According to Russian statistics, Vilna had close to 200,000 inhabitants just prior to World War I, roughly forty percent of whom were Jewish, more than thirty percent were Polish, and about twenty percent were Russian and the rest consisted of small Lithuanian, Byelorussian, German and Tartar minorities.[1]

In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was convened by the winning parties of World War I. Its purpose was to map the future of postwar Europe. When the status of Vilna came up for discussion, the Lithuanians claimed Vilnius as the rightful historical capital of independent Lithuania; the Poles rejected such claims on the basis of the cultural and linguistic affinities of Wilno to Poland. The Soviet regime, in diplomatic isolation, voiced its opinion that although Vilna had been part of Russia, the Bolsheviks were ready to share it with the oppressed peoples (mostly peasants) of Lithuanian and Byelorussian origins. Nobody asked or wanted to hear what Vilne meant to the Jews.[2]

In the summer of 1935, the municipal authorities of Vilna, then under Polish rule, announced that a sports stadium would be constructed on the site of Vilna’s oldest Jewish cemetery.³ At the time, the graves and tombstones of such greats as R. Menahem Mannes Chajes (d. 1636), one of Vilna’s earliest Chief Rabbis; R. Moshe Rivkes (d. 1671), author of Be’er Ha-Golah, a classic commentary on the Shulhan Arukh; R. Shlomo Zalman (d. 1788), younger brother of R. Hayyim of Volozhin and a favorite disciple of the Gaon of Vilna; R. Elijah b. Solomon (d. 1797), the Gaon of Vilna; and R. Abraham Danzig (d. 1820), author of Hayye Adam, a digest of practical Jewish law, stood in all their glory together with several thousand graves of all the Jewish men, women and children who had lived and died in Vilna between the years of 1592 and 1831.[4]

Tombstone Inscription of R. Menahem Mannes Chajes (d. 1636), embedded in the wall at the extreme left, in the Old Jewish Cemetery.

Tomb of R. Shlomo Zalman (d. 1788), younger brother of R. Hayyim of Volozhin, in the Old Jewish Cemetery.

Tomb of R. Elijah b. Solomon (d. 1797), the Gaon of Vilna, top right, in the Old Jewish Cemetery.

Grave and Tombstone Inscription of R. Abraham Danzig (d. 1820), center, in the Old Jewish Cemetery.

R. Chaim Ozer Grodzenski, spiritual leader of Vilna Jewry, as well as the leading Torah authority of his generation, interceded on behalf of Vilna and worldwide Jewry. He made it clear than no such desecration of a Jewish cemetery would be tolerated by the Jewish community. When the municipal authorities informed him that under the laws that applied at the time any cemetery not in use for one hundred years or more (the old Jewish cemetery was closed in 1831 due to lack of space) could be demolished by government decision, R. Chaim Ozer was adamant and informed the authorities that Jewish law prohibits the desecration of any Jewish cemetery, whether or not presently in use. Moreover, R. Chaim Ozer informed the authorities that the Jewish community would not comply in any way with the immoral demands of the municipal government. An attempt at a compromise was then made by the authorities; they were prepared to allow the section where the famous rabbis were buried to remain standing, so long as the Jewish community would agree to allow the government to demolish the remainder of the cemetery – where ordinary folk, i.e., men, women, and children were buried. R. Chaim Ozer ruled out any such compromise solution and, instead, engaged in a tireless, worldwide lobbying campaign, in an effort to persuade the government officials to rescind their decree.[5]

R. Chaim Ozer Grodzenski (in 1939).

When some rabbis in Palestine – sensing the gravity of the situation – issued a broadside calling for the grave of the Gaon of Vilna to be exhumed so that his remains could be transferred to the Holy Land, R. Chaim Ozer was livid. For, explained R. Chaim Ozer, by acquiescing to the exhumation and transfer of famous rabbis, one in effect consigns the rest of the cemetery to mass destruction. Moreover, it sets a precedent for all governments in Europe – just transfer the famous rabbis out of the Jewish cemetery and the Jews will agree to abandon the remainder of the cemetery.[6] The upshot of R. Chaim Ozer’s wisdom and intransigence was that under his watch,

no sports stadium was constructed on the old Jewish cemetery.[7] R. Chaim Ozer died on August 9 [= 5 Av], 1940.[8] Vilna, and arguably world Jewry, would never again have a leader who so deftly and gracefully combined within himself mastery of Torah, practical wisdom, and an unswerving commitment to the dissemination and protection of Jewish values – with profound and unstinting loyalty to his people, both living and deceased – under any and all circumstances.

Despite a Jerusalem Post story that would suggest otherwise (“Anger Flares Over Lithuanian Sports Palace,” Sam Sokol, 8/11/2015) there is today a remarkable consensus in Vilnius that the site of the former Snipiskes Cemetery and the graves beneath must be protected. On this matter, the government of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Jewish community which I chair, and the Committee for the Preservation of Jewish Cemeteries in Europe (CPJCE), which is Europe’s foremost halachic authority on cemeteries, all agree.

Attention is now focused on the abandoned former Soviet Sports Palace, which partially sits on the cemetery grounds and in its current condition is mostly a gathering place for graffiti artists and alcoholics. The government rightly wants to remove the building and turn it into a center for conferences and cultural events. Because the building itself has been designated an architectural heritage site, no significant structural changes are possible, but the interior will be renovated. The surrounding area will be maintained as a memorial park with inscriptions that describe some of the most famous people who were buried there.

The Lithuanian government and the CPJCE have an agreement dating to 2009, concerning the cemetery site. Even though we are only in a planning stage and still months away from any construction, recent discussions between the two have worked out an understanding for dealing with the renovation of the former Sports Palace. The CPJCE will provide rabbinic oversight and ensure that there are no halachic violations in the course of the work that takes place. The government has further agreed to limit the type of activities that will take place in the renovated center so that they are in keeping with the special nature of the site.

If anything, this should be a cause for celebration and a model for how other governments in our part of the world should deal with similar challenges of respecting and protecting Jewish cemeteries and the mass graves of Holocaust victims.

So what accounts for the “angry voices” in your story and the outrageous claims that a “desecration” is taking place?

No doubt some of those quoted are simply uninformed, and this fuller explanation will assuage their concerns. But sadly there are others who do know better but are using this issue to advance their own personal feuds and grievances. Some of them are rivals to the CPJCE, and while they would never publicly criticize its eminent Chairman, Rabbi Elyakim Schlesinger, they pretend not to know his involvement here. Perhaps even more destructive is the role being played by our community’s former rabbi, Chaim Burstein. His contract was recently terminated – he has spent more days abroad on his personal business than serving our Jews here in Lithuania – and so he is spreading these stories in order to attack me. It pains me to say these things, but your readers should know the truth.

As a proud Litvak who has the honor to chair a small but resilient Jewish community I have been part of many difficult struggles during these past decades as we have pressed the Lithuanian government to return former Jewish property and pressed the Lithuanian people to squarely confront the history of our Holocaust-era past. Those struggles are not over, but we have had much success. How ironic that as we now have Lithuanian leaders who are prepared to see clearly what happened in the past, we have fellow Jews who refuse to see clearly what is happening today.

Faina Kukliansky

           

On August 15, 2015, Faina Kukliansky, Chairperson of the Lithuanian Jewish Community, issued a statement regarding the planned $25,000,000 Convention Center to be constructed by the Lithuanian government, and funded in large part by the European Union’s Structural Funds Program, in the center of Vilnius’ oldest Jewish cemetery – in use from the 16^th through the 19^th centuries – in the Shnipishkes (Yiddish: Shnipishok) section of Vilnius.

In the opening paragraph of the statement, Faina Kukliansky assures all concerned “that the site of the former Snipiskes cemetery and the graves beneath must be protected.” Her assurance, however, rings hollow, for as one reads on, it becomes apparent that she fully supports the idea of a Convention Center being constructed over the remains of the Jews buried in the cemetery.[10]

Ms. Kukliansky writes about the “abandoned former Soviet Sports Palace, which partially sits on the cemetery grounds.” One gets the impression that perhaps an annex to the Soviet-era Sports Palace, or its outer wall, sits on the cemetery grounds. In fact, the Soviet-era Sports Palace sits squarely in the very center of the old Jewish cemetery.[11]

Soviet-Era Sports Palace in Vilna, as it looks today, in the Old Jewish Cemetery.

Ms. Kukliansky continues: “Because the building [i.e., the Soviet-era Sports Palace] itself has been designated an architectural heritage site, no changes are possible.” Really? It was in the Soviet period that all the tombstones were systematically removed from the cemetery between 1948 and 1955, and it was in the Soviet period that a Sports Palace was constructed over the dead bodies of thousands of Vilnius Jews.[12] Now who was it that designated the Soviet Sports Palace an architectural heritage site? If it was the Soviets, what has this to do with Independent Lithuania? If, however, it was Independent Lithuania that made this designation, then rectification is long overdue. Indeed, the government of Lithuania should recognize the Shnipishkes Jewish cemetery as a heritage site of the Jewish community of Vilnius from the 16^th through the 19^th centuries. It should certainly not condone and perpetuate the Soviet desecration of a Jewish cemetery. That the EU supports such misuse of funds is nothing short of scandalous. Surely, there is ample room in and around Vilnius for the construction of a Convention Center someplace other than smack in the center of historically, the single most important Jewish cemetery in Lithuania and one of the most important in all of Europe.

Ms. Kukliansky labels those who disagree with her as “simply uninformed” or having a particular axe to grind. She does not entertain the possibility that building a Convention Center over a Jewish cemetery is not everybody’s cup of tea. I’m afraid it is Ms. Kukliansky who seems to be unaware of how many thousands of graves remain on the site, of how often bones have surfaced in recent years on the face of the cemetery,[13] and how despite prior agreements with the Lithuanian authorities, two entire buildings were constructed in recent years on the cemetery grounds.[14] Does she really believe – as she claims – that the construction of a $25,000,000 Convention Center will involve no excavation outside the present perimeters of the Soviet-era Sports Palace? Does she really believe – as she claims – that the type of activities that will take place in the renovated center will be in keeping with the special nature of the site? I wonder who is “simply uninformed.”

Faina Kukliansky writes: “If anything, this should be a cause for celebration and a model for how governments in our part of the world should deal with similar challenges of respecting and protecting Jewish cemeteries and mass graves of Holocaust victims.”

Nations of Eastern Europe take note! If you want to deal with respecting and protecting Jewish cemeteries, learn from the Vilnius experience. First remove and destroy all Jewish tombstones, and afterwards excavate wherever possible and destroy the remains of those who were buried there. Then build a Sports Palace or a Convention Center in the heart of the Jewish cemetery! Make certain that the new structures are designated architectural heritage sites, so that they cannot be dismantled. This should be followed by a celebration of how Jewish cemeteries have been respected and protected in the most proper fashion.

Faina Kukliansky is to be congratulated for assuming the responsibility of leading a “small but resilient Jewish community.” Sadly, she makes no mention of the fact that heartfelt and pained voices have been raised by a number of distinguished members of her small community, voicing strong opposition to the construction of the Convention Center in the Jewish cemetery.[15] But there is another issue here. Faina Kukliansky is much too modest in thinking that the “small and resilient Jewish community” of Vilnius is her only constituency. The Vilnius Jewish cemeteries belong not only to Vilnius and its Jewish community. The spiritual, as well as the genetic, descendants of the thousands of men and women buried in the Shnipishkes and Zaretcha Jewish cemeteries live the world over. They remember their ancestors, study their writings, often live by their teachings, and should have the right to pray at their graves in a cemetery not desecrated by a Convention Center.

Faina Kukliansky would do well to weigh carefully the consequences of the precedent she is setting. By lending her support to the construction of a Convention Center over the old Jewish cemetery, she places in jeopardy every Jewish cemetery in Europe and, perhaps, elsewhere as well. True, she claims that she relies on a rabbinic ruling issued by the CPJCE in London. Distinguished rabbis the world over, however, have raised their voices in unison against the construction of a Convention Center in the old Jewish cemetery, rendering the London opinion – at best – a minority one. These voices include the leading halakhic authorities in Israel¹⁶ and the United States,¹⁷ and the present heads of the great yeshivot that once graced Lithuania, which due to the Holocaust and Soviet repression had to resettle elsewhere.¹⁸ Faina Kukliansky would also do well to remember the voice raised long ago by her pre-World War II predecessor in Vilna, Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzenski. He did not allow the Polish government to desecrate the very Jewish cemetery that is about to be desecrated by the Lithuanian government with her approval.

