” is apparently to the first one in this passage of the commentary of רב סעדיה גאון:ואחר זה נאמר שדיבורו לא תצא כצאת העבדים סובל שני פירושים: האחד לא תדור בהיותה אצל אדוניה במצב של עבדים. כי המלה יציאה פעמים משמשת בהוראת מגורים, כמו שאמר דויד למלך מואב יצא נא אבי ואמי אתכם (שמואל-א כב:ג), וכמו שיש לפרש ויצא בן אשה ישראלית (ויקרא כד:י).הפירוש השני – שלא תצא כצאת העבדים העברים, שנאמר עליהם ובשביעית יצא (כא:ב). אבל היא דרה אצל אדוניה עד שתגדל, בין בזמן קרוב ובין בזמן רחוק.[20]This is still not very clear.  R. Yehudah Leib Krinsky understands the Gaon thus:פירוש אם רעה היא בעיניו ואינו רוצה ליעדה אין ראוי שתשב בביתו להשתמשות לבד, כי אסור לו להניחה עוד ביד האדון מעת שיאמר לא חפצתי לקחתה:[21]R. Yehudah Leib Fleischer finds this explanation baseless, and offers an alternative:כתב בעל "מחוקקי יהודה" … ואין אני יודע מאין לקח את הפירוש הזה.והנה בתרגומו הערבי של רבנו סעדיה גאון ז"ל (הוצאת דירינבורג, פאריס תרנ"ג) מצאתי: “פלא תכרג כאלעביד". ותרגומו: “לא תצא כעבדים". אבל הח' המו"ל מביא שם גרסא אחרת, מדפוס קונסטיטינא (שנת ה' אלפים ש"ו ליצירה) ושם הנוסחא: “לא תקים מקאם אלעביד". ותרגומו: “לא תשב במקום העבדים". ולזה שבים דברי ראב"ע ז"ל. ומזה ראיה כי הנוסחא של דפוס קונסטיטינא הנכונה.[22]Still not very clear, but Rav Kasher understands this to mean that רב סעדיה is explaining the verse in the manner of the Tosaphists.[23]  He also suggests another Medrash in support of this exegesis:[24]לא תצא כצאת העבדים, בת אחת היתה לי ומכרתיה להם [לאמה] שאין אתם מוציאין אותה אלא חבושה בארון [שנאמר] לא תצא כצאת העבדים, נהגו בה כבוד, ששביתם אותה מאצלי שנאמר עלית למרום שבית שבי וכו' (שמות רבה פ"ל ד.)מובא בילהמ"כ ישעיה דף סג. ותהלים דף קסח. ובשינויים בכד הקמח אות האמונה: וכן אמרו במדרש וכי ימכור איש את בתו לאמה לא תצא כצאת העבדים, וכי ימכור איש זה הקב"ה שנאמר ד' איש מלחמה, את בתו לאמה זו התורה שמכרה לישראל, מוציאין אותה חבושה בארון, לא תצא כצאת העבדים הזהרו בה שלא תנהגו בה מנהג בזיון והפקר, …ויש להעיר שבדברי חז"ל כאן: נהגו בה כבוד. וגירסת כד הקמח: שלא תנהגו בה מנהג בזיון והפקר, יש מקור למה שכתבו הרס"ג ושאר הראשונים בפשטא דקרא: לא תצא כצאת העבדים, כלומר שלא יכריחה לעשות מלאכתו בחוץ כמו עבדים ולא תשב במקום העבדים. ע"כ.[25]Rav Kasher also notes that Rav Avraham Menahem b. Ya'akov Rapa of Porto (who later changed his name to 'Rapaport') also offers a similar interpretation of our verse, apparently independently:לא תצא כצאת העבדים. לא תהא יצאנית לרוץ בשוק הנה והנה כדרך צאת העבדים והא צחות. וכל מקום שנאמר עבדים סתם בכנענים הכתוב מדבר שאין עבד עברי נקרא עבד סתם:[26]

Feminist and Feminine Perspectives

Rav Yehudah Herzl Henkin, always interesting on femininity and feminism, has a careful analysis of the contours of כל כבודה, of which we shall merely cite one brief excerpt, in which he argues that the loss of honor consequent to a woman's leaving her home is due to the fact that she may err and sin, and this is therefore only true in the general case, but a particular woman who can remain an אשת חיל and God-fearing is permitted to leave her home:מכאן למה שהספדתי בענין מקומה של אשה שסיימתי בו הגם שהכתוב תאר וחכמים הזהירו על סתם נשים שתשארנה בבתיהן, כל זה אמור לגבי רוב נשים, אבל יחידה שיכולה להיות גם אשת חיל ואשה יראת ד' יכולה לצאת.וכתבתי שהדבר נובע מן המציאות ומן הרגילות ומוסב על אזהרת חכמים שהאשה היוצאת מתקלקלת, וגם דברי הכתוב יש לפרש כן, שכיון שהמציאות כן ממילא כבודה של אשה היא פנימה כדי שלא תתבזה ביציאתה שהלא אם תכשל אין לה גנאי יותר מזה. …[27]We began this essay with Psalms; we give the last word to she who has been called "a psalmist for the 21st century", the incomparable אתי אנקרי, who used to insist, in the powerful, haunting, beautiful titular song of her breakout album, רואה לך בעינים, that confinement within walls and self-abnegation are just too high a price to pay, even for love: אני רואה לך בעיניים
אני רואה את הכל
היית עוטף אותי בבית וחוםרואה לך בעיניים,
רואה את הכל
היית סוגר אותי, אם היית יכול רואה לך בעיניים
שכלום לא חשוב
רק אתה, אני ואתה שוב ושוב רואה לך בעיניים
שיותר מהכל –
היית סוגר אותי, אם היית יכולהיית בונה לי קירות
היית מתקין לי מנורות
שיהיה לי אוררואה לך בעיניים,
זה כתוב בגדול
היית מרשה לי, מוחל על הכלאני רואה לך בעיניים,
רואה את הכל
היית אוהב אותי כמו שאיש לא יכולהייתי משוטטת בין הקירות
הייתי עושה בם צורות –
שיהיו לי שמייםאני רואה לך בעיניים
אני רואה את הכל
היית עוטף אותי בבית וחוםאני רואה לך בעיניים
אני רואה את הכל –
רק אותי לא רואה בתוך הכחולהלכתי לפני שעות
וטוב לי מחוץ לקירות
להתגעגע לבית[Explanation and (feminist) analysis.]I say “used to”, of course, since this is early Ankri, in her edgy, התרסה periodCurrent, tichel-wearing Ankri, who understands the great, paradoxical religious truth that real freedom requires discipline and subservience to a Higher law, has, indeed, explained that “it is sometimes difficult for me to to connect” to her great, early classics רואה לך בעינים and לך תתרגל איתה (although she insists that this is due to her personal maturation, rather than her religion).  And musical genius that she is, she apparently occasionally manages to nevertheless perform רואה לך בעינים, while investing it with an entirely new atmosphere:"רואה לך בעיניים" כמו שלא נשמע מעולםואז אנקרי מפתיעה. היא אומרת: "לא תאמינו, אבל תאמינו", ומתחילה לנגן בגיטרה את "רואה לך בעיניים", שיר שטבוע עמוק עמוק בדי.אן.איי המוזיקלי הישראלי. גם הפעם הוא מרגש, אבל דרך הביצוע העכשווי שלו ניתן להבין את עוצמת השינוי שחל באנקרי. משיר שתמיד היה נשמע כעוס וכואב יוצאת פתאום אתי אנקרי אחרת – מפויסת, שלמה, שלווה, במשמעות הפוכה לביצוע המקורי.[Note: this essay has its roots in a discussion that occurred on the Areivim and Avodah mailing lists; see this אישים ושיטות post, and my comment thereto.][1]              תהילים מה:יד – קשר[2]              משנה תורה – יד החזקה אישות יג:יא – קשר[3]              פתחי חושן ירושה ואישות פרק י' הערה ט' ד"ה ומהו שיעור המלאכות, ועיין לעיל שם הערה ג'[4]              גיטין יב. – קשר[5]              יבמות עו: – עז. – קשר[6]              שבועות ל. – קשר[7]              שו"ת חת"ם סופר אה"ע חלק ב' סימן צ"ט – קשר[8]              שו"ת צור יעקב סימן ע"ה – קשר[9]              דעת זקנים מבעלי התוספות שמות כא:ז, ועיין תוספות השלם (גליס) אותיות ט וי"ט[10]              פירוש החזקוני שם[11]              פירוש התוספות, נדפס בספר הדר זקנים (ליוורנו ת"ר), והובא בחומש אוצר הראשונים, שם – קשר[12]              פירוש על התורה מרבינו יעקב בן כבוד מרנא ורבנא רבינו הרא"ש זלה"ה (הנובר תקצ"ט), שם – קשר [עמוד  19]‏[13]              שו"ת חבצלת השרון, תנינא סימן י' – קשר[14]              איני יודע פירוש מילים אלו[15]              שו"ת מהר"י ברונא, סימן רמ"ב – קשר[16]              גיטין שם – קשר[17]              מכילתא דרבי שמעון בן יוחאי (מהדורת אפשטיין), שם, עמוד 165 – קשר, הובא בתורה שלמה אות קס"ג[18]              תוספות השלם, שם, עמוד קע"ג. I am indebted to Andy for bringing this to my attention.[19]              אבן עזרא (מהדורת וייזר), פירוש הקצר שם, עמוד רצא[20]              פירושי רב סעדיה גאון לספר שמות (מהדורת רצהבי), שם, עמוד ק"י[21]              מחוקקי יהודה, שם, יהל אור אות רי"ח – קשר[22]              משנה לעזרא, שם, עמוד 161 – קשר[23]              תורה שלמה, שם, אות קס"ג[24]              I do not understand why Rav Kasher adduces this Medrash, since he himself has earlier cited the מכילתא דרשב"י which would seem to be much more directly supportive of the Tosaphist position.[25]              שם, אות קס"ו[26]              מנחה בלולה (ווירונה תשנ"ד), שם – קשר[27]              שו"ת בני בנים, חלק א' סימן מ' ד"ה מכאן למה שהספדתי – קשר




