1

Parshegen, an amazing new work on Targum Onkelos

Parshegen, an amazing new work on Targum Onkelos

By Eliezer Brodt
רפאל בנימין פוזן, פרשגן, ביאורים ומקורות לתרגום אונקלוס, בראשית,963 עמודים.
הנ”ל, העקיבות התרגומית בתרגום אונקלוס, מגנס, ירושליםתשס”ד, 362 עמודים.
After many years of waiting, one volume of a highly anticipated work on Targum Onkelos, Parshegen, has finallyappeared. This volume by Rabbi Dr. Rafael Posen is an in-depth study of Targum Onkelos. Many have studied Targum Onkelos over the centuries, and continue to do so – especially when doing Shenayim Mikra Ve-echad Targum weekly, but few have penetrated the depths of this incredible work. To be sure, many others have treated the Targum before this work, most notably Rashi and the Ramban. Different works and articles by many authors have focused on different aspects of the Onkelos. But there are few that have done what Rabbi Posen sets out to do in this work.
Rabbi Posen has long demonstrated his great expertise in the Targum in numerous articles in various journals (both academic and rabbinic) over many years. A few years ago Rabbi Posen published a work on the Targum based on his doctorate called Ha-Iykivut Ha-targumit Be-Targum Onkelos (The Consistency of Targum Onkelos’ Translation). This work, printed by Magnes Press, outlines some of his themes in dealing with the Targum.[1] I highly recommend it for someone who wishes to grow in his appreciation for Onkelos (henceforth TO). One of his themes in this book, which others have also dealt with, is to show the great consistency within TO and the significance of the exception. Many times TO uses a certain word to explain something consistently throughout the Chumash except for one or two places where he uses a different term. Posen successfully shows that there was a coherent system in how and when TO used which words in which places. He explains why he deviated in some places and that it was in no way random or sloppy. It is precisely these deviations, when understood, which can show what makes TO so special and that is not just a simple translation of the Torah.
In this work Posen uses manuscripts and the academic literature available on TO side by side with all the traditional seforim written on TO. He does not just gather information but he dissects and analyzes it all very carefully, sometimes reaching his own original conclusions. He also deals with other important aspects related to understanding why Onkelos translated as he did as it relates to Halacha, Aggadah and other theological issues, such as how TO deals with anthropomorphism, which is probably the most famous TO issue of all. He also deals with the relationship of Onkelos to Midrashei Halacha and Aggadah. In each case he gives a good overview of the prior literature and issues that have been raised on that particular topic.
However in this book he only gives samples of his commentarial work on TO, outlining his ideas, so although he deals with many different pieces in TO (as a quick look at the index will show) it’s not a running commentary of TO in any way.
In the introduction he mentions that he is in middle of writing a work on Targum Onkeles called Parshegen which will be a running commentary on the whole Targum. Parshegen volume one has just been released by Yefeh Nof, his nephew’s publishing house [which will perhaps explain why there is no mention that Rabbi Posen is a Dr. having written a PhD on TO][2].This new volume is just on Genesis and is 963 pages! The presentation of the material is beautiful, well organized, concise and to the point (and if it’s 963 page and concise, you know it’s good). It is therefore a veritable goldmine. Rabbi Posen’s focus is to give the reader a clear explanation of why TO says what it does. Under the assumption that TO always has a very good reason for specifically translating the words, Rabbi Posen demonstrates how exactly TO did this. As he does in his other work, he uses the necessary manuscripts, early prints of the Targum[3] and the academic literature available alongside the seforim written on TO. He does not just gather information, but he dissects and analyzes it very carefully, checking if they are consistent with other places in the Targum. His competent use of manuscripts show how many times they can help one understand different Targumic issues. This path was not followed by many of the more recent Charedi works on TO. Posen also shows how having a good background in the Aramaic language helps a great deal. Another area he focuses on is the various statements of TO that play a role in Halacha and to underscore this, how at times it is even quoted in the Shu”t literature. He also focuses on the Targum’s usage of Midrash (both Halacha and Aggadah) which others have dealt with before. To better understand Onkelos he sometimes compares and contrasts it with the other Targumim.
To mention some other highlights of the work, in the beginning he includes a nice collection of sources about Onkelos and a very good overview of the Targum literature in general, and who likely wrote TO, and where. He included a very cool, lengthy poem about Onkelos, written in Aramaic, which he authored, as well as a running commentary explaining it. The work concludes with a nice appendix (over forty-five pages) dealing with perhaps the most famous issues that his many predecessors, beginning with the Rambam, have dealt with – TO’s approach to anthropomorphism. Parshegen includes a very nice haskamah from Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl, who mentions that he went through this whole work as it was written over the years, adding many comments which Posen found useful and included in this work.
All in all if, one wants to learn TO on a high level and to appreciate how special the Targum is, I highly recommend it. I feel that Rabbi Posen successfully accomplishes the goals he set in the introduction of his book: to write a clear and concise commentary on the Targum Onkelos. If one uses it one will definitely be able to understand why TO enjoys pre-eminence of all the Targumic literature. I only hope that the remaining volumes will appear in the near future as planned.
 
Parshegen is distributed by Yefeh Nof and it should be available in all stores shortly. For now see Girsa in Jerusalem and Biegeleisen in NY. If one wants some samples pages please contact me at Eliezerbrodt@gmail.com.
I wanted to add one notation to this work. An area of halacha in which Targum Onkelos plays an important role isto differentiate between the names of Hashem in the Torah which are Kodesh and which are Chol. The reason why this is important is because the halacha is that every time a sofer writes a name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah he has to articulate that it’s “Leshem Kedushat Hashem. Failing to do so, the Sefer Torah is pasul. Now Rabbi Posen is well aware of this and deals withTO as it relates to this issue. However, one important work which I did not see him quote from is the Meleches Hakodesh(Prague 1812) of Rabbi Eleazer Fleckeles, who gathered all these ambiguous name, the opinions of everyone who remarked upon them and reached conclusions about each one. In addition, he deals with Onkelos in many of the places.[4]
Another work in relation to this topic, which Rabbi Posen does use, is called Biur Shemos Kodesh Vechol. This work was printed in 1923 by Haham Moses Gaster. For many years it was assumed to be from the Rambam, as per the attribution. Rabbi Kirshbaum wrote some interesting notes on this sefer (Tzion Le-menachem, siman 6). In 1985, Y. Levinger proved that it is a forgery and it is not from the Rambam.[5] Rabbi Posen writes that Rabbis Kapach and Nebenzahl also do not agree that it is from the Rambam. R. Yitzchac Shilat told me that he too does not believe it to be authentic. Rabbi Posen points all this out in a footnote in the end of the book (pp. 922-923). However he should have mentioned this already in the beginning when he quotes the work a few times (see p. 77, 112). Other recent works used this sefer without even realizing that – at best – it is hardly clear that it is an authentic work of the Rambam, such as Miat Tzori (p. 6) and Nikadesh es Shimcha (all over the sefer).
There will be follow-up post about Rabbi Posen’s footnote in Parshegen about Shadal’s path-breaking Ohev Ger (Vienna 1830; rp. Cracow 1895) on Targum Onkelos and it’s use. I will jump off from there and also discuss the use of Shadal and Rabbi Naftali Hirz Wessely in seforim in general.
[1] Reviewed in Hamayan 45:1 pp. 88-89.
[2] Although the author is not referred to asa Dr., the works of S. Leiberman (p. 66) Cassuto (p. 161) L. Ginzburg (p.4 3 ) L. Zunz (p. 42) are all referenced normally. In the volume printed by Magnes Press Posen thanks his teachers Dov Rafel and Nechama Leibowitz in the introduction, but probably for similar reasons he does not do so in this volume, although he does quote them both [for ex. see p. 142, 152]. This volume is surely intended as a “sefer.”
[3] See R. M. Frieman, Pores Mapah, pp. 190-198.
[4] On this topic see also R. Avraham ibn Ezra (not that one!), Batei Khnesiot, siman 285; R. Yaakov Shor, Mishnat Yakov p. 6.
[5] I. Twersky when he quotes this work inhis work on the Rambam does not comment. H. Davidson in his work on the Rambam, Moses Maimonides, (Oxford Press 2005), where he deals with works misattributed to the Rambam does not even mention such a work.



More new seforim and some other things

More new seforim and some other things

By Eliezer Brodt

One

Here is another list of new of seforim I recently came across in various seforim stores. 1. רבינו חננאל, מסכת ב”ק, שט”ז עמודים+ מבוא, מהדיר ר’ יוסף דובאוויק, ע”י מכון וגשל. 2. נתיבות משפט על רבינו ירוחם – דפוס חדש. [ראה כאן]. 3. שו”ת לבוש מרדכי, ד’ חלקים, כולל תולדות והרבה הוספות. 4. חשק שלמה, ר’ שלמה ב”ר מרדכי, מכון הכתב, חו”מ סי’ א-סח. 5. מקורי התפילה- טעמיה נוסחותיה ומנהגיה, ר’ אפרים זלוטניק, 334 עמודים. 6. דרשות איגרות ותולדות, רבי אריה ליבושי הלוי הורוויץ, בעל שו”ת הרי בשמים, תקנ”ח עמודים. 7. שו”ת וישמע משה- אוצר פסקים ותשובת, שהשיב מרן הגרי”ש אלישב שליט”א, ע”י ר’ משה פריד, תנב עמודים. 8. שיעורי מרן הגרי”ש אלישב –ברכות,- כולל שיעורים ופסקי הלכה בתוספות ביאורים והערות, תשס”ב עמודים. 9. הלכות מועדים, [תש”ע], ר’ שלמה גרוסמן, דיני יום טוב, תצ עמודים. 10. יבקשו מפיהו, הל’ שידוכים, תקמ”א עמודים, פסקי הגרי”ש אלשיב שליט”א, נכתב ע”י ר’ זעליג קוסובסקי. 11. קובץ בית המדרש, פסקי הלכה מבית מדרשו של הגרי”ש אלישב שליט”א, חוברת על שבט, סיון, תמוז, 12. באר ישראל- [תש”ע], הלכות ימים נוראים, וסוכות, ר’ אברהם ישראלזון, כולל פסקי מרן הגרי”ש אלישב שליט”א, רמ”ב עמודים. 13. דבר הלכה, [דפוס חדש] ר’ אברהם הלוי הורביץ, בעל ה’ארחות רבנו’, ב’ חלקים, א’ הלכות יחוד, ב’ הלכות איטור וגידים לענין תפילין. 14. קובץ, אור ישראל, גליון סג. 15. קובץ, היכל הבעל שם טוב, גליון לב. 16. ישורון חלק כה, תשע”ה עמודים [אפשר לקבל תוכן העניינים]. 17. בצל האמונה, דרשות ומאמרים לחג הסוכות, הרב שג”ר, 245 עמודים. 18. נימוקי הרמח”ל, על עניני ראש השנה ויום כיפור, מכון הרמח”ל, 79 עמודים. 19. מטעמי יצחק, הרב יצחק הלוי הורוויץ [ר’ איציקל האמבורגער], ב’ חלקים, ע”י ר’ דוד מנדלבוים. 20. שברו את הכלים, הקבלה והמודרניות היהודית, רוני ויינשטיין, 647 עמודים. 21. Yaacob Dweck, The Scandal of Kabbalah, Princeton Press

Two

I would like to mention copies of both my seforim Ben Kesseh Lassur and Likutei Eliezer are still available for sale. They both contain lots of information related to Elul, Rosh Hashanah and Aswret Yemei Teshuvah amongst other things. Email me at eliezerbrodt@gmail.com for a table of contents or to purchase. For sample chapters of these works, see here and here.

Three

For previous posts on Elul and Rosh Hashanah see the following posts: For saying L’dovid during the months of Elul and Tishrei see here and here. If one can give a knife as a present, see here. About eating Siymonim on Rosh Hashanah see here, about saying tehilim on Rosh Hashanah see here. This post (in Hebrew) discusses the custom of refraining from meat on Rosh ha-Shana. The bulk of the commonly recited piyutim on Rosh ha-Shana are attributed to R. Eliezer ha-Kallir who is discussed here. And, finally, in this post, Dr. Shapiro discusses Adon Olam, the poem that many have the custom to say on Rosh ha-Shana (even if they refrain the rest of the year).

Four

See here at this new blog related to the Mesilat Yesharim for an update to an old post of mine related to the Mesilat Yesharim.

Five

There are many titles left from the seforim sale list posted here.




New Seforim list – Elul 2011

New Seforim list – Elul 2011
by Eliezer Brodt
As
a courtesy to our readers, below I provide a list of some new seforim
and books that I recently have purchased or become aware of. Some are
brand-new, others have been out already for a few months
  1. בית
    היין על הלכות יין נסך, הרב
    צבי הירש גראדזענסקי, ש”ט
    עמודים.
  2. אגרת
    משה חלק ט. [עדיין לא הגיע
    לארץ ישראל ולכן לא ראיתי].
  3. גנזים
    ושו”ת חזון איש,
    תכ”ד עמודים.
  4. ירושלים
    במועדיה, ירח האיתנים,
    הרב אביגדר נבנצל, שי”ח
    עמודים.
  5. תשובות
    וחידוש מעשי למלך, אורח
    חיים, תס”ד
    עמודים.
  6. צוואת
    רבי יהודה החסיד המפאור, מכון
    אוצר הפוסקים, תרי”ח
    עמודים (וגם מבוא מפתחות
    ותולדות המחבר).
  7. אלפא
    ביתא תניתא דשמואל זעירא, כרך
    שני
    – ר’ שמואל
    אשכנזי.
  8. תוספות
    ר”י הזקן, שבת,
    חלק ב, מכון
    אופק.
  9. תשובת
    רב נטרונאי גאון, מהדורה
    חדשה עם תיקונים, מכון
    אופק.
  10. מילי
    דאגרות, ב’ חלקים
    מכתבים של הרב מרדכי גיפטר.
  11. מעשה
    צדיקים, ר’ אברהם
    כלפון (חבר של החיד”א),
    תקצ”ו עמודים
    [ספר מלא חומר חשוב
    ומעניין].
  12. בין
    הכוזרי לרמב”ם, ר’
    יצחק שילת, רפו
    עמודים.
  13. משנת
    ארץ ישראל –ספראי – ראש
    השנה.
  14. משנת
    ארץ ישראל- ספראי-
    ביצה.
  15. אלה
    מסעי, רשימת מסע הרבנים
    בראשותם של הראי”ה קוק
    והגרי”ח זוננפלד,
    274 עמודים.
  16. חמשת
    מיני דגן- זהר עמר,
    252 עמודים.
  17. הקנטוניסטים-
    יוסף מנדלביץ’, 288 עמודים.
  18. לשאלת
    החרם על ספרד, ר’ יחיאל
    גולדהבר, פ’ עמודים.
  19. מבקשי
    פניך שיחות עם הרב אהרן ליכטנשטיין,
    נכתב ע”י
    הרב חיים סבתו, 296 עמודים.
  20. אשירה
    ואזמרה לה’ על עניני שירה
    וזמרה, ר’ מרדכי
    שפר, תשס”ד
    עמודים.
  21. קבלה
    למשה מסיני, ר’ ראובן
    ניסן (קבלה והלכה),
    ר”א עמודים.
  22. סגולות
    האריז”ל, מלוקט
    מכתבי האריז”ל,
    תנ”ט עמודים.
  23. בזכרנו
    את ציון, עניני זכר למקדש
    ואבלות חורבן הבית, ר’
    אורי כהן, תקס”א
    עמודים.
  24. יחיד
    ודורו, שני חלקים,
    תולדות הרב מרדכי צוקרמן.
  25. קראי
    מזרח אירופה בדורות האחרונים, בעריכת
    דן שפירא וד’ לסקר,
    מכון יצחק בן צבי, 289
    עמודים+ 190 עמודים.
  26. התנ”ך
    מן השטח, ראיות ארכיאולוגיות
    והיסטוריות לתנ”ך,
    ר’ לייבל רזניק,
    399 עמודים, ראובן
    מס.
  27. אלוהים
    משחק בקוביות, מה באמת
    אומרת לנו האבולוציה? מיכאל
    אברהם, 503 עמודים.
  28. אגדת
    צפת, עלי יסיף, 273
    עמודים.
  29. על
    זמן חיבורם של ספר הזוהר וספר הבהיר,
    תולדות סימני הניקוד והטעמים
    המקראיים ככלי לתיארוך של ספרי קבלה,
    יצחק פנקובר, הוצאת
    כרוב, 188 עומדים.
  30. כלי
    מחזיק ברכה, ר’ שלום
    קליין, אוסף מאמרים על
    זמני השנה ומעודי ישראל, שס”ד
    עמודים.
  31. אור
    עולם, תולדות הרמח”ל
    ומשנתו, ר’ מרדכי
    שריקי, 203 עמודים.
  32. הוד
    והדר כבודו, פרקי הוד
    ודרשות מהגאון ר’ יוסף
    שחור, [כולל סיפורים
    ומכתבים מהנצי”ב והגר”ח
    מבריסק], 190 עמודים.




New Writings from R. Kook and Assorted Comments, part 5

New Writings from R. Kook and Assorted Comments, part 5
by Marc B. Shapiro
Continued from here.
The next post (or perhaps the one following) will return to my analysis of R. Kook’s recently published Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor with which this series began. Yet before doing so, there are a number of other points I would like to make and respond to some comments and questions.

1. In previous installments I have mentioned how R. Kook compares the Torah scholars and the masses, and how the masses have elements of natural morality that are not to be found among the scholars. This is not the only provocative distinction R. Kook makes. He also distinguishes between the great tzadikim and everyone else. These two groupings are, of course, different in many ways. Yet one of the most interesting distinctions R. Kook makes—and one can find parallels to this in Ibn Caspi and hasidic texts— is that for the elites the nitty-gritty of halakhic study can have a negative affect on their spiritual life. Here is what he writes in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:412:

האדם הגדול כשהוא מכניס את עצמו יותר מדאי במדת הפרטים, בין בלימודם בין בחרדתם, הרי הוא מתקטן, ומעלתו מתמעטת, וצריך לשוב בתשובה מאהבה, מתוך גדלות הנשמה, לקשר את תוכן חיי נשמתו בענינים גדולים ונשגבים.

