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Ghosts, Demons, Golems and their Halachik Status

One explicit mention of a ghost appears in the Talmud Ketubot 103a. The Talmud records that every week Rebbi used to return to his house after he died. The Talmud, however, does not record what Rebbi used to do when he came back. The Sefer Hassidim states that Rebbi was different than other dead people in that he was considered almost fully alive. Rebbi, according to the Sefer Hassidim, would make Kiddush for his family.[1]

A much later instance of an interaction with a ghost is found in R. Pinchas Katzenellenbogen’s (1691-1765/1767) Yesh M’Nechalin. R. Katzenellenbogen happened across a man who had the last two of his fingers bent back and connected to his palm. R. Katzenellenbogen inquired whether the man was born that way. The man explained that he was not and instead this happened when he had attended a fair. There were hundreds of people in a large room preparing for the next day’s events. Suddenly, the door of the room opened on its own. Standing at the doorway was a women dressed in tachrichim (death clothes). One person, screamed that it was his dead mother. Someone got up and slammed the door shut only to have the door open by itself again with the woman standing there. This man then went and pushed the “ghost” and from that day on his fingers were permanently connected to his palm.

Continuing on the theme of dead or other beings which interact with those still alive, we come to a rather strange question which has occupied the minds of many people for the last 800 years. The question is what is the status of someone who has intercourse with a demon? The first to mention this question is R. Isaac of Vienna (1200-1270) in his work Or Zarua. He states that intercourse with a demon is halackically meaningless. He cites a midrash which has a hassid (pious one) who was seduced by a demoness on Yom Kippur. Afterwards he felt very bad about this, but Elijah the Prophet visited him and asked him why he was sad. After the hassid explained what happened Elijah said don’t worry it was only a demon. The Or Zarua therefore says as Elijah appeared to him and he told him it was ok, intercourse with a demon is not a problem.

Now, the Or Zarua was not addressed at an actual question, however, R. Meir of Lublin (1558-1616) was asked about an “actual” case where a woman had intercourse with a demon and thus could she remain married to her husband. Although R. Meir was unaware of the Or Zarua he independentally came to the same conclusion – she was still permitted to remain married as intercourse with a demon has no effect. Least one say this is all in the realm of theory or not followed, the Beit Shmuel the classic commentary on Shulhan Orach Even haEzer quotes this law of R. Meir of Lublin (Even haEzer 6:17).

The question of intercourse with a demon seems to have come up without respect to the local or time period. R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai (Hida) discusses “groups of women who go out to the forest” and conduct rituals with music and it seems they were visited or engaged in intercourse with demons. The Hida follows the ruling of R. Meir of Lublin and permits these women.

In Hungary in the 19th century there was a celebrated case where a woman became pregnant while her husband was away and she claimed the “father” was a demon. It appears the child was not deemed a mamzer (bastard) and the woman was allowed to remain married.

Now, there were some who questioned this whole line of reasoning and said that if one engages in intercourse with what appears to be human even if they are a demon it is of no moment. Thus, a married woman would be prohibited to remain married. The first to come to this conclusion was R. Yitzhak Binyamin Lipman (17th century) in his Nahlat Binyamim. Additionally, R. Yosef Zechariah Stern says if one follows the above rulings, what is stopping anyone who commits adultery to just claim it was a demon.

Moving on from demons, we now go to beings created via the Sefer Yetzirah. The Sefer Yetzirah (Book of Creation) is a work which allows via manipulation of various names of God to create things. Many have dealt with the halakhic status of such creations. For instance, R. Meir Leibush (1809-1879) in his work the Malbim says the reason Abraham was able to give the angels milk and meat together was Abraham did not give them meat from a born cow. Rather, the Malbim points to the verse which says “the calf which he [Abraham] made.” Malbim explains the words “he made” are literal, i.e. Abraham created the calf via the Sefer Yetzirah and thus was able to feed them both this meat and milk at the same time.

