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Engaged Couples, צעירים, and More

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Engaged Couples, צעירים, and More
Marc B.Shapiro
Continued from here
1. Regarding engaged couples having physical contact, this is actually the subject of a section of the book Penei Yitzhak by R. Hezekiah Mordechai Bassan. Here is the title page.
This book was published in Mantua in 1744 by Menahem Navarra who was a descendant of R. Bassan. Navarra, who was at this time a doctor, not a rabbi, was nevertheless very learned in Torah matters. (He would later be appointed rabbi of Verona.[1]) Navarra included three essays of his own in the volume, the second of which is called Issur Kedushah. In this work he criticizes members of the Jewish community for allowing engaged couples to have physical contact before marriage. Here are the first two pages of the work.
Navarra and the others I have referred to are only dealing with an engaged couple touching before marriage, but not with actual sexual relations. Yet this too is mentioned many centuries before Navarra. Ezra 2:43 and Nehemiah 7:46 refer to בני טבעות. A commentary attributed to R. Saadiah Gaon[2] explains this as follows:

בני טבעות: שקלקלו אבותם גם [צ”ל עם] ארוסותיהם קודם שיכניסו אותם לחופה והיו סומכין על קדושי טבעות ומקלקלין עם ארוסותיהן.
What this means is that after kiddushin, which was effected by aטבעת  (ring), but before actual marriage (the two used to be separated, sometimes for many months), the engaged couple would have sexual relations. The children who resulted from this were referred to negatively as בני טבעות. As S. H. Kook points out,[3] R. Saadiah’s explanation is also mentioned by R. Hai Gaon.[4]
R. Hayyim Benveniste, in seventeeth century Turkey, also speaks about how engaged couples would have physical contact. This shows again that there was a divergence between what the halakhah requires and what the people were actually doing (much like you find in a large section of Modern Orthodox society today). Here are R. Benveniste’s words:[5]
להתייחד שניהם כמו שנוהגים פה תירייא ואיזמיר, שאחר השדוכין אחר עבור קצת ימים מתייחדין החתן והכלה ומכניסים אותה לחדר וסוגרין אותן הסגר מוחלט כמו שמסגרין הנשואה אחר ז’ ברכות, מנהג כזה רע ומר הוא, ואיכא איסורא מכמה פנים . . . ועוד שנכשלים באיסור נדה, וברוב הפעמים תצא כלה לחופתה וכריסה בין שיניה, וכמה מהם הודו ולא בושו שבאים עליה שלא כדרכה. אלא א-להים הוא יודע שטרחתי הרבה לבטל מנהג זה פה תיריא ועלה בידי, ועשיתי הסכמה בחרמות ונדויים על זה, ולסבת בעלי זרוע בעלי אגרופין אשר אין פחד א-להים לנגד עיניהם חזר המנהג לסורו רע.
There are a few different points that are of interest in what R. Benveniste writes. The first is that he says that in the majority of cases the bride arrives at the huppah וכריסה בין שיניה. This means that she is pregnant. Even if there is some exaggeration here, R. Benveniste is telling us that many Jewish women were getting pregnant before marriage. Readers might recall my post here where I mentioned R. Ovadiah Bertinoro’s assertion that most Jewish brides in Palermo were pregnant at the time of their wedding.
R. Benveniste mentions how he was able to improve matters by using the power of the herem to keep people in line, but that his success was short-lived as powerful members of the community were able to undermine his authority. This shows us, just as we saw in the text I quoted from R. Eleazar Kalir, that parents were often happy when their children had physical contact before marriage, and they opposed what they regarded as the overly puritanical approach of the rabbis. When R. Benveniste refers to those who באים עליה שלא כדרכה, this means that some of the couples had a sexual relationship, but wanted the woman to be a virgin at the wedding.
R. Jonah Landsofer (Bohemia, died 1712) also testified to the problem we have been discussing:[6]
בבית ישראל ראיתי שערוריה איכה נהיית’ כזאת שאין איש שם לבו להוכיח בשער בת רבים על התקלה וקלקלת שוטי’ שקלקלו והרגלו הרגל דבר עד שנעשה טבע קיים לבלתי הרגיש ברעה אשר ימצאם באחרית הימים והוא אשר נעשה בכל יום ערוך השלחן וצפה הצפית מיום שגומרין שידוכין בין בחור ובתולה מושבים אותם יחד ומוסרי’ הבתולה לזנות בית אביה בחיבוקים ונשוקים ומעשה חידודי’ וכל הקרואים והמסובי’ מחזיקי’ בידו.
Because the masses had no interest in what the rabbis had to say about this matter, R. Landsofer concludes that one need not even rebuke them, as they won’t listen anyway. Not long ago I heard a rabbi going on about the holy communities of Europe of a few hundred years ago, about their support of Torah, the respect they gave to the rabbis, and their commitment to halakhah. All of this is true, but if you look a little closer you find that these communities were actually very much like contemporary Modern Orthodox communities, in that together with a commitment to halakhah, many people also felt that they could determine which halakhot could be ignored. Or perhaps they didn’t even think they were violating halakhah. Maybe they assumed that the rabbis were making their lives difficult with extreme humrot. Either way you look at it, it is very obvious that there were many in traditional Jewish societies who created their own standards of practice which did not always correspond to what the rabbis insisted on, and they had no interest in changing their ways because of what the rabbis were saying.[7]
While the standard rabbinic view has always been that bride and groom are not to have any physical contact until after the wedding ceremony, the rabbis in Germany were a little more lenient. Sefer Maharil records that the practice was for the bride and groom to touch before marriage, but only on the morning of the wedding, a time that also included celebration.[8]
בעלות השחר ביום הששי היה קורא השמש לבא לבה”כ . . . ומביאים הכלה וחברותיה. וכאשר תבא עד פתח חצר בה”כ הלך הרב והחשובים והיו מוליכין את החתן לקראת הכלה. והחתן תופש אותה בידו ובחיבורן יחד זורקין כל העם על גבי ראשן חטין ואומרים פרו ורבו ג”פ. והולכין יחד עד אצל פתח בה”כ ויושבין שם מעט ומוליכין הכלה לביתה.
This detail, that the groom held the bride’s hand prior to the wedding, is found in a number of other German sources.[9] I don’t know how this practice of holding the bride’s hand before the wedding ceremony can be reconciled with what appears in Tractate Kallah, ch. 1:
כלה בלא ברכה אסורה לבעלה כנדה.
The word כלה here means a woman who is betrothed but not yet married.
R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, Kisei Rahamim, Kallah, ch. 1, comments on this passage:
כלה בלא ברכה אסורה כלומר אפי’ לחבק או ליגע בה כנדה.
I also find it noteworthy, and strange from our perspective, that Sefer Maharil tells us that for the wedding ceremony the rabbi would bring the bride to the groom, holding her by her robe:[10]
והרב היה תופס אותה בבגדיה והוליכה והעמידה לימין החתן.
R. Israel David Margulies (19th century) cites this text from Sefer Maharil and correctly notes that in medieval times the brides were much younger than in his day. He assumes that the typical bride was under 12 and a half years old, and therefore there was no problem of impure thoughts with such brides.[11]
ואיזה הירהור יהי’ בכלה קטנה או נערה כזאת, ולכן לקח אותה הרב בעצמו אצל מפתן הבית מן יד הנשים, והביאה אל החתן ושארי הנשים נשארו ולא היה להם שום עסק בבהכ”נ ולא היה חשש הרהור במקום קדשו.
2. Recently I heard a shiur where the rabbi said that if there is a Torah or rabbinic commandment to do something, only the talmudic sages can, as an emergency measure, forbid the action. The classic example is the Sages telling us not to blow the shofar if Rosh ha-Shanah falls out on Shabbat. There is nothing controversial in what the rabbi said, and I think most would agree, even if there some exceptions to this general rule. The rabbi further noted that post-talmudic authorities cannot make gezerot as this power is also reserved for the talmudic sages. This viewpoint is shared by many, yet there are important authorities who disagree, and perhaps more significantly there is evidence of post-talmudic gezerot.
I mention this now, after Passover [this post was written a few weeks ago], since those who reviewed the laws of Pesach would have seen Shulhan Arukh 453:5 which states:
האידנא אסור ללתות בין חטים בין שעורים.
“Nowadays, it is forbidden to moisten either wheat or barley [for grinding].”
If you look at the Mishnah Berurah he explains that while the Sages forbid moistening barley because it will easily leaven, according to the Talmud it is permitted to moisten wheat. In fact, according to the Talmud, Pesahim 40a, Rava held that it is an obligation to wash the grains of wheat: מצוה ללתות.
The Mishnah Berurah explains that it is the geonim who forbid moistening wheat since we are not expert at doing it properly, and it might come to be leavened, or we might delay removing the wheat after the moistening (before grinding) and this might lead to leavening. If the geonim forbid something that the Talmud permitted (or even required), isn’t this to be regarded as a gezerah?
3. Let me now mention something relating to Sukkot, which I had hoped to post closer to the holiday, but as the rabbinic saying goes, מה שהלב חושק הזמן עושק.
Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 649:4 states:
גנות הצעירים של עובדי כוכבים וכיוצא בהם מבתי שמשיהם מותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינים למצוה.
[Regarding what has grown in] the gardens of the צעירים of idolators and similar [gardens] of the houses [or: buildings] of their attendants, one is permitted to take from there a lulav or the other minim for the mitzvah.
Who are the צעירים of the idolators? The Taz states that he does not know:
איני יודע פירושו, אבל הוא ענין ממשרתי עבודת אלילים.
It is not just the Taz who doesn’t know, as none of the traditional commentaries have a clue. The Feldheim English translation of the Shulhan Arukh with Mishnah Berurah (which I make use of when I provide translations) doesn’t translate the word הצעירים, and instead simply transliterates it.[12]
In fact, I  am sure that R. Joseph Karo, living in the Muslim world, did not know what the צעירים are either. You might find this a strange assertion. After all, if R. Karo recorded the halakhah, how could he not know what he was writing? However, in this case R. Karo was just recording what appears in R. Aaron Hakohen of Lunel’s Orhot Hayyim (Florence, 1750), Hilkhot Lulav, no. 8, in the name of the Ritva:
כתב הר’ יום טוב אשבילי ז”ל בשם רבו ז”ל הוי יודע שגנות הצעירים והדורסים וכיוצא בהם מבתי הכומרים אינם משמשי ע”ז ולא נויי ע”ז ופירותיהם וכל אשר בהן מותרין בהנאה ומותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינין למצוה עכ”ל.
From a halakhic standpoint the importance of the halakhah is that it tells us that one can take a lulav and other other minim from the garden of an idolator, and it is not important exactly what type of idolator the צעירים are.
As mentioned, the halakhah in the Shulhan Arukh is taken from the Orhot Hayyim. It is first quoted in the Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim 649, where it cited more exactly from the Orhot Hayyim than what appears in the Shulhan Arukh:
כתוב בארחות חיים ]הל’ לולב סי’ ח[ נגות הצעירים והדורסים וכיוצא בהם מבתי הכומרים מותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינים למצוה.
In the Beit Yosef (and also in Orhot Hayyim) it says הצעירים והדורסים. Furthermore, instead of מבתי שמשיהם that appears in the Shulhan Arukh, we have מבתי הכומרים, which means the houses (or buildings) of the priests. I have no doubt that the the word שמשיהם is a censor’s replacement of the original הכומרים. In the first printing of the Beit Yosef, Venice 1550, the sentence quoted above appears in its entirety. Yet when the Beit Yosef was next printed, Venice 1564, the entire sentence was deleted, obviously a requirement of the censor. The Shulhan Arukh was first printed in Venice, also in 1564. It thus makes sense that the deletion of the word הכומרים is due to censorship, and it could be that it was this alteration that prevented the entire halakhah from being deleted.
Before we get to הצעירים, what is the meaning of הדורסים that appears in Orhot Hayyim and is copied in the Beit Yosef? If you look at the Ritva that the Orhot Hayyim is citing, he states:[13]
והוי יודע שגנות השעירים והדוכסים וכיוצא בהם מבתי הכומרים, אינם משמשי ע”ז ולא נויי ע”ז, ופירותיהם וכל אשר בהם מותרים בהנאה, ומותר ליטול משם לולב או שאר מינין למצוה וכן קבלנו מרבותינו ז”ל הלכה למעשה.
The first thing to notice is that instead of הצעירים we have the word השעירים. This is a clear mistake, and the editor notes that the word הצעירים appears when the passage is cited in Orhot Hayyim. Unfortunately, the editor doesn’t note that are also least two other places where in speaking about benefit from avodah zarah the Ritva refers to גנת הצעירים.[14]The text from Ritva quoted above also has, instead of הדורסים which appears in Orhot Hayyim, another strange word, הדוכסים. This means “dukes” (or noblemen, princes, rulers, etc.) and makes no sense here since the context is avodah zarah which has nothing to do with a duke’s garden.

So we now have to explain not just what צעירים means but also דורסים or דוכסים. R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai[15] suggests that צעירים is derived from Zechariah 13:7: והשבתי ידי על הצוערים, “And I will turn my hand upon the little ones.” It is hard to see how telling us that צוערים is related to צעירים helps us to understand the point of the Shulhan Arukh. R. Azulai also refers the reader to Rashi’s commentary on Zech. 13:7:
על הצוערים: על השלטונים הצעירים מן המלכים.
Perhaps I am missing something, but I don’t see what this passage adds other than showing us thatצוערים  and צעירים mean the same thing. Why does R. Azulai have to tell us this? The wordצעיר  is found elsewhere in the Bible, so we already know what it means.
R. Azulai’s short note also refers the reader to Abarbanel’s comment to Zech. 13:7. It is Abarbanel who will help us to understand what is going on with the word צעירים. (As R. Azulai was commenting on the Shulhan Arukh, he did not attempt to explain דורסים/דוכסים which is only found in the Beit Yosef. We shall return to this word soon.)
Abarbanel writes:
והשיבותי ידי על הצוערים שראוי שיפורש כפי זה הדרך על כומרי אדום הדורשים להם אמונתם וכזביהם והם עצמם נקראים אצלם צעירים להורות על ענוותנותם ושפלותם כי בעבור שאלה חטאו והחטיאו את אחרים בלמודם ודרושותיהם [!] אמר השם שישיב ידו ומכותם עליהם.
While this passage has nothing to do with the Shulhan Arukh, R. Azulai saw the relevance of it as Abarbanel makes the connection between צוערים and צעירים as we saw already with Rashi. Abarbanel also specifically connects this to Catholic priests, telling us that these priests would call themselves צעירים as a sign of modesty.
From this we can understand that when the Shulhan Arukh refers to gardens of the צעירים he means gardens belonging to Catholic priests. But who in particular are the צעירים? To answer this question let’s return to the Beit Yosef which referred to both צעירים and דורסים/דוכסים. As already noted, this entire passage is taken from the Orhot Hayyim.
In 1902 R. Moses Schlesinger published the second volume of the Orhot Hayyim. In the introduction he included a helpful list of all the times that the Beit Yosef cites the Orhot Hayyim. When he comes to our example, p. xv, he has a note in which he cites the great Abraham Berliner[16] that the proper reading is גנות הצעירים והדורשים. In other words, instead of דורסים/דוכסים, which appears in the Ritva and the Orhot Hayyim, it should say דורשים. When he wrote the Beit Yosef, R. Joseph Karo probably just copied the word דורסים that was in his copy of the Orhot Hayyim without knowing exactly what it meant (as its exact meaning, while of interest to historians and Seforim Blog readers, is not relevant to the underlying halakhah).[17]
So what does הצעירים והדורשים mean? Berliner explains this as well (and it was actually earlier explained by Leopold Zunz[18]). The two most important medieval Catholic orders were the Franciscans and the Dominicans. The actual name of the Franciscans is the “Order of Friars Minor.” They were often called “Little Brothers” or “Minorites.” Thus, when the Ritva and Orhot Hayyim refer to the צעירים this is just the Hebrew translation of “Minorites”, i.e., the Franciscans. As Abarbanel correctly pointed out, this term was adopted as a sign of humility.[19]As for the דורשים, the meaning of this is obvious (after Berliner and Zunz have enlightened us). The actual name of the Dominicans is the “Order of Preachers,” so דורשים (preachers)=Dominicans. What the Ritva and Orhot Hayyim are telling us is that when it comes to the mitzvah of lulav, one can use that which grows in the gardens of the Franciscans and the Dominicans (and the same halakhah would apply to other Catholic orders. The monasteries would often have gardens and Jews would be able to purchase things from there.)

In Nahmanides’ Disputation[20] he too refers to theצעירים  and the דורשים.
והיו שם ההגמון וכל הגלחים וחכמי הצעירים והדורשים.
In his note, R. Hayyim Dov Chavel identifies the צעירים as the Franciscans. However, he doesn’t know that the דורשים are the Dominicans, and he therefore explains that the word means הנואמים. In his English translation, Chavel writes, “Among them were the bishop [of Barcelona] and all the priests, Franciscan scholars, and preachers.”[21]
It is noteworthy that the fifteenth-century R. Solomon ben Simeon Duran, who lived in North Africa, was apparently also unaware of the meaning of צעירים, and therefore applied it to all young Catholic religious figures, not merely Franciscans. )At least, that is what I think he means, as opposed to understanding his use ofצעיריהם  to refer to young men as a whole.) After contrasting the sexual purity of the Jews with what occurs in surrounding society, he writes, in very strong words:[22]
וצעיריהם הם כולם מטונפים בעריות מנאפים עם נשי רעיהם ובאים על הזכור והטוב שבהם מוציא שכבת זרע לבטלה בידו וזה מפורסם אצלם.
4. Since in a prior post I discussed Jacob’s love of Rachel and Leah, let me share a strange interpretation I recently found, involving love and Jacob’s brother, Esau. The general understanding is that Esau loved Isaac. Indeed, it is very difficult to read the Torah and conclude differently. Therefore, I was quite surprised to find that the medieval R. Abraham Bedersi is of the opinion that, after Isaac gave Jacob the blessing intended for Esau, not only did Esau not love Isaac, but he was ready to cause his death! This would be accomplished by killing Jacob, since Isaac’s great sorrow would bring on his end. To arrive at this interpretation, Bedersi offers a novel understanding of Gen. 27:41: יקרבו ימי אבל אבי ואהרגה את יעקב אחי. The standard understanding of these words is that when the days of mourning for his father arrive, then Esau will kill Jacob. As he didn’t want to cause his father pain, he decided to wait until he was dead to kill Jacob. However, Bedersi understands ואהרגה to mean, “when I will kill Jacob” this will cause my father to die.
Here are his words from his Hotem Tokhnit:[23]
ועשו הרשע ידוע שלא היה אוהב יצחק אביו כמו שתראה שאמר יקרבו ימי אבל אבי ואהרגה את יעקב אחי וביאור נכון בו אהרגה את יעקב אחי ובאמת יקרבו ימי אבל אבי שהוא יצטער על בנו וימות.
As mentioned, this is a strange interpretation so I Iooked around to see if I could find a similar approach. I didn’t see anything in Torah Shelemah. I looked in the ArtScroll extended commentary to Genesis (not the Stone Chumash) and it does not bring any interpretations that suggest that Esau intended to cause Isaac’s death. However, the commentary states as follows:
Ralbag interprets similarly:[24] Even if it accelerates my father’s death [lit. brings near the days of mourning for my father] I nevertheless will kill my brother Jacob (cited by Tur).
I don’t know where they got this from, as Ralbag does not say what is attributed to him. All Ralbag says is that Esau wished to kill Jacob after Isaac’s death. The Tur, who was a contemporary of Ralbag, does not cite him.
R. Abraham Bedersi’s Hotem Tokhnit focuses on Hebrew synonyms and in an era before concordances and computers would have required an enormous amount of work. It found on hebrewbooks.org, but it is not on Otzar ha-Hokhmah.