R. Kook goes so far as to say that for these elites the very practice of mitzvot is not part of their spiritual identity per se. They have, as it were, moved beyond this, and their involvement with the practical sphere of mitzvot is based on their connection to the larger world.[1] I think that this passage, from Shemonah Kevatzim 1:410, is the most antinomian in all of R. Kook’s writings. In it we also see how problematic the halakhic details of life are to the special personality who wants to soar the heights of spirituality and yet has to be involved with practical halakhic matters. I think it obvious that R. Kook is reflecting his own personal spiritual struggle here. On the one hand, he wants to lose himself in love of and experience of God, to bind his soul with the divine. On the other hand, as a practicing rabbi he was called upon day in and day out to answer all sorts of everyday halakhic questions. One can imagine him alone in his study, enraptured in mysticism, even nearing prophetic insights, and someone comes to his door asking him to determine the kashrut of a dead chicken. With this he is brought down to the mundane halakhic world.[2]
ישנם אנשים גדולים כאלה, שמהלך רוחם הוא כל כך נשא, עד שמצדם אם כל העולם היה במעמדם, היו המצות בטלות כמו שיהיה לעתיד לבוא, לימות המשיח או תחיית המתים. והם בכל זאת מקושרים הם במצות הרבה מאד, לא למענם, כי אם למען העולם כולו, המקושר עמם. וכשהם באים אל הפרטים, לעסוק בהם מצד עצמם, מוצאים הם סתירות נפשיות גדולות האלה, שהם נמוגים מרוב יגונם. וכשבאים לעסוק בתורה ובמצות בפרטיות בשביל העולם, יושפע עליהם מעין של גבורה ושל קדושה, שאין דומה לו.
Let me also return to the issue of the Jewish masses’ natural morality vs. the rabbinically tuned morality of the scholars, and how according to R. Kook the former is superior to that of the latter. I was asked if I can provide some examples of this. I think the most obvious such example is the response to sexual abuse that we have witnessed in the Orthodox world. While the natural impulse of the masses was that abusers must be immediately removed from any contact with children, many of the learned rabbis were able to come up with all sorts of reasons why this was not necessary, and why the police should not be called. Over time the view of the rabbinic class has evolved and many of them now advocate a strong response to sexual abuse. However, what took them a long time to get to was immediately understood by the Jewish masses, and they understood it intuitively. Years from now people will wonder how it was that rabbis refused to protect children. It will be incomprehensible to them how this could have happened. We who lived through this experience know that it was precisely the pressure on the ground, from the Jewish laypeople (and the bloggers and newspapers), that forced changes in this matter.[3] Here I think is a good example where talmudic learning led scholars לטהר את השרץ בק”ן טעמים, while the Jewish masses, with their intuitive natural morality, saw that evil must be exposed and they emerged victorious.[4]

The same phenomenon was seen in the Leib Tropper affair, where once again it was the masses, together with a couple of indefatigable bloggers, who saw what was really going on, and forced the issue. This happened while many leading rabbis continued to stand by Tropper. They were oblivious to what was unfolding before their eyes and what was obvious to everyone but them.[5] And let’s not forget about all the gedolim who signed a letter in support of the monster Elior Chen.[6] It is difficult to make sense of these terrible lapses of rabbinic judgment with a haredi Daas Torah perspective, but with R. Kook’s analysis all becomes clear.

I thought of R. Kook’s comments on the intuitive morality of the masses after hearing a few shiurim on the subject of lo tehanem. One of them has since been removed from the site. Listening to these shiurim was shocking to me, not simply because I found the views discussed at odds with what everyone in my community regards as basic Jewish values (and matters about which we would be quick to criticize non-Jews if they ever spoke this way). What was particularly surprising was how the speakers, all learned talmudically, have fallen into what I would call the textualist trap of Centrism. What this means is that the written word has become so sanctified that they feel it is their obligation to resurrect every halakhah recorded in the standard codes in order improve the masses’ behavior.

Yet for all their learning, these rabbis don’t appreciate that there are some halakhot that simply fell out of practice. This happened in pre-modern times, before there were Reform and Conservative movements. In other words, it happened at a time when communities had the status of kehillah kedoshah. Because of this, historically the poskim generally tried to be melamed zekhut on the actions of the people, on the assumption that kol hamon ke-kol sha-dai, which is in line with how R. Kook understood the pious Jewish masses. That explains why, to give just one example, confronted with the fact that pious people did not wash before eating wet food, the vast majority of poskim tried to find a justification for this. They did not lecture the people about how they were sinning and try to resurrect a practice that had fallen out of fashion. Their assumption was that there must be some justification for the practice of the masses, even if it is not readily apparent.[7]

As Haym Soloveitchik discussed in “Rupture and Reconstruction,” there is today no faith in the practice of the masses. Therefore, instead of justifying the practices which oppose the textual tradition, the rabbis are attempting to reestablish the textual tradition. The problem with this is that there is also what I call an aggadic tradition, where values and morality were passed on, and this sometimes was in tension with the letter of the law. The Jewish people, acting with their innate Torah-intuitive morality, developed an approach, and this was recognized as legitimate until recent times.[8] So we now have a situation where shiurim are being given on the prohibition of lo tehanem telling people all sorts of things about how to relate to non-Jews that no one, and this includes great rabbis, ever paid attention to (e.g., one can’t say that X is a good baseball player!).

I am not going to get into the halakhic justification which can be offered as to why the pious Jewish people didn’t follow the letter of the law. There is indeed halakhic justification. (See R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 15 no. 47.) Yet my point is that the Jewish people didn’t need any specific halakhic justification, because they knew from their intuitive natural morality what was proper. This is what R. Yehudah Amital meant when he said that growing up in Hungary he never heard anyone talk about “halakhah this, and halakhah that”.[9] As R. Amital pointed out, the people who speak like this, who have an endless focus on halakhic particulars, are those who have lost touch with the tradition. In a traditional society there is no need for one to delve into endless halakhic details, as simply by growing up in this society one knows how to conduct oneself. In a traditional society, you don’t need books to tell you, for example, how big the matzah needs to be and how much water you need to wash your hands, and by the same token you don’t need books to tell you what you can and can’t say about the Mets’ leading slugger or whether or not you can give your maid a gift on her birthday. There has been so much discussion about how Haredism is a modern invention, but the truth is that Centrism, with its Pan-Halakhism, is just as much a modern invention as haredism. Looking around, it is actually some groups of Hasidim who are the only real traditionalists, the ones who have a mesorah and who don’t need to constantly look into a book to tell them how they should live. As the great Hungarian scholar Ludwig Blau put it, “A drop of tradition is worth more than a ton of acumen.”[10]

2. In my last post I summarized R. Eleazar Ashkenazi’s position in his Tzafnat Paneah, pp. 29-30, as follows:

He also offers another explanation for the lengthy lifespans [in the Torah], namely, that the Torah recorded what the popular belief was, no matter how exaggerated, and Moses was not concerned about these sorts of things. In other words, just like today people say that the Torah is not interested in a scientific presentation of how the world was created, R. Eleazar’s position is that the Torah is not interested in a historically accurate presentation.
Dr. Eric Lawee, who has a chapter on Ashkenazi in his forthcoming book, wrote to me that he reads Ashkenazi differently than I did. I went back to the text and thanks to Lawee, I would like to clarify some of what I wrote.[11] It appears that the first part of Ashkenazi’s comment is merely stating that the Torah recorded exaggerated numbers as figures of speech, much like the Land of Israel is described as flowing with milk and honey which was never meant to be understood literally. Although it is true that people understand the lifespans literally, Ashkenazi sees this as a misinterpretation of the Torah. In other words, it is not correct to say that the Torah recorded the exaggerated numbers because that was what the people believed.

Yet in this very discussion, Ashkenazi also states that the exaggerated numbers are only found in the very ancient stories. However, with regard to events closer to Moses’ time the latter was more careful about recording the details accurately. It is because of this comment that I wrote that Moses left the stories of the distant path cloaked in legend. I should have also clarified that Ashkenazi is only referring to the ענייניהם ושנותיהם of the ancients who are not part of the prophetic tradition which includes Adam, Noah, and the Patriarchs. Here Ashkenazi does seem to be saying that the Torah records popular conceptions, for if not from these conceptions, where did Moses get the inaccurate information that he recorded?

It is possible to explain that the lengthy lifespans of people like Adam and Noah, whom Ashkenazi stresses were of concern to Moses and he was therefore careful with regard to their details, were always intended be understood figuratively. However, with regard to the others mentioned in the early chapters of Genesis, Ashkenazi speaks of הגוזמות הספוריים הבלתי מדוקדקים , and here it seems that he does advocate the notion that the Torah is including material that was popularly believed, even if not accurate.[12] He also writes about how certain matters in the Torah were recorded בבלבול ובקיצור מופלג ומקומותיהם ומקריהם שלא בדקדוק One such matter is the genealogies, about which he writes: לא היתה הכוונה לדקדק במספר שנות חיי כל איש כי אם על דרך כלל

Ashkenazi’s viewpoint is interesting because he acknowledges that in certain factual matters the Torah is not exact, and indeed this is not a concern of the Torah. This sounds very similar to how many people explain the first few chapters of Genesis. Yet it is much less common for Orthodox spokesmen to extend this approach to later chapters of the Torah, e.g., to say that say the genealogies recorded are not accurate. But is there a conceptual difference between saying that the Torah is not interested in presenting creation in a historically accurate form, and that is why there is no mention of billons of years or of evolution, and saying that the Torah is not interested in exact genealogies, but simply presents what was commonly thought and this explains the lengthy lifespans? If there is no conceptual difference, where does one draw the line? Surely there are some parts of the Torah in which factual history must be assumed. This is an issue that has not yet been adequately dealt with, and I will soon be publishing a letter by a great Torah scholar which refers to this problem.

3. In the last post I cited an example where R. Shalom Messas was criticized for not understanding an Aggadah literally. More than one person thought that I should have cited sources showing how foolish it is to take bizarre aggadot literally. It is, of course, easy to cite such sources, beginning with the Rambam’s Introduction to Perek Helek.[13] Most of these are quite famous, so let me call attention to a book not so well known. It is R. Eliezer Lippmann’ Neusatz’ Mei Menuhot, published in 1884. Here is its title page.

Neusatz was a student of the Hatam Sofer, and this book appears with the approbation of R. Simhah Bunim Sofer (the Shevet Sofer).


Here is the first page of the approbations to his book Be-Tzir Eliezer. Pay careful attention to how R. Abraham Samuel Sofer (the Ketav Sofer) describes Neusatz’ standing as a student of the Hatam Sofer.
On p. 16a, after citing Maimonides’ words that the majority err in understanding aggadot literally, Neusatz comments that this was the situation in earlier times, which were less religiously sophisticated than later generations. The proof that the earlier generations were religiously naïve is that belief in divine corporeality was widespread then. According to Neusatz, people who were so mistaken about God that they imagined him as a corporeal being would obviously not be able to understand Aggadah in a non-literal fashion. He contrasts that with the generation he lived in, which was able to properly understand Aggadah.

אמנם בדורנו זה נזדככו יותר הרעיונות ונלטשו הלבבות והמושגים האלהיים הנשגבים האלה מצטיירים בלבות המאמינים בטוהר יותר ורוב זוהר, ונתמעטו אנשי הכת הזאת, ותה”ל רובם יודעים שחז”ל כתבו אגדותיהם ע”ד משל ומליצה וחדות וכפי הצורך אשר היה להם לפי ענין הדורות אשר היה לפניהם, פנימיותם הם ענינים אמתיים נשגבים עומדים ברומו של עולם.
I assume that Neusatz would say that the traditional notion of the generations declining only refers to the scholars, as it is obvious from his words that when it comes to the masses the generations have been getting better.

Neusatz also has an interesting explanation as to why certain prophecies, in particular those of Ezekiel, are not written in proper grammatical Hebrew. This was already commented on by Abarbanel. Abarbanel simply attributes this to Ezekiel’s and Jeremiah’s unpolished Hebrew skills![14] He further claims that this is why there are an abundance of keri u-khetiv, ketiv ve-lo keri etc. in the book of Jeremiah. The original Hebrew had to be corrected!

Neusatz has a different approach to explain certain prophets’ apparent deficiencies in the Hebrew language. He explains that since the prophets were speaking to the lower classes, and they wanted their message to sink in, they adjusted their language accordingly. (Mei Menuhot, pp. 13b, 34b). This is also how he explains certain passages in the book of Ezekiel which would appear to be at odds with modest and proper speech. Since the prophet was speaking to the masses, he had to use their coarse language (p. 35a). This is no different than politicians today, who adopt a certain mode of speech to connect with the listeners. It also explains many of R. Ovadiah Yosef’s outrageous comments. In speaking to the masses he forgets who he is, and uses the sort of lower class language that allows him to connect with his listeners, but that is not acceptable for someone in his position.

Neusatz calls attention to R. Joseph Albo’s comment, Sefer ha-Ikarim 3:25, that even the Torah was written so as to speak to its various audiences, which included not just the wise people but also the foolish ones:

לפי שהתורה לא נתנה לחכמים ולמשכילים בלבד, אבל לכל העם מקצה גדולים וקטנים חכמים וטפשים, ראוי שיבואו בה דברים מוכנים [צ”ל מובנים כמ”ש במהדורת הוזיק] לכל.
Neusatz is also explicit that very few aggadot are actually the result of the Sages’ ruah ha-kodesh (p. 32a). He states that Maimonides’ astronomical views in the Mishneh Torah do not come from a holy source, but from the Greeks, and in our day must be rejected (p. 38a). He also acknowledges that at times the Sages’ opinions were based on the best scientific knowledge of their time, which we now know is mistaken (pp. 36a-36b, 38a-38b). On page 39b he discusses Maimonides’ rejection of astrology. The problem with Maimonides’ position is that the Talmud clearly accepts astrology. In Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters I argue that Maimonides must have assumed that the greatest of the Sages rejected astrology. Yet the problem is that although Maimonides might assume this, is there any rabbinic source to justify this assumption? Neusatz argues that there is. There is a famous rabbinic statement in Shabbat 156a: אין מזל לישראל This means that Israel is not under the planetary influence. However, the statement is not a denial of the efficacy of astrology per se, and indeed assumes that the nations of the world are under the planetary influences. In very original fashion, Neusatz argues for a different understanding of the statement that he believes was shared by Maimonides:

והנה ידוע דעת הרמב”ם שהמזל אינו פועל כלל ונ”ל דס”ל שזה הוא כונת ר’ עקיבא ור’ יוחנן ורב ושמואל ורב נחמן ב”י בסוף מסכת שבת שאמרו אין מזל לישראל, וכונתם שאין ראוי לישראל עם חכם להאמין שמזל פועל.

In other words, אין מזל לישראל means that it is not proper for a smart people like the Jews to believe in the efficacy of astrology!

Neusatz also discusses Maimonides’ general attitude towards superstition, and argues that today, when all the superstitious beliefs have been proven false, it is a religious requirement to advocate Maimonides’ approach in these matters (p. 40b). As to why the Sages appear to believe all these superstitions, Neusatz assumes that they had to deal with the masses who were enmeshed in these notions, and that as long as the superstitious ideas were not idolatrous, the Sages were willing to tolerate them (p. 41ff. This is exactly Meiri’s view with regard to Zugot, but Neusatz had no way of knowing this as this section of the Meiri had not yet appeared in print.) Neusatz adopts the same view with regard to demons, which like Maimonides he too sees as non-existent (pp. 43ff.).[15]

Neusatz sees no harm in the Sages using common figures of speech if they never actually took them literally. Just as today we use expressions such as “the devil is in the details,” so too the Sages would refer to phenomena as due to a demon even though they didn’t believe this literally. To support this assumption, he brings a very interesting example where the Sages even used a mythological image (p. 45a). Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, ch. 6, in speaking of the sun, writes: “The sun rides in a chariot and rises, crowned as a bridegroom.” This is obviously taken from the Greek myth of Helios, the god who drives the chariot of the sun across the sky every day. Yet despite this mythological origin, which Neusatz assumes must have been known to the Sages, the image appears in a Midrashic text. Neusatz writes:

ומי לא יבין? שרק על צד יופי הדבור והמשל אמרו כן לציירה כפי פעולתה, באשר מימי קדם ועד היום מפורסם משל זה לפעולת השמש ניתן לה מאת בעלי הממשילים (קראם הרמב”ם טלסמאות ובל”א מיטאלאגיע) ועד היום מציירים הממשילים את פעולת השמש בתמונה זו וכנודע.
It is in his discussion of demons that Neusatz brings amazing testimony from the Hatam Sofer, rejecting the authenticity of the vast majority of what is included in the book known as the Zohar.[16] Before quoting it, let me repeat that this book has the haskamah of the Hatam Sofer’s grandson, R. Simhah Bunim Sofer (the Shevet Sofer). Here is what Neusatz writes on p. 43b:
בפירוש שמעתי כן מפה קדוש אדומ”ו גאון ישראל קדוש ד’ מכובד מוהר”ר משה סופר זצוק”ל אב”ד ור”ם דק”ק פרעשבורג שאמר בפני רבים מתלמידיו, אלו היה יכולת ביד אדם להעמיד מדרשי רשב”י על טהרתן לבררם מתוך מה שנתחבר אליהם מחכמי הדורות שאחריו לא יהיה כולו רק ספר קטן הכמות מאד מחזיק דפים מעוטים.
The Hatam Sofer is often portrayed as both a religious extremist as well as lacking a critical sense. The first assumption, that he was an extremist, is absolutely false and is a creation of the nineteenth-century Reformers. I won’t go into it here, but suffice it to say that the Hatam Sofer was often a very lenient posek, the exact opposite of what people mean by “extremism”.

