Summer
of 2013 Book Sale

By
Eliezer Brodt

This list consists of a few parts. Part one is composed of
seforim and books printed by the Iggud. The rest of the list is composed of
seforim and books which I came across while hunting for seforim. Many of these
titles are very hard to find. Some of the prices are better than others, but
all in all I think they are fair. Almost all the books are brand new or in very
good shape. Also included in this list are over one hundred titles of academic
books that are in print but are being offered here for cheaper prices. There is
only one copy of many of these titles so they are being sold on a first
come, first serve basis. E mail your order to eliezerbrodt@gmail.com. I will than send you a bill based on
what is available. Payment will be done Via Pay Pal. Shipping is not included
in the price; that depends on the order and size, ranging between 5-9 dollars (with a few exceptions) a
book. All books will be air mailed out after I receive the money.

Feel free to ask
for details about any specific book on the list. All questions should be sent
to me at eliezerbrodt@gmail.com thank you and
enjoy.

Part of the proceeds
of
this sale will be going to help support the efforts of the Seforim blog.    

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שונות

The Kabbalat Shabbat Memorandum       Sivan 5773

by Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber

The recent rather
acrid debate on women leading the Kabbalat Shabbat service appeared, at first,
to be primarily a halachic one. But it soon overflowed into additional areas,
revealing it as a clearly political polemic. Indeed, I found the whole
discussion which appeared on a whole series of blogs, and a major published
article, most astonishing. We are not talking about women reading the Torah
and/or having aliyot. The criticisms raised against this practice I can well
appreciate, though I disagree with them and have sought to refute them.

But here we are
talking about a practice first established in the latter years of the 16th
cent., among a small group of people, disciples of the Ari ha-Kadosh in Safed,
which took place outside the confines of the synagogue looking over the hills
and watching the sunset, and reciting some psalms and piyyutim. It gradually
spread to other venues, first being practiced outside the synagogue in the
courtyard, and, later, when in the synagogue, recited at the bimah, rather
than the chazan’s lectern, clearly to emphasize its different status from the Maariv
service. In many communities there is no sheliah tzibbur leading the
service; rather the congregants sing the Psalms together. Indeed, in small
communities often the service begins even before there is a minyan of
ten men, and the congregation wait for the requisite number in order to say Barchu.

But the debate
about Kabbalat Shabbat was intended to have far broader implications,
for, by the same argument it would also disallow women to lead Pesukei
de-Zimra, for example. Indeed, this tendentious aim is overtly revealed by
yet another argument put forward, namely that a Shaliah tzibbur must
have a full beard; something that obviously excludes women, (Shulhan
Aruch 53:6). The reason given is the dignity of the congregation, kevod
ha-tzibbur, which is clearly irrelevant in present day society.  Both the Maharam Mi-Rotenberg and the Rashba
agree that the congregation can waive this requirement.  The original ruling applied only to
permanent shlichei tzibbur, not to occasional readers, and, on occasion,
even a thirteen-year old, who has reached maturity may lead the service.
Additionally, the Biur Halachah writes that this requirement may be
waived when there is no one else to fulfill this function. And finally, this
restriction referred to very specific prayers, such as Keriat Shema, on
fast-days in Eretz Yisrael because of drought, and The High Holidays. In any
case, nowadays hardly any synagogue requires its reader to be bearded; even
American Rabbis are often clean-shaven, because the plain meaning of that
ruling is that a service should be led by one who is mature, i.e.
post-bar-mitzvah. And a thirty-year old without a beard is fully eligible to
serve as a shaliah tzibbur. Indeed some of greatest hazzanim were
beardless, such as the Koussevitzky brothers, Mosheh, David, Jacob and Simhah,
Leibele Waldman, Leibele Glanz, Zavel Kwartin, Shmuel Malavsky, to list only a
few of the best-known names.

Two additional
arguments were put forward. Firstly, that for Kabbalat Shabbat, the Shaliah
Tzibbur wears a tallit. This, of course, is in the case where there
is a Shaliah Tzibbur. Now according to the Magen Avraham (Orah
Hayyim 18:1) citing the Bayit Hadash (Bah) one really should
remove the tallit one is wearing when one says Barechu since it is night
and one does not wear tzitzit at night. And so many Aharonim
specifically rebuked those who wore a tallit at night. However, those
who did so, did so because of kabbalistic reasons related to Kevod Shabbat,
and not kevod ha-tzibbur. Indeed, there were even those who wore a
tallit for kiddush at home, and kiddush at home is hardly a tefillat
tzibbur or rabbim, (see J. Levy, Minhag Yisrael Torah 1,
Brooklyn 1994, pp.87-88).

The second point
raised was, curiously enough, from R. David Sperber, my grandfather’s Teshuvot:
Afrakasta de-Anya, (3rd ed, Israel 2002, vol.4, p.215). There he
says that if one cannot find a minyan, at least try to pray with two
other people, since this would constitute a tefillat rabbim, which is
more readily accepted by God. He derives this from a passage in Hayyei Adam
(Klal 68:11) who says that every mitzvah which can be done be-haburah
in a group, should be so done, and not as an individual, because “the
greater the number of people, the greater is the honour to the king.” If
three people give tzedakah, does that make it a rabbim? If three
people declaim Psalms together does that make it a tefillat rabbim?
Surely the term my grandfather zt”l used was not intended to give a
special status to the group of three, but merely to say that such a mitzvah
or prayer is more acceptable before the Holy One Blessed be He, than that of a
single individual. (His other reference to vol.2 p.211 is quite irrelevant to
this issue.)

