Thoughts on “Confrontation” and Sundry Matters, Part I By: Marc B. Shapiro Rabbi Meir Soloveichik’s year-old essay, “No Friend in Jesus,”[1] caused me to once again think about the Rav’s essay “Confrontation,” (available here) and how it should be understood. Before getting to that, let me note, for those who don’t know, that Soloveichik is emerging as one of the most interesting, if controversial writers, on interfaith matters. I don’t know if he picks the titles of his articles, but they are certainly catchy. In addition to “No Friend in Jesus,” I also have in mind “The Virtue of Hate,”[2] and “Of (Religious) Fences and Neighbors.”[3] The last article focuses on the Maria Johnson’s wonderful book, Strangers and Neighbors. Johnson is my colleague at the University of Scranton and the book deals with what she has learnt from living in a haredi community. The friendships she has developed (which would be impossible in a large city where the haredim have no substantive contact with non-Jews and certainly do not allow their children to play together) bring great enlightenment to her own Christian faith. With all of the bad press focusing on the haredi community (some of which is deserved and self-inflicted), it is nice to read such a positive portrayal.

Soloveichik is currently working on his PhD at Princeton, and due to his many essays he has already made a mark. While it is true that political concerns play a central role in his writing, and he seems most comfortable in the role of public intellectual rather than academic scholar, there is a great deal of learning in everything that he produces. He has also emerged as Orthodoxy’s most prominent “theocon,” which has led him to take positions that in my opinion are at odds with the proper halakhic response.[4] I also suspect that many will not look kindly upon his theoretical defense of torture, although no one can argue the case better than he can.[5]

There are those who will criticize Soloveichik because he engages in theological dialogue with Christians, and they think that this is in violation of the Rav’s strictures. If that were the case, then the Rav himself would be in violation, because he first delivered his famous “Lonely Man of Faith” as a lecture at a Catholic seminary.[6] The fact is that the Rav never said that theological issues couldn’t be discussed with non-Jews in a non-official setting. It all depends on the context of the discussions and the venue. In any event, it is very important to have a rabbi who actually understands Christian dogma. Otherwise, you can get poskim, like R. Joseph Messas, mentioned below, who come to decisions based on entirely incorrect information.

We should all be happy that there is a rabbi who knows that before Newman was an actor and then a tomato sauce, there was a more important Newman, that Immaculate Conception is not Virgin Birth, that Limbo is not only a game played at Bar Mitzvahs, and that St. Thomas is more than an island in the Caribbean. There are, however, many rabbis who know very little about Christianity. That is fine, but it is not fine when they try to speak about a matter they know nothing about. Some time ago I heard a talk in which the speaker gave his take on what was wrong with certain Christian ideas. The only problem was that that he had but a smattering of knowledge of the religion he was discussing. (Can you believe that there are people who speak about Catholicism without even knowing what happened at Vatican II?) After the talk someone asked me what I thought about the speaker. My reply was to quote the immortal words of Ha-Gaon R. Mizrach-Etz: “A man has got to know his limitations.”[7]

Let me begin with a short article I wrote on “Confrontation” that originally appeared on the website of Boston College’s Center for Jewish-Christian Understanding. I don’t think that many people have seen it, and posting it here will give it some more exposure. I would encourage people to also read the other papers.[8] One can even watch the original presentations.[9] “Confrontation”: A Mixed Legacy If any evidence were needed of the centrality of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik in contemporary American Orthodoxy, one need only look at the vigorous exchange of ideas between Drs. Korn, Berger and Rabbi Klapper. These thinkers have focused on a close reading of the seminal essay “Confrontation,” and have argued about its message and implications in a changed world. I would like to call attention to some points that have not been raised, which I regard as unfortunate results of the widespread acceptance in American Orthodoxy of the perspective offered in “Confrontation.”

My goal in these comments is not to criticize the essay, but rather to clarify its impact. In fact, both in my personal and professional life (with perhaps one exception) I have avoided all venues of interfaith dialogue, and this despite being in my tenth year of teaching at a Jesuit university. I have participated in numerous events where Christians were exposed to Judaism, as well as some where I learnt more about Christianity, but it is unlikely that Rabbi Soloveitchik’s position has any relevance to these situations.

Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s warning was directed against Jews dialoguing with Christians in some sort of organized, presumably official,[10] meeting, and the fears he expressed relate to this type of setting. On the other hand, individual Jews and Christians discussing each other’s religion has occurred in every generation, and neither this, nor a Jew giving a lecture to Christians about some aspect of Judaism, qualifies as dialogue of the sort that the Rav was warning against. It is therefore not surprising that even the most strident opponents of dialogue do not mention the subject of Orthodox professors teaching at universities whose student body is primarily Christian.

I have abstained from involvement in interfaith dialogue not because I regard the Rav’s essay as a binding halakhic decision, but because I would have felt uncomfortable being regarded by the other side as a representative of Judaism. (Despite being part of a department of Theology and Religious studies, I am hardly a theologian.) In addition, I have always been sensitive to an aspect of dialogue that the Rav was concerned with, namely, that Jews will feel pressure to adjust their religious views in response to moves from the Christian side. In calling attention to this point, I feel that the Rav was uncannily prescient.

Yet despite the fact that I have lived my life in accordance with the Rav’s guidelines, I believe that his position has had certain negative consequences. It might be that these are the sorts of consequences that Orthodox Jews who follow the Rav’s prescriptions must live with, but I hope not.

One of these consequences is religious separatism, and when it comes to interfaith relations the Modern Orthodox have adopted the same position as that of the right-wing Orthodox. Thus, in the United States one finds virtually no relationships between Modern Orthodox rabbis and Christian clergymen, or between Modern Orthodox groups and their Christian counterparts, even of the sort that the Rav would encourage.[11] This type of separatism is to be expected when dealing with the haredim, but one would have thought that the rabbinic leadership of Modern Orthodoxy would be more open-minded in this area. Yet for many Modern Orthodox rabbinic figures this is not the case, and when a group of Cardinals recently toured Yeshiva University a number of faculty members and students of the Rav expressed strong criticism of the administration in allowing this visit.[12] In fact, the Rav was often cited as a source for this opposition, as if anything he wrote in “Confrontation” spoke against friendly relations and interchange of ideas in non-theological settings.[13]

In today’s Orthodox world, when it comes to Christianity the stress is on the negative, beyond anything the Rav wrote about in “Confrontation.” This has brought about a broad refusal on the part of Modern Orthodox rabbis to have even the barest of relationships with their Christian counterparts. I am not blaming this on “Confrontation,” since before the essay appeared such relationships were also rare, but the essay reinforced the atmosphere of distance between Orthodox Jews and Christians in all spheres, even though this was not its intent. To put it another way, I would say that, despite its intent, “Confrontation” reaffirmed Orthodox Jews’ inclination that, in all but the most negligible circumstances, they should ignore the dominant religion and its adherents. A different essay by the Rav could have put an even greater stress on the positive results of interfaith cooperation in “secular” spheres.[14] Instead, almost nothing was done to remove the fear of Christianity from Orthodoxy, and while in the very shadow of Vatican II this might have been the correct approach, by now I think we have moved beyond this. Yet even in our day it would still be unheard of for a Christian clergyman to address the members of an Orthodox synagogue or group about matters of joint concern. A lay Christian might be welcome, but any relationship with clergy is seen as dangerous, in that it could lead to a compromising of traditional Jewish beliefs.

Another result of the lack of any dialogue between Orthodox Jews and Christians is that in addition to the fear of Christianity, there remains an enormous amount of ignorance. On numerous occasions I have heard Orthodox Jews assert that according to Christianity one must accept Jesus in order to be “saved”. When I have pointed out that this notion has been repudiated by the Catholic Church as well as by most Protestants, the response is usually incredulity.