R. Isaiah Horowitz in his work Sheni Luchot HaBrit (Shelah) similarly understands the controversy between the brothers and Joseph. Specifically, Joseph, according to some Midrashic sources three negative things about the brothers – they at ever min ha-hai, they engaged in intercourse with Canaanite females and they embarrassed the children of the servants. The Shelah explains all three were based upon the Sefer Yetzirah. He explains that the Sefer Yetzirah was written by Abraham and passed on to Isaac and then to Jacob. The brothers, however, felt the sons of the servants were not worthy of such an important work (thus speaking ill or embarrassing them). Additionally, the brothers acted on the book and created animals which they ate from before killing them as there was no need being they were created via the Sefer Yetzirah. Further “it is possible that the tribes [the brothers] had created a woman” and it was these things Joseph saw and misunderstood to be regular beings. Again, according to the Shelah, intercourse or otherwise with beings from other worlds pose no halakhic issues. It is not surprising the Shelah took this position as the Shelah’s teacher was R. Meir of Lublin the one who permitted the woman who had intercourse with a demon to remain married.[2]

Perhaps the brothers were not the only ones to make women for this purpose, it is recorded (albeit much later) that R. Solomon Ibn Gabriol (1021-1058) created a woman to “serve” him. But, when the authorities found out he was forced to show it was merely wood and not a person.[3]

At the end of the forgery Niflot HaMaharal (the most comprehensive source for the false legend the Maharal of Prague created a golem) there is a discussion of various aspects of a golem. For instance, whether a golem would create impurity after it was “killed” (it would not) and the like. In regards to intercourse they state that “a golem can not reproduce nor does it have desires for the opposite sex.” It would seem that in the Paul Wegner 1920 silent movie classic “Der Golem” he disagreed with that premise. Part of the plot line is the Golem falling in love with the Maharal’s daughter; the nobleman’s son also does and she in fact runs off with him only to have the Golem rescue her. (It seems the Simpsons also follows with a similar plot line.)

As a final note, it is worthwhile mentioning that going the route of trying to connect with the other world does have it perils. R. Yaakov Ettlinger, in his Binyan Tzion describes a case where a woman met a man who told her he was Elijah the prophet and through their union the Messiah would be produced. The woman believed him, only to find out after the fact the person was con man. R. Ettlinger deals with whether in such a case she can remain married to her husband. So, ultimately one should make certain they verify the credentials of any demon, golem or ghost prior to engaging in any questionable acts.

Sources: Yesh M’Nechalin, 267-68; Hannah Sprecher, “Diabolus Ex-Machina: An Unusual Case of Yuhasin” in Jewish Law Association Studies VIII: The Jerusalem Conference Volume, 183-204; J.H. Chajes, Between Worlds: Dybbuks, Exorcists, and Early Modern Judaism (who although discusses the topic of intercourse with a demon appears to have been unaware of Sprecher’s article which contains many more sources than Chajes cites or discusses); Moshe Idel, Golem, esp. pp. 213-241 (which was reprinted almost in its entirety in a Torah u-Madda Journal 9 (2000) article by Dr. John Loike available here (PDF); R. Yudel Rosenberg, Niflot HaMahral (Pitrokav, 1909), pp. 71-74; R. Yaakov Ettlinger, Binyan Tzion, no. 164; Shnayer Z. Leiman, “The Adventure of the Maharal of Prague in London; R. Yudl Rosenberg and the Golem of Prague,” Tradition 36:1 (2002): 26-58; see also the account in Kav Ha-Yashar from R. Moshe Koidonover, translated by Zinberg, A History of Jewish Literature, vol. 6, pp. 161-63.

[1] See the discussion in the R. Reuven Margulies edition how he could have been motzei them if he was dead. Sefer Hassidim, no. 1129.

[2] Interestingly, Idel in his book Golem, appears to have been unaware of the connection between the Shelah and R. Meir of Lublin.

[3] In the halakhic realm, most are already familiar with the well-known question first posed by R. Tzvi Ashkenazi and elaborated on by his son R. Ya’akov Emden, whether a golem could be counted for a minyan (quorum).