As for not having a critical sense, this too is false. I am not saying that he viewed matters as did R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes or R. Solomon Judah Rapoport,[17] but the quotation from Neusatz shows that the Hatam Sofer was much more complex than he was caricatured by his opponents. There are numerous examples that could be cited to illustrate this. In Limits of Orthodox Theology I mentioned that the Hatam Sofer leaned towards Ibn Ezra’s view that the entire last chapter of Deuteronomy was not written by Moses. He also wondered whether the Targum on Ruth was of Sadducean origin.[18] Another example relates to what was discussed in this post regarding the Jerusalem Talmud’s view that there is a mistake in the book of Jeremiah. (I neglected to mention that the J. Talmud there also states that there is a mistake in the book of Ezekiel.) According to the Hatam Sofer, the mistake in our book of Jeremiah is due to an erroneous emendation that dates back to biblical times.[19]

4. In my last post I quoted what R. Itzele of Ponovezh said about the superiority of the religious masses’ outlook to the Daas Torah of the gedolim. I had originally quoted this in an earlier post and referred to what R. Avraham Shapiro said about it. R. Avraham, before he became known as the Rosh Yeshiva of Merkaz ha-Rav and Chief Rabbi of Israel, had published R. Itzele’s teshuvot, Zekher Yitzhak, in 1949. Here is the title page of the book (taken from hebrewbooks.org).
Unfortunately, the version on Otzar ha-Hokhmah has been censored. Here is the title page at it appears on Otzar ha-Hokhmah, with no indication as to who brought the book to publication.

The Otzar ha-Hokhmah version is also missing R. Avraham’s learned introduction. I have no doubt that Otzar ha-Hokhmah is innocent in this matter, and was unaware that the volume it put online had been tampered with. (If you have Otzar ha-Hokhmah there is actually no reason to use the first edition of Zekher Yitzhak, as a second edition, with an additional volume, was published by Machon Yerushalayim in 2000, and this is also found on the Otzar.)

All this is by way of introduction to saying that a couple of people wondered if R. Avraham had any interesting ideas in addition to being a posek and Talmudist.. Many people indeed only see him in the latter mold. I remember some years ago when I asked an acquaintance in Israel how it was possible that some people in Merkaz ha-Rav were willing to go against the Rosh Yeshiva, R. Avraham, and establish Yeshivat Har ha-Mor. It was explained to me that “if you want to know if something is muktzeh, then you should ask R. Avraham. But in terms of hashkafah, R. [Zvi] Tau is the one to follow.”

Yet I think this is an exaggeration, and those who are interested in R. Avraham can find lots of interesting things in his book Morashah, as well as in the two volumes published on R. Avraham by R. Yitzhak Dadon, Imrei Shefer and Rosh Devarkha. (Dadon is the man – ספרא וסייפא – who killed the terrorist who attacked Merkaz a few years ago.) I have also given two lectures on R. Avraham at Torah in Motion that can be downloaded.

R. Avraham knew an enormous amount about the history of great Torah scholars, and while he didn’t have a critical sense, he knew when a story was nonsense.[20] For example, R. Shalom Schwadron told a story about how when R. Kook, R. Isser Zalman Meltzer, and R. Moshe Mordechai Epstein were together once, they decided that each one should repeat a tractate of Talmud by heart.[21] That was the extent of their conversation. R. Avraham thinks that the story is, to put it bluntly, crazy. No normal person could sit and listen to someone else rattle off an entire tractate. Furthermore, are we supposed to think that these gedolim had no Torah to speak to each other about and that they would be happy to just sit and listen to the other repeat the Talmud? (Imrei Shefer, p. 269).

A valuable story is recorded in Imrei Shefer, p. 34. One of the students asked as follows: If when peeling a cucumber he mistakenly took off some of the cucumber itself, is that is regarded as ba’al tashhit? The students started laughing upon hearing this question, but R. Avraham became very serious. He replied:
זו שאלה של “עצבנות”, יש עצבנות ביראת-שמים, לכן מגיעים לשאלות כאלה. אדם נורמאלי מקלף וזהו! אסור לבחורים להגיע למצב של שאלות כאלה.
We see from here that R. Avraham was aware that there is a fine line between religious practice and obsessive-compulsive behavior. Many readers have probably come into contact with individuals who unfortunately have crossed the line. It is interesting to speculate if observance of halakhah can sometimes lead to obsessive-compulsive behavior or if it is simply that an obsessive-compulsive personality is able to function very well in the halakhic system. As for humrot and hiddurim, which many critics see as connected with obsessive-compulsive behavior, R. Avraham had a simpler approach. He believed that the humrot we see are simply because people have more money today than in the past. When you have money, you can adopt hiddurim that no one dreamed about years ago.[22]

Since many people who read this blog are very interested in R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik and his family, let me mention something fascinating in Imrei Shefer, p. 251. R. Yehoshua Magnes, one of R. Avraham’s leading students, is quoted as follows (and the information certainly come from R. Avraham): R. Moses Soloveitchik supported R. Isaac Rubenstein. The extremists wanted to put R. Moses in herem until R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz told them in no uncertain terms that one doesn’t put “the son of the Rebbe” in herem!

This is referring to the great dispute in Vilna over the chief rabbinate in the late 1920s. The Mizrachi decided to put forth their own candidate, Rubenstein, who emerged victorious. This was seen as a terrible slap in the face to R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski, who until then was regarded as the unofficial chief rabbi of Vilna. The election of Rubenstein was also a rejection of the tradition that, since the late eighteenth century, there was no chief rabbi in Vilna.[23]

This story, assuming it is true, answers a perplexity I had for some time. Making of a Godol, p. 749, relates how some Polish rabbis were so upset at R. Moses Soloveitchik that they threatened to put him in herem. In response to this threat, R. Baruch Ber is quoted as saying that one doesn’t put the son of the Rebbe in herem. The story quoted by Kamenetsky has to do with a rabbinical dispute between a certain Agudist rabbi and a Mizrachi shochet. We are told that R. Moses opposed R. Zvi Hanokh Levin’s support of the rabbi. Yet why would this occasion a herem? Others have assumed that the rabbis may have wanted to place him in herem for accepting the position at the Warsaw Takhkemoni, the Mizrachi school. Yet again, why would this lead to a herem? R. Hayyim’s great student, R. Shlomo Polachek, the Meitchiter, also taught at a Mizrachi school.

Assuming the information in Imrei Shefer is correct, all is understandable. If R. Moses supported R. Isaac Rubenstein, then the herem would make perfect sense. Here was an issue in which the entire rabbinic world had joined together to support R. Hayyim Ozer. The great dayan of Vilna, R. Henokh Eiges, the Marheshet, resigned from the Mizrachi on account of the slight to R. Hayyim Ozer’s honor. R. Aaron Rabinowitz, the son-in-law of R. Reines, the founder of Mizrachi, did likewise.[24] To support Rubenstein would thus be viewed as a terrible betrayal of rabbinic solidarity, which in the rabbinic mind would be deserving of a herem.

Why would R. Moses have supported Rubenstein? Presumably this was tied in with his opposition to Agudat Israel. It is known that he was quite opposed to the Agudah, claiming that in this opposition he was simply following in the path of his father, R. Hayyim .[25] In fact, this opposition explains another interesting point. In Keneset Yisrael 10 (1932), a journal published by the Hazon Ish’s brother and brother-in-law, there appears an article by “Shlomo Kohen.” Kohen was one of the Hazon Ish’s students, but the article was by the Hazon Ish. Why did the Hazon Ish not want to sign his own name to it? The article is directed against another article published by R. Moses Soloveitchik in Ha-Pardes, in which he cited the hiddushim of his son, R. Joseph Baer. As the Steipler explained, the Hazon Ish wanted to disprove what R. Moses wrote (in the name of his son) because R. Moses was associated with the Mizrachi (teaching at Takhkemoni) and he therefore wanted to diminish his stature (לבטלו).[26] In other words, the fact that the Hazon Ish decided to dispute with R. Moses (and he rarely disputed with contemporaries) was not because he so respected the latter, but the exact opposite.[27]

With regard to Mizrachi rabbis, let me quote something else repeated by R. Avraham Shapiro: The Hafetz Hayyim once wrote to a certain Mizrachi rabbi with all sorts of elaborate titles. When R. Velvel Soloveitchik was asked how the Hafetz Hayyim could write with such respect to a Mizrachi rabbi, R. Velvel responded that this is what happens when you don’t listen to any lashon ha-ra! (Imrei Shefer, p. 271). He said this as a criticism of the Hafetz Hayim. In other words, sometimes you need to listen to lashon ha-ra in order to know how to properly evaluate people. (R. Avraham was very upset with this story and doubted its veracity, although the comment is very much in line with how R. Velvel would express himself.)

Regarding Imrei Shefer, I was very happy to see on p. 267 that R. Avraham studied Kitvei R. Weinberg, which I published a number of years ago. Both volumes of this work are now available on hebrewbooks.org.

5. People continue to write to me about my earlier posts on R. Kook.[28] Many are fascinated with R. Kook’s position on sacrifices that I discussed here.
Let me therefore call attention to another recently published text, found in R. Tsuriel’s Peninei ha-Re’iyah, p. 212. (It earlier appeared in Meorot ha-Re’iyah, Haggadah shel Pesah, p. 225.). This is actually the text from which R. Kook’s famous words in Olat ha-Re’iyah, p, 292, are taken. There R. Kook envisions a future of vegetable sacrifices.


Olat ha-Re’iyah was published in 1939, after R. Kook’s death. Now that the original text of R. Kook’s words has been published, we can see how R. Zvi Yehudah did not merely “abridge” his father’s text, as Tsuriel puts it, but clearly censored it to soften its radicalism, which is a pattern seen again and again in R. Zvi Yehudah’s editing.

What appears in R. Kook’s original text is further elaboration about how in Messianic days the animals will be raised in intelligence to the level of man, and he even brings a biblical verse in support of this notion. Isaiah 43:20 reads: “The beasts of the field shall honor Me, the jackals and the ostriches.” The fact that animals are portrayed as honoring God shows that they will move beyond behavior based purely on instinct. Then R. Kook writes as follows, and pay careful attention to what I have underlined, which is undoubtedly the reason why R. Zvi Yehudah thought he had to censor the text.
אם כן יהיה כערך האדם עכשיו. על כן לא יהיה צריך לקרב מהם ולהקריב, ויהיה איסור בזה, ותהיה ההקרבה רק מנחה מהצומח, שהוא לא ישכיל עוד על שיעלהו בפועל. על כן תערב המנחה, ולא שאר קרבן מהחיים.

Here R. Kook isn’t just expressing a preference for vegetable sacrifices, but telling us that it will actually be forbidden to offer animal sacrifices.

Regarding Tsuriel’s Peninei ha-Re’iyah, some of the passages from R. Kook cited from manuscript are quite valuable. See e.g., p. 385, where R. Kook states that when it comes to a war to defend the Jewish people even the tribe of Levi goes out to fight. What this means, of course, is that R. Kook would be opposed to any draft exemption for yeshiva students.

In addition, Tsuriel has selected passages from R. Kook’s writings and arranged them in order of the various parshiyot, so that one can always find a good piece for a devar Torah. For parashat Metzora (p. 231), he quotes R. Kook’s statement in Ezrat Kohen, no. 21, that even if one expresses heretical thoughts, this doesn’t mean that he really is a heretic. Rather, it could be that he is simply trying to show that he is in line with what “the world” is saying, but it doesn’t mean that he really believes it.

This is just one more angle whereby R. Kook tries to defend the modern free-thinkers. His most famous defense is that modern heretics have the status of onsin, in that the environment today almost forces them into their false beliefs so that they cannot be held responsible for their views. He also states that those who express heretical beliefs are not really certain of their heresy, and it is only one who is certain in this who is to be regarded as a heretic.

With the publication of Shemoneh Kevatzim we see that R. Kook goes even further and completely removes the orthoprax individual from the status of heretic. I quoted the relevant passage here.
We see from R. Kook that one who holds a heretical belief, but lives as an observant Jew in his daily life, is regarded as part of the Torah community. As I put it in my earlier post: Two important things stand out. First, while not condoning orthopraxy, R. Kook states that one who is observant, despite the fact that he denies ikkarim, is to be regarded as an erring Jew, not as a heretic. R. Kook’s position is a complete rejection of the idea that people who are shomrei Torah u-mitzvot can be read out of the fold and be regarded as heretics because of their incorrect beliefs. The second important point is that he rejects the Rambam’s entire theological conception of Principles of Faith and aligns himself with the Ra’avad, showing once again that the Rambam’s position has not attained unanimity.[29]

Had R. Zvi Yehudah printed this text, we might have been spared some of the heresy hunting in the religious Zionist world, and discussions of whether one can drink this or that observant Jew’s wine due to the fact that he might have some heretical thoughts. In fact, it is only with the publication, uncensored, of R. Kook’s writings that the “lights” of his soul are revealed in all their grandeur. What other spiritual leader with unconventional views could declare that he is ready to fight the entire world for the truth as he sees it, to proclaim his views without any compromises and without worrying about what the “world” will say? While I greatly respect R. Herzog, R. Weinberg, and R. Soloveitchik, they certainly could never say the following (Pinkasei ha-Re’iyah [2010], vol. 2, p. 201):

“אם אני מוכרח להיות איש ריב לכל העולם מצד הנטיה של האמת העמוקה שבנפשי, שאינה סובלת שום הטיה של שקר, אי אפשר לי להיות איש אחר. וצריך אני להוציא מן הכח אל הפועל רק את יסודות האמת העקריים הצפונים ברוחי, בלא שום התחשבות עם מה שחושב העולם בכל הסכמותיו.” זהו הפתגם של דורש האמת, המתעורר בגבורתו העליונה.

See also ibid., p. 208, where we see his self-image as a prophet of old, and that no one other than he can see clearly what is taking place in the world:

מה יש עכשיו בעולם? וכי מפני שאין שום איש, ושום למדן ביחוד, רוצה להביט מה שיש עתה בעולם, וכי בשביל כך, גם אנכי לא אביט? לא! אני אינני משועבד להרבים. הנני הולך במסילתי, בדרך הישרה, ישר אביט.
R. Kook’s commitment to his path, despite the controversy that ensued, was a trait also seen in R. Shlomo Goren, with all the tragic consequences, both personal and professional. Perhaps the Lubavitcher Rebbe is the only one after R. Kook who was able to successfully chart a path undisturbed by the opposition, and without any need for compromise.

One other passage from R. Kook’s recently published Pinkasei ha-Re’iyah vol. 2, p. 207, is worth noting. While tolerance of opposing viewpoints is often viewed as characteristic of a watered-down commitment to one’s own belief, R. Kook adopts a different perspective:

הסבלנות בדעות, כשהיא באה מלב טהור ומנוקה מכל רשעה, אינה עלולה לקרר את להבת רגש הקודש שבתוכן האמונה הפשוטה, מקור אושר החיים כולם, כ”א להרחיב ולהגדיל את יסוד ההתלהבות המקודשת לשמים.


To be continued.
[1] For a different perspective, see the recently published Pinkesei ha-Re’iyah, vol. 3, p. 69, where R. Kook states that one might have expected non-Jewish philosophers, since they are not involved with practical mitzvot, to be able to attain a higher grasp of theological truths, as they can devote themselves exclusively to this. Yet R. Kook explains that this is not the case.
[2] In R. Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Man we also see his dissatisfaction with practical halakhic decision-making. His alternative to this is theoretical halakhic study, which is very different than what R. Kook saw as his goal. In the hasidic world, the communal rav was relegated to the role of halakhic technician, while the focus of spiritual leadership was the Rebbe, who did not involve himself in practical halakhic rulings.
[3] Together with the crackdown on sexual abuse, there have been other changes as well. In my youth there were teachers who would punish students physically. This was, in fact, the traditional method of disciplining students, and is mentioned in Makkot 2:2, Bava Batra 21a, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 2:2, Rotzeah u-Shemirat ha-Nefesh 5:6, and Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 551:18, Yoreh Deah 245:10. See also the picture from the 1395 Coburg Pentateuch, of a teacher with his whip, available here.
It is clear from the rabbinic sources that the physical punishments were not designed to inflict real pain, although one wonders whether the picture from the Coburg Pentateuch reflects a harsher reality. See Elliot Horowitz, “The Way We Were: ‘Jewish Life in the Middle Ages,’” Jewish History 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 81-82. In any event, today, what parent will allow the teacher to lay a hand on his child, even if the pain is minor?
Even though, as mentioned, teachers were never supposed to inflict real pain, I think it is fair to say that the physical punishments over the generations sometimes did get out of hand (see next note). I recall vividly one rebbe who would squeeze kids’ arms and even throw them against the wall. Today, in every Modern Orthodox school and even some haredi schools, that type of behavior would be grounds for immediate termination. Regarding how students were physically punished in the great yeshivot, we have reports of Roshei Yeshiva and mashgichim who would slap students in the face. See e.g., Moshe Tzinovitz, Mir (Tel Aviv, 1981), p. 464; Shaul Stampfer, Ha-Yeshivah ha-Litait be-Hithavutah (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 335 n. 76. Even R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin, who was a very gentle person, would occasionally slap a student in the face. On one occasion this even led to the students going “on strike” (i.e., ceasing all Torah study) in protest against the Netziv’s action. They viewed the slap as an insult to the entire student body since this was the sort of thing one would expect a melamed to do in a heder, not the rosh yeshiva of the great Volozhin. The Netziv was forced to publicly apologize to the entire student body. See M. Eisenstadt, “Revolutzyah ba-Yeshivah,” Ha-Tzefirah, 1 Sivan 5676; Stampfer, Ha-Yeshivah ha-Litait, pp. 128-129, 149.
On at least one occasion, a student certainly deserved being slapped in the face. It happened at Telz in 1905. At this time there were two mashgichim, and as was often the case at the great yeshivot, the students were very opposed to the mashgichim. (A few years earlier the students had gone on strike due to the invasive actions of a previous mashgiach, R. Aryeh Leib Hasman. See Stampfer, Ha-Yeshiva ha-Litait, p. 334.). One of the students waited above and when given the signal poured a bucket of fish sauce upon the mashgiach. R. Eliezer Gordon, the Rosh Yeshiva, slapped the suspected student on the face. Simcha Assaf, who records the story, tells us that this was the only time Gordon ever did such a thing. See Assaf, “Shenot ha-Limudim sheli bi-Yeshivat Telz (5665-5668),” in Immanuel Etkes and Shlomo Tikochinski, eds., Yeshivot Lita (Jerusalem, 2004), p. 235.