It is also significant that Orthodox Jews treat Christianity as an abstraction, and detailed discussions about its halakhic status continue to be published. I find it strange, however, that in our post-modern era people can write articles offering judgments about Christianity based solely on book knowledge,[15] without ever having spoken to Christian scholars and clergymen, that is, without having ever confronted Christianity as a living religion.[16] There is something deeply troubling about Orthodox figures discussing whether Christianity is avodah zarah without attempting to learn from Christians how their faith has impacted their lives. I would think that this narrative, attesting as it does to the redemptive power of faith, must also be part of any Jewish evaluation of Christianity.[17] Yet barring theological dialogue, how is this possible?
I realize that the halakhic system prefers raw data to experiential narratives, but certainly modern halakhists and theologians are able to find precedents for inclusion of precisely this sort of information. After all, wasn’t it personal contact with Gentiles, and the recognition that their lives were not like those of the wicked pagans of old, that led to a reevaluation of the halakhic status of the Christian beginning with Meiri and continuing through R. Israel Moses Hazan,[18] R. David Zvi Hoffmann, and R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg?

The concern with dialogue leading to attempted revisions of traditional Jewish beliefs is certainly well-founded, but the flip-side is that without any direct contact distortions can arise in the other direction as well, namely, in how non-Jews are viewed. Could Saadia Grama ever have written his infamous book[19] if his Gentile neighbor, the Christian, was a real person instead of a caricature? Of course, one does not need interfaith theological dialogue in order to see adherents of other religions in a more positive light than Grama, but as noted above, a current trend opposes even non-theological dialogue. When all substantive contact with the Other is off-limits, it becomes much easier for extremists to reawaken old prejudices that should have no place in a modern democratic society.

I don’t have any illusions that the leaders of American Orthodoxy will change their stance on this matter even after considering what I and others have written. Yet this does not mean that all is lost when it comes to Jewish-Christian relations. Even without theological dialogue there is still a great deal that we can discuss, and thus ensure that neither Orthodox Jews nor Christians are strangers in each other’s eyes. There is a host of social and political issues that affect both of our communities and a vast reservoir of goodwill and respect among Christians for Jews, and Orthodox Jews in particular. Isn’t it time the Orthodox responded in kind?* * *With regard to the Rav and Christianity, it is interesting to note what R. Samuel Volk wrote. R. Volk was one of the other roshei yeshiva at RIETS, an outstanding talmudist who had studied in Telz. Yet he was no fan of the Rav and went so far as to accuse the latter of adopting Christian imagery. In his eulogy for Dr. Samuel Belkin, the Rav described the latter as a wandering and restless yeshiva student. This was too much for Volk (who clearly had a bone to pick with the Rav). In the introduction to volume 7 of his Sha’arei Tohar, he wrote: ראשית כל הנני להעיר שהביטוי הזה של “נודד” שאל “גאון” זה מהגוים ימ”ש, שאומרים שבעבור שעם ישראל לא קבלו תורת “אותו האיש” נתקללו להיות “עם נודד לעולם” ימ”ש וזכרם. ועליהם אין להתפלא דמה לנו ולהם? אבל על “גאון” הנ”ל שיש לו אפי’ “פאספארט” של זכות אבות יש להתפלא! He repeats this criticism of the Rav in his Sha’arei Tohar, vol. 8, p. 332.[20] Yet this is nothing compared to how he savages Dr. Belkin, his former boss. Out of respect for Belkin, I will refrain from reproducing what he writes (which can be found in the just mentioned sources). His words are a good reflection of the conflict and tension that existed between Belkin and the roshei yeshiva, many of whom saw Belkin’s goals as at odds with Torah Judaism[21] On occasion Belkin had to give in to them, as in their threat to resign en masse if he went through with his plan to move Stern College uptown near Yeshiva University. Yet they usually had to sit by and feel growing anger at what they viewed as Belkin’s wrong-headed moves. It was only after they were no longer employed at YU that they could express themselves openly. When they did, it is not surprising that they could be sharper than the most harsh haredi critics. Another strong attack on Belkin was penned by R. Chaim Dov Ber Gulevsky, who also taught at YU. (I will have a great deal more to say about his fascinating writings in one of my upcoming posts.) As with Volk, Gulevsky too, unfortunately, falls into the trap of attacking Belkin personally.[22] In the case of Gulevsky, I can say that he believed that in doing so he was defending the honor of the Rav, for whom he has the greatest respect. Yet, as with Volk, his attack is way overboard, so much so that I am again embarrassed to cite it. It is unfortunate that rather than focusing on all the Torah he taught while at YU, Gulevsky concludes on the following note: ואני תפילה שנזכר לחיים טובים ממלך חפץ בחיים אמן ואמן. ושלא יענישו ושלא ירחיקו אותי ממקורי, וממחיצת צדיקים ישרים ותמימים גאוני ישראל קדושי עליונין בגלל שפעם הייתי במחיצתו של “אותו הנשיא”, “אשר מכף רגל והראש לא היה בו מתום” . . . ר”ל. In Gulevsky’s attack, we also see reflected the long battle between the roshei yeshiva and the adherents of academic Jewish scholarship. This dispute was found at the institution from its early years, and is described in Rakefet’s biography of Revel, Solomon Zeitlin was probably the first focus of the roshei Yeshiva’s anger. A number of others, most notably Irving Agus and Meir Simhah Feldblum, would later run into trouble from the halls of RIETS on account of their outlooks. In Gulevsky’s mind, Belkin was not an adherent of Torah study of the traditional sort – he even denies the well-known story that Belkin received semikhah from the Hafetz Hayyim at age seventeen. He sees Belkin as having sold his soul to the idolatry of academic Jewish studies, with all the heresy that went along with it. In fact, it is not merely academic Jewish studies that Gulevsky sees as Belkin’s downfall, but no less than the hated ‘hokhmah yevanit” that the Sages had warned about. Philo of Alexandria is, in Gulevsky’s understanding, just another example of “hokhmah yevanit.”[23] This involvement with Greek wisdom also led Belkin to his friendships with Christian scholars and “the professor who thought that ‘the Jews made a terrible mistake’ in pushing away oto ha-ish r”l”. Gulevsky told me that (as I suspected) the unnamed professor is Harry A. Wolfson, who was the preeminent Philo scholar of his time. Yet I don’t think Wolfson ever said this, and I believe Gulevsky has confused Wolfson with Joseph Klausner. Gulevsky also recalls with pain how, in his annual shiur in memory of R. Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor, for whom RIETS was named, Belkin would include material dealing with Philo rather than give a traditional shiur. According to Gulevsky, this even led Belkin to make heretical statements with regard to the Oral Law. He also blasts Belkin’s lengthy article on Philo and Midrash Tadshe[24] and what he regards as Belkin’s foolish attempt to posit a Philonic influence on the Zohar through an ancient midrashic tradition.[25] Rather than seeing this last article as a worthy attempt to uphold an ancient dating for the Zohar, Gulevsky instead points out how Scholem rejected Belkin’s position as completely nonsensical, even doing so on a visit to Yeshiva University.[26] * * * Returning to the issue of Judaism and Christianity, let me begin by calling attention to some curiosities that are perhaps not so well known. The first relates to R. Israel Moshe Hazan, mentioned above. His positive view of Christian scholars seemed so over the top to R Eliezer Waldenberg, that the latter delivered a stinging rebuke in Tzitz Eliezer 13:12: שומו שמים למקרא מה יפית כזה לאמונת הנוצרים וחכמיהם מפורש יוצא וללא כל בושה, מפי בעל התשובה . . . ובכלל המותר לקרוא קילוס לחכמיהם? ואיה האיסור של לא תחנם שישנו בדבר? As far as I know, Hazan is the only rabbinic author to publish a Christian haskamah in his work (he actually publishes two). These appear in his Nahalah le-Yisrael, which is devoted to a halakhic problem dealing with inheritance. Translations of these haskamot are found in the appendix to Isadore Grunfeld’s The Jewish Law of Inheritance.[27] (The section dealing with Hazan and his Nahalah le-Yisrael is called: “A Cause Célèbre, A Remarkable Man and a Remarkable Book.”) The Christian scholars’ haskamot appear together with the haskamot of such renowned figures as R. Hayyim David Hazan of Izmir (later Rishon le-Zion in Jerusalem), R. Eleazar Horovitz of Vienna, R. Shimon Sofer of Mattersdorf, R. Avraham Samuel Sofer of Pressburg, and R. Meir Ash of Ungvar. Hazan’s testimony about Jews who would go to the Church to listen the music, even if they stood outside the sanctuary has also been very troubling for many. The whole question of the propriety of entering a church deserves its own post. In years past no Jew would enter a Church unless he was forced to, or in order to avoid enmity. R. Moses Sitrug, Yashiv Moshe, vol. 1, no. 235, discusses the latter case and he advises removing one’s head covering before entering the church. If not, one will be forced to do so in the church, and this would appear as if one was worshipping with the Christians.[28] (When the Chief Rabbi of England is present in a church for an important state function, he does not remove his kippah, and is not expected to.) I began this post with Meir Soloveichik. There was actually another Soloveitchik who also had a great interest in things Christian. I refer to R. Elijah Zvi Soloveitchik. Here is a picture of him.
He was the grandson of R. Hayyim of Volozhin and the uncle of R. Joseph Baer Soloveitchik, the Beit Halevi. He is also the subject of a comprehensive monograph by Dov Hyman, who was a medical doctor trained in London and who lived in Manhattan. For some reason this book was kept fairly secret, with only fifty copies published and never sold in stores. Here is the title page of the book.Among Soloveitchik’s works is a volume entitled Kol Kore (Paris, 1875). Friedberg, Beit Eked Seforim, describes this book as “in opposition to the New Testament.” Yet Friedberg never looked carefully at the volume, for if he did he would have seen that rather than being in opposition to the New Testament, it is in favor of it. Yet it is not a missionary tract. Rather, Soloveitchik followed the approach of R. Jacob Emden (whom he cites in his introduction) that the New Testament is only directed towards Gentiles, and supports the Noahide Laws. However, it has nothing to say to Jews, whom it acknowledges are obligated to keep the Torah. In line with this conception, Soloveitchik felt comfortable in authoring a commentary on the book of Matthew, and that is what the Kol Kore is. Here are the title pages of the first edition as well as the 1985 reprint. This is not the only rabbinic commentary on the book of Matthew. In 1900 R. Samuel Weintraub’s commentary on this Gospel was published (Milhemet Shmuel). Yet unlike Soloveitchik’s work, Weintraub’s commentary is devoted to exposing the Gospel’s faults.[29] Here are the two title pages of the book. The book is an interesting polemic, which unlike most polemics is written in the form of a commentary. Yet there are times when the author goes too far. For example, he deals with Matthew 1:18, which states that Mary was impregnated by the Holy Spirit. Needless to say, he strongly attacks this notion. But he also has to make sense of Gen. 6:2, which states that “the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair; and they took them as wives.” The problematic words are בני אלהים, as this might be taken to show that the Torah also shares the mythological conception of gods impregnating women. Weintraub writes: הוא כתרגום אונקלס בני רברביא, ואמרו בב”ר ר”ש בן יוחאי הי’ מקלל למי שמתרגם בני אלהיא, כי לא יתכן כלל שהמלאך יבוא אל האשה ויחמוד אותה, ורק העובדי אלילים היו מאמינים בשטותים הללו כמבואר בספרי מיטהאלאגיע ובס’ יוסיפון, תדע שהרי הכתוב מסיים עלה: וירא ד’ כי רבה רעת האדם בארץ, ולא כתיב כי רבה רעת בני אלהים בארץ, כי בני אלהים האמורים היו ג”כ בני אדם כתרגום אונקלס. ואם רצה השי”ת לברא את המשיח ברוח קדשו היה לו לבראו עפר מן האדמה מבלי אב ואם כמו שברא את אדם הראשון ואז היו כולם מודים בו ואין הקב”ה בא בטרוניא עם בריותיו. The only problem with Weintraub’s point is that in his zeal to attack the Christian belief, and by asserting that only pagans could believe in a nonsensical notion such that an angel could desire a woman, he has unknowingly also placed certain rabbinic texts into the category of not simply fools, but עובדי אלילים. Devarim Rabbah 11:10 describes how “two angels, Uzah and Azael, came down from near Thy divine Presence and coveted the daughters of the earth and they corrupted their way upon the earth until Thou didst suspend them between earth and heaven.” Similar passages are found in other rabbinic texts, in particular Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, ch. 22, which elaborates on how the angels desired and impregnated human women. This is part of the whole genre of “fallen angels” stories found in the ancient world. I personally have no doubt that passages such as these are foreign imports, mythological tales that somehow found their way into Jewish literature. Yet precisely because the “fallen angel” genre became part of Jewish tradition, even if one chooses to reject it I think it is going much too far to regard something that appears in traditional rabbinic sources as being idolatrous. The Sages could adopt non-Jewish notions when these related to science, history, and folklore – and even halakhah if Yaakov Elman is correct – but they would not adopt anything that smacked of idolatry. (I understand that this last statement can be challenged from a Maimonidean perspective. However, I don’t think Maimonides is correct, either historically or theologically, in the way he ties astrology to idolatry.)