(On a personal
note, I might add, that in order fully to understand my sainted grandfather’s
ruling, one has to appreciate his particular brand of hassidic piety, which was
a blend of halachah, kabbalah and a special brand of hassidut. See my father’s
introduction in his Michtam le-David on the Torah.

His belief in the
efficacy of prayers was all so evident to anyone who saw him in prayer.  I served him in his latter years and
received my semichah from him.)

Now my learned
colleagues knew all these facts, which are plainly evident to anyone who is
conversant with the relevant sources. Nonetheless, they chose to disregard
them, or to reinterpret them in a forced fashion.

So looking more
closely at the discussion, it becomes evident that rather than this being a
genuinely halachic debate, it is more a socio-political polemic, built on shaky
grounds and dressed in the somewhat misleading garb of halachic disquisition.

(And see now the
very significant comments of Prof. Marc B. Shapiro, (link), and Rabbi Zev Farber’s responses to Rabbi R. Freundel’s articles.)

Another note on
Women’s aliyot.

One of the
central points of controversy between those who permit women’s aliyot and those
who do not, is the understanding of the critical text in B. Megillah 23a which
states that “all are counted among the seven aliyot, even women and
children. But the Rabbis said: ‘A woman should not read the Torah because of
the dignity of the community’ “. It is this final section that is the main
source of the controversy. Some have claimed that “But the Rabbis said: A
woman should not read…” is an absolute decree that cannot be changed.
Others – myself included – have argued that this is advice, rather than a
decree, limited by the principle of “the dignity of the community”.
That is to say, if there is no such slight on the community, the advice becomes
irrelevant. I argued that most of the places where the phrase “But the
Rabbis said” may be understood as “advice” and not
“decree”. Recently Ephraim Bezalel Halivni sought to show that in
many instances “But the Rabbis said” should clearly be understood as
a “decree” formulation. However, he himself (Studies in Liturgy
and Reading The Torah, Jerusalem 2012, p.160) agrees that there are examples
where this phrase can be understood as “advice”. Hence, even
according to his position, he will have to agree that it is possible
that in our Megillah text “But the Rabbis said” may be advice. In
other words there is an element of uncertainty (safek) as to the precise
interpretation of that text.

And even if we
were to interpret it, as have some, as a decree, it is a decree with a reason.
Now there exists a well-known controversy between Rambam and Raavad as to
whether when the reason for a decree is no longer relevant the decree is still
in force; Rambam says yes, and Raavad disagrees. It is true that in such
controversies we follow the Rambam; however, it is equally true that it is not certain
that he is correct.  Perhaps the
Raavad’s position is more correct. In other words, there still exists an
element of uncertainty (a safek) as to who is right. It is just that in
accordance with certain pragmatic rules of halachic adjudications (pesak),
we follow the ruling of Rambam.

Moreover, R.
Yosef Messas added a further consideration, arguing that even according to the
view of Rambam, this principle only applies where there is a fear that the
original reason could be relevant in the future. But in a case where there is
little or no reason to think that the reason will resurface, the original
prohibitions may be disregarded, (Otzar Michtavim 1, 454; cf. Marc B.
Shapiro, Conversations 7, 2010, p.101). Here too, we may be fairly
certain that in our modern society the dignity of the community will not be
impugned by a woman’s aliyah even in the future, in addition to which, we have
already pointed out that a community can, according to both the Maharam
Mi-Rotenburg and the Rashba, forgo their dignity should they so wish.

Now, I cannot say
that R. Messas’ interpretation is necessarily correct.  There exists a safek, in fact, a
triple sfek sfeka: (i) what is the correct interpretation of B.
Megillah’s phrase, (ii) whether to rule like Rambam or the Raavad, and (iii) even
if one follows Rambam, should we accept R. Messas’ interpretation that it
applies even when there is little or no reason to think that the reason will
resurface.

Without going
into all the details of the very complex kuntres sfek-sfeka, surely here
we should rule: sfek sfeka le-kula, most leniently, admitting the
permissibility of women’s aliyot, especially when added to all our other
arguments.

Final Note

And finally, a
somewhat pedagogical comment. The Beit Yosef, of R. Yosef Caro in Yoreh Deah
242 writes:

It is forbidden for a hacham to give a ruling permitting
something which looks strange, for the masses will see this as permitting the
forbidden.

He bases himself
on Hagahot Maimoniyot to Rambam Hilchot Talmud Torah chapter 5 sect.6.  Now almost all innovations look strange, and
can easily be understood as permitting the forbidden . And indeed this is the
ruling in Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:10. (And see Beur ha-Gra ibid. sect. 21
for Talmudic sources.) But the Shach (Siftei-Chen) ad loc. sect.17 modifies
this statement as follows:

It would appear that this [refers to a case] where he permitted
[something] without any explanation [for his ruling] – setam – and
indeed so it appears from the proofs he brings from Hagahot Maimoniyot and B.
Sanhedrin 5ab… and B. Nidah 20a…, and the beginning of B. Berachot (3 b)…  But if he tells the questioner the reason
for his ruling, and explains to him his arguments (ומראה
לו פנים), or if he brings
evidence from the book, it is permitted.

And the Beer
Heiteiv brings this in abbreviated form. (See also note 8, ad loc. in Otzar
Mefarshim in the Machon Yerushalayim [Friedman] ed. of the Shulhan Aruch.)

This indicates to
us very clearly that all the changes that we are advocating must not only be
firmly based in our canonic sources, but also clearly presented to the general
public.