The Golem of Prague in Recent Rabbinic Literature

The Golem of Prague in Recent Rabbinic Literature
by: Shnayer Leiman
In a recent issue of המאור – a rabbinic journal of repute – an anonymous notice appeared on the Golem of Prague.1 Apparently, a rabbi in Brooklyn had publicly denied the authenticity of the Maharal’s Golem, claiming that R. Yudel Rosenberg (d. 1935) – in his נפלאות מהר”ל (Piotrkow, 1909) – was the first to suggest  that the Maharal had created a Golem. According to the account in המאור, the rabbi based his claim, in part, on the fact that no early Jewish book records that the Maharal had created a Golem. In response to the denial, the anonymous notice lists 6 “proofs” that the Maharal of Prague, in fact, created a Golem. Here, we list the 6 “proofs” in translation (in bold font) and briefly discuss  the weight they should be accorded in the ongoing discussion of whether or not the Maharal created a Golem.
   1. How could anyone imagine that a [Jewish] book written then [i.e., in the 16th century] could include a description of how Jews brought about the deaths of numerous Christians? At that time, the notorious censors censored even more fundamental Jewish teachings. Fear of the Christian authorities characterized every move the Jews made, from the youngest to the oldest.
The argument is presented as a justification for the lack of an early account of the Maharal and the Golem. Only in the 20th century could the full story appear in print, as it appears in נפלאות מהר”ל.  Apparently, the author of the anonymous notice has never read נפלאות מהר”ל. The volume does not depict how “Jews brought about the deaths of numerous Christians.” If the reference here is to the punishment meted out by the Golem to the Christian perpetrators of the blood libel,  נפלאות מהר”ל never depicts the Golem as bringing about the death of anyone, whether Christian or Jew. If the reference here is to the blood libel itself, נפלאות מהר”ל describes only how Christian criminals plotted against Jews (by means of the blood libel) and subsequently needed to be brought to justice by the Christians themselves. Nowhere are Jews described as bringing about the deaths of numerous Christians.
This argument, of course, does not prove that the Maharal created a Golem in the 16th century.
    2. The Maharal’s creation of the Golem is alluded to on his epitaph, in the line that reads: “It is not possible to relate.” More proof than this in not necessary.
The full line on the epitaph reads as follows: “For him, praise best remains silent, for in any event it is not possible to relate the full impact of his many good deeds.”2 See Psalm 65:2 and cf. Rashi to b. Megillah 18a, ד”ה סמא דכולא משתוקא. Nothing is said – or hinted – here about a Golem. Alas, more proof than this is necessary indeed.
    3. If this was an invention of the author of נפלאות מהר”ל, how come a storm was not raised up against him when he published his book a century ago? Although one solitary voice was raised up against him, the majority of Gedolei Yisrael greeted his book with esteem, especially since its author was the noted and respected Gaon, author of numerous works, Rabbi Yehudah Yudel Rosenberg.
First, it should be noted that R. Yudel Rosenberg did not invent the notion that the Maharal of Prague had created a Golem. Evidence for the Maharal’s Golem dates back to 1836 (before R. Yudel Rosenberg was born).3 If the rabbi in Brooklyn claimed otherwise, he was mistaken. Thus, the claim in 1909 that the Maharal of Prague had created a Golem occasioned little or no surprise.
Second, R. Yudel Rosenberg ascribed the book to R. Yitzchok b. R. Shimshon Katz, the son-in-law and contemporary of the Maharal. R. Yudel described in great detail how he had managed to come into possession of this rare manuscript.4 There was no immediate reason to suspect that this was a literary hoax, especially coming from the hand of R. Yudel Rosenberg.
Third, had the book contained pejorative material about the Maharal, a storm would surely have been raised against it. Instead, the book presented the Maharal as a master kabbalist, who created the Golem in order to stave off the notorious blood libel accusations against the Jews. Why should anyone have protested against this heroic image of the Maharal?
In any event, even if one concedes that “the majority of Gedolei Yisrael greeted his book with esteem” (a dubious claim that cannot be proven), it surely does not “prove” that the Maharal created a Golem. A book published in 1909 is hardly proof that the Maharal created a Golem in the 16th century.
    4. Chabad Hasidim relate in detail how R. Yosef Yitzchok Schneersohn visited the attic of the Altneu shul in Prague and saw what he saw. He wasn’t the first to do so – as reported by various elders – in the last 400 years.
Indeed, a long list of the names of the famous and not-so-famous who visited the attic of the Altneu shul can easily be drawn up. That the sainted Rebbe, R. Yosef Yitzchok Schneersohn, visited the attic of the Altneu shul is established fact. It is recorded in contemporary documents, i.e, in the Sichos and Letters of his successor, the Rebbe, R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson.5 Exactly what the Rebbe saw in the attic is less certain. According to one account, when asked, R. Yosef Yitzchok chose not to respond.6 According to another account, he reported that he saw ”what remained of him,” i.e., of the Golem.7 For Lubavitchers, this may be unassailable proof that the Maharal created a Golem, and perhaps that is as it should be. But for historians, dust – or even a bodily form – seen in an attic early in the 20th century hardly constitutes proof that the Maharal created a Golem in the 16th century. As a matter of fact, it should be noted that extensive renovation took place in the attic of the Altneu shul in 1883. No evidence of the Golem was discovered then.8 A film crew visited and filmed the attic in 1984. No evidence of the Golem was discovered then.9
    5. No one disputes the fact that the Maharal put an end to the blood libel accusations that the Jews had suffered for generations. And even this was not fully spelled out in the book [i.e., נפלאות מהר”ל]. Can someone explain how the Maharal accomplished this?
The rhetorical question at the end of the fifth “proof” presupposes the existence of the Golem. Only by means of the Golem was the Maharal able to counter the blood libel accusations. No one disputes that the Maharal put an end to the blood libel accusations? Quite the contrary, no one has ever discovered a shred of evidence that links the Maharal to staving off a blood libel accusation! Nowhere in his writings, nowhere in the writings of his contemporaries (Jewish and non-Jewish) and disciples, is there a word about the Maharal’s involvement in staving off a blood libel accusation. That he put an end to the blood libel accusation is historically untrue. While the blood libel charge became less frequent in the Hapsburg lands after the 16th century, it hardly disappeared.10 From the 16th through the 18th centuries, the blood libel accusation largely shifted to Eastern Europe. In Poland alone, between 1547 and 1787, there were 81 recorded cases of blood libel accusation against the Jews.11 The Beilis case is a sad reminder that the blood libel accusation continued into the 20th century as well.12
Needless to say, this argument hardly proves that the Maharal created a Golem in the 16th century.
    6. I saw in מליצי אש  to 18 Elul,13 a citation from a manuscript copy of a letter by the Maharal from the year 5343 [=1583] addressed to R. Yaakov Ginzburg, describing how he [the Maharal] was directed by Heaven to create a Golem in order to save the Jewish people. See there for details.
The manuscript referred to here is a notorious 20th century forgery of a letter ascribed to the Maharal, itself based upon R. Yudel Rosenberg’s נפלאות מהר”ל. The Munkatcher Rebbe, R. Hayyim  Eleazar Shapira (d. 1937), apparently was the first of many to expose this forgery.14
II
 In a subsequent issue of המאור, R. Hayyim Levi added 4 new “proofs” that the Maharal created a Golem.15  A brief summary of each of the new “proofs” is followed by an even briefer discussion of the weight they should be accorded in the ongoing discussion of whether or not the Maharal created a Golem.
    1. The חיד”א in his שם הגדולים16 cites a responsum from the חכם צבי,17 who in turn cites a letter by R. Naftoli Ha-Kohen of Frankfurt,18 who mentions his ancestor the Maharal “who made use of the Holy Spirit.” The חיד”א adds that he heard an awesome story about the Maharal and a revelation he had which led to a private conversation between the Maharal and the King of Bohemia.
Not a word about the Golem of Prague appears in any of these sources. Indeed, where we can examine the available evidence (in the case of the awesome story heard by the חיד”א), it apparently had nothing to do with a Golem.19
    2. R. Shimon of Zelikhov, משגיח of Yeshivat Hakhmei Lublin, said: “Everyone knows that the Maharal made use of the Sefer Yetzirah and created a Golem. I don’t claim that one needs to believe the tales in the storybooks about the Maharal. But it is clear that the Maharal used the book of Yetzirah and created a Golem.”20
R. Shimon of Zelikhov, a great gaon and zaddik, died as a martyr in 1943.21 His claim in the 20th century, however weighty, does not prove that the Maharal created a Golem in the 16th century.
    3. In the book אלף כתב,22 the author writes that he heard from the Spinka Rebbe23 in 1922 that he saw an original letter of the Maharal that described how and why he created the Golem.
This is the same notorious 20th century forgery listed as a “proof” above, section I, §6. For the refutation of this proof, see the reference cited in note 14.
    4. See סיפורים נחמדים,24 which records a story in the name of R. Yitzchok of Skvere25 about the Maharal, the Golem, and the double recitation of מזמור שיר ליום השבת at the קבלת שבת service.
This story, first published in 1837,26 is one of the oldest of the Maharal and the Golem stories. It was retold by R. Yitzchok of Skvere, and published in Yiddish (in 1890) and Hebrew (in 1903). Wonderful as the story may be, it cannot be adduced as “proof” for an alleged event that occurred some 300 years earlier.
—————————
Even aside from the dictates of rationalism, what militates against the notion that the Maharal created a Golem is the fact that nowhere in his voluminous writings is there any indication that he created one. More importantly, no contemporary of the Maharal – neither Jew nor Gentile in Prague – seems to have been aware that the Maharal created a Golem. Even when eulogized, whether in David Gans’ צמח דוד 27 or on his epitaph (see above), not a word is said about the creation of a Golem. No Hebrew work published in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries (even in Prague) is aware that the Maharal created a Golem.28
In this context, it is worth noting that R. Yedidiah Tiah Weil (1721-1805),29 a distinguished Talmudist who was born in Prague and resided there for many years – and who was a disciple of his father R. Nathaniel Weil (author of the קרבן נתנאל) and of R. Jonathan Eibeschuetz, both of them long time residents of Prague – makes no mention of the Maharal’s Golem.
R. Yedidiah Tiah Weil
R. Nathaniel Weil
This, despite the fact that he discusses golems in general, and offers proof that even “close to his time” golems existed. The proof is a listing of famous golems, such as the golems created by R. Avigdor Kara (d. 1439) of Prague30 and R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem (d. 1583) of Chelm.31 Noticeably absent is any mention of the Golem of the Maharal of Prague.32
Note too that the first sustained biographical account of the Maharal – by a distinguished rabbinic scholar from Prague – was published in 1745.33 It knows nothing about a Golem of Prague. The deafening silence of the evidence from the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries needs to be addressed by those who are persuaded that the Maharal created a Golem.
The cumulative yield of the “proofs” put forward in המאור in support of the claim that the Maharal created a Golem is perhaps best described as an embarrassment of poverty. In the light of what passes for historical “proof” in המאור, it would seem that המאור – a reputable rabbinic journal – would probably do well to focus more on halakhah and less on Jewish history.
III
Whereas המאור commemorated the 400th anniversary of the Maharal’s death by focusing on the imaginary accounts of the Maharal and the Golem, scholars in the Czech Republic are to be congratulated for commemorating the 400th anniversary by designing a magnificent exhibition of the Maharal’s life and works and displaying it at the Prague Castle. The exhibition was accompanied by an even more magnificent printed volume edited by Alexandr Putik and entitled Path of life (and referred to several times in the notes to this posting). Despite the many excellent studies in the book devoted to the Maharal’s life and thought, much space – some will argue too much space – is devoted to the history of the Golem in art, sculpture, film, and theater. In contrast to המאור, the essays in Path of Life assume that the Golem of Prague was legendary, not a fact. Here, we reproduce one of the many imaginary paintings of the Maharal and the Golem displayed at the exhibition and included in the volume. It was done by Karel Dvorak in 1951.33