With regard to ‘fallen angels”, and the cross-cultural influence on Judaism, Rabbi Leo Jung’s volume on the topic was long the classic treatment.[30] He deals with all sorts of folklore in the aggadic literature, much which has its origin in non-Jewish sources.[31] While today, this sort of book would be excommunicated in certain circles, even years ago Jung was sensitive to the implications of what he was writing. He therefore included at the beginning of the book some pages about the authority of the aggadah. This is quite interesting, since one does not expect to find such a discussion in an academic work.[32] He notes that the purpose of Aggadah is not history, but to amuse, to cheer up, to let the people forget their present suffering by either leading them back to the glorious past or by painting in bright colors the fullness of times when there will be no enemy, no slander, no prejudice. There is no trace of a definite method, of any endeavor to weave these stories into a dogmatic texture, the Haggadah containing all that had occupied the popular mind, what they had heard in the beth hammidrash, or at a social gathering. Stories contradicting each other, theories incompatible with one another, are very frequent. They are recorded as the fruits of Israel’s genius. They have no authority, they form no part of Jewish religious belief. Nor may they be taken literally: it is always the idea, the lesson, and not the story, which is important. It is wrong to say that the Haggadah contains the doctrines of the Rabbis, or that only orthodox views have been admitted to the exclusion of all the rest (pp. 3-4).Jung continues by citing the classic sources in this regard, namely, R. Sherira Gaon, R. Samuel ha-Nagid, and of course, R. Abraham ben Maimonides. He also cites R. David Zvi Hoffmann, “recognized as the greatest rabbinical authority of our age” (p. 4), who in his introduction to his commentary to Leviticus states that there is no obligation to accept Aggadah. Jung concludes:It is very important to remember that there is no such thing as a systematic Jewish Theology. Even a system of fundamental points of creed did not grow up before the times of the Karaites and then was evolved through the necessity of defending Judaism. Maimonides endeavored to condense Judaism into thirteen principles of faith, but, as Crescas rightly contends, they are both too many and too few. The Haggadah, while preaching the beauty of holy life, does not give us law of belief and practice; the religious conduct of the Jew is regulated entirely by the Halakha (pp. 6-7).The status of Aggadah has been raised so much in recent centuries that people today are often unaware of the attitude towards Aggadah of some geonim and rishonim, in how they were prepared to reject aggadot that didn’t appeal to them. Thus, they will be surprised to read what Jung writes. For similar sentiments from another Orthodox leader, let me quote from Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz, in his Foreword to the Soncino Talmud (in words that today would land him in herem): We have dogmatical Haggadah, treating of God’s attributes and providence, creation, revelation, Messianic times, and the Hereafter. The historical Haggadah brings traditions and legends concerning the heroes and events in national or universal history, from Adam to Alexander of Macedon, Titus and Hadrian. It is legend pure and simple. Its aim is not so much to give the facts concerning the righteous and unrighteous makers of history, as the moral that may be pointed from the tales that adorn their honour or dishonour. That some of the folklore elements in the Haggadah, some of the customs depicted or obiter dicta reported, are repugnant to Western taste need not be denied. “The great fault to be found with those who wrote down such passages,” says Schechter, “is that they did not observe the wise rule of Dr. Johnson who said to Boswell on a certain occasion, ‘Let us get serious, for there comes a fool.’ And the fools unfortunately did come, in the shape of certain Jewish commentators [!] and Christian controversialists, who took as serious things which were only the expression of a momentary impulse, or represented the opinion of some isolated individual, or were meant simply as a piece of humorous by-play, calculated to enliven the interest of a languid audience.” In spite of the fact that the Haggadah contains parables of infinite beauty and enshrines sayings of eternal worth, it must be remembered that the Haggadah consists of mere individual utterances that possess no general and binding authority. to be continued . . .