R. Akiva Yosef Schlesinger, Tikkat Shofar on Shabbat & plagiarism (of course)

Menachem Mendel has a very good post discussing the issues and the history regarding the propriety of blowing the shofar on Rosh HaShana when it falls on Shabbat. A central figure in this discussion is R. Akiva Yosef Schlesinger. R. Schlesinger is perhaps best known for his book Lev haIvri a commentary on the last will and testament of the Hatam Sofer. In this book, which perhaps can be used to trace much of Haredi ideology today, the bulk is devoted to putting down the “reformers.” He discusses Mendelssohn’s Biur, speaking in the vernacular and a host of other issues. There is no doubt he held what many would consider extremists views. R. Schlesinger has a less well known side – his love of Israel and dislike or almost vehement hatred of inertia.

R. Schlesinger who was born and raised in Hungry emigrated to Israel. When he got to Israel, at the time, most people were supported by the various kollelim. These kollelim would be set up by country, Hungarian Kollel etc. (the American Kollel was controversial). These kollelim in turn wielded tremendous power – they had the money. R. Schlesinger took a very dim view of these kollelim. First, he felt the money was not given out based upon need and merit, rather it was given based upon status and connections. Additionally, this system only ensured that people would never actually try and make money themselves. To be clear, these kollelim did not only support people learning full time, rather, almost everyone was supported by them.

R. Schlesinger came out strongly against the kollelim and decided to set up his own system. This system he outlined his book Kollel HaIvirim. First, he explains his system would be democratic. He explains that the Torah requires one to follow the majority. This is so, even when a Godol or the like holds different views. He proves this by pointing to the system of the Sanhedrin. There, they did not just go with greatest Rabbi on the Sanhedrin, rather, they started polling the views of the lowest one. (p. 7).

According to R. Schlesinger’s system the Kollel or Board would be in charge of almost everything. They would oversee the education of the children. He advocated for marriage at 18 and then a 3 year period to devote to study. However, R. Schlesinger notes, not too many people are successful at just studying Torah full time, therefore, the Kollel should see who is not or who does not have an interest and they should learn a proper profession. This study should not be half hazard. Instead, they should study from a expert and devote a significant amount of time to this endeavor. He includes agriculture among these professions. (p. 9-10)

R. Schlesinger did not shy away from accountability. Even today many religious organizations do not have open books. R. Schlesinger, however, advocated for a yearly accounting which would be sent to all where they could view all the expenses and the accounting of the Kollel. (p.11).

He also seems to have taken what today would be considered a religious Zionist view of the then current status of Israel. Although at the time, Israel was under the rule of the Turkish government, due to the fact, they were fairly benevolent he understood that it was already then – long before the founding of the State of Israel – the messianic era. Specifically, he points to the Talmudic passage which explains the only change during the messianic era will be the removal of government oppression (אין בין עולם הזה לימות המשיח אלא שעבוד מלכיות בלבד). (p. 19) Additionally, he chides his former countrymen on their aversion to move to Israel. He says R. Isaiah Horowitz in the 16th century moved to Israel although it took a year to do. Today, he says, it is easy. The government gives anyone who wants a pass and it on the fast ships and rail it takes a mere 10 days. (p. 16).

Although it was fairly safe, R. Schlesinger was aware there still should be a security force. Thus, he advocated for a month long rotation for everyone. These watchers would serve for a month and then others would take their place. He says they should do so even on Shabbat. (p. 26b).

He wanted everyone to have a flag. There would be a general Kollel haIvrim flag with white, green, purple and turquoise. Then each shevet would have their own as well. (p. 27).

All of these plans met with serious resentment from the established Kollelim. They viewed him as undermining their system and way of life. So, as anyone who wants to get someone in trouble does – they searched his books to find something they could ban. Sure enough, they were successful. In his book Bet Yosef Hadash, which is on the Bet Yosef, he discusses a terrible problem and attempts to find a satisfactory answer. In Russia at the time there was forced conscription for a 25 year period. This was a Jewish death sentence – some people, were taken as young as 8. So, some would flee Russia and move to Israel to avoid this. At times, their wives refused to come. R. Schlesinger, therefore, discusses the possibility of getting around the Herem of Rabbenu Gershon on two wives. R. Schlesinger’s enemies, however, accused him of doing away with and not respecting the Herem.