Sid Leiman
Professor Emeritus of Jewish History and Literature
Brooklyn College

September 13, 2015
Erev Rosh Ha-Shanah 5776

Notes:

[1] Laimonas Briedis, Vilnius: City of Strangers (Vilnius, 2009), p. 168.
[2] Briedis, op. cit., p. 195. [The Briedis quotes have been slightly edited by me for the sake of clarity. -SL]
[3] See Yaakov Kosovsky-Shahor, ed., אגרות ר‘ חיים עוזר (Bnei Brak, 2000), vol. 1, pp. 400-401. Cf. Dov Eliach, הגאון (Jerusalem, 2002), vol. 3, p. 1142. See also the brief notice in Israel Klausner,
וילנא ירושלים דליטא: דורות האחרונים (Tel-Aviv, 1983), vol. 2, p. 554.
[4] For a concise history of the old Jewish cemetery in Vilna, see Israel Klausner, קורות בית העלמין הישן בוילנה (Vilna, 1935).
[5] In general, see Kosovsky-Shahor, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 400-405.
[6] Kosovsky-Shahor, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 402-403.
[7] A soccer field, just north of the old Jewish cemetery, was initiated in 1936 and eventually became Zalgiris Stadium when construction was completed by the Soviets in 1950. See Antanas Papshys, Vilnius: A Guide (Moscow, 1980), p. 127. It is still in use in Vilnius.
[8] For a moving account of his funeral, see Yosef Friedlander, “The Day Vilna Died,” Tradition 37:2 (2003), pp. 88-92.
[9] Faina Kukliansky’s statement was translated from Lithuanian into English and posted on August 15, 2015 on the Lithuanian Jewish Community website here. For the full context of the “Convention Center on the Old Jewish Cemetery” controversy, and for a comprehensive paper trail of statements made by Faina Kukliansky and the various parties involved in the controversy to date, see here. This site exists due to the incredible industry of the indefatigable Professor Dovid Katz of Vilnius, who also has prepared a register of all public voices that have been raised in opposition to the proposed construction of a Convention Center on the old Jewish cemetery, available here.
[10] One suspects that Ms. Kukliansky distinguishes between the land under the former Soviet-era Sport Palace (which, due to the excavations necessary for its construction, presumably led to the disposal of all Jewish remains that had been buried there) and the land surrounding the former Soviet-era Sports Palace (which presumably retains the remains of all those Jews who had been buried there). Thus, she feels comfortable with the construction of a Convention Center over the former Soviet-era Sports Palace. In terms of Jewish law, however, such a distinction is meaningless. Once a Jewish cemetery is consecrated it becomes a hallowed place, much like a synagogue. Like a synagogue, it cannot be used for secular purposes and it may not be desecrated in any way. And like a synagogue, it retains its sanctity whether or not Jews are actually present at any specific time or on a specific day. The Jewish cemetery remains hallowed in its entirety, even if all the remains have been removed from it; how much more so if remains are strewn throughout the cemetery! On the hallowed status of a Jewish cemetery, see, e.g., R. Jacob Moellin (d. 1427), ספר מהרי“ל: מנהגים (Jerusalem, 1989), laws of fasting, p. 270; R. Elijah Shapira, אליהו רבה על ספרי הלבושים, to שלחן ערוך אורח חיים 581:4, note 39; and R. Judah Ashkenazi (d. circa 1742), באר היטב, and R. Samuel Kolin (d. 1806), מחצית השקל, to שלחן ערוך אורח חיים 581:4. In all the passages just cited, every Jewish cemetery is described as a מקום קדוש, i.e. a holy place – which is precisely why Jewish cemeteries are designated as places appropriate for prayer. When a municipal office building, or an apartment house, or a convention center is constructed on a Jewish cemetery, it as an act of desecration. Ms. Kukliansky seems upset about “the outrageous claims that a desecration is taking place.” The claims are hardly outrageous; it is the desecration that is taking place that is outrageous.

That a Jewish cemetery retains its hallowed status even if some or all the remains are removed from it and buried elsewhere is an official ruling of many rabbis, including R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (d. 1995), one of the greatest halakhic decisors of modern times. At שו“ת מנחת שלמה (Jerusalem, 1999), vol. 2, responsum 88, p. 338, he rules unequivocally: “A Jewish cemetery, even if should happen that its remains have been exhumed, remains prohibited [for secular use, or for being sold to a second party], and always retains its character as a Jewish cemetery.” Cf. R. Moshe Feinstein,אגרות משה: יורה דעה חלק ג (New York, 1982), responsum 151, pp. 418-419.
[11] This can be seen by examining maps of the Jewish cemetery prepared during the last 200 years, as well as detailed photographs of the Jewish cemetery taken in the last 100 years. Even U.S. intelligence reports released by Wikileaks concede that “the Sports Palace property indisputably rests in the middle of the former cemetery.” See here.
[12] The Soviet-built Sports Palace, used primarily for volleyball and basketball games, was opened in 1971 and remained in use in Independent Lithuania until 2004.
[13] The evidence here is shocking indeed. See, e.g., Binyomin Rabinowitz, “Can Anything Be Done to Save the Remnants of Vilna’s Old Jewish Cemetery,” Dei’ah VeDibur (August 31, 2005), pp. 1-9, available online here.
[14] See, e.g., the Wikipedia entry on “Jewish Cemeteries of Vilnius”: “The Palace of Concerts and Sports (Lithuanian: Koncertų ir sporto rūmai) was built in 1971 right in the middle of the former cemetery. In 2005, apartment and office buildings were built at the site,” here.
[15] See, e.g., Ruta (Reyzke) Bloshtein’s stirring plea to the Lithuanian government online here.
[16] E.g, Rabbi Samuel Auerbach of Jerusalem, son and successor of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach.
[17] The list is much too long to be included here. Suffice to mention: Rabbi David Feinstein (head of Mesivta Tiferet Jerusalem), Rabbi Aharon Feldman (head of Ner Israel Rabbinical College), Rabbi Shmuel Kamenetsky (head of Talmudical Yeshiva of Philadelphia), and Rabbi Aaron M. Schechter (head of Mesivta Chaim Berlin).
[18] These include Rabbi Chaim Dov Heller, head of the Telz Yeshiva, formerly in Telshiai, Lithuania; Rabbi Osher Kalmanowitz, head of the Mirrer yeshiva, formerly in Mir, Greater Lithuania (today in Belarus); and Rabbi Aryeh Malkiel Kotler, head of the Beth Medrash Govoha in Lakewood, formerly in Kleck and Sluck, Greater Lithuania (today in Belarus).

This commentary on Psalms is a forgery. While the volume is attributed to Rashbam it was actually written by Satanow. Regarding this forgery, David Rosin writes as follows:[12]

הכי קרא שמו יצחק ויהי כצחוק בעיניו להתחפש במעטה רבנו שמואל ולעשות מעשהו ולעבוד עבודתו. זר מעשהו ונכריה עבודתו, כל השומע יצחק לו

3. In my post here I quoted R. Moses Isaac Ashkenazi in his Ho’il Moshe that King David is not to be regarded as a prophet as he only had ruah ha-kodesh. One of the commenters wrote:

Rashi Megilla 14a quotes a Halachot Gedolot which names David as [a] prophet. Rashi speaks specifically about prophets as opposed to Ruach Hakodesh, and excludes Daniel based on Megilla 3a.

 Another commenter was more strident:

Wonderful example how modern scholars have no place in the Torah world! As first commenter pointed out, Dovid Hamelech is prominent in the list of 48 neviim, and there are scores of sugyos based on the nevuah of DH. The makom mizbeach, etc. Pure AmHaaRatzus!

I am not sure if I am the am ha-aretz he is referring to, which in any case would be uncalled for since I never said that David only had ruah ha-kodesh and was therefore not a prophet. All I did was point out that R. Moses Isaac Ashkenazi said this. When I called the commenter’s attention to the fact that his strong words were directed against R. Ashkenazi, he wrote:

I wouldn’t start up with Hoil Moshe, but was pointing out the danger of someone reading this post, and then taking it at face value. For anyone fluent in Shas they will find numerous references to DH’s nevua. Ruach HaKodesh wouldn’t work for all the halachos we learn out from DH. . . . I do thoroughly enjoy your posts, but find them quite dangerous. I would prefer my children at least stick to Artscroll and have their basics –DH’s nevua – straight!

Now let me say something that I did not put in the comments because I want the entire audience to see it, not just the tiny group that reads the comments. The commenter just quoted is a perfect example of one who is certain of something, and certain that the opposing position is incorrect, and this leads to very harsh language. Let’s leave aside R. Moses Isaac Ashkenazi who is not an important scholar. All would agree that R. Moses Sofer, the Hatam Sofer, is important and certainly not an am ha’aretz (which is the term the commenter used). Yet the Hatam Sofer is explicit that David was not a prophet and only had ruah ha-kodesh, which is exactly what R. Ashkenazi states and what the commenter so harshly attacks. Here are the Hatam Sofer’s words in Torat Moshe ha-Shalem, Ba-Midbar, p. 74.

הנה לא מצינו לישראל מלך שיהי’ גם נביא משולח לעם כי אם משה רבינו ע”ה, דכתיב גבי’ (דברים ל”ג ה’) ויהי בישורון מלך, אבל שארי נביאים לא היו מלכים והמלכים לא התנבאו, ודוד המלך ע”ה רה”ק הו”ל ולא נבואה, ולכן אחז”ל (גיטין נ”ט ע”א) מימות משה עד רבי לא מצינו תורה וגדולה במקום אחד, דאלו כל הנביאים היו עליהם בגדולה השופט והמלך שבימיו, וכל המלכים אפי’ דוד ושלמה היו הנביאים שבדורם גדולים מהם בתורה . . . שהרי אין מלך נביא.

This notion, that the kings were not prophets (other than Moses), is also stated in Zohar, Terumah, p. 154a, and this is presumably the Hatam Sofer’s source. I don’t deny that there are other authoritative sources that contradict this, including passages in the Talmud. Some of them are cited by R. Reuven Margaliyot in his note to the Zohar, ad loc., and we can speculate as to why the Hatam Sofer preferred the Zohar over these other sources. I cite this only to show that commenters should be very careful before labeling something as am ha’aratzus, as you never know whom you might be insulting with this comment.

4. The latest book in my series with Academic Studies Press has recently appeared. It is Sara Reguer, My Father’s Journey: A Memoir of Lost Worlds of Jewish Lithuania. (Reguer is the granddaughter of R. Simcha Zelig Reguer, the dayan of Brisk.) Here is the book’s description.

Born into a leading Lithuanian-Jewish rabbinic family, Moshe Aron Reguer initially followed the path of traditional yeshiva education. His adolescence coincided with World War I and its upheavals, pandemics, and pogroms, as well as with new ideas of Haskalah, Zionism, and socialism. His memoir, recently discovered and here translated and published for the first time, discusses his internal struggles and describes the world around him and the people who influenced him. Moshe Aron Reguer wrote his memoir at the age of 23, on the eve of his departure for Eretz Israel in 1926. However, his story did not end there, but continued in British Mandated Palestine and the United States. He kept in touch with the family in Brest-Litovsk until the Nazis destroyed Jewish Lithuania, and some of their correspondence is included within this volume.

Anyone who is interested in Jewish Lithuania and the great yeshivot will find this book of value.

I also want to call attention to the recent publication of Menachem Kellner, Jewish Universalism, edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes. Kellner’s work has made a great impact, not only in Jewish scholarship but among thinking Jews in general. This small volume is a wonderful read and contains an intellectual portrait of Kellner written by James A. Diamond as well as a lengthy interview with Kellner.

This book is number 12 in Brill’s Library of Contemporary Jewish Philosophers. Here is what has appeared so far and what if forthcoming (taken from the Brill website).

Published Volumes

Vol. 1: Eliezer Schweid: The Responsibility of Jewish Philosophy

Vol. 2: Jonathan Sacks: Universalizing Particularity

Vol. 3: David Novak: Natural Law and Revealed Torah

Vol. 4: Eugene B. Borowitz: Rethinking God and Ethics

Vol. 5: Elliot N. Dorff: In Search of the Good Life

Vol. 6: Judith Plaskow: Feminism, Theology, and Justice

Vol. 7: David R. Blumenthal: Living with God and Humanity

Vol. 8: Moshe Idel: Representing God

Vol. 9: Lenn E. Goodman: Judaism, Humanity, and Nature

Vol. 10: Avi Sagi: Existentialism, Pluralism, and Identity

Vol. 11: Elliot R. Wolfson: Poetic Thinking

Vol. 12: Menachem Kellner: Jewish Universalism

Forthcoming Volumes

Vol. 13: J. David Bleich: Where Halakhah and Philosophy Meet (est. October 2015)

Vol. 14: Michael Fishbane: Jewish Hermeneutical Theology (est. October 2015)

Vol. 15: Norbert M. Samuelson: Reasoned Faith (est. November 2015)

Vol. 16: Arthur Green: Hasidism for Tomorrow (est. January 2016)

5. The issue of truth-telling in halakhic matters, discussed in the last chapter of my new book, has been of interest to many people. I did not want to be too lengthy in my response to Aryeh Frimer here, because it was not my own independent post. So let me now add some more details. DG reminded me of the following source. According to R. Jacob Moellin, when the Talmud states that a law is rabbinic but a verse is brought as an asmachta, this was done so as to mislead the people into thinking that it is a Torah law so that they would observe it more carefully.[13] In other words, the Sages were engaging in falsehood for a higher purpose.

This is exactly the sort of thing that Frimer claimed is not part of mainstream halakhic thought, a point which I disputed. It also is very relevant to my discussion of the dispute between the Hatam Sofer and R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes regarding “raising the prohibition”. Here are the Maharil’s words, as quoted by his student.

כל היכא דאיתמר מדרבנן הוא וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא, הכי פירושו ודאי תקנתא דרבנן הוא והם יצאו ובדקו ומצאו להם סמך מקרא, וסמכו דבריהם עליו כדי להחזיקם שיהיו סבורים דהוא מדאורייתא ויחמירו בו, ולא אתו לזלזל ולהקל בדברי חכמים

In the notes to this text, the editor informs us that one of the manuscripts has a different version. Instead of כדי להחזיקם שיהיו סבורים it reads להטעות הבריות שהם סבורים. This text is even more explicit that the Sages were not being honest with the masses. This manuscript has a handwritten note explaining that instead of reading להטעות הבריות it should say להטעים לבריות because the word להטעות is a דבר מגונה . In other words, the person who made this “correction” was troubled by the explicit statement that the Sages would deceive people, even if it was for a higher cause.

If there is one thing people have learnt from my posts over the years, it is that whenever you find a passage that diverges radically from what others think is appropriate, you will find those who deny the passage’s authenticity. In this case, the most prominent of the deniers is R. Joseph Engel[14]:

לענ”ד לא מיסתברי כלל ולא אאמין כלל שיצאו מפה קדוש המהרי”ל ז”ל

R. Simhah Klein writes[15]:

וכי ישקרו חז”ל לחזק דבריהם שיהיו סבורין דהוא דאורייתא

However, R. Eliyahu Bohbut is not at all bothered by the claim of the Maharil that the Sages engaged in a form of deception vis-à-vis the masses. After quoting the passage he explains matter-of-factly[16]:

כלומר דאסמכתא באה כביכול “להטעות” את העם שיסברו דאיכא איסור דאורייתא “ויחמירו בו”

Regarding one of the other matters I discussed in the book, namely, so-called “Orthodox history”, the folllowing appears in Divrei David (p. 30a), a collection of teachings of R. David Moses Friedman, the first Chortkover Rebbe.

פ”א סיפרו לפניו על איזה מעשה שאדמ”ור מרוזין זי”ע סיפר אותו פעם בסינגון זה ופעם בסיגנון אחר אמר על זה מרן אדמ”ור זי”ע שהסיפורי מעשיות שמספרים הצדיקים הוא לפי מה שצריך באותו שעה

This is an acknowledgment that the stories told by the rebbes are not really history, as they are designed to serve the needs of the present. As I think most people today realize, haredi “historical” writing in general is as much about the present as the past, and it is precisely because of this that authors feel it is legitimate to cover up or even alter the historical record in order to best serve the religious needs of the present.