Among the many interesting things you will find in Hotem Tokhnit is that he says that unlike the word יהודי, the word עברי is only used in the Bible in the context of slavery, and he provides examples of this (p. 152). With this in mind, I can see why some people would prefer the term Mishpat Yehudi instead of Mishpat Ivri.

On p. 202  he quotes an otherwise unknown comment of Ibn Ezra that the meaning of the word סלה is “truth”.
כי ענין סלה אמת ונכונה ועל זה אמר אשרי יושבי ביתך עוד יהללוך סלה (תהלים פ”ד ה’) באמת וביושר.
Beginning on p. 1 in the second section, there is a long letter from Samuel David Luzzatto. He refers to an unnamed scholar who could not accept that Rabad, in his comment to Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7, would say that people greater than Maimonides thought that God had a physical form. He therefore suggested changing גדולים וטובים ממנו to גדולים וטובים מעמֵנו (tzeirei under the mem).
Luzzatto completely rejects this point, arguing that גדולים וטובים מעמנו means people greater than our nation, i.e., non-Jews. Furthermore, he adds, where do we find Rabad, Rashi, etc. using the word עמנו to refer to the Jewish people.
On p. 2 Luzzatto records the following lines from one of Bedersi’s poems, in which one word summarizes each of Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles:
נמצא כיִחודו והֶבדלו                    קדמות עבודתו נבואתו
משה ותורתו אֲנצחַ                       ידע גמול גואל בהחיותו
Luzzatto also publishes a long poem from Bedersi together with Luzzatto’s commentary, without which it would be very difficult to understand much of what Bedersi was saying. One of my favorite lines is found on p. 13:
ולא תבין שפת כל-עם בשירים        לבד טרחם, כפז על גב בעירי
What this means is that poems are difficult for the masses, of every nation and language, to understand. They regard them as a burden, much like an animal, if you place gold on its back, won’t appreciate what it is carrying. It will only feel the burden of the weight.
5. Since I mentioned Mendelssohn in the last post, let me note the following. I recently saw that Eliezer Segal, in his wonderful book, Introducing Judaism (London and New York, 2009), p. 110, uses a picture of Mendelssohn. You can see it here. (Copyright prevents me from posting the picture.) We are told that the image is from the 18th century, yet there is no doubt that this is not a picture of Mendelssohn. You can look at authentic pictures of Mendelssohn here and they look nothing like this image. Incidentally, in a student’s description of Mendelssohn’s 1777 meeting with Kant, he is described as  having a goatee.[25]
6. In a comment to my last post, Maimon wrote: “On the subject of R. Bachrach’s responsum – it bears noting that the pre-reform homogeneous [should be: heterogeneous] Jewish society (especially in Germany) contained people of varying levels of observance from across the spectrum and as such many behavioral patterns that would be unthinkable in contemporary Orthodox society are detailed in the Halakhic writings from that era.” Maimon is correct, and it is not only in recent centuries or in Germany that one finds communities with people of different levels of religious observance. This is how Jewish societies have always been, in every era and place, at least until the second half of the twentieth century and the creation of haredi societies. I have already cited numerous examples that justify this statement, but let offer one more that shows how even in medieval times young men and women would socialize in a way that Maimon might say “would be unthinkable in contemporary Orthodox society.” I would only add that instead of “contemporary Orthodox society,” I prefer to say “contemporary haredi society,” since as mentioned already, Modern Orthodox society still has significant variations in level of observance. (When I speak of variations in level of observance, I have in mind bein adam la-Makom halakhot. I am not referring to halakhot having to do with monetary issues and dina de-malchuta dina, regarding which I believe the Modern Orthodox community is superior to what we find in the haredi world.)
R. Meir of Rothenburg was asked about young Jewish men and women who were drinking together. As a joke, one of the young women asked one of the men if he would betroth her. He took a ring and threw it to her, and recited the text of kiddushin. (At a future time I can discuss the halakhic arguments that R. Meir used to free the woman from having to receive a get.) One cannot overlook the fact that the way the young men and women were socializing together, much like you would find among kids at Modern Orthodox high schools, shows that there was no strict separation between the sexes. Here is the question, as it appears in Irving Agus, ed., Teshuvot Ba’alei ha-Tosafot, no. 85.

R. Meir of Rothenburg’s answer is found in She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharam mi-Rothenburg, Prague ed., no. 993.7. Two people have asked me to comment on Rabbis Yitzchok Adlerstein’s and Michael Broyde’s article here arguing that hasidic schools shouldn’t be forced to offer secular education. While the Seforim Blog is not the place for commenting on these sorts of matters, after reading the article I felt I had to make one point. Adlerstein and Broyde cite the famous Supreme Court case which allowed the Amish to opt out of secular education and they apply this logic to the hasidic communities. While it is true that if it went to court the hasidic communities would probably prevail, there is a big difference between the Amish and the hasidic communities. The Amish do not take welfare, food stamps, and other forms of government assistance. Thus, they make choices and live with the consequences. However, the hasidic communities refuse to provide their children with the basic skills needed to function in the modern economy, and as a result rely heavily on the welfare state. No one who believes in limited government and is opposed to the welfare state can support a situation where kids are allowed to grow up almost guaranteed to be in need of public assistance.[26]

 

[1] Regarding Navarra, see Cecil Roth, “Rabbi Menahem Navarra: His Life and Times. 1717-1777,” Jewish Quarterly Review 15 (1925), pp. 427-466.
[2] Perush al Ezra ve-Nehemiah (Oxford, 1882), p. 30.
[3] Iyunim u-Mehkarim (Jerusalem, 1959), vol. 1, p. 259.
[4] Ginzei Kedem 4 (1930), p. 52. While there is no historical evidence for this explanation, it does show that the practice of using a ring for kiddushin existed already in the geonic period. For other sources from this era, see Mordechai Margaliot, ed., Ha-Hilukim bein Anshei Mizrah u-Venei Eretz Yisrael (Jerusalem, 1938), no. 25. For a very detailed discussion of use of a ring for kiddushin, see Pardes Eliezer: Erusin ve-Nisuin (Brooklyn, 2010), vol. 4, ch. 30.
Only in Yemen did the practice of using a ring not become widely accepted (though even there it was used in some places). See R. Yitzhak Ratsaby, Shulhan Arukh ha-Mekutzar, vol. 7, pp. 27-28. There is no mention of using a ring for kiddushin in the Talmud. It does, however, appear in Tikunei Zohar, nos. 5, 10 (as pointed out by R. Moses Isserles, Shulhan Arukh Even ha-Ezer 27:1), but Tikunei Zohar does not date from the tannaitic or amoraic period. The Sefer ha-Hinukh, no. 539, says that the reason we use a ring for kiddushin is so that every time the woman looks at her hand she remembers the following things (which apply to all means of kiddushin, but wearing a ring allows her to remember them).
שהיא קנויה לאותו האיש ולא תזנה תחתיו ולא תמרוד בו ותתן לו יקר והוד לעולם כעבד לאדוניו.
Regarding what I have underlined, even if today some men like being treated like that, going into a contemporary marriage expecting to get this sort of treatment is a recipe for marital disaster.
The ring for kiddushin has nothing to do with the engagement ring. I always wondered why the practice of giving a diamond engagement ring was not condemned as hukkot ha-goyim, especially by those who have an expansive understanding of this halakhah. Even if it is not halakhically forbidden, it is clearly a practice that came from non-Jewish society. How is it that people who refuse to have anything to do with things like Mother’s Day or Thanksgiving have no problem giving a diamond ring as an engagement present? R. Chaim Rapoport pointed out to me that R. Zvi Hersh Ferber of London (d. 1966) condemned the giving of engagement rings as hukkot ha-goyim. See Kerem Tzvi: Bereishit, vol. 1, p. 132.
As for wedding rings for men, R. Meir Mazuz states that there is absolutely no problem with a man wearing a ring. See Asaf ha-Mazkir, p. 194, Bayit Ne’eman, pp. 441ff. He calls attention to Shabbat 62a, וחילופיהן באיש, from which we see that this was not regarded as a problem. He also quotes Kaf ha-Hayyim 161:31 who writes (summarizing an earlier source):
דת”ח שתורתם אומנתם וכן בעלי בתים שעוסקים במו”מ ואין להם מלאכה גרועה א”צ להסיר הטבעות בשעת נט”י אע”ג דמהדקי טובא.
R. Mazuz states that on his wedding day his father, the great R. Matzliach Mazuz, gave him a ring to wear, and that in Tunisia this was the general practice, that a groom received a ring and wore it for the rest of his life. However, upon coming to Israel R. Mazuz saw that it is not accepted for talmidei hakhamim and “fearers of heaven” to wear a ring so he stopped wearing it. (This is his language in Asaf ha-Mazkir. In Bayit Ne’eman he writes that the haredim do not wear rings.) R. Mazuz adds that he does wear the ring on the night of Passover to commemorate the words of Genesis 15:14: “Afterward shall they come out with great substance.” (“Great substance” includes jewelry.)
R. Mazuz notes that in a picture of the Moroccan sage, R. Isaac Bengualid (1777-1870), author of the responsa work Va-Yomer Yitzhak, he is wearing a ring. Here is the picture.

He also mentions a picture of R. Elijah Hazan (1848-1908) of Alexandria, author of the responsa work Ta’alumot Lev, where he is wearing a ring. I have not been able to find this picture. See also here where S. has a picture of R. Bernard Illowy wearing a ring as well as a picture of R. Samson Wertheimer’s wedding ring.
R. Hayyim Amselem, here (from May 5, 2105), writes very strongly against those who oppose wedding rings on religious grounds, using the opportunity to once again blast the Ashkenazic haredim.
איפה ההגיון הבריא?
הבוקר בעתון ישראל היום ובערוץ 7 מפרסמים בהבלטה ובהתפעלות פסק הלכה “חדש” המתיר ואפילו ממליץ בעידן המודרני לגברים נשואין לענוד טבעת נישואין, בעולם הדתי והחרדי, שוללים זאת כי זה “מנהג גוים”, לדעתם וכו’ וכו’ .
מה שהם אינם יודעים שאין כאן כל חדש ובעדות הספרדים היה זה מנהג פשוט שרבים מאוד מהגברים ענדו על ידם טבעת נשואין, או טבעת בכלל ולא היה פוצה פה ומצפצף, ידועות כמה תמונות של גדולי תורה והלכה שבאצבעם טבעת כגון תמונתו של הגאון רבי יצחק בן וואליד רב ודיין בעיר תיטואן במרוקו, וכן עוד רבנים, שכך עשו מעשה, עיין בספר אסף המזכיר עמוד קצ”ד.
מה הבעיה? הבעיה היא שהרבנים האשכנזים ובעיקר החרדים, מה שהם חושבים בדעתם שזה אסור, ובמיוחד אם זה דומה להנהגה לא “חרדית” אז זה כבר אסור וחילול השם וכו’ והם לא מסוגלים להכיל בסובלנות דעה אחרת, מה גם שהם בטוחים לגמרי שהתורה היא רק שלהם ואין לאחרים זולתם כלום, וכמובן ההמון הפשוט שומע ונוהה אחריהם בעינים עוורות.
גם אם תוכיח להם שאפילו בתלמוד כך משמע [עיין מסכת שבת (דף ס”ב ע”א)] לא יעזור כלום, ואם תעיז גם להביע את דעתך, אוי ואבוי אתה חולק על גדולי ישראל? אתה נגד “ההשקופע” החרדית, דמך בראשך.
איי איי איי איפה היהדות השפויה והמתונה נעלמה?
[5] Keneset ha-Gedolah, Even ha-Ezer 66, Tur no. 1.
[6] Meil Tzedakah, no. 19.
[7] In the prior post I gave examples of takanot forbidding an engaged man to enter the house of his fiancée. For another example from 1594 in Italy, see R. Solomon ha-Levi, Divrei Shlomo (Venice, 1594), p. 299a. R. Hayyim Palache mentions that in nineteenth-century Izmir they also proclaimed such a takanah. See Hayyim ve-Shalom, vol. 2, no. 89, Masa Hayyim, ma’arekhet shin, no. 124 (p. 27a). R. Elijah ha-Levi (16th century) of Constantinople, Zekan Aharon, no. 117, discusses the matter as well. He states that in his community there is no “evil practice” of having the engaged couple spend time together at her home, which leads to all the problems that have been mentioned.However, he notes that this was an old practice in some places in the Ottoman Empire, and therefore in order to prevent serious sins the rabbis instituted that at the engagement the wedding blessings were recited and the woman would also go to the mikveh at this time.
Regarding the engaged couple before the wedding, it is also worth noting that among some hasidic groups from the Chernobyl line, there is a festive meal, called a חתן מאהל, the evening before the wedding. At this time, the future bride and groom dance together using a long handkerchief or gartel. At the wedding itself, the practice in a number of hasidic groups (and not only among the Hasidim) is that the bride and groom dance together actually holding hands. See Pardes Eliezer: Erusin ve-Nisuin, vol. 5, p. 538; Ohel Moshe 7 (Kislev 5750), p. 67. Here are two examples of this from Youtube.

Regarding dancing while holding hands, I found something quite interesting in R. Joseph Hahn (d. 1637), Yosif Ometz (Frankfurt, 1928), p. 344:
המספר מעות לאשה כדי להסתכל בה אף על פי שמלא תורה ומעשים לא ינקה מדינה של גיהנם וכל שכן הנוגע בידה ממש, ובמחול של מצוה המדקדקים כורכים סביבות ידיהם בגד שקורין וטשינלן, ואם יודע בעצמו בודאות שלא יבא לידי הרהור שרי.
R. Hahn tells us that during a Mitzvah dance, when there are men and women dancing together, those who are careful about halakhah would wear a type of glove. This means that even if they held hands with a woman they would not touch her skin. R. Hahn says that one who knows that he will not be driven to sexual thoughts is permitted to do this.
R. Ezekiel Feivel, Toldot Adam (Jerusalem, 1987), ch. 15 (p. 215), says that R. Shlomo Zalman of Vilna (the brother of R. Hayyim of Volozhin) used to dance with brides holding their hand. A handkerchief or something other covering ensured that he didn’t touch their skin::
אחז ביד החתן ודבר עמו דברי תורה אשר זורו במזור האמת והאמונה . . . אחר כן רקד עם הכלה אחוזי יד על ידי מטפחת בנועם לב ופנים מאירות ובסדר מתוקן ונעים מאד.
R. Abraham Hayyim Schorr, Torat Hayyim: Avodah Zarah 17a, was very opposed to this practice of holding the bride’s hand, even if separated by something like a handkerchief, which he says was done by some talmidei hakhamim. (He means actually holding hands with the handkerchief ensuring that skin does not touch. He is not referring to when the man and woman each hold a different end of the handkerchief. See R. Yosef Rapoport’s letter in Or Yisrael 24 [Tamuz 5761], p. 245.)
ונר’ דאסו’ ללכת במחול עם הכלה בשבעת ימי המשתה אפי’ אינו אוחז בידה ממש אלא בהפסק מטפחת כדרך שנוהגין מקצת ת”ח שבדור הזה אפ”ה לאו שפיר עבדי.
I will deal with the larger issue of mixed dancing, and the rabbinic responses, in a future post.Regarding R. Shlomo Zalman covering his hands, we are told that he never touched the pages of a sefer with his bare hands. He always turned the pages while wearing gloves or with a handkerchief. One time he didn’t have either with him, and he turned the pages with his lips. See Toldot Adam, p. 214.

We are also told that when he slept he wore gloves in order that his bare hands not touch his body. This way when he woke up he could start studying Torah immediately without washing his hands, so careful was he not to waste even a moment away from Torah study. See Toldot Adam, p. 218. This approach of R. Shlomo Zalman ignores the main reason offered for washing in the morning, namely, that it is to remove the ruah ra’ah. Therefore, R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira could not believe that the story of R. Shlomo Zalman wearing gloves was true. See Nimukei Orah Hayyim, 4:1

 

על כן אין להאמין על אותו צדיק טעות ומעשה כזה

.
See also R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yabia Omer, vol. 4, Orah Hayyim no. 2:8-9; and R. Moshe Yehudah Leib Rabinovich’s letter at the beginning of R. Zev Zicherman, Otzar Pelaot ha-Torah, vol. 1 (Brooklyn, 2014)..