 

Not to be outdone, the Czech post office issued a commemorative  stamp to mark the 400th anniversary of the death of the Maharal. It features an imaginary portrait of the Maharal wearing a European casquette, reminiscent of the one the חפץ חיים used to wear in Radun. The first day cover includes an imaginary portrait of the Golem as well.
One wonders if the Maharal, prescient as he was, ever imagined that this is how he would be remembered on the 400th anniversary of his death!
Notes
1.  Anonymous, “הילולא קדישא הארבע מאה של המהר”ל מפראג זי”ע: יצירת הגולם” Ha-Ma’or  62:4 (2009), p. 95.
2.  The Hebrew original reads:
לו דומיה תהלה כי אין מספרים לרוב כח מעשי[ו] הישרים . See O. Muneles, כתובות מבית-העלמין היהודי העתיק בפראג, Jerusalem, 1988, p. 273. Cf. K. Lieben, גל עד, Prague, 1856, Hebrew section, p. 3.
3.   See S. [the author asked that I not reveal his name], “An Earlier Written Source for the Golem of the Maharal from 1836,” at On the Main Line, November 4, 2009. Cf. S. Leiman, “The Adventure of the Maharal of Prague in London,” Judaic Studies 3(2004), p. 20, n. 34; and see below, n. 32, for evidence from 1835 that may link the Maharal and the Golem.
4.  נפלאות מהר”ל , Piotrkow, 1909, pp. 3-4.
5.  See, e.g., R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson, תורת מנחם: התוועדויות, Brooklyn, 1992, vol. 1, p. 6.
6.  See previous note.
7.  Copy of a hand-written note by R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson published in the periodical כפר חב”ד, issue 798, 1998. The Hebrew reads in part:
בנוגע לעיקר הענין (שהמהר”ל עשה את הגולם), בעצמי שמעתי מכ”ק מו”ח אדמו”ר שראה הנשאר ממנו בעליית בית הכנסת דמהר”ל פראג.
 The full text of the letter is also available online at http://theantitzemach.blogspot.com, entry “למה נקרא שמו ברוך דוב“, Tuesday, April 27, 2010, in a comment by Anonymous posted on Wednesday, April 28, 2010 at 12:28 A.M. I am indebted to Zalman Alpert, reference librarian at the Mendel Gottesman Library of Yeshiva University, for calling my attention to the online version (and to many other important references over the many years we have known each other).
Yet a third account, drawn from a conversation with Rebbetzin Chana Gurary, a daughter of R. Yosef Yitzchok Schneersohn, provides even more detail. Rebbetzin Gurary reported:

I then asked him [her father, the Rebbe] to tell me what he had seen there. My father paused for a moment and said: “When I came up there, the room was filled with dust and shemus. In the center of the room I could see the form of a man wrapped up and covered. The body was lying on its side. I was very frightened by this sight. I looked around at some of the shemus that were there and left frightened by what I had seen.

Special thanks to Rabbi Shimon Deutsch for providing me with a copy of Rebbetzin Gurary’s testimony, as reported to Rabbi Berel Junik.