Finally, a few people have asked about what I wrote on p. 244, that the strand of Jewish tradition that countenances falsehood “deserves to be understood in a sympathetic manner as well”. This does not mean that people need to agree with those who countenance falsehood, and I certainly do not. However, in writing an academic study as opposed to a polemic, it is important to recognize that approaches that today we might regard as unacceptable, were viewed very differently in other times and cultures (and for some, these “other times and cultures” continue into our own day). I am interested in understanding what leads people to diverge so dramatically from a value that I regard as important. In my book I did not set out to judge them, but in a sympathetic manner, i.e, with a sensitivity to their worldview, attempt to understand them. (When I used the word “sympathetic”, I did not mean that I approved of what I was describing, only that I was sensitive to the motivations behind the approach.) By the same token, when I see that great figures from earlier years have written troubling things about non-Jews or women, I also approach this in a sympathetic manner, understanding that for these people, living in a vastly different time and often suffering under terrible anti-Semitism, it made sense that they would express certain thoughts that today pretty much everyone regards as unacceptable. One need not be a complete historicist to acknowledge that all people are influenced by their era, for good and for bad. This is what I mean by understanding in a sympathetic manner.

Coming Soon: R. Ysoscher Katz and Modern Orthodox Halakhah; The Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Dispute Regarding the Historicity of the Hanukkah Miracle; R. Steinman and the Messianic Belief; R. Mazuz’s Short-Lived Entry into Politics; and a response to R. Aharon Lopiansky’s article in Dialogue.

Rabbi Yitzchok Oratz, a musmach of Beth Medrash Govoha, is the Rabbi and Director of the

Monmouth Torah Links community in Marlboro, NJ.

God knows the nature of every generation, Rabbi Dovid Bashevkin has written a Sefer uniquely appropriate for the nature of ours[1].

Take a trip to your local Jewish bookseller during this time period, and you will find numerous seforim, old[2] and new[3], on the themes of sin and repentance. Although they certainly vary in style and quality, a common denominator among many is the heavy reliance on Rambam’s Hilchos Teshuva and Sha’arey Teshuva of Rabbeinu Yonah of  Gerondi[4].  And this is to be expected. Timeless classics, these works of the great Rishonim are unmatched in their systematic and detailed discussion of sin and punishment, free will[5] and repentance, and are a prerequisite study for any serious discussion of Teshuva.

But therein lays the dilemma.

For although Rabbeinu Yonah maps out the exalted levels of Teshuva that one should certainly strive for, they seem not to be for the faint of heart.  Is our generation really up to the task of embracing the sorrow, suffering, and worry, the humbling and lowering oneself[6], without allowing for the concomitant sense of despair[7] and despondence[8]?

And how many of us can honestly stand before the Creator, and proclaim that we will “never return” to our negative actions, to the extent that God Himself will testify that this is the case[9]? If confession without sincere commitment to change is worthless[10], does repeating last year’s failed commitments not require choosing between giving up and fooling ourselves?

This is where B’Rogez  Rachem  Tizkor comes in.  Based heavily on the thought of Izbica in general, and Reb Tzadok ha-Kohen of Lublin in particular, it discusses the value of spiritual struggle, the interplay between determinism and free will, the redemptive potential of sin, and the status of those who have not yet arisen from their fall.

In a refreshingly humble[11], almost apologetic, essay at the Seforim blog, R’ Bashevkin expresses hope that his work brings “the much needed attention these thinkers deserve in contemporary times,” while delivering a message of “comfort and optimism[12],” without being disloyal “to the type of avodas Hashem . . . they hoped to engender[13].” I think he was successful on all accounts.

Overall, the sefer is a good introduction to R’ Tzadok for those who are not familiar with his thought, and offers many insightful and fascinating comments even for those who are. Some that I found particularly interesting includethe insight into why R’ Mesharshiya cursed Ravina that he should come to permit forbidden fats (Yevamos 37a, B’Rogez Rachem Tizkor p. 16), what important lesson can be learned from the Talmudic teaching that one who responds Amein Yehay Shemy Rabbah with all his might is forgiven even if he has a trace of idolatry (Shabbos 119b, p. 18), what benefit is there in requiring that anyone appointed to the Sanhedrin know how to purify a sheretz (Sanhedrin 17a, p. 19), why does the Talmud expound so harshly on the sins of Achan (Sanhedrin 44a, p. 36), a new understanding of why one may lie for the sake of peace (Yevamos 65b, p. 84), and what possibly could be negative about being attached to Torah (p. 23).

In the aforementioned essay, the author hopes that, in keeping with its theme, the work is read with a “measure of mercy.” He has nothing to worry about. My main critiques are that some of the discussion of the more controversial statements of Izbica required more elaboration[14], the lack thereof leads to a seeming conflating of two similar, yet far from identical, concepts, and more contrasting and supporting texts (both from within Izbica and R’ Tzadok’s thought and without) would have made for a stronger case and deeper understanding.

My hope is to fill in these gaps in some small measure. Hopefully it will further enlighten those whose appetite was whet by this fine work.

ועתה באתי להעיר כדרכו של תורה, ואת והב בסופה.

“הכל בידי שמים אפילו יראת שמים!”

א) בסי’ ג’ שו”ט בטוטו”ד בענין מה שנראה שהוא חידוש נועז[15] מבית מדרשו של האיזביצ’א, דהכל בידי  שמים אפילו יראת שמים[16], ודיש מושג של עבירות שהם למעלה מבחירת האדם[17].

וקודם כל אעיר, דכנראה עירבב שני דברים דומים אבל לא שוים. דהיסוד הראשון הוא דהכל בידי  שמים אפילו יראת שמים, דהיינו דכל מה שהי’ הוה ויהי’ הוא בדיוק רצונו יתב”ש, כל מעשי המצוות וכל העבירות, דוכי יעשה בעולם דבר שלא ברשות קונו ובלא חפצו? כל אשר חפץ ה’ עשה בשמים ובארץ! וכשמדברים על דרך זה, אין שום חילוק בין עבירות שהן למעלה מבחירתנו ואלו שתוך שדה בחירתנו. “כל מה שחטא הי’ גם כן ברצון השם יתברך” (צדקת הצדיק אות מ’). “ולעתיד יתברר כן על כל חטאי בני ישראל וכו’ שיתברר שהיה מסודר מאמיתות רצון ה’ יתברך שיהיה כן ואם כן גם בזה עשו רצון ה’ יתברך” (מחשבות חרוץ אות ד’). הכל הוא מאתו יתברך.

והענין השני הוא כשמדברים מתוך עולם הבחירה[18], דע”פ פשטות בחירה הוא ד”נדע בלא ספק שמעשה האדם ביד האדם” ו”עושה כל מה שהוא חפץ ואין מי שיעכב בידו מלעשות הטוב או הרע,” ומשו”ה “דנין אותו לפי מעשיו” (רמב”ם פרק ה’ מהלכות תשובה), ואעפ”כ חידש האיזביצ’א  ד”לפעמים אשר יצר האדם מתגבר עליו עד שלא יכול לזוז בשום אופן ואז ברור הדבר כי מה’ הוא” (מי השילוח פרשת כי תצא כ”א:י”א), ו”פעמים יש אדם עומד בנסיון גדול עד שאי אפשר לו שלא יחטא” (צדקת הצדיק אות מ”ג)[19].

הרי דיש שני ענינים נפרדים, שניהם חידושים נפלאים, ושניהם מבית מדרשו של האיזביצ’א.

ב) אבל באמת, כד נעיין היטב בזה,  נמצא  הרבה  סייעתא לשני החידושים בדברי חז”ל ובתורתן של גדולי ישראל אף מאלו הרחוקים מתורת איזביץ, דבעיקרי התורה ויסודותיה תורה אחת היא לכם[20].

הרואה דברים אלו בודאי יחשוב דתורת איזביץ  יש כאן.

ואינו כן. אלא מבית מדרשו של בעלי המוסר, מפי המשגיח המפורסם הרה”ג ר’ יחזקאל לוינשטיין ז”ל  יצא הדברים (אור יחזקאל, שיחות אלול עמוד ס”ז – ס”ח). ולהפתעתי מצאתי  שדבריו הובאו  גם בספר ממחבר מפורסם של חסידי ברסלב[21]. הרי דתורת ברסלב, איזביץ, ובעלי המוסר, כולם מסכימים לעצם היסוד דהכל בידי שמים, ללא יוצא מן הכלל.

ומקור הדברים לכאורה הוי במדרש (במדבר רבה, פרשת נשא, פרשה “יג סי’ י”ח):

“אע”פ שאירע לשבטים שבא לידיהם מכירת יוסף את סבור שלא היה בא לידם אותו המעשה             אלא א”כ היו רשעים במעשה אחרים לאו אלא צדיקים גמורים היו ולא בא לידם חטא מעולם וכו’ אלא זה בלבד ומתוך גנותם סיפר הכתוב שבחם שלא היה בידם עון אלא זה בלבד ולפי שמכירת יוסף זכות היה לושהיא גרמה לו למלוך וזכות היתה לאחיו ולכל בית אביו שכלכלם בלחם בשני רעבון לכך נמכר על ידם                        שמגלגלין זכות על ידי זכאי.”

ולכאורה תמוה, דאף דלבסוף היה לטוב עדיין צ”ע מה דה”זכות” מתייחס להם דהא מפורש במדרש דמכירת יוסף היה “עון.”

אלא לכאורה הכוונה הוא דכל ענין מכירת יוסף הי’ עצה עמוקה של אותו צדיק הקבור בחברון[22] ובהכרח ירדו בנ”י למצרים דעצת ה’ היא תקום. הרי דבמכירת יוסף, אף דנחשב להם לעון, אפ”ה היו השבטים שלוחא דרחמנא לקיים גזירותיו. ומעשה אבות סימן לבנים[23], דכן הוא בכל מה שאירע בהעולם, הכל הוא לקיים רצונו יתברך[24], וזהו אף בהעבירות שאדם עושה[25], אבל בעבירות אין התועלת והטוב שיצא ממעשי אדם מתיחחסים לו[26], ואדרבה נענש עליהם אף שמעשיו היו “גופא רצונו יתברך[27].” אבל כל זה כשלא עשה תשובה, אבל אצל שבטים שאמרו “אבל אשמים אנחנו על אחינו” (בראשית פרק מ”ב פסוק כ”א) שהוא תשובה על מעשיהם (עיין בשערי אהרן בשם הזוהר ועוד) נעשה להם זדונות כזכיות ממש וכמו שלא הי’ עון כלל, דיבוקש עון ישראל ואיננו, וכל הטוב הנמשך ממעשיהם מתייחס להם כזכות ממש[28] (עיין בזה בס’ תקנת השבין סי’ י’ אות ט).  הרי דאף מעשי העבירות הוי קיום רצונו יתברך.

ג) וכל זה הוא בנוגע להענין הראשון (ד”כל מה שחטא הי’ גם כן ברצון השם יתברך” ו”אף כאשר האדם חוטא וכו’ זה גופא רצונו יתברך”). ובנוגע הענין השנית, דהוא דאף כשמדברים על עולם הבחירה אפ”ה לפעמים יש מציאות דיש עבירות שא”א שלא יכשל בהן, בזה היטיבו אשר דברו בזה ב”ברגז רחם תזבר” דשפיר משמע מפשטות שיטת ר’ אלעאי (קידושין מ.) דיש ענין בזה.

  ובאמת, יש עוד כמה מקומות בש”ס דמשמע כן. עיין צדקת הצדיק (אות מ”ג) דהביא מגמ’ ברכות ל”ב. “משל לאדם אחד שהיה לו בן הרחיצו וסכו והאכילו והשקהו ותלה לו כיס על צוארו והושיבו על פתח של זונות מה יעשה אותו הבן שלא יחטא,” וכן מגמ’ כתובות נ”א: “כל שתחלתה באונס וסוף ברצון אפי’ היא אומרת הניחו לו שאלמלא לא נזקק לה היא שוכרתו מותרת מ”ט יצר אלבשה” “הרי דזה מחשב אונס גמור אף על פי שהוא ברצונה מכל מקום יצר גדול כזה אי אפשר באדם לכופו.[29]”

ועייו בס’ יד קטנה (ריש הל’ תשובה) דהאריך לחדש דיש ענין “רב וגדול למאוד” בוידוי פה אף בלי חרטה[30] ובלי עזיבת החטא[31], ובכל דבריו מיירי במי ש”אין לו שלטון וממשלה על חוזק כבד לבבו להטותה באמת” ו”הרי הוא כמו אנוס מן חוזק כבד לבבו,” הרי דנקט לדבר פשוט שיש מצבים ויש אנשים שבשום אופן א”א להם לשוב מדרכם הרעה.

ועיין בס’ מכתב מאליהו ב”קונטרס הבחירה” (ח”א עמוד קי”ג) שביאר הגרא”א דסלר זצ”ל לא רק דיש עבירות שהן למעלה מבחירתנו, אלא רוב מעשינו הוא למעלה או למטה מנקודת הבחירה שיש לכל או”א. ועיין שם בהערה מהרב ארי’ כרמל דהמקור לדבריו הוא מדברי ר’ אלעאי בקידושין שם. הרי לא רק דכן ס”ל לר’ אלעאי אלא נקטינן כדבריו[32].

ויש לציין שבדברי הנחל נובע מקור חכמה כנראה מבואר דלא כזה. עיין ליקוטי מוהר”ן (תנינא, תורה ק”י) “שמעתי, שאיש אחד שאל אותו: כיצד הוא הבחירה? השיב לו בפשיטות, שהבחירה היא ביד האדם בפשיטות. אם רצה עושה, ואם אינו רוצה אינו עושה. ורשמתי זאת, בי הוא נצרך מאד, כי כמה בני אדם נבוכים בזה מאד, מחמת שהם מרגלים במעשיהם ובדרכיהם מנעוריהם מאד, על כן נדמה להם שאין להם בחירה, חס ושלום, ואינם יכולים לשנות מעשיהם. אבל באמת אינו כן, כי בודאי יש לכל אדם בחירה תמיד על כל דבר, וכמו שהוא רוצה עושה. והבן הדברים מאד[33].”