Book
week 2013

By:
Eliezer Brodt

Book week just began in
Eretz Yisrael. As I have written in previous years every year in Israel, around
Shavous time, there is a period of about ten days called Shavuah Hasefer – Book
Week (see here, here here, here  here and here). Many of the companies
offer sales for the whole month. Shavuah HaSefer is a sale which takes
place all across the country in stores, malls and special places rented out
just for the sales. There are places where strictly “frum” seforim are sold and
other places have most of the secular publishing houses. Many publishing houses
release new titles specifically at this time. In my reviews I sometimes include
an older title if I just noticed the book. As I have written in the past, I do
not intend to include all the new books. Eventually some of these titles will
be the subject of their own reviews. I try to include titles of broad interest.
Some books I cannot provide much information about as I just glanced at them
quickly. Some books which I note, I can provide Table of contents if requested,
via e mail.

As this list shows
although book publishing in book form has dropped greatly worldwide, Academic
books on Jewish related topics are still coming out in full force.

I have also included
some academic books that came out this year but are not being sold at
book week.

Additionally this year I
am offering a service, for a small fee to help one purchase these titles (or
titles of previous years). For more information about this email me at
Eliezerbrodt-at-gmail.com. Part of the proceeds will be going to support the
efforts of the the Seforim Blog.

Bar Ilan University has many excellent
new titles this year.

Merkaz Zalman Shazar has some new titles.

This year at the Shazar
booth there are some otherwise hard to track down some books related to Poland
from Tel Aviv University available for some very reduced prices amongst the
titles of interest are;

א. החדר מחקרים תעודות פרקי ספרות וזכרונות עמנואל
אטקס ודוד אסף (עורכים)

ב. זיכרונות יחזקאל קוטיק דוד אסף (מהדיר) שני
חלקים

ג. פנקס פתוח, מרדכי נדב

ד. קרקא קזימייז קראקוב, אלחנן ריינר (עורך)

ה. בין זיכרון להכחשה, יואל רבא

ו.אלכסנדר גוטרמן, קהילות ורשה בין שתי מלחמות
העולם, אוטונומיה לאומית בכבלי החוק המציאות 1917-1939

ז. גל עד- כרך כג.

 The Bialik Institute
has many new titles, amongst them:

Machlelet Herzog has some new titles:

Magnes has many new
titles:

 Reuven Mass has some new titles worth mentioning:

Mechon
Ben Tzvi
has some new important titles:  

           

Kibutz Hamuchad has a few good titles
this year:

Shocken –JTS has special
sales on older titles:

A new face
at book week was Machlelet Efrata. Worth mentioning is:

Carmel Publishers has
some new titles:

Yeddiot Seforim has a few nice titles:

After being out of print
for years this classic is back in print.

Some Random Academic
stuff not at the book week:

Some older excellent
titles of Mercaz Shazar I thought worth mentioning:

Partnership Minyanim and More

Marc B. Shapiro

1. A few people have wanted me to comment on the recent debate between Rabbis Barry Freundel and Zev Farber about the so-called Partnership Minyanim in which women lead Kabbalat Shabbat. See here. The issue goes back to R. Freundel’s article in Tradition 44:2 (2011) on the topic. I was planning to respond to this article when it first appeared, and even wrote some pages, but I never completed the piece. Since the issue has once again surfaced, now is a good time to deal with it. Some of what I will say was also stated by an anonymous commenter on the Torah Musings blog, but both R. Zev Farber and Lazer Kaganovitch can testify that I sent them these points before the commenter posted anything, so I see no reason not to record my thoughts. (I should also note that this anonymous commenter, while pointing out errors and misreadings by R. Freundel, did not show proper respect in recording his criticisms.)

In his article, R. Freundel argues against the Partnership Minyanim with an original approach. Rather than summarize his viewpoint in my own words, this quotation sets forth his thesis, which the article attempts to prove:

In those communities which do not employ a Hazan for Kabbalat Shabbat, that lack would indicate that they view this liturgy as neither mandatory nor communal. Nonetheless, putting a woman (and maybe a child) into the role of Hazan would still be problematic. Adding a Hazan makes the prayer mandatory and communal but women and possibly children cannot lead a mandatory communal prayer. As a result, even in a setting that currently has no Hazan, the innovation of using a Hazan who cannot serve as a Hazan for communal prayer creates a halakhic dissonance that is unsustainable.

This is quite an argument and if it could be sustained, then it would be a significant contribution to the debate. However, in my opinion, and the opinion of everyone I know who has examined the issue, R. Freundel’s argument is completely unconvincing. There is simply no way that having a person read a few paragraphs of Psalms or more recent compositions before some other people makes the prayer “mandatory” and “communal.”

Before getting into some particulars of R. Freundel’s piece, let me offer a more general criticism. Reading the article I was troubled by the author’s need to come up with a halakhic argument to forbid that which pretty much everyone can see is not a halakhic matter at all (apart from possible halakhic concerns of tzeniut). Those who are in favor of Partnership Minyanim devote great efforts to show that there is no halakhic objection, and therefore these minyanim should be instituted, and R. Freundel is playing the same game, but from the other side. He feels that he needs to show why Partnership Minyanim are halakhically forbidden, and therefore shouldn’t be instituted.