Review: Ma'amar al Yishma'el
by Eliezer Brodt & Ish Sefer  Solomon Ibn Aderet, Ma'amar al Yishma'el, Bezalel Naor ed., Spring Valley, NY, 2008, 178 pp.
Bezalel Naor, Mitsvat Hashem Barah, Spring Valley, NY, 2008, 220 pp.
  R. Bezalel Naor, who has published a host of translations and explanations of R. Kook's writings, as well as Post Sabbatian Sabbatianisms, discussing Sabbatean works, has published two works in a single volume. The first, Ma'amar al Yishma'el, is a critical edition of R. Solomon Ibn Aderet's (Rashba) discussion of Islam.   This work was printed from manuscript (which today is lost) for the first time in 1863 by Y. Perles. Most recently it was printed in the new Shut ha-Rashba by Machon Yerushalayim in their last volume (siman 367). At first it was not accepted that Rashba authored this work but today it is accepted that  he is indeed the author. Naor's edition begins with an excellent introduction dealing with amongst many things the authorship of this work, Naor raises the possibility that R. Dovid who was a talmid of the Ramban was the author. Throughout the text he brings various proofs about the authorship from other writings of the Rashba. As an appendix Naor printed a copy of a manuscript of Steinschneider where he deals with the authorship of this text.   The main topic of this work is about the Rashba defending the Torah from an Islamic attack. Although much has been written on Jewish Christian disputes, when it comes to Jewish Islamic disputes, much less is written or known. Indeed, most are probably unaware that the Rashba wrote this work defending Judaism against Islam. Naor's edition begins with an excellent introduction discussing the work generally and specifically providing background materials on exactly what the Rashba was responding to.  Naor discusses both the Jewish as well as Islamic sources in all languages. It is pretty incredible to see his command in both these groups of sources, it is clear that much time and hard work went into preparing this work.   The main topic which the Rashba deals with is defending that the Torah which we have is 100% accurate and was never tampered with. The Rashba deals with many specific examples in a very orderly fashion. Specifically, the Rashba elaborates why the torah publicized what seems to be sins of Reuven (p.74) and Yehudah (pp. 73-74). The Rashba also deals with why the torah had to include the story of Lot and his daughters (pp. 72-73). Another issue that the Rashba defends is proving that the numbers of the Jews given by the Torah was 100% accurate (pp. 63-71). Additionally, the Rashba deals with the famous incident of the finding of the Sefer torah in Yoshiayhu's time. There are also many Chidushim with regard to the seven Noachide commandments.   Regarding why Hashem chose to give the Torah publicly the Rashba writes (p. 90):והתבונן כי בשתי תורת האלו, רוצה לומר, תורת בני נח ותורת משה עליו השלום לא רצה השם יתברך שיקבל אותם ממנו נביא, ויקבלו אותם מן הנביא שאר העם. וזה לשתי פנות גדולות האחד: כדי שלא יוכל אחד ממי שנתחייב באורה התורה, להסתפק בקבלתה, ולחשוד מי שקבלה, שבדה מלבו, או ששבש בם קצת… והשניה, כדי שלא יוכל לשבש בדת ובאמונה לאחר זמן, ויטעון שהשם יתברך נתן עתה על ידו תורת כן וכן, כמו שנתן תורה ראשונה מתחלה עד יד הנביא פלוני אשר קדמו. אלא קבץ כל הנמצא באותו זמן ונתן רוחו עליהם והתנבאו…   Naor already points out that although this is similar to the proof offered by the Kuzari, however, this proof has a new addition to it as it includes the notion that the ז' מצות בני נח were also directly and publicly given by God!    Besides for the actual main topics that the Rashba deals with and its great importance (as he is one of our most important Rishonim) there is also a wealth of interesting side points and discussions in this work.   Amongst the many important points that the Rashba writes is that although we find many times about the Torah that the Gemarah says שכחה התורה וחזרה ויסדה (one of example of this is by with Ezra). The Rashba explains at great length that it does not mean the Torah was almost completely forgotten at these times. Rather all of torah is connected and if one thing is forgotten it is as if everything is forgotten so Ezra prevented this from happening (pp. 100-05). With this the Rashba explains many things amongst them the famous Gemarah in Pesachim (66b)תנו רבנן: הלכה זו נתעלמה מבני בתירא. פעם אחת חל ארבעה עשר להיות בשבת, שכחו ולא ידעו אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו. אמרו: כלום יש אדם שיודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו? אמרו להם: אדם אחד יש שעלה מבבל, והלל הבבלי שמו, ששימש שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון ויודע אם פסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו. שלחו וקראו לו. אמרו לו: כלום אתה יודע אם הפסח דוחה את השבת אם לאו? אמר להם: וכי פסח אחד יש לנו בשנה שדוחה את השבת? והלא הרבה יותר ממאתים פסחים יש לנו בשנה שדוחין את השבת. אמרו לו: מנין לך? אמר להם: נאמר מועדו בפסח ונאמר מועדו בתמיד. מה מועדו האמור בתמיד – דוחה את השבת אף מועדו האמור בפסח – דוחה את השבת. ועוד, קל וחומר הוא: ומה תמיד שאין ענוש כרת דוחה את השבת, פסח שענוש כרת – אינו דין שדוחה את השבת. מיד הושיבוהו בראש ומינוהו נשיא עליהם, והיה דורש כל היום כולו בהלכות הפסח. התחיל מקנטרן בדברים, אמר להן: מי גרם לכם שאעלה מבבל ואהיה נשיא עליכם – עצלות שהיתה בכם, שלא שמשתם שני גדולי הדור שמעיה ואבטליון. אמרו לו: רבי, שכח ולא הביא סכין מערב שבת מהו? אמר להן: הלכה זו שמעתי ושכחתי. אלא, הנח להן לישראל אם אין נביאים הן – בני נביאים הן. למחר, מי שפסחו טלה – תוחבו בצמרו, מי שפסחו גדי – תוחבו בין קרניו. ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה, ואמר: כך מקובלני מפי שמעיה ואבטליון. Many people have discussed this Gemarah throughout the ages (its was a popular derasha topic for Shabbat HaGadol) how could they forget such a thing? The Rashba explains it with his same theme. Here to Naor includes an excellent lengthy footnote dealing with this Gemarah providing many sources.  Another important statement of the Rashba (pp. 116-17) is:כל שכן ספר כולל מה שהוא ומה שהיה ועתיד להיות כתורתנו השלמה והתמימה שכוללת מן החכמה כל מה שהיה מן הבריאה הראשונה עד תכלית כל חכמה. ואפילו בא נביא מן הנביאים לכתוב בפרטי כל מה שתרמוז בה לא יכיל גליון וכן בפירושי מצותיה.    When talking about Rabbenu Hakodesh role in the writing of the Mishna he writes (p. 119): והודיעונו יתרון חכמת רבינו הקדוש בסדור ספרו סדר המשנה חברו בתכלית החכמה בקצור ובסדור בסתם ואחר כך מחלוקת ומחלוקת ואחר כך סתם וכולל ענינים גדולים בדברי קצתם.   Although, as mentioned above, the notes are generally excellent there is comment that deserves to be discussed. The Rashba referring to a Gemrah in Mesectas Pesachim calls (p. 103) it מסכת פסח שני. Here, Naor does not explain what the Rashba meant. The intention of the Rashba is that many rishonim called the part of Pesachim which deals with Korbon Pesach, Pesach Shenei, and referred to the first part of Pesachim that deals with Chametz and perek Arvei Peachim as Pesach Rishon. This fact was not known to everyone see for example Hagadah Shelemah (p.197) where it is pointed out that the Abarbanel was not aware of this and made a mistake because of this. [See also R. N. Rabonowitz, Mamar Al Hadfosass Hatalmud, p.27]. The Merei writes (Peachim 57b):אמר מנחם בן שלמה לבית מאיר י"א זאת המסכתא ר"ל מסכת פסח שני היא מסדר מועד וכבר ביארנו בפתיחת החבור שבסדור רבינו הקדוש ע"ה היו מסכת פסח ראשון וזאת המסכתא חוברות אשה אל אחותה נכללות במסכתא אחת נקראת פסחים ופרק ערבי פסחים היה אחרון לכל פרקיה ובימי הגאונים ז"ל חלקוה . לשתים וקראו הראשונה פסח ראשון והעתיקו פרק ערבי פסחים ממקומו וסדרוהו בסוף פסח ראשון וקראו שם המסכתא הזאת פסח שני ועל זה הצד הורגלנו בלמודה אחר מסכת פסח ראשון על הדרך שסדרנו בפתיחת החבור והיא כוללת חמשה פרקים וסדרם לפי שיטתנו…
Another nice piece is (p. 67): יש לנו להשיב ולומר שלא כל התולדות אשר היו להם זכר הכתוב רק מקצת מהם או מקצת מן הנזכרים ואף על פי שהיו להם או למקצתם בנים אחרים רבים מאלה, אלא שלא זכר כאן רק אותם שהיה הצורך מביא לזכרם, מפני שאלה היו ראשי בית אבות למשפחותם והאחרים בלבד יקראו על שמם כאשר קרה ליוסף שלא זכר הכתוב מכל בניו רק מנשה ואפרים…   The text of Ma'amar also contains extensive footnotes which provide the sources for the Rashba's statements as well side discussions. In the final section of this work, Naor explores, in greater detail, some issues he raised in passing in his notes. Just to mention a few of the many topics he deals with in the notes and appendixes (with just a few additional sources). These topics are rather eclectic ranging from the Ramban's position regarding the Ibn Ezra (pp. 136-143). In the introduction Naor has another nice discussion about the Ibn Ezra's position regarding the authorship of the Torah (pp. 23-28) although many deal with this topic Naor has some new important points based on some manuscripts showing what R. Ezra of Gerona, the Rebbe of the Ramban, thought of the Ibn Ezra. Other issues he deals with in regard to the Ibn Ezra are with his work the Iggeres ha-Shabbat (p. 141 n.578) [see also Ohr Yisrael 54:238] and additions which were put in by others in his works (p.142 n.582) [see also my Bein Keseh Lassur (Jerusalem, 2008), p. 53]. Others issues Naor deals with: did the Rashba know Arabic (p.21 n.24), the authorship of the classic Kabbalah work Mereches Aleokus (pp. 53-55). It is interesting that the Rashba always refers to Muchamed as Meshugah (see the note on p. 61-62 about this) [One can add to this Marc B. Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters (Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 2008), 151-52]  Another great note is about R. Abraham Ben Ha-GRA whose usage of very rare editions of the Talmud (pp. 72-72 n.236), and also about Ba'al Tosef on Taryag Mitzvot and the seven Noahide Laws (pp. 86-90). These are but a few samples.In the introduction Naor writes that only after he completed working on this sefer did he find out that Chaim Zalman Dimitrovsky printed it already with notes – had he known he never would have bothered working on it. As is obvious, Naor has a tremendous command of the sources in Hebrew and academic world and he did incredible research for this work yet he never discovered the well known source where most should begin with when working on the Rashba – Dimitrovsky's works. It was good that he only found it at the end as he did a beautiful job dealing with many many things which Dimitrovsky did not, making it very worth while that he too worked on this sefer.   One minor piece of criticism is that Naor makes paragraph divisions between each section giving each chapter a heading.  While this is very useful, Naor does not explain that these are his creation and not the Rashba's and thus can cause some confusion.  For example, on page 120 he quotes a piece from Yigdal which would be a nice early source but after checking it out with other versions of the Mamar its clear that Naor himself added this in -to be helpful.  The second book included in this volume is Mitzvat Hashem Barah. This book deals with the seven Noahide commandments. Rather than dealing with the actual commandments – i.e. a mere list – this book delves into rather interesting issues that surround these laws. For example, Naor has a fascinating discussion regarding R. Hayyim Hirschensohn's opinion that all commandments can be adduced logically. This discussion implicates what obligations there are in absence of specific commandments or, in the classic parlance, what happened before Matan Torah (pp.72-83). As an aside although it is very useful that he quotes the exact lengthy pieces of Hirschensohn he says he is doing so as they are very rare seforim. Although it is true that a hard copy of the seforim are hard to get but anyone can access them today thanks to Hebrew books.