8.  See N. Gruen, Der hohe Rabbi Loew, Prague, 1885, p. 39.
9.  See I. Mackerle, Tajemstvi prazskeho Golema, Prague, 1992. Cf. his “The Mystery of Prague’s Golem,” December 12, 2009, at http://en.mackerle.cz.
10.  See, e.g., R. Po-chia Hsia, The Myth of Ritual Murder, New Haven, 1988, pp. 203-209.
11.  See Z. Guldon and J. Wijaczka, “The Accusation of Ritual Murder in Poland 1500-1800,” Polin 10(1997), pp. 99-140.
12.  For basic bibliography on the Beilis case, See S. Leiman, “Benzion Katz: Mrs. Baba Bathra,” Tradition 42:4 (2009), pp. 51-52, n. 1.
13.  Rabbi A. Stern, מליצי אש, Vranov, 1932. In the three volume Jerusalem, 1975 photomechanical reproduction of מליצי אש, the passage appears in vol. 2, p. 87.
14.  For discussion and references, see S. Leiman, “The Letter of the Maharal on the Creation of the Golem: A Modern Forgery,” Seforim Blog,  January 3, 2010.
15.  R. Hayyim Levi, “המהר”ל זי”ע” Ha-Ma’or 63:1 (2009), p. 84.
16.  R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai (d. 1806), שם הגדולים השלם , Jerusalem, 1979, vol. 1, p. 124.
17.  R. Zvi Ashkenazi (d. 1718), שו”ת חכם צבי, סימן ע”ו, ed. Jerusalem, 1998, pp. 183-4.
18.  Loc. cit. R. Naftoli Ha-Kohen Katz of Frankfurt died in 1719. Cf. below, n. 32.
19.  See Rabbi A.S. Michelson, שמן הטוב, Piotrkow, 1905, pp. 118-120.
20.  R. Avraham Shimon of Zelikhov, נהרי א”ש, Jerusalem, 1993, p. 173.
21.  See M. Wunder, מאורי גליציה, Jerusalem, 1978, vol. 1, cols. 238-243; Jerusalem, 2005, vol. 6, cols. 105-106.
22.  Rabbi Y. Weiss (d. 1942), אלף כתב, Bnei Brak, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 47-48.
23.  R. Yitzchok Eizik Weiss (d. 1944). On him, see T.Z. Rabinowicz, The Encyclopedia of Hasidism, London, 1996, pp. 534-5.
24.  Y. W. Tzikernik, ספורים נחמדים, Zhitomir, 1903, pp. 13-14. Tzikernik’s hasidic tales were reissued by G. Nigal in סיפורי חסידות צירנוביל, Jerusalem, 1994.  In Nigal’s edition, the story about the Maharal and the Golem appears on pp. 128-130.  Tzikernik, who died circa 1908, was a follower of R. Yitzchok Twersky of Skvere (see next note) and recorded his stories for posterity.
25.  On R. Yitzchok Twersky of Skvere (d. 1885), see Y. Alfasi, אנציקלופדיה לחסידות: אישים, Jerusalem, 2000, vol. 2, cols. 339-40.
26.  The 1837 version appears in B. Auerbach, Spinoza, Stuttgart, 1837, vol. 2, pp. 2-3. See above, note 3, for a similar version of the story published in 1836. But the 1836 version makes no mention of the double recitation of מזמור שיר ליום השבת at the קבלת שבת  service.
27.  See David Gans, צמח דוד, Prague, 1592, entry for the year 5352 (= 1592). In M. Breuer’s edition (Jerusalem, 1983), the passage appears on pp. 145-6.
28.  It is noteworthy that in 1615, Zalman Zvi Aufhausen, a Jew residing in Germany, published a defense of Judaism against a vicious attack by the apostate Samuel Brenz. In the introduction to his defense, Aufhausen writes that he was encouraged by the great Jewish scholars in Prague and Germany to undertake his defense of Judaism. In the list of accusations, Brenz accused the Jews of engaging in magical rites and creating golems out of clay. Aufhausen admitted that Jews created golems out of clay in the talmudic period (see b. Sanhedrin 65b), but only by means of Sefer Yetzirah and the Divine Name, and not by engaging in magical rites. After the talmudic period, according to Aufhausen, Jews no longer had the ability to create golems out of clay, especially in the German lands. Aufhausen concludes:
 אביר אונזרי גולמיים אין דיזן לאנדן מכין מיר ניט אויש ליימן זונדר
אויש מוטר לייב ווערין זיא גיבורן.
    In these lands, however, our Golems are not made from clay, but
rather they are born from the bodies of their mothers.
See Zalman Zvi Aufhausen, יודישר טירייאק [second edition], Altdorf, 1680, pp. 7a-b. Given the apologetic nature of Aufhausen’s defense, it is difficult to assess how much stock should be put in his claim. But, surely, if the Maharal’s Golem had been strolling the streets of Prague a decade or two earlier than the appearance of the first edition of Aufhausen’s work, he could hardly claim openly that Jews no longer had the ability the create Golems out of clay after the Talmudic period.
29.  See L. Loewenstein, Nathaniel Weil Oberlandrabbiner in Karlsruhe und seine Familie, Frankfurt, 1898, pp. 23-85.
30.  See the entry on him in Encyclopaedia Judaica, Jerusalem, 1971, vol. 10, cols. 758-759. In the 17th and 18th centuries, it was widely believed that he was the author of ספר הפליאה, a kabbalistic work that describes the creation of a Golem. Prof. Moshe Idel (in a private communication) suggests that this may have led to the belief that R. Avigdor Kara of Prague created a Golem. In any event, the fact that a distinguished Talmudist in 18th century Prague was persuaded that R. Avigdor Kara had created a Golem, suggests the possibility of a transfer in Prague of the Golem legend from R. Avigdor Kara (who by the end of the 18th century was relatively unknown) to the Maharal (who by the end of the 18th century resurfaced as a major Jewish figure whose works were being reprinted for the first time in almost 250 years).  For other suggestions regarding the linkage between the Maharal and the Golem, see V. Sadek, “Stories of the Golem and their Relation to the Work of Rabbi Loew of Prague,” Judaica Bohemiae 23(1987), pp. 85-91; H. J. Kieval, “Pursuing the Golem of Prague: Jewish Culture and the Invention of a Tradition,” Modern Judaism 17(1997), pp. 1-23; Kieval’s updated version in his Languages of Community: The Jewish Experience in the Czech Lands, Berkeley, 2000, pp. 95-113;  B. L. Sherwin, “The Golem of Prague and his Ancestors,” in A. Putik, ed., Path of Life: Rabbi Judah Loew ben Bezalel, Prague, 2009, pp. 273-291; and J. Davis, “The Legend of  Maharal before the Golem,” Judaica Bohemiae 45(2009), pp. 41-59.
31.  On R. Eliyahu Ba’al Shem of Chelm, see J. Guenzig, Die Wundermaenner in juedischen Volke, Antwerpen, 1921, pp. 24-26; G. Scholem, “The Idea of the Golem,” in his On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism, New York, 1969, pp. 199-204; M. Idel, “R. Eliyahu, the Master of the Name, in Helm,” in his Golem, Albany, 1990, pp. 207-212; and idem, גולם, Tel Aviv, 1996, pp. 181-184.
32.  R. Yedidiah Tiah Weil, לבושי בדים, Jerusalem, 1988, p. 37. The passage comes from a sermon delivered in 1780.
Yet another 18th century witness, R. Saul Berlin (d. 1794), was apparently ignorant of the Maharal’s Golem. In his כתב יושר (written in 1784 but published posthumously in Berlin, 1794), p. 3b, Berlin writes:
ואולי דבר סרה על הנסים הידועים לכל בני הגולה, כאותם שעשה מוהר”ר לוי [קרי: ליוא] בהזמינו את הקיסר רודאלפוס למשתה, וע”י שם הוריד בירה מן השמים, או בגולם שעשה מוהר”ר נפתלי זצ”ל אשר עפרו עודנו טמון וגנוז.
              Did [Wessely] speak disparagingly about the miracles known throughout the Jewish Diaspora? [Did he speak disparagingly] about those miracles performed by Rabbi Liva when he invited Emperor Rudolph to his party, and when by means of a Divine name he caused the Prague Castle to descend from heaven? Or regarding the Golem created by Rabbi Naftoli of blessed memory, whose dust still remains stored away?
Clearly, R. Saul Berlin knew legends about the Maharal. But when he needed to adduce a sample of the Golem legend, he had to turn elsewhere! Interestingly, the legend about the Prague Castle descending from heaven onto the Jewish quarter of Prague was first told about R. Adam Baal Shem, and not about the Maharal.  It first appeared in print in Prague in the 17th century. By the 19th century, the very same story was told in Prague circles with the Maharal as its hero. Once again (see above, note 30) it would appear that we have a sample of the transfer in Prague of a legend from one hero to another, with the Maharal as the recipient. In general, see C. Shmeruk, ספרות יידש בפולין, Jerusalem, 1981, pp. 119-139.
Even more interesting is the reference to the Golem of R. Naftoli, otherwise unrecorded in Jewish literature. The reference is almost certainly to R. Naftoli Ha-Kohen Katz (1645-1719), distinguished halakhist and master of the practical kabbalah, whose amulets – apparently — didn’t always work. From 1690 to 1704 he served as Chief Rabbi of Posen. (Note too that the Maharal served as a Chief Rabbi of Posen!) Recorded in Jewish literature (though I have never seen it cited in any discussion of the Golem of Prague) is an oral tradition from 1835 that the Maharal’s Golem was created in Posen and that the remains of the Golem could still be seen in the 19th century in the old synagogue of Posen “under the eaves, lifeless, and inactive like a piece of clay.” See S. M. Gollancz, Biographical Sketches and Selected Verses, London, 1930, pp. v and 50-55, and especially p. 54. It is at least possible that R. Saul Berlin heard about the legend of the Golem of Posen and assumed (wrongly) that the Golem was created by the famed practical kabbalist and rabbi of Posen, R. Naftoli.
I am indebted to S. of the On the Main Line Blogspot (see above, note 3) for calling my attention to the כתב יושר passage.
Apparently, reports about the remains of Golems in attics were a rather widespread phenomenon in the early modern period. Aside from the reports about Prague and Posen, see the report about the Great Synagogue in Vilna  (where the Vilna Gaon’s Golem rested in peace) in H.L. Gordon, The Maggid of Caro, New York, 1949, p. 176. A similar report about a Golem in Beshtian circles is recorded in R. Yosef of Tcherin, דרכי החיים, Piotrkow, 1884, Introduction, pp. 14-15.
33.  R. Meir Perels (d. 1739), מגילת יוחסין , appended to R. Moshe Katz, מטה משה, Zolkiev, 1745. It was reissued separately in Warsaw, 1864, and is available in L. Honig, ed., חדושי אגדות מהר”ל מפראג, London, 1962, vol. 1, pp. 17-32. Perels’ מגילת יוחסין is riddled with inaccuracies and needs to be used with caution. See A. Putik and D. Polakovic, “Judah Loew ben Bezalel, called Maharal: A Study of His Genealogy and Biography,” in A. Putik, ed., Path of Life: Rabbi Judah ben Bezalel, Prague, 2009, pp. 29-83. Putik and Polakovic cite significant earlier studies by Y. Yudlov, D.N. Rotner, S. Sprecher, and others. See also N.A. Vekstein ‘s important analysis of Perels’ מגילת יוחסין, entitled “המהר”ל מפראג,” in המודיע, September 4, 2009.