The truth of the matter is that many of the most important things traditional Jews do and don’t do have nothing to do with halakhah. Something can be a bad idea, even a very bad idea, and deserve to be rejected even if there is no technical halakhic objection to it. As the Steipler wrote (Karyana de-Igarta [2011 ed.], vol. 2 no. 581):

יש כמה דברים שאין בכח החכם להורות איסור אע”פ שבאמת אינו נכון כלל

There are good reasons people can offer in opposition to Partnership Minyanim without falling into the “pan-halakhic” trap that everything you oppose has to be shown to be halakhically improper. Opponents of the Partnership Minyanim should be able to acknowledge that if non-bar mitzvah age boys are permitted to serve as a hazan for pesukei de-zimra or Kabbalat Shabbat then, apart from issues of tzeniut (in which I include kol ishah), there is no “technical” halakhic objection with women doing so as well. But as mentioned already, lack of a prohibition doesn’t necessarily make something a good idea. Plenty of synagogues will not let someone serve as a hazan if he is wearing jeans (or if he is not wearing a jacket or hat), yet this doesn’t mean that we need to find a technical halakhic objection for something which is at essence a matter of synagogue custom and propriety, and therefore does not need to be supported by halakhic sources. By the same token, I think we have reached the point whereby the typical Orthodox rabbi acknowledges (privately, at least) that there is no real halakhic objection to a woman rabbi, while at the same time continuing to oppose the concept (much like many oppose yoatzot halakhah). They oppose it because of how women rabbis will change the structure of traditional Judaism, change it in way they view as negative. This point can be made without using halakhic arguments that after a little investigation people will see don’t carry any weight. This is especially so in the Modern Orthodox world where there are women principals of Jewish day school, women synagogue presidents, women teachers of Talmud, women learning advanced halakhah, and no one bats an eye when a woman speaks in front of men.

For those who oppose things like women leading Kabbalat Shabbat, a weak halakhic argument is worse than no argument at all. The best tactic for the opponents is simply to keep the issue focused on what direction is best for Judaism. It is known that a number of great rabbis refused to provide halakhic reasons for particular decisions they gave, especially when the halakhic justification was weak. They chose this path precisely because they didn’t want these issues to become matters of halakhic debate, as there were other, even more important considerations guiding them. (In a future post I will give examples.) What R. Freundel’s article does is empower the proponents of Partnership Minyanim because they can rightfully say, “If this is the best our opponents can muster in terms of halakhic objections, then there really is no reason to oppose what we are doing.”

Now let’s turn to some particulars, as there are a couple of points in R. Freundel’s article that I would like to comment on. He writes:

The second oft-cited opinion in Rishonim is that of Nahmanides, who argues for obligatory twice a day recitations of the Amidah by women at Shaharit and Minha. The problem is that, despite the fact that the Mishna Berurah quotes this approach in the name of Ramban, I cannot find this opinion anywhere in Nahmanides’ writings. An examination of the section of Shulhan Arukh where Mishna Berurah makes this statement indicates that he is quoting R. Akiva Eiger.

There is a misunderstanding here. Here is the passage from the Mishnah Berurah 106:4 referred to by R. Freundel.

What the Mishnah Berurah is saying is that Nahmanides’ view is that prayer is a rabbinic commandment. The part about Anshei Keneset ha-Gedolah requiring the Amidah to be recited twice a day and that women are also obligated in this is not from Nahmanides. This is the Mishnah Berurah speaking. Contrary to what R. Freundel writes, the Mishnah Berurah is not quoting R. Akiva Eger.

           

In the next paragraph, Freundel writes:

R. Eiger cites Nahmanides from section 89 of Responsa Besamim Rosh. At one time this book was attributed to a variety of important scholars including Ramban, but now it is known to have been written by Isaac Molina in the 16th century. . . . Section 89 of Besamim Rosh tells us that women “in our area” are required to pray twice a day because “they have accepted this practice upon themselves.” This is hardly an indication that all Jewish women are required to recite the formal liturgy at Shaharit and Minha as Mishna Berurah claims.

Here is the responsum from Besamim Rosh.

It never uses the words “in our area”, and furthermore, the responsum is not from Nahmanides. It seems that R. Freundel makes the false assumption that at one time this book was attributed to Ramban because he thinks that R. Akiva Eger is citing a responsum of Ramban in Besamim Rosh. Yet Besamim Rosh was never attributed to Nahmanides nor to Isaac Molina.[1] The latter supposedly gathered the teshuvot (that is what it says on the title page, but this is part of Saul Berlin’s forgery). This means that R. Freundel’s critique of the Mishnah Berurah falls by the wayside, since the responsum in Besamim Rosh has nothing to do with the Ramban and thus nothing to do with the Mishnah Berurah’s point, which is derived from the Ramban. .

Here is the text from R. Akiva Eger.

 

In his heading he cites Ramban, but that is simply a quote from the Magen Avraham, and has nothing to do with the Besamim Rosh that he cites immediately following this. All R. Akiva Eger is doing by citing Besamim Rosh is providing another relevant text dealing with the issue under consideration, i.e., women and prayer. In R. Akiva Eger’s responsa, vol. 1, no. 9, he cites this same responsum in Besamim Rosh. (R. Akiva Eger thought that Besamim Rosh was an authentic work.[2]) 

However, how did R. Freundel ever assume that Besamim Rosh was citing Nahmanides? He never could have concluded this if he used the Machon Yerushalayim edition, which is the text I just used. He also could not have concluded this if he used one of the older editions of the Shulhan Arukh in which R. Akiva Eger’s note doesn’t even refer to Ramban. See here:

Yet here is the text as it appears in what used to be the standard edition of the Shulhan Arukh. In this edition there is a mistake in R. Akiva Eger’s text and it indeed has him stating that Nahmanides’ view is found in Besamim Rosh.