Naor also presents the controversy between R. Jacob Emden and Moses Mendelssohn regarding the Noachide laws (pp. 16-34). While some maybe aware of the correspondence R. Emden had with Mendelsshonn regarding determining the time of death (see Moshe Samat's article in Hadash Assur min ha-Torah (Jerusalem: Dinur Center & Carmel Publishing, 2005), 157-227), most are not aware of this important philosophical debate. For two additional scholarly sources to this topic not mentioned by Naor, see the important unpublished paper of Professor Lawrence Kaplan, "On the Boundary between Old and New: The Correspondence Between Moses Mendelssohn and R. Jacob Emden," delivered at the Jewish Thought in the Eighteenth Century conference, Harvard University (Spring 1984), and the extensive discussion in chapter seven of Jacob J. Schacter, "Rabbi Jacob Emden: Life and Major Works," (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1988), 661-747 ("The Emden-Mendelssohn Correspondence"), and see esp. 720n3 for citations to previous descriptions of the correspondence, and also 725n37, 726n48, 742n150, 743n165, 744n168, where he discusses Kaplan's paper. Naor adds much to this topic. After these discussions, Naor then provides insights on the various Parshiyot ha-Torah that implicate Noahide laws especially before Matan Torah. Again the topics covered and, more importantly, the manner in which they are covered are terrific in scope and depth. His command of the "Yeshivish" sources along with Kabbalah (pp.97-102) and hasidut is excellent. Although much has been written on this topic of seven Noahide commandments especially before Matan Torah including a massive sefer (in size) called Birkot Avot and a recent pamphlet Mebei Medrasha from R. K. Redisch, Naor brings many new things to the table not dealt with before.
Here to he has many great footnotes scattered throughout the sefer some strictly for the sake of a very side footnote one such example is on pp. 5-6 about the Tosafot Yom Tov which writes (Nazir 5:5):והכוונה בודאי ממאמר מי שלא נתקיימו דבריו הוא מה שאמרנו עכ"ל. ונתקיימו דבריו. אע"פ שבגמרא לא פירשו כן. הואיל לענין דינא לא נפקא מינה ולא מידי. הרשות נתונה לפרש. שאין אני רואה הפרש בין פירוש המשנה לפירוש המקרא שהרשות נתונה לפרש במקראות כאשר עינינו הרואות חבורי הפירושים שמימות הגמ'. אלא שצריך שלא יכריע ויפרש שום דין שיהא סותר דעת בעלי הגמ':   He brings a few sources that a סברא is דאורייתא (p.78 n.180) Just to add one obscure source to his list see R. Avraham Grodzensky in Torat Avraham (p.264) who writes:גם סברת האדם ושכלו הפשוט כמקרא מפורש הוא, ואדרבה כל סברא פשוטה ביותר מפורש הוא ביותר כאשר נבאר איתא בב"ק (מו:) מניין להמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה… מתקיף לה רב אשי הא למה לי קרא סברא הוא… קושיא זו של רב אש אינה על סברא שדעת התורה והשקפתה כלולה בה, אלא על סברא פשוטה שהולה מבקש את הרופא מפני שמרגיש את כאביו ואל סברא זו מקשה…
One point of interest although this could really be nothing when Naor quotes Mendelssohn (pp.16-34) and Weisel (p. 19 n. 48, 200-203) in the text of the sefer he brings there name in abbreviation one suspects it has to do with fear for citing their names openly only in the notes (p.22 n.51) which much less people read does he quote Mendelssohn by full name.