ד) אבל עיין שם בצדקת הצדיק שסיים ביסוד גדול “אבל האדם עצמו אינו יכול להעיד על עצמו בזה כי אולי עדיין היה לו כח לכוף היצר.”  ובס’ ברגז רחם תזכר שם הביא מעוד כמה מקומות בתורתו של הכהן הגדול שכן הוא, והביא ביאור נפלא בזה מבעל פחד יצחק, ויסוד זה שייך בשני הענינים, בין מה דהכל הוא מהשי”ת ובין מה דיש עבירות למעלה מהבחירה, בכולם אסור לנו בפועל להכחיש הבחירה בשום פנים ואופן וחייבים אנו להלחם ביצרינו בכל נימי נפשינו[34].

ואם כנים אנחנו בזה[35], דמצד אחד תורת איזביץ  יש לו יסודות נאמנים וקיימים בדברי חז”ל והרבה ס”ל כמותו, ומצד שני דבפועל אסור לנו להכחיש הבחירה כלל וכלל, יש כאן תמיה גדולה — א”כ מה כל הרעש הזה על תורתו, מה חרי האף הגדול הזה דלא רצו להדפיס ספריו ואף שרפו ספריו באש ר”ל[36]?

וכד נעיין היטב בזה, נראה דעיקר הרעש על חידושו הי’ על מה דגלא רזין מעלמא דאתכסיא, רזין עילאין וטמירין שכיסה עתיק יומין ולא איתגלאו מכמה דרין. ובזה הניח מקום לטעות בדבריו (כאשר כבר הי’ ר”ל) להחליש חומר החטא. והיטיב דבר בזה הגאון המקובל ר’ יצחק מאיר מרגנשטרן שליט”א מירושלים ד”מדרגה זו וכו’ אין מגלין אותה אלא לצנועים, ומכל שכן שאין לדרוש בה בקול רעש גדול, כי אם בדוקא בסוד ובהעלם גדול, דחלילה לאדם שיחשוב קודם החטא דהכל מרצונו יתברך וכיוצא באלו מחשבות פגול, דבזה עלול הוא להתיר מה שאסרה תורה וכו’ והרי הוא בכלל אחטא ואשוב אין מספיקין בידו לעשות תשובה, ודייקא אחר שכבר נכשל רח”ל בחטא, אז ישיב אל לבו לשוב אל ה’ בכל לבו ובכל נפשו, ולא יעלה על דעתו דאחר שנתרחק הנה מכאן ואילך הרי הוא מרוחק ושוב לא יזכה לראות אור השמש, דאינו כן, דודאי בפנימיות בדרך העלמה הכל היה כרצון השי”ת לצורך תיקון העולם, אלא דכבוד אלקים הסתר דבר.”

ובימינו כבר דורשין סתרי תורה, שפוני טמוני חול דתורת איזביץ, ברבים, בקולי קולות וברעש גדול. ואפשר דכן צריך להיות. דבדור חלש, ודור שרבים משתוקקים להרגיש בחוש ד”קרבת אלקים לי טוב,” יש צורך גדול לדמות לשכינה ולהחיות רוח שפלים ולב נדכאים[37], ללמוד זכות על החוטא (אבל לא על החטא), ואפילו אם הוא בעצמו הוא  החוטא[38], ולהבין דלפעמים באמת יש נסיונות שהם למעלה מנקודת בחירתנו, ושהכל הוא עצת ה’, ואל לנו ליפול בעומק היאוש ודכאון[39]. ועכ”ז צורך להדגיש דבעצם תוקף הנסיון יש לנו ללחום ביצר בכל כחנו, ואין לנו להתיאש מלהתגבר עליו בטענת שאין ביכולתנו.

ה) וכשם שחייב ללחום ביצה”ר וחלילה לחשוב קודם החטא דהחטא הוא רצונו, כך אסור לעמוד במקום נסיון. ומפני זה יפה הביא (בעמוד מ”ט) לתמוה על דברי הכלי יקר (חקת י”ט:כ”א) דבעל תשובה מותר וצריך לעמוד במקום הנסיון שנפל מתחלה, ואף להתיחד עם אותו אשה אשר חטא, ואם יתגבר על יצרו בזה נחשב בעל תשובה גמורה. ויפה כתב לתמוה על דבריו.

ויש להוסיף בזה דברי המי השלוח (ח”ב פרשת יתרו עה”פ לא תשתחווה להם ולא תעבדם) “ולא תעבדם שלא תעשה מהם עבודה להש”י בהכניסך לנסיון בדי שתתגבר על יצרך וכו’ ואפילו אם מכוין שעי”ז יתגבר כבוד שמים בהתגברו על היצר.” ועיין רמב”ם פ”ב מהל’ תשובה ה”ד “ומתרחק הרבה מן הדבר שחטא בו.” ועיין צדקת הצדיק אות ע”ג, ובס’ מגדים חדשים (ברכות ל””ד ע”ב ובמילואים שבסוף הספר) הביא מכמה ספרים דכתבו כעין דברי הכלי יקר, וגם אלו החולקין על דבריו, ועיין שם בשם לקט יושר (ע’ קל:ו) “שאחד רצה לעשות כדלעיל ועשה העבירה שנית,” ועיין בס’ שערים מצויינים בהלכה (ברכות שם) שהביא מכמה מקומות דמבואר דלא כהכלי יקר, וכתב דדבריו בזה תמוהין[40] )אבל לכאורה מדברי הירושלמי הובא בערל”נ סנהדרין כ”ב. יש ראי’ לשיטת הכלי יקר, וצ”ע(.

ו) בעמוד ס”ט הביא פירוש נפלא (מר’ שמחה ווליג נר”ו) דהכוונה במדרש איכה (ה’:כ”א) “חדש ימינו כקדם כאדם הראשון כמד”א (בראשית ג’) ויגרש את האדם וישכן מקדם לגן עדן” דהכוונה הוא דוקא לאחר החטא, דבזה מיירי הפסוק. וכבר מזמן אמרתי כן לעצמי ולאחרים, והדבר מפורש בחדושי רד”ל שם “שאחר שנתגרש לקדם עשה תשובה ונתקבל ברצון.”

ובזה אמרתי דאפשר להגן על הרמב”ם מקושייתו של הריטב”א. דעיין כתובות (ח.’) דאחד מברכת חתנים הוא “שמח תשמח ריעים האהובים כשמחך יצירך בגן עדן מקדם ברוך אתה ה’ משמח חתן וכלה.”  ועיין רש”י שם “בגן עדן מקדם דכתיב ויטע גן בעדן מקדם וישם שם וגו.'”

ועיין בריטב”א שם דכתב וז”ל “גירסת רש”י ז”ל כשמחך יצירך בגן עדן מקדם וכן הגירסא בכל הספרים וכן הכתוב אומר ויטע ה’ אלהים גן בעדן מקדם וישם שם את האדם והרמב”ם ז”ל גורס מקדם בגן עדן ואין הלשון הזה מתוקן כראוי, כי הלשון הזה נאמר על האדם כשנתגרש מג”ע וישכןמקדם לגן עדן ואע”פ ששם אמר לגן וכאן אמר בגן שמא יבא לטעות אדם בענין וגם בלשון[41].

ולפי דברי המדרש דברי הרמב”ם א”ש. דזהו גופא מה מברכין להחתן וכלה, שהקב”ה ינהג עמהם ברחמים כאשר עשה לאדם וחוה אף לאחר הנפילה, לאחר שנפל מאגרא רמא שהי’ יושב בג”ע והיו מלאכי השרת צולין לו בשר ומסננין לו יין (סנהדרין נ”ט:) לבירא עמקתא של בזעת אפך תאכל לחם (בראשית ג’:י”ט), אבל לא גירש אותם מיד אלא נתן להם את השבת “אדם שמר את השבת בתחתונים והיה יום השבת משמרו מכל רע ומנחמו מכל שרעפי לבו” (פרקי דר”א פרק כ’)[42], ויעש להם כתנות עור, וכמש”כ רבינו בחיי שם “ע”ד הפשט רצה ליחס פעולת ההלבשה אליו יתברך להורות על אהבתו וחמלתו על יצוריו, שאע”פ שחטאו לא זז מחבבן, והוא בעצמו השתדל בתקונם ובגמילות חסדים. והנה כל זה חסדי הש”י, ועל זה אמר הכתוב: (דניאל ט, ז) “לך ה’ הצדקה ולנו בושת הפנים”. ולפי”ז א”ש הגמ’ בסוטה (י”ד.) “דרש ר’ שמלאי תורה תחלתה גמילות חסדים וסופה גמילות חסדים תחילתה גמילות חסדים דכתיב ויעש ה’ אלקים לאדם ולאשתו כתנות עור וילבישם” ולא מנה החסד שעשה עמהם לפני החטא בהכנת כל צרכי החתונה (עיין ברכות ס”א., ב”ר פרשה ח’ אות י”ג) דעיקר החבה והחסד הוא לאחר החטא, דאפ”ה לא זז מחבבן, ועיקר הברכה הוי דוקא  “מקדם לגן עדן” ולא “גן בעדן מקדם[43].”

ז) בעמוד ע”ד הביא (מהגר”ר גרוזובסקי זצ”ל בשם הגר”ח חלוי) דהמחלוקת עם רשעים “צריכה להיות כשנאת הבעלים לעכברים שמצטער על שישנם וצריך לבערם ולא כחתול הנהנה ממה שיש לו לבער ולאכול.” וכתב דזה א”ש לשיטת הרמב”ן עה”ת לבאר למה נענשו המצריים אע”פ שהיתה גזירה על כלל ישראל, וק”ו לגבי ישראל “אם דחה אותו האיש יותר מן הראוי וכו’ הרי זה בכלל שנאה גמורה וגדול עונו.”

ויפה כתב. אבל יש להעיר ולהוסיף, דלפי דברי הרמב”ן בפרשת לך לך (ט”ו:י”ד), אף אם לא דחה אותו יותר מן הראוי כלל, אלא בדיוק במדה המחייבת, כל שנהנה מעצם השנאה כחתול לעכבר, הרי בכלל שנאה האסורה וגדול עונו. דהא ברמב”ן שם איתא כמה טעמים למה נענשו המצריים, דטעם אחד הוא שהוסיפו על הגזירה, ושוב כתב ד”אם שמע אותה ורצה לעשות רצון בוראו כנגזר אין עליו חטא אבל יש לו זכות בו וכו’ אבל אם שמע המצוה והרג אותו לשנאה או לשלול אותו, יש עליו העונש כי הוא לחטא נתכוון, ועבירה הוא לו.” וזהו טעם שנית דשייך אף כשלא הוסיפו כלום. ודון מינה ואוקי באתרה.

ושמעתי לפרש (כמדומני בשם אחד מאדמור”י גר) “וירא פינחס וכו’ ויקם וכו’ ויקח רמח בידו” — אבל הקנאים תמיד יש רמח מזומן בידיהם . . .

 “אין צדיק בארץ אשר יעשה טוב ולא יחטא”

ח) בעמוד ט”ו הביא קושיית התוס’ (שבת נ”ה: בד”ה ארבעה) על הגמ’ דארבעה מתו בעטיו של נחש, דצ”ע מהפסוק בקהלת (ז’:כ’) “כי אדם אין צדיק בארץ אשר יעשה טוב ולא יחטא.”  וכתב לפרש ע”פ דברי השלה”ק (מס’ תענית, פרק תורה טור, סי’ קמ”ד – קמ”ה) “שטמונים בתוך הנפילות והמכשולות של צדיקים הכח והדחיפה לעשות טוב.” וענין זה הוא באמת בריח התיכון של כל הספר, דכל הנפילות הם בעצם לטובותינו, וכל הירידות בעצמותן הם לצורך עלי'[44], ושהכל הוא עצת ה’ לטוב לנו לחיתנו.

אבל עדיין פירוש השל”ה בלשון הפסוק דחוק. ושמעתי ממו”ר המשגיח הרה”ג ר’ מתתיהו סלומון שליט”א (בשם רבו הרה”ג ר’ אלי’ לפיאן זצ”ל) לפרש על פי דברי ר’ יונה (בשע”ת שער הראשון אות ו’) “אמת כי יש מן הצדיקים שנכשלים בחטא לפעמים, כענין שנאמר כי אדם אין צדיק בארץ אשר יעשה טוב ולא יחטא,” דלכאורה תמוה דמתחלה אמר דיש מן הצדיקים, דהיינו מקצתם, דנכשלים בחטא, והביא ע”ז פסוק דאין צדיק בארץ אשר לא יחטא, דמשמע דכולם חוטאים. ותירץ הרה”ג ר’ אלי’ ז”ל דבאמת מצינו צדיקים אשר אין חוטאים, אבל צדיקים אשר עושים טוב בהם אין מי שלא יחטא.  דהיינו, שפיר אפשר להיות צדיק לעצמו ולישב בזוית ולעבוד את ה’, אבל מי שמלמד לאחרים ועוסק בצרכי צבור “לעשות טוב[45]” א”א לו שלא יחטא[46].

ועצם יסוד הדברים כבר נמצא במשך חכמה פרשת נח (ט’:כ’), בפתוחי חותם להחת”ס (נדפס כהקדמה לשו”ת יו”ד),  ובספורנו סוף פרשת בראשית (ו’:ח’)[47].

ולפי”ז מיושב קושיית התוס’, דהארבעה מתו בעטיו של נחש, עם כל צדקתם שאין לתאר ואין לשער, לא מצינו שלימדו והשפיעו על אחרים ועסקו בטובת העולם[48] באותו מדה[49] שעשו אאע”ה, משה רבינו, ודוד המלך, דהם (אע”פ שחטאו) קיימו רצון ה’ למען אשר יצוה את בניו ואת ביתו אחריו, צדיקים כאלו זכו לעצמם וזכה לדורי דורות, ומצדיקי הרבים ככוכבים יזהירו, וצדקתם עומדת לעד[50].

ונמצא, שלא רק “שטמונים בתוך הנפילות והמכשולות של צדיקים הכח והדחיפה לעשות טוב,” אלא הדחיפה לעשות טוב הוא גרמא לנפילות, ואעפ”כ זהו רצונו יתב”ש.

ט) בעמוד ל”ד הביא מר’ צדוק הכהן (תקנת השבין סי’ ט”ו, אות פ”ד) שהמקור להענין ש”אע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא” הוא משיטת ר”מ בקידושין ל”ו. דבין כך ובין כך נקראו בנים, והלכה כמותו דדייק קרא[51].