R. Freundel writes:

While all agree that women do not count towards adding Elokeinu, there is some debate about whether women can count among the three for zimmun. Nonetheless, even for those who say that women do count for the three no one suggests that a woman can lead if there are both men and women present. This is either because women’s obligation is rabbinic while men’s is Biblical or because the formal text of Birkat ha-Mazon contains references to certain mitsvot (e.g., circumcision) which are not applicable to women (emphasis added).

The passage I have underlined is incorrect. Ritva writes as follows[3]:

נשים חייבות בברכת המזון מן התורה, ולפיכך אשה מברכת לאיש על ידי זימון, או אם הוא עם הארץ להוציאו ידי חובתו כדרך שהאיש מוציאו.

See also R. Asher Ben Hayyim, Sefer ha-Pardes, ed. Blau (New York, 1984), pp. 176-177, and also the Hazon Ish, Orah Hayyim 30:8, who mentions that according to one approach in the rishonim גם הנשים רשאות לזמן כה”ג אם אין אנשים בקיאין . 

R. Freundel writes:

The presence of a Hazan was essential to Magen Avot becoming a mandatory tefillah be-tsibbur. Magen Avot became mandatory with a Hazan. . . . If the presence of a Hazan makes a prayer mandatory, then Kabbalat Shabbat, which today has a Hazan in the vast majority of synagogues, is also mandatory.

I think R. Freundel has it all backwards. The presence of a hazan never made Magen Avot mandatory. Rather, when Magen Avot was made mandatory, it was required that there be a hazan. But what does this have to do with Kabbalat Shabbat which was never made mandatory by anyone?

R. Freundel writes:

R. Kook maintained that one who has heard the repetition of the Amidah on Rosh Hodesh thereby fulfilling his tefillah be-tsibbur requirement, but who must repeat his silent Amidah because he forgot Ya’ale ve-Yavo[,] counts among the six to whom four who previously prayed are added for recitation of devarim she-bi-kedushah. His repeat prayer constitutes tefillat rabbim in that venue, which is sufficient to count him in the majority of a tsibbur that has not yet prayed. Tefillat rabbim is, therefore, not a larger form of individual prayer, rather it is a diminished form of tefillah be-tsibbur and therefore, he counts because his is a minor act of communal prayer.

This description is incorrect as R. Kook does not “maintain” that which is being attributed to him. In his responsum, Orah Mishpat, no. 23, R. Kook presents both sides of the matter and concludes וצריך בירור. What this means is that he does not make a final decision. In any event, what does this have to do with someone such as a minor or a woman leading a prayer that is not obligatory?

The larger problem of R. Freundel’s article is that he makes assumptions which are simply not in accord with the practice of Jewish communities. For example, his argument leads to the conclusion that it should be forbidden (not just inappropriate, but forbidden) for someone under bar mitzvah age to lead any part of the service. Yet this is the practice in communities all over the world. Doesn’t every Modern Orthodox synagogue have a child lead Adon Olam? R. Freundel assumes that the only reason this can be permitted is because of hinnukh considerations. That is possible, but it is just as likely permitted precisely because there is no prohibition, and it is a nice thing to do. In other words, there is no default position that it is prohibited, from which one then needs to then find a way to permit.

The Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 53, discusses the practice of children leading the congregation in maariv and those who objected. He explains that the practice can be defended since there is no repetition of the Amidah, the hazan is not fulfilling anyone’s obligation for him, and maariv is also reshut. In other words, there are no considerations of hinnukh raised here, and for the Beit Yosef there is no default position that it is prohibited, and certainly no concept of tefillat rabbim, (which is mostly a hiddush of R. Freundel). It seems to be entirely a matter of synagogue etiquette, i.e., kevod ha-tzibbur, and if this can be overcome, then there is no halakhic problem. R. Yitzhak Zilberstein even argues that in an extreme circumstance (the particular case concerned a prison) one need not protest if a non-Jew leads the maariv service![5]

Let me stress that there is nothing wrong with R. Freundel coming up with a hiddush dealing with tefillat rabbim. However, a hiddush such as this cannot be the basis for forbidding a practice such as Partnership Minyanim. To see how far R. Freundel’s model takes him, in response to criticism he even stated that it is forbidden for a woman to recite tefillat ha-derekh on behalf of men and also to lead a communal recitation of Psalms. R. Freundel assumes that this is all tefillat rabbim and therefore forbidden for a woman to lead.

I have no doubt that if you ask the typical posek about a woman reciting tefillat ha-derekh or reading a Psalm before a mixed group of men and women, he will say it should not be done, for reasons of tzeniut or mesorah. But if you ask him if it is forbidden on account of tefillat rabbim, he won’t have a clue what you are talking about. Speaking historically, there is simply no such halakhic framework, and I find it hard to believe that people are going to be convinced that if some men and women sit down to read a few Psalms together (or a liturgical text of more recent vintage) that there is a prohibition for a woman to lead the recitation. (Again, I am not referring to tzeniut issues here.). Let me just remind readers that R. Ovadiah Yosef, relying on numerous rishonim, has ruled that if necessary a woman can read the Purim megillah for men (which might arise if no men know how to read it).[6] If the halakhically obligatory Megillah can be read by women for men, with none of the poskim saying a word about a concept of tefillat rabbim, then why should people accept that there is a prohibition for a woman to lead a group of men and women in recitation of a Psalm? (I realize that one can respond that reading the Megillah is not tefillah, but it would nevertheless be strange to permit a woman to read an entire book of the Bible before a group of men, and at the same time not allow her to read even a few verses from another book, i.e., Psalms.)