On page 69 he deals with a Rambam who says יראה לי explaining that when ever the Rambam uses such language he is saying his own hiddush. It is surprising that although through out  this work Naor demonstrates great bekiyut in the works of the Aderet here he does not mention in the notes that he composed a work on all the Rambam's that say יראה לי recently reprinted by Ahavat sholom called Teshuvah Meyerah and more importantly he deals with this Rambam. One weakness is neither of these two works in the volume have an index which would have been rather useful as there are many many topics of interest in this sefer and one can not find them easily.   

Finally, it is worth noting that the book itself is rather nice to look at in part due to the color cover depicting a Spanish synagogue scene from the period of the Rashba. All in all this work is well worth owning and reading carefully.

The book is available in Jewish bookstores in Baltimore, Boston, New York and Pittsburgh or via the Orot website, with a special offer here.  

Haskamot (rabbinical approbations) to Hebrew books have an very interesting history.  There are a few different forms of haskamot, perhaps the most important form is that which granted the author and/or publisher a copyright. Typically, the haskamah would prohibit republishing the particular book for a period of ten or fifteen years, etc.  In some instances, it was not only the particular book but any book in the field. For example, the haskamah to R. Yom Tov Lipmann Heller's edition of the Mishna with his commentary, Tosefot Yom Tov (Prague 1617) provides that "it is prohibited from printing any Mishnayot with any commentary for four years."[1] The history of this particular form haskamah begins with the approbation that appears on the first Rabbinic bible (Venice 1517).  As Jordan Penkower has previously provided, the approbation which appears at the end of Chronicles states that it is  forbidden [for] any one under the penalty of excommunication and also the loss of the books in the territories of the Holy Roman Church, to print or cause to be printed these books with the Targum or without the Targum and the Hebrew Commentaries of the Bible for the space of ten years from 1515.[2]This approbation is somewhat unique for Hebrew books as it was not given by a Rabbi but instead by Pope Leo X. Indeed, the version of this bible which contains this approbation was also dedicated to the Pope. Felix Pratensis, the editor and former Jew (he became a Augustin monk), explains in the dedication that the very idea of including the Targumim is favorable to the Church.  He explains that  the text we have added the ancient Hebrew and Chaldee Shcola, to wit the common Targum and that of Jerusalem.  These contain many obscure and recondite mysteries, not only useful, but necessary to the devout Christian.  We have wished with good reason to publish the whole under the sanction of your name [Leo X], for whereas on this book the foundation and the entire superstructure of Christianity rests, you are revered by us as the chief head of the Christian Church on earth and no one can deny the appropriateness of the dedication to you of our work.  Another odd approbation appears in the book printed much later in Lemberg, 1878.  This book, Peni Abraham, authored by R. Abraham Abba Seelenfreund includes approbations dated years before the book was ever published. For example, R. Meir Perles' approbation is dated 1852.  But, that approbation is not unique in the history of approbations.  In fact, the first Ashkenazik approbations, appearing in R. Shlomo Luria's Hakmat Shlomo (Krakow 1581) contains the approbation of R. Kalman of Worms dated 1542.  Instead, the odd approbation is that of R. Yitzhak Meir Alter, the Gerrer Rebbi otherwise known as the Hiddushei ha-Rim.  The reason this approbation is odd does have to do with the date.  Specifically, it is dated, Rosh Hodesh Tamuz, 1870.  The problem is that R. Alter died some four years earlier on the 23 of Adar 1866!  Now it is possible that instead of 5630 (1870) it should read 5620 (1860) and the letter Chuf was inadvertently changed to a Lamed, but in all events, it is a rather interesting slip of the pen.[3]    Now, it is not only the approbation that is of interest, in fact, R. Seelenfreund himself was somewhat of a character. According to the brief biography by R. Yekutiel Yehuda Greenwald,[4] R. Seelenfreund ended up divorcing his first wife during sheva Berakhot.  Additionally, although R. Seelenfreund was the Rabbi in Zaloshick (Poland) for a period of time, in 1875 he took a position in Kosice, Hungary for a short period of time.  While R. Seelenfreund was considered Ultra-Orthodox, as the term was used by the Hungarians, Kosice, as were many cities in Hungry was split between three Jewish factions, Reform, Ultra-Orthodox and Status Quo.  R. Seelenfreund was appointed Rabbi of the Status Quo  synagogue and thought that his relationships with Ultra-Orthodox Rabbis would allow him to remain to be viewed as such.  Indeed, on his first sefer, Pras Avot (Lemberg 1865), he obtained the approbation of R. Yosef Shaul Nathanson.  It was R. Nathanson's suggestion for the title of the book to be Pras Avot. It appears that R. Seelenfreund, however, was very wrong in his calculation regarding Kosice. He eventually left Kosice and returned to Zaloshick but not before relationships between himself and the community broke down.  He even published a small book, Kol Shover Shekarim (Kosice 1878) to defend himself.  It is unclear why much of this history of R. Seelenfreund does not appear in Cohen's biography of R. Seelenfreund from Hakmei Hungaria.[5]  It appears that Cohen was unaware that R. Seelenfreund left Kosice or that he published Kol Shover Shekarim.  

Y. Meiselman, Ha-Noten Sheleg, Be-Inyanei ha-Sheleg veha-Kerach be-Halacha, Holon, 2001, 266 pp.With winter approaching, a review of a work devoted to the topic of snow is particularly appropriate.  While everyone is familiar with R. Zevin's discussion of the halachik use of snow in his Le-Or ha-Halacha, R. Zevin only took his discussion so far. Today, we now have a work that is entirely devoted to snow and halacha.  This book, which is on Orach Hayyim and volumes on the other sections of Shulchan Orach are planned.  Indeed, the author in his introduction is aware how silly books devoted to a single topic can be and offers some justification for composing this work. This somewhat unique in so far as the author is at least willing to admit and deal with the problems with single subject works.  That is, there is no issue with writing a book on all of hilchos shabbos which incorporate something about snow.  What becomes problematic is when one takes a single subject and merely culls from other books what they have to say about it.  For example, is there any need for a book I once came across that is hundreds of pages on the "halachos" of walking in front of someone praying?  In this case, however, the author appears to have succeeded in producing a valuable work.   As one would expect with a book devoted to a singular halacha, it covers every possible aspect of snow. The first section collects every mention of snow in Tanakh and the Talmud.  Additionally, he collects stories that are centered around snow. A common theme is that many great people felt shoveling snow was not beneath their dignity.  For example, he has two stories one with R. Chaim Volozhin and the other with the Chofetz Hayyim which are similar.  In both, whenever it would snow all the paths in the morning would be cleared by these great Rabbis.  The author then ensures that his readers are actually aware of the phenomena that will be discussed so he provides the scientific definitions of snow, ice, and hail.    The book then turns to the halachik questions.  It covers the obvious ones like shoveling snow on shabbos, using snow for ritual hand washing etc. as well as some more esoteric topics like skiing on shabbos.  Additionally, as appears to be de rigueur today, the final section are questions and responses from R. Chaim Kenifsky. The author explains that many of the questions he asked R. Chaim were not novel and instead asked questions that had been discussed previously – one assumes to see if R. Chaim agreed or disagreed with the prior opinions.   Although the author claims his book is merely a collection of sources, in fact it is much more.  The author after collecting the various sources on a particular topic analysis the sources and actually is unafraid to come to his own conclusions.  This is especially surprising as so many authors are afraid of ever actually giving a conclusion for fear that someone will think it makes sense and follow it.  Rather, we typically get inane disclaimers on seforim that are devoted to halacha that in fact it is not a halachik work.  Indeed, in the case of this book, in some cases the author appears to disagree with the conclusion of R. Kenifsky.  Because of the author's willingness to actually offer opinions the book is a much more satisfying read, one not only gets a list of sources (many of which should be well-known) but also the reader can begin to see where the potential flaws are and come to their own conclusions.   Turning to the particulars, the author allows for shoveling snow on Shabbat, salting icy walkways, and even skiing (when he asked R. Chaim about skiing, R. Chaim admitted that he didn't know what it was, the author then showed him pictures of people skiing).  Many of these laws start with a discussion of the well-known pronouncement of the Mahram of Rottenberg that one can urinate on snow on Shabbat.  One area that he takes a restrictive view is not really related to winter but ice.  That is, he questions squeezing or mashing freeze pops or other frozen snacks on Shabbat due to the prohibition of mesarek.  Additionally, the author expends considerable energy on the burning question for most kids – can one make and throw snowballs on Shabbat. See 7:3 and Miluim no. 3. On this issue there is a split amongst the authorities.  The author in the additions in the back attempts to find additional support for those who allow for making and throwing snowballs on Shabbat.  He also discusses whether one can make snowmen (which he prohibits).   In all, the book is an enjoyable read that provides the starting point for an serious discussion regarding the halachot implicated by snow.  