In the light of the discussion in notes 30-33 — and until new evidence is forthcoming — it seems evident that the linkage between the Maharal and the Golem originated after 1780 and before 1835, almost certainly in Prague but perhaps in Posen.

34.  See A. Putik, ed., Path of Life, pp. 398-399.

 




Marc Shapiro: R. Kook on Sacrifices & Other Assorted Comments

R. Kook on Sacrifices and Other Assorted Comments
by: Marc B. Shapiro

1. At the beginning of my previous post (the Gurock review) I mentioned R. Solomon Isaac Scheinfeld (1860-1943). The source of the comment I quote is his Olam ha-Sheker (Milwaukee, 1936), p. 77.1 Scheinfeld was the unofficial chief rabbi in Milwaukee, arriving there in 1902 and serving until his death in 1943. Here is his picture.

He had a traditional education, having studied for three years in the Kovno Kollel under R. Isaac Elhanan Spektor, from whom he received semikhah.2 He also had a very original mind, and wrote a number of books and essays. One of his most fascinating works is the article he published under the pseudonym Even Shayish. In this article he argued that since sacrifices will never be revived, they are now irrelevant to Judaism and all references to them should be removed from the prayer book.
R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg has a lengthy essay in which he critiques Scheinfeld’s position. A Hebrew translation of this essay appears in volume 2 of Kitvei R. Weinberg. Yet Weinberg himself leaves open the possibility that there won’t be a return to sacrifices (p. 255):
אין דנים כאן על עצם הרעיון היסודי של הקרבנות. לו היתה היום קיימת אצלנו שאלה כזאת והיא דורשת פתרון דחוף – אין מספר מצומצם של יהודים בארץ אחת בני סמכות להכריע בענין זה, וכל שכן כאשר הם אינם מייצגים את כלל ישראל. שאלה זאת חייבים להביא לפני הבית דין של כלל ישראל. רק לבית דין כזה הרשות לקבוע אם להשאיר טקס מקודש בעם בתוקפו או לבטלו. היום שאין לנו ארץ ולא בית המקדש ולא כהנים הרי זה מגוחך ומצער כאחת להעלות תביעה לבטל עבודת קרבנות!
Weinberg doesn’t mention Maimonides, but this is usually to where people turn when seeking to argue against a revival of sacrifices. According to the Guide 3:32, Maimonides thought that sacrifices were a concession to the masses’ primitive religious notions, developed in an idolatrous society. While Maimonides is explicit in the Mishneh Torah that there will be a return of the sacrificial order, his reason for sacrifices offered in the Guide led some people to assume that his true opinion was that there will not be sacrifices in the future. One example is R. Simhah Paltrovitch, Simhat Avot (New York, 1917), pp. 7-8, who offers a mystical approach:
אמנם מה נעשה במה שדברי מורנו ורבנו הרמב”ם ז”ל שהוא בסברתו מתנגד לאלה הדברים, ואומר כי בימים הבאים עת קץ משיחנו, יבוטל עבודה בקרבנות ולא יהיה עוד . . . להעולם הזה נתנו הפשט והדרוש, ובעולם השני יקויים הרמז והסוד . . .וכן ממש הוא טעם של הרמב”ם ז”ל שיבוטל הקרבנות, כי אז יהי’ התורה על צד הרמז וסוד כמו שארי המצוות המבוארות בתורה, כי יתחלפון מן הפשט לרמז וסוד שמשונים מן הפשט.
R. Joseph Messas also cites Maimonides’ reason for sacrifices and concludes that there will be no return of the sacrificial order (Otzar ha-Mikhtavim, vol. 2, no. 1305).
לפי”ז יתבטלו לעתיד כל הקרבנות כי זה אלפי שנים משנעקרה ע”ז מישראל, וישראל גוי אחד, עובדים רק לאל אחד ועל ידי ישראל בגלותם נעקרה ע”ז גם מכל האומות.
What about the problem that the abolition of sacrifices would mean a change in Torah law, which is a point that R. Kook will also deal with? Messas answers simply:
ואין בזה שנוי בתורה חלילה, דזיל בתר טעמא
What this means, I think, is that from the beginning sacrifices were only intended to be offered in a society in which people were attached to primitive religious notions associated with idolatry, and the animal sacrifices that went along with this. However, once this era has passed from the scene, then there will no longer be any obligation for sacrifices.

A really shocking comment against sacrfices appears in a supposed letter from R. Yaakov of Lissa to R. Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (published in Ha-Posek, Kislev 5712). Responding to Kalischer’s advocacy of renewing sacrifices even before the coming of the Messiah, R. Yaakov claims that to do so would cause Jews to be a subject of mockery by the Gentiles and the non-religious Jews.

לבי נוקף ונפשי מלא רטט ורעד כי אם ישמעו הגויים והקלים בישראל שאנחנו מקריבים קרבנות ימלאו שחוק פיהם ונהיה 
ח”ו ללעג ולקלס וה’ יודע כמה צרות וקלקולים יצמחו מזה

It is very unlikely, to put it mildly, that a gadol be-Yisrael would give this as his reason for not fulfilling a mitzvah. When one realizes that the person who published this letter was the famous forger Chaim Bloch, then all doubts are removed: The letter, like so much else published by Bloch, is a complete forgery. Apparently Bloch had some negative feelings about sacrifices and transferred them to R. Yaakov. Interestingly, when this letter was republished in Dovev Siftei Yeshenim, vol. 1, Bloch made a subtle change in the letter, which as far as I know, no one has yet pointed out. The letter’s authenticity had been attacked by Zvi Harkavy in Kol Torah (Nisan-Iyar 5712), and one of the things he pointed to was this line, and that R. Yaakov could never have written it. So when Bloch republished the letter, in an attempt to bolster its authenticity, he altered it to read as follows (I have underlined the newly added words):

כי אם ישמעו הגויים והקלים בישראל שאנחנו מקריבים קרבנות בזמן הזה לפני ביאת משיח צדקנו ובטרם עומד בית מקדשנו 
על מכונו, ימלאו שחוק פיהם ונהיה ח”ו ללעג ולקלס

Had he been smart enough to have added these extra words in the first edition of his forgery, it would have been more believable. Now R. Yaakov is not speaking of the non-Jews and the non-religious mocking the offering of sacrifices, but only mocking the offering of them before the coming of the Messiah and the building of the Temple.

Michael Friedlaender’s The Jewish Religion (London, 1891), was for many years regarded as a standard work of Orthodox belief. As far as I know, it was the first of its kind in English and can still hold its own against many more recently published books. You can see it here. On pages 162-163, 417-418, he speaks of the return of the sacrificial order in Messianic days, and how we should look forward to this, even if it is contrary to our taste. He says that we should not model Divine Law according to our liking, but rather model our liking according to the will of God. Yet despite these strong statements, he was also sensitive to those who were not comfortable with sacrifices. He writes as follows (p. 452):

References to the Sacrificial Service, and especially prayers for its restoration, are disliked by some, who think such restoration undesirable. Let no one pray for a thing against his will; let him whose heart is not with his fellow-worshippers in any of their supplications silently substitute his own prayers for them; but let him not interfere with the devotion of those to whom “the statues of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart” . . . and who yearn for the opportunity of fulfilling Divine commandments which they cannot observe at present.

This passage is quoted by British Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz in his Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 532. Upon seeing this, R. Yerucham Leiner, then living in London, wrote a letter to the Jewish Chronicle (Dec. 17, 1943; I learnt of this from Louis Jacobs, Tree of Life, second ed., p. xxix). Before quoting from his letter, let me reproduce what Wikipedia says about this most incredible figure.

Grand Rabbi Yerucham Leiner of Radzin, son of Likutei Divrei Torah, author of Tiferes Yerucham, Zikaron LaRishonim, Mipi Hashmua, Zohar HaRakiya. Moved from Chelm to London to America. Continuation of the Radziner line in America, and one of the last direct descendants of the Leiner family. After the war, he did not reinstitute the wearing of techeiles as other branches of Radzin did, even though his father, Grand Rabbi Avraham Yehoshua Heschel Leiner of Radzin-Chelm, wore them, as he was a chosid of his older brother, the Orchos Chayim, who had reinstituted the wearing of techeiles. Reb Yerucham believed that the original formula of his uncle was lost during the war. This is the reason that his family doesn’t wear techeiles today, only pairs that were left from pre-war Europe. Reb Yerucham was an expert in all areas of Torah and scholarship. There existed very few admorim/tzaddikim since the beginning of Chassidus who were also lamdanim in both the Polish and Lithuanian styles of learning, bibliographers, Jewish historians, very learned in Kabbalah works, philologists, and masters of both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. Reb Yerucham was very close with the Satmar Rebbe, Rabbi Yoelish Teitelbaum ZTVK”L. He always made sure to spend a few weeks vacationing with the him, specifically learning Midrashei Chazal, of which they were both masters. He studied and visited with Rabbi Yitzchok Hutner, and they were good friends in later life. They always treated one another with special respect. He established the Radziner shtiebel in Boro Park. Died 20 Av 5724 (1964). Buried in Beth Israel Cemetery, Woodbridge, New Jersey

Responding to the quote from Friedlaender, Leiner wrote: “This opinion was put forward by the founders of Reform Judaism, Holdheim and Geiger. But it is hardly in accord with Orthodox traditions of Judaism.” The editor of the Jewish Chronicle responsed: “The words quoted with regard to the Musaph are those of the great and sainted scholar, Dr. Michael Friedlander, for 42 years Principal of Jews College: and it is certainly strange to class him with Holdheim and Geiger.”