[8] Ed. Spitzer (Jerusalem, 1989), p. 464.
[9] See Yaakov Yisrael Stall’s note in R. Judah he-Hasid, Sefer ha-Gematriot (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 309 n. 71. (R. Judah he-Hasid states that the groom would lift up his future bride.)
[10] Sefer Maharil, p. 465.
[11] Har Tavor (Pressburg, 1861), p. 33b. Regarding the age of Jewish brides in medieval times, See Avraham Grossman, Hasidot u-Mordot (Jerusalem, 2001), ch. 2. He makes the following interesting point (Pious and Rebellious, trans. Jonathan Chipman [Waltham, 2004], pp. 47-48):
The phenomenon of beating wives may also have been exacerbated by marriage of girls at an early age. The fact that at times the wife was extremely young led the husband to relate to her as he would to his own daughter. This was particularly true in those places where young girls were married to husbands significantly older than themselves, which was, as we have seen, a common phenomenon in Jewish society, and particularly in Muslim countries. Moreover, it may well be that the beating of the wife, which was a part of the life of the young couple, also continued thereafter.
[12] R. Yihye Moses Abudi, Magen Ba’adi (Jerusalem, 1904), vol. 2, p. 30b, also doesn’t know what the word means. What he thinks is the obvious meaning is, as we will soon see, mistaken.
ול”נ פשוט כיון שהם קורין לה גנות הגדולים אנו מכנים להם שם לגנאי לקרות להם גנות הצעירים.
[13] Hiddushei ha-Ritva: Sukkah 29b, Mossad ha-Rav Kook ed., cols. 278-279.
[14] Hiddushei ha-Ritva: Avodah Zarah 51b, Mossad ha-Rav Kook ed., col. 259; Hiddushei ha-Ritva: Rosh ha-Shanah 28a, Mossad ha-Rav Kook ed., col. 264.
[15] Birkei Yosef, Orah Hayyim 649:3. R. Moses Sofer also refers to Zech. 13:7. See the Makhon Yerushalayim ed. of Shulhan Arukh, ad loc.
[16] Abraham Berliner was an outstanding representative of German Orthodoxy. He was a member of R. Azriel Hildesheimer’s separatist Orthodox community, and he taught for many years at the Rabbinical Seminary of Berlin. Nevertheless, the annual Yerushatenu, which is devoted to the study of all aspects of German rabbinic history, prayers, customs, etc., saw fit to publish a letter which attacks Berliner and places him in what the letter-writer regards as the “anti-Torah” camp. See Yerushatenu 3 (2009), p. 396. This was an unfortunate lapse in judgment by the editors of what is otherwise a fabulous publication. The editors intended to show their open-mindedness by publishing even the nonsense of an extremist, but the job of the editors is to ensure the high quality of their publication, and this means that they have to reject that which is unsuitable.
[17] Unfortunately, the Makhon Yerushalayim edition of the Beit Yosef simply points out that instead of דורסים the text should perhaps read דוכסים. In other words, the editors were unaware that דורשים is the correct reading. Hopefully, in the next printing they will correct this matter. If they do so, based on this post, it will be my second “contribution” to this magnificent edition. Here is the Makhon Yerushalayim Tur, Even ha-Ezer 173, p. 539.

In note 3 at the bottom of the page it refers to a קושיא גדולה printed in the journal Or Torah in 1992 (Heshvan 5753, no. 23). This was a question I asked R. Meir Mazuz and he replied that instead of ונשא בתו the text should apparently read ונשא בת אשתו .
[18] Zur Geschichte und Literatur (Berlin, 1845), p. 181.
[19] In his defense of R. Moses Hayyim Luzzatto and his circle, R. Jacob Hazak uses the phrase גנות הצעירים to make a nice melitzah. See Iggerot Ramhal u-Venei Doro, ed., Shriki (Jerusalem, 2008), p. 357:
ואל יחשבו אותנו כמורדים וכפושעים ח”ו, וכל מי שתורת אלקיו בקרבו, ואהבתו ית’ גברה בו, ילבש בגדי קנאה ולא ישמע גנ”ות הצעירים.
[20] Kitvei Rabbenu Moshe ben Nahman, ed. Chavel, vol. 1, p. 308.
[21] Ramban: Writings and Discourses (New York, 1978), vol. 2, p. 668.
[22] Milhemet Mitzvah (Leipzig, 1855), p. 14.
[23] (Amsterdam, 1865), p. 16.
[24] The word “similarly” makes no sense here, as the commentary does not previously cite an interpretation similar to the one given by “Ralbag.”
[25] See Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., The Jew in the Modern World (Oxford, 1995), p. 61.
[26] According to the last census, Kiryas Joel has a higher percentage of residents receiving food stamps than any other city or town in the entire country. See here. The taxpayer should never be required to subsidize communities when the poverty is self-imposed.


Daily Birkat Cohanim in the Diaspora

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Daily
Birkat Cohanim in the Diaspora *
By Rabbi Daniel
Sperber
Question: May
Cohanim outside the Land of Israel give the priestly blessing (Birkat
Cohanim, or Nesiat Kapayim) on weekdays and on regular Shabbatot?
Answer: The
Torah explicitly requires the Cohanim to bless the people (Numbers
6:23), but does not tell us where or when they should do so. Rambam (Sefer
ha-Mitzvot, Mitzvat Assei 26) who gives no details, but refers us to
B. Megillah 24b, Taanit 
2b, and Sotah 37b, to work out the details. However, there are
versions of the Rambam’s text (edited by R. Hayyim Heller and R. Yosef Kefir)
when there are the additional words “every day”, and this, indeed, is
his ruling in the heading of his Hilchot Tefillah and Birkat Cohanim;
and see further ibid chapter 14, and this also is the ruling in Sefer
ha-Hinuch, Mitzvah 367. However, there we find the additions that
“the Mitzvah applies in all places at all times…” Hagahot
Maimoniyot, to Rambam Hilchot tefillah 15:12 note 9 writes, on the
basis of R. Yehoshua ha Levi’s statement in B. Sotah 38b, that any Cohen
who does not bless the people transgresses three commandments, splitting as it
were the biblical verse in Numbers ibid. thus: “So shall you bless
the children of Israel/ say unto them”, adding verse 27 ibid., “And
they shall put my name upon the children of Israel…” The Hagahot
Mordechai modifies this by adding that if the Cohen has not been summoned
to bless the people, he does not transgress by not doing so, referring to the
Yerushalmi text, and this view is accepted by the Beit Yosef, Orah Hayyim
128. There is also a minority view, rejected by mainstream authorities, that of
Rabbenu Manoah, that even if the Cohen was not called, if he did not bless the
people, he transgresses at least one commandment.
Outside
Israel it is the practice for the Cohanim not to give the priestly blessing, even
though the mitzvah clearly applies abroad (see R. Hayyim Hezkel Medini, Sdei
Hemed vol.3, p.271, vol.8 pp.177 and 381), and for the congregation not to
request that they do so, – this with the exception of musaf on the
foot-festivals and Yom Kippur – even during Neilah. The Beit Yosef was very
perturbed by this practice. He writes (Orah Hayyim 128):
The Agur wrote that Mahari Kolin [the Maharil] was
asked why the Cohanim do not give the priestly blessing every day, since it is
a positive commandment. And he answered that it was the custom of the priests
to make a ritual ablution [in the Mikvah] before blessing,
* This is
an expanded version of an article published under this title in Conversations
20, 2014, pp.150-155.
as is recorded in Hagahot Mordechai, and to do so
every day in the winter would be very difficult for them.
Hence, the custom evolved to do so only on the
festivals. Furthermore, [doing so] would curtail the business activities (mi-taam
bitul melachah), and in any case if the Cohen is not summoned he
does not transgress.
However,
the Beit Yosef continues:
He forced himself to justify his local custom; but the
reasoning is insufficient. For that which he said that they were accustomed to
make a ritual oblution every day, this is a stringency – i.e. it is not really
required – which leads to leniency… Since ritual ablution as a requirement for
the priestly blessing is not mentioned in the Talmud. And even if they took
upon themselves this stringency, why would they cancel three commanments, even
if they were not transgressing since they had not been summoned. Surely it
would be better that they carry out these three commandments clearly and not
make the ritual ablutions, since there are not required, and by not doing so
they could fulfill the three commandments.
He ends
by saying:
And praise be to the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael and
all Egypt who give the priestly blessing every day, and do not make ritual
oblutions for it.
Indeed
there are some congregations that still follow the Beit Yosef’s position. Thus,
the Syrian community has birkat Cohanim every day, (see H.C. Dobrinsky, A
treasury of Sephardic Laws and Customs, Hoboken N.J., New York 1986, p.168).
This too was the Amsterdam custom of the Portuguese community, (Shemtob
Gaguine, Keter Shem Tov, vol.1, Kédainiai 1934, pp.222-227 note 268, who
also quotes Even Sapir, that this was the practice in Yemen, and
possibly in some Moroccan congregations), while in Djerba they did it on
Shabbatot and festivals, (R. Moshe HaCohen, Brit Kehunah, Orah Hayyim,
pp.101-102, and note 30). Thus, there are several precedants for this practice.
However,
the Ashkenazi Rema, R. Mosheh Isserles, in his Darkei Mosheh ibid. 21,
seeks to justify the Ashkenazi custom. He writes:
Because [doing so] would curtail business activities
for the people in these countries, for the Cohenim are struggling to support
themselves in the exile, and they can barely support their families, other than
the bread they gather by the sweat of their brows daily, and they are not
happy. And it is for this reason that they do not carry out the priestly
blessing, which leads to bitel melachah la-am. And even on Shabbat they
do not do so, because they are troubled and concerned about their future…, and
they are only joyful on the festivals. And thus the custom evolved only to
bless the people on the festivals. So it would appear to me.
The
notion that the Cohen must be joyful when blessing the congregation has its
roots in the early Rishonim, (in Rash’s teacher, R. Yitzhak ben Yehudah).
The Mateh
Efraim, of R. Efraim Zalman Margaliot, added that this was an ancient
practice, even more than five hundred years old, going back to the Tashbetz
ha-Katan, a disciple of the Maharam Mi-Rothenburg, and the Kol Bo
sect.128, and accepted by the Maharit, the Agur, the Darkei
Mosheh etc., “and one may not stir from this custom” . He also
gives additional reasons to support this custom.
R. Efraim
Zalman Margaliot (1760-1811) in his response, Beit Efraim, Orah Hayyim 6,
Lvov 1818, also suggested that the reason for the absence of birkat Cohanim
abroad is because in our days the pedigree of Cohanim is questionable, and a Zar,
non-Cohen, may not bless the people (see B. Ketubot 24b), and doing so
several times every day would be making a berachah le-vatalah – an idle,
that is to say, unnecessary, blessing, which is forbidden – on numerous
occasions by many people. However, since birkat Cohanim is a mitzvat
aseh, a positive commandment, and we rule that even in questions of
uncertainty – safek -, when we are dealing with a mitzvat aseh,
we rule le-humra, stringently; and certainly it is superceded by the
seriousness of the mitzvah. Furthermore, if the Beit Efraim‘s
argument were correct, how come the Cohanim abroad do bless the people
on festivals during musaf?  [1]
The
Sefardi Kaf ha-Hayyim, R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer, on the other hand (Orah
Hayyim ibid note 16), cites French R. Yaakov of Marvege, (in his Shut
Min-ha-Shamayim no.38), who writes that:
In a place where there are suitable Cohanim to bless
the people, and they do not do so even once a year, both the congregation that
do not call them to do so, and the Cohanim themselves, who do not make the
blessing, transgress, also because they seem not to be relying on their Father
in Heaven.
This was
cited by the Egyptian Radbaz, R. David ben Zimra, and especially  the Hesed le-Avraham of R. Avraham
Azulai, who writes at length censuring those who do not bless the people, enumerating
the negative effects of their flawed thinking, concluding that “it be
proper to do so in every place, and not to seek out strategies to avoid doing
so.”
And even
the Ashkenazi Hafetz Hayyim, in his Mishnah Berurah 128:12 in the
Beur Halachah wrote:
It is only because of weekness that the Cohanim can go
out and not go up [to bless the people. For if not so, certainly they are not
acting well to needlessly nulify a positive commandment.
Indeed,
there are some Ashkenazi congregations where they do carry out the priestly
blessing at least once a month, as we learn from the Sefer ha-Miktzoot,
or even every Shabbat, as is mentioned in the Mateh Efraim.
Finally,
we may cite the words of R. Yehiel Michel Epstein, in his Aruch ha-Shulhan,
Orah Hayyim 128:4, who writes:
And behold, it is certainly the case that there is no
good reason to nullify the mitzvah of birkat Cohanim the whole
year long, and [it is] a bad custom. And I have heard that two great
authorities of former generations – probably the Gaon Eliyahu of Wilna and R.
Hayyim of  Volozin – each one wished to
reestablish birkat Cohanim daily in their location, and when they
decided on a given day [to begin], the issue become confused and they did not
succeed, and they said that from Heaven it was thus decreed.
In view
of all the above we may state that Birkat Cohanim does not require
ritual oblution, and in present day diaspora countries, blessing the people
will not effect or curtail any business activities, and people in the diaspora
are not downtrodden nor do they live in permament misery, so that they cannot
be joyful enough to bless the congregation. And according to some opinions
(e.g. the Pri Hadash) even if they are not called to give the blessing,
they may/should do so, (see e.g. Piskei Maharitz, Orah Hayyim vol.1,
Bnei Brak 1987, pp.259-260, with the note of R. Yitzhak Ratzabi ibid. Note 7,
ibid. Beerot Yitzhak). Thus, the reasons given for avoiding giving the
priestly blessing are for the main part largely irrelevant in present-day diaspora
conditions.
On the
other hand, not doing so means not carrying out three positive biblical
commandments, and according to some ,albeit minority, opinions this is also the
case when the congregation does not summon the Cohanim. Some, somewhat mystical
sources also stress the great spiritual benefits of the priestly blessing, and
the considerable negative effect of their absence. Furthermore, we have seen
evidence that in some Ashkenazi communities Birkat Cohanim was practiced
on Shabbatot or monthly, and not merely on the festivals.
Taking
into account all of the above, I would think that nowadays, there is little
justification for not carrying out the priestly blessing daily in our diaspora
congregations.
I would
like again to refer to the Hesed le-Avraham:
מי שאינו
מברך מאבד טובה הרבה ומראה שאינו חפץ במצות ולא חפץ בברכה, ובז לדבר יחבל לו, לכן
הכהן הירא את דבר ד’ ובמצותיו חפץ, לא יעבור מלברך לעשות נחת רוח ליוצרו, כי טוב
בעיני ד’ לברך את ישראל ומה טוב ומה נעים מנהג איזה מקומות, שהכהנים נושאים כפיהם
בכל יום וכן ראוי לנהוג בכל מקום, שלא לבקש תחבולות לבטל מ”ע מן התורה.
To
summarize:
This is a
biblical commandment obligating the Cohanim to bless the people.
Not doing
so means not fulfilling that biblical commandment, and, according to some
authorities, even transgressing three biblical commandments.
Here we
may add yet another element to our discussion. There is a well-known opinion of
R. Eliezer Azikri, in his Sefer Haredim chapter 4 (with the commentary
of R. Yitzhak Leib Schwarz, Kunszentmiklos 1935, p.19), that “those who
stand before the Cohanim in silence and direct their hearts to receive the
benedictions as the words of God, they too are included in the mitzvah
as parts of the 613 [mitzvot]”.
The
commentator, ad loc. (note 18-19) discusses this opinion, printing out that it
is a subject of considerable controversy among the greatest of authorities, but
he quotes the author of the Haflaah, R. Pinhas ha-Levi Horowitz, (in his
notes to Ketubot 24b and Rashi ibid.), that just as there is a
commandment to the Cohanim to bless Israel, so too is there a commandment to
Israel to be blessed by the Cohanim. He states that there are other examples
where the torah, explicitly commands only the active partner and not the
passive recipient, but nonetheless both are obligated. He brings as one example
to mitzvah of yibum which devolves both on the levir (yavam)
as well as the sister-in law (yevamah), even though the Torah
commandment is directed towards the levir alone. The Haredim‘s novum was
widely accepted, even though his source remained to many unclear.
Furthermore,
the Gemara in B. Sotah 38b states in the name of R. Yehoshua ben Levi, that God
Himself yearns to hear Birkat Cohanim, basing himself on the verse in Numbers
6:27, “And they shall put My name upon the children of Israel; and I will
bless them”, further adding that “Every Cohen who blesses [the
people] is blessed”, and he that does not do so is not blessed”, as
it is written, “And I will bless them that bless thee” (Genesis
12:3).
This view
is already found in a statement of the Tosafist R. Yaakov of Mervege,
Sheelot u-Teshuvot min ha-Shamayim (ed. R. Reuven Margaliot, Jerusalem
1957, no.37, p.69), already briefly 
cited above, who writes as follows:
I was also uncertain as to those places where there
are Cohanim who are suitable to carry out birkat cohanim and were
accustomed not to do so even once a year. And I asked [advice] concerning this
issue, whether [in their not doing so] there is a transgression, or whether one
can rely upon R. Yaakov who said that the Cohanim are not obligated to bless
other than when the people tell them to do so.
And they [i.e. from Heaven] replied: Both these and
these transgress; namely, the people (literally: Israel who do not tell  them [to bless], and appear not to be  fearful of [the requirement to receive] the
blessing of  Father in Heaven, and the
Cohanim, who do not bless on their own accord the nesiat kapayim, for is
it not written, “And I will bless those that bless thee” (Genesis
12:3), and from the positive [statement] we may deduce the negative, (i.e. that
from the positive statement that God will bless the blessers, we may deduce
that he will curse them that do not bless).
Admittedly
this is an opinion of a Kabbalistic nature, and we do not necessarily rule
accordingly when there is an opposing view of the niglah (the
rationalist position), as is well known. However, this same view was also
indicated in the commentary attributed to the Raavad to Tamid 33b, [2] but
which is actually by the rationalist Tosafist R. Baruch be-R. Yitzhak Vermaiza,
[3]  the 
author of Sefer ha-Terumah. This commentary in this instance
bases itself on (the largely lost) Sefer Miktzoot. [4]  The editor of this commentary pointed out (in
note 48) that this was the view of the Haredim, adding that it was also
noted by R. Zeev Pomeranchik, in his Emek Berachah, Jerusalem 1948,
sect.7, further cited by R. Pinhas Horowitz, in his Sefer Haflaah (to Ketubot
24b), and so also in Hagahot R. Akiva Eiger to Shulhan Aruch, Orah
Hayyim 128:1, and similarly in the Beur Halachah ibid.
It should
however not be overlooked that this point of view was not accepted by all
authorities. Thus, it was questioned by R. Yosef Babad, in his Minhat
Hinuch, Mitzvah 378, (ed. Machon Yerushalayim, vol.3, Jerusalem 1991, p.66)  [5],
basing himself on the Ritba to Sukkot 31b,  [6]  who writes explicitly that there is no
obligation on the part of “Yisrael to be blessed. [7]
Nonetheless,
considering the gravity of the iussue, [8] we
should surely take servious account of the Haredim’s view, appearing as
it does in a number of significant rishonim and aharonim, and not
deprive Am Yisrael in the diaspora from having opportunity to participate in
this important mitzvah.
The
reasons given by the various authorities for not fulfilling this mitzvah
regularly in the diaspora, are, of themselves problematic, but in any case
quite irrelevant to present day diaspora communities. There exist precedents in
different congregations, even outside Eretz-Israel, for daily, weekly or
monthly priestly blessings. [9]
In
Jerusalem and in some parts of Eretz Yisrael the priestly blessing is carried
out daily.
This
being the case, why should we deprive Am Yisrael in the diaspora and its
Cohanim, and even, as it were, God Himself, from the opportunity to participate
in this all important mitzvah?
In view
of all of the above, I see no reason why the daily, or at least weekly,
blessing on the part of the Cohanim not be reinstated in diaspora communities.

[1]  R. Shaar
Yishuv Cohen, Shai Cohen vol.1, Jerusalem 1997, pp.54, discusses this
issue in detail, showing that the view of that a Zar is forbidden to
bless was not mentioned in the Rambam, the Rif and the Rosh,
and that there is no issue of a berachah le-vatalah, etc. We shall not
repeat his detailed argumentation, which is beyond the scope of this study.
[2] Ed. Yair
Goldstoff, Jerusalem 1989, p.131.
[3] See E. E.
Urbach, Baalei ha-Tosafot: Toldotehem, Hibburehem, Shitatam, 2nd
edition, Jerusalem 1980, vol.1, pp.346-361, on this personality. He was a disciple
of Rabbenu Tam (ibid. p. 347 note 13), and definitely of the rationalist
school.
That this commentary is by R. Baruch be.R. Yitzhak was
demonstrated by A. Epstein, in his pamphlet on Sefer Yihusei Tannaim
ve-Amoraim p.16; Poznansky, Anshei Kairuwan, (Harkavy Festschrift
, Petersburg 1909), p.22; Hayyim Michel, Or ha-Hayyim 2nd
edition, Jerusalem 1965, p.28; M.M. Kasher and Y. Mandelbaum, Sarei ha-Elef
2nd edition, Jerusalem 1979, vol.1, p.330 no.4; vol.2, p.629,
referring also to Eliav Schochetman, Alei Sefer 3, 1979, p.83.
Goldstoff, in his introduction seems to have been quite unaware of all of the
above.
[4]  Ed. Simhah
Assaf, Jerusalem 1947, pp.39-40, no.47. In his note at the end of the passage,
he brings a wealth of bibliographic references, which supplements that which
was cited in the preceding note.
[5]  For some
reason that sentence is bracketed in that edition.
[6]  Ed. Eliyahu
Lichtenstein, Jerusalem 1975, p.97. And see editor’s note 319 ibid.
[7]  The editor
also refers us to R. Avraham Dov Shapira, Dvar Avraham, vol.1,
Warsaw-Pietrokow 1906, sect.31, basing himself on Yerushalmi Megillah
4:8, and cited by the Tosafot in Hagigah 16a, s.v. be-Cohanim,
and the Shiyarei Korban to Nazir 7:1, R. Reuven Margaliot, in his
note ibid., also refers to the Rashba to Sukkah ibid. However,
here I think his albeit (prodigious) memory failed him, since there is no
Rashba to Sukkah, and no doubt he really meant the Ritba. And
perhaps his mistake came about because the Ritba to Sukkah was
first published in Sheva Shitot la-Rashba, Berlin 1757, so that many
authorities mistakenly attributed it to the Rashba. See Lichtenstein’s
introduction, ad init and his note 1.
[8]  We may
further note that this has a lively current discussion in Habad circles. See,
for example, Hearot Ha-Temimim ve-Anash, published by Yeshivat
Tomchei Temimim Lubawitz ha-Merkazit, Kfar Habad, issues 219-221,
224, 233, 239, and in Pardes Habad 15-18. There the discussion is
primarily directed to Eretz Yisrael. And the case for Eretz Yisrael was argued
very persuasively and in great detail by R. Shaar Yashuv Cohen, in his Shai
Cohen, vol.1, Jerusalem 1997, pp.3-79. And on p.24 he brings a letter from
the Lubawitch Rebbe, in which he mentions that the Baal ha-Tanya
expressed his desire to reinstitute the daily birkat Cohanim, especially
since in his words this blessing “is rapidly drawn throughout all the worlds,
without prevention or hiderance and with no examination of the forces of
stringency” (Likkutei Torah, Korah ad fin.).  However, despite this, he did not do so for
some unknown reason. And it was for this reason that the Rebbe preferred to let
the existing situation be, rather than reactivating the daily blessing. Very
recently this subject has also been discussed in Mosheh Rahamim Shayo’s Mehkerei
Aretz: Hilchot Birkat Cohanim Jerusalem 2015, chapter 10, pp.128-129, who,
however, makes no significant novum to the whole issue.
A more comprehensive discussion may be found in Eitan
Shoshan, Minhat Eitan, vol.1, Bnei Brak 2003, sect. 7 note 1, pp.141-144.
He refers us to Hatam Sofer, Orah Hayyim sect.22, who seems to find
support for this view from the Tosafot to Rosh ha-Shanah 16b,
s.v. ve-Tokin; but he notes that in a different responsum, (sect. 167),
he wrote that most decisors are of the opinion that there is no obligation upon
the Yisrael to be blessed. The problem of this apparent contradiction is left
unsolved. The Maharsham, R. Shalom Mordechai Schwadron, vol.8, Satmar
1910, sect.25, cites the view of the Ritba, but concludes that,
nonetheless, there is an obligation on the part of the Yisrael, since he
is assisting the Cohen to carry out the mitzvah. (See Bentzion A.
Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot, vol.2, Jerusalem 2002, p.2, note 4.)
Shoshan brings a number of additional sources supporting this view, but also
the opposing position, e.g. Mahari Assad (R. Yehudah Assad) Yehudah
Yaaleh, Lvov-Petersburg 1873-1880, sect.46, Aruch ha-Shulhan, Orah
Hayyim 128:4; and that this was apparently the view of the Hazon Ish,
according to R. Hayyim Kanievsky, (referring to R. Shalom Yuda Gross, Nesiat
Kapayim ke-Hilchata p.14). (Incidentally, his references are not altogether
reliable, and his attributions likewise.) Finally, he examines the implications
(nakfa mina) of these two opposing views. And see his summarizing
remarks on p.611.
[9]  Indeed, this
is exactly what R. Y.M. Tycocynsky wrote concerning Eretz Yisrael…”for the
reasons given by the Poskin for abolishing a positive mitzvah
outside Israel every day, and the reasons… because of the need for ritual
ablution and also the problems of livelihood that cause them to be without
being joyful, and birkat Cohanim has to be [carried out] with joy and
good will, since we end the blessing ‘be-ahavah‘, ‘with love’ – [these
reasons] were not sufficient for the greatest of Poskim to abolish a
great mitzvah that [actually] comprises three mitzvot, and
[consequently] they praised the people of Eretz Yisrael who keep this positive
commandment…, (cited by Shaar Yiashuv Cohen, ibid. pp.16-17).


Traditional Jewish source for the “Seven Deadly Sins”

|
Traditional
Jewish source for the “Seven Deadly Sins”
 By Chaim Sunitsky
In Christianity as well
as in western culture there is a well-known concept of “Seven Deadly Sins”
usually enumerated as: pride, covetousness, lust (understood as illicit sexual desire),
envy, gluttony, anger and sloth. In particular this theme is well known through
the art of Hieronymus Bosch.
Even though there is no
clear biblical source for this particular list of sins, in general the number
seven plays a major role in the Bible and in particular the concept of some
“seven sins” is thought to come from Mishle (6:16): שֶׁשׁ
הֵנָּה שָׂנֵא ה וְשֶׁבַע תּוֹעֲבַות נַפְשׁוֹ (there are six things
Hashem hates and [altogether] seven that are abomination to Him).
In traditional Jewish
literature the number seven[1] certainly
plays a very important role. The Talmud (Sukkah 52a) mentions seven “names” (or
types) of Yetzer Hara and in a different place (Eruvin 19a) seven names of
Gehinom. The Zohar (Hechalot in Parshat Pekude) associates the two with each
level in Hell ruled by a different aspect of the Satan. One would therefore expect
some list of “seven deadly sins” in our literature as well. However it would come
as a surprise to find the list that is almost identical.
Still such a source
does exist. The GR”A[2]
comments on the Agada in Berachot (4b) that the Angel of Death flies in eight
steps (מלאך המות בשמונה):
ששמונה
סבות המיתה על האדם הם , אחת מחמת חטא אדה״ר וז׳ מחמת ז׳ ראשי עבירות שהם גרם כל העבירות
והם התאוה והקנאה והגאוה שהוא הככוד והכילוה שהוא עין הרע והזנות שהוא היצה״ר ושנאת
הבריות והבטלה והיא שביעית נוק׳ לשבת בית ובה כלולין ד׳ כידוע והוא מ”ש שיחת הילדים
כו׳ וישיבת כו׳. וז׳ שמות יש ליצה”ר הידועים וז׳ מדורות ז׳ ראשי תנינים וז׳ גשרים
לס”א וז׳ של להט החרב המחהפכת צבוע כו׳ וז׳ עונשים של התורה ד׳ מיתות ב״ד ומיתה
ביד״ש וכרת ומלקות
Because there are eight
causes of death, one due to the sin of Adam and seven due to the seven main
transgressions that cause all other sins and they are the תאוה (desire for gratification which can in our case mean gluttony[3]) קנאה (envy), גאוה
(pride) that is also ככוד (honor), כילות (stinginess) that is bad eye, זנות (illicit sexual desire) that is Yetzer
Hara, שנאת הבריות  (hatred of others) and בטלה (sloth). And this [sloth] is the seventh – feminine[4] “to
sit at home[5]”
and it includes 4 as it is known, like it says “childish conversation etc and
sitting [with ignoramuses[6]].” And
there are seven known names of Yetzer Hara, and seven “heads” of the snake and
seven bridges of the “Sitra Achra” and seven of the rotating sward that turns
from hyena etc and seven types of punishments: four types of execution by Bet
Din, death at the hands of Heaven, Karet and flogging.
Regarding his words “seven
of the rotating sward that turns from hyena” he is referring to an Agada in
Baba Kama (16a) about six species turning into one another every seven years
and the person not bowing down at Modim turning into a snake:
צבוע
זכר לאחר שבע שנים נעשה עטלף עטלף לאחר שבע שנים נעשה ערפד ערפד לאחר ז’ שנים נעשה
קימוש קימוש לאחר שבע שנים נעשה חוח חוח לאחר שבע שנים נעשה שד שדרו של אדם לאחר שבע
שנים נעשה נחש והני מילי דלא כרע במודים
The male hyena after
seven years turns into a bat, the bat after seven years turns into an arpad (possibly
a species of bat), the arpad after seven years turns into kimmosh[7], the
kimmosh after seven years turns into a choach, the choach after seven years
turns into a demon. The spine of a man after seven years turns into a snake if
he doesn’t bow when reciting Modim[8].
The GR”A’s comments on
this Agada in Baba Kama are similar to his comments in Berachot: the six
animals are hinting to 6 active (masculine) sins and the seventh – to the
passive (feminine) sin of laziness:
תניא
צבוע זכר כו׳. הן ז׳ קשרים דתנינא דלהט כו׳ לכן הן מתהפכין והשביעית דנוק׳ שלכן נעשה
נחש והראשונה בדכורא לכן נעשה שד
“They are seven knots
of the snake of the “rotating [sward]” etc and therefore they turn into each
other and the seventh one is the feminine and therefore he [who doesn’t bow at
Modim] becomes a snake (fem) while the first [six] are masculine and therefore
he turns to a demon (masc)”.
R. Avraham, the Vilna
Gaon’s son explains the words of his father as follows:
הן
ז׳ קשרים דתנינא דלהט פי׳ דלהט חרב המתהפכת שמתהפכת לשבעה גוונים הם ז׳ ראשי עבירות
שהם גרם כל העבירות , והם התאוה והקנאה והגאוה שהוא הככוד, והכילות שהוא עין הרע ,
והזנות שהוא יצה”ר, ושנאת הבריות, והבטלה והיא שביעית נוק׳ לשבת בית
The seven knots of the
snake of the “rotating sward” meaning the “rotating sward” turns into seven
types of seven major sins that are a cause of all other sins and they are the תאוה, קנאה,
גאוה that is ככוד,
כילות that is bad eye, זנות that is Yetzer Hara, שנאה and בטלה. בטלה is the seventh [passive] feminine
“to sit at home”.
The correspondence of the
GR”A’s list of seven deadly sins and the non-Jewish list is almost exact with the
exception of שנאה (hatred) being used instead
of anger (כעס), and even these two are closely related.
The main question becomes: what is the GR”A’s source for this specific
collection of transgressions?
It seems that the
GR”A’s source is Mishnayot in Avot. The first three sins are mentioned in 4:21הקנאה והתאוה והכבוד  that
cause מוציאין את האדם מן העולם to take the person
out of this world. The next three sins are in 2:11:   עין הרע, ויצר הרע, ושנאת הבריות and they also “take the person out of this world[9]”. The
last of the seven sins includes the four types of time wasting mentioned in
Avot 3:10. These four also said to “take the person out of this world[10]”.
In conclusion I propose
that the collection of the “Seven Deadly Sins” that are a source[11] of all
other transgressions[12] is
found in Judaism.[13]


[1] Of course in
Kabala this number is very important as it relates to seven lower Sefirot.
[2] The GR”A didn’t
write a commentary to all agadot like Maharsha or Maharal, we only have his
words on Berachot and some of Shabbat, Megillah, Baba Kama, Baba Batra and
Bechorot; much of his commentary is hard to understand but his son R. Avraham
helps us in his super-commentary.
[3] As the other
main “desire” for sexual gratification is mentioned separately later.
[4] In Kabala
action is associated with male and passivity with female. The first six sins
are related to six “masculine” Sefirot of Sitra Achra and the Seventh – to
Malchut or Nukva – the passive “feminine” Sefira.  
[5] See Yeshayahu
44:12. Kabalistic literature uses this verse to refer to the feminine aspect –
Nukva.
[6] See Avot 3:10 שנה של שחרית, ויין של צהרים, ושיחת הילדים, וישיבת בתי כנסיות של
עמי הארץ, מוציאין את האדם מן העולם.
The GR”A is hinting that sloth includes 4 different types of empty wasting time
just as Malchut is known to include 4 separate aspects.
[7] According to
the English Artscroll and Soncino, kimosh and choach are types of thorns, but
it seems that this agada is talking about various animals. Indeed Rashi (Hoshea
9:6) brings that according to Targum Yonatan on this verse kimosh and choach
are some kinds of animals. (Hebrew Artscroll also brings the possibility that choach
and kimosh are animals.)
[8] Regarding how
Modim is related to this the GR”A gives a mystical explanation that is beyond
the scope of the present article.
[9] See also GR”A
on Mishle 21:4 that there is a correspondence between the sins mentioned in these
two mishnayot. I presume it is similar to the correspondence between the
Sefirot Hesed-Gevurah-Tiferet and the lower level Netzach-Hod-Yesod. The GR”A
also writes there that these sins correspond to the qualities of students of
Balaam (see Avot 5:19).
[10] Indeed these
are the only 3 Mishnayot in Pirke Avot that use the expression: מוציאין את האדם מן העולם
[11] Note how the
qualities of a person are in a sense more fundamental than the actions, see the
beginning of R. Hayim Vital’s “Shaare Kedusha” and “Even Shlema” written by the
students of the GR”A according to the teachings of their Rebbe. 
[12] Interestingly
even the Hebrew article in Wikipedia on the “Seven Deadly Sins” assumes it’s a
Christian concept and does not mention that this concept has a source in
Judaism as well.
[13] It might even
be that this idea came from Judaism into early Christianity.


Parshat Ki Tisa. The Anointing Oil Revisited.

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Parshat
Ki Tisa. The Anointing Oil Revisited.
 By Chaim Sunitsky
In this parsha we have
the instructions of how to make anointing oil:
וְאַתָּה
קַח לְךָ בְּשָׂמִים רֹאשׁ מָר דְּרוֹר חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת וְקִנְּמָן בֶּשֶׂם מַחֲצִיתוֹ
חֲמִשִּׁים וּמָאתָיִם וּקְנֵה בֹשֶׂם חֲמִשִּׁים וּמָאתָיִם וְקִדָּה חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת
בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ וְשֶׁמֶן זַיִת הִין
All the proportions of
the ingredients are clearly explained except the second. Moshe had to take 500
(shekalim[1]) of
Mar Dror. Kinamon (probably cinnamon) “its half, 250”, K’ne – 250 and Kida –
500. The peculiar expression “its half, 250” is explained in the Talmud (Kritot
5a) to mean that 250 shekalim is taken twice. According to this the expression
“its half” is explaining the half of the weight of Kinamon and that it is
“gezeriat hakatuv” that this spice is not taken at once but rather as two
halves, 250 shekalim each. The total weight of the spices is then
500+250*2+250+500=1750.
Needless to say this
explanation does not seem to be the straightforward meaning of the verse. It is
a lot simpler to consider that mahatzito (its half) is explaining the previous
weight: while Mar Dror is 500, Kinamon is only half of that – 250. Still
practically all the commentators follow the view of our Talmud and even Rashbam
who usually explains according to what he believes to be the pshat. The words
of Rabeinu Bahya (30:23) are that this explanation is the kabala of Hazal
(presumably from Sinai) and that we already knew that half of 500 is 250, so if
we explain the Torah according to the simple meaning, these words are
redundant. However it was noticed already in Biur of Mendelssohn[2] that
our taamim don’t support this explanation, as they should have used a mesharet
to connect “mahatzito” to the next words[3]. He
leaves this as a question of why Baal Hataamim didn’t follow Hazal[4].
However Shadal in his
Chumash commentary brings from Yerushalmi Shekalim[5] (6:1)
that the total weight of the 4 spices was 1500. This implies that the weight of
Kinamon was only 250 as is the straightforward meaning of the verse[6]. We
thus find support for our Mesorah that followed a different tradition and there
was no clear “Mesorah from Sinai” that this verse should be read as the Bavli
suggests[7] but
rather this was one of possible interpretations in out Gemora.

[1] All the weights
are in shekalim although in some sources (Yerushlami Shekalim 6:1) the weights
seem to be in “mane” and not shekalim, it is probably based on a scribal error
[2] See also “Vikuach”
of Shadal (page 96) where he tries to prove from here that the tradition of
taamim is not from Ezra otherwise our Mesorah would not contradict this.
[3] Instead we have
a “tipcha” that connects this word to the previous phrase.
[4] In general the
Tosafot on Shabbat 55b already noticed that our Mesorah sometimes doesn’t
follow the Talmud. We usually follow the Mesorah in regards to the laws of
writing of the Torah. Moreover, the opinion of Masoretic scholars may have
influence on other laws like writing a “get” (see Bet Shmuel at the end of the
laws of writing names of men and women printed after siman 129 of Even Haezer;
see also GR”A, Even Haezer 129:51).
[5] Another
interesting contradiction between Bavli and this perek of Shekalim is the
number of tables in the Second Temple. The Mishna in Shekalim seems to imply
that there was only one table in the Heichal (and therefore presumably one
Menorah), but Talmud Bavli (Yoma 51b) implies that the Second Temple had 11
tables and 11 Menorot just like the First Temple (see Tosafot Rid ad loc who
notices this contradiction). Maybe at the time after the victory of Hanukkah
when the Jewish people were poor, there was only one Menorah and one table, and
at some later time more were made.
[6]Most
commentaries to Yerushalmi say this except for R. Shlomo Sirilio who changes
the girsa in Yerushalmi so as not to contradict the Bavli.
[7] While we are at
it, I’d like to add that regarding Ketoret, where the Torah mentions only 4
species, and Hazal add 7 more, that maybe the remaining 7 spices are not a Sinaic
tradition, see Shir Hashirim Rabbah 3:7 and Ramban (30:34). This would explain
why R. Natan could add Kipat Hayarden and not break the prohibition of “Bal
Tosif”. Maybe the Torah allows taking small quantities of various other spices
as long as the main ingredients were the 4 enumerated in the Torah in equal
proportion.  


Open Orthodoxy and Its Main Critic, part 1

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Open Orthodoxy and Its Main Critic, part 1
Marc B. Shapiro

Please note: The conversation in the comments, while of importance, does not fit the focus of the Seforim Blog. Anyone who wishes to continue can email Dr. Shapiro or the conversation can be continued on a different website.
1. Those who follow Jewish debates on the internet have probably heard of Rabbi Avrohom Gordimer, who has assumed the mantle of defender of the faith. He sees his goal as exposing the non-Orthodox nature of Open Orthodoxy, and has spent many hundreds of hours reading everything written by Open Orthodox figures (and their spouses), looking for a problematic sentence in order to pounce on them. He not only attacks the Open Orthodox rabbis but also shows his contempt for them by generally refusing to even mention their names. Instead, he refers to an unnamed Open Orthodox rosh yeshiva or rabbi and you don’t know who he is speaking about until you click on the link. I realize he doesn’t respect these figures, but to even deny them the simple courtesy of mentioning their names, as if to do so is muktzeh mehamat mius, is in my opinion simply disgraceful (albeit a common writing style in the haredi world).
This obsession with the Open Orthodox reminds me of how in earlier centuries Christian zealots “could declare themselves ‘crusaders’, join a company of St. Peter Martyr, and assume a special responsibility for denouncing suspicious behaviour to the Holy Office.”[1] It also reminds me of how in previous years the right wing would constantly attack YU and Modern Orthodoxy. Now that the Open Orthodox are under attack, YU and Modern Orthodoxy re getting a pass. But make no mistake about it, if there wasn’t an Open Orthodoxy to kick around, YU and Modern Orthodoxy would once again be the focus. It appears to me, and many others, that all of Rabbi Gordimer’s attacks are pretty meaningless by now, as we get it, he doesn’t like Open Orthodoxy and he thinks that they are not “Orthodox” (a Christian term which perhaps it is time to jettison). Simply drumming this point continuously is not going to make it any clearer.[2]
R. Kook famously said that the righteous do not complain about heresy but add faith.[3] In other words, they always focus on the positive. Now the truth is that this quote, taken by itself, is problematic, as we have examples where R. Kook himself complained about heresy. I think that the passage therefore must be speaking in generalities. In other words, he doesn’t mean that the righteous never complain, but that their essential nature does not focus on the negative and finding the flaws in others. Rather, they are focused on adding faith in order to show the truth of their own position.
Rabbi Gordimer gives us a continuing list of controversial statements from people identified with Open Orthodoxy. As mentioned, he will spend hours and hours reading their material until he finally hits pay dirt. We are never told about any of the good things he sees in the writers he so often attacks, and how 99% of what he reads in their writings is not objectionable. I also find it most curious (but not unexpected) that it is only the left who are subjected to this type of detailed examination, all in order to find material with which to attack them. What about people on the right who also say objectionable things? Why are they not subjected to the same criticisms? How come he criticizes Open Orthodox figures for their liberal Zionism, but never says a word of criticism about the anti-Zionism found in Satmar and other haredi groups? The question is rhetorical.
Another problem is that while Rabbi Gordimer himself tries to stick to the issues, the comments to his posts, which have to be approved before being posted, sometimes do contain derogatory and insulting remarks about individuals. How can anyone view this as appropriate?
I have no difficulty if someone wants to criticize, even sharply, Open Orthodox writers, as long as there are no personal attacks. In fact, if the criticisms of Rabbi Gordimer and others were offered on a basis of friendship and common purpose, I can tell you without hesitation that the Open Orthodox writers would be grateful for the criticism and dialogue, as they want nothing more than to engage with all segments of the Jewish world, including the more right wing elements.
As mentioned above, I find it most objectionable that all of Rabbi Gordimer’s (and others’) criticism is of the left, never the right. I have made this point in a number of lectures. Occasionally, individuals have replied to me that it is unfair to compare Open Orthodox ideas with actions of people identified with the haredi world, as these actions are simply the result of people making mistakes and say nothing about haredi Judaism itself. Thus, they claim, if a criminal is haredi, this has nothing to do with the ideals or teachings of haredi society.
While there is some truth to this argument, it is not entirely true. For example, the widespread cover-ups of sexual abuse in haredi society, and the reluctance to go to the authorities, are directly related to haredi ideology. Yet Rabbi Gordimer has never commented on this. I also have no doubt that some financial crimes in the haredi world, including by institutions such as yeshivot, are often related to both the structure of haredi society, which leads many into poverty, and also haredi teachings that may downplay or even deny the halakhic prohibition of certain white collar criminal activity. And you don’t need me to say this. Haredim say the same thing all the time. I mention this only to stress that just as I would be the first to say that there is plenty to criticize in Open Orthodox thought, there is also plenty to criticize in haredi thought (and also in Centrist thought). In fact, as we shall soon see, one can find things written by those on the right that I think many readers, including haredim, would find even more objectionable than what Rabbi Gordimer has written about.
Before going further, let me note that there is much that Rabbi Gordimer criticizes that I don’t find at all objectionable, and I will give an example of this below. By the same token, there are aspects of the Open Orthodox critique of haredism and Centrism that I do not share, and I don’t expect either the haredim or the Open Orthodox to agree with everything I write either. But that is OK, as no one can expect everyone to agree on everything. Well-founded criticism is a vital part of any society and must be appreciated. Just as there is what to criticize in all camps, there is also a great deal to praise in all camps (and in some areas, in particular Torah study and respect for Torah scholarship, the haredi world is far superior to what is found among non-haredim in the United States).
As noted already, Rabbi Gordimer is an avid reader of Open Orthodox writings. In fact, I think he has read more such writings than anyone else (even more than the Open Orthodox!), and yet he is not able to come up with anything positive that they say or do. This shows me that he is not being fair, as I can give a long list of great things that Open Orthodox rabbis have done across the country, things that even the most right wing would applaud. I can do the same with haredi rabbis and I guarantee you that Open Orthodox rabbis would applaud. Contrary to the mean caricatures one finds online, the Open Orthodox are some of the most genuine and giving people I have ever met, and I say this as one who has never been an adherent of Open Orthodoxy. The Open Orthodox leadership and its rabbis show respect not only for those on their left (which leads Rabbi Gordimer and others to criticize them) but also for those on their right, as I can attest from many years of personal interaction. (When I speak of respect for those on their right, I am not referring to people like myself, but of Torah scholars firmly ensconced in the haredi world who do not reciprocate this respect.) In short, we must recognize there is a lot of good in all camps and we should support positive developments no matter where they originate.
Furthermore, it is important for the halakhic community to understand that there needs to be different paths for different people as not everyone has the same spiritual make-up. It is therefore important to have responsible halakhic authorities who can speak to the different communities. Rather than engaging in constant criticism, Rabbi Gordimer should be happy that the communities on the left are able to turn to an outstanding talmid chacham such as R. Dov Linzer, as he understands their situation and can provide proper guidance. I encourage people to examine some of R. Linzer’s recent halakhic writings here.
Returning to an earlier comment I made, if the point of all the criticism of Open Orthodoxy is the protection of authentic Judaism by countering the distortions on the left, then shouldn’t the distortions on the right also be countered? Aren’t these also dangerous, even more dangerous as they reach a wider range of people and are regarded as authentic Torah teachings by many? Since Rabbi Gordimer and others only look to criticize those to their left, never those to their right, they must ask themselves if the protection of Judaism is really their only goal, or if, unconsciously perhaps, their crusade against Open Orthodoxy also has other motivations.
When I have mentioned these points to various people, they always ask me to provide examples of what I am talking about, i.e., of writings from the haredi world that should be criticized by Rabbi Gordimer in the same way he criticizes what Open Orthodox writers are saying. There are lots of examples I could give (and readers can find some of them in previous posts), but let me choose a book that was actually removed from a synagogue library because of the views expressed in it.[4]
In 2007 Rabbi Dovid Kaplan published Major Impact.[5]
It has a chapter entitled “Jews and Goyim”. The chapter begins as follows:
Every Shabbos in Kiddush we declare that HaKadosh Baruch Hu chose us from all the nations. At every Havdalah we declare that we’re as different from them as day is from night. It’s always interesting to see examples of just how different we are. So read this chapter and then enjoy your next Kiddush and Havdalah.
Here are some examples from the chapter:

We once took our kids on a trip to the United States. A goy on the plane asked me how many children we have. I told him five. “How old are they,” he asked. “The oldest is eight, and the youngest is three months.” “Wow,” he said with a look of disbelief, “you have twins?”

COMMENT: The idea of bringing children into the world on a regular basis was utterly foreign to his way of thinking. 

The Polish maid brought her fiancé to meet her employer, Rebbetzin Ruchama Shain. “You have to treat your wife with respect,” she said. “Oh, don’t worry. I’ll only beat her if she disobeys me,” responded the big shaigetz.

COMMENT: And he’ll only steal if he doesn’t have enough money. And he’ll only kill if he’s upset. And he’ll only . . . 

Shechitah houses often employ goyim, big strong ones, to help with the animals. A friend related the following incident to me. A cow had just been shechted. One of the goyim walked over with an empty cup, filled it with blood that was oozing from the neck, and then drank it down.

COMMENT: For him there’s no issue. For us it’s unimaginable. 

I once saw a young boy sitting on a fence at the zoo. A little old goyish lady wearing a zoo maintenance outfit approached him. “Come on down off that fence honey,” she said, “cuz I don’t want you to fall.” Wow, I thought to myself. It’s nice of her to be so concerned. I was really impressed, but only briefly. “cuz if you fall there’ll be brains all over the place, and I don’t wanna hafta clean up no brains.”

COMMENT: Can you imagine a Jewish bubby ever talking like that? 

Dr. Jacobs was making his rounds through the ward accompanied by Dr. Obama [!], an African-American. “What’s happening with Mr. O’Neill?” he asked Dr. Obama. 

“Her blood pressure is up and she has a little edema. Other than that she’s fairly stable.”

“I asked about Mr. O’Neill.”

“And I answered. ”

“But why did you refer to him as ‘she’?”

“Oh, I guess you wouldn’t know. Mr. O’Neill is eighty-eight years old. Back in Africa our native tribe has a custom. Once a man passes eighty-five and can’t do much, he’s referred to as ‘she.’”

COMMENT: We place older people on a pedestal and make every effort to make them feel important. Anything that may even remotely reduce their dignity is by definition pasul. And them? Yuch![6]

I realize that most of these stories are made up in order to make non-Jews look bad, but this last one is really stupid, even as a racist story, since when was the last time you heard an African-American referring to the customs of his native tribe? Also, in case anyone missed it, the name “Obama” is probably not an accident.
I don’t think there is any need for me to elaborate on how offensive this material is. Everyone understands how we would react if the focus was Jews and if one were to extrapolate from a (phony) story with one Jew to the entire Jewish people. The ideology expressed in this book (and others like it) is in direct opposition to everything I was taught about how Torah is supposed to make one a more refined individual. I also wonder, how many potential baalei teshuvah who picked up this book were turned off to Judaism after reading what I have quoted?[7]
I have no doubt that Rabbi Gordimer agrees with me that the views expressed in this book are not in line with what we should stand for as a people. So will we see a condemnation of this book and of ones that express similar views, or do they get a pass because they emanate from the haredi world?
Despite my great opposition to this book, I am willing to acknowledge that other things the author has written can be valuable. Why can’t Rabbi Gordimer, despite his criticism of Open Orthodox writers, admit that even if he disagrees with them about certain things, they can still make valuable contributions in areas where he would agree with them? In sum, when Rabbi Gordimer begins criticizing the problems in the haredi and centrist worlds with the same enthusiasm (or even half the enthusiasm) as he takes on writers in the Open Orthodox world, then I and many others might begin to take him seriously as someone who can offer a valuable perspective.
I should note that R. Yitzchok Adlerstein has made some comments relevant to the matter I have just discussed:

Mean-spirited and racist remarks made on comboxes on websites catering to the Chassidic community turn up quoted on anti-Semitic and anti-Israel websites. . . . Enough material exists to make it easy for intelligent outsiders to get beyond the posturing of spokespeople and learn about attitudes often expressed by the masses. For decades, observant Jews of all persuasions could go about their business flying under the radar of their neighbors. If they stayed out of trouble with the law (or did a good enough job at keeping malefactors out of the headlines), they were more than tolerated by other Americans. There are no longer any secrets. Every small group is the subject of inquiry, and the free sharing of information means that outside investigators quickly learn what people speak about behind closed doors. 

Agudath Israel undertook an impressive program of community education to parts of its membership regarding dina demalchuta[8] and chillul Hashem[9] in the aftermath of too many high-profile scandals. It will not be enough. The next exposés (they have already begun) will not deal so much with criminal behavior as with rejection and contempt. Many Americans who are not anti-Semitic will still not take kindly to the thought that large numbers of people, albeit minorities even within their own communities, have little or no regard for them as human beings, and no concern for their welfare. Those who take the policy of hen am levadad yishkon to the limit will soon learn that there are minimum expectations placed upon citizens not by law but by popular sentiment. If they wish to live as equals in the United States, they will have to come to some sort of modus vivendi with other Jewish values like darkhei shalom and genuine regard for the tzelem Elokim in all people.[10]

Let me now turn to the reason I have been discussing Rabbi Gordimer in the first place, and that is his attack on R. Ysoscher Katz found here. Rabbi Gordimer claims that there is no such thing as Modern Orthodox pesak, and that decisions by Modern Orthodox poskim “should look no different than if [they] were adjudicated by a chareidi posek; process (research) and product (conclusion) should be indistinguishable.” This is simply false, as anyone who knows the writings of Modern Orthodox poskim can attest. A posek is not a computer. All sorts of meta-halakhic considerations go into his rulings and this explains why a Modern Orthodox posek will come to different conclusions than haredi poskim on many issues. I am not referring to whether a tea bag can be used on Shabbat, as in this sort of case there shouldn’t be any differences between haredi and Modern Orthodox poskim, but in matters concerning which the two camps differ (e.g., the role of women) there will obviously be differences among the poskim.
For Rabbi Gordimer, all poskim share the same “process”. Not only is this historically incorrect, it isn’t even “doctrine”. Does he really think that there are any haredim who believe that Modern Orthodox poskim operate the same way as haredi poskim? Of course they don’t, which is precisely the reason why they reject Modern Orthodox halakhists, because they know that their meta-halakhic values influence their halakhic decisions. The haredim don’t oppose meta-halakhic values per se. Meta-halakhah has a very prominent place in haredi halakhah. It is the particular Modern Orthodox meta-halakhic values that they see as problematic.
I realize that for people reading this post what I have just said is neither new or even controversial. Many of you are probably wondering why I am even wasting my time in making an obvious point. So let me mention some important sources that you might have been unaware of that illustrate what I have been saying.
In 1951 R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik was asked if it was permitted to volunteer to serve as a chaplain in the U.S. armed forces, as this might lead to various halakhic problems, in particular with regard to Shabbat. Before analyzing the halakhic sources, R. Soloveitchik gives us an insight into the meta-halakhic factors that are operating within him. He confesses his lack of objectivity in a way that directly contradicts his portrayal of how Halakhic Man operates. A haredi posek who did not see any value in participating in larger American society could never have penned the following words, which stand as a complete rejection of Rabbi Gordimer’s point:
I have undertaken the research into the halakhic phase of this problem, which is fraught with grave political and social implications on the highest level of public relations, with utmost care and seriousness. Yet, I cannot lay claim to objectivity if the latter should signify the absence of axiological premises and a completely emotionally detached attitude. The halakhic inquiry, like any other cognitive theoretical performance, does not start out from the point of absolute zero as to sentimental attitudes and value judgments. There always exists in the mind of the researcher an ethico-axiological background against which the contours of the subject matter in question stand out more clearly. In all fields of human intellectual endeavor there is always an intuitive approach which determines the course and method of the analysis. Not even in exact sciences (particularly in their interpretive phase) is it possible to divorce the human element from the formal aspect. Hence this investigation was also undertaken in a similar subjective mood. From the very outset I was prejudiced in favor of the project of the Rabbinical Council of America and I could not imagine any halakhic authority rendering a decision against it. My inquiry consisted only in translating a vague intuitive feeling into fixed terms of halakhic discursive thinking.[11]
R. Soloveitchik’s description does not only apply to himself, but is how all poskim operate, although, with the possible exception of R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, none of them have been as self-reflective as R. Soloveitchik. It would actually be a good project to interview different poskim and see how each of them formulate the role of intuition and their own “ethico-axiological background” in the formation of halakhic decisions. In R. Nachum Rabinovitch’s recently published Mesilot bi-Levavam,[12] he states that a posek who is not guided by broad ethical considerations, a pesak of his “is not worth the paper it is written on.” These ethical considerations will of course vary, depending on whether the posek is haredi or Modern Orthodox/Religious Zionist.
Here are two examples of what I am talking about from R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, and which shows how wrong Rabbi Gordimer is in his assumption that one’s ideology doesn’t affect one’s halakhic decisions. R. Weinberg was asked about the halakhic permissibility of autopsies in the State of Israel. He wrote as follows (Kitvei ha-Gaon Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, vol. 1, p. 42):
והנה זה דבר ברור, שלעולם לא יגיעו בארץ ישראל לדעה אחת . . . ופתרון השאלה תלוי הרבה בהערכת המצב בעולם הרפואה, וביחס אל המדינה ומוסדותיה; וגם בהבנת המצב במחקר מדע הרפואי, וביחס אל החכמים העוסקים במדע זה, הן במחקר והן בשמוש למעשה.
R. Weinberg explicitly tells us that how one decides the halakhah depends on how one evaluates a series of non-halakhic matters. One of these is how one relates to the State of Israel. Obviously, a haredi posek who sees no real significance to the State of Israel will be inclined to rule one way, while a posek who regards Jewish self-rule as being of momentous significance will be inclined to rule differently. None of what I am saying is at all radical or controversial. It is simply obvious to anyone who studies halakhic literature.
Elsewhere, as we have seen in previous posts, R. Weinberg states that if there is a dispute among halakhic authorities we must reject the view that will bring the Torah into disrepute in people’s eyes (Kitvei ha-Gaon Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, vol. 1, p. 60):
ואגלה להדר”ג [הגרא”י אונטרמן] מה שבלבי: שמקום שיש מחלוקת הראשונים צריכים הרבנים להכריע נגד אותה הדעה, שהיא רחוקה מדעת הבריות וגורמת לזלזול וללעג נגד תוה”ק.
Obviously, a posek from a closed haredi society is going to have a different view regarding whether a halakhic decision will bring the Torah into disrepute in people’s eyes. In fact, I would assume that such a posek would reject R. Weinberg’s statement completely, seeing it as giving in to modern values even when in opposition to Torah sources.
Although I can cite numerous other texts to support what I am saying, let me just add one more. The late R. Aharon Felder, She’elat Aharon, vol. 1, no. 12, responded to someone who claimed that R. Moshe Feinstein’s halakhic decisions were not at all influenced by his nature or surroundings. R. Felder completely rejects this claim and adds[13]:
לא נתנה תורה למלאכי השרת וזהו כלל גדול אף בקשר למנהיגי ופוסקי הדור.
I mention R. Felder since I have very fond memories of a Shabbat I spent as scholar-in-residence in his shul not long before his untimely passing. I was fortunate to be able to spend hours talking with him over that Shabbat, and by telephone afterwards. While people generally knew him as a posek, he was also full of information about great rabbis, many of whom he knew personally, and he was happy to share this information. Here is a picture of us together.
One of the interesting things I learnt from speaking to him was that he had semichah from R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin. I think this is very unusual as I have never met anyone else who received semichah from R. Zevin. This connection to R. Zevin probably explained something else that happened over the Shabbat which was also very unusual. On Shabbat morning R. Felder spoke. Usually, when there is a scholar-in-residence the rabbi does not speak, but R. Felder had something he wanted to say. He devoted most of the derashah, which dealt with the importance of truth, to my post here on ArtScroll’s censorship of R. Zevin’s Ha-Moadim ba-Halakhah. Having a derashah focus on a Seforim Blog post was certainly a new one for me. In the derashah, R. Felder mentioned that when he first learnt of the censorship years ago, he told Rabbi Meir Zlotowitz that what ArtScroll did was completely wrong, and that while they are entitled to disagree with what R. Zevin wrote, they had no right alter his words.
To Be Continued
2. This past year we were told that it was Agudath Israel of America’s 93rd convention. This convention was significant as the Agudah finally threw in the towel and accepted the internet, setting up a website for the convention and broadcasting live. See here. The Agudah now has its own website here.
This new policy came in through the back door, with no explanation as to why something that until now has been forbidden is now permitted. This was typical for the Agudah, and years from now we will probably be able to read in the official history of Agudath Israel of America how the Agudah was among the first to recognize the great value of the internet for spreading Torah, and how the Agudah immediately seized this opportunity. Also of interest is that although the website just mentioned is the official Agudah website, and reports on all that is going on with Agudath Israel of America, it is called the Lefkowitz Leadership Initiative. Yet as anyone who examines the website can see, the Lefkowitz Leadership Initiative is only a small part of the website. Apparently, there is still a problem with calling the Agudah website by its proper name so they had to use a bit of false advertising by referring to it as the Lefkowitz Leadership Initiative.
What about the “93rd convention”? This would mean that the first Agudath Israel of America convention was in 1923 (as we are speaking about annual conventions). How is this possible if Agudath Israel in America was not formed until 1939 and its first convention was held on July 9-11, 1939?[14] See here for a 1950 news report which speaks of the 28th annual convention. This would mean that the first convention was indeed in 1923. Yet see here for a 1947 news report that speaks of Agudah’s 9th annual convention. This would mean that the first convention was in 1939, which is indeed correct. In years prior to 1947 the reports of the Agudah conventions also give 1939 as the year of the first convention.
So what happened between 1947 and 1950 and how did the Agudah start portraying itself as having conventions before Agudath Israel of America even existed? Rabbi Moshe Kolodny, the Agudah archivist, informed me that the 93rd year is a commemoration of the founding of the American branch of the World Agudat Israel on July 20, 1921. (As already mentioned, Agudah Israel of America was itself not founded until 1939). The problem with this explanation is that the 2015 convention should then be the 95th convention, not the 93rd. This is quite apart from the fact that I don’t understand how the Agudah can speak of 93 conventions when until 1939 there weren’t any annual conventions for Agudath Israel of America.
1923 as a year is significant in Agudah history, as it is the year when the first World Agudath Israel convention took place in Vienna. This is the convention from which we have the recently discovered video of the Chafetz Chaim. What I think happened is that between 1947 and 1950 some Agudah functionary decided that the annual Agudath Israel of America convention should be tied to 1923, and that is why this year’s convention was called the 93rd convention. The problem with this is, as mentioned, not only that Agudah Israel of America has not had 93 conventions, but that even if you date the conventions to 1923, you still don’t get 93 conventions. I say this because while the first world Agudah convention was held in 1923, this was not a yearly event. The next world convention was not held until 1929.
I have told this to a number of people and they are all surprised. Yet I find it hard to believe that I am the first person to point out that there have not been 93 annual conventions. Maybe some of the readers who attended the convention can weigh in. Can it really be that no one in attendance realized the problem involved in advertising it as the 93rd convention?
I realize that next year when the Agudah announces its 94th convention, opponents of the Agudah will, based on this post, write about how 94 is an incorrect number. But the more important point is that the Agudah actually has an annual convention. Mizrachi used to have an annual convention, but it is no more. Isn’t it significant that the Modern Orthodox have nothing to equal the annual Agudah convention?
3. A couple of months ago I was speaking to two people and one of them asked me why, if the right wing is so opposed to Open Orthodoxy, that they don’t just put its leaders in herem. I replied that in today’s day and age we don’t find anyone being put in herem. They will put books in herem but not individuals, as we saw with R. Nathan Kamenetsky and R. Natan Slifkin. Why don’t they put people in herem anymore? The answer usually given is that no one will pay attention to the herem.[15] Yet people don’t pay attention to the herems on books either, and that hasn’t stopped them from banning books.
In the discussion one of the people said that if they would put a herem on the leaders of Open Orthodoxy, they would have to also to put a herem on some women, and this would never work.  As he put it, the negative publicity would be too much, as the rabbis would be portrayed as big bullies coming after defenseless women. I have no idea if this is the reason why they haven’t put a herem on the Open Orthodox leadership, but I have to confess that I had never thought of the female angle. It probably is the case that putting women in herem would create a public relations nightmare that would equal what we have seen with the sexual abuse cover-ups and the declarations that basic historical and scientific knowledge is to be regarded as heresy. (In fact, I think that even putting men in herem in this day and age would lead to a big backlash.) That then got me thinking, how often in Jewish history have women been put in herem? I am only aware of the following cases: one in the Talmud,[16] two others discussed by R. David Ibn Zimra[17] and R. Meir Katzenellenbogen[18] respectively, and another two separate cases that involved many Italian rabbis.[19] Yet there must be others.
4. As I write this post, Yosef Mizrachi is in the news. It began with his unbelievably ignorant comments about the Holocaust and soon moved into other outrageous things he said, both about the Holocaust and in general.[20] Years ago I found another really offensive comment about the Holocaust, yet in this case the author was actually a well-known posek. In seeking to explain why the Holocaust occurred, R. Ovadiah Hadaya writes as follows, in words that sound like they could have been said by Mizrachi:[21]
לפעמים יש הרבה ממזרים בישראל שלא ידועים ואז הקב”ה מוכרח למחותם וכדי שלא יתביישו משפחתם אז הקב”ה נותן רשות למשחית להרוג גם טובים עמהם בכדי שלא יורגשו מי הם הממזרים.
Just think about the implications of this statement. 6 million pure Jewish souls, including 1 million children, are destroyed, and R. Hadaya suggests this was done to get rid of the mamzerim. Furthermore, in order not to embarrass the families of the mamzerim all the rest had to be killed as well, as if the omnipotent God couldn’t come up with some other way to take care of this. I don’t think that this passage can even be called “theodicy”, as theodicy is the defense of God’s goodness and omnipotence in the face of evil. The theology of this passage, if accepted as true, would actually lead people to doubt God’s goodness and omnipotence.
One day, not long after I found this passage, I was in the National Library of Israel reading room, and there, as usual, was Prof. David Weiss Halivni. I was very comfortable talking with him, but I wasn’t sure if I should tell him about what R. Hadaya said. I thought it might really unsettle him, seeing how a rabbi could give this explanation as to why all his loved ones were slaughtered in the most cruel way. In the end, I decided to share it with him. All Prof. Halivni said, and this is applicable to Mizrachi as well, is that when it comes to the Holocaust Sephardim simply don’t get it. What he meant was that not having the personal connection to the Holocaust, their discussions of it are without the emotional intensity one finds in the Ashkenazic world. In the Ashkenazic world, detached explanations of the sort offered by R. Hadaya and Mizrachi would be too offensive to even consider.
[1] Brian Pullan, The Jews of Europe and the Inquisition of Venice, 1550-1670 (London, 1997),  p. 100.
[2] If one looks at the attacks that have been made on Open Orthodoxy by Rabbi Gordimer and others, you will find the Open Orthodox placed together with Early Christians, Sadducees, Reform, and Conservative Jews. A friend commented that it is a wonder that they aren’t also compared to Sabbateans. I replied that this is probably only because the attackers are unaware of the fact that Shabbetai Zvi gave women aliyot, a step that Gershom Scholem describes as the “substitution of a messianic Judaism for the traditional and imperfect one.” See Sabbatai Zvi, p. 403.
[3] Shemonah Kevatzim 2:99.          
[4] It would be interesting to create a list of books removed from synagogue libraries for heresy or other reasons. When I was in yeshiva in Israel (and some of my classmates will probably remember this episode), Rabbi Alfred Kolatch’s Second Jewish Book of Why popped up in the beit midrash. This volume, and the others in Kolatch’s series, were extremely popular and sold more than 1.5 million copies. See here. Kolatch was a Yeshiva College graduate but he was ordained at the Jewish Theological Seminary. One of the teachers at the yeshiva insisted on having the book removed because the author was a Conservative rabbi. This teacher also wanted to show that Kolatch was an ignoramus. He pointed to a passage, p. 294, where Kolatch discusses why women are not obligated in tzitzit. Kolatch mentions that most assume that it is a mitzvat aseh she-ha-zeman gerama. He also offers another option, that in ancient times the four-cornered type of garment to which tzitzit were attached was a male garment, so women never adopted the practice of tzitzit. The teacher mocked the notion that tzitzit had anything to do with a male garment, and was adamant that the only reason women do not wear tzitzit is because it is a time-bound positive commandment. Unbeknownst to the teacher, and I didn’t feel comfortable mentioning it to him at the time as I thought he might not take it well after making such a public case against Kolatch, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan includes tzitzit (and tefillin) as male garments which women are forbidden to wear. See Targum Ps. Jonathan, Deut. 22:5.
[5] This book was called to my attention by Michael Steel.
[6] It is true that observant Jews place older people on a pedestal. Sometimes they may even go too far. R. Solomon Kluger, one of the most outstanding nineteenth-century poskim, has a passage that is very difficult to understand. It appears in his commentary on the Shulhan Arukh, Hokhmat Shlomo, Hoshen Mishpat 426.
According to R. Kluger, if one has to put oneself in a degrading situation or if it requires too much effort to save the life of another, then one doesn’t have to do it. In giving an example of טרחה יתרה he mentions an old person, who according to R. Kluger would not be obligated to trouble himself excessively to save the life of another. Many have discussed this strange passage (and surprisingly, a number of the discussions do not note that at the end R. Kluger appears to backtrack from his hiddush). R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2, p. 290, uses the following very strong language regarding R. Kluger’s suggestion:
הוא טעות גמור ושרי להו מרייהו, דדברי חכמת שלמה הא ודאי ח”ו לאומרם.
As we have come to expect, at least one scholar questioned the authenticity of R. Kluger’s words, a phenomenon we find whenever a radical position is expressed. But in this case the scholar I am referring to is the great R. Reuven Margaliyot who should have known better. He writes (Nefesh Hayah, 13:3):
והנה על כגון דא בוודאי אמרו דחדש אסור מן התורה ותמה אני אם יצאו דברים הללו מפיו הקדוש.
When I first saw R. Kluger’s words, I thought of R. Moses Isserles, Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 251:9:
ואפילו חכם לכסות ועם הארץ להחיות [החכם קודם] ואשת חבירו כחבר.
Many understand להחיות to mean literally to save from death. I think most will offer a sigh of relief that the Shakh writes:
בזמן הזה שאין תלמיד חכם . . . כל שכן דאין לדחות פקוח נפש מפניו.
[7] Contrast what appears in Kaplan’s book with what R. Ahron Soloveichik wrote:

Every human being, regardless of religion, race, origin, or creed, is endowed with divine dignity. Consequently all people are to be treated with equal respect and dignity.  

Anyone who fails to apply a uniform standard of mishpat, justice, tzedek, righteousness, to all human beings regardless of origin, color or creed is deemed barbaric.  

People who refuse to grant any human being the same respect that they offer to their own race or nationality are adopting a barbaric attitude.

The quotations all come from R. Soloveichik’s Logic of the Heart, Logic of the Mind (Jerusalem, 1991), and are discussed in Meir Soloveichik’s recent essay, “Founding Brothers”: The Rav, Rav Ahron, and the American Idea,” in Soloveichik, et al., eds., Torah and Western Thought: Intellectual Portraits of Orthodoxy and Modernity (New Milford, CT, 2015), pp. 96ff.
Torah and Western Thought is quite an interesting book and I highly recommend it. It also contains essays on R. Kook, R. Isaac Herzog, Nehama Leibowitz, R. Immanuel Jakobovits, R. Yehuda Amital, R. Aharon Lichtenstein, R. Norman Lamm, and Prof. Isadore Twersky. For obvious reasons the essay on Twersky, written by Carmi Horowitz, was of particular interest to me, and I was very happy to read, p. 258 n. 26, that Rabbi David Shapiro “is now editing and preparing for publication more than twenty years of Rabbi Twersky’s divrei Torah delivered at the Talner Beit Midrash.”
[8] As long ago as 1819, Leopold Zunz wrote about “the persistent delusion, contrary to law, that it is permissible to cheat non-Jews.” See Amos Elon, The Pity of It All: A Portrait of the Germany-Jewish Epoch, 1743-1933 (New York, 2002),  p. 113. In an earlier post here I wrote:

Isn’t all the stress on following dina de-malchuta revealing? Why can’t people simply be told to do the right thing because it is the right thing? Why does it have to be anchored in halakhah, and especially in dina de-malchuta? Once this sort of thing becomes a requirement because of halakhah, instead of arising from basic ethics, then there are 101 loopholes that people can find, and all sorts of heterim.

After writing this I heard R. Jeremy Wieder’s shiur on the topic of dina de-malchuta dina (available here) and he makes some very similar points.

[9] This is a mistake. It is not Hashem (with a capital “H”, implying “God”) but hashem (or ha-shem). I.e., it is not a desecration of God but of His name. Thus, one should writeחילול השם  not חילול ה’. See Lev. 22:32: ולא תחללו את שם קדשי. Nissim Dana titled his 1989 translation of one of R. Abraham Maimonides’ works ספר המספיק לעובדי השם. Yet the last two words should be ‘לעובדי ה.
Regarding the use the “Hashem”, I found something very confusing in the ArtScroll Stone Chumash. In place of the Tetragrammaton, ArtScroll does not use the word “Lord” but “HASHEM”, as this is how people pronounce the Tetragrammaton. While ArtScroll is the first translation to adopt this approach, it does have a certain logic. However, this logic breaks down a few times on p. 319 when the ArtScroll commentary attempts to explain what occurs at the beginning of parashat Va-Era. For example, “Or HaChaim comments that God’s essence is represented by the name HASHEM.” This makes no sense, as there is no name HASHEM. The commentary should have written that “God’s essence is represented by the four letter name of God.”
[10] “Digital Orthodoxy: The Making and Unmaking of a Lifestyle,” in Yehuda Sarna, ed., Developing a Jewish Perspective on Culture (New York, 2014), pp. 280-281.
[11] Community, Covenant and Commitment, ed. N. Helfgot (Jersey City, 2005), pp. 24-25. See also The Rav Speaks (Brooklyn, 2002), pp. 49-50: “I once said that there exists problems for which one cannot find a clear-cut decision in the Shulchan Aruch (code of Jewish law); one has to decide intuitively.” For another example where we see that R. Soloveitchik did not operate as Halakhic Man, see R. Menachem Genack, “My First Year in the Rav’s Shiur,” in Zev Eleff, ed., Mentor of Generations (Jersey City, 2008), p. 171:

I went to be menachem avel [console the mourner] at his home on Hancock Road in Brookline on Shushan Purim. His aveilus on Shushan Purim itself was something of a chiddush: although the Mechaber writes that one should sit shivah on Shushan Purim, the Remah rules that one should not. And Rav Soloveitchik said that, should he be asked to pasken the question, he would follow the opinion of the Remah. But he himself could not do otherwise than sit shivah on that day. Sitting shivah was the only way he could express himself that day – psychologically he could not do otherwise.

It is impossible to imagine that the Rav’s uncle, R. Isaac Zev Soloveitchik, would have ever consciously allowed his emotions to influence how he decided halakhah. See e.g., here where I write: “Another such example of this is the report that when one of R. Velvel’s sons died shortly after birth, and the family was crying, he was insistent that they stop their tears, since there is no avelut before thirty days.”

[12] (Ma’aleh Adumim, 2015), p. 512.                                                           
[13] R. Menahem Azariah of Fano even states that one can ignore a conclusion of R. Samuel Di Medina as he was angry when he wrote a particular responsum. See She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rama mi-Fano, no. 109.
                                                                                              
ואין לחוש לדברי הר”ש די מדינה שכתב ההפך מזה, כי נראין הדברים מתוך התשובה שבא לכלל כעס עם אחד העם שהיה מנהיג כך והוא מוחזק בעיניו שהיה עושה כן להתיהר ושלא לש”ש.
On the other hand, see here for the following story told by R. Eliezer Melamed in which R. Zvi Yehudah Kook turns his father into a religious robot, completely lacking any natural emotion.
פעם ליווה אבי מורי את הרצי”ה בלכתו מהישיבה לביתו, ואז סיפר לו הרצי”ה שלאחר פטירת הרב חיים עוזר גרודז’ינסקי מוילנא, קיימו לזכרו אזכרה בירושלים. אחד הספדנים אמר בתוך דבריו, שאצל רבי חיים עוזר האהבה לישראל לא קלקלה את השורה, והוא אהב את מי שצריך לאהוב. ומתוך דבריו נרמזה ביקורת על מרן הרב קוק, שנפטר שנים ספורות לפני כן, שכביכול אצלו האהבה קלקלה את השורה. דברים אלו ציערו וקוממו את הרצי”ה. זמן לא רב אח”כ התקיימה האזכרה השנתית של מרן הרב קוק, ואז הזכיר הרצי”ה את המשנה בברכות (לג, ב): “האומר על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך . . . משתקין אותו”. וזאת משום שהוא תופס את מידותיו של הקב”ה כאילו יש בהן חולשה אנושית של רחמנות שחורגת ממידת הדין והצדק, ואילו האמת היא שגם רחמיו של הקב”ה הם גזרות מדויקות. וכך הוסיף הרצי”ה: הצדיקים הגדולים ההולכים בדרכי ה’, הרחמים שלהם ואהבת ישראל שלהם אינם רגש אנושי שסובל מחולשה וטעות, אלא הם גזרות הנובעות מעומקה של תורה. וכל מי שאומר על הצדיקים שמידותיהם רחמים – “משתקין אותו”! וכך חזר כמה פעמים ואמר כלפי אותו ספדן “משתקין אותו”!
[14] For the founding of Agudath Israel of America and its first convention, see Aharon Rakeffet-Rothkoff, The Silver Era in American Jewish Orthodoxy (Jerusalem/New York, 2000), pp. 162-163.
[15] If they started putting individuals in herem, one of the questions that would be raised is does the banned person’s spouse and children also have to abide by the herem. It is hard to see how a couple could remain married if that was the case. This matter is actually discussed by R. Solomon ben Adret, She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba ha-Meyuhasot le-Ramban, no. 266. He informs us that R. Abraham ben David (Rabad) did not think that a wife has to observe the herem (we don’t know what he thought about the children). However, the Rashba disagrees and states the wife is indeed obligated to observe the herem.
[16] Nedarim 50b.
[17] She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, vol. 7, no. 50.
[18] See She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharam mi-Padua, no. 73.
[19] See Yakob Boksenboim, ed., Parashiyot me-Havai Yehudei Italyah ba-Meah ha-16 (Tel Aviv, 1986), pp. 29ff.; Nahum Rakover, “Shikulim be-Anishah: Hatalat Ones ke-she-ha-Avaryan Alul la-Tzet le-Tarbut Ra’ah o le-Hishtamed,” in Yitzhak Alfasi, ed., Ha-Ma’a lot li-Shelomo (n.p., 1995), pp. 367ff.
[20] R. Amnon Yitzhak actually spoke about Mizrachi’s statement before anyone else (someone obviously fed it to him). This youtube video was put up on October 25, 2015, two months before Mizrachi’s statement became an international scandal.

After the controversy broke, I looked around a bit and found that from a religious standpoint, Mizrachi has said something regarding the Holocaust that is much worse than what he was called to task over, as his comment defames many great rabbis. In the video below he has the chutzpah to think that he knows why so many tzadikim were killed in the Holocaust. He explains – I hope you are sitting down –  that they were not really complete tzadikim, and he identifies their supposed flaw. On the other hand, he states that the complete tzadikim were saved (and he makes the ridiculous statement that R. Aaron Kotler was a kiruv activist in Europe). Has anyone before Mizrachi ever made the appalling statement that survival of the Holocaust is proof that Rabbi X was more righteous than Rabbi Y who was murdered?

Contrast what Mizrachi said with what R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, a survivor of the Holocaust, said (Seridei Esh, vol. 1, p. 1):
רעדה תאחזני ובושה תכסה את פני לבוא ולספר על הנסים והנפלאות שנעשו עם אזוב קטן כמוני, אשר לא אדע במה לתלות נס-הצלתי, בוודאי לא מזכות יתירה, אלא ממיעוט זכות להמנות בין מקדשי השם הגדול והנורא
The only explanation R. Weinberg could give as to why he was miraculously saved was that he was not worthy enough to die al kiddush ha-shem.
In my Torah in Motion classes on R. Elchanan Wasserman I discuss the false claim that R. Elchanan returned to Europe “to die with his students.” I don’t know how this yeshiva myth arose. R. Elchanan left the United States in March 1939, more than five months before the German invasion of Poland. He didn’t know what was coming and would never have returned to Poland if he did. (R. Elchanan’s son, R. Simcha Wasserman, is reported to have made this exact point. See R. Ari Kahn’s post here.)

[21] Yaskil Avdi, vol. 8, p. 200. R. Hadaya was also a kabbalist but surprisingly he makes an obvious mistake, ibid., p. 97, as pointed out by R. Meir Mazuz in his just published Darkhei ha-Limud, p. 7. R. Chaim Vital, Sha’ar ha-Gilgulim, hakdamah 34, states:
והנה משה תחילה היה הבל בן אדם הראשון ואח”כ נתגלגל בשת ואח”כ בנח ואח”כ בשם בן נח
R. Hadaya writes:
הרי לך דעם שמשה היה אחרי כמה מאות שנים, מזמן הבל ושת ונח ובנו שם, עכ”ז נתגלגל בהם
According to R. Hadaya, what R. Vital is saying is that Moses was reincarnated into Abel, and then into Seth, Noah, and Shem, even though Moses lived many years after them. This would be a great mystery if R. Vital had said it, since how could a person be reincarnated into someone who lived before him? Yet this is not what R. Vital said. If you look at the quotation from Sha’ar ha-Gilgulim you can see that its point is that Abel was reincarnated as Seth, and then Noah, and then Shem, and in the end came Moses.


The Agunah Problem, part 2; Wearing a Kippah; More Censorship by ArtScroll

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The Agunah Problem, part 2; Wearing a Kippah; More Censorship by ArtScroll
Marc B. Shapiro
1. Continued from here.
There is even an opinion, which as far as I know is accepted by many, that if a man apostatizes the beit din can still not force him to issue a divorce. This is first mentioned by R. Meir of Rothenburg and his reason is quite surprising. He says that a woman would rather be married to an apostate than not married at all.[1]
כתב מורי רבינו עובר על דת או אפילו משומד אין כופין אותו להוציא ותדע מדלא מנה רשע עם שכופין אותן להוציא וטעמא דטב למיתב טן דו מלמיתב ארמלו אם לא שעבר על דת שקיבל עליו חרם שהוא כלפי דידה כגון שלא להכותה או שלא להקניטה.
This position, and the opposing one that we do force a meshumad to give a get: משומד כופין אותו על ידי גוים, is mentioned by R. Moses Isserles, Even ha-Ezer 154:1.
Today, there is no way in the world that a religious woman would wish remain married to an apostate, so how could the hazakah טב למיתב טן דו מלמיתב ארמלו be applicable in such a case? I therefore don’t see how any beit din could tell a woman whose husband apostatized that they are not able to compel him to divorce her. Incidentally, R. Solomon Luria couldn’t believe that R. Meir of Rothenburg really meant what he said. According to R. Luria, the word משומד here does not mean “apostate” but a משומד לכל התורה, that is, a complete sinner who is still in the Jewish community and can be brought back to Torah observance, perhaps even by his wife.[2]
כל זמן שלא נטמע ביניהם אפי’ הוא משומד לכל התורה כולה אין כופין אותו מאחר שיכול לקיים שאירה כסותה ועונתה כראוי וגם אולי על ידה יתחרט ויחזור למוטב ובזה יתיישבו דברי מהר”ם שכתב שאין כופין כלל אפילו משומד.
This is not the standard position as pretty much everyone assumes that R. Meir of Rothenburg was talking about an actual meshumad. Yet it must be noted that as with R. Luria, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg also found R. Meir of Rothenburg’s language strange, since how can you say טב למיתב טן דו מלמיתב ארמלו about a woman living with an apostate? R. Weinberg therefore suggested that perhaps R. Meir just meant a sinner.[3] Elsewhere, R. Weinberg sees it as obvious that a Jewish woman would not want to marry an apostate, even one who has repented from his apostasy.[4]
והנה זה דבר ברור שהמומר מאוס בעיני כל אחד מישראל, ואפילו אם חזר בתשובה שלמה הוא מאוס כשזוכרים שהמיר את דתו, וק”ו ב”ב של ק”ו אם לא עשה תשובה שלמה אלא הרהר תשובה בלבו ואח”כ חזר לסורו שהוא מאוס ואין שום בת ישראל מתפייסת עם אדם כזה.

הכל יודעים ששום בת ישראל לא תנשא לאיש שהמיר דתו אפילו אם עשה אח”כ תשובה בלבו ואפילו אם ימיר את דתו החדשה בדת ישראל.

Just as with the case of a real meshumad, it is hard to imagine that today a woman who wants to divorce her husband because he has become completely non-observant, and the husband refuses to give the get, that this woman would not be regarded as an agunah. I am speaking about the more modern communities. What about in the haredi world? I was shocked to read the following in a recent work by R. Judah Itah explaining why it is that even today a woman would rather be married to an apostate than be alone, something that is obviously factually incorrect and is a terrible indictment of Jewish women.[5]
והנה בדין זה אם כופין המומר לכאורה איירי דבאה האשה ומבקשת מהבי”ד שיעזרו לה לצאת מרשות המומר כי לא טוב לה להיות בחברת המומר. א”כ היאך אתה דוחה את רצונה בנימוק דטוב לה כיון דטב למיתב תן [!] דו וכו’ הרי היא זועקת דאין זה טובה בשבילה. וצ”ל דקים לחז”ל דכל אשה רוצה להיות בחברת איש מלהיות בודדה, ומה שאומרת שרצונה לצאת מהמומר לא זה סיבה בגלל המומר אלא אפשר מפני שעיניה נתנה באחר ולכן אין כופין המומר, דלא מאמינים למה שאו’ שכל רצונה לא להיות בחברת המומר.
Can R. Itah really believe that a Bais Yaakov girl could live with an apostate and the only reason she would scream to get out of the marriage is because she has her eye on someone else? If there was a haredi woman who chose to remain with an apostate rather than demand a divorce, wouldn’t the haredi world regard her as a traitor?
In the previous post I discussed R. Weinberg’s responsum dealing with a man accused of sexual abuse. In that case, R. Weinberg refused to force him to give a get. This responsum is mentioned in a 2013 decision by the Jerusalem Beit Din available here. In a 2-1 decision the beit din refused to order a convicted sexual abuser to give his wife a get. The majority recommended that the husband give a get, but as far as compelling the husband, or even telling him that he was obligated to give a get, the beit din felt that its hands were tied.
We are taught that the ways of Torah are pleasant. Can it really be that a woman who wants to be divorced from a sexual abuser has no recourse? Must it be the case that the beit din’s hands are tied and the husband can keep his wife a prisoner? 
This brings me to a suggestion which can perhaps solve some of the problems at least in the State of Israel. I am not naive enough to think that it will ever be implemented, but I do think that it is a good approach. As I just mentioned, the Jerusalem Beit Din case of the convicted sexual abuser was decided by a 2-1 majority. One of the dayanim thought that the husband could be compelled to give the divorce, but unfortunately for the wife he was in the minority. If you examine the decisions of the various batei din you find that some dayanim are more liberal than others when it comes to ordering the husband to issue a divorce. This doesn’t mean that the other dayanim are “bad guys”, as some feminists like to portray them. They just feel bound by certain halakhic restrictions. The more liberal dayanim, however, follow a halakhic tradition that assumes that if the husband and wife have been separated for a long time, or if there are good reasons for the woman to want a divorce, even if these reasons are not mentioned in the Talmud, then the husband can be forced to issue the get.
Since I think we all agree that freeing women from dead marriages is a positive goal, would it violate any halakhic procedure for certain communities to have batei din composed exclusively of those rabbis who accept the halakhic position that a husband can be obligated to divorce his wife even in cases not specified in the Talmud? This would not be an example of deciding the halakhah before the case was heard, but only of creating a beit din of dayanim who are at least open to a more liberal understanding of when divorce is to be required.
This would no different than the conversion courts set up in Israel recently under the direction of R. Nachum Rabinovitch. Only dayanim who have a liberal perspective on conversion are on this court. This doesn’t mean they will always agree on all points, but they will agree on certain baseline positions. This might be a solution to the sort of case that appeared before the Jerusalem Beit Din, discussed above. Had the make-up of the beit din been different, rather than a 2-1 decision leaving the wife in a miserable marriage perhaps for the rest of her life, the decision could have been 2-1 or 3-0 in her favor.
I don’t think anyone would object if a community said, for example, that they will only hire a rabbi who supports, or opposes, the heter mekhirah. That is the community’s prerogative. So why should it be problematic to say that for certain communities only dayanim who have a liberal perspective on when a husband is obligated to give a get should be seated on batei din dealing with these issues? I think that some dayanim will be fine with this. While their interpretation of halakhah does not generally permit them to obligate a husband to give a get, they recognize that others have a different perspective. It is not uncommon for a posek to tell a questioner that he should inquire of another posek who will probably give him a more lenient answer. For example, both R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Ovadiah Yosef, when confronted with questions about abortion, rather then reply that it was forbidden they advised the questioners to ask R. Eliezer Waldenberg, as he had a more lenient opinion in this matter.[6] Many more such examples could be cited dealing with a whole host of issues.[7]
Here is what appears in R. Eliyahu Sheetrit’s Rabbenu, p. 137. 

It describes how R. Ovadiah Yosef did exactly what I am suggesting. He purposely arranged to have a dayan join the beit din on a certain day, knowing how this dayan held in a halakhic matter. In other words, R. Ovadiah was “stacking the deck” to get a decision he believed to be correct. If R. Ovadiah felt comfortable in doing this, then I don’t think there is a problem with picking dayanim who are known to accept the view that men can be required to issue a get in a wide range of cases.
Another way to solve the problems I have written about in the last two posts would be if the batei din accepted the view of R. Moshe Feinstein that when the husband and wife are living separately, and there is no chance of reconciliation, then halakhah requires the husband to give a get. I realize that R. Moshe’s position is not in line with the sources I have previously referred to, but since so much is at stake, perhaps the dayanim could agree that R. Moshe’s position is sufficient to rely on. This is what he states in Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 4, no. 15:2 (emphasis added):
ובדבר איש ואשה שזה הרבה שנים שליכא שלום בית, וכבר שנה וחצי דרים במקומות מופרדים, וכבר ישבו ב”ד חשוב ולא עלה בידם לעשות שלום ביניהם. וראינו גילוי דעת חתום מהב”ד שלא הועיל כל השתדלותם לעשות שום. וכנראה מזה שהב”ד סובר שא”א לעשות שלום ביניהם. אז מדין התורה באופן כזה מוכרחין להתגרש ואין רשות לשום צד לעגן, לא הבעל את אשתו ולא האשה את הבעל, בשום עיכוב מצד תביעת ממון. אלא צריכים לילך לפני ב”ד לסדר התביעות בענייני ממון ולסדר נתינת וקבלת הגט.
R. Moshe’s approach was anticipated by R. Hayyim Palache in the 19th century. Therefore, if some poskim feel that R. Moshe’s authority isn’t enough to rely on, R. Palache words might be sufficient for them (and indeed, in recent years some dayanim have relied on R. Palache).[8] R. Palache actually sounds like he is describing the contemporary scene when he says that if either husband or wife refuses to allow the divorce to go through in order to take revenge on a spouse, that the heavenly punishment for such an action is very great. He then says that if it has been eighteen months and the couple still can’t get along, then the husband is forced to give a divorce.[9]
וידעו נאמנה כי כל הבא לעכב מלתת גט בענין זה כדי להנקם זה מזה מחמת קינאה ושינאה ותחרות כאשר יהיה האופן פעמים שהאיש רוצה לגרש והאשה אינה רוצה וכדי להנקם מהאיש מעכבים הדבר שלא לש”ש עתידין ליתן את הדין . . . וכמו כן להפך כשהאשה רוצה להתגרש והאיש איו רוצה וכדי להנקם מהאשה מעכבים מלתת גט שלא לש”ש כם בזה לא בחר ה’ ויש עונש מן השמים . . . והנני נותן קצבה וזמן לדבר הזה דאם יארע איזה מחלוקת בין איש לאשתו וכבר נלאו לתווך השלום ואין להם תקנה ימתינו עד זמן ח”י חדשים ואם בינם לשמים נראה לב”ד שלא יש תקנה לשום שלום ביניהם, יפרידו הזווג ולכופם לתת גט עד שיאמרו רוצה אני.                     
As I mentioned, some dayanim will be very content not to sit on cases where their stringent approach will lead to a situation where the husband is not obligated to give his wife a get. They will recognize the problems women are sometimes placed in because of their approach and be happy that other dayanim have a different perspective, even though they themselves cannot agree. What then to do about the dayanim with a stringent perspective who will not agree to recuse themselves? I don’t see any reason why communities cannot declare that they do not wish to accept a situation where women are locked in dead marriages if there are valid halakhic options. As such, they will only hire dayanim who adopt a liberal perspective as to when a husband can be obligated to issue a divorce. This does not mean that these communities would be deciding cases in place of the dayanim, and every case is obviously different. However, there is nothing wrong with inquiring of a dayan what his halakhic philosophy is before seating him on the bench. This has nothing to do with deciding specific cases, as anyone who has ever watched a Supreme Court nominee hearing understands.[10] You are permitted to ask a question of a posek whom you assume will offer a lenient decision, as long as you are prepared to follow the decision even if in the end it is not what you expected. By the same token, one can appoint as a rav or a dayan someone whose halakhic philosophy is in line with the values of the community he will serve. That is all that I am suggesting. 
As mentioned in the last post, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg states that if there is a dispute among halakhic authorities, we must reject the view that will bring the Torah into disrepute in people’s eyes (Kitvei ha-Gaon Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, vol. 1, p. 60):
ואגלה להדר”ג [הגרא”י אונטרמן] מה שבלבי: שמקום שיש מחלוקת הראשונים צריכים הרבנים להכריע נגד אותה הדעה, שהיא רחוקה מדעת הבריות וגורמת לזלזול וללעג נגד תוה”ק.

This formulation of R. Weinberg can provide justification for the approach I am suggesting. Interested readers should also examine R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 5, no. 26, where he writes to R. Elyashiv and justifies his liberal perspective. He sums up his position with these important words

ואחרי זאת בקחתנו גם בחשבון חומר השעה המיוחד שאנו חיים בה בתקופתנו אשר רבו שוטני התורה וכן בראותינו פירצת הדור הצעיר המנוער מתורה ויראת שמים וכשלא מוצא אוזן קשבת לדבריו עושה במחשך מעשיו, וכמה פעמים הרי אזנינו שומעות ולא זר מהמכשולים הגדולים שהנשים נכשלות ומכשילות את הרבים באיסור א”א ואנו עומדים רפה אונים באין בידינו להעמיד הדת על תלה, נדמה לי ששפיר ישנו במה שכתבתי בספרי שם כר נרחב לתת מקום לדון בכובד ראש בהערכת כל מקרה ומקרה שלטענת מאוס עלי ולהשתמש לפי הצורך בכפיה . . . ולכן לפענ”ד נאמנים המה דבריו של המהר”א טוואה בחוט המשולש שכותב שאפי’ לדעת הסוברים שלא לכוף אם יש צורך שעה בכפייה יכופו דאין לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות, ובלבד שתהא כוונת הדיין לש”ש ויחקור על הדבר כראוי.

I quoted R. Waldenberg at length as there are some people who thought that my previous post sounded “reformist”, because I argued that divorce halakhah should not be decided in a vacuum but should take into account the contemporary reality. As you can see, this is exactly what R. Waldenberg says.

R. Waldenberg concludes that the final decision on this matter should come from all the rabbinic courts in Israel. He does not want to have a situation like we have today, where different courts have entirely different approaches when it comes to how to deal with divorce law. 

There is another point that is important to make. I have heard people say that the problem of the agunah that we have today, where a man refuses to give his wife a get, is a new phenomenon. This is completely incorrect, as this phenomenon is already seen in the medieval responsa. However, you won’t generally find it discussed among the responsa that deal with agunah. The matter is discussed when dealing with whether one can be forced to give a divorce. From medieval times until the present, women in unhappy marriages have demanded divorces. As we have seen, in situations that many people today would consider cases of agunah, in prior generations the rabbis ruled that the woman was not entitled to a get. 

Even in earlier years, however, we do find examples of agunot where the husband refused to give a get, even after being told to so by a beit din, and the community tried to help. The 19th century Hebrew newspapers have a number of such cases. Here is one example that appeared in Ha-Magid, Feb. 13, 1861, pp. 27-28.
It is interesting that when they caught up with the man they imprisoned him in the rabbi’s house. They also took his money and used it as leverage.
Let me make one final point. In matters of divorce my feeling is that when either husband or wife wants a get, and it is obvious that there is no future in the marriage, then neither party should prevent the divorce from taking place. There shouldn’t be any reason to go to a beit din to force a divorce. Adults should be able to see that the marriage isn’t working out and come to a conclusion that it is time to end it. Any husband who chooses to withhold a get when he knows that the marriage is over is acting in a very cruel way, and the full weight of halakhically acceptable communal pressure should be brought on him. Nothing should scandalize us more than a so-called religious person keeping his wife captive as a means of revenge. I would even suggest reading the names of some agunot during the Shabbat prayers, in order to sensitize people to the issue.
I know that many people will regard what I have just written as obvious. What I will now say might anger some, but I think that it too should be obvious. I have often heard it said that a get should never be withheld, and that the get should be given immediately. For example, on ORA’s website it states: “[I]t is never acceptable to refuse to issue a get once the marriage is irreconcilable.” On JOFA’s website it states: “As soon as it becomes clear that there will be no reconciliation, the Get should be written and delivered to the woman so that it cannot be used as a bargaining tool in financial or custody negotiations.” 

While in general both these statements are correct, it is not correct that this is always the case. For instance, let’s say the wife runs away to Europe with the kids. Does anyone seriously think that the husband is still obligated to give her a get? In such a circumstance it is entirely appropriate for the husband to insist that she come back to the United States and settle all custody issues before a get is issued. Or let’s say a husband and wife separated, and the wife refuses to let the husband see his children. It could be many months before the secular court rules on the matter of visitation. Why would anyone think that in the meantime the husband is obligated to give his wife a get if she refuses to allow him to see his children? I don’t think that there is any reputable beit din in the world that would side with the woman in these two cases. These are obviously extreme examples, and have nothing to do with the typical agunah case we hear about. Yet we should be aware that there are nuances that sometimes come into play, and every case must be investigated by a reputable beit din before judgments are made.

Finally, those who want to learn more about the matters we have been discussing should consult R. Shmuel Gartner’s detailed book, Kefiyah be-Get (Jerusalem, 1998). A 2000 page book with the title Mishpat ha-Get has just appeared. I have not yet seen it but it must have important material as well. There is also another book that is worth noting, R. Raphael Aaron Ben-Shimon’s Bat Na’avat ha-Mardut (Jerusalem, 1917). R. Ben-Shimon (died 1928) was a leading Egyptian rabbi and author of a number of significant works. What makes Bat Na’avat ha-Mardut of particular interest is that he has a number of formulations that if written today would lead certain people to claim that he was a feminist or an adherent of Open Orthodoxy. For example:

P. 4:

ואמנם בזמנינו זה הנה מתלאה, כי הוסב דין המורדת לאכזריות נוראה כי בתי דינין בזמנינו האחרונים, לסיבת כי לא מצאו כל הדין מפורש מה יעשה לה להמורדת בטענת מאיס עלי ואחרי אשר אין לנו עתה דין הכפיה לכוף את הבעל לגרש בשום אופן אחזו בשיטת החומרא עד דיוטא התחתונה, ושמו להם לקו כי המורדת היא כאשה מפרת באמונה וכל חמירא דאיכא ברשותייהו נתנו אותה על ראש המורדת האומללה, כאלו הוא דין דאיסור והיתר אשר המחמיר בה בטוח הוא ממכשול יותר מהמתיר, וע”כ העמידוה על גחליה ריקה. חופשה לא ניתן לה, הפסידה נדוניתה וכ”ש כתובתה, ואף אם חזרה בה לא יקבלו תשובתה
P. 8:
דהרמב”ם ז”ל נתמלא חמלה וחנינה על בנות ישראל
P. 154:
 ואמינא ולא מסתפינא שאם היה הרמב”ם ז”ל חי אתנו היום, היה מרעיש העולם, על אחרוני זמננו אשר דנין את המורדת דמאיס עלי במשפט מר וקשה ואכזרי כנ”ל, ואומר בקול רם הלא תבושו הלא תכלמו לתלות בי קלון אכזריות כזאת אשר לא דמיתי, ולא עלתה על לבי, הן אנכי חסתי על נפשות בנות ישראל, שיחיו חיי צער ויהיו כשפחות וכשבויות חרב להבעל לאיש שנוי [שנאוי] נפשם
2. In the previous post I referred to a couple of Supreme Rabbinic Court decisions. In these cases R. Elyashiv was a member of the court and the decisions were published in the Piskei Din shel Batei Din ha-Rabaniyim be-Yisrael. In both of the cases I cited the decision was unanimous and no individual dayan is recorded as having authored the published decision. Nevertheless, the rulings are reprinted in R. Elyashiv’s Kovetz Teshuvot, vol. 1, as if they were written by him alone (and maybe they were, but no evidence for this is provided). This volume was not published by R. Elyashiv but by one of his followers, and is a collection of previously published court rulings and responsa. There are 253 sections and the table of contents at the beginning of the volume provides the original sources of all the material.
When you look at the list of sources you find something unusual. While the names of the various books and journals are given one also finds some abbreviations. This is strange since these abbreviations are nowhere explained, and abbreviations are only used for a very small number of the many different sources. I was unable to figure out what all of the abbreviations mean but I did figure out the following:
פ”ד = פסקי דין של בתי הדין הרבניים בישראל
י”א = יביע אומר
ד”י = דרך ישרה
מ”ש = משפטי שאול

When reprinting rulings from R. Elyashiv that appeared in the Israeli government Beit Din publication, rather than telling the reader where they are taken from, all we get is פ”ד. Similarly, the typical reader will have no way of knowing that material has been taken from R. Ovadiah Yosef’s Yabia Omer, R. Yitzhak Yedidyah Frankel’s Derekh Yesharah, and R. Shaul Yisraeli’s Mishpetei Shaul. Obviously, for the individual who published the Kovetz Teshuvot, there is something problematic with all of these individuals, and with the government beit din, and he therefore wouldn’t even mention the name of their publications.
If you look at Yabia Omer, vol. 3, Orah Hayyim no. 33, and Mishpetei Shaul, no. 34 you can see the original letters from R. Elyashiv. Needless to say, in these letters he relates to R. Ovadiah and R. Yisraeli as valued rabbinic colleagues. However, in Kovetz Teshuvot the beginning of the letters has been deleted, and the reader therefore has no idea who R. Elyashiv was corresponding with. Elsewhere in Kovetz Teshuvot, when the recipient of a letter is “kosher” in the eyes of the publisher, the beginning of the letter is indeed included.[11] For some reason, in the list of sources the publisher does not abbreviate the titles of R. Isaac Herzog’s Heikhal Yitzhak and R. Yitzhak Nissim’s Yein ha-Tov. Yet he still deletes the beginning of R. Elyashiv’s letters taken from these books, so the reader does not see the very respectful way he refers to R. Herzog and R. Nissim. Here, for example, is how R. Elyashiv’s letter appears in Heikhal Yitzhak, vol. 2, no. 24.

As you can see from the titles R. Elyashiv gives to R. Herzog, he has the utmost reverence for him.

Here is how the page appears in Kovetz Teshuvot, where all this is deleted.

Also, notice how at the beginning of the letter in the original it says אני מודה לכ”ג מרן, yet the wordמרן  is deleted from Kovetz Teshuvot. In the second paragraph R. Elyashiv writes
ואנכי לא באתי בשורות אלה אלא להשיב על מה שהעיר מרן שליט”א

In Kovetz Teshuvot מרן has been removed, leaving us with להשיב על מה שהעיר שליט”א, which doesn’t make sense since שליט”א does not follow a verb.[12]
For those who have read my new book, this example will not be surprising and illustrates once again the lack of basic intellectual integrity that we find in some segments of the haredi world. From the response to my book, I can tell you that the ones most upset about this sort of thing are none other than haredim. They really believe in the haredi outlook and can’t understand why some members of their society, such as the publisher of Kovetz Teshuvot, feel that the haredi position is so weak that it can only survive by misleading people. How could a haredi not be upset when seeing how a publisher feels that he knows better than R. Elyashiv which rabbis are deserving of respect, and therefore takes upon himself to “correct” R. Elyashiv’s “mistakes”? If this is not a complete undermining of Daas Torah, then I don’t know what is.
3. In this post I referred to the German Orthodox practice of men not wearing a kippah. R. Yoel Catane informed me on the authority of his mother, a native of Frankfurt and a relative of the Breuer family, that even R. Joseph Breuer when he taught secular subjects at the Hirsch school in Frankfurt did so without a kippah. R. Catane also points out that many German Orthodox Jews continued the practice of going bareheaded even when they came to Israel. R. Catane gives as an example of this Yitzhak Ernst Nebenzahl, who served as State Comptroller in Israel and was punctilious in his Torah observance. His son is the famous Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl. Even in his old age in Jerusalem, the elder Nebenzahl continued his practice of going bareheaded, which when it came to the German Orthodox was not a reflection about their level of piety. Here is a picture of him without a kippah.
Dr. Aharon Barth, a grandson of R. Azriel Hildesheimer, was also a well-known German Orthodox Jew. He served as the director of Bank Leumi and was one of the two people whose signature was on the first currency of the State of Israel. He also wrote the Orthodox philosophical work Dorenu Mul She’elot Netzah, which has been reprinted a number of times and has also been translated into English, French, and German. You can read about Barth here. Here is his picture showing him bareheaded.

R. Catane mentioned the following anecdote. Once Barth was giving a lecture to bankers in Israel and he heard some thunder. He stopped the talk, took a kippah out of his pocket and put it on his head, made the blessing on the thunder, then put the kippah back into his pocket and continued with the lecture.
4. In Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox I wrote about how in its English translation of R. Zevin’s Ha-Moadim ba-Halakhah, ArtScroll censored references to Saul Lieberman, removing his rabbinic title. Leon Well pointed out to me that ArtScroll didn’t just remove the “R.”, but in one case removed Lieberman’s name entirely. In Ha-Moadim ba-Halakhah (Tel Aviv, 1955), p. 133, in the article on Shemini Atzeret, R. Zevin writes:

בנוגע לתוספתא משער ר”ש ליברמאן [!] ב”תוספת ראשונים” השערה חריפה

In the Festivals in Halachah, vol. 1, p. 346, the following “translation” appears: “As regards the passage from Tosefta on which Rashi’s interpretation is based, Tosefes Rishonim ventures a daring speculation.”

On the topic of Saul Lieberman’s name being censored, Professor Yaakov Spiegel called my attention to the following. Here is R. Dov Berish Zuckerman’s Beit Aharon: Beurei ha-Rambam al pi ha-Meiri (Jerusalem, 1984) p. 311.

This volume appeared posthumously, published by Machon Yerushalayim. If you look at the second column, 6 lines from the bottom, it says שוב הראני חכם אחד. Who is the anonymous scholar? What appears in this book had earlier been printed in Talpiot 4 (1949), p. 139. In the original we find הר”ש ליברמן שליט”א.[13]

David Farkas called my attention to another case of ArtScroll censorship, this time in its new Midrash Rabbah. Here is a page from Bereshit Rabbah, Miketz, Parashah 90.

In the Etz Yosef commentary there are three dots, showing that something is missing. This is the only time I am aware of that when ArtScroll engaged in censorship they let the reader know that something was removed, so I guess we have to be thankful for this.

What was so terrible in the Etz Yosef that ArtScroll had to delete it? Here is the uncensored version of the commentary, and as you can see, Etz Yosef cited Mendelssohn. That is why it had to be removed.

While on the topic of censorship, let me share another example of censorship of R. Kook. This time R. Kook’s name is removed from R. Meir Abovitz’s commentary on the Jerusalem Talmud.

5. I want to call readers’ attention to a new book recently sent to me by R. Yaakov Shapiro. Its title is Halachic Positions: What Judaism Really Says About Passion in the Marital Bed, available here. This is the most detailed book there is on halakhah and marital sexuality. In many ways it is designed to counter a lot of the stringencies that have arisen over time and which the author feels are non-halakhic and also psychologically unhealthy, thus making a happy, balanced marriage much more difficult. You can also watch the author here, here and here. I think readers will be surprised, and perhaps upset, when they learn that some of what they have been told is forbidden is actually permitted according to the standard halakhic authorities. See also what I wrote here in note 26.

I also should add that this book is not for the prudish, as it is very explicit in what it discusses. This in fact relates to one of the themes of the book, that halakhah itself is not prudish as sex is an important part of life and is discussed in halakhic works just like everything else. Having said that, I must note that there is a difference between being prudish and refraining from inappropriate slang when discussing halakhic matters. While the author is careful in this matter, he does refer to another recent book that makes this mistake. I am uncomfortable in even recording the title of this other new halakhic work by Rabbi S. Even-Shoshan, but readers can see it here.

I don’t think I am being overly fastidious if I say that in my opinion any halakhic work with a title like that should not be regarded as a legitimate text. My yardstick in this regard is if one would feel comfortable using a word when speaking with a great rabbi or when giving a lecture. Thus, while the term “oral sex” is fine (and I was even present when a well-known rav was asked a question using these words), for the life of me I can’t understand how a rabbi discussing a halakhic topic can use a slang word.[14] In fact, I don’t think that even an acceptable term like “oral sex” should be used in the title of a book, as it is needlessly provocative. This sort of provocative title is also found with another book published by Rabbi Even-Shoshan. One who wants to write about these matters should use a title like “Jewish Sexual Ethics” or “Marital Intimacy in Halakhah”, with all the details discussed in the book.[15]

6. In the last post I wrote about a dispute in understanding a text between Rabbis Israel Brodie and Shlomo Yosef Zevin on one side, and Profs. Shlomo Zalman Havlin and Israel Moshe Ta-Shma on the other. I was incorrect in this, as R. Zevin actually agrees with Havlin and Ta-Shma. Thanks to Rabbi Dovid Solomon for noting this.

[1] Hagahot Maimoniyot, Hilkhot Ishut 25:4.
[2] She’elot u-Teshuvot Maharshal, no. 41. Cf. Yam Shel Shelomo, Yevamot 4:22.
[3] Seridei Esh, vol. 3, p. 75.
[4] Kitvei ha-Gaon Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg, vol. 2, pp. 443, 447.
[5] Even Sapir (Jerusalem, 2013),  pp. 358-359.                     
[6] See R. Ovadiah Yosef, Ma’yan Omer, vol. 8, p. 173; R Nahum Stepansky, Ve-Alehu Lo Yibol, vol. 3, p. 296.
[7] Since I referred to Ve-Alehu Lo Yibol in the last note, see also in this book, vol. 3, p. 191, for another example, this time dealing with a kashrut issue. R. Auerbach thought that the matter was forbidden, but stated that if the questioner wished he could also ask R. Waldenberg for his opinion. See also ibid., p. 212, where the author asked a question of R. Waldenberg and he replied, “Do not ask me. I am stringent in this matter. Go to R. Ovadiah and ask him.”
[8] Hayyim ve-Shalom, vol. 2, no. 112. Another important source is R. Shlomo Moshe Amar, Shema Shelomo, vol. 3, Even ha-Ezer no. 19. In an email to me, Prof. Amichai Radzyner noted that in recent years many dayanim have been adopting a more liberal position regarding when a husband can be forced to give a get, and also when he is told that he is obligated to give a get even if the court cannot force him. Much important material in this regard is found in the many issues of the journal Ha-Din ve-ha-Dayan, found here. 
[9] R. Palache’s responsum is cited by many and is an important source for those who have argued for a more liberal approach to Jewish divorce law. I don’t think anyone will be surprised that R. Abraham Samuel Judah Gestetner, who in his Megilat Plaster [Monsey, 2014] makes the ridiculous argument that R. Jacob Emden’s Megilat Sefer is a Haskalah forgery, also says that this responsum of R. Palache was inserted into the volume by an unknown heretic. See ibid., p. 85.
[10] My own opinion is that no one should be appointed a dayan in the State of Israel unless he has served in the army. After all, how can a dayan understand the people appearing before him without having had such an experience? Yet I realize that this is a pipe dream.
[11] Strangely enough, he includes the beginning of the letter to R. Yitzhak Yedidyah Frankel even though, as I have mentioned, he doesn’t tell us where the letter comes from.
[12] The censorship in Kovetz Teshuvot was also noted by Avraham (Rami) Reiner in his fine article, “Kavim Rishoni’im le-Darko ha-Hikhatit shel ha-Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv,” Netuim 17 (2011), p. 78 n. 12.
[13] R. Zuckerman also mentions Lieberman’s point, and refers to him by name, in Kol Torah 12 (Adar 5718), p. 22.
[14] It is worth noting that there are some passages in rabbinic literature that if said by anyone today would be regarded as nibul peh (this is the correct transliteration, not “nivul”). See Changing the Immutable, ch. 6, for some examples. See also Megillah 25b: “R. Huna b. Manoah said in the name of R. Aha the son of R. Ika: It is permitted to an Israelite to say to a Cuthean, Take your idol and put it in your שי”ן תי”ו (buttocks).” Tanna de-Vei Eliyahu: Eliyahu Zuta, ch. 22 (end), is very explicit: ‘בני אותו מקום שאתה אוהב וכו
[15] An example of what I am talking about is Jennie Rosenfeld and David Ribner, The Newlywed Guide to Physical Intimacy. This book is explicit in its discussion, but the title is an appropriate one.