Menachem Kellner – Who is the Person Whom Rambam Says Can be ‘Consecrated as the Holy of Holies’?

Who is the Person Whom Rambam Says Can be
‘Consecrated as the Holy of Holies’?
By Menachem Kellner

Menachem Kellner is Professor of Jewish Thought at the University of Haifa. Author of several dozen articles on Jewish philosophy, Kellner has written/edited fourteen books, including, most recently, Maimonides’ Confrontation With Mysticism (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006).

This is his first contribution to the Seforim blog.

Rabbi Aryeh Leibowitz’s learned and interesting article in the most recent issue of Tradition (“The Pursuit of Scholarship and Economic Self-Sufficiency: Revisiting Maimonides’ Commentary to Pirkei Avot,” Tradition 40.3 (Fall 2007): 31-41) contained a passage which really surprised me, even though, perhaps, it should not have. (A PDF of this article is only available to online/print subscribers of Tradition.)

In his article, Leibowitz discusses Maimonides’ position vis-à-vis the appropriateness of scholars receiving communal funds. In doing so, Leibowitz surveys the Maimonidean sources, including the well-known statement of Maimonides in his Mishneh Torah in hilkhot Shemittah ve-Yovel. Leibowitz in his discussion of this particular source, however, appears to have made a common mistake. As this mistake has broad implications, it is necessary to set the record straight on Maimonides’ true meaning.

Leibowitz weakens his own argument by apparently not realizing that Rambam in Hilkhot Shemittah (13:13) is not talking about Jews in particular, let alone talmidei hakhamim. The passage in question is one of the clearest examples of universalism to be found in the Mishneh Torah. It may be that because that universalism goes against the grain of so much of what passes for Torah Judaism today that it is so easily missed.

Before turning to what Rambam says, let it be noted that he divided his Mishneh Torah into fourteen books. The seventh book of the fourteen is itself divided into seven sections (and is the only book divided into precisely that number of sections). This seventh section is itself divided into thirteen chapters. The thirteenth of these chapters is itself divided into thirteen paragraphs (halakhot) in the printed editions.[1] Thus, the thirteenth halakhah of the thirteenth chapter of the seventh section of the seventh book of the Mishneh Torah marks the precise mid-point of that work.

The number thirteen is, of course, significant in Judaism generally, but has special significance for Rambam. Not only did he promulgate thirteen principles of Judaism, but in “Laws of Circumcision,” 3.9 he emphasizes the fact that the word “covenant” (brit) is found precisely thirteen times in the account of Abraham’s circumcision (Gen. 17).[2]

The number seven is significant in many human societies, and not just in Judaism (Judah Halevi to the contrary – see Kuzari 2.20); according to Leo Strauss (1899-1973) it is of particular significance to Rambam.[3] I am in general no enthusiast for Straussian numerology, but this case seems too contrived not to have some significance.

Let it be further noted that for Rambam the halakhot of shemittah and yovel have messianic significance (Hilkhot Melakhim 11.1). I have proven (to my complete satisfaction at least) that according to Rambam the distinction between Jew and Gentile will lose all significance by the time the messianic era reaches fruition.[4]

So, what precisely does Rambam write in this special place in the Mishneh Torah? Here are his words:

Not only the Tribe of Levi, but each and every individual human being, whose spirit moves him and whose knowledge gives him understanding to set himself apart in order to stand before the Lord, to serve Him, to worship Him, and to know Him, who walks upright as God created him to do,[5] and releases himself from the yoke of the many foolish considerations which trouble people — such an individual is as consecrated as the Holy of Holies, and his portion and inheritance shall be in the Lord forever and ever. The Lord will grant him adequate sustenance in this world, the same as He had granted to the priests and to the Levites. Thus indeed did David, peace upon him, say, O Lord, the portion of mine inheritance and of my cup, Thou maintainest my lot (Ps. 16:5).[6]

Leibowitz translates the beginning of this passage as follows: “Not only the Tribe of Levi, but every single individual from among the world’s inhabitants whose spirit moves him…” (p. 32) and the penultimate sentence as follows: “Behold this person has been totally consecrated…” He then goes on to say:

Maimonides is not stating that this individual, who has dedicated his life to God, can rely on financial support from the community; rather Maimonides is stating that that such an individual can also sustain himself on less and will reap the benefits of heightened spirituality and increased divine assistance. (p. 33)

In an erudite footnote to this sentence Leibowitz makes it abundantly clear that he has missed a crucial point here: Rambam is not talking about Jews, be they talmidei hakhamim supported by the community or not.[7] He is talking about (unconverted) Gentiles who, through their devotion to God, become “as consecrated as the Holy of Holies.” Rambam here is talking about God’s support of all human beings who consecrate themselves; he could hardly imagine that this sentence would be turned into an argument in support of kollelim!