ויש לציין למש”כ בהגדה של פסח “מגיד משנה” (לבעמח”ס שו”ת משנה הלכות ז”ל) דגם בעל ההגדה סתם כר”מ. ד”כנגד ארבעה בנים דברה תורה,” דאף הרשעים דהוציאו עצמן מן הכלל וכפרו בעיקר עדיין נקראו בנים למקום. וזה תואם שיטתו (בשו”ת משנ”ה ח”ו סי’ כ”ז, כ”ח, ל[52]’) המובא ב”ברגז רחם תזכר” (עמוד ע”ז, ובצדק כתב המחבר ד”ניכרין דברי אמת”) לחלוק על דברי האדמו”ר ממונקאטש זצ”ל[53], וס”ל דחייב להתפלל על נדחי ישראל שישובו בתשובה שלמה.

וכדברי המשנ”ה הוא מנהג כלל ישראל, וכמו שהוא בנוסח תפלת זכה שאומרים בכניסת יום הקדוש[54] “ובתוכם תרחם על פושעי עמך בית ישראל ותן בלבם פחד הדר גאונך והכנע לבם האבן וישובו לפניך בלב שלם וכו’ גם כי הרבו אשמה לפניך עד שננעלו בפניהם דרכי תשובה אתה ברחמיך הרבים תחתור להם חתירה מתחת כסא כבודך וקבלם בתשובה וכו'[55].”

י) בסי’ ב’ הביא שיטת האג”מ (אבה”ע ח”ד סי’ פ”ג) דכל סוגיית הגמ’ (סנהדרין מ”ד.) בענין “ישראלאע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא” הוי רק דברי אגדה[56] להשמיענו חביבות ישראל להקב”ה שאפילו בשעה שהן חוטאים קורא אותן ישראל. ומבואר בדברי האג”מ דכוונת רבי אבא בר זבדא  בגמ’ שם “אע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא” הוי על שאר כלל ישראל (ולא על עכן) דאע”פ שגם הם נחשבו כחוטאים מחמת ערבות[57], אפ”ה עדיין שם ישראל עליהם, וכתב האג”מ דכן משמע מדברי רש”י שכתב “מדלא אמר חטא העם עדיין שם קדושתן עליהן.“

ויש לציין שכעין הבנת האג”מ בהגמ’ וברש”י כתבו עוד מהאחרונים. עיין שו”ת אפרקסתא דעניא (ח”ב או”ח סי’ י”ט) וז”ל “ותו דעל גוף הדבר אני תמה, שהביאו מאמרם ז”ל, אע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא לענין המומר עצמו, הרי בסנהדרין שם הכא קאמר “חטא ישראל” אר”א ב”ז אע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא, אמר ר”א היינו דאמרי אינשי, “אסא דקאי ביני חילפי אסא שמה ואסא קרו לה”. ופרש”י מדלא אמר חטא העם, עדיין קדושתן עליהם עכ”ל. והרי הכונה הפשוטה לפענ”ד, דאע”פ שנתחייבו כל ישראל בחטאו של עכן מטעם ערבות, מ”מ קרי להעם בשם ישראל, דעדיין קדושתם עליהם, וזה מבואר במשל שהביא אסא כו’ דהיינו הצדיקים וכו’ אבל חילפא גופא לא קרו לי’ אסא” עכ”ל האפרקסתא דעניא.   וכן הוא בשו”ת דברי יציב (אבה”ע סי’ ס”ב, אות ז:כ”ג) “חטא ישראל אמר ר’ אבא בר זבדא אע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא, אמר ר’ אבא היינו דאמרי אינשי אסא דקאי ביני חילפי אסא שמיה ואסא קרו ליה עיי”ש. וכו’ והנלע”ד בביאור הענין, דהנה רש”י בסנהדרין שם ביאר חטא ישראל מדלא אמר חטא העם עדיין שם קדושתם עליהם עכ”ל, וכו’ והיינו דקאי על כלל ישראל שקדושתם עליהם אע”פ שחטא עכןוכו’ ולמד הש”ס מכאן דישראל הוא היינו שכלל ישראל נשאר בקדושתו אף שהחוטא ביניהם, וזה כוונת רש”י עדיין שם קדושתם עליהם. ועל זה הביא המשל וכו’, וה”נ כלל ישראל אף שעומדים ביניהם רשעים מ”מ לא נפגמה קדושתם וישראל הם, אמנם המומר עצמו לא נקרא ישראל. “

אבל אף דבהבנת הגמ’ ורש”י שוה דבריהם, בעצם הענין חילוק גדול יש. דלהדברי יציב משום דהגמ’ מיירי בהציבור א”כ א”ש הני שיטות דס”ל דמומר לגמרי דינו כעכו”ם, דהא לגבי היחיד אין כאן ענין “ישראלאע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא[58]” (וכעין זה הוא באפרקסתא דעניא שם), משא”כ להאג”מ אין צורך כלל להענין דאע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא, דבודאי מומר דינו כישראל, משום דלא שייך המציאות לישראל שיעשה בדין נכרי.

ואף דבעצם סברת האג”מ נראין דבריו[59], אבל מה שהוסיף דהפוסקים שנראו מדבריהם ד”אע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא” הוי מקור להלכה צ”ל דרק מליצת הלשון בעלמא הוא, בצדק העיר בזה בספר “ברגז רחם תזכר” (עמוד ל”ה) דמדברי המרדכי (יבמות סי’ כ”ט) לא משמע כן. ובאמת כן הוא בהרבה מקורות, בראשונים ואחרונים, דשפיר משמע מלשונם דהשתמשו ב”אע”פ שחטא ישראל הוא” כמקור גמור להלכה ולא רק כמליצת הלשון[60] — לדוגמא עיין חידושי רמב”ן (ב”מ ע”א:), ב”י או”ח סי’ נ”ה, גר”א יו”ד סי’ קנ”ט ס”ק ד’, טושו”ע ונו”כ אבהע”ז  סי’ קנ”ז (עיין שם בגר”א ס”ק ז’), וכהנה רבות.

  י”א) בעמוד פ”א – פ”ב הביא להקשות על שיטת הנפש החיים (פרק ז’ בפרקים שלאחר שער ג’) דענין העבודה על דרך “עבירה לשמה” לא היתה נוהגת אלא קודם מתן תורה לבד, וצ”ע דהא עצם הלימוד (בנזיר כ”ג:) הוא מיעל דהיתה זמן רב אחר מ”ת. וכתב לתרץ דבאמת קושיא מעיקרא ליתא, דבית הקיני לא מבני ישראל המה, ודברי הנפש החיים אמורים רק לגבי העבודה דכלל ישראל.

אבל באמת אינו ברור כלל דיעל לא היתה מבנ”י.  דעיין ילקוט שמעוני (יהושע רמז ט’) “יש נשים חסידות גיורות הגר, אסנת, צפרה, שפרה, פועה, בת פרעה, רחב, רות, ויעל אשת חבר הקיני.” אבל עיין בזית רענן שם די”ל שנתגיירה לאחר המעשה. ועיין בזה בדורש לציון להגאון הנו”ב (סוף דרוש ב’ ד”ה בו ביום) ובשו”ת בית שערים חלק אורח חיים סימן לד.

אבל באמת מצינו בחז”ל ובראשונים דכבר נתגיירה בשעת מעשה. דהא מצינו שהרגה לסיסרא ביתד ולא בכלי זין כדי שלא לעבור על איסור כלי גבר, ואיסור זה שייך אצלה רק אם כבר נתגיירה. עיין בזה  ברש”י[61] נזיר נ”ט., בגליון הש”ס שם (דהביא דכן הוא בתרגום ובילקוט), בשו”ת אגר”מ (או”ח ח”ד סי’ ע”ה),  ובשו”ת (בצל החכמה ח”ה סי’ קכ”ו).

ולתרץ הקושיא על הנפש החיים — עיין מש”כ הנצי”ב (העמק דבר סוף שלח), ובפירוש “הקדמות ושערים” על הנפש החיים שם (אות ב’), ובהערות לנפש החיים (בני ברק, תשמ”ט, אות 7)[62].

י”ב) בעמוד פ”ד הביא לדון בענין לעבור על איסור קל להציל מהחמור, והביא מס’ עקידת יצחק לחלק דזהו רק היתר ליחיד אבל לא לרבים. עיין בס’ “לבושה של תורה” להרב פסח אליהו פאלק שליט”א (סי’ מ”ד אות ג’ – ה’) מש”כ בענין זה בכלל, ובענין שיטת העקידת יצחק בפרט.

ובענין זה שמעתי בשם גדולי ישראל דאף דיש מתירין להזמין אנשים שאינם שומרי תו”מ לסעודת שבת במטרת לקרבם ליהדות, אף אם יודעים שיחללו בשבת כשבאים ברכב, אבל הוראה זו אין מגלין אלא לצנועין, אבל א”א להיות הוראה כללית לכל או”א[63].

ואפילו בנוגע הוראה ליחיד, לפני כמה שנים שאלתי את הגרי”ש אלישיב זצ”ל בנוגע לאחד מבני קהילתי, איש יקר שרצה לקרב לתו”מ אבל לצערו במציאות א”א לשמר שבת לגמרי כהלכתה עדיין מפני לחץ משפחתו, אם מותר לי ללמדו האיך לחלל שבת באופן שיעבור רק מדרבנן וכו’. והשיב דמותר ללמד הסוגיות עמו והוא ערום יעשה בדעת, אבל אסור לפסוק וללמדו מה שיש בפועל לעשות כדי לחלל השבת.

י”ג) בעמוד צ”ד העיר (בדרך אגב) בענין אם שייך לומר דאפשר לחלוק על הגמ’ דהא ב”ד יכול לבטל דברי ב”ד חבירו ע”פ י”ג מדות. ולכאורה יש להעיר דמבואר בכמה מקומות דלעתיד יהי’ ההלכה כב”ש (עיין הרב שמואל אשכנזי, אלפא ביתא תניתא דשמואל זעירא, ח”א עמוד 241 – 244), וא”כ מבואר דלעת”ל ישתנה הדברים מדינא דגמ’. אבל לכאורה זה גופא דינא דגמראשב”ד יכול לסתור חבירו. ודכמו דמה דהתשבי יתרץ כל ה”תיקו” שבש”ס לא הוי סתירה להגמ’ כמו כן הך כללא דב”ד יכול לבטל דברי חבירו. ואדרבה — אם א”א להם לבטל בית דינו של ב”ה א”כ זה גופא יהי’ ביטול דינא דגמ’ דנפסק שיש בידם לבטל דברי ב”ד אחר.

ועיין בזה בגמ’ יומא פ’ ע”א וברש”י  שם, בדברות משה (יבמות פרק ד’ הערה נ”ט), ובס’ “באמונה שלמה” (להרב יוסף זלמן בלאך שליט”א, עמוד בעמוד שי”א – שי”ב הערה ד’).

י”ד) בעמוד צ”ה העיר בענין לפרש בדברי הראשונים מה שלא כיונו במובן ההיסטורי. יש לציין למה שהביא  הרה”ג ר’ מיכל שורקין שליט”א (ס’ מגד גבעות עולם ח”ב עמוד ז’) מסורה שקיבל הגרי”ד הלוי סאלאווייציק ז”ל מאביו הגר”מ ומדודו (בעל  עבודת המלך) “שהרמב”ם  כתב את ספרו ברוח הקודש, ולאחר שנכתבו הדברים, אין הרמב”ם בעל הבית” על היד החזקה ושפיר אפשר לתרץ את דברי הרמב”ם אף כשתירץ הרמב”ם באופן אחר בתשובותיו (והביא שם דכעין זה כתב האו”ת אף בנוגע להשו”ע). וכנראה דכן קיבל הגר”מ ז”ל מפי קדשו של אביו הגאון החסיד הגר”ח מבריסק, וכמו דמצינו שביאר הגר”ח דברי הרמב”ם במ”ת אף שכבר כתב הרמב”ם בתשובה לחכמי לוניל דיש ט”ס במשנה תורה  (עיין הל’ נזקי ממון פ”ד ה”ד ובכס”מ ובחידושי רבינו חיים הלוי שם), וכן מפורסמת שמועה כזו בעולם הישיבות בשם הגר”ח, ומסורה זו היא אף למעלה בקודש, דכן ס”ל זקני הגר”ח הנצי”ב והגר”ח מוואלאזהין ז”ל, עיין בשו”ת נשמת חיים (ב”ב תשס”ב, סי’ ס”ז) דכתב הרה”ג ר’ שלמה הכהן מווילנא להגר”ח ברלין (בנו של הנצי”ב)  וז”ל “וכן שמעתי מפי אביו הצדיק זצ”ל שאמר בשם חמיו זקנו הצדיק מו”ה חיים מוואלזין שיש לומר פירוש בלשון הרמב”ם והשו”ע אם הוא עולה ע”פ ההלכה אף שבודאי לא כוונו לזהמשוםשרוח הקודש נזרקה על לשונם“. וכנראה כן ס”ל גם מרן החת”ס זי”ע — עיין בליקוטי שו”ת (סי’ ק”א סוף בד”ה אמנם) דהביא ביאור בדברי הרמב”ם אף דכתב שם ד”הרמב”ם בעצמו לא תי’ כן לחכמי לוניל” (וע”ע בשו”ת חת”ס חלק ז’ סי’ כ”א). וכעי”ז כתב הפנ”י (כתובות ל”ה ע”ב בד”ה ואי)[64].

וְהָאֱמֶת וְהַשָּׁלוֹם אֱהָבוּ; On Changing the Immutable by Marc B. Shapiro

By Yitzchok Stroh

Professor Marc Shapiro’s latest work, Changing the Immutable, contains considerable interesting and pertinent information for the student of Jewish history. As stated on the cover, the author attempts to reveal how the (Jewish) orthodox ‘establishment’ silences both past and present dissenting voices through “Orthodox Judaism Rewriting Its History.” I don’t intend this to be a review of the entire work (that would take a lot more time and space), however I did want to share some of my frustration here, because I sense that the author’s bias affected his objectivity, and I am afraid that many a reader will be left with an impression that in many ways does not reflect the reality of this complex topic. In this article, I would like to examine one passage of Shapiro’s work to illustrate this point. In chapter eight, entitled, “Is the truth really that important?” Shapiro writes:

Because my purpose in this chapter is to chart the outer limits of what has been viewed as acceptable when it comes to falsehood and deception. I will be focusing on the more ‘liberal’ positions. My aim is to show just how far some rabbinic decisors were willing to go in sanctioning deviations from the truth. One must bear in mind, however, that there are often views in opposition to the ones I shall be examining. Perhaps this knowledge can serve as a counterweight to the shock that many readers will experience upon learning of some of the positions I will mention.

One ‘liberal’ position was expressed by R. Moses Isserles, who went so far as to say that one can even slander someone for the sake of preserving the community. The particular case he was discussing concerned a terrible community dispute that had created the possibility that the Jewish population would be expelled from the city. In what many will find a problematic decision, Isserles offered the opinion, which was then put into action, that it was acceptable to provide false information about an individual whom the government suspected of wrongdoing, if this would alleviate the situation. Although the Talmud states, with regard to giving a man up for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews, that this is not the way of the pious, Isserles defended his approach: “Even if we did not act in accord with the way of the pious, nevertheless, we acted in accord with the law. I have proven that it is permitted to speak leshon hara [slander] in order to preserve peace.”[1]

Here, Shapiro portrays the רמ”א, the primary codifier of halacha for Ashkenazic Jewry, to have ruled that for the sake of preserving the peace, it is acceptable to provide false information to non-Jewish authorities about a presumably innocent individual whom the government suspected of wrongdoing.

Shocking indeed.

Unfortunately, Shapiro fails to present the תשובה of the רמ”א thoroughly and accurately, and as a result, the reader is left with an erroneous understanding of the opinion of the רמ”א. Furthermore, Shapiro fails to present the relevant section of Talmud precisely, which may lead to further misunderstanding. I am not accusing Professor Shapiro of intentional distortion, but חז”ל do teach us הוי זהיר בתלמוד ששגגת תלמוד עולה זדון — so, with this in mind, I would like to offer a more careful presentation of the Rema’s position as a counterweight for those who’ve read this (inaccurately presented) ‘shocking’ position of the רמ”א.

סימן י”א in  שו”ת הרמ”א is written in complicated rabbinic style, and does not provide a full account of what transpired — but, as the רמ”א writes in the introduction to the תשובה, we should be able to extract sufficient background information as necessary for our purposes[2]:  

The תשובה is a כתב התנצלות[3] (a “writ of justification”) defending actions taken by the בית דין of the רמ”א in response to a local crisis, and as the  רמ”א makes it quite clear in his description of the events, the ensuing bitter results were unexpected and troubling:

 … הנה בכל אלה לשלום נתכוונו בעצם וראשונה, אף כי במקרה מרה היתה באחרונה, ואף מקצת עזי פנים היו בקרבנו ועכשיו מהפכים דברינו לתוהו ובהו. מיהו אנו לשם שמים נתכוונו, והכל נמשך אחר המחשבה והכוונה. אף כי אחריתו ראש ולענה. “Behold in this entire incident our intention was peace, first and foremost, even though by happenstance the end was bitter. There were also a few brazen individuals amongst us, who are now turning things into utter chaos. However, our intent was for the sake of Heaven, and ‘everything follows one’s thoughts and intentions’, even though the end was gall and wormwood.”

While it is probably impossible to reconstruct a precise account of the incident, the following is obvious from the details presented in the תשובה: (1) The government did not suspect anyone of any type of wrongdoing[4]. (2) It was not an individual that was slandered; it was a group of about one hundred respectable community leaders or activists that were slandered. (3) False information was never provided to non-Jewish authorities, and those slandered were not slandered publicly — they were slandered in a private ruling by the decision of a בית דין which was then recorded in a written document. (4) Furthermore, the document was fashioned in a manner which made it evident that the ruling was an exaggeration and not an actual account, and (5) it was drafted only to be used as a means of forcing two opposing sides to reconcile a community quarrel. Unfortunately, (6) the document did become public knowledge and its intention was misconstrued by unscrupulous individuals.[5] And (7) there were dire consequences, probably due to involvement of the non-Jewish authorities, but we do not know what those consequences were.

The actual events that led up to this action are described at length and can be summed up as follows:

A group of pretentious rabbinic and lay leaders[6] convened to place a ban on a certain individual, causing him great harm[7]. (The reason for the ban is not clear.) This individual then sought to take revenge upon those who had placed the ban upon him[8] and was joined by others who sympathized with his cause,[9] ultimately splitting the entire community between his supporters and his enemies[10]. This caused a tremendous desecration of G-d’s name as the strife continued to escalate[11], which led to placing the entire community in danger of being expelled by the authorities[12].

The רמ”א and his colleagues attempted to intercede with the individual’s opponents, but were completely ignored[13], and the matter escalated to the point of death threats against the man upon whom the ban had been placed[14]. In an attempt to resolve matters, the רמ”א and his partners decided to write a fictitious halachic ruling[15], containing exaggerated and slanderous accusations against the individual’s opponents, with the goal being that the individual in question would then use this document to extort the ruling written against him from his enemies, whereby both the documents would be exchanged and destroyed. 

Now, before you extrapolate from here that the רמ”א  had a flippant attitude towards honesty, please consider:

(1) The רמ”א and his colleagues were quite concerned about the possibility that this individual might use the document inappropriately (i.e. reveal its contents to the authorities), and to prevent this, they had him swear a strict oath that he would not show the document to anyone else, and that he would only use it to get his opponents to hand over their original חרם document to him[16]. Anyone familiar with the severity of an oath in Jewish law, and the general fear of swearing falsely at that time, will understand why the outcome was quite a surprise to the rabbis who signed this slanderous document. Furthermore, רמ”א had taken additional steps to insure that the document would be null and void if misused, and as the רמ”א concludes in his justification, “אבל לא נחתם להרע בו לשום אדם חלילה לנו מרשע” (…it was not signed to inflict harm upon any person; G-d forbid that we should do evil).

(2) Regardless of the fact that the slanderous ruling and the resulting document were extremely limited in nature and not meant to be seen by the public (and certainly not the government), the רמ”א was clearly still troubled by the elements of dishonesty. He makes it quite obvious that he felt that he had no choice, and that it was entirely out of concern for the safety of the community that made speaking and writing falsely and negatively about fellow Jews necessary in this case. It is this decision that the רמ”א is attempting to justify in his כתב התנצלות – and as we will see, this was hardly taken lightly.

The רמ”א goes on to quote various sources to support his decision, and proceeds, in rabbinic style, to argue the point by analyzing a Talmudic ruling. Shapiro, when he discusses the Talmudic ruling tells only half the story. Shapiro writes, “The Talmud states, with regard to giving a man up for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews, that this is not the way of the pious.” However, as we shall see, giving a man up for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews has nothing to do with the pious — indeed, it is strictly forbidden according to the Talmud. The Mishnah in תרומות rules that if non-Jews were to approach a group of Jewish women and demand that they hand over one of them be defiled or else they would defile all of them, that it is forbidden to hand over one of the women. The Talmud Yerushalmi adds that the same rule would apply in a situation where a non-Jew demands of a group of Jews that they hand over one Jew to be executed or else they would all be killed, that it is likewise forbidden to hand over one of them[17]. 

In this תשובה the רמ”א applies an analogy: Just as it is forbidden to save the lives or the innocence of all through giving over one individual to be defiled or killed, so too it would be forbidden to slander, ridicule, and deride one individual, or a group of individuals (even if no one ever became aware of the slander) in order to remove slander and ridicule from the entire community.

However, the רמ”א sees two distinctions between the cases: Firstly, the halachah that forbids giving someone over applies to a situation where it is done with an action, whereas if it is a matter of speech it would be permitted. Meaning that if the powers that be needed information with which they could kill one of the group, and they threatened that unless that information is provided they would kill them all, it would be permissible to give this information — since by merely providing information they are not directly participating in the action of murder, and therefore they would not be considered accomplices to the execution. So too in our situation, since slander is a matter of speech, the Talmud’s aforementioned rule would not apply. And secondly, the prohibition not to give someone over to the gentiles, is only in a case where they do not request a specific individual. However, were the non-Jews to demand a specific individual to defile or kill, and threaten that if he isn’t turned over they would defile or kill the entire group, then it would be permitted to turn him over. The רמ”א compared the situation in his city to a situation where specific individuals are being targeted; therefore he permitted falsehood and לשון הרע to be spoken.

Regarding this second limitation, the רמ”א questions his ruling based on the following anecdote related in the Talmud Yerushalmi: An individual was sought by the royal government, and he escaped to לוד. When the government surrounded the מדינה, ר’ יהושע בן לוי handed him over to them. Until this point in time it had been common for Eliyahu HaNavi to visit R. Yehoshua, but after this incident, אליהו הנביא ceased his visits. Subsequently, R. Yehoshua fasted many fasts, and Eliyahu appeared to him, and said, “Shall I reveal myself to a slanderer?” To which R’ Yehoshua responded, “But have I not acted according to the משנה?”  To this Eliyahu replied, “Can this be considered משנת חסידים?”

It is in response to this that the רמ”א states, “even if we did not act in accordance with ‘the way of the pious’, nevertheless, we acted in accordance with the law.” It seems reasonable to assume that since the slander recorded in the document written by the רמ”א and his colleagues was never meant to be seen by anyone and would have alleviated the threat of expulsion, the רמ”א felt that it was not necessary to follow “the ways of the pious” and was satisfied with following the letter of the law[18]. Hence, Shapiro’s claim in the name of the רמ”א “that it was acceptable to provide false information about an individual whom the government suspected of wrongdoing if this would alleviate the situation” is neither fair nor accurate.

In conclusion, I think it is fair to say that the position of the רמ”א in שו”ת הרמ”א סימן י”א does not represent a radical position which may shock many readers as being “on the outer limits of what has been viewed as acceptable when it comes to falsehood and deception”. Rather, there is no reason not to view this as the position of a responsible community leader of a high moral caliber, and it is unfortunate that he has been portrayed differently.

Postscript:

Although the following does not affect the above, I include it for whatever historical interest it may have: From the language of תשובה י”א in שו”ת הרמ”א (קהלתנו, עירנו, רחובותינו, = our community, our city, our streets) it seems almost certain that the case under discussion took place in the author’s city.  If the author was the רמ”א, that city would be Cracow, Poland where the רמ”א served as Rav from an extremely young age until his passing. However R. Asher Ziv, the Rema’s biographer and editor of his תשובות, suggests that the incident took place in the city of Prague in Bohemia[19]; a city plagued by strife and under the constant threat of expulsion. Since the five תשובות following סימן י”א in שו”ת הרמ”א were written by various rabbanim regarding problems in the city of Prague, it is not unlikely that תשובה י”א also concerns a dispute in Prague.

Based on the above, it would seem plausible to conclude that תשובה י”א was not even authored by the [20]רמ”א; rather it was sent to him by a colleague from Prague[21]. It is additionally possible that the תשובה was in no way connected to the רמ”א, however, since the תשובה was found among the other תשובות relating to Prague it was included accidently. This would not be all that surprising, since we do know that there are תשובות in שו”ת הרמ”א which were erroneously included in the collection[22].

   

Response by Marc B. Shapiro

Let me begin by thanking Rabbi Yitzchok Stroh and the many others who have read my book carefully, especially those who have sent comments. Some readers have pointed out errors or alternative ways to read passages and others have called attention to important new sources. I have already mentioned some of these in past posts and will continue to do so in future posts.

Stroh believes that my presentation of a responsum of R. Moses Isserles is inaccurate and suggests that it was my bias that led to my objectivity being affected. I am not sure what my bias would be in this case, presumably a desire to make use of an important source in support of my argument.

Stroh’s summary of the responsum is helpful, especially since as Stroh notes it is difficult to reconstruct exactly what happened. The beginning of the case was, as Stroh states:

A group of pretentious rabbinic and lay leaders convened to place a ban on a certain individual, causing him great harm. (The reason for the ban is not clear.)

In reading over the responsum, I think that the reason for the ban is explained on p. 56 in Siev’s edition. It states:

עליו נגזרה גזירה ונחתך עליו דין מסור הגמורה

I assume this means that they regarded him as a moser, and that is why he was placed under the ban. Earlier it states regarding this man ודמו להיות מותר which apparently alludes to the fact that a moser should be killed.

Stroh notes that I am mistaken in assuming that the government suspected one of the Jews of wrongdoing and that R. Isserles ruled that false information could be provided if this was the only way to save the community. He also states that contrary to my presentation, it was not one person who was to be slandered but numerous community leaders.

I have read over the responsum and I have to agree that the slander was not directed against one person but against a group, so I thank Stroh for this correction. In fact, I am not the only one to make this mistake, and am indeed in good company (not that this is in any way an excuse). Nachum Rakover also describes the case as being one of slander against an individual.[23]

מוציאי הדיבה קיוו, שאם “ישנו את טעמם”, כלומר ישקרו אודות מישהו מהקהילה, יעלה בידם להחזיר את השלום על כנו.

Based on this, Rakover then has an entire section dealing with if it is OK to sacrifice an individual to save the many.

R. Aryeh Pomeranchik writes:[24]

בתשו’ הרמ”א סי’ י”א למד מזה, דמותר להוציא שם רע על אחד מן הצבור כדי להשקיט בזה המריבה שנפלה בין הצבור ולעשות שלום

R. Aharon David Goldberg writes:[25]

אמנם בתשובות הרמ”א סי’ י”א מפורש דלא כדבריו, שדן בשאלה אם מותר להוציא שם רע על אחד מן הצבור כדי להשקיט מריבה

R. Yitzchak Zilberstein might also make this error (although it could be that he was simply not being exact in his description of the case, as his focus is on the underlying halakhah):[26]

ובתשובות הרמ”א (סימן יא) למד מזה, שמותר להוציא שם רע על אחד, כדי להשקיט בזה מריבה שנפלה בין הציבור ולעשות שלום.

It is certain, however, that R. Zilberstein is mistaken when he states[27] שלמעשה הרמ”א לא התיר, as the entire responsum is indeed a justification of the action which occurred, and R. Isserles states: “Even if we did not in accordance with ‘the way of the pious’, nevertheless, we acted in accordance with the law.”