They consigned his books to the fire and put a ban on them.

In the end, however, his students (and he had many) were successful in setting up the city of Petach Tikvah (see here for more). They wanted R. Schlesinger to join them, and he did. He purchased land, but to honor his father in law, purchased it in his father in laws name.

Unfortunately, this had terrible ramifications. When R. Schlesinger returned to Hungary to gain support for his movement, his enemies went to his father in law. His father in law was old and could not take this. His father in law signed over the land he owned in Petach Tikvah, the land which was the culmination of R. Schlesinger’s dream to his enemies, the Hungarian Kollel. R. Schlesinger then attempted to get it back. He did win some court victories. His opponents, however, used his own means against him. They ignored the pronouncements of the Bet Din, knowing that R. Schlesinger would never go to a non-Jewish court.

It seems that not only was R. Schlesinger a tragic figure, but other things he touched as well. Shmuel Weingarten was an avid Zionist. He published, among other things, a book demonstrating the collection of anti-Zionist letters in Dovev Siftei Yeshanim were forgeries. At the end of his life he obtained letters sent to R. Schlesinger’s group (although they don’t mention it, Weingarten shows they in fact were)and published them in a volume titled B’Shevach Yishuv Ha’aretz. These letters were from many Rabbis, some who were not that well known. Weingarten, as he notes, had to spend considerable effort tracking down and providing biographical information about these persons. He also transcribed the letters. He, unfortunately, did not live to see this book published.

In 1999/2000 some in Beni Brak B. Margolius (most likely a woman due to the lack of first name), published a book, Ragli Mevasar. This book is divided into three parts. The first two are biographies of R. Schlesinger and his father in law. The last part are the very same letters originally published by Weingarten. Additionally, they include the very same biographies that Weingarten did. There is absolutely no attribution at all! I have included a page from each were the reader can see how they are the same. The top page is from Weingarten and the bottom from Ragli Mevasar. None of the library catalogs I have seen note that this is plagiarized.




Jews, Beards and Portraits

“If men be judged wise by their beards and their girth, Then goats would be the wisest creatures on Earth.”

With the High Holidays approaching one of the more interesting attributes which takes a more prominent position is that of shaving or facial hair. Of course, prior to any Shabbat or Yom Tov, one is supposed to shave and take a haircut. Yet, for the High Holidays, there is a special emphasis on facial hair. One of the attributes that the Hazan should have is a beard. Although a beard is not the only qualification for the Hazan, nor is it the dispositive one, it is still mentioned. The importance of the beard is mentioned in the Hazan’s prayer prior to the Mussaf prayers. In that prayer, he lists some of his possible faults including his lack of a full beard (זקן מגודל). [As an aside, this prayer is public and a general one listing in a general manner the various shortcomings everyone really has, Artscroll has that one should say silently some of the faults which seems to belie the fact that every hazzan says this thus removing any individual stigma. Yet, were I pray most years, the Hazzan goes one step further and says half if not more silently. I don’t know if this is due to his immense piety or in fact all those things are applicable to him or perhaps he doesn’t think any of those are applicable and is really just skipping them.]

While the Torah prohibits shaving one’s face with a razor, according to most, one can still remove facial hair. There is a long and tortuous debate about what exactly one can use to remove facial hair, however, putting that aside, it is assumed that there are permissible methods of removal. Now, aside from the straight halakhic (Jewish Law) debate there is another issue that is implicated in removing one’s beard – kabbalah. Some hold that although one is not prohibited from shaving according to a strict reading of the law, one must still be cogent of the kabbalah, which they argue, prohibits any trimming or shaving of the beard.

While some claim kabbalah prohibits shaving, there are others who question this. This debate while ostensibly centered around the interpretation of kabbalah texts, instead revolves around the practice of a single person, R. Menachem Azariah of Fano (Rama m’Fano).

The Rama m’Fano was considered one of the greatest kabbalisits of his generation. He authored many important works on kabbalah and was considered, among many, the heir for Lurianic kabbalah. Thus, his practices regarding shaving can shed light on whether kabbalah really advocates for a beard or if one can still conform with kabbalah and be clean shaven.