Why do I say this? The operative term in our passage is kol ba’ei olam. In every other place in the Mishneh Torah where Rambam uses this expression the context makes it clear that he means human beings as such, in contradistinction to Jews specifically.[8] In none of these places could the term mean proselytes or Noachides. There is no reason in the world to think that davka here Rambam had a more restrictive meaning in mind.

The expression “each and every individual human being” translates the Hebrew, kol ba’ei olam. This expression finds its classic use in a debate between the school of Rabbi Akiva, who maintained that the Torah was revealed to the Jews alone, and the school of Rabbi Ishmael, who insisted that the Torah was ultimately meant to reach kol ba’ei olam, “each and every individual human being.”[9] Here there can be no doubt but that the expression literally means all human beings (as opposed to Jews, native or converted).[10]

The expression is best-known to most contemporary Jews from a text which Rambam himself may or may not have known the liturgical poem (piyyut) unetaneh tokef.[11] The poem is based on Mishnah Rosh Ha-Shanah 1.2, which in turn is based on Ps. 38:15. It is a safe bet that most Jews who recite this passage on the yamim nora’im do not realize that the clear intent of these texts is all human beings, not Jews. Rambam, on the other hand, certainly knew it.[12]

The entire debate – ably analyzed by Rabbi Leibowitz – over whether Rambam’s statement at the end of Shemittah ve-Yovel represents a retreat from his strictures against compensation for Torah study is thus based upon a demonstrable misunderstanding of Rambam.[13]

Notes:
[1] Rambam did not number the specific halakhot in the Mishneh Torah; unfortunately for the elegance of the point I am making here, the best mss. count our halakhah as the 12th, not 13th. My thanks to Rabbi Shalomi Eldar for pointing this out to me.
[2] Isaac Abravanel discusses various other reasons for Maimonides’ use of precisely thirteen principles in Rosh Amanah chapter ten.
[3] Strauss, “How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed,” in trans. Shlomo Pines, Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. xi-lvi, p. xiii. Further on the significance of the number seven in Maimonides see Joel Kraemer, “Moses Maimonides: An Intellectual Portrait,” in Kenneth Seeskin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11-57, especially pp. 20 and 42.
[4] See my discussion in Maimonides on Judaism and the Jewish People (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991).
[5] I wonder if this expression ought to be read as an implied critique of notions of original sin? Such notions are not only native to Christianity, but also attracted a number of (post-Maimonidean, Kabbalistic) Jewish figures. For a recent study on expression of original sin in Jewish exegesis, see Alan Cooper, “A Medieval Jewish Version of Original Sin: Ephraim of Luntshits on Leviticus 12,” Harvard Theological Review 97:4 (2004): 445-460. For some studies on the notion among Jewish philosophers, see Daniel J. Lasker, “Original Sin and Its Atonement According to Hasdai Crescas,” Da’at 20 (1988): 127-35 (Hebrew), and Devorah Schechterman, “The Doctrine of Original Sin and Commentaries on Maimonides in Jewish Philosophy of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” Da’at 20 (1988): 65-90 (Hebrew).
[6] I cite the translation of Isaac Klein, Book of Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 403.
[7] In that footnote (no. 11), Leibowitz cites medieval authorities who take Maimonides to be talking about Jews and also an essay by a Rabbi Steven Weisberg who understood Maimonides to making a point about “an elevated state of utopian existence for a God-fearing Jew, rather than an operative point of law” (emphasis added).
[8] Actually, my Bar-Ilan “responsa project” database found them; I just pushed the buttons. In any event, the places are: “Repentance,” 3.3 and 6.3,”Tefillin,” X.11, “Sanhedrin,” 12.3, and “Kings,” 8.10. See further Ya’akov Blidstein, “The Promulgation of Religion as an Aim of War in Maimonides’ Teachings,” in Avriel Bar-