There is a good deal more to say about the phenomenon of Partnership Minyanim and the strange way they came about. Before Prof. Daniel Sperber got involved, the basis for them was an article written by an otherwise unknown rabbi in the Edah Journal. I can’t help but wonder about the halakhic methodology of changing traditional Jewish practice simply because a rabbi writes an article with some suggestions. If tomorrow a rabbi, any rabbi, writes an article arguing that in today’s day and age when men and women mix freely, that there is no need for a mehitzah in prayer (after all, it is not mentioned in the Shulhan Arukh), would that then give people carte blanche to remove the mehitzah? Had this not already been an issue between the Orthodox and Conservative, and thus of great symbolic significance, I am sure the mehitzah would already have been removed in liberal Orthodox synagogues. And what about counting women in the minyan? Halakhic arguments can be advanced for this as well. Is the only reason the liberal Orthodox don’t accept R. Ethan Tucker’s and R. Micha’el Rosenberg’s arguments[7] because of their non-affiliation with Orthodoxy? If an Orthodox rabbi had advanced the same argument as them, would it then be OK to move to complete halakhic egalitarianism?[8]

2. In a previous post I wrote about the dispute over whether there is pesak in hashkafah. Only recently did I see the following relevant statement of R. Soloveitchik, The Emergence of Ethical Man, p. 6 (emphasis added).

It is certain that the fathers of the Church and also the Jewish medieval scholars believed that the Bible preached this doctrine [the separateness of man from nature]. Medieval and even modern Jewish moralists have almost canonized this viewpoint and attributed to it apodictic validity. Yet the consensus of many, however great and distinguished, does not prove the truth or falseness of a particular belief.

3. In a previous post I called attention to a bizarre segulah from R. Zvi Hirsch Kaidonover which I didn’t translate and which I suggested the police might regard as a form of sexual abuse. The text is as follows:

ועוד סגולה נפלאה לתינוק הנולד שלא יקרה עליו חולי נכפה בר מינן, מיד כשנולד ישימו בפיו ברית קודש של תינוק ויהיה ניצול כל ימיו מחולי נכפה

If you thought that this was strange, I guarantee that you will find the following, which was sent to me by a friend, even stranger.

The text comes from Meir Benayahu, Toldot ha-Ari (Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 224-225, and describes a “cure” recommended by R. Isaac Luria. The passage is too bizarre to translate. If the man who “came to the rescue” was just a man off the street it would be one thing. However, we see that it was none other than R. Moses Galante, a great sixteenth-century Torah scholar of the land of Israel who was given real semikhah by R. Joseph Karo. Even though the pre-modern mind was able to come up with all sorts of strange “cures”,  I would like to believe that the entire story is a fiction. But even if it never happened, the fact that people believed it happened tells us a great deal about their mindset.

On p. 110 n. 4, Benayahu cites the following text from R. Hayyim Vital (and note the shocking passage I have underlined):

On p. 111 he records a story that once when a lion was about to attack R. Hayyim Ben Attar

All of these texts relate to the power of circumcision, a topic that is relevant to an earlier post here where I discussed the notion that Eliezer took an oath to Abraham by placing his hand on Abraham’s circumsision.

Returning to the first story quoted from Benayahu, there is no doubt that people can believe all sorts of strange things. There is currently a situation in London where a leading rabbi is charged with inappropriate contact with women. This rabbi denies the charges. However, he has admitted, so I am informed, that he did touch women in non-sexual ways, but this was done as part of his “therapy” which he claims was halakhically permitted. Now obviously we can’t have a situation where a male therapist, or  “therapist”, is arm wrestling or massaging his female patients. In fact, after everything we have seen these last few years, I think we can all agree that there can’t be any touching.

Imagine my surprise, therefore, when in the most recent volume of Ma’ayan Omer I came across the following text:

R. Ovadiah gives permission for a kabbalist to touch a woman as part of his kabbalistic healing. R. Ovadiah requires that he wear gloves when touching her, but this is still surprising, as once such a heter is given it is not too difficult to see where this can lead..

I didn’t know what to make of the words צריכה להתפשט. Does this mean that a woman can remove all her clothes if that’s what the kabbalist needs in order to complete the healing process? (According to news reports, the Breslov figure currently in the news for sexual impropriety operated in this way). I was certain it couldn’t mean this, but then what does it mean? I wrote to R. Avraham Yosef and here is his reply.

Even with R. Avraham’s explanations, both regarding the nature of the pesak and the limited removing of clothes, it is still very difficult to stomach. But I acknowledge that this is only because of my rationalist perspective and my assumption that virtually all of these “kabbalists” are more snake oil salesmen than anything else. (R. Yitzhak Kaduri, a real kabbalist, said that an authentic mekubal does not charge money for helping people, so that immediately knocks out some of the most popular “kabbalists” who make a very good living at their craft.) However, for one who believes that a kabbalist can heal just like a doctor, then all the heterim that apply to a male doctor, including touching a woman while healing her, would also apply to a kabbalist. Skeptical as I am, I wonder why such a powerful kabbalist can’t do his healing without touching the woman.[10]

Recent years have seen a breakthrough regarding the elusive identity of “Monsieur Chouchani,” the mysterious vagabond who in the capacity of mentor, exerted such an incredibly profound effect upon the Nobel-laureate novelist Elie Wiesel as well as the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in the post-war, post-Holocaust years in France. I am referring to the identification of Chouchani as none other than Hillel Pearlman, an early student of Rav Kook in his short-lived Jaffa Yeshivah.[2]

Pivotal to the identification (which we shall not enter into here) is a letter that Rav Kook penned from exile in St. Gallen, Switzerland to two students of the Yeshivah. We offer the letter in English translation:

With the help of God

6 Tishri 5676 [i.e., 1915]

A good conclusion[3] to my beloved soul-friends, each man according to his blessing,[4] the dear “groom,” the Rabbi, sharp and encyclopedic, crowned with rare qualities and character traits, our teacher Rabbi Hillel, may his light shine; and the dear “groom,” exceptional in Torah and awe of heaven, modest and crowned with rare character traits, Mr. Meir, may his light shine.