The most famous of our sages to speak of a Messianic era without animal sacrifices is, of course, R. Kook, who envisions vegetable sacrifices. He writes this in his commentary to the siddur, Olat ha-Reiyah, vol. 1, p. 292. In the preface R. Zvi Yehudah tells us that he began writing this commentary during World War I. I don’t need to go into any detail on this, as I have done so already in The Limits of Orthodox Theology, where I also mention passages in R. Kook’s writings that offer a different approach. The notion that there will only be vegetable sacrifices in Messianic days is, of course, a radical position, and many who don’t know R. Kook’s writings find it impossible to accept that he could have said this. This is what happened when R. Yosef Kanefsky of Los Angeles published an essay in which he mentioned R. Kook’s view.3 He was attacked by some prominent rabbis since they found it impossible to believe that R. Kook could say what was attributed to him. Yet it was Kanefsky who was right, not his opponents.

In my book I dealt with R. Kook’s position on sacrifices, because positing that there will be no sacrifices in the future would seem to be in contradiction to Maimonides’ Principle that the commandments of the Torah are eternal. That consideration is precisely what makes his position so radical. A couple of years ago one of R. Kook’s notebooks dating from his time as rabbi in Bausk, which lasted until 1904, was published. We actually have two publications of this, one by Boaz Ofen called Kevatzim mi-Ketav Yad Kodsho, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 2008), and the other, which comes out of the world of Merkaz ha-Rav, called Pinkesei ha-Reiyah (Jerusalem, 2008).

This is not the first competing publications of the same material by these people, and as I will show in my forthcoming book, the Merkaz editions are tainted by censorship in that “problematic” passages are removed.4 Those who claim to be the greatest adherents of R. Kook have once again taken it upon themselves to save their master from himself, as it were, and decided which writings of R. Kook should appear and which should not. Yet in the passage I am interested in now (no. 8 in the Ofen edition and no. 6 in the Merkaz edition), the two books are identical. The passage is very significant since it shows you that even in his earlier years R. Kook had the same notion later expressed in Olat ha-Reiyah, that the future would only know vegetable sacrifices. (In case people are wondering, R. Kook was not a vegetarian. Yet he did see vegetarianism as part of the eschatological future. His great student, the Nazir, was a vegetarian, as was Nazir’s son-in-law, R. Shlomo Goren, and as is his son, R. Shear Yashuv Cohen.5)

This passage gives us new insight into R. Kook’s view of sacrifices, and how things will change in the future era. He begins by speaking of the abandonment of meat-eating in the Messianic era, since this will not be something that people desire. Recall that in speaking of eating meat, the Torah writes (Deut. 12:6): כי תאוה נפשך לאכל בשר, which means “when thy soul desires to eat meat.” The Messianic era is not a time when people will have this desire, as R. Kook also explains in his famous essay on vegetarianism, “Afikim ba-Negev”.

What about the sacrifices that are required by the Torah? R. Kook offers a few possibilities. One is that sacrifices will still be necessary. Yet he also speculates that perhaps certain animals will be so spiritually advanced that they will on their own offer themselves as sacrifices, in acknowledgment of the great benefit that will come to them and the world through their actions.6 This solves the problem of people deliberately killing animals, which goes against his conception of the eschaton.

What is most interesting for our purpose is another suggestion by R. Kook, namely, that the Sanhedrin will use its power to uproot a matter from the Torah in order to abolish obligatory animal sacrifices. Their reason for doing this will be that the killing of animals will no longer be part of the culture in Messianic days. R. Kook even shows how the Rabbis will be able to find support for this step from the Torah. What he is doing, I think, is imagining himself as part of the future Sanhedrin that abolishes sacrifices, and informing us of the derashah that will be used to support this. This is related to what I wrote in an earlier post, see here, and I repeat it now:

As to the general problem of laws that trouble the ethical sense of people, we find that it is R. Kook who takes the bull by the horns and suggests a radical approach. The issue was much more vexing for R. Kook than for other sages, as in these types of matters he could not simply tell people that their consciences were leading them astray and that they should submerge their inherent feelings of right and wrong. It is R. Kook, after all, who famously says that fear of heaven cannot push aside one’s natural morality (Shemonah Kevatzim 1:75):

אסור ליראת שמים שתדחק את המוסר הטבעי של האדם, כי אז אינה עוד יראת שמים טהורה. סימן ליראת שמים טהורה הוא, כשהמוסר הטבעי, הנטוע בטבע הישר של האדם, הולך ועולה על פיה במעלות יותר גבוהות ממה שהוא עומד מבלעדיה. אבל אם תצוייר יראת שמים בתכונה כזאת, שבלא השפעתה על החיים היו החיים יותר נוטים לפעול טוב, ולהוציא אל הפועל דברים מועילים לפרט ולכלל, ועל פי השפעתה מתמעט כח הפועל ההוא, יראת שמים כזאת היא יראה פסולה.

These are incredible words. R. Kook was also “confident that if a particular moral intuition reflecting the divine will achieves widespread popularity, it will no doubt enable the halakhic authorities to find genuine textual basis for their new understanding.” R. Kook formulates his idea as follows (Iggerot ha-Reiyah, vol. 1, p. 103):

ואם תפול שאלה על איזה משפט שבתורה, שלפי מושגי המוסר יהיה נראה שצריך להיות מובן באופן אחר, אז אם באמת ע”פ ב”ד הגדול יוחלט שזה המשפט לא נאמר כ”א באותם התנאים שכבר אינם, ודאי ימצא ע”ז מקור בתורה.

R. Kook is not speaking about apologetics here, but a revealing of Torah truth that was previously hidden. The truth is latent, and with the development of moral ideas, which is driven by God, the new insight in the Torah becomes apparent.

Ad kan leshoni in the previous post.

In other words, R. Kook sees the Sanhedrin as able to actualize new moral and religious insights that have become apparent. That is why it is important for the Sanhedrin to use derashot when dealing with these matters, as this shows that the idea is not something new that has been developed, but something that was latent in the Torah, and only now has become apparent.

So what derashah can be used to justify an abolishment of animal sacrifices? R. Kook points to Num 28:2: את קרבני לחמי לאשי . This is usually translated as “My food which is presented to Me for offerings made by fire”. Yet the word לחמי actually means “my bread.” Right after this, in discussing the particulars of the sacrifice, the Torah states: “The one lamb thou shalt offer in the morning.” R. Kook’s proposed messianic derashah is: “Whenever animals are killed for personal consumption, you should use them for sacrifices, but when they are not killed for personal use, make sacrifices of bread.”

I don’t think I am exaggerating in saying that this is one of the most provocative and radical texts in R. Kook’s writings. I say this not because of his advocacy of abolishing sacrifices, which I don’t think to be that significant in the larger scheme, but due to how he is envisioning the process by which the Rabbis will actually use derashot to create a Messianic Judaism.

The Rambam, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1, speaks of laws derived from the hermeneutical principles that can be altered by a future beit din ha-gadol (even one not as great as the one that established the original law). This was the great fear of the opponents of a reconstituted Sanhedrin, that the Mizrachi rabbis would take upon themselves to do precisely this. Since so many of our laws are based on derashot, Judaism as we practice it can be entirely reworked. R. Kook is showing us how this can be done, but he is going further than anything Maimonides envisioned, since sacrifices are not matters that have been established based on a rabbinic derashah but are commanded by explicit biblical verses.

Basically, what R. Kook is doing is recreating the world of the Pharisees, before Judaism was bound to codes (beginning with the Mishnah). It was a time when Jewish law was developing and the biblical verses could be read—some would say “read”— in all sorts of ways. In the days of the Pharisees much of the halakhah as we know it was created, and to a large extent that can be done again in the Messianic era.
Here are R. Kook’s words (note also his exegesis with ריח ניחוח) :

שהסנהדרין אז ימצאו לנכון, ע”פ הכח שיש להם לעקור דבר מה”ת בשוא”ת, לפטור מקרבנות החובה של מין החי, כיון שכבר חדלה הריגת החי מן המנהג של תשמישי הרשות והמקרא מסייע, שקרא הכתוב לקרבן לחם, “את קרבני לחמי לאשי”, ואח”כ אומר “את הכבש אחד”, הא כיצד? כל זמן שבע”ח קרבים לתשמיש הרשות, עשה בע”ח לגבוה, אבל כשבע”ח אינם קרבים לרשות, עשה הקרבנות מלחם, ועל זה רמזו חז”ל: “כל הקרבנות בטלין וקרבן תודה אינה בטלה” שיש בה לחם . . . רק כעת עד זמן ההשלמה תאמר להם שיקריבו כבשים, ומותנה תמיד לריח ניחוח, וכיון שיבורר בזמן ההשלמה שהריגת הבע”ח [אינה ראויה] אי אפשר שתהיה לריח ניחוח.