R. Shabbtai Baer (d. 1674) in his Be’er Esek was asked whether kabbalah mandates that one keep a beard. He replied by first discussing all the relevant texts and in the end makes the argument that perhaps in the Diaspora kabbalah doesn’t mandate growing a beard. He then gets to the crux of what would become the debate for the next 300 years – the practice of the Rama m’Fano. R. Baer states that he attempted to find out exactly what the practice of the Rama m’Fano was in this area. He learnt that every Friday, the Rama m’Fano would trim his beard or shave his beard “as is the custom in Italy.” And in fact, his students, including R. Baer’s father in law, followed in the practice of their teacher and also shaved. As R. Baer correctly points out, someone of the stature of the Rama m’Fano, obviously is extremely telling for whether kabbalah mandates keeping a beard. From his evidence, R. Baer concludes that kabbalah can not mandate keeping a beard.

Yet, R. Baer’s testimony regarding the Rama m’Fano did not go unchallenged. R. Yosef Ergas, in his Divrei Yosef claims R. Baer got it wrong. Specifically, R. Ergas investigated the practice of the Rama m’Fano as well. R. Ergas came to contrary conclusion than that of R. Baer – the Rama m’Fano had a full beard and he never shaved. R. Ergas’s evidence is based upon a portrait of the Rama m’Fano. In this portrait the Rama m’Fano has a full beard.

This debate continued on to the 19th century with R. Moshe Sofer (Hatam Sofer) and R. Eliezer Shapiro (Munkatcher Rebbe). R. Sofer was asked the very same question as R. Baer was, whether one shouldn’t shave based upon kabbalah. After first professing that “we do not follow kabbalah” and that “he does not occupy himself with that which is hidden” he then goes on to discuss the Rama m’Fano. He uses, as did R. Baer, the Rama m’Fano to demonstrate that kabbalah does not mandate a full beard. Instead, R. Sofer points out that based upon testimony the Rama m’Fano did not keep a beard.

R. Shapiro in his Minhat Eliazer takes strong issue with R. Sofer. He notes that R. Sofer’s evidence must be based upon the Be’er Esek and R. Shapiro argues that R. Ergas’s portrait of the Rama m’Fano has settled this issue and R. Shapiro alleges that had R. Sofer been aware of R. Ergas’s evidence R. Sofer would never have said what he did.

So, in the end, it seems in part this hinges on the portrait of the Rama m’Fano. Well in 1904 in a biography on the Rama m’Fano, the author included a portrait of the Rama m’Fano. In this portrait it is clear as day the Rama m’Fano has a full beard. In fact the author of the biography, devotes a chapter to the beard of the Rama m’Fano. He claims, however, with his publication of the portrait this issue is truly settled. What the author neglects to mention is how in the world do we actually know this in fact is the portrait of the Rama m’Fano. Although the author does provide how he obtained the portrait, no where on the portriat does it actually state this is the picture of the Rama m’Fano. Now, if you will recall, even R. Joseph Ergas testimony regarding the portrait was rather late – close to 125 years after the Rama m’Fano died. R. Baer, in fact, was actually much closer, at least in time, to the Rama m’Fano, and had his father in law who studied under the Rama m’Fano personally to talk to. Thus, it would appear that although the author with the publication of this portrait deemed this issue settled, in fact it is far from settled.

This was not the only (possibly) erroneous portrait to be brought into the debate about beards. The famous portrait of Maimonides was also discussed in the beard context. There are those who claim based upon their reading of Maimonides that using scissors on the beard is prohibited. The question then becomes, the portrait of Maimonides clearly shows a trim beard. The issue with this line of inquiry is that the portrait doesn’t necessarily depict Maimonides at all. This portrait was first published in 1744 and was allegedly based upon a medallion – a medallion which was never produced or seen by anyone other than the one who published it. You can see this portrait as well as the page from the book it originally from here (scroll down half way).

Finally, it is worth noting that Jews, even important Rabbis were far from universal in their facial hair. R. David Nieto is a good example. In this portrait, he has a wig and is sporting a stilleto beard which one assumes was the style of the times. R. Joseph Baer Solovetchik during the 1950s had a goatee.