Peace! Peace! Blessing with abundant love.

My dear friends, for too, too long I delayed the response to your dear letter. In your goodness you will give me the benefit of the doubt. Only as a result of the preoccupation brought on by the pain of exile and the heart’s longing produced by the general situation (God have mercy), were things put off.

Many thanks to you, our dear Mr. Meir, for your detailed letter, whereby you deigned in your goodness to write to us in detail the state of our family members in the Holy Land, especially the state of the girls, may they live.[5] May the Lord repay your kindness and gladden your soul with every manner of happiness and success, and may we together rejoice in the joy of the Land of Delight upon the holy soil, when the Lord will grant salvation to His world, His land and His inheritance, speedily, speedily, soon.

And you, my beloved Mr. Hillel, all power to you for your dear words, upright words pronounced with proper feeling and the longing of a pure heart. We are standing opposite a great and powerful vision previously unknown in human history. There is no doubt that changes of great value are hidden in the depths of this world vision. There is also no doubt that the hand of Israel through the spirit, the voice of Jacob,[6] must be revealed here. Far be it from us to treat as false all the deeds and events, the longing for general life, that we experienced the past years. As much as they are mixed with impurities; as much as they failed to assume their proper form, their living description, their true life—we see in them in the final analysis, correspondence to the holy vision, unmistakable signs that things are happening according to a higher plan. The hand of the Lord holds them, to pave a way for His people, weary from its multitudinous troubles, and also for His world, crouching under the weight of confused life.

It is certainly difficulty at this time to trace which is the way of the process, but in this respect we may be certain: The terrible wandering of such great and essential portions of our nation residing in Eastern Europe, where the spiritual life of Israel is concentrated, and the necessity of rebuilding physically and spiritually new communities, educational institutions and Torah academies—will bring numerous new results, certainly for good. From those new winds that have been blowing in our world for the past half-century and more, something is to be derived, if we can purify them, erecting them upon foundations of purity and holiness. The opinions and longing for spiritual and physical building of Israel; the mighty desire of building the Land and the Nation, despite external and internal obstacles; the visions tucked away in the hearts of numerous thinkers to uplift the horn of Israel and its spirit, to bind together the strength of life with the sanctity of the soul, the talent of understanding with the depth of faith, immediate implementation with longing for salvation—all these are things that will bear fruit, and the Master of Wars, blessed be He, will grow from all of them His salvation.[7]

One thing we know for certain, that we are invited to great projects: philosophic projects; literary and publicistic projects; practical and social projects; projects at the interior of eternal life and projects of temporal and secular life; projects that remain within the border of Israel; and projects that overflow and touch the streams of life of the world at large and their many relations with the world of Israel, which was, is, and will be a blessing to all the families of earth,[8] as the word of the Lord to our ancestor [Abraham] in antiquity.

My beloved, I request that you write to us whatever is [happening] to you, your situation in detail, whether in spiritual or material matters; whatever you imagine might interest us, whether of private or public affairs. For all I will be exceedingly grateful to you, with God’s help.

I am your fast friend, looking for your happiness and success, and your return together with all our scattered people to the holy soil in happiness and success. May the Lord bless you with all good and extend to you peace and blessing and a good conclusion, as is your wish and the wish of one who seeks your peace and good all the days, longing for the salvation of the Lord,

Abraham Isaac Ha[Kohen] K[ook][9]

In order to understand the contents of the letter, the better to grasp the identities of its two recipients, we must first acquaint ourselves with the circumstances in which it was written.

For one decade, from 1904 to 1914, Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook served as Rabbi of the port city of Jaffa (precursor to Tel-Aviv). During those years in Jaffa he taught a select group of students in a yeshivah of his own making. (This yeshivah is not to be confused with the famous Yeshivah Merkaz Harav founded by Rav Kook in Jerusalem in the early 1920s.) In summer of 1914, Rav Kook set sail for Europe to attend the Knessiyah Gedolah or World Congress of the recently organized Agudath Israel movement. Due to the outbreak of World War One (on Tish’ah be-Av of that year), the conference was cancelled. Unable to return to Jaffa, Rav Kook remained stranded in Europe for the duration of the War, first in St. Gallen, Switzerland, where his needs were provided for by a sympathetic Mr. Abraham Kimhi, and later in London, where Rav Kook served as Rabbi of the Mahzikei Hadat synagogue in London’s East End.[10]