What about the non-Jewish government? Again, I have to agree with Stroh that there is no evidence that the slander was ever directly reported to the government, although I still assume that R. Isserles would agree that to save the community, one would even be permitted to slander someone to the non-Jewish authorities, not merely to the Jewish community. As I see it, and please correct me if I am wrong, the entire logic of R. Isserles’ responsum leads to this result even if, in the case under discussion, the slander was intended to remain in the Jewish community. How else is one to understand his words (p. 53):

דמותר להוציא שם רע אם כוונתו לשמים ולתכלית טוב כדי לעשות שלום

I thank Rabbi Stroh for setting the record straight.

Regarding giving up a man for execution in response to a demand made by non-Jews, I thought I was clear that we were dealing with a demand for a specific person, the details of which Stroh properly explains. Yet I should have also mentioned that the case must be one where the entire community will itself be killed if they do not give up the man.[28]

In his conclusion, Stroh states that the position of R. Isserles should not be seen as radical. “Rather, there is no reason not to view this as the position of a responsible community leader.” Yet I still think that in the eyes of most people what R. Isserles agreed to will be seen as “on the outer limits of what has been viewed as acceptable.” In fact, R. Daniel Eidensohn, who translates some of R. Isserles’ responsum here, writes as follows: “As far as I know the ruling of the Rema was not accepted and is not cited with approval by anyone else. It is the thinking, however, of one our major poskim and illustrates how important community peace is.”

R. Israel Zev Minzberg finds the permission to slander another for the sake of peace incomprehensible, and states that one cannot rely on this ruling.[29]

דברי התשו’ הנז’ נפלאו ממני ולדעתי אין לסמוך ע”ז למעשה כלל וכלל.

R. Yitzhak Hutner also found the responsum unacceptable and stated that it was not written by R. Isserles.[30] In other words, contrary to Stroh, Rabbis Eidensohn, Minzberg and Hutner do find the conclusion of the responsum surprising, and indeed “on the outer limits”.

Finally, I must note that R. Zilberstein refers to the responsum of R. Isserles in another place where he discusses the following problem:[31] Reuven is a very good and God-fearing student. His brother Shimon is not, and causes Reuven all sorts of serious problems. The teacher of Reuven wants to stop Shimon from doing this, and the only way to do so is to tell Shimon’s father, Yaakov, that Shimon said that he was going to steal from Yaakov in order to hire some thugs who would attack Reuven. When Yaakov hears this, he will take steps against Shimon and this will stop Shimon’s harassment of Reuven. Is it permitted for the teacher to lie about Shimon in order to protect Reuven?[32]

R. Zilberstein concludes that it is permitted to tell Yaakov the falsehood about Shimon, since Shimon is a “ba’al mahaloket”. In addition to citing R. Isserles’ responsum, he also cites an opinion of the Hafetz Hayyim.[33] The Hafetz Hayyim states that if one sees that a certain individual will be a bad influence on his son or student, he should warn him to keep away from this individual. If, however, by telling the truth about this individual, it will not be enough to keep one’s son or student away, the Hafetz Hayyim states that “it is possible” that it is permitted to exaggerate the individual’s wrongdoing, on the condition that one does this le-shem shamayim and not because of any personal grudge.

Although the Hafetz Hayyim shows some hesitation as to whether this is permissible, R. Zilberstein has no such qualms and concludes that it is permitted to lie for the good purpose of helping Reuven.

This decision provides further proof for my point that there are many voices in the tradition that sanction departing from the truth when they deem it necessary.

By Israel Drazin

The Babylonian Talmud has the earliest report of the authorship and date of Targum Onkelos. It states that an individual named Onkelos composed the translation in the first third of the second century CE. Since the nineteenth century, scholars have generally rejected this recollection and dated the Targum, or its final redaction, in the third century CE. I will show that the proper date is more likely the late fourth or early fifth century CE. This dating is supported by seeing the consistent use of the targumist of the final version of tannaitic Midrashim that were not edited until the late fourth century.

The Babylonian talmudic scholars gave preference to the literal Aramaic translation of the Pentateuch, which they called targum didan (“our translation”), over other translations.[1] However, they had but a single unreliable memory of its author.

            A Palestinian Amora (in Megillah 3a) curiously states that Onkelos composed the authorized translation after it had been forgotten.

            The Babylonian Talmud states that Onkelos was the son of Kolonikos, who was the nephew of the Roman Emperor Titus. He converted to Judaism. Several miraculous stories are revealed about him.[3] These tales are virtually identical with those conveyed of the Greek translator Aquilas, and, as we shall see, were confusedly ascribed to Onkelos.[4] Thus, according to R. Jeremiah and the Babylonian Talmud, Targum Onkelos was composed about 130 CE.

            There are several serious problems with R. Jeremiah’s opinion. The Babylonian Talmud translates pentateuchal words eighteen times using the term u’m’targuminun, “and it is translated,” or “the Targum states.”[5] Despite R. Jeremiah’s view of authorship, in none of these instances is Onkelos mentioned by name. Midrashim use the same formula seventeen times and Onkelos is cited only once, in a late twelfth-century midrash (Numbers Rabbah 9).[6] An opinion is attributed to an individual called Onkelos only once in the Talmud. This opinion is in no way related to the Targum.[7]

            There is good authority confirming that Aquilas translated the Bible into Greek about 130 CE. There is, however, no corroboration for connecting the Aramaic translation currently called Targum Onkelos with a person named Onkelos other than the single statement in the
tractate Megillah. The talmudic sages, R. Jeremiah or R. Hiyya, obviously confused the two translations.[8] It is hardly possible that R. Eleazar and R. Joshua had two students with virtually identical names, both of whom were born of the same noble lineage under highly unusual circumstances, and both of whom underwent remarkably similar miraculous events.

            It is more likely that the redactors of the Babylonian Talmud did not know who composed their “authorized” or “officially accepted” translation. They recalled that the Jerusalem Talmud of several generations earlier had stated that Aquilas composed the authorized Greek translation. They ascribed their Aramaic version to him as well.[9]

            The only essential difference between the names of Onkelos and Aquilas in Hebrew script is the addition of the letter nun, a characteristic insertion in Babylonian Aramaic. Onkelos is thus a Babylonian equivalent of the name Aquilas.[10]

            There are indicators that suggest, although admittedly they do not prove, that Targum Onkelos could not have been composed in the second century. If Onkelos existed, aside from the unbelievable circumstance that both he and Aquilas underwent the same curious life experiences, there must have been some differences. Why is no difference mentioned in the two stories? Moreover, why is there no allusion to Onkelos in the Talmud, where the Targum is extolled? If the Babylonian talmudic rabbis knew the author of the Targum, we would expect that Onkelos’ name should have been cited whenever the Targum is mentioned.[11] If Onkelos was a noted Palestinian scholar of the second century, he should have been included in the Jerusalem Talmud whose final redaction occurred at the end of the fourth century. Further, if the author of the Targum was known, there should have been no need for the tradition of R. Jeremiah, and the Talmud should never have questioned this tradition.

            Even more significantly, if Onkelos composed the Targum in the second century, why is his name not mentioned in the tannaitic midrashim that were edited in the late fourth century? Jewish tradition is meticulous about naming the source of every teaching.[12] Furthermore, the Mishnah in the Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 8b, edited after the traditionally held composition date of the Onkelos Targum, quotes R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who lived during and after the traditional composition date of Targum Onkelos. He identified only the Greek translation as being holy. The Mishnah knows nothing of Targum Onkelos. The Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 9b, comments upon this Mishnah and states in the name of R. Abbahu (circa 300 CE), who made his statement in the name of R. Johanan (circa 250 CE, both living several generations after the supposed composition of Targum Onkelos), that the halakhah follows R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.

The problems that refute the talmudic view of the dating of Targum Onkelos also confront and refute the views of modern scholarship. Some writers, such as M. H. Goshen-Gottstein and B. Grossfeld, accept the talmudic dating.[13] Grossfeld, for example, maintains that Onkelos and Aquila are the same person, argues that the parallels between the Targum and the midrashim point to a common tradition upon which both genres of scriptural interpretations rest, and concludes that where the school of R. Akiba and R. Ishmael differ, Onkelos upholds the views of R. Akiba’s school. Grossfeld knew only 153 cases in the Pentateuch where Targum Onkelos and the tannaitic midrashim parallel each other. He attributes Onkelos’ translation to the Akiban school because he notes that in 19 of these 153 instances the Targum’s deviation were like those of R. Akiba. Grossfeld did not know that Targum Onkelos parallels the tannaitic Midrashim in 698 instances, as we will show, in just four of the pentateuchal books, and he did not analyze the parallels or take note of the frequent times that the targumist differed with the Akiban school (e.g. Exodus 21:3, 19; 22:3).

            Most scholars reject the Talmud’s date and assign the date of composition to the first half of the third century CE. They rely on references to the Targum in a volume on targumic traditions collected in Die Masorah zum Targum Onkelos,[14] which is said to have been composed in the first half of the third century CE.[15] There is no evidence of the time of composition of this Masorah and no certainty that many elements were not added at later dates. A second proof for the third century dating is the existence of non-halakhic material in the Targum. The argument is that later rabbis could not have authorized divergences from halakhah. These scholars fail to note that rabbinic tradition has always tolerated dissident opinions as to the peshat, the literal sense of the text. Contra-halakhic biblical interpretations occur in the early midrashim and the Talmuds, as well as in the later commentaries of Rashi, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, Nachmanides, and others. There is no rabbinic statement indicating that Targum Onkelos has halakhic authority. The rabbis only forbade teachings which encourage “behavior” that is contrary to halakhah.

While studying, translating and commenting upon Targum Onkelos to the Pentateuch,[16] I noted the remarkable reliance of this Aramaic translation upon the present version of all of the tannaitic midrashim.[17] This has led us to date the Targum to a time following the final redaction of these midrashim.[18]

            I will illustrate this conclusion by focusing on the book of Numbers. A comparison of the words used in Targum Onkelos and Sifrei to Numbers shows the reliance of the author(s) of the Targum upon this late fourth-century midrash[19] and shows the many similarities between the two documents.[20] The findings are rather startling when one realizes that the two documents were not only written in different languages, but that their authors and editors, as will be seen, had totally different agendas. While space constraints restrict us from detailing the findings in the other pentateuchal books, we will also outline these findings briefly and show the consistency of the targumic borrowings.

            The method used in the following study of Numbers is relatively simple. Whenever the Onkelos translation replaces the biblical Hebrew word with a word that deviates from being an exact translation of the original, the tannaitic midrash is examined.

            We will see, for example, that there are five instances where our targumist relied on Sifrei to Numbers’ definitions. Sifrei defined words with what we may call a full definition formula: ein bakhal makom elah (‘there is no place that X means anything else but ‘Y’). Onkelos quotes Sifrei’s word definition each time this formula is used, except where the midrash differentiates dabeir, ‘speak’, from amar, ‘said’.[21]

            Similarly, Sifrei uses what we could call a short definition formula, in (‘There is no… but’), thirteen times.[22] Again, Onkelos incorporates Sifrei’s exact word or uses a synonym of the midrashic term in each instance. Thus, repeatedly and consistently, Onkelos defines the biblical terms exactly like the midrash whenever the midrash states that it is giving a definition. In each instance, the targumist used Sifrei as a dictionary.

            Additionally, our targumist repeats – one might even say “quotes” – Sifrei’s exact word in 53 other verses and is similar to the midrash an additional 35 times in the book of Numbers. Thus, when Onkelos parallels the midrash, it is more likely to repeat the midrash’s exact word than to use a synonym. These numbers are extraordinary since the Targum is an Aramaic translation and the midrash is a Hebrew documentary, and there is extant midrash on only a third of the biblical text.

            In total, Targum Onkelos parallels Sifrei to Numbers in 106 instances, in over a third of the verses where Sifrei has commentary. This is not happenstance. The Targum uses the word because the targumist drew it from the midrash.[23]

            The Onkelos targumist not only drew his translation, indeed his very words, from Sifrei to Numbers but did so as well with the tannaitic midrash Sifrei Zutta to Numbers.

            Sifrei Zutta does not use the full definition formula contained in Sifrei, but it has the short formula ein in five verses (7:3, 10:31, 11:3, 11:18 and 15:38). In each of these instances, our targumist deviates from the biblical text and uses an Aramaic synonym for Sifrei Zutta’s word.

            In addition, Onkelos quotes Sifrei Zutta’s exact word 61 times and is similar to the midrash 38 times. In total, the Targum parallels this midrash in 104 places.[24]

Turning now to the opposite perspective, the following answers the question: why did the targumist not copy everything in the midrash and why did he include material not in the midrash? This will help us understand that the targumist consistently drew his material from the midrash and only failed to do so because of good reasons.

            As mentioned earlier, the targumist and the midrash compilers had different agendas. The targumist quotes the midrash when their purposes are the same, when the midrash translates the text’s simple meaning. He deviates from the midrash when the midrash goes beyond this task. He adds material that is not in the midrash when the midrash did not attempt to clarify the text’s meaning and his rendering does so.

            The following list catalogues some of the kinds of deviations inserted by the targumist to clarify the text that are not in Sifrei. These changes, which are explained in chapter 3 and in the author’s Targum Onkelos to Numbers, either did not concern the halakhic and aggadic-minded commentators of the midrash, or they are insertions that the compilers of the midrash did not feel compelled to add to every verse when they had already commented upon it elsewhere (e.g. Shekhinah or adding a preposition).[25]

Explaining the text with an Aramaic idiom

Replacing el, which means “God,” with “idol”

Changing the harsh “take” to the softer “lead”

Grammatical and tense replacements

Explanation of metaphors

Using words to avoid anthropomorphisms, such as memra

Treating a name as verb

Updating and thereby identifying a place name

Being more explicit than the Bible

Avoiding an anthropomorphism and anthropopathism

Changes to preserve Israelite honor

Changes to protect God’s honor

Removing redundancies

Replacing the plural Elohim with the Tetragrammaton

            Thus, the targumic insertions that are of not in the midrash are absent from the midrash because they do not concern the midrashic authors. Conversely, the targumist only incorporates Sifrei material that interprets biblical verses according to their literal meaning. He avoids using derash, interpretations trying to disclose the text’s hidden meaning, or where the midrash has halakhah, theology, legends, and parables.