Sources: Shu’t Be’er Esek no. 70; Shu’t Divrei Yosef, no. 28, Shu’t Hatam Sofer, Orah Hayyim no. 159; Shu’t Minhat Eliezer, vol. 2 no. 48; see also, Elliot Horowitz, “The Early Eighteenth Century Confronts the Beard: Kabbalah and Jewish Self-Fashioning,” Jewish History 8 (1994):95-115; and by Horowitz as well, “On the Significance of the Beard in Jewish Communities in the East and in Europe in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times,” Pe’amim (1994):124-148 [in Hebrew].

There is much more on this topic, however, I can’t right now provide a complete bibliography.




R. Yechiel Heller and the Status of Non-Jews

Some have recently posted regarding the status of non-Jews vis-à-vis Jews. Although, they are more focused upon the medieval time period, I though it would be instructive to discuss a more contemporary view. This view, is striking in its breath as well in its authorship.
R. Yechiel Heller, author of the teshuvot Amudi Ohr, is well-known in Yeshiva circles. While respona literature is generally not studied as one of the commentary on Talmud, there are at least two of R. Heller’s responsa which are standard fare in Yeshivot when studying Talmud. (One is a discussion regarding toch k’edi dibur k’dibur and the second deals with misasek). However, R. Heller has a lesser known responsum, which does not appear in his Amudi Ohr but in a different and rare work. This work, Sheni Perakim’al Davar haHov l’Ohev haKazar (Two Chapters on the Obligation to Love the Czar) printed in St. Petersburg in 1852. One of these chapters is authored by R. Heller. In this chapter he makes a very novel and very important arguement regarding the status of non-Jews.

R. Heller argues that non-Jews today, have the status of Geri Toshav. This is so even without any formal acceptance of that status. R. Heller explains that such formal acceptance is necessary only for individuals, but when an entire nation (he focuses on Christians) falls into the category there is no need for any formal acceptance. Today, he argues, the nations of the world more or less follow the seven Noahide laws (he explains idolatry for this catogry allows for shituf) and therefore automatically considered geri toshav.

This position has tremendous ramifications which R. Heller himself notes. Specifically, all the laws in the Talmud regarding non-Jews are not applicable to geri toshav. Thus, R. Heller explains, that yayin nesach is not applicable with a ger toshav. Nor is the special prohibition against selling weapons, returning a lost object, or yihud (seclusion). Additionally, one can lend with usery to a ger toshav. All of this, R. Heller explains, is applicable to the non-Jewish people we find our self living with.

This stunning opinion did not go unchallenged. There are those who question whether, without a formal acceptance one can be considered a ger toshav. In fact, there is an entire work written to refute R. Heller’s position, however, this work is still in manuscript form and has never been printed. (If someone is willing, I would like to get a copy of this from the JNUL- you can email me).

However, it is important to note, that irrespective of whether this position is the correct one, at the very least it is an important historic position, one that bears further dissemination and study.

Sources: For more on R. Heller see R. E. Katzman’s biography, “Mofet haDor, HaGoan R. Yechiel Heller ZT”L – Ba’al Amudi Ohr” in Yeshurun 4 (1998) 648-681; 682-695 (reprint of the eulogy of R. David Luria for R. Heller); R. A. Mandelstamm, Sheni Perakim, St. Petersburg, 1852; Peli [R. Pinchas M. Heilprin] Iggeret Cheil Bet HaElyi, The Jewish National and University Library Ms. Heb. 8°5224, [1855].