Review: Me'achsanya Shel ha-Torahby Eliezer Brodt Me'achsanya Shel ha-Torah, Rabbi Moshe Hubner, ed., New York, 2008, 297 pp.   As mentioned in the past, there is an austounding amount of seforim being published.  One genre, that is bursting at the seams, is sefarim on Chumash. There are seforim printed from famous people; some are still with us, while others have been gone for many years. These seforim focus on all kinds of topics: mussar, machashavah, pshat, kabbalah, d'rush, and halachah. In truth, it is virtually impossible to keep up with what is printed. I would, however, like to mention just one such sefer printed this year: Me'achsanya Shel ha-Torah. This sefer is composed of three generations of Torah from the Hubner family. Most notably, Rabbi Shmuel Hubner, z"l, who was a big Rav for many years; ybl"ch, his son, Rabbi Y. Hubner; and his grandson, Rabbi Moshe Hubner, a young author who is frequently featured in the Hamodia Magazine Torah section. This sefer contains many interesting pieces on Chumash, some short and many long, representing unique and interesting topics and styles in learning. Aside from the many interesting chiddushim presented, it is worthwhile to note the mention of many rare and exotic sefarim quoted as sources throughout the work. As in almost any sefer, a variety of interesting content can be found apart from the actual body of the work. I would like to mention just a few of the interesting discussions I found in this sefer.  The sefer begins with a very nice but straight to the point biography of Rabbi Shmuel Hubner, written by his son, Rabbi Y. Hubner. This biography was based on stories heard from Rabbi Shmuel Hubner throughout his lifetime (1891-1983). Rabbi S. Hubner  made his rounds in Europe, meeting many different gedolim (almost like a Forrest Gump). (One gets the impression that there are many more nice stories that should have been printed here.) Just to mention some of the facts mentioned: Rabbi S. Hubner attended the levayah of Harav Yosef Engel, zt"l, and heard the famous hesped of Harav Meir Arik, zt"l, who said on Rav Engel that he was a baki in all areas of Torah, Bavli Yerushalmi, Tosefta, etc., to which Rav Steinberg, the Brode Rav, asked him if he wasn't perhaps exaggerating a bit. Rav Arik replied that it was one hundred percent true, and there was no exaggeration involved.  Rav Hubner studied at the Berlin Seminary and heard shiurim from Harav Chaim Heller, zt"l. He was in Vienna when the Rogatchver Gaon, zt"l, passed away and he visited with him a bit before he died. He heard the Rogatchver expound on some topics in the parashah based on his well-known and unique methods of thought and assessment. Rabbi Hubner was the rebbi of the well-known scholar and writer, ybl"ch, Rabbi Tuviah Preschel.   After the war, Rabbi S. Hubner was a Rav in Brooklyn. Over the years he printed many pieces on all kinds of topics in the various Torah journals. Eventually, he collected many of them that related to practical halachah and printed them in a sefer entitled Sh"ut Nimukei Shmuel. This sefer received very warm haskamos from Harav Moshe Feinstein, zt"l, and Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt"l. Some of the pieces have been reprinted in Me'achsanya Shel ha-Torah, along with many new pieces found in Rabbi Hubner's many personal journals, which have never before been printed. This leads to a now-famous discussion regarding divrei Torah left behind after a person's petirah. In particular, if the mechaber did not leave instructions as to whether his writings should be printed, is his family permitted to do so? Another issue is, do these pieces carry weight in halachah, since the writer might have changed his mind before he passed away. An additional questioned is, if the mechaber specified not to print his writings, must his family adhere to his wishes? Much has been written on these topics, but Rabbi M. Hubner found information in his grandfather's notes addressing this very issue, which he included in Me'achsanya Shel HaTorah. Being that Rabbi S. Hubner's answer was very original, I am quoting it here in its entirety (intro pg. 9-10):   קראתי את תשובתו שבה כת"ה שקיל וטרי באריכות בנידון השאלה אם יש לשמוע להמחבר שציוה שלא לפרסם את כתביו הכוללים חידושים ותשובות. ואחרי שכת"ה מביא צדדי היתר וצדדי איסור הוא מגיע למסקנת שאין לשמוע לצוואת המחבר ויש להדפיס את כתביו. לע"ד נראה שיש לחקור ולמצוא טעמו ונימוקו של המחבר מפני מה הוא ציוה שלא להדפיס את כתביו ופסק הדין בשאלה זו תלוי בנימוקו של המחבר. דעתי זו מיוסדת על דברי הח"ס באו"ח סי' ר"ח שכתב וז"ל : כל המחבר ספר ומתערב במחשבתו לגדל שמו רבצה בו האלה האמורה במילי דאבות : נגיד שמא אבד שמא (פרקי אבות פ"א מי"ג) ולא תעשינה ידיו תושיה להוציא מחשבתו לפועל, כי יבוא מבקרי מומין ויחפשו וימצאו, מלבד שהוא עובר איסור דאורייתא דברים שבעל פה אי אתה רשאי לכותבן, ולא הותר אלא משום עת לעשות לה', (גיטין ס א) ואם איננו עושה לה' הרי איסורו במקומו עומד. לעומת זה מי שיודע בעצמו כי כל מגמתו לשם הית"ב, להגדיל תורה ולהדירה ורק מונע בר מפני חשש מבקרי מומין ומלעיגים ומלעיבים במלאכי ה' עבירה היא בידו, וכשם שיקבל עונש על הדרישה הנ"ל [אם אינה לשם שמים], כן ייענש זה על הפרישה, עכ"ל. בדברי החתם סופר הללו נמצאת התשובה על השאלה דמר. אם הציווי של המחבר שלא לפרסם את כתביו נבע מן החשש הראשון הנזכר בדברי הח"ס אז לדעתי מצוה לקיים דברי המת ולא להדפיסם, כי לב יודע מרת נפשו, ואין היורשים רשאים לעבור על צוואתו, כי ע"י הדפסת הספר יעשו רעה להמחבר, ואילו היה חי היה מורה בכל תוכף נגד ההדפסה, ועכשיו שאינו יכול למחות פסק הדין צריך למנוע מעשות לו עול. ואם ישאלני איך אפשר עכשיו לידע מה היה הנימוק שבגללו אסר את הפירסום ? אשיבנו שזה אפשר להכיר מתוך תשובותיו. אם דברי הח"ס מובאים בתשובותיו ובחידושיו, אז קרוב לודאי שגם תשובה זו היתה ידועה לו והיא היא שהניעה והביאה אותו לידי כך שיאסור לפרסם את כתביו. ברם אף אם דברי הח"ס