            Examples of midrashic derash that Onkelos refrains from using are: the Massoretic Text’s (MT’s) “uncover the woman’s head” (Numbers 5:18) teaches that Israelite women should keep their heads covered. MT’s “place in her hands” (5:18) is required to tire her out so that she will repent. MT’s “two turtledoves and two young pigeons” (6:10) implies that people may not substitute turtledoves for pigeons or pigeons for turtledoves.

            Halakhic elements are on virtually every Sifrei page. They appear only rarely in the Aramaic translation, which also has contra-halakhic matter, and then only when they help readers understand the text’s simple meaning. MT’s “command” (5:2) is said to apply immediately and for future generations. MT’s “his sin” clarifies that one does not confess his father’s sins. MT’s “eyes” (5:11) excludes a blind person.

            Aside from its avoidance of anthropomorphisms, theology and morality are also generally absent from Onkelos, but abound in the midrash. Sifrei derives the lesson that strength is granted to those who are strong, and encouragement to those who are stout of heart (5:2), Aaron was righteous because he did exactly what Moses told him to do (8:1), and the Israelites were virtuous because they did what Moses instructed (9:1). Merit flows to the meritorious and humiliation to those who are disgraceful (9:1).

            Various legends and parables do not appear in Onkelos. For example, each of the seven days of preparing the Tabernacle, Moses set it up and then dismantled it (7:1). Aaron’s sons did not literally die before the Lord; they fell outside so as not to render the Tabernacle unclean. In fact, an angel sustained them after they had been struck with fire, helped them outside, and allowed them to fall in the courtyard (7:1). The Israelite desert leaders were the same individuals who were assigned as their supervisors while they were slaves in Egypt (7:3).

            In summary, the Onkelos targumist consistently drew the explanations and definitions from the late fourth century midrashim that helped explain the text’s simple meaning, and frequently even quoted the midrash. He ignored material that did not further this agenda. Thus he could not have composed his translation before the end of the fourth century.

We read in the Talmud (Baba Metziah
85a):

R. Zeira, when he moved to the land of
Israel, observed a hundred fasts to forget the teachings of Babylonia, [1] so
that they should not disturb him.
He fasted another hundred times so that R.
Elazar should not die during his years and the responsibilities of the
community not fall upon him.He fasted another hundred times so that
the fire of Gehenna should have no power over him.

There are some difficulties with R. Zeira
forgetting the teachings of Babylonia:

1) Both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmud
contain many interactions between sages who travelled from the land of Israel
to Babylon or from Babylon to the land of Israel. These sages shared their own teachings
and traditions with their counterparts. By forgetting Babylonian teachings, R.
Zeira is choosing not to participate in this knowledge transfer. Why? [2]

2) R. Zeira is mentioned many times in
the Jerusalem Talmud and sometimes he transmits in the name of his Babylonian
teachers. Many of these exchanges clearly took place when he already was in the
land of Israel. How can he transfer Torah information that he has supposedly forgotten?
[3]

3) The Talmud (Shabbat 41a) relates that
when R Zeira was about to leave for the land of Israel, he went out of his way to
hear one more teaching from his teacher, Rav Yehuda.  Why would he go to the trouble of amassing
more Babylonian teachings if he intended to immediately forget them?

4) Forgetting one’s learning purposefully
isn’t a pious thing to do. The Mishna Pirkei Avot 3:10 strongly discourages it,
as does the Talmud:  R. Elazar said:  One who forgets a word of his learning (Talmud)
causes his descendants to be exiled – Yoma 38b. Resh Laqish said:  One who forgets a word of his learning (Talmud)
transgresses a negative commandment – Menachot 
99b.

We can find a simple solution to these
questions in one of the manuscripts of Baba Metzia, written around 1137
and housed in the National Central Library in Florence. The manuscript disagrees
with the premise that R. Zeira ever forgot his learning:

R. Zeira fasted so that he would not
forget the teachings of Babylon.

He observed another forty fasts so that
R Il’a should not die in his lifetime.

He observed another forty fasts that the
fire of Gehenna should have no power over him.

The paragraph that precedes the story of
R. Zeira (in all versions) tells of Rav Yosef (R. Zeira’s colleague) who also observed
a series of three sets of forty intermittent fasts. The purpose of Rav Yosef’s
fasts was to guarantee that the knowledge of the Torah would not depart from
himself, from his children and from his grandchildren. The goal of Rav Yosef’s
fasts seems to agree with the goal of R. Zeira’s fasts; to remember (i.e., not
forget) the teachings of Babylonia.

According to this manuscript, all of R.
Zeira’s fasts have something in common with each other. He fasted so he would
not forget, he fasted so that R. Ila’i would not die, and he fasted so that the
fire of Gehina would not harm him. He always seems to be fasting so that
something should not happen.

However, many authorities have discussed
the standard version, and no one (as far as I know) has relied on this reading
to resolve the original questions. [6]

Here
are some of the classical interpretations that attempt to solve the problems of
R. Zeira’s forgetting.

Rashi
writes (BM 85a) that the students in the land of Israel were not בני מחלוקת, were not contentious, ונוחין זה לזה, they were pleasant to each other]  . . .   ומיישבין את
הטעמים בלא קושיות ופירוקין and they explained their reasoning without challenging each
other with difficulties and rebuttals.

According
to Rashi , R. Zeira forgets the “atmosphere” of the Babylonian academies.  [7]

Maharsha (1555-1631), disagrees with
Rashi. He argues that the sages in the land of Israel do engage in questioning
and answering like their counterparts in Babylonia.  He cites the Gemara (Baba Metzia 84a) where
R. Yohanan says about Reish Laqish:  he
would raise twenty-four objections, and I would reply with twenty-four answers.

Therefore, Maharsha explains that
possibly the Babylonian piplul was faulty and similar to a style of piplul
that existed in his own time דוגמת חילוקים
שבדור הזה. He objects to this style of questioning and answering because it
distances one from the truth, and can’t help one rule on halakhic issues. Accordingly,
R. Zeira fasted in order to forget how to piplul the Babylonian way.

Abravanel (1437-1508) in his commentary
on Pirkei Avot (on the Mishna in chapter 5 which begins: There are four types
who study with the sages) writes somewhat similarly. The problem with the one who
is compared to a sponge, who soaks up everything – is that he retains things
that are untrue. In the search for truth, there are necessary steps which themselves
are untrue:  כי לא תברר האמת כי אם בהפכו truth can only
be evaluated when compared with its opposite. R. Zeira fasts to forget the stages in
the arguments of the Babylonian Talmud that were untrue.

In summary, all three of these
interpretations agree that R. Zeira didn’t literally forget the Babylonian
teachings. He forgot the “atmosphere” of the Babylonian academies or the
interim discussions that took place there.  [8]

I’d like now to give some examples of
how the story of R. Zeira is presented in some early Hassidic sermons, to show
how the Rebbes and their audiences understood the story of R. Zeira. These
sources aren’t concerned with explaining our Gemara; R. Zeira’s story is cited
to support an ethical or moral lesson.

Torah Or is a collection of sermons by
R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi (1745-1812). On
page 69c, in a discussion about spiritual worlds, the author says:

The purpose of the river diNur, (fiery
river (or maybe fiery light)), in which the soul submerges itself as it passes from
this world to Gan Eden, is to erase its memories of this physical world. If the
soul remembers its encounter with materiality, it can’t experience Gan Eden.
And when the soul goes from the lower Gan Eden to the higher Gan Eden it also must
pass through a river diNur to forget the comprehension and pleasures of the
lower Gan Eden. (Zohar part 2 210a) This is the idea in the Gemara: R. Zeira
observed 100 fasts to forget the Talmud of Babylonia even though he had studied
it with devotion.

In Likutei Moharan (ch. 246), R. Nachman
of Bratslav (1772 – 1810) writes:

In these examples of Hassidic thought there
is no difficulty with the idea that R. Zeira forgets his learning in order to reach
higher spiritual plateau. Forgetting is a purification process that is both
necessary and exemplary. [9]

Returning now to the literal sense of the
Gemara:

R. Issac Halevi (Rabinowitz)
(1847-1914), the author of Dorot Harishonim addresses our problem in a footnote
(Dorot II p 427 footnote 93). He posits that in R.  Zeira’s time there were already two canonized
collections of Talmudic material arranged around the Mishna; each in its own
distinct form and style.

כבר הי׳ להם סתמא דהש”ס על המשנה שגרסו כבר במטבע קבועה,
וכן הי׳  להם אז כבר גם בארץ ישראל.

R. Zeira chose to
forget the Babylonian Talmud (as it existed in his time), because it interfered
with his studies in the land of Israel.

According to this
interpretation, R. Zeira forgot only the redaction or arrangement of the
teachings he had learned.  He didn’t forget
the teachings themselves (or the study method). [10]

I’d like to suggest
an original explanation. It’s based on passages in the Talmud about R. Zeira
and additionally can explain why only R. Zeira decided to forget the teachings
of Babylon when he moved to the land of Israel.

We
see that the teachings of the land of Israel (especially R. Yohanan’s) did
reach R. Zeira while he was still in Babylon [11]. R. Zeira, however, didn’t really
trust these teachings. Sometimes he thought they were attributed incorrectly,
or their content was not accurate. He doubted if a statement in the name of R.
Eleazar was correct. [12] He was unsure if R. Yohanan agreed with R. Aqiba’s
position or not. He distinguished between the different amoraim who
transmitted teachings. In general he looked at Torah that reached Babylon as
something that was possibly unreliable, inaccurate or “damaged in transit”.

  

R. Zeira was
only able to resolve his doubts when he moved to the land of Israel and learned
the Torah of the land of Israel there. He then forgot the imprecise version of
these teachings that he had previously memorized in Babylon – “the teachings of
Babylon”. He could forget them because they were superseded by accurate
teachings that he now received in the land of Israel. [13]

I’d like to thank Reb Gary Gleam who
provided the cabbage rolls and coffee, and the late night sounding board.

————————————————————————————————————————–

[1] תלמודא בבלאה is sometimes translated
as Babylonian Talmud, which I think is an anachronism. I will use the translation
“Babylonian teachings”. All the available manuscripts have תלמודא דבבל  =  the teachings of Babylonia. The phrase Talmuda
dBabel or Talmuda Babelah occurs only here
(Google). Talmud in the sense of teachings occurs many times, often in
comparison to mikra or mishna.

 [2]
Compare Rosh Hashana 20b: “When R. Zeira went up [to the land of Israel], he
sent [a letter] to his colleagues [in Babylonia]  . . .”  R.
Zeira didn’t break off all contact with the old country. He taught them what he
heard and learned in the land of Israel.

[3] See Goldberg, Abraham. “Rabbi Ze’ira
and Babylonian Custom in Palestine” (Hebrew) Tarbiz vol. 36 1967 (pages
319-341), for examples of Babylonian traditions that R. Zeira brought to the
land of Israel. The following quote is from the online abstract:

“R.
Zeira is the outstanding figure among many who came from an area of unmixed
Babylonian tradition and who tried to impose their own Babylonian practice upon
Palestinian custom.”

[5] The words “so that it should not disturb
him” would be out of place in this version of the story, since according to
this version, R. Zeria never forgot the Babylonian teachings, but the idea is
that the text is short. There is a geniza fragment from The Friedberg
Project for Talmud Bavli Variants and it is equally as short. (Note
that it matches the standard editions with regard to the goal of R. Zeira’s
fast.)

Translation of the geniza fragment:

R. Zeira observed forty fasts to forget
the teachings of Babylon.

He fasted another forty times that R
Il’a should not die in his lifetime.

He fasted another forty times that the fire of
Gehenna should have no power over him.

[6]
The author of Dikduke Soferim mentions this version but doesn’t suggest that its
reading is better than the standard one. Dikduke Sofreim has written elsewhere
that this specific manuscript belonged to Christians who translated (into Latin)
passages that were regularly used against Jews in inter-faith disputations.
There’s no Latin on this page, but you can see Latin on some other pages.

[7]
Rashi mentions his source as Sanhedrin 24a. He understands that the students of
Babylon were antagonistic to each other unlike the students in the land of
Israel who were pleasant to each other. Rashi apparently was thinking of this in
his commentary on the prayer of R. Nehunya ben HaKanah – Berachot 28b. The
prayer reads: “May it be Your will that I don’t make a mistake in a halakhic
ruling, and that my colleagues rejoice with me  . . .”  Rashi
understands the prayer this way – May it be Your will that I don’t make a
mistake in a halakhic ruling and my colleagues make fun of me.

[8]
The explanations of Maharsha and Abravanel have prompted subversive
interpretations by the school of the German Jewish historians of the
Talmud.  In the Soncino translation of
Shabbat 41a, the translator, Rabbi DR. Freedman (1901-1982) writes:  “Weiss, Dor, III, p. 188, maintains that R.
Zera’s desire to emigrate was occasioned by dissatisfaction with Rab Judah’s
method of study; this is vigorously combatted by Halevi, Doroth, II pp. 421 et
seq.”

Jacob Neusner’s
in his book A History of the Jews in Babylonia page 218, also questions the
idea that sages of the land of Israel rejected the Babylonian methods of study,
and finds “Halevi’s strong demurrer quite convincing”.

[9]
In this context, the Talmudic statement: גדולה עבירה לשמה ממצווה שלא לשמה   – מסכת הוריות י’ ע”ב may be somewhat
relevant.

[10] I’m not sure, according to R.
Halevi,  did R. Zeira also forget the
anonymous Talmudic layer (stam or redactor) that existed in his time? 

[11]
The first of these conversations definitely took place in Babylon. The fourth
interaction occurred in the land of Israel but revises a teaching that R. Zeira
probably heard in Babylonia. The middle two quotes are may describe R. Zeira in
Babylon, but even if they occurred when R. Zeira was already in the land of
Israel, they reflect doubts that he had while in Babylon.  The number 40 in the last example is also
remarkable. He repeats something 40 times in order to remember. He fasts 40
times to forget. 

[12]
R. Eleazar teaches without citing his source but everyone knows that his
teachings are R. Yohanan’s (Yerushalmi Berakot 2:1 and Yerushalmi Shekalim 2:5).

[13] R. Zeira didn’t forget the native
Babylonian teachings, authored and recorded by the Babylonian amoraim. He
never doubted their accuracy. He brought those teachings to the land of Israel
and enriched the Torah of the land of Israel with them.