R. Kook then cites the proof he mentions in Olat ha-Reiyah and in his essay “Afikim ba-Negev” (Otzarot ha-Reiyah [Rishon le-Tziyon, 2002], vol. 2, p. 103), that Malachi 3:4 writes: וערבה לה’ מנחת יהודה וירושלים כימי עולם וכשנים קדמוניות . This verse, in speaking of a sacrificial offering in Messianic days, mentions the minhah sacrifice, which is not an animal offering.

As mentioned, the passage from R. Kook is so interesting because it shows that he was not merely thinking about the Messianic era, but also the actual functioning of the future Sanhedrin. He was imagining the derashot that could be used to “update” Judaism. I am unaware if this aspect of R. Kook’s thought was known before the publication of this latest volume. I also don’t know if any scholars have taken note of it even subsequent to the publication. However, in “Afikim ba-Negev” (Otzarot ha-Reiyah, vol. 2, p. 103), R. Kook also, in an offhand sentence, provides a possible derashah to justify the abolishment of sacrifices. He doesn’t develop the idea, but just puts it out there. Here is the sentence:

והגביל “לרצונכם תזבחהו” (ויקרא יט, ה) שיהיה אפשר וראוי לומר “רוצה אני”. (רש”י על ויקרא א, ג).

The Talmud, Rosh ha-Shanah 6a, which is quoted by Rashi, Lev, 1:3, states that one cannot bring a sacrifice unless it arises from one’s free will. Now the Talmud, which is speaking of one particular sacrifice, actually says that we force him to bring it until he agrees, and this means that he is “willing.” But R. Kook is using this passage to hint at a different matter. In future times, when sacrifices will be so far from human sentiment, it will be impossible to do it willingly. The derashah, לרצונכם תזבחהו , will then come into play. Since this teaches that one can only bring a sacrifice when one is willing, at a time when animal sacrifices are not considered acceptable, and thus not something people “want” to do, animal sacrifices will no longer be a requirement. Remember, R. Kook describes this future era as one in which the animals will be far advanced of what they are now. It is only when the animals are at the low state that they currently are, that we can offer them as sacrifices and eat them. He writes (Otzarot ha-Reiyah, vol. 2, p. 101), in a passage in which animals are compared to one’s children:

מי לא יבין שאי אפשר להעלות על הדעת שיקח האדם את בניו, ברוח אשר יטפחם וירבה אותם להיטיב ולהשכיל, ויזבחם וישפך דמם?

The texts we have seen are important in explaining how his viewpoint of the abolishment of sacrifices relates to the Ninth Principle of Maimonides. As mentioned, in my book I listed R. Kook’s view as being in opposition to the Principle. R. Kook is certainly great enough to disagree with Maimonides in this matter had he chosen to. Yet we see from his newly published writings that he would not have regarded himself in disagreement, because he understands the abolishment of sacrifices to be carried out in a purely halakhic fashion. Since the Rabbis have the exegetical authority to do such things, an authority given to them by the Torah, we are not speaking of a revision of Torah law. This case is then no different than any of the other examples where the Sages interpret Torah law different that the peshat of the verse.

Returning to the newly published text, R. Kook’s imagination continues to run, and he doesn’t stop with sacrifices. In my book I called attention to R. Hayyim Halberstam’s view that in Messianic days the first born will take the place of the kohanim. R. Kook must have been attracted to this view for kabbalistic reasons, and here he provides a possible basis for how this too can be justified by the Rabbis. He also notes that since the change can be justified, “it is not uprooting a Torah matter, but rather fulfilling the Torah.”! In other words, built into the Torah is the notion that the kohanim would only be temporarily in charge of the divine worship. R. Kook argues that since the First Born were removed from their role because of the sin of the Golden Calf, it is impossible for the effects of this sin to last forever, as repentance is a more powerful force. Therefore, when the sin of the Golden Calf is atoned for there will no longer any reason for the First Born to be kept from the Avodah, and it will return to them.

Following this, R. Kook offers another way of explaining why his view of sacrifices should not be seen as a “reform” or as evidence of the Torah changing (he obviously was sensitive to this point). He says ויש לדרוש, in other words, he is once again providing the halakhic justification that can be used by a future Sanhedrin in abolishing sacrifices. His new exegetical reasoning goes as follows: The obligation of animal sacrifices was only intended for an era when the kohanim were in charge of the Avodah. This is how one is to understand the verse (Lev. 11:1) ושחט אותו על ירך המזבח . . . וזרקו בני אהרן הכהנים את דמו. In other words, it is only to the descendants of Aaron that animal sacrifice is commanded,

אבל כשיהיו כשרים ג”כ בכורות, אז מטעם העילוי של בע”ח וכלל המציאות אין הבע”ח נהוגים כ”א לחם ומנחה . . . וכך הוא המדה בכל מקום שנמצא פסוק בתורה וסברא ישרה שיש כח ביד ב”ד הגדול, מכש”כ כבצירוף הנביאים לפסוק הוראת גדולות כאלה.

Note that R. Kook ties together a verse in the Torah with logic. When both are present, then the Beit Din ha-Gadol is able to act in order to make adjustments to Torah law. In this matter, the “sevarah yesharah” is the sense that animal sacrifices will not suitable for the future eschatological era, and the verses in the Torah that he cites give “cover” to the sevarah yesharah. That is, they provide the exegetical justification. (I wonder though, is R. Kook really correct when he implies that the only time the Sages could uproot a commandment was when they also had a biblical verse to justify this?)

R. Kook concludes that all that he is speaking about is a long way off, and it is possible that the Resurrection will come before this and then all sorts of things will change. Yet all his prior ruminations here are about a pre-Resurrection era, when the Beit Din ha-Gadol is functioning and adjusting Torah law by means of derashot and sevarah yesharah. This is not the sort of thing that will be taking place post-Resurrection.7

Finally, lest anyone start using R. Kook’s thoughts in an antinomian fashion, he throws in the following for good measure:

וזה היה מקור תרבות והרע ד”אחר”, שחזי שהמצות יש להן יחש מוגבל ותכליתי, חשב שבאמת אפשר להתעלות למעלה מהמעשים, גם בלא עת, ובאמת הכל אחדות יחיד היה הוה ויהיה, וכל עת וזמן את חובותיה נשמור, בלא נדנוד צל פקפוק.

Earlier in this post, I referred to the implications of R. Kook’s ideas with regard to Jewish law being adjusted because of new moral insights. In fact, I think it is R. Kook who provides the most comprehensive and satisfying approach to this issue. I don’t want to get into that subject at present, as I plan on returning to it, especially as a number of people have written to me about R. Kook’s views. In my future post I will illustrate my point by citing a number of examples of rulings and statements by mainstream halakhists from earlier centuries which could never be made today. The only way to explain this, I will argue, is that there has been a change in societal norms and this has made certain approaches not just practically impossible but simply wrong for our times. (See here where I cite in this regard R. Weinberg and R. Aviner.) However, I promised someone that I would give one example in this post, so here it is. R. Hayyim Benveniste, Keneset ha-Gedolah, Even ha-Ezer 154, Hagahot Beit Yosef no. 59, in discussing when we can force a husband to give a divorce, writes as follows:

ובעל משפט צדק ח”א סי’ נ”ט כתב דאפי’ רודף אחריה בסכין להכותה אין כופין אותו לגרש ואפי’ לו’ לו שחייב להוציא.

Can anyone imagine a posek, from even the most right-wing community, advocating such a viewpoint? I assume the logic behind this position is that even if the man is running after her with the knife, we don’t assume that he will actually kill her. He must just be doing it to scare her, and that is not enough of a reason to force him to divorce her. And if we are wrong, and he really does kill her? I guess the reply would be that this isn’t anything we could have anticipated even if we saw the knife in his hand, sort of like all those who have let pedophiles run loose in the yeshivot, presumably on the assumption that just because a man abused children in the past, that doesn’t mean that he will continue to do so.8

Notes

1 Among other interesting passages in this book, see p. 24, where he objects to people who write “ethical wills.” Quite apart from the frauds who wrote them, in order to show that they were really great people when they were in fact far from it, many tzadikim also wrote these wills. Yet Scheinfeld says that this was a mistake, since many of their children, and even more their grandchildren, assimilated among the Gentiles. He continues by lamenting how much worse things have gotten in his day:

ובימינו אלה בודאי אינו מהראוי לכתוב צוואות, כמעט כל הבנים מתרחקים והולכים מדרכי אביהם, אינם רוצים ואינם יכולים ללכת בדרכיהם: “וכשם שמצוה לאמר דבר הנשמע, כך מצוה שלא לאמר דבר שאינו נשמע.”