I have seen haredi authors who argue that opposition to physical punishment in school is a sign that people have moved away from “Torah values” in favor of modern psychology. See R. Chaim Rapoport’s response to this approach in his wonderful discussion of the issue in Datche 41 and 41 (2008). See also R. Avraham Steinberg, Encyclopedia Hilkhatit Refuit, vol. 6 cols. 767-768.

Another change in our era is that signs of physical affection between a rebbe and student, which at one time were very important especially as the rebbe served as a father figure, are no longer acceptable. A student cannot even sit on his rebbe’s lap, as was done in years past. It is reported that when R. Hayyim Soloveitchik visited his great student, R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz, who at this time was serving as rosh yeshiva of Keneset Beit Yitzhak in Slobodka, R. Baruch Ber sat on R. Hayyim’s lap. Just like he sat on R. Hayyim’s lap when he was a young student, R. Hayyim wanted R. Baruch Ber to sit on his lap when he was a grown man. See Making of a Gadol, p. 87. The fact that we could never imagine something like this happening today shows how different our mindset is. There are loads of stories of rebbes kissing their students. R. Zvi Yehudah Kook was known in particular for this. See e.g., Iturei Yerushalayim, no. 55 (2011), p. 4. Here are three stories from R. Shlomo Riskin’s recently published memoir, Listening to God, which also bring us back to a more innocent time.
I couldn’t wait to share my discovery [of Darwin’s theories and how they could help explain the Torah] with my rebbe, Rav Mandel, that Monday morning. I brought him the book, and showed him the relevant passages—totally ignorant of the “red flag” raised in religious circles by the mere mention of Darwin. Rav Mandel barely took the book in his hand; he slapped my face, and then kissed my forehead. “Your interpretations are magnificent, but it is forbidden to read such heretical literature,” he said gently. I smarted at the slap, felt vindicated by the kiss, and continued to adore my rebbe. . . . “ (p. 51)
Riskin describes being tested by Dr. Samuel Belkin.
He asked me which Talmudic tractate I was studying, spoke to me “in learning,” and gave me a section of Gemara and the Tosafot commentary to read. He then came around the desk where I was sitting, kissed me on the forehead, and said to Tante, “you’re right, He can have a full scholarship to Yeshiva University.”(pp. 67-68)
After Riskin passed the examination to become a city rabbi in Israel, “Rabbi [Shaul] Yisraeli rose—and visibly moved—kissed me on the forehead.” (p. 369)
In general, I have to say that Riskin’s book is quite interesting. I must note, however, that in a number of places where he is critical of people or tells a story that might be embarrassing, Riskin refers to individuals by their initials. If he did so in order to leave the figures anonymous, he was not entirely successful, since in a few cases it is not that hard to figure out whom he had in mind.
[4] Unfortunately, refusal to protect children is not a new thing. See this post where I mentioned even allowing rapists to go free.
What is new is that parents are now beginning to stand up. Here is a passage from a nineteenth-century memoir from which we see that in the past even murder was covered up. (The case described is definitely not manslaughter, which is what is described in Makkot 2:2 and Rambam, Hilkhot Rotzeah u-Shemirat ha-Nefesh 5:6. Incidentally, the latter two sources are only speaking about a society in which teachers were permitted to hit the students, and have no applicability today vis-à-vis most of the Orthodox world.)
One of the angry teachers I mentioned was nicknamed David with the tangled hair, as his head was covered with a mass of knotted hair. He was hot-tempered and frightening, and often came to within an inch of killing a pupil. When particularly enraged, he would lift a child up and ferociously throw him to the ground, so that he landed like a corpse. That actually did happen once. After the funeral the parents of the deceased never dared accuse him of murdering their child. They accepted it as preordained that their son should die while learning Torah, and so did the rest of the community. No one considered the melamed a murderer. Even the sons of M.S. who made it their business to ferret out sinners in the town, in order to cause strife and contention, kept silent on this matter, and David the melamed kept on teaching as if nothing had happened.
Yekhezkel Kotik, Journey to a Nineteenth-Century Shtetl (Detroit, 2002), p. 145. On p. 431, David Assaf, the editor, calls attention to a different memoir which tells of a child dying as a result of his melamed’s beating. On p. 145, Kotik also speaks of another melamed who “would take all his anger out on that particular part of the boy’s anatomy that is generally not mentioned in print.”
(In some segments of the hasidic world the cover-ups unfortunately also continue. Had the New Square madman succeeded and killed the five people in the house he was intent on burning down, does anyone think that the community would have assisted the police in finding the murderer? In a future post I will mention cases of murder and attempted murder carried out for “pious” reasons.)
After my previous post on ultra-Orthodox tolerance of sexual abuse, there were some who doubted that there is any rabbinic support for this. Those who can read Hebrew, please read the following responsum from R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 16, pp. 169-171.
According to Klein, there is never a time when sexual abuse can be reported to the police, even if a child is being continuously raped. That is because there are never two male witnesses who see the abuse. If someone does report the abuse, it is a mitzvah to kill the moser. If anyone has a difficult time understanding why a segment of the hasidic world time and again offers support for the perpetrator and ostracizes the victim, this is all the explanation you need. From their perspective, the victim who goes to the police is worse than the sexual abuser. Based on Klein’s understanding, I don’t think there is a “heter” for a woman who has been raped by a Jew to go to the police, because there is no halakhic evidence of a crime. (He also says that it is forbidden to turn in a murderer. In case anyone needs to be reminded how crazy this viewpoint is, I am writing these words only a few hours after the monster who killed Leiby Kletzky was identified.)

A friend insists that there is no difference between Klein’s position and that of Agudat Israel. This is not true at all. Whereas Klein states that someone can never be turned in to the police, the Agudah position is that a molester can be turned in, but only after a rabbi gives approval. The Agudah position continues to develop, and I have no doubt that in the end the Agudah will end up holding a position identical to that of the RCA. I also think that it is public pressure that will move Agudah in this direction, as public pressure has been responsible for all the adjustments in the Agudah’s position that we have seen until now.
Yet even without public pressure, the current Agudah position is so untenable, that it will have to be updated. For one, it asks people to violate the law. The law is clear that some people are obligated to contact the police when they suspect child abuse. By insisting that a rabbi be consulted before doing so, mandated reporters are being put in the position of being told by a rabbi to refrain from doing something that the law requires. Do the Agudah constituents realize that listening to the rabbi in these circumstances can open them up to both criminal and civil penalties?

As for the rabbis, I can’t imagine who would agree to be on the Agudah’s panel of rabbis that will examine accusations of abuse in order to determine if it is permitted to go to the police. If one of these rabbis rules that the evidence is not compelling and it is therefore forbidden to go to the police, and the rabbi is wrong, he opens himself (and the mandated reporter) to a lawsuit by the parents of the molested child. Whatever the ultimate verdict, the lawyer fees alone will end up bankrupting the rabbi. Is the Agudah prepared to set up a fund to defend rabbis sued by parents of molested children? Certainly not, which is why no rabbi who is thinking straight will ever agree to put himself in such a circumstance. The Agudah’s position also leaves the organization itself vulnerable to a lawsuit by parents of victims.

Finally, unlike so many of the cynics in our community, I don’t think the Agudah position is all about protecting rabbis, guilty or not. I really do believe that the Agudah recognizes that there is a problem. It is convinced that the rabbis it will charge with examining abuse cases will indeed make sure that molesters are turned in. The problem, however, is that we have seen all this before. We have seen over and over again that it is precisely the rabbis who have failed in this matter, often because they are not willing to turn on their own. It was precisely because of this that the community of laypeople rose up and said “No more.” One doesn’t need to be a prophet to see that by relying on individual rabbis to determine if an accusation of sexual abuse is credible, there will continue to be cover-ups. (Am I wrong in assuming that these cover-ups never would have happened if women were in charge? Would mothers ever have permitted child molesters to continue to prey on the young?)
The Agudah position is thus both a public relations and legal disaster in the making. The Church tried such an approach already and it doesn’t work. I don’t understand why such smart people in the Agudah don’t see how their new position is doomed to failure.
[5] See here where I attribute the rabbinic silence to the money Tropper was handing out. I also brought proof that even great rabbis are not immune to being influenced by money. Regarding this point, see the recent biography of R. Zvi Pesach Frank written by Shabbetai Dov Rosenthal, Geon ha-Hora’ah (Jerusalem, 2011),, vol. 1, pp. 410-411. A letter from R. Frank is published in which he criticizes members of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate (of which he was a member). The subjects of his criticism were gedolei Yisrael, and yet he accuses them of being improperly influenced by Israeli government money. He adds:
מי לנו גדול מהכהן הגדול שלא צירפוהו לדון בענין עיבור השנה, שהיה חשש נגיעה שמפני הקור יכריע שלא לעבר השנה
[6] See e.g., here.
[7] I hope to treat this phenomenon in great detail when I am able to complete my article on contemporary halakhic practices in opposition to the Shulhan Arukh.
[8] There are loads of sources that speak of the great weight to be assigned to the practices of the Jewish people, even when these practices appear to violate the textual halakhah. For one example, see R. Solomon Laniado, Beit Dino shel Shlomo (Jerusalem, 1986), Orah Hayyim no. 17 (p. 96): שכל מה שנהגו ישראל שכינה מוסכמת עמהם
Laniado (died 1793) was the chief rabbi of Aleppo.
[9] See my post here.
[10] Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger, ed., The Rabbinical Seminary of Budapest 1877-1977 (New York, 1986), p. 77.
[11] I would also like to mention a recent article by Lawee that deals with some issues relevant to earlier installments of this series, such as the possibility of errors in the biblical text. See Lawee, “Isaac Abarbanel: From Medieval to Renaissance Jewish Biblical Scholarship,” in Magne Saebo, ed., Hebrew Bible/Old Testament (Goettingen, 2008), vol. 2, p. 210, who calls attention to Ibn Ezra, Ex. 25:29, who claims that there is a mistake in the Book of Chronicles. He also notes Abarbanel’s commentary to I Kings 10:22, which suggests another error in Chronicles, due to Ezra misunderstanding a verse in the Book of Kings.
[12] Elsewhere, Ashkenazi speaks of Moses having access to historical records, but there he assumes that these records are accurate. See Epstein, Mi-Kadmoniyot ha-Yehudim, p. 136:
כי כל התורה ברוח הקדש כתבה משה וידע שמות אלופי אדום ומשכנותם ומלכיהם ידועה [!] גמורה מפי ספרים ומפי סופרים ונודע לו האמת ונכתב בספר.
[13] See also this earlier post of mine.
[14] See Abarbanel’s introductions to Jeremiah, p. 298, and Ezekiel, p. 434. In the latter source he writes:
הן אמת שיחזקאל הנביא לא היה בקי בלשון הקדש ולא בכתיבתו
For other references, see Eric Lawee, Isaac Abarbanel’s Stance Toward Tradition )Albany, 2001), p. 276 n. 46.
[15] On p. 46a he offers a different perspective which I don’t think can be brought into line with what he says earlier. Here he accepts the existence of some sort of demonic beings, and claims that the superstition is only that humans can interact with and influence them. Neusatz’ book was published posthumously, and it is possible that had the author been alive he would have worked out a more consistent theory.
[16] In the next issue of Milin Havivin, I deal with Orthodox views of the Zohar. In the meantime, I was surprised to find that R. Berel Wein describes the Zohar in an unsympathetic manner. Although some may claim that Wein was only presenting the history, his less than reverential attitude towards the book comes across very clearly, even if he didn’t consciously intend this. See the video here.

For another surprising piece by Wein (called to my attention by Mel Barenholtz), see here.
Wein describes Midrash as “legend.” While this might be a term used by academics (and is in the title of Louis Ginzberg’s great work), the Yeshiva World has always rejected the word as a proper description. Wein’s entire article can be seen as a reflection on the fact that rabbis, in their sermons, quote all sorts of Midrashim as if they are historical, which they are of course not. So what value do these “legends” have, and why should we use them to fill in the “missing parts” of the biblical text? That is the question Wein deals with.
In fact, Wein’s entire article, with its demand for truth in history and the need to abandon fantasy, is the sort that in today’s day and age could generate a herem. Here, for example, is one very provocative sentence: “Many times legend becomes myth. Myth is a sense of human recognition that the story being told is not factual but it nevertheless changes legend from history or biography into literature and philosophy – sometimes sacred holy literature and philosophy.” (emphasis added). And how about this paragraph, which uses the word “mythology,” certainly knowing the knee-jerk reaction it will provoke among people.

The Torah does not deal with myth per se. Yet the Flood and Noah’s ark, the Tower of Babel, the centrality of the land of Israel, factual as they all are in the biblical narrative, nevertheless were all combined to create a basis for the holy mythology of the Jewish people. In addition, the idea that the “events of the works and decisions of our founders, the fathers of Israel, are a sure guidepost for their descendants” helped strengthen a mythology that binds the Jewish generations together and gives us insights into the values of Judaism and historical events, past and present (emphasis added).

In speaking of the Flood, Noah’s Ark and the Tower of Babel, Wein states that they are factual “in the biblical narrative.” Does this mean to imply that they are really not historical events, but it is only in the biblical narrative that they are regarded as factual? Since these events, Wein tells us, are among the great myths of Judaism, and he just finished telling us that myth is not factual, this seems to be what he is saying.
[17] These two scholars would never have said, as did the Hatam Sofer, that Yiddish was invented by the medieval Jewish sages to keep Jews separate from non-Jews. See She’elot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer, vol. 2 no. 11. There are many other examples that show that the Hatam Sofer was still very much part of the medieval worldview, which is why I state that he is a complex figure. For instance, he still leaned towards Ptolemaic astronomy, centuries after Copernicus (although he acknowledged that the issue was complicated). See Eliezer Brodt’s post here.
Another example is the Hatam Sofer’s famous comment that he doesn’t understand the value of Jews training to be doctors in medical schools where they dissect non-Jewish bodies. Since Jews keep kosher, how can the information obtained from non-Jewish bodies be applicable to them? See Hiddushei Hatam Sofer, Avodah Zarah 31b. Yet I think it is more important is that in this very passage the Hatam Sofer also laments how there is no Jewish medical school.
[18] See Lishkat Soferim to Even ha-Ezer 17:43 (found in standard editions of the Shulhan Arukh).
[19] Derashot Hatam Sofer, vol. 1, p. 331b. This text is discussed here.
[20] The same was true with R. Moshe Feinstein. See R. Aharon Felder’s recently published Rishumei Aharon, pp. 18-19. This book has lots of interesting stories about R. Moshe. Felder is not afraid to point out how R. Moshe, unlike other Roshei Yeshiva, had a more moderate viewpoint when it came to attending college. See pp. 19-21. See also p. 21 for the following story, which shows R. Moshe as a real down-to-earth person, who was far removed from “frumkeit” and had little patience for the aspiring pietist:
פעם ניגש למו”ר זצ”ל חתן ביום חתונתו וביקש לדעת איזו כוונה צריך לכוין בשעת ביאת מצווה. פנה אליו מו”ר זצ”ל וענה “איני מאמין שתוכל לכוין כלל וכלל”. והוא לא הסתפק והמשיך לשאול שוב את שאלתו, אם אני יכול לכוין מה הכונה הראויה לאותו זמן? ומו”ר זצ”ל לא הגיב, ורק המשיך ללכת לדרכו.