Much concerning the Jaffa yeshivah remains shrouded in mystery. No archive remains of this short-lived institution.[11] Thus we are pretty much left in the dark as to the curriculum,[12] enrollment, and even location. Fortunately, significant headway has been made in this direction in the recent article by Moshe Nahmani of the Yeshivat Hesder of Ramat Gan, “She’areha Ne’ulim—Yeshivat Harav Kuk be-Yaffo” (“Closed Gates—The Yeshivah of Rabbi Kook in Jaffa”).[13] Through painstaking research, the author was able to put together a list of students. Researchers had no difficulty identifying the “Hillel” of the letter as Hillel Pearlman. It was merely a case of “connecting the dots.”[14] But Nahmani was baffled by the “Meir” who is one of two co-addressees in our letter.[15]

I believe that I have solved the mystery of the missing Meir. In 1977, I was a visitor to the home of Rabbi Mayer Goldberg of Oakland, California. Rabbi Goldberg was a successful businessman (at that time in real estate) and a Jewish philanthropist, especially supportive of yeshivot or rabbinical academies. Rabbi Goldberg revealed to me that he had studied under Rabbi Kook in Jaffa.[16] He then went on to share with me a teaching of Rav Kook that I have since repeated on many an occasion. He said that before being exposed to Rav Kook’s teaching, the term “yir’at shamayim” (“fear of heaven”) had only a restrictive, narrowing connotation. Rav Kook explained the term in a totally different light. By the term “yir’at shamayim,” Rav Kook conveyed to his young listeners the vastness, the enormity, the infinitude of the universe.

Reading Moshe Nachmani’s article concerning Rav Kook’s yeshivah in Jaffa, and his bafflement as to the full identity of the student named simply “Meir,” I recalled my meeting with Rabbi Mayer Goldberg. I resolved that during my forthcoming visit to the East Bay area (as it has come to be known) I would meet with the late Rabbi’s children to learn from them more details of their father’s involvement with Rav Kook. What emerged from our discussion (conducted on February 14, 2013) is the following reconstruction of events.

Mayer Vevrick was born circa 1890 “near Kiev.”[17] At some time before World War One, Mayer boarded a ship from Odessa to Jaffa. In the words of his daughter Rachel Landes:

Once he arrived in Jaffa, he sought out the yeshiva of Rabbi Kook. Rabbi Avraham Kook was a world renowned scholar and it was there my father headed to study further. He became a “hasid,” a follower of the Rabbi, and thoroughly enjoyed his studies there. He lived in Rabbi Kook’s home.[18] He studied Talmud…with Rashi and the commentaries, for many hours a day with the other young men. These were the happiest days of his life, with uninterrupted Torah study, and the joy of learning with Rabbi Kook. Mayer adopted [Rabbi] Kook’s philosophy and was guided by it for the rest of his life.[19]

In World War One, Mayer left Jaffa for Egypt. There he was held by the British in an internment camp. Eventually, with some ingenuity, he was able to book passage on a boat to the United States.[20] Initially he resided on the East Coast. In Boston, he received a ketav semikha (writ of ordination) from Rabbi [Joseph M.] Jacobson. The semikha was written by Rabbi Jacobson on the spot in recognition of Mayer’s knowledge of Torah.[21] Later, Rabbi Mayer relocated to the West Coast, first to Washington State and finally to California.[22]

What becomes apparent from the letter of Rav Kook is that “Meir” remained in Jaffa after Rav Kook’s departure for Europe (followed almost immediately by the outbreak of World War One), and thus was in a position to give the Rav an update on the welfare of his daughters left behind in Jaffa. What also becomes apparent, is that in the Fall of 1915, “Meir” and his companion Hillel were no longer in the Land of Israel but somewhere else, for in his concluding remarks Rav Kook expresses the wish that they return to the Holy Land. This is consistent with Rabbi Goldberg’s biography, whereby he (along with countless other Jews of Erets Israel) was forced to flee the Holy Land at that time.[23]
This also coincides with the reconstructed biography of Hillel (Pearlman). Both students of Rav Kook, Hillel (Pearlman) and Meir (Goldberg) ended up in the United States in World War One. Whereas we are being told that Hillel (Pearlman) later left the United States for Europe and North Africa, reinventing himself as the mysterious “Monsieur Chouchani,” Mayer Goldberg remained in the United States.

Rabbi Mayer Goldberg passed away on September 25, 1992, a centenarian.[24] Shortly before his passing, Rabbi Goldberg had published in Jerusalem a collection of kabbalistic insights (culled from his marginalia in the books of his library), entitled Margaliyot shel Torah (Pearls of Torah). Much of the material in the book is attributed to the kabbalistic work Yalkut Reubeni.[25] My attention was riveted to an unattributed piece, which would appear to originate with Rabbi Mayer Goldberg himself:

In Exodus 2:12 we read that Moses slew the Egyptian (who was beating a Hebrew) and buried him in the sand. The Hebrew words are: “Vayyakh et ha-mitsri vayitmenehu ba-hol.”

Rabbi Goldberg observes that the word “ha-mitsri” (“the Egyptian”) has the same numerical value (gematria) as the word “Moshe” (“Moses”). In other words, Moses slew himself! The Rabbi then goes on to explain that what is truly conveyed by the verse, is that Moses slew the opinions of Egypt. Moses, growing up in the house of Pharaoh, had imbibed secular knowledge stripped of Godliness. So in other words, on a deeper level, what Moses was actually slaying was himself, or a part of himself that was thoroughly Egyptian in outlook. He then buried that secular learning devoid of Godliness “in the sand.” Here the Rabbi plays on the word “hol,”which may have another meaning beside “sand”: the secular. This is to say, Moses buried that tainted learning in the secular realm.[26]

Mayer Goldberg in youth:

Rabbi Mayer Goldberg in rabbinic attire: