There is an excellent site discussing various issues with eruvin, many of them contemporary (especially in light of the seforim which have been published on the topic in the last couple of years, many dealing with the Brooklyn controversy). Today, he has the second part of his series on the St. Louis eruv controversy which includes a rather fascinating discussion regarding two seforim printed at the turn of the 20th century.

Both of those seforim are available online, if one is interested in reading further.

On the Main Line had a discussion regarding whether one should or should not follow customs based upon kabbalah. He brought up the custom of removing teffilin on Rosh Hodesh “before Mussaf.” However, what is facinating about this custom of removing the teffilin is that most people actually get it wrong. That is, according to just about everyone that discusses this one should not remove ones teffilin right before mussaf.

The first to address this custom in a meaningful manner was R. Azariah m’Fano, one the leading kabbalists of his day.

This is what one should do if they want to properly remove their teffilin on Rosh Hodesh. One should remove the teffilin right after shemoneh esreh and one should not wait until after u’va l’tzyion like other days . . . it is proper to remove them before one reads from the torah the portion discussing the mussaf sacrifice . . . and if one removes them before hallel this is even better . . . u’va l’tzyion on the day of Rosh Hodesh is really part of the mussaf . . . and it is wholly improper to wait to remove the teffilin right before one is going to start mussaf as this is worse than Yeravam who removed his teffilin before the king (Sanhederin 101b), there he only removed them in front of an earthly king but one who waits to remove his teffilin until right before mussaf is doing so in front of God.

Thus, R. Fano has two basic points. First, one should not wear teffilin for any portion of the prayers connected with Rosh Hodesh and therefore one should preferably remove them before hallel but at the very least before reading the Torah. Second, one should certianly not remove them right before starting mussaf as this is highly disrespectful to God.

R. Mordechi Yaffo, in his Levush also says that one should remove them before the reading of the torah. R. Eliyahu Shapiro in his Eliyahu Rabba and Zuta quotes R. Fano and agrees that one should not remove them right before mussaf. R. Karo in Shulchan Orakh just states that one shouldn’t wear them for mussaf but does not say when one should remove them. R. Moshe Isserles does the same. In fact, on Hol HaMo’ad, those who wear teffilin remove them not right before mussaf but instead before hallel.

So one may be asking themselves, well if everyone that disucsses when one should take them off says to do so much earlier than we do, how come no one does that now. And for that, we need to turn to R. Avroahom (hamechune Abeli) Gombiner in his Mogen Avrohom. The Mogen Avrohom cites a passage which is attributed to R. Issac Luria that one should wait to remove the teffilin until after the reading of the torah. Now, asute readers will realize that even according to this, one can still fullfill all the opinions (or close enough) and wait to remove the teffilin until after the torah reading but long before mussaf. However, again, most don’t do this, instead they wait until right before mussaf, right at the time R. Fano, no lightweight said one is disrespecting God.

So we now turn to the another passage in the Magen Avraham for the answer. There is a custom to have the teffilin on for 4 kaddashim and 3 keddusot (kedusha in yotzer, kedusah in Shemoneh esreh, and the kedusah of u’va l’tzion). So the question becomes what does one have to do on Rosh Hodesh. Does one need to leave the teffilin on for those kaddashim or because of these other reasons, namely the mussaf can one ignore that requirement on Rosh Hodesh. The Mogen Avrohom says that Rosh Hodesh is different than Hol haMo’ad and on Rosh Hodesh one can not ignore that requirement and therefore one must keep the teffilin on until after the kaddish following u’va l’tzyion.

But here is the issue with the Mogen Avrohom, R. Yeshaya Horowitz (Shelah) holds that really this requirement is switched and one only need 3 kaddashim and 4 kedushot (he counts barakhu as the fourth). So according to him, one has already gotten their three kaddashim after the reading of the Torah.

So to recap, in order for one to require removal of the teffilin right before mussaf one needs to ignore R. Fano (and others who follow him), and ignore R. Horowitz as well.

[As an aside, R. David ben Levi in his Taz says that one need not remove his teffilin at all. R. Joseph Baer Soloveitchik held that if one doesn’t have time to wrap them before begining mussaf one should follow the Taz and just say mussaf with them on.]

Sources and further reading: Shu’t Rama M’Fano no. 108 (reprinted in Siddur R. Shabtai Sofer, vol. 2 p. 238-39; R. Mordechi Yaffo, Levush, Orakh Hayyim, no. 25 (at the end) and no. 423; R. E. Shapiro, Eliayhu Rabba, Zuta on the Levush; R. Y. Karo, Shulchan Orakh, no. 423:4; R. M. Isserlles Rama, 25:13; Shulchan Orakh Ari”zal, no. 423; R. A. (hamechune Abeli) Gombiner, Mogen Avrohom, no. 25:28; id. at 30; 423:6; R. Nerelanger, Yosef Omets, no. 696; R. J. Kierchheim, Minhagai Vermisia, p. קפג; R. B. Hamburger, Gedoli HaDorot ‘al Mishmar Minhagi Ashkenaz, p. 102-03; R. Yom Tov Lippman Heller, Hilchot Teffilin, Ma’adeni Yom Tov. no. 74

Rabbi David Feldman, who is well known for his book on issues relating to Jewish law and the beginning of life (abortion, birth control etc.), has now published via Yashar Books, a book on end of life issues and Jewish law. This book covers such topics as reproductive technology, stem cells, organ transplants, suicide, and determining death. Although it covers such weighty topics it is a rather easy read. Rabbi Feldman eschews highly technical discussion and instead has opened the book for everyone. Each topic gets about ten pages of treatment and Rabbi Feldman lays out the basic principles underlying each of these issues.

He begins with an extensive introduction on pikuach nefesh which much of the subsequent discussions are premised upon. The book is a little over 130 pages, which means none of the topics are treated in great depth. However, as Rabbi Feldman states in the introduction his purpose was not to provide a comprehensive book on the topic, rather to give some general guidance on this hot button issues. In this area he succeeds. He does provide a very basic introduction to the topics and does provide some of the key sources. Consequently, one who reads this book will have the basics to further investigate these issues.

However, with this approach there are some significant draw backs. Rabbi Feldman, while stating what he feels the commentaries say, does not provide sources for these. He give almost no citations to any source he quotes (there are two exception to this, once he gives a citation to R. Feinstein’s responsum and once he gives a cite to a responsum from R. Moshe Sofer). For example, when discussing organ transplants he tells us the key responsum is from R. Yechezkel Landau (Noda Biyehudah) where he holds when the organ donor is “in front of us.” That is, on a simple level, one can only do a transplant when one has a ready person to accept the organ. Rabbi Feldman then goes on to discuss others who have applied this statement all without ever providing where R. Landau said it, nor where the subsequent discussion can be found. This seriously hampers any follow up a reader wishes to do or for that matter, to ensure Rabbi Feldman’s reading is the correct reading.

To be fair, Rabbi Feldman does offer that is one contacts him via email he will provide citations and additional sources, however, his email doesn’t appear anywhere in the book. Assuming these citations were omitted to enable easier reading, why they could not be included on a page or two at the end I do not understand. Instead, we are left to blindly trust Rabbi Feldman in his assessment of the sources.

Further, Rabbi Feldman is far from the first to write on these topics. Instead, a simple search of RAMBI one can see there are numerous articles on all of these topics, none of these are provided. While Rabbi Feldman is not obligated to cite the works of others, it is difficult to understand Rabbi Feldman’s claim that “the need to address [these issues] is both urgent and constant,” as these very issues have been already comprehensively discussed by many, many others.

Additionally, as I mentioned previously, this book does provide an excellent starting point for these discussions. We are bombarded with many who claim to know what the Bible says for these important topics, but most are blissfully unaware of what the Bible and more specifically Jewish law says and has said about these topics, this cures that. But, it is hard to say it will facilitate further discussion when one doesn’t know where to go next.

In the end, this book, in a clear and straightforward manner, if a bit curt, which provides the groundwork for understanding extremely important issues regarding the end of life and new technologies relating that implicate life and death.

Although the Megilah only lists mishloch monot, matnot l’evyonim, and reading the Megilah as the customs on Purim, many others have become accepted. Most are of the ilk of boofunery or merrymaking. From making noise to drinking in excess, all have become part of the Purim landscape. With these, however, there are some lesser known customs. What is perhaps of interest is that it seems that there are those authorities that permit much if not all of these types of customs, there are others who seem set on shutting down much of the Purim fun.

For instance, the Rabbi Judah of Minz permits cross-dressing on Purim. This is so, even though this runs counter to a law in the Torah prohibiting these actions. What is lesser know, is that R. Minz also permits mixed dancing on Purim as well. In the Taknot of Padua it says “we decree that no one is permitted to dance with a married woman, no man with any married woman, with the exception of Purim.” (emphasis added).

Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin in his Beni Banim vol. 1 no. 37 (5), links the two statements of R. Minz. R. Henkin says, just as R. Minz permitted cross-dressing as it was done for the joy of Purim, he permitted the mixed dancing under the same rational. That is, the dancing was just an outgrowth of the joy and not for licetnioius purposes.

Or, in the Customs of Worms, they not only celebrated Purim on the day, on the Shabbat after Purim they celebrated with similar merrymaking. Including, after the Friday night prayers all the people would first go to the Rabbi for a blessing, and then proceed to the women’s section where the Rabbi’s wife “would place her hands on their heads and bless them.” Additionally, R. Hayim Yosef Azulai in his travelogue, Ma’agel Tov, records that the Jews in Amsterdam would party all night long on the Friday night after Purim.

Although R. Minz was a proponent of happiness and its outgrowth on Purim, there were others that did not view Purim in the same vein. Rather, they seem bent on outlawing as much as possible even on Purim.

For instance, R. Samuel Aboab takes issue with at least two such Purim customs. First, he says in his Sefer Zikhronot, an ethical work and published anonymously, that he was befuddled his entire life how R. Minz and in turn R. Moshe Isserles in his Rama could allow for cross dressing on Purim. He spends at least four pages to demonstrating why this is incorrect. He states even if R. Minz is correct he should have kept that to himself. This is not his only negative opinion regarding Purim. In his responsa, Devar Shmuel, he says it is absolutely prohibited to read or even own the parody Mesachat Purim. He says any such copies should be destroyed.

Another person who looked with askance on the merry making was R. David ben Shmuel haLevi (Taz). He first follows the ruling of his father-in-law, R. Joel Sirkas (Bach), that cross-dressing is prohibited. R. Levi then also states in the law of Tisha B’av, that the prohibition of filling ones mouth with joy, is applicable even at at wedding and even on Purim.

So it seems that just as in society at large there are those who dislike the merrymaking on Purim, this is reflected in the Halakhic authorities as well. And conversely, there are those that viewed the merrymaking as a positive thing and therefore permitted many other things in connection with that merrymaking.

A new sefer came out titled Ohron shel Chachomim. This work purports to collect the various laws and philosophy one should have for the Rabbis. The first section is just the basic law applicable to a talmid chacham, standing, not addressing by first name etc. In this section there is also a brief discussion about the “laws” of emunat chachmim. We are treated however to such laws as “not only is one obligated to follow the chachamim but also their children and their secretaries (mishamsheham) one should not question.” Or this one: “When a person goes to a tzadik and discusses his problems but doesn’t understand what the tzadik responds [I assume it was unintelligible] or it appears the just ignores his request – don’t let this blessing be small in your eyes. Rather believe God will send your salvation.” For many of these laws, the citations are to either aggadic passages in the Talmud or to Midrashim.

The second section discussion yeridat haDorot the lowering of the generations. This begins by telling the reader the concept of yeridat haDorot is not in relation to the tzadik rather it is to the generation. That is, the tzadik is of course as great as in previous generation rather it us that are unable to appreciate this. But then you may ask, it continues, why then do we hear of the great miracles these tzadikim did in previous generations, why not now? Of course, it is due to us – we have created a situation where the tzadikim can’t work their miracles today.

The author then treats us to a discourse on whether the achronim can argue on the rishonim. He explains that this is prohibited. In a footnote he deals with the many achronim that seem to disagree with this. However, he writes these off by noting they are like rishonim. Of course, this then poses another problem (or not) for him as if they are truly like the rishonim then it follows that their peers couldn’t argue on them as they are obviously greater. He just says that this doesn’t appear to be the case and this is allowed. He extends this prohibition against arguing against earlier ones and says this is applicable to the pronouncements of the Shulhan Arukh and the Rama. He appears to be unaware that R. Hayim Volhzin says the Gra said this is not the case and that ever Rav should just do what they see fit irrelevant of the opinion of the Shulkah Orakh and the Rama. Additionally, he doesn’t seem to be aware that R. Moshe Feinstein said the same thing. Or perhaps it is just a case of selective memory.

The next couple of chapters are devoted to the law of a Talmid Chacham today as well as the role of a Rebbi for Chassidim. The chapters include information on “Just Looking at the Rebbi Allows One To Gain In Torah and Avodah,” “The Belief in The Tzadik” as well as lesser topics such as “The Trip to the Rebbi,” “The miracles of the Rebbi” etc.

All in all, this book presents a rather interesting view into what some consider the laws and customs governing the interaction with the Rabbinic class.

I got the book at Biegeleisen in Brooklyn.

What is perhaps one of the more intreging sefarim ever published. Behinat HaKabbalah is two books in one. The first, Kol Shakal (the voice of a fool), is a scathing attack on Rabbinic Judaism. Basically, anything not found explictly in the Torah is claimed as false. For example, the requirment of mikva is deemed wrong as the verse only requires one to “wash one’s body.” This first portion takes up the majority of the book. The second half, Sa’agas Areyeh, (roar of the lion) is a defense of Rabbinic Judaism. However, the defense in some sense proves the first half as it is so sparse leaving the reader to posit that the author of Sha’agas Areyeh actually agreed with the author of Kol Shakal. Some even go so far to claim the author really wrote both works in an extremly sly attempt to gain wider readership. That is, they created a work which externally would be viewed as a defense of Rabbinic Judaism i.e. Sha’agas Areyeh, only to be able to slip in the most more persausive Kol Shakal.

Typically, the second portion is attributed to R. Yehuda Areyeh of Modena. (Mar Gavriel has an excellent post on him here). If that is so, some then argue he was a closet heritic or perhaps in today’s vernacular- Orthoprax. That is, although R. Modena sat on the Venice Bet Din, wrote numerous traditional sefarim, and even authored on the selichot that is said on Yom Kippur Katan, in his heart he really did not believe in any of it. This, of course, is rather shocking.

In truth, the authorship of both of these works is somewhat up in the air. As mentioned, some attribute it to R. Modena, however, this is not certian. The reason being, this work was not published until 1852 and Modena died in 1648. The work was first published by Isaac Shmuel Reggio (YaSHar) a rather interesting character in his own right. [As an aside, Reggio was far from what many would consider “traditionally orthodox” he permitted shaving on Hol HaMoad which got him into trouble. (His father wrote a pamphelet against him on that issue). However, this year someone from Monsey reprinted his commentary on the Torah, apparently Reggio’s biography was unknown to the sponser of the printing.] Reggio claimed to have published this from a manuscript in Modena’s own hand. He has an extensive introduction as well as notes thourhout.

Others have questioned Reggio’s assertion that it emenates from Modena. One has even pointed to Saul Berlin the author of the noted forgery Besamim Rosh as the author of this. However, that has been discredited.

In the end, whom ever the author maybe this work still stands as one the most interesting and entertaining attacks on Rabbinic Judaism.

There is much in this area and the interested reader can consult Reggio’s introduction; T. Fishman, Or Hadash al Zemano shel Sefer Kol Shakal v’al Mekom Hibburo, in Tarbiz 59 (1990) 171-190; Fishman’s book length treatment in “Shaking the Pillars of Exile‘Voice of a Fool,’ an Early Modern Jewish Critique of Rabbinic Culture;” E. Rivkin, Leon da Modena and the Kol sakhal; B. Kahlar, Shagas Areyeh al Kol Shakal in Mehkarim v’Inyuim (Tel Aviv, 1954) 357-378.