For another such story, see p. 20 where he records how R. Moshe told a certain Rosh Yeshiva that it was inappropriate for him to refuse to be mesader kidushin just because there would be mixed seating at the wedding. See also p. 22 that R. Moshe refused to write a letter to the judge on behalf of one who was to be sentenced for drug dealing. R. Moshe told the criminal’s father that his son damaged people’s lives and therefore “Let him sit in prison.” On p. 28 he quotes R. Moshe’s positive view of R. Kook. On p. 73 he quotes R. Moshe that a male massage therapist can massage a woman if he does not have a continuing professional relationship with her (!), a man can cut a woman’s hair, and a male teacher or principal can be present when girls in the school sing as the assumption is that he is involved with other things and not paying attention.
What many will regard as a surprising pesak appears on p. 36:
מותר להיות Wine Tester ולטעום סתם יינם, באופן שפולט ואינו בולע
I assume this pesak is based on Rama, Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 108:5, who is speaking about יין נסך, implying that it is permitted to taste but not swallow סתם יינם. See also Pithei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 98:1, for the view that it is permitted to taste, but not swallow, things forbidden by the Sages.
(Regarding tasting without swallowing, see Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 567:1-3. Based on the Rama in 567:3 it would appear that it is permissible to chew gum on a fast day other than Yom Kippur.)
Although I can’t be certain, I find it hard to believe that R. Moshe would require the wine taster to make a blessing on the non-kosher wine. If so, then R. Moshe would presumably agree with those poskim who have ruled that one does not make a blessing on gum and that you can chew it before morning tefillah. See what I wrote here.
See R. Yitzhak Barda, Yitzhak Yeranen, vol. 2, no. 11, and R. Moshe Levi, Birkat ha-Shem, vol. 2, pp. 41ff., vol. 5, pp. 537ff., for complete discussions of the topic. R. Meir Mazuz also holds that one does not make a blessing on gum. See Or Torah, Tamuz 5771, p. 973. The logic of this viewpoint is explained by the Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 210:
ולי נראה דברכה לא בטעימת חיך תליא אלא באכילה תליא כדכתיב ואכלת וברכת ואכילה היינו הנאת מעיים כדברי הרא”ש ז”ל
Speaking of gum, I wonder if R. Moshe would agree with R. Yitzhak Abadi that all the standard gums (Wrigleys, Trident, etc.) are kosher. See Or Yitzhak, vol. 1, Yoreh Deah no. 24:
כפי שבררנו החלק הטעים והמתוק שבו אין בו שום שאלה, ומה שנשאר הגומי אח”כ וממשיכים ללועסו אין בו לא טעם ולא ריח, והרי הוא כעץ בעלמא ושרי ללועסו כל היום כולו אף אם עירבו בו מדברים האסורים.
The kashrut organizations assume that gum needs a hashgachah. Here is what R. Zushe Blech has to say on the subject
The need for reliable Hashgacha for gum stems from many ingredient concerns. Plasticizers can be pure lard or tallow and emulsifiers are also often made from animal fats. Flavors and glycerin can also be completely non-Kosher. Even if all of the ingredients in a Kosher gum were acceptable, the equipment on which the product is made requires a Kashering from non-Kosher productions. Although the gum itself is not swallowed, these fats and flavors migrate from the gum into the mouth.
See here. (What does Blech mean by “reliable Hasghacha”? Does it mean that hashgachot that disagree with his understanding are not “reliable”?)
Let’s leave flavors out, as none of the flavors in the major gums are non-kosher. Let’s also leave out the issue of equipment, since this is not a real halakhic concern (as anyone who has ever lived in a place other than Israel and America, and thus has to buy foods without hashgachah, is well aware.) The issue is glycerin, emulsifiers etc. I don’t understand why this should be a problem. Even assuming that it is forbidden to swallow these things as part of a food, why would it be prohibited to simply chew on these tasteless items? Is there any kashrut problem when my son chews on his pigskin baseball glove while waiting patiently for a ball to be hit to him?
Returning to Felder, I give him credit for not being embarrassed to tell us how he once asked R. Moshe the following idiotic question (p. 20):
פעם הלכתי עם מו”ר זצ”ל לניחום אבלים, ולפני שנכנסנו לרכב ביקש ר”מ אחד מישיבת “רבינו יצחק אלחנן”, אם יכול להצטרף לנסיעה כי בית האבלים היה בקרבת מקום לשכונה של הישיבה הנ”ל. ושאלתי את מו”ר זצ”ל האם מותר לנו לקחת את אותו ר”מ לאותה ישיבה? וענה לי “למה לא, הרי נמצאים שם הרבה גדולי ראשי ישיבה שמלמדים תורה”.
Could it be that Felder didn’t know that R. Moshe’s great student, R. Nissan Alpert, taught at YU, or that his son-in-law, R. Moshe Tendler, likewise did? Did he not know that R. Moshe had close relationships with many of the Roshei Yeshiva at YU, and was colleagues with them in Agudas ha-Rabbonim?
While on the subject of teachers at YU, here is a page of a letter, never before published, by R. Yaakov Kamenetsky. It was sent to his son, R. Nosson, whom I thank for giving me permission to publish it. (The notations on the side of the letter are by R. Nosson.) In the letter, R. Yaakov admits that it would have been better for him to teach at YU, since the YU musmachim have a much more significant role in American Orthodoxy than those he was teaching. However, what prevented him from doing so is how this would appear to his sons. They would wonder, if YU was good enough for him to be part of the faculty, why did he think it so important to send his sons to haredi yeshivot?
[21] Kol Hotzev (Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 178-179.
[22] Among my children’s generation, many kids believe that there is a halakhic requirement to have two sinks. Some of these kids have literally never been to a kosher home which doesn’t have this. If they saw such a home, they would probably assume that there must be a heter for one sink, but only for those who can’t afford to redo their kitchens.
[23] R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik wrote of the difficulties R. Hayyim Ozer had, and strongly identified with the latter. See his hesped for R. Hayyim Ozer in Divrei Hagut ve-Ha’arakhah (Jerusalem, 1982), p. 194:
הגאון ר’ חיים עוזר לחם על זה בחרוף נפש. הוא סבל הרבה בעטיה של שיטה זו, סבל יסורי נפש ורוח. בשעה שהרבה מאחינו נכונים היו למסור את החושן לידי זרים ולהסתפק בציץ. עמד הוא בפרץ ומחה נגד זה.
The truth is that R. Soloveitchik is incorrect when he writes עמד הוא בפרץ ומחה נגד זה R. Hayyim Ozer did not protest the slight to his honor, or lead the opposition to Rubenstein. It was the other sages, including the Hafetz Hayyim and the Hazon Ish, who took the reins in this matter. Regarding the Hazon Ish, see Binyamin Brown, Ha-Hazon Ish (Jerusalem, 2011), p. 53.
[24] See Aharon Sorasky, Rabban shel Yisrael (Bnei Brak, 1971), p. 115; Moshe Tzinovitz, Ishim u-Kehilot (Tel Aviv, 1990) p. 240. Rabinowitz was the father-in-law of R. Avigdor Zyperstein, who taught at YU. In Vilna, the center of European Jewish scholarship, an Agudah rav, Grodzinski, and a Mizrachi rav, Eiges, sat on the same beit din and worked closely together. In Europe, every small town had a rav. Sometimes the rav was an adherent of Agudah, and other times a follower of Mizrachi. But as far as the townspeople were concerned, that didn’t matter. He was the rav and if there were halakhic questions in the town he was the one to decide them. If you were an Agudist and the rav was a Mizrachi man, when you had a halakhic question you would go to your rav. The politics of the Jewish world did not interfere when it came to halakhah. Furthermore, the various Agudat Rabbanim in Europe (and also in the U.S.) welcomed all rabbis, regardless of where one stood in the Agudah-Mizrachi dispute. In the post-World War II world, however, the haredi world has entirely changed all this and rewrote the rules. They were able to convince their followers that unless a rav follows the haredi Daas Torah he is not a reliable rav, and therefore he should not be consulted on halakhic matters. In other words, the halakhic competence of a rav was made dependant on his political outlook. This is a complete break with Jewish tradition, as it existed in Europe. While some might regard this development as simply another example of haredi “shtick”, I think it is more significant as it illustrates once again that haredi Judaism can be just as modern and revolutionary as that which it sees itself as fighting against.
[25] See Zvi Weinman, Mi-Katovitz ad Heh be-Iyar (Jerusalem, 1995), pp. 52ff.
[26] E. Horowitz, Orhot Rabbenu (Bnei Brak, 2005), vol. 5, p. 169
[27] See Brown, Ha-Hazon Ish, pp. 55-56.
[28] One well-known haredi rav wrote to me as follows:
I just read your post . . . regarding the abolishment of animal sacrifices. Barukh sheKivanti l’Da’ato shel Harav Kuk when I once told my students at . . . (and advised them to keep it under wraps) that perhaps a future Sanhedrin will find a drash to do that. But I had a caveat in that our present moral sensitivities were formed during the Exile in which we were enslaved to general, non-Jewish thinking. Therefore, after the Messiah arrives and we are able to think independently, and until we are on own long enough to form our own, Jewish ideas, all we will be able to do is continue from where we left off at the Destruction of Ba’yit Sheni. Only after some time has passed may the Sanhedrin decide that animal sacrifices ought to be abolished. This approach explains why the Rambam sets down Hilkhot Korbanot though he may have been prepared to abolish them had he been sitting on the Sanhedrin. It’s for that interim time — between the arrival of Mashiah and whenever the Sanhedrin makes its Judaism-inspired [changes].
He then added the following critical note:
Within the blog you used a term which ruffled my sensibilities: “Messianic Judaism.” Simply because that term has been usurped and corrupted by Christians who call themselves “Messianic Jews,” you should have written “Messianic-Era Judaism”.
[29] R. Isaac Hutner is quoted saying something very similar to that of R. Kook.. See R. Yitzhak Alster, Olat Yitzhak (Jerusalem, 2003), vol. 1, p. 188 (referred to by Bezalel Naor, The Limit of Intellectual Freedom [Spring Valley, 2011]):
שאין דנים הכופר עפ”י מחשבתו ודבורו לחוד עד שעושה מעשה מומרות. וכך היה לשונו: איך וואלט ניט געפסקנט אויף אימיצר אז אעהר איז אן אפיקורס סיידן איך וואלט געזעהן א ריעותא אין זיין מצוות מעשיות, כאיטש אפילו אפיקורסוס איז נישט תלוי אין מעשים, אבער מעלע וואס א מענטש רעדט – ער גלויבט אליין נישט וואס ער רעדט



The Legend of R. Yehuda Halevi’s Death: Truth or Fiction & the Cairo Genizah

The Legend of R. Yehuda Halevi’s Death: Truth or Fiction & the Cairo Genizahby Eliezer Brodt

A few years ago on the Seforim Blog I dealt with the famous legend of R. Yehuda Halevi’s death (link). More recently in Ami Magazine (# 32) I returned to this legend and related topics. This post contains new information as well as corrections that were not included in those earlier articles.

R. Yehuda Halevi was born in the year 1075 in Toledo, Spain, and died in 1141.[1] He is famous in Jewish history for being a great paytan,[2] authoring hundreds of beautiful piyutim. However, he is even more famous for authoring one of the most important Jewish philosophical works of all time, the Kuzari. This work is written in dialog form between a king and a Jew who is persuaded to convert to Judaism. The Jew defends Yiddishkeit, dealing with many issues of philosophy and various Mitzvos among other topics. This work was written by R. Yehuda in Arabic, but was translated into Hebrew in 1167. It was learned by many throughout the centuries, and numerous works were written to explain it.[3] The Kuzari had a tremendous impact on Jewish thought through the centuries and continues to do so today. In this article, I hope to deal with two legends told about R. Yehuda Halevi: one about how he met an untimely death when he got toEretz Yisroel [4] and the other about him being the father-in-law of Ibn Ezra.

Among the more famous kinos that we recite on Tisha B’Av is Tzion Halo Tishali. This piyut is about the author’s passion to walk on the holy soil of Eretz Yisrael and to pray at the Kevarim. Throughout the Kuzari and in many of his piyutim we find a strong emphasis of his love for Eretz Yisroel[5]. R’ Yosef Dov Soleveitchik, when talking about R’ Yehuda Halevi in his lectures on the Kinos, said “Rabbi Yehuda Halevi adored everything about Eretz Yisroel; he was madly in love with Eretz Yisroel. I have never known anyone so in love with Eretz Yisroel as Rabbi Yehuda Halevi. There were many others who went to Eretz Yisroel, but they did not confess their love for the land in such terms as he did”.[6]

Already in the Machzor from Worms written in 1272 and in the Nuremburg Machzor written in 1331 we find this kinah was said on Tisha Bav. The piyut, however has become famous for a different reason.[7]

In the Artscroll commentary on the Kinos, R. Avraham Chaim Feuer writes:

An ancient manuscript states that R. Yehuda Halevi composed this kina while journeying towards Eretz Yisroel and recited it when he reached Damascus, facing the direction of Zion. Although many historians believe that R. Yehuda Halevi only got as far as Egypt, never even reaching Damascus, tradition has it that he finally reached Jerusalem (circa 1145).[8] There he fell to the ground in a state of ecstasy… As he was embracing the dust near the temple mount, he was trampled and killed by an Arab horseman.[9]

R’ Yosef Dov Soleveitchik, when talking about R’ Yehuda Halevi in his lectures on the kinos, said,

“While we know that he left for Eretz Yisroel, we know nothing about him from the date of his departure from Egypt. A story is told, I do not know if it’s true, that when he arrived in Eretz Yisroel, he fell on the soil… at that very moment a Bedouin on a horse rode over him and killed him. Now they say there is documentary evidence that he died in Egypt on his way to Eretz Yisroel. I do not know about it.”[10]

The story has certainly entered Jewish popular culture. In 1851 Heinrich Heine published his Romanzero, and in the section of ‘Hebrew Melodies’ he writes of “Jehuda ben Halevy’s” death at the hands of an “impious Saracen” horseman:

Calmly flow’d the Rabbi’s life-blood,
Calmly to its termination
Sang he his sweet song.—his dying
Sigh was still—Jerusalem!

In this article I intend to discuss this legend of R. Yehuda Halevi’s death. Did he actually reach Eretz Yisrael? When did he compose the piyut of Zion Haloeh Tishali? Why did he want to go to Eretz Yisroel so badly, considering that it was very dangerous in his time?

By the way of introduction, it is worth noting the words of R’ Elazar Ezkiri in his classic work Sefer Chareidim. He says that everyone is supposed to love Eretz Yisroel and go there… therefore the Amoraim would kiss the ground when they came,[11] and it’s good to recite the piyut Shir Yedidus composed by R’ Yehuda Halevi . . . [12] Apparently Rav Yehuda Halevi is considered a first stop for expressing such affection.

R. Abraham Zacuto (1452-1514) in Sefer Yuchsin (first printed in 1566) writes that “R. Yehuda Halevi was fifty [years old] when he came to Eretz Yisroel and he is buried together with his first cousin, Ibn Ezra.”[13] Later, however, R. Zacuto writes that R. Yehuda Halevi is buried with R. Yehuda bar Ilay in Tzefat.[14] Setting aside the apparent contradiction regarding R. Yehuda Halevi’s burial place, in both of these descriptions R. Yehuda Halevi is depicted as having actually made it to Eretz Yisrael. Notably absent, however, is the legend of an Arab/Bedouin horseman killing him.

The earliest source for the Arab horseman legend only appears in R. Gedaliah Ibn Yachia’sShalsheles Hakabbalah, first published in Venice in 1587, over four hundred years after R. Yehuda Halevi died. He states that he heard this legend from “an old man”.[15] Although theShalsheles Hakabbalah appears to be the source for R. Feuer’s statement above, the Shalsheles Hakabbalah has one addition to the legend — omitted by R. Feuer — that R. Yehuda Halevi recited the kinah of Zion Halo Tishali right before the Arab horseman killed him.[16]
The next time that this legend appeared in print, after its mention in the Shalsheles Hakabbalah, is by R. David Conforte (1618-1678) in his Koreh Hadoros (first printed in Venice, 1746),[17] followed by R. Yechiel Halperin (1660- 1749) in Seder Hadoros (first printed in Karlsruhe, 1769).[18] It was then repeated by R. Wolf Heidenheim in his edition of the Kinos. R. Yehosef Schwartz (1804-1865) in his Tevous Haaretz also brings this legend.[19] By the 19th century, this legend became, perhaps, the most famous story about R. Yehuda Halevi, since not much else was known about him.

Adam Shear called attention to an edition of the Kuzari printed in 1547 which says on the front page:כוזרי חברו בלשון ערבי החכם הגדול אבי כל המשוררים רבי יהודה הלוי הספרדי ז”ל אשר קדש שם שמים בויכוחו הישר הזה… (ראה: ארשת א, עמ’ 67).

This term is usually used for martyrdom. Shear suggests that perhaps it comes from this story, later mentioned by the Shalsheles Hakabbalah,[20] although he concludes that the idea is far-fetched.