One more Book on Stam Yayin

I neglected to mention one other book that was just published. The book Dimyon Areyeh was originally printed in 1616 in Prague, this was the only edition until now. This book is addressed to those of Nikolsburg who were leinient in regards to Stam Yayin. This practice had been justified by R. Moshe Isserless (Rema) in his teshuvot which were subsequently removed in many editions. However, many questioned this practice this book, Dimyon Areyeh, is one of them. There is a nice introduction about the author, R. Yehudah Leib Pisak, and collects what little we know about him. It also discusses some of events and history about the stam yayin controversy. The type has been reset and includes new footnotes throughout. Additionally, it includes the Kuntras Pesak B’Inyan Taknot HaKehilot from R. Shmuel ben David Moshe haLevi author of Nahlat Shivah (which according to this publisher lends support to the Dimyon Areyeh). It is interesting that this was its original title but was removed (for no reason) in later editions of the Nahlat Shivah. Also in at least one edition of the Nahlat Shivah there are no real haskomat (m’ta’am ha’kamut) in a effort to shield those giving the approbation from criticisim which was leveled against the book. It is the Berlin 1763 edition.

If one wants to read more about the Rema leiniency see Asher Ziv’s edition of the Teshuvot HaRema no. 124. For more on the removal of that teshuva see Ziv, pages 66-67 and now Y.S. Spiegel Amudim b’Tolodot HaSefer haIvri – Kitiva v’Hataka p. 273 (also see his footnotes for more on the controversy generally); Daniel Sperber Minhagi Yisrael vol. 2 56 note 26. And, of course, on this topic generally see Haym Soloveitchik, Yenam.

Finally, I should mention in light of R. Dr. Shlomo Sprecher’s excellent article in Hakirah, a book he relies upon heavily – R. Tertis’s Dam Brit – is available from Biegeleisen in copy format, albeit smaller than the original folio size but does include pictures of the “Tertis Apparatus.”




Kuntress Ha-Teshuvot Review

I have previously briefly mentioned a couple of problems with the new work Kuntress Ha-Teshuvot haHadash, now I would like to give a full review. First, I am no expert in the teshuva literature, that being said I was somewhat disappointed with this book.

The book first contains a long introduction into the teshuva literature in general. It discusses such topics as the importance of the literature, the pervasiveness or lack there of, as well as censorship in the teshuvot and different bibliographic topics. On this last point, the introduction discusses how, at the advent of printing, teshuvot do not seem to have been that important. They come do this conclusion by comparing amounts of other types of books printed during the same period with that of teshuvot. Books on other topics were printed in mass, while teshuvot made up only a very small portion of the books printed.

The introduction is fairly informative, although for much of this ground there are far better works out there (documented in the extensive footnotes), this does provide a basic understanding. Finally, there is a discussion about the book itself and what Boaz Cohen’s work (the predecessor to this one) is out to accomplish. This last topic is also covered in an English translation of the introduction, however, all the rest of the introduction is not translated.

The bulk of the book is devoted to the actual bibliographical entries of the teshuva books. This volume covers books with titles between aleph and lamed. But it is far from clear what exactly the standard for these entries are. If I had to categorize my main complaint with this, it would unevenness. That is, for some entries there is a significant amount of information such as some important teshuvot from that book, what other books discuss this one, and other points of interest. For other books with equally important and interesting teshuvot there is nothing.

So for Luach Eres by R. Jacob Emden (no. 1950) there is a long entry dealing with all the content of the work as well as others who he discusses and those who discuss the work as well. They also include articles on the book as well. This runs over three densely packed columns. The same is true for Eleh Divrei HaBrit (no. 222) as well as many, many others.

But for the book Har Tabor (no. 1129) which discusses the proper place of the bimah in the center of the synagogue there is no mention of any other books which discuss this topic, or any other books which disagree with this book either.

Another example, the book Be’ar Esek (no. 406) contains a teshuva about the R. Menacham of Fano and whether he had a beard. This teshuva was highly controversial and R. Yosef Erges, R. Moshe Sofer, and R. Eliazer of Munkatz all wrote about it. There is no mention of this teshuva in the entry nor is there any mention of the literature this teshuva spawned.

This last point, that at times they fail to reference other books about the one entered happens time and time again. Perhaps the most egregious example of this is the Divrei Iggeret by R. Menhem Steinhardt (no. 759). Although the entry does note this book contains a teshuva on kitnyot (he permits it) it doesn’t mention any of the books discussing this topic, e.g. Ashro Hametz (which has no entry at all), nor does it mention the teshuva from R. Moses Sofer against R. Steinhardt’s permitting kitnyot. Additionally, it doesn’t mention an article devoted to the book itself. Professor Judith Bleich wrote an article titled “Menahem Mendel Steinhardt’s “Divrei Iggeret”, Harbinger of reform” in the Proceedings for the World Congress of Jewish Studies 10 (1990): 207-214.