On pp. 82-83 he criticizes the “inflation” with regard to rabbinic titles that he saw in his day, and which has increased a great deal more since his time. Here is a very good example of this “inflation,” from responsa written by R. Moshe Malka, Ve-Heshiv Moshe, nos. 34-35. In this case I can guarantee you that the recipient is not deserving of the titles he has been given.



For another example of such exalted titles with regard to a non-rabbinic figure, see R. Michel Shurkin, Meged Givot Olam (Jerusalem, 2005), vol. 2, p. 5, who is speaking of Prof. Samuel Soloveitchik:

כיוצא בזה ראיתי מעשה, כשבשנת תשכ”ז נפטרו במשך תקופה קצרה אחיו של הגרי”ב זצ”ל, הגאון ר’ שמואל זצ”ל . . .

In R. Weinberg’s letter to Samuel Atlas, published in Torah u-Madda Journal 7 (1997), pp. 107-108, he writes: “’Geonim’ sprout up there as grass in the field. Those who were emissaries of the yeshivot and unimportant mashgihim have overnight become outstanding geonim.”

For more on the nonsense of elaborate titles of praise, see the many sources quoted by R. Pinchas Meyers, Nahalat Pinchas (Jerusalem, 1995), vol., 2, no. 41. See also R. Chaim Hirschensohn, Malki ba-Kodesh, vol. 1, p. 90, vol. 6, pp. 198, 200, 237-238.

Returning to Scheinfeld, here is what he has to say on the topic (pp. 82-83):

לרב פשוט מתארים “הרב הגאון”. לרב גדול בתורה באמת מתארים “מאור הגולה, בקי בכל חדרי התורה”. באמעריקא, ארץ החנופה והשקר, מתארים לכל דרשן פטפטן “הרב המטיף הגדול, פה מפיק מרגליות” ועוד. מגוזמים, מגוחכים עוד יותר תוארי-הכבוד של רביי החסידים: “אד”מור, סבא קדישא, בוצינא קדישא, צדיק יסוד עולם, בנן של קדושים, פרי צדיק, גזע ישישים, פטיש החזק, עמוד הימיני” ועוד ועוד. בעולם הקולטורי נוהגים: כשכותבים מכתב לאדם שקבל התואר Ph.D. מאיזה בית מדעים, מתארים אותו בתואר דר. ודי בזה. אפילו כשכותבים לדר. איינשטיין, לא היה שום אדם כותב: “כבוד הדר. החוזה בכוכבים, נהירין לו שבילי דרקיע” ועוד, דברים שהם ראויים לייחס לו באמת.

After seeing what the term “Gaon” has become in our time, it is worth recalling what appears in R. Malachi ha-Kohen, Yad Malachi, Kelalei ha-Geonim 1. If we use the following definition of Gaon, you can count the living geonim on one hand, and perhaps still have some fingers not counted:

ושמעתי אומרים שתנאי הגאון היה לידע ש”ס על פה גמ’ ומשניות.

The Hatam Sofer states (Sheelot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer ha-Hadashot, Yoreh Deah no. 33):

ידע מעלתו מיום שהורגלו בני מדינתו בתואר “גאון אמיתי”, גילו ופרסמו שסתם גאון אינו אמיתי, אבל חוששני שגם אמיתי אינו אמת.

The exaggerated titles are most often found in haskamot, and with this in mind see the haskamah published by Jacob Goldman in his book Peret ve-Olelot (Jerusalem, 1930).

This is not the only example of an author giving himself a haskamah (the Aderet comes to mind), but I think it is the only example of an author giving himself a haskamah which tells the world how unqualified he is.
2 See Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee (Philadelphia, 1963), p. 209.
3 “Willingness to Sacrifice,” Jewish Journal, available here
4 Speaking of editions, I don’t understand why people continue to cite works such as Orot and Orot ha-Kodesh. Now that we are fortunate to have the Shemonah Kevatzim, and can cite R. Kook from the source, why would anyone continue to refer to writings that have been edited, and touched up, by R. Zvi Yehudah and the Nazir?
5 In an earlier post I called attention to Joseph Ibn Caspi’s incredible comments about how we are to treat animals, wherein he notes that “we are very close to them and we both have one father”!

See here.

Elsewhere in Caspi’s writings we see ambivalence towards eating meat. There too he explains that that an animal is אחינו בן אבינו החי

He also writes

עיקר הכוונה שלא נאכל בשר, כי יספיקו לנו הצמחים. ולכן בבראשית לא הותר לנו רק עשב השדה, ואחר המבול נתפשט אכילת בעלי החיים שהוא כאילו נאכל אבינו [!] כי הוא סוגנו [סוג שלנו] הקרוב

Both of these sources, from Caspi’s Gevia Kesef, p. 31, and Metzaref le-Kesef, p. 294, are cited in Hannah Kasher, “‘Eikh Yetzavenu ha-Shem La’asot Toevah ka-Zot:’ Bikoret Akedat Yitzhak al pi R. Yosef Ibn Caspi,” Et ha-Daat 1 (1997), p. 41.

For an opposing viewpoint to that of Caspi, see R. Gershon Ashkenazi, Avodat ha-Gershuni, no. 13:
צער בעלי חיים לא שייך אלא בבעל חיים כשהוא בחיים חיותו . . . מי שנוחר את הבהמה במקום שיוכל לשחטה אין בזה משום צער בעלי חיים, וכי הבהמה אחינו הוא לברור לה מיתה יפה.

R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, Or li-Netivati, pp. 245-246, expresses himself similarly to Caspi:

בהשקפת האחדות השלמה לא נראה את עצמנו בתור דבר פרטי מיוחד בפני עצמו, וכן לא את כל אחד ואחד מכל יצורי עולם, לא את החי, לא את הצומח ולא את הדומם, אלא כולם וכולנו דבר אחד ממש . . . לא זה אוכל את זה כי אם הכל אוכל את הכל.

For the view, expressed by a couple of rishonim as well as the Aderet, that before his sin Adam was permitted to eat meat, see R. Bezalel Naor, Maamar al Yishmael (Spring Valley, 2008), pp. 52ff. (first pagination; there is an enormous amount of learning in this book. In addition, it opens with a Hebrew letter to Naor from Prof. Isadore Twersky.).
.
6 In the following section (no. 9 in the Ofen edition and censored from the Merkaz edition for reasons unclear), he offers another possible reason for the continuation of sacrifices:

יתכן שימשכו הקורבנות גם בזמן התקופה של השלמת הבעלי חיים רק בתור עזר לתקן הנפשות המגולגלות בבהמות, וכפי המעלה הגדולה של הדעת אז תהי’ הדעת ברורה מי יבוחר לקרבן.
7 Regarding the authority of the Court to uproot a mitzvah from the Torah, see the interesting observation of R. Hayyim Hirschensohn, Commentary to Horayot, vol. 1, p. 3b (Hirschensohn’s numbering):

אמר ר’ יוסי לא שהורו מותר לאכל חלב יודעין היו שאסור לאכול חלב והתורה נתנה רשות לב”ד להורות, וזה לא נקרא לדעת הירושלמי עקירת כל הגוף, שטעו שיש כח לב”ד לעקור דבר מן התורה אפילו בקום ועשה, וזה נקרא הגוף קים רק עקירת מקצת, לאמר שאין נצחיות ח”ו לחוקי התורה שיוכל הב”ד לעקרם כרצונם, כדעת רבני הרפארים היום החושבים שמפני צורך הזמן יכולים להתר איסורים מפורשים וקבועים בתורה, ולא נקראים בזה כופרים בעיקר, רק ב”ד טועים ולו הי’ בהם שאר תנאי פר העלם דבר היו חייבים עדת הראפרים בפר העלם דבר.

8 There is another theory as to why the sectarian hasidic world in particular has had so many cases of covering up and defending child sex abusers. It is that they simply do not regard these people as so terrible. The evidence for this appears obvious, in that in case of after case we see that they continue to allow sex abusers to teach and refuse to turn them over to the authorities and warn the parent body. Had they caught the rebbe eating at McDonald’s, you can be sure he would have been fired, but not so when it comes to fooling around with kids. The question is why do they have this outlook, and how come they don’t regard child sex abusers as so terrible? Here is a possible answer (which a wise person suggested). Look at where these societies get their information about human nature, the information that they regard as authentic and true. It does not come from modern psychology, but from Torah sources and folk beliefs. If you look only at traditional rabbinic literature, you won’t conclude that child sex abuse is as terrible as modern society views it. Yes, it is a sin and the person who commits it must repent as he must do with all sins, but there is nothing in the traditional literature that speaks to the great trauma suffered by the victim. How do we know about this trauma? Only from modern psychology and the testimony of the victims. Yet this type of evidence does not have much significance in the insular hasidic world (unless it is your own child who has been abused). Certainly modern psychology, which is often attacked by figures in that community, is not given much credence, especially not when they are confronted with an issur of mesirah. This theory makes a lot of sense to me and I am curious to hear what others have to say.