In 1840 R. Shmuel David Luzzatto (ShaDaL) in his collection of the Diwan containing the poems of R. Yehuda Halevi, Besulas Bas Yehuda, questions the legend on the grounds that Jerusalem was in the hand of Christians at the time, and Arabs were not allowed in the city. Furthermore, even if there were Arabs around, they would not have done such a brazen act right at the city gate.[21] So Shadal concludes that he died on his way from Egypt, never even reaching Eretz Yisroel.[22] S. Fuenn accepts the conclusion of Shadal.[23] R. Michael Sachs in his work Die religiöse Poesie der Juden in Spanien also accepts Shadal’s conclusion because he notes that while Ibn Ezra refers to him in his work on Chumash he does not mention anything unique about his death,[24] he just says שאלני ר’ יהודה הלוי מנוחתו כבוד.Around the same time R. Matisyahu Strashun reached the same conclusion, perhaps independently. In a letter written in 1841, he questioned the veracity of the legend,[25] alsopointing out that Jerusalem in the times of R. Yehuda Halevi was ruled by Christians and not by Arabs. R. Strashun allows that although it is possible that R. Yehuda Halevi composed Zion Halo Tishali when he got to Jerusalem — not that we know that he did — the part of the story about the Arab killing him is certainly not true. As a general matter, R. Strashun notes that it is well known that the Shalsheles Hakabbalah is an unreliable source.[26]Simon Dubnov suggests that there is a kernel of truth to the story –that some Crusader must have killed a Jew right after he arrived in Eretz Yisroel.[27]Israel Zinberg suggests that, most likely, R. Yehuda Halevi returned home to Spain after visiting Eretz Yisrael, based on the fact that R. Shlomo Parchon, a student of R. Yehuda Halevi who lived in Spain, quotes a statement from R. Yehuda Halevi “after R. Yehuda Halevi was in Egypt”.[28]Specifically, R. Yehuda Halevi had told Parchon that he was doing teshuva and therefore no longer composing.[29] Zinberg therefore argues that this statement to Parchon must have taken place after R. Yehuda Halevi was in Egypt; thus R. Yehuda Halevi must have returned to Spain.[30] David Kaufmann also used R. Shlomo Parchon as a source to deduce how R. Yehuda Halevi died. Kaufmann points out that had R. Yehuda Halevi died in such a spectacular fashion as the legend has it, R. Shlomo Parchon would have been sure to note it. Since R. Parchon makes no note of this extraordinary death, R. Yehuda Halevi must have died a natural death.[31] InAmudei Avodah, Landshuth also questions the legend due to lack of evidence that R. Yehuda Halevi ever made it to Eretz Yisrael.[32]

In regard to the piyut, Zion Haloh Tishali, Leser Landshuth cites different opinions about where it was written: either in Spain, Damascus, or Syria.[33] Yitzhak Baer[34] and David Kaufmann cite a manuscript housed at Oxford which says that R. Yehuda Halevi said this piyut when he got to Yerushalayim.[35]

Earlier I mentioned that the Sefer Yuchasin writes that R. Yehuda Halevi was fifty years old when he came to Eretz Yisrael, and he is buried with his first cousin, Abraham Ibn Ezra. Later he writes that he is buried with R. Yehuda bar Ilay in Tzefas. In the Travels of R. Benyamin of Tudela, written around the year 1170, which is only thirty years after the R. Yehuda Halevi died, R. Benjamin records that he visited the grave of R. Yehuda Halevi in Tiveriah.[36] It’s interesting to note that in the travels of R. Pesachya of Regensburg which were written right after R. Benyamin of Tudela’s (around 1180) there is no mention of the grave of R. Yehuda Halevi.[37]

In the travels of R. Yitzchak ben Alfurah, written around 1441, he also writes that he visited the graves of Ibn Ezra and R. Yehuda Halevi.[38] In a different anonymous list of Kevarim in Eretz Yisroel from the fifteenth century, recently printed from manuscripts from the Ginsburg Collection, it also records that Ibn Ezra and R. Yehuda Halevi are buried next to each other.[39]All of these sources provide strong evidence that R. Yehuda Halevi actually made it to Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, an anonymous traveler in 1473[40] and R. Yosef Sofer in 1762 write that they visited the grave of Ibn Ezra but make no mention that R. Yehuda Halevi is buried there as well.[41] In the travels of R. Moshe Yerushalmi from 1769, he writes that he visited the graves of Ibn Ezra and R. Shlomo Ibn Gabirol , but no mention is made of the grave of R. Yehuda Halevi.[42] A manuscript from the author of the Koreh Hadoros, seems to indicate that R. Yehuda Halevi was buried in Jerusalem.[43] It should of course be noted that the location of Ibn Ezra’s death in Eretz Yisroel is itself problematic. Although Sefer Yuchasin brings the opinions that he is buried in Eretz Yisroel, he initially states that he died in Calahorra, Spain. Furthermore, Rabbi Moshe of Taku – an earlier source than Sefer Yuchasinwrites of a legend told to him by Jews of England that Ibn Ezra died there, after encountering a number of sheidimwhich appeared to him as black dogs.

Another piece of evidence can be found inn some early manuscripts, where we find before the kinah the following superscription:

זאת הקינה יסד ר’ יהודה קשטלין לפני הר ציון

But even more than that Rabbi Holzer discovered in a manuscript written before 1300 (which he is preparing for print) , which has the following statement:

יסוד רבינו יהודה הלוי הקשטלין אשר יסדה תחת הר ציון בבואו לירושלים עם המלך מספרד וראה הר ציון שמ(ו)[ם] נשא את קולו ובכה על חורבנו ואמר ציון הלא תשאל

See The Rav Thinking Aloud, p. 222. I would like to thank Zecharia Holzer for bringing this source to my attention. What is important about these sources is that they are before theShalsheles Hakabbalah.

To sum up, there are early sources which imply that R. Yehuda Halevi did indeed arrive in Jerusalem. But with regard to the legend that he was trampled at the gates as soon as he got there, it is much more questionable.
Over one hundred years ago the Cairo Genizah was discovered and collected from an attic of theBen Ezra shul. Due to this incredible find, every area of Jewish literature and history has been greatly enriched.[44] Just to list some of the many areas that were enhanced by this discovery: many works of the Geonim and manuscripts related to the Rambam were found[45] as well aspiyutim of great people. Knowledge of Jewish history, especially from the time period of the Geonim[46] and onwards was greatly improved by this discovery. Additionally, many years after the Cairo Genizah was originally found and its great treasures published, even more discoveries were made based on documents that were supposed to have been discarded since they were thought to have no value. Many of these later discoveries were made by the great Genizah scholar Shlomo D. Goitein. Starting in 1954, Goitein printed his discoveries with his explanations of the material in various journals and then later on, in his classic series A Mediterranean Society which documents in great detail every aspect of Jewish life based on those finds.

One area that benefited greatly from the later discoveries of Goitein was the history of R. Yehuda Halevi. Before this discovery, the biography of R. Yehuda Halevi was written by the early scholars of Jewish history such as Shadal[47], David Kauffman, Chaim Schirmann and many others. Their work was based heavily on the poems of R. Yehuda Halevi, for this was just about the only source. These poems existed in many manuscript collections. For example, R. David Conforte (1618-1678) in his Koreh Hadoros mentions seeing one such collection.[48] Before the aforementioned discoveries, all that was known about R. Yehuda Halevi was that he was a great poet, a medical doctor,[49] and an Askan. He was possibly a talmid of the Rif[50]and was certainly close with the Ri Migash, and may have even been his secretary for a short time.[51]And of course, in addition to his piyutim he was most famous for his important work of Jewish thought, the Kuzari.

However, among the Genizah discards Shlomo D. Goitein found many documents relating to R. Yehuda Halevi, all written around 1130-1141, including many in R. Yehuda Halevi’s own handwriting! Many of these documents can be viewed online today. Starting in 1954, Goitein printed his discoveries with his explanations of the material, in various journals, mostly inTarbitz. Later on, in his classic multi-volume A Mediterranean Society (volume V, pp. 448-468), he included an excellent chapter on R. Yehuda Halevi based on all the material which he had found over the years. Most of his interpretations of the material he discovered have been accepted by Professors C. Schirmann and Ezra Fleischer, renowned experts on Piyut.

In A Mediterranean Society, Goitein writes, “a full publication of all the geniza letters referring to Judah Halevi would fill a book.”[52] Although Goitein never got around to writing that book, in 2001, Professors Moshe Gil and Ezra Fleischer did write such a book. The title of the book isYehuda Halevei U’vnei Chugo, and it is a six hundred and forty page study of all the material from the genizah discovered by Goitein relating to R. Yehuda Halevi. This book includes all the original documents (55!) with notes and an in-depth history of all that can be gleaned from these letters. The discoveries of Goitein, followed by Gil and Fleischer are simply astounding.
For the purposes of this article, we will focus on discoveries related to R. Yehuda Halevi’s journey to Eretz Yisrael[53]. The relevant documents were written by a Cairo business man named Abu Said Halfon who was a very close friend of R. Yehuda Halevi. I should mention at the outset, that we have more in depth information of R. Yehuda Halevi’s last year of his life from these letters than we have of the rest of his life. It is also incredible to see from these letters how popular R. Yehuda Halevi was and how beloved he was by everyone.[54] This was before the Kuzari was widely read and learned, since R. Yehuda Halevi had just completed this work right at that time. A description of him from the letters reads, “God has been beneficent to you and sent you the quintessence and embodiment of our country our refuge and leader the illustrious scholar and unique and perfect devotee rabbi Judah the son of Halevi”.[55]

What follows is a brief time-line of R. Yehuda Halevi’s journey to Eretz Yisrael based on the research of the aforementioned professors.[56] In 1129, when R. Yehuda Halevi was fifty four years old, he decided to make the journey to Eretz Yisrael. In the year 1130, R. Yehuda Halevi began his journey. He intended to travel through Egypt. We don’t know why he didn’t. But we do know that he ended up in North Africa. In North Africa, he became good friends with Ibn Ezra. For some unknown reason, he ended up back in Spain.[57] Not too much information is known about why this journey to Eretz Yisrael did not end up happening. Ten years later, in 1140, R. Yehuda Halevi began the journey again. He ended up in Alexandria on September 8. He had intended to leave from Egypt to Eretz Yisrael immediately, but was delayed. He ended up staying in Cairo until Pesach. After that he returned to Alexandria. A few days before Shavuos of 1141, he boarded the boat, and on Shavuos, he set sail to Eretz Yisrael.[58] A letter written about 6 months later indicates that R. Yehuda Halevi was no longer alive. It seems that he was alive for 2 months in Eretz Yisrael and that he died in either Tammuz or Av.[59] We don’t have any information about his stay in Eretz Yisrael. It would seem that either he got sick or died a natural death. From the documents there is no clear answer as to whether the legend is true or not (except by omission). It’s rather disappointing that with all the manuscripts discovered in the Cairo Geniza that enriched us with an in-depth, heavily detailed history of R. Yehuda Halevi’s last years until he left to Eretz Yisrael, we do not know anything more, but of course the documents could not refer to the unnatural death if that had not happened or been dreamed of yet.

However, there is one letter written three months after the death of R. Yehuda Halevi that does seem to indicate that perhaps the legend is true. The letter reads as follows (the ellipses appear in the original):

ולא נעלם ממנה אודות רבינו יהודה הלוי הצדיק החסיד זק”ל אשר עליו באמת ניבאו נביאי האמת עין לא ראתה, ההיה גבור ביראת אלהים ובתורתו, ומאמרי פעליו מעידים צדקו, באודותיו ירונו כצפורים בעתותן למנוחת עולם הוטע כבוד גן אלהים, וברמה הוא נשא נס גדולותיו והליכות גבורותיו, אשר תרונה ביקרו, והתיקר… וביקרו, ותמונת ה’ הביט… בשדה צען להאירה… זק”ל לא… צור… מחנה שדי… להתנחל לרשת… עזי…וישם… בדמות השכינה ובמראה… בשערי ירושלים

This letter was first printed by Jacob Mann in 1920 but he dismissed the possibility that it was referring to the author of the Kuzari.[60] Goitein highlights the line “ולא נעלם ממנה אודות רבינו יהודה הלוי הצדיק החסיד זק”ל,” which would seem to indicate that his death was not natural (calling him a kadosh is typically reserved for martyrs). Note that the last words, בשערי ירושלים, would seem to support the legend. However, the letter is damaged and hard to read so one cannot say anything conclusively. However Fleischer is willing to use the letter, even with its missing parts, to support the legend. Especially since, he says, the author of the letter used the word קדוש twice in the phrase זק”ל instead of the usual ז”ל. He also has other proofs from a careful reading of the letter. Fleischer concludes from this that the legend about R. Yehuda Halevi’s death is not so far-fetched. In light of this possibility, Fleisher notes, that one should be careful not to make fun of legends.[61] Additionally ,there is also another letter in this collection that refers to R. Yehuda Halevi as a kadosh.[62]

We have shown, in light of the documents discovered in the Cario Genizah that R. Yehuda Halevi did indeed make it to Eretz Yisroel. And it would seem that there is also a good chance that the story that the Shalsheles Hakabbalah brings is true, and that he died a strange death through unnatural causes. The question remains as to why he decided to go to Eretz Yisroel at that time.[63] There were no real communities of any sort there, traveling was dangerous, and he was an older man. It is clear from many of his poems and especially from specific passages that he had a tremendous love for Eretz Yisroel. Professor Elchanan Reiner notes that he was one of the first known people that actually made the dangerous voyage to Eretz Yisroel in the times of the Rishonim. Reiner says that it was due to his strong desire to daven there, especially at various Kevarim.[64] There is strong support for this, especially in his kina Zion Halo Tishali,where he mentions this desire to daven at the kevarim. Ezra Fleischer suggests that R. Yehuda Halevi thought others would follow him to Eretz Yisroel.[65]

Goitein writes: “one might argue that the themes of Israel’s uniqueness, of the holiness of Palestine… are overdone in the Kuzari and in Ha-levi’s poetry. They are but for good reasons. It was a time of extreme urgency. Constant and gruesome warfare was going on in Spain. As Judah Ha-Levi emphasizes in his poems, whenever Christians and Muslims fought each other, the Jews were affected most by the disturbance of peace. The feeling of impotence in the absence of any signs of relief was dangerous forebodings of despair and loss of faith… All in all, the voice of encouragement ringing out from Ha-levi’s poems was stronger than whimpers of despair.”[66]

Rabbi Yehuda Leib Gerst, without seeing what Goitein wrote, suggested that since this was a time that Jews were downhearted, especially about Eretz Yisroel, he wanted to reawaken love for Eretz Yisroel. Even though it was dangerous to go at that time and it seems that many tried to convince him not to go, he still gave up everything: family, friends and a comfortable life style. He writes that even if the story of the Shalsheles Hakabbalah did not happen exactly as he heard it, his trip to Eretz Yisroel still caused a tremendous Kiddush Hashem.[67]

Although R. Yehuda Halevi’s trip did increase the Jewish people’s hope and did increase its emphasis on Eretz Yisrael, it is not clear that this was his own personal intention for going. In one of the letters discovered in the Geniza, it sounds as if he wanted to go quietly. He knew his days were numbered and he wanted to be in Eretz Yisrael alone.[68]

There is one last point worth mentioning: R’ Shlomo Yosef Zevin wrote a beautiful piece that shows that in addition to the Kuzari being a philosophical work, it also has many halachic aspects and was accordingly used by many.[69] One recent example is in the famous controversy between the Chazon Ish and many other gedolim regarding the placement of the International Dateline – specifically regarding which day the bochurim of the Mir yeshiva should celebrate Yom Kippur in Japan. One of the main sources on the topic of the Chazon Ish was the Kuzari.[70]Regarding the halachic aspect of going to Eretz Yisroel, the Kuzari writes that it is a Mitzvah even nowadays, making him one of the earliest sources to say such a thing. Even more importantly, he says one should go even if it’s dangerous.[71] In this light, it is evident why he made this trip: he held that he was halachically obligated to even though it was dangerous![72]

I would like to conclude with one last point that is related to all this. I mentioned earlier that R. Abraham Zacuto in Sefer Yuchasin writes that “R. Yehuda Halevi was fifty [years old] when he came to Eretz Yisroel and he is buried together with his first cousin, Ibn Ezra.[73] Now we know that there was certainly a strong connection between Ibn Ezra and R. Yehuda Halevi. D. Kaufmann gives a listing of the many times which Ibn Ezra quotes R. Yehuda Halevi throughout his works.[74] In addition, there are many other places in his works which clearly indicate that R. Yehuda Halevi had a great influence on his works.

R. Azariah de Rossi, in his Me’or Eynaim, writes that R. Yehuda Halevi was Ibn Ezra’s father-in-law (chapter 42). Koreh hadoros also brings this down. R. Immanuel Aboab in his Bemavak ‘al Erko shel Torah, written in 1615, claims that Ibn Ezra was both R. Yehuda Halevi’s son-in-law as well as a cousin.[75]

The Shalsheles Hakabblah brings a legend which he had heard about how exactly Ibn Ezra became the son-in-law of R Yehuda Halevi.[76] The gist of the story was that R. Yehuda Halevi was working on a poem and he got stuck. He left his notebook open and went away, and when he returned, he found the poem completed. It turned out that Ibn Ezra had completed it, and because of this, R. Yehuda Halevi let him marry his only daughter. There are many versions of this story, but strangely, if this were true, in the many times that Ibn Ezra quotes the Kuzari in his works, he never once refers to him as his father-in-law.[77]

R. Yehuda Al-charizi writes in his Sefer Tachkemoni, (written between 1195-1234) that Ibn Ezra had a son Yitzhak who was also a great poet but he tragically left the proper path, apparently converting to Islam.[78] Some took this as a license and went so far as too say that any of the problematic ideas[79] mentioned in the writings of Ibn Ezra were added in by this son.[80] For many years scholars were searching for more details about this sad saga. Finally they found a collection of Yitzchak’s poems which they hoped would shed some light on the matter, but the owner wanted a ridiculous sum of money for it. It was not purchased, and during the Second World War it was lost. Eventually, the collection was found and printed but it turned out that it did not really shed much light on this story.

However, in the same documents that Goitein found about R. Yehuda Halevi, there were many mentions of Yitzchak Ibn Ezra (some in the documents written by R. Yehuda Halevi himself). Both Goitein and Fleischer concluded that although R. Yehuda Halevi was not the father-in-law of Ibn Ezra, his son Yitzchak did marry R. Yehuda Halevi’s only daughter.[81] They go so far as to show that Yitzchak and his wife, R. Yehuda Halevi’s daughter, were supposed to follow him to Eretz Yisroel eventually. So there was indeed a family connection between Ibn Ezra and R. Yehuda Halevi. There is even a letter with instructions from R. Yehuda Halevi for a Yehuda ibn Ezra which some want to suggest was his grandson, son of Yitzchak![82] In Sefardi communities it is not unique at all to name after a living relative.

In conclusion I have shown based on documents from the Cario Genizah that it is likely that the legend recorded by Shalsheles Hakabbalah regarding R. Yehuda Halevi is true and he did indeed make it to Eretz Yisroel and that he died an unusual death. We also see from these documents that the legend which is brought by many that there was a family connection between R. Yehuda Halevi and Ibn Ezra is also true, as Yitzchak, Ibn Ezra’s wayward son married R. Yehuda Halevi daughter.

I would just like to conclude with a great quote from the Chazon Ish which I think is very appropriate here:

דברי הימים וקורות עולם הם מאלפים הרבה את החכם בדרכו, ועל תולדות העבר ייסד אדני חכמתו. ואמנם בהיות האדם אוהב לחדש ולהרצות לפני הקהל, נצברו הרבה שקרים בספרי התולדות, כי בן אדם אינו שונא את הכזב בטבעו, ורבים האוהבים אותו ומשתעשעים בו שעשועי ידידות, ועל החכם להבר בספורי הסופרים לקבל את האמת ולזרות את הכזבים, וכאן יש כר נרחב אל הדמיון, כי טבע הדמיון למהר ולהתקדם ולהגיד משפט, טרם שהשכל הכין מאזני משפט לשקול בפלס דבר על אפנו, והדמיון חוץ משפטו כרגע, מהו מן האמת ומהו מן הכזב (אמונה ובטחון, פרק א אות ח).