אינם מובאים בתשובותיו אפשר ואפשר שתשובות הח"ס ובתוכן גם התשובה הנ"ל היו ידועות לו, שכן לא יצוייר שמחבר תשובות לא ישתמש בתשובות הח"ס. בהתחשבות עם זה לבי מהסס להתיר הפרסום. הדבר שונה אם הנימוק העיקרי לצוואתו לא היה החשש הנ"ל אלא מטעם אחר כגון מפני חשש המבקרים או מפני שהיה מיראי הוראה, אז רשאי או יותר נכון מצוה להדפיס את כתביו כמפורש בדברי הח"ס שהבאתי לעיל. והנני להביא עוד ראיות לכך : בספר חסידים סי' תתקל כתב מי שגילה לו ה' דבר ואינו כותבו הוא גוזל את הרבים כדכתב סוד ה' ליראיו ובריתו להודיעם. ובשבט סופר (פ' כב) דעתיד אדם ליתן דין וחשבון על זה שאינו כותב חידושיו. ובספר מור וקציעה סי' רכג כתב דמי שגומר ספר בכתיבה וכל שכן בהדפסה יש לו לברך ברכת שהחיינו שכן עושין שמחה לגמרה של תורה, שאין שום קנין ובניו שיש בו שמחה יותר מזה. וכן מצינו ביבמות (צו ב) שדוד המלך התפלל אגורה באהלך עולמים (תהל' סא) וכי אפשר לאדם בשני עולמים ? אלא דוד אמר לפני הקב"ה רבונו של עולםל יהי רצון שיאמרו דבר שמועה מפי בעוה"ז. וכמו שאמר רשב"י כל ת"ח שאומרים דבר שמועה מפיו בעולם הזה שפתותיו דובבות בקבר. העיקר בנידון זה, לידע מאיזה טעם המחבר ציווה שלא לפרסם את כתביו.     Another very interesting discussion found in this sefer (pp. 264-66) is a piece about the authorship of Lecha Dodi. Being that I have never seen or heard a discussion of anyone denying that Harav Shlomo Alkebetz, zt"l, authored the tefilah, I feel it is worthwhile to quote this piece in part. Rabbi S. Hubner knew an interesting person named Reb Meir Sokel, who suggested to him as follows:    רק שני החרוזים הראשונים נכתבו ע"י שלמה אלקבץ, שבהם הוא שר על קדושת שבת. אבל שאר החרוזים, שבהם שוב אין זכר לשבת, ואין להם כל קשר לחרוזים הראשונים, הם מעשה ידי מזייף והם מכוונים לאיזה "איש הנערץ והנקדש", אישיות מהוללה ומפוארה, שאליה מדבר המזייף בלשון נקבה – כלומר המזייף מטיף בהם לנצרות באורח מוסווה… מאיר סוקל מסיק שהשיר "לכה דודי" לא יוכל להיכלל בשירי ישראל, ורק מתוך אי-ידיעה ואי-הבחנה הוכנס השיר לסדר התפילה ויש להימנע, לדעתו, מלאמרו. To which Rabbi S. Hubner replied to him at length:  א- השיר "לכה דודי", כמו שהוא לפנינו נדפס בפעם הראשונה בפראג בספר "ארחות חיים" בשנת שע"ב כשלושים שנה אחר פטירת המשורר. ולא יתכן כי בזמן שבני דורו של המשורר היו עוד בחיים יהיה איש לזייף באופן גס כזה, ישאיר רק שני חרוזים מקוריים ואת החרוזים האחרים ימיר בחרוזיו "החשודים", והזיוף לא הוכר ואיש לא מחה כנגדו. ב- דבר ידוע הוא שהאר"י [האשכנזי – ר' יצחק לוריא] שהמשורר הסתופף בצלו, בחר בשירי אלקבץ מפני שנכתבו על דרך האמת. והלא בזמן שנדפס השיר שהוא לפנינו היה ר' חיים ויטאל, איש סודו ותלמידו הגדול של האר"י עוד בחיים. אם כן איך אפשר הדבר, שר' חיים ויטאל לא הדגיש בזיוף ובשינוי שאיש בליעל ביצע בשירו של אלקבץ, שהאר"י בחר בו, וציין אותו כשיר שנכתב על דרך האמת, והשינוי נתקבל ? ג- מאיר סוקל קובע שהחרוזים האחרונים של השיר לא יצאו מתחת ידו של אלקבץ, שהרי אין להם שום קשר לחרוזים הראשונים. מסקנתו של מ. ס. בנויה על הנחות בלתי נכונות. לאמיתו של דבר אין כאן סטיה מן הענין, החרוזים האחרונים מחוברים וקשורים אל הראשונים. עובדה היסטורית היא שאלקבץ, אחר בואו מאדריאנופול לצפת, הצטרף לחבורה הקדושה שהתקבצה מסביב להאר"י. בין אלה היו גיסו של אלקבץ, המקובל ר' משה קורדובירו, ר' יוסף קארו [בעל השולחן ערוך], ר' משה אלשיך, ר' אליהו די וידאש [בעל ראשית חכמה] ועוד. ערגה עזה להופעתו של הגואל היתה ממלאה את לב כל אלה וכל מאוויי נפשם היו להחיש את הגאולה. חד לכוסף הגאולה, אנו מוצאים בחרוזים האחרונים של "לכה דודי". אחרי שהמשורר שר בשני החרוזים הראשונים על קדושת השבת, הוא נותן ביטוי בחרוזים האחרונים לתקוות הגאולה, שנפשו של המשורר ערגה לה כל כך. הוא פונה אל ירושלים הנקראת "מקדש מלך" (עמוס ז יג) ומנחם אותה שגאולת ה' קרובה לבוא, אחרי שבני ישראל קבלו את השבת – וזה על יסוד מאמרו של ר' שמעון בן יוחאי "אלמלי משמרין ישראל שתי שבתות כהלכתן מיד נגאלים".  כל הנימוקים האלה שהזכרתי מספיקים כבר להפריד את השערתו של מ. ס., אבל הוספתי עוד נימוק מענין והוא : הלא הרדר, מסופרי המופת בספרות הגרמנית, תרגם את השיר "לכה דודי" לגרמנית מפני חשיבותו של השיר ולא מצא בו שום דופי. גם המשורר בחסד עליון, היינריך היינה, נזדקק לשיר זה לתרגמו ולא פסל אותו בשל חוסר אחידות. והנה מ. ס. פסל תוך גישתו השכלתנית שיר שנתקדש אצל בני ישראל במשך דורות. את כל זה כתבתי לו, אבל איני יודע אם נימוקי שיכנעו אותו או עמד על דעתו.    Another discussion of interest, in a more bibliographical sense, is a chapter (pp. 271-75) written by Rabbi Tuviah Preschel. It concerns a translation of the Talmud that Rabbi Shmuel Hubner wrote while hidden away in Belgium during World War II. What is unique about this translation is that it was done in Yiddish. By 1944 (when Belgium was liberated), Masechtos Brachos, Baba Metziah and part of Bava Kama had been completed. By 1948, a few more masechtos were completed. As late as 1965, some of these volumes were already being reprinted. Due to technical reasons, the printing of these masechtos was never completed. What is interesting is that Rabbi Hubner's translation seems to have escaped the otherwise rather excellent article of  Rabbi Adam Mintz, "The Talmud in Translation" in Printing the Talmud, an updated version of his article in Torah Umadah.

Aside from these valuable pieces, there are many more to be found in Me'achsanya Shel ha-Torah. Just to note some, there is a very interesting discussion on the halachic aspects of adopting children (pp. 213-26); why the children "steal" the Afikomon on Pesach night (pp. 140-43); what reward can/does one get for learning via listening to a taped recording (p. 173)? (This question is found in the middle of a long discussion on the meaning of "שלא ברכו בתורה תחילה"); whether Hashem's shvuah to Noach not to destroy the world was only as pertains to a flood or any other means as well (pp. 31- 34); Zimri's understanding of the avodah zarah of baal pe'or (pp. 156-59); and an incredible lengthy discussion showing the historical background and logic behind the many the takonos of Ezra Hanavi (pp. 206-13).
For information regarding the sefer, Rabbi Moshe Hubner may be contacted at hubners@gmail.com.