The next problem with the work is incompleteness. This is apparent in the entries as well as the bibliography provided. So some of the problems mentioned above are the worst, in that they don’t list anything about the book, at times even when they do they do a shoddy job. Already in my previous post I mentioned the poor entry on the organ. But there are numerous others. For instance, they have a fairly comprehensive entry on the book Hayi Olam (no. 1456) which deals with the issue of cremation. They discuss the content of the book as well as others who disagree with the author. They list other books dealing with the same subject matter as well. However, they fail to mention Michael Higger’s coverage (perhaps the most comprehensive) on this topic. (This appears in his Halakhot ve’Aggadot, 1933).

Or we have the entry for Modena’s works. Perhaps it is worthwhile to compare this entry with another. We first have the entry for the Zakan Ahron by R. Ahron Walken. As each entry includes biographical information and sources this entry reads “על המחבר ראה: דור רבניו וסופריו, ו, עמ’ 31-32; אהלי שם, עמ’ 201; אנציקלופדיה של הציונות הדתית, ב, עמ’ 175-177. וראה לאחרונה, אליעזר הכהן כ”צמאן, “נעימות התורה- הג”ר אהרן וואלקין אב”ד פינסק בעל בית אהרן, זקן אהרן, וכו'”, ישורון יא (תשס”ב), עמ’ תתצא-תתקד; יב (תשם”ג) עמ’ תשכז-תשלט.” So, for this we have three entries plus a recent article discussing the biographical details. Now we turn to Modena. For Modena we have the following: “על המחבר ראה “אריה ישאג – ר’ יהודה אריה מודינה ועולמו” and then provides the detail for that book. So we have one entry for Modena biography. So was Modena unknown? No, far from it, he wrote his own autobiography. There have been numerous articles on him as well as a full lengthy doctoral dissertation by Adelman. His autobiography is available in both Hebrew and English. The English version contain articles on him as well. But none of these are mentioned.

Now we get to omissions. The book Avot ‘Atrarah L’Banin (no. 4) contains, as the entry notes, an extensive teshuva on the permissibility of being photographed. It includes a list of Rabbis who had their photograph or more likely, their portrait done. This is all well and good. However, the entry leaves out perhaps the most interesting part, the author of Avot included a photograph (loose) of himself in the first edition. Thus, his teshuva was in a sense to justify his own practice.

There is no entry for the book Hadrat Panin Zakan which is a collection of teshuvot on beards. Nor is there an entry for the book Da’as HaRabanim which is two long teshuvot from R. Menachem Mendal Kasher and R. D. Polonski (Kli Hemdah) discussing women’s suffrage.

The editors claim this list only goes up to the year 2000. However, for some entries they include editions even after the year 2000. For R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin’s Beni Banim (no. 555) they include his fourth volume printed in 2004. However, for R. Teichtel’s Em HaBanim Semacha (no. 239) where there have been two recent translations which are different they do not include this. But again for R. Menachem Kasher’s Hatekufa haGedolah (no. 1144) (how this even qualifies as a teshuvah book is left unanswered) they include his 2001 edition.

Or we have the entry for the Helkat Ya’akov (no. 1496) where they note the first edition date and then the rest they claim are photo-offsets of the original. This is wrong. In the subsequent editions R. Herzog’s approbation was removed and thus they are not just copies of the original.

However, perhaps the answer to some of these shortcomings comes from the introduction itself. The editors explain how this work came to be. They explain that this was initially an “auxiliary tool for another project” a project on “Jewish education in the halakhic literature.” This is perhaps most telling. They are explaining to the reader that (a) they are not bilbiographers; (b) they did not initially set out to do this; (c) they are not experts in teshuvot. These shortcomings are apparent. This being said, it is important to recognize that this is a vast improvement over Cohen’s work and a welcome entry for Jewish biliography.