[1] For his basic history see Y. Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, 1, pp. 66-77;Encyclopedia Judaicia, 11, pp. 492-501; Yehudah Halevi, A. Doron, Ed. 1988 and the sources in note 4. See also S. Werses in B-Orach Maadah, (Aron Mirsky Jubilee volume), pp. 247-86.
[2] See for example what R. Menahem di Lonzano writes:כי היה מנהג ישראל… לשורר לש”י בליל שבת… וחשובי קדמוני המשוררים… ורבי יהודה הלוי… (דרך חיים, דף כג ע”א).
[3] Its influence is the subject of the beautiful book, A. Shear, Kuzari and the Shaping of Jewish Identity, 1167-1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 (based on his Phd, The Later History of a Medieval Hebrew Book, Studies in the Reception of Judah Halevi’s Sefer Ha Kuzari, University of Pennsylvania, 2003).
[4] For some more information on R’ Yehuda Halevi in relation to this topic: See; D. Kaufmann, Mechkarim Besafrus Haivrit Byemei Habenyim pp. 166-207; C. Schirmann, Toldos Hashirah Haivrit Besefard Hamuslamit, pp. 441-443; M. Ish Sholom, Kivrei Avos, 1948, pp. 190-192;Kovetz R. Yehudah Halevi, 1950, pp. 47-65; Y. Burlu, R’ Yehuda Halevi, 1968; Zev Vilnay,Matzevos Kodesh Beretz Yisroel 2:298-299; E. Reiner revisited this in, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage to Eretz Yisrael (1099-1517),(PhD dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 30-33; T. Ilan, Kivrei Tzadikim, 1997, p. 255; A. Shear, The Later History of a Medieval Hebrew Book, Studies in the Reception of Judah Halevi’s Sefer Ha Kuzari, (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), 2003, pp. 95, 513-514; Y. Yahalom, Judah Haevi: A life of Poetry, Jerusalem 2008, pp. 7-8; R. Scheindlin, The Song of the Distant Dove: Judah Halevi’s Pilgrimage (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.150-152, 249-252; Hillel Halkin, Yehuda Halevi (New York: Nextbook/Schocken, 2009), pp. 236-242. See also Lawrence J. Kaplan, The Starling’s Caw’: Judah Halevi as Philosopher, Poet, and Pilgrim, Jewish Quarterly Review 101:1 (Winter 2011): 97-132; David J. Malkiel – Three perspectives on Judah Halevi’s voyage to Palestine, Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, June 2010, 1–15. (Thanks to Menachem Butler for the last two sources).
[5] For more sources on R. Yehuda Halevi and his love of Eretz Yisrael, see: D. Kaufmann, (supranote 4), pp. 193-194; A. Shear, supra, pp. 516-517; C. Schirmann, Letoldos Hashirah Vehadramah Haivrit, vol. one, pp. 319-341; C. Schirmann, Toldos Hashirah Haivrit Besefard Hamuslamit, pp. 466-480. Franz Kobler, A Treasury of Jewish Letters, vol. one, p. 155; Abraham Haberman,Toldos Hashirah Vhapiyut, vol. one, p. 185; R’ Yosef Dov Soleveitchik, Lord is Righteous in All His Ways: Reflections on the Tish’ah Be-Av Kinot,pp. 304-312.
[6] R’ Yosef Dov Soleveitchik, Lord is Righteous in All His Ways: Reflections on the Tish’ah Be-Av Kinot,p. 304.
[7] On this Piyut and how famous it became see A. Doron in B-Orach Maadah, (Aron Mirsky Jubilee volume), 1986, pp. 233-238[=Yehudah Halevi, A. Doron, Ed. 1988, pp. 248-254]; B. Bar Tikvah, Sugot Vesugyot Be-fiyut Hapravencali VeHakatloni, pp. 395-425; I. Davidson, Otzar Ha-shira Ve-hapiyut, 3, pp. 321-322.
[8] Below I demonstrate that this date is incorrect and that the correct death date is 1141.
[9] The Complete tisha B’av Service, 1998, p. 328. See also R. Yakov Weingarten, Kinos Ha-Mifurush, 1988, p. 43, 276; Rabbi Berel Wein, Patterns in Jewish History, 2011, pp. 75-76 (as an aside its worth mentioning that this book is excellent).
[10] The Lord is Righteous in All His Ways: Reflections on the Tish’ah Be-Av Kinot, p. 303. [I would like to thank my friend Rabbi Dov Loketch for bringing this source to my attention]. In the new edition of the Rav’s Kinos this is recorded slightly differently.
[11] See the Gemarah at the end of Kesuvot.
[12] Sefer Chardeim, p. 208. See also his Mili Deshmayhu, pp. 4-5. The truth is the author ofShir Yidddus was not R. Yehuda Halevi, see R. Menachem Krengel in his notes to Shem Hagedolim, p. 35a; I. Davidson, Otzar Ha-shira Ve-hapiyut, 1, p. 348.
[13] p. 217, Filipowski ed.
[14] id., p. 219.
[15] Shalsheles Hakabbalah, p. 92.
[16] Shalsheles Hakabbalah, p. 92.
[17] Koreh Hadoros, p.33. He writes that he heard it from ‘old people’ and then saw it in theShalsheles Hakabbalah.
[18] Seder Hadoros, p. 201
[19] Tevous Haaretz, p.443. Benjamin the Second, in his book, Asia & Africa from 1846-1855, also brings down this story (p.13) but it only appears in the English edition of his work not in the Hebrew.
[20] A. Shear, Kuzari and the Shaping of Jewish Identity, 1167-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.162-163.
[21] Besulas Bas Yehuda, pp. 25-29.
[23] Knesset Yisroel,1, p. 400.

[24] Die religiöse Poesie der Juden in Spanien, Berlin: Veit, 1845, pp. 287-291.

[22] Interestingly enough, David Kaufmann uses other evidence to prove that the poems of R. Yehuda Halevi indicate that Jerusalem was under Christian rule (Mechkarim Besafrus Haivrit Byemei Habenyim p. 194). See also Sefer Yerushalyim 1099-1250; M. Ish Shalom, Betzalon Shel Malchus, p. 234. A.M. Luncz in his edition of Tevous Haaretz, p. 443 also did not believe the story.[25] See my article in Yeshurun 24 (2011), pp. 467-468.[26] Mivchar Kitavim, pp. 215-216. See also Chida, Shem Hagedolim, Vol. 1, p. 2, Vol. 2, p. 24; A. David, Mifal Histographi shel Gedaliah Ibn Yachi, Baal Shalsheles Hakabbalah,(PhD dissertation, Hebrew University Jerusalem, 1976) and E. Yassif in Sippur Ham Haevrei pp. 351-371.[27] Kovetz R. Yehudah Halevi, 1950, p. 29. See also A. Aderet, Itineraries in Yiddish to Eretz Yisroel in the 17th and 18th century, (Heb.), Phd Bar Ilan 2006, p. 236.
[28] Machberes Hauruch p. 5.
[29] Independently, we know that during R. Yehuda Halevi’s stay in Egypt he was a prolifi composer. Perhaps, what is meant by the above story, is that he was going to limit the focus of future compositions, not that he was abandoning composing entirely.
[30] Toldos Safrus Byisroel, vol. 1, p. 115. On this trip to North Africa see Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, p. 192.
[31] Mechkarim Besafrus Haivrit Byemei Habenyim p. 195.
[32] Amudei Avodah, p.70.
[33] Amudei Avodah, p.76.
[34] Kinos p. 130.
[35] Mechkarim Besafrus Haivrit Byemei Habenyim p. 195. Shadal writes it was written in Spain.
[36] There are actually various readings of these words in the manuscripts, but Adler accepts this as the correct reading See his edition of The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela, London 1901, p. 29. R. Scheindlin (note 5), p. 276 disagrees with Adler’s reading.
[37] See Masos Eretz Yisrael, pp. 51-53 and Kovet Al Yad 13:267-269.
[38] Avraham Yari, Masos Eretz Yisrael, p. 110. Also see J. Prawer, Toldos Hayehudim Bemamleches Hazelvonim, p. 150
[39] Kovet Al Yad 14:292.
[40] Masos Eretz Yisroel, p. 113.
[41] Iggrot Eretz Yisroel, p. 301.
[42] Masos Eretz Yisroel, p. 438. I would venture to say the author confused R. Shlomo Ibn Gabriel with R. Yehuda Halevi. Both being famous composers, they are sometimes confused. Furthermore, we have no source that R. Shlomo Ibn Gabriel ever came to Eretz Yisrael (aside from a very late letter written in 1747 printed in Egrot Eretz Yisrael, p. 273). (See also David Kaufmann, p. 205 and Sinai, vol. 28, p. 290). I have written about this elsewhere. See also R. Moshe Riescher, Sharei Yerushlayim. p. 151, 145.
[43] Sinai vol. 28, p. 284.
[44] There are a great many articles on this topic see: R. Brody in B. Richler, Hebrew Manuscripts: A Treasured Legacy, Ofek 1990, pp. 112-133; N. Danzig, A Catalogue of Fragments of Halakha and Midrash from the Cairo Genizah in the Elkan Nathan Adler Collection of the Library of The Jewish Theological Seminary of America (New York, 1997), 3-39 (Hebrew); A. Hoffman and P. Cole, Sacred Trash: The Lost and Found World of the Cairo Geniza (New York: NextBook/Schocken, 2011). See also E. Hurvitz, Catalouge of the Cairo Geniza Fragments in the Westminster College Library, Cambridge, N.Y. 2006
[45] See for example Yehsurun, 23 (2010), pp. 13-34; S. D. Goitein Moses Maimonides, Man of Action – A Revision of the Master’s Biography in Light of the Geniza Documents, Hommage à Georges Vajda: études d’histoire et de pensée juives. Louvain: Peeters 1980, pp. 155-167.
[46] R. Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998)
[47] Shadal first printed a collection of his poems in 1840 but, continued working on it for the many years. Right after he died, in 1864 the Mekizei Nirdamim Publishing House printed as its first work a more complete edition of R. Yehuda Halevi’s poems from Shadal.
[48] p. 32.
[49] D. Kaufmann, (note 5), p. 175; C. Schirmann, Toldos Hashirah Haivrit Besefard Hamuslamit, p. 437; Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, p. 177.
[50] D. Kaufmann, (note 5), p. 169.
[51] D. Kaufmann, (note 5), p. 170; C. Schirmann, Toldos Hashirah Haivrit Besefard Hamuslamit, p. 435; Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, p. 59, 122; Y.Ta- Shema, Rebbe Zerachia Halevi, 1992, p. 37.
[52] A Mediterranean Society, p. 462.
[53] There is a lot related to R. Yehuda Halevi in these documents unrelated to this article. Such as an autograph letter where he discusses why he wrote his classic work Kuzari. See Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, pp.182-184; A Mediterranean Society, p. 456, 465; Mordechai A. Friedman, Judah Ha-Levi on Writing the Kuzari: Responding to a Heretic, in B. Outhwaite and S. Bhayro, eds., ‘From a Sacred Source’: Genizah Studies in Honour of Professor Stefan C. Reif (Leiden 2011), 157-169. (Thanks to Menachem Butler for this last source). Some of the other autograph letters show him dealing with Pidyon Shivuyim. See A Mediterranean Society, p. 462-465; Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chug, p.178-181. See also Mordechai A. Friedman, “On Judahha-Levi and the Martyrdom of a Head of the Jews: A Letter by Halfon ha-Levi ben Nethanel,” in Y. Tzvi Langermann and Josef Stern, eds., Adaptations and Innovations: Studies on theInteraction between Jewish and Islamic Thought and Literature from the Early Middle Ages to the Late Twentieth Century, Dedicated to Professor Joel L. Kraemer (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 83-108.
[54] Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, pp. 202-203. See also R. Yehuda Al-charizi, Sefer Tachomoni, 1952, pp. 46-48
[55] Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, p. 330. The translation is from S. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, volume V, p. 289.
[56] See also C. Schirmann, Toldos Hashirah Haivrit Besefard Hamuslamit, pp. 421-480.
[57] This is the trip mentioned above from R. Shlomo Parchon. It is pretty clear that he was good friends with Ibn Ezra even before this.
[58] Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, p. 483. On the significance of his departure being on Shavuos see Y. Ta-Shema, Halacha, Minhag U-mitzios Be-Ashkenaz 1100-1350, 2000, p. 179; J. Katz, The Shabbes Goy, 1989, pp. 35-48.
[59] Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, pp. 253-254, 494, 495.
[60] The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatmid Caliphs, 1, 1920, pp. 224-225.
[61] Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, pp. 254-256, 484-490. See also Goitein in Tarbitz, 46:245-250.
[62] Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, p. 256, 496.The truth is this proof alone is not enough as a friend pointed out to me in Genizah documents we do find זקל and זל for example if one looks in the Shut of R. Avraham ben HaRambam printed by Goitein, in 1937 which is based on documents from the Cario genizah one will see זל, זצל andזקל for זל andזצל see p. 1,4, 7,10,13,26 & many more place. Forזקל see p. 9,104, 161,170. A search on the Princeton Genizah Project shows thatזל and זצל are much more common than זקל but זקל does appear over 36 times.
[63] For other possible explanations why R. Yehuda Halevi wanted to go to Eretz Yisroel see. S. Abramson, Kiryat Sefer, 29 (1953), pp.133-144; David J. Malkiel – Three perspectives on Judah Halevi’s voyage to Palestine, Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, June 2010, 1–15. Also see J. Prawer, Toldos Hayehudim Bemamleches Hazelvonim, pp. 154-156.
[64] Reiner, (note 5).
[65] Pe’amim 68, pp. 4-15.
[66] A Mediterranean Society, volume V, pp. 449-450. On the political situation in the times of the Kuzari, see Y. Baer, Mechkarim, pp. 251-268.
[67] Peletas Beis Yehudah, 1971, pp. 84-88. (I would like to thank my friend Rabbi Eli Meir Cohen for bringing this source to my attention.)
[68] Yehudah Halevei U’vnei Chugo, p. 205.
[69] Le-Or Ha-Halachah, 2004, pp. 358- 377.
[70] Chazon Ish, Kuntres Yud Ches Shoess, p. 186. See also Genazim Ve-shut Chazon Ish, pp. 205-290 just printed this week [make sure to get it while it is still around] See also here for an interesting work on the topic. See B. Brown, Ha-Chazon Ish, 2011, pp. 612-637. See also R Alexander Moshe Lapides, Toras Hagoan Rebbe Alexander Moshe, p. 20, 23; see also R Chaim Zimmerman, Agan Ha-sahar, p. 427. R. Aryeh Rabinowitz, Toras Haolam Ve-Hayehadus, part 4, 29a. [As an aside, on this author see what the Chazon Ish writes:

וראיתי להגאון האדיר ר’ אריה ממינסק בספרו באר היטב… (חזון איש, קדשים ס’ כו אות טז).

The Chazon Ish does not use such language frequently. [Thanks to my Uncle, Rabbi Sholom Spitz for pointing out this source to me].

The truth is this whole issue is not so simple as the Ravad comments on the Baal Ha-Maor:

והריח אשר הריח מן הכוזרי ומחבורי רבי אברהם ב”ר חייא הספרדי כי הם פירשו ההלכות הללו על זה הדרך עצמו והוא מתעטר בעדים שאינם שלו, אין לנו ללמד מדברי מי שאינו מאנשי התלמוד לפי שהם מסבבים פני ההלכה לדבריהם כאשר לא כן. וכבר שמענו כי הנשיא רבי יצחק ב”ר ברוך ז”ל שהיה בקי בזו החכמה והיה בקי בהלכה שבר את הדברים האלה ויישר כחו ששבר… ועם כל זה ואריכות דבריו אין הלכה יוצאה לאור מדבריו, רק ממה שכתב בספר הכוזרי…יוצא לאור לפי הסברא ההיא(כתוב שם, לראב”ד, ראש השנה ה ע”א).

He is complaining that he plagiarized from the Kuzari but we do not pasken like him anyways…and was not a talmudist! The truth is it is possible that the Chazon Ish gave much more weight to Kuzari as he held there is no such thing as being a Baal Aggdah alone. I am referring to the censored passage from the Chazon Ish Emunah U-bitchon where he writes:

אלה שלא זכו לאור הגמ’ בהלכה, המה משוללים גם מאגדה באפיה האמיתי. כי בהיותו חסר לב חכמה, אי אפשר לו לקנות מושגים שמימיים אמיתיים, גם אינו מסוגל ללימודים מישרים. ומה שהזכירו בגמ’ בעלי אגדה – היינו חכמים בהלכה שהוסיפו עיונם גם באגדה, אבל לא יתכן להיות ריק מהלכה ולהיות בעל אגדה. ויתכן אנשים שעסקם בהגיונות בני אדם כעין פילוסופי’ ריקנית, פעם במדות פעם בקורות הדורות ועוד כיוצא בהם, ומשתדלים לקבוע הגות לבם במסגרת התורה, ויתכן שיצליחו למשוך לב השומעים ולהנעים זמירות באזני המקשיבים. ואמנם אלה אין להם חלק בתורה, לא בהלכה ולא באגדה, כי כיסוד ההלכה יסוד האגדה. אין אגדה הגיון לב – האגדה היא חלק התורה שקבלנוה דור אחר דור, אשר מסרה משה ליהושע ויהושע לזקנים וכדתנן באבות. ולהיות בעל אגדה החובה להיות בקי במקרא בתורה בנביאים וכתובים, להיות בקי בכל אגדות שנאמרו בגמ’ בקיאות נאמנה, להיות בקי במדרש בקיאות שנונה ומסודרת, ואחר כך לשאת ולתת בהן בהבנת המסקנות שבהם, וכמו שלא יתכן חכם בהלכה בלא קנין הבקיאות המרובה.

So the Kuzari had to be a star Talmudist too. On this issue see Y.Ta- Shema, Rebbe Zerachia Halevi,1992, p. 4; I. Twersky, Rabbad of Posquieres, p. 266.

On these censored pieces of the Chazon Ish see B. Brown, Ha-Chazon Ish, 2011, pp. 166-167 (and see here). It’s worth mentioning these pieces have been finally printed in an authorized version from the family this week in a work called Genazim Ve-shut Chazon Ish, pp. 106-112.Besides for the Ravad writing against the Kuzari on this topic see also in the sefer Divrei Chachomim on the dateline, p. 27:

וראיתי כי אין ללמוד להלכה מדברי הכוזרי הנ”ל, כי כמו שאין למדין הלכה מן ספרי המקובלים… כן אין למדין הלכה מן ספרי מחקר ודרוש כהכוזרי…
[71] Kuzari, 5:23.
[72] See Y. Zisberg, Medieval Rabbinic Attitudes towards the Land of Israel and the Religious Obligation of its Settelment, (PHd Bar Ilan 2007), pp. 48-57 who has an excellent discussion on this topic.
[73] It is not clear if Ibn Ezra ever even made it to Eretz Yisroel see N. Ben Menachem, Inyani Ibn Ezra, pp. 182-190, 239; Uriel Simon, Transplanting the Wisdom of Spain to Christian Lands: The Failed Efforts of R. Abraham Ibn Ezra, Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook 8 (2009) 139-189; Zisberg, supra, pp. 58-68. Regarding where he is buried see: M. Ish Sholom, Kivrei Avos, 1948, p.189; Zev Vilnay, Matzevos Kodesh Beretz Yisroel 2:299; T. Ilan, Kivrei Tzadikim, 1997, p. 255.
[74] supra p. 206. See also Yakov Reifman, Iyunim BeMishnat Harav Ibn Ezra, 1962, pp. 95-97, 56; N. Ben Menachem, Inyani Ibn Ezra, pp. 225-233; Y. Ibn Shmuel, Kuzari, pp. 371-372; E. Fleischer, Hashira Haivrit Besefard, 2, pp. 266-267. However see A. Shear, Kuzari and the Shaping of Jewish Identity, 1167-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 23 and his doctorate, The Later History of a Medieval Hebrew Book, Studies in the Reception of Judah Halevi’s Sefer Ha Kuzari, (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2003, pp. 96-97) who concludes that Ibn Ezra did not see the Kuzari’s work.
[75] p. 247.
[76] pp. 92-93.
[77] N. Ben Menachem, Inyanei Ibn Ezra, pp. 233-240, 346-356 collected many version of this Legend. See also: R. Dovid Ganz, Tzemach David, p. 121; R. Yosef Sambori, Divrei Yosef, p. 100;Shut Chavos Yair, siman 248; R’ Yosef Dov Soleveitchik, Lord is Righteous in All His Ways: Reflections on the Tish’ah Be-Av Kinot, p. 304-305; Kovetz R. Yehudah Halevi, 1950, pp. 84-93. See also A. Shear, Kuzari and the Shaping of Jewish Identity, 1167-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. p. 298.

Interestingly enough the Meiri in his Seder Hakablah and the Sha’ari Zion make no mention of this relationship between Ibn Ezra and R. Yehuda Halevi.
[78] Sefer Tachkemoni, 1952, p. 45.
[79] A topic worthy of its own article in the Future B”h.
[80] N. Ben Menachem, Inyani Ibn Ezra, p. 255.
[81] Yehuda Halevei U’vnei Chugo pp. 148-173. Many agree with this suggestion but some still disagree (see ibid, pp. 250-251). See Halkin, (note 5) pp. 330-335. For more on this whole sad affair with the son of Ibn Ezra see E. Fleischer in Toldos Hashirah Haivrit Besefard Hanotzrit, pp. 71-92; E. Fleischer, Hashira Haivrit Besefard, 2, pp.264-270. See also Y. Levine, Avrhom Iban Ezra, 1970, p. 17.
[82] Yehuda Halevei U’vnei Chugo pp. 491-494. See also E. Fleischer, Hashira Haivrit Besefard, 2, pp. 270-273; D. Kaufmann (note two), p. 190, 201.

Interestingly enough the Meiri in his Seder Hakabbalah and the Sha’ari Zion make no mention of this relationship between Ibn Ezra and R. Yehuda Halevi.




Attribution and Misattribution: On Computational Linguistics, Heresy and Journalism

Attribution and Misattribution: On Computational Linguistics, Heresy and Journalism
by Moshe Koppel

Prof. Moshe Koppel is on the faculty of the Computer Science Department at Bar-Ilan University. He has published extensively on authorship attribution, as well as on a diverse array of topics of Jewish and scientific interest.

A few days ago, newspaper readers from New Jersey to New Zealand read about new computer software that “sheds light on the authorship of the Bible”[1]. By the time the news circled back to Israel, farteitcht and farbessert, readers of Haaretz were (rather gleefully) informed that the head of the project had announced that it had been proved that the Torah was written by multiple human authors[2], just as the Bible critics had been saying all along.
I’m always skeptical about that kind of grandiose claim and this is no exception, even though the person who allegedly made the claim in this particular case happens to be me. The news reports in question refer to a recently published paper[3] in computational linguistics involving decomposition of a document into authorial components. A brief reference to application of the method to the Torah (Pentateuch) is responsible for most of the noise.
In what follows, I’ll briefly provide some background about authorship attribution research, sketch the method used in the paper, outline the main results and say a few words about what they mean. My main purpose is to explain what has actually been proved and, more crucially in this case, what has not been proved.
Authorship Attribution
One of my areas of research for over a decade has been authorship attribution, the use of automated statistical methods to identify or profile the author of a given text. For example, we can determine, with varying degrees of accuracy, the age, gender and native language of the author of a text[4]. Under certain conditions, we can determine, with varying degrees of certainty, if two texts were written by the same person[5]. Some of this work has been applied to topics of particular interest to students of Jewish texts, such as strong evidence that the collection of responsa Torah Lishmah was written by Ben Ish Chai[6] (although he often quoted the work as if it were written by someone else) and that all of the letters in Genizat Harson are forgeries[7].
Whenever I have lectured on this topic, the first question has been: have you ever analyzed the Bible? The honest truth is that I never really understood the question and I suspect that in most cases the questioner didn’t have any very well-formed question in mind, beyond the vague thought that the Bible is of mysterious provenance and ought to be amenable to some sort of statistical analysis. I would always mumble something about the question being poorly defined, Bible books being too short to permit reliable statistical analysis, etc. But, while all those excuses were quite true, I also had a vague thought of my own, which was that whatever well-formed research question I could come up with regarding Tanach, it would probably land me in hot water.
One research question that I have been working on with my graduate student, Navot Akiva, involves decomposition of a document into distinct stylistic components. For example, if a document was written by multiple authors, each of whom presumably writes in some distinct style, we’d like to be able to identify the parts written by each author. (Bear in mind this is what is known in the jargon as an unsupervised problem: we don’t get known examples of each author’s writing to analyze. All we have is the composite text itself, from which we need to tease apart distinctive looking chunks of text.) The object is straightforward: given a text, split it up into families of chunks in the best possible way, where by “best” we mean that the chunks that are assigned to the same family are as similar to each other as possible.
Even I could see that this could have some bearing on Tanach. So when Prof. Nachum Dershowitz, a colleague with whom I share a number of research interests, introduced me to his son, Idan, a graduate student in the Tanach program at Hebrew University, we agreed to consider how to apply this work to Tanach (sort of fudging the question of whether this meant Torah or Nach). It happens that, apart from being the most studied and revered set of books ever written, Tanach offers another advantage as an object of linguistic analysis: precisely because it has been the subject of so much study, there are many available automated tools that we could exploit in our research.

The Method
Here’s how our computerized method works. Divide a text into chunks in some reasonable way. These chunks might be chapters or some fixed number of sentences or whatever; the details aren’t critical and need not concern us at this stage. I’m going to call these chunks “chapters” (only because it is a less technical sounding word), but bear in mind that we are not assuming that a chapter is stylistically homogeneous; that is, the split between authors might take place in the middle of a chapter.
Our object is to split our collection of chapters into families of stylistically similar chapters. (The chapters in a family need not be contiguous.) All the chapters that look a certain way, please step to the left; all others, please step to the right.
As a first step, for any pair of chapters, we’re going to have to measure the similarity between them. The trick is to measure this similarity in a way that captures style rather than content.
The way we do it is as follows: we begin by generating a list of synonym sets. For example, for the case of Tanach, we would consider synonym sets such as betoch, bekerev; begged, simla; sar, nasi; makel, mateh, shevet; and so on. There are about 200 such sets of Biblical synonyms. We generate this list automatically by identifying Hebrew roots that are translated by the same English root in the KJV. Note that not every occurrence of, for example, shevet (which can mean either “staff” or “tribe”) is a synonym for makel (which is always “staff”). We use online concordances to disambiguate, that is, to determine the intended sense of a word in a particular context. (In this respect, Tanach is especially convenient to work with.)
For every chapter and every such set of synonyms, we record which synonym (if any) that chapter uses. The similarity of a pair of chapters reflects the extent to which they make similar choices from among synonym sets. The idea is that if one chapter uses – for example – betoch, sar and mateh and the other uses bekerev, nasi and makel, the two chapters have low similarity. If a chapter doesn’t use any of the synonyms in a particular synonym set, that set plays no role in measuring the similarity between that chapter and any other chapter.
Once we know the similarity between every pair of chapters, we use formal methods to create optimal families. Ideally, we want all the chapters in the same family to be very similar to each other and to be very different from the chapters in other families. In fact, such clean divisions are unusual, but the formal methods will generally find a near-optimal clustering into families. (What we call families are called “clusters” in the jargon, and the process of finding them is called “clustering”. The particular clustering method we used is a spectral approximation method called n-cut.)
A key question you should ask at this point is: how many families will we get? You might imagine that the clustering method will somehow figure out the right number of families. Indeed, there are clustering methods that can do that. But – note this carefully – the number of families we obtain is not determined by the clustering method we use. Rather it is given by us as an input. That is, we decide in advance how many families we want to get and the method is forced to give us exactly what we asked for. This is a crucial point and we’ll come back to it when we get to the meaning of all these results below.
In any case, at this stage, we have a tentative division of chapters into however many families we asked for. (For simplicity, let’s assume that we have split the chapters into exactly two families.) This is not the final result, for the simple reason that we have no guarantee that the chapters themselves are homogeneous. The next step is to identify those chapters that are at the core of each family; these are the chapters we are most confident we have assigned correctly and are consequently the ones most likely to be homogeneous. (Note that when I say “we are confident” I don’t mean anything subjective and wishy-washy; all this is done automatically according to formal criteria a bit too technical to get into here.)
Now that we have a selection of chapters that are assigned to respective families with high confidence, we use them as seeds for building a “model” that distinguishes between the two families. Very roughly speaking, we look for common words (ones not tied to any specific topic) that appear more in one family than in the other and we use formal methods (for those interested, we use SVM) to find just the right weight to give to each such word as an indicator of one family or the other. We now use this model to classify individual sentences as being in one family or the other.

Results
Wonderful, so we did all sorts of geeky hocus-pocus. Why should you believe that this works? Maybe the whole synonym idea is wrong because we ignore subtle differences in meaning between “synonyms”. Maybe the same author deliberately switches from one synonym to the other for literary reasons. Maybe we are biased because we believe something wicked and we subtly manipulated the method to obtain particular results.
These are legitimate concerns. That’s why we test the method on data for which we know the right answer to see if the method gives that right answer. In this case, our test works as follows. We take two books, each of which we can assume is written by a single distinct author, mix them up in some random fashion, and check if our method correctly unmixes them. In particular, we took as our main test set random mishmashes of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel.
We found that the method works extremely well. About 17% of the psukim could not be classified (no differentiating words appeared in these psukim or their near neighbors). Of the approximately 2200 psukim that were classified into two families, all the Yirmiyahu psukim went into one family and all the Yechezkel psukim went into the other, with a total of 26 (1.2%) exceptions. We obtained similar results on a variety of other book pairs.
So maybe we should have left well enough alone. But with a power tool like this in hand, how could you not want to see how it would split the chumash? Shoot me, but for me, like Rav Kahana hiding under his rebbe’s bed, Torah hee velilmod any tzarich. We did the experiment. I should hasten to mention, though, that the chumash experiment is only briefly mentioned in the published paper, which focuses on proving the efficacy of the method (it’s a computational linguistics paper, not a Bible paper).
Now, I should point out that until I got involved in this, I was a complete am haaretz in Bible Criticism, a perfectly agreeable state of affairs, as far as I was concerned. However, Idan Dershowitz immediately observed that our split was very similar to the split between what critics refer to as the Priestly (P) and non-Priestly portions of the Torah. Bear in mind that there are ongoing disagreements among the critics about precisely which psukim should be regarded as P and which not. We took two standard such splits, that of Driver and that of Friedman, and refer to the set of psukim for which they agree as “consensus” psukim. (They agree just over 90% of the time.)
Here’s the result. Our split of the Torah into two families corresponds with their split for about 90% of all consensus psukim.
Let me say a few words about the main areas of disagreement. To a significant extent, our split runs along lines of genre. One family is mostly – not completely – legal material and the other is mostly narrative. Since what the critics call the Priestly sections include pretty much all of Vayikra (which is mostly laws), as well as selected portions of Bereishis, Shemos and Bemidbar, their split also corresponds somewhat to the legal/narrative split. Most of the cases where our split is different than theirs involve narrative sections that they assign to P and our method assigns to the family that corresponds to non-P, for example, the first chapter of Bereishis. (The rest of the disagreements involve P sections that scholars now refer to as H and consider some sort of quasi-P, but I don’t want to get into all that, mostly because I’m still pretty clueless about it.)
Before you dismiss all this by saying that all we did was discover that stories don’t look like laws, let me point out there are plenty of narrative sections that the computerized analysis assigned to the P family (or, more precisely, to the nameless family that turns out to be very similar to what the critics call the P family). Two prominent examples are the story of Shimon and Levi in Shechem and the story of Pinchas and Zimri.
One more point: when we split the Torah into three or more families, our results do not coincide with those of the critics. In the case of three families, Devarim does seem to split off as its own family, as the critics claim, but there are a fair number of exceptions. And even with four or more families, no hint of the critics’ E/J split shows up at all.

Interpreting the Results
So does all this mean that we have proved that the Torah was written by at least two human authors, as the breathless reports claim? No.
First of all, as I noted above, our method does not determine the optimal number of families. That is, it does not make a claim regarding the number of authors. Rather, you decide in advance how many families you want and the method finds the optimal (or a near-optimal) split of the text into that number. If you ask it to split Moby Dick into two (or four or thirteen) parts, it will do so. Thus the fact that we split the Torah into two tells us exactly nothing about the actual number of authors.
Having said that, I want to temper any religious enthusiasm such a disclaimer might engender. First of all, with a few improvements to the method we could probably identify some optimal number of families for a given text. We simply haven’t done so. Second, the fact that – for the case of two families – the results of our method coincide (to some extent) with those of the critics would seem to suggest that the split the method suggests is not merely coincidental.
But, the deeper reason that our work is irrelevant to the question of divine authorship is simply that it does not – indeed, it could not – have a thing to say on that question. If you were to have some theory about what properties divine writing ought to have and close analysis revealed that a certain text probably did not have those properties, then you might have to change your prior belief about the divine provenance of that text. But does anyone really have some theory about what divine texts are supposed to look like? Several press reports about this work referenced the idea that “God could write in multiple voices”. I find that formulation a bit simplistic, but it captures the fact that any attempt to map from multiple writing styles to multiple authorship must be rooted in assumptions about human cognition and human performance that are simply not relevant to the question of divine action[8].
In short, our results seem to support some findings of higher Bible criticism regarding possible boundaries between distinct stylistic threads in the Torah. These results might have some relevance regarding literary analysis of the Torah. Taken on their own, however, they are not proof of multiple authorship. Furthermore, there is nothing in these results that should cause those of us committed to the traditional belief in divine authorship of the Torah to doubt that belief.
[3] M. Koppel, N. Akiva, I. Dershowitz and N. Dershowitz, (2011). Unsupervised Decomposition of a Document Into Authorial Components, Proceedings of ACL, pp. 1356-1364.
[4] S. Argamon, M. Koppel, J. Pennebaker and J. Schler (2009), Automatically Profiling the Author of an Anonymous Text, Communications of the ACM, 52 (2): pp. 119-123 (virtual extension).
[5] M. Koppel, J. Schler and E. Bonchek-Dokow (2007), Measuring Differentiability: Unmasking Pseudonymous Authors, JMLR 8, July 2007, pp. 1261-1276.
[6] M. Koppel, D. Mughaz and N. Akiva (2006), New Methods for Attribution of Rabbinic Literature , Hebrew Linguistics: A Journal for Hebrew Descriptive, Computational and Applied Linguistics, 57, pp. 5-18.
[7] מ. קופל, זיהוי מחברים בשיטות ממוחשבות: “גניזת חרסון”, ישורון כג (אלול ה’תש”ע), תקנט-תקסו.
[8] I realize that this argument comes close to asserting that the claim of divine authorship is unfalsifiable, which for some might cast doubt on the meaningfulness of that claim. A proper response to that concern would involve a discussion of the nature and content of religious belief, a discussion that is well beyond the scope of this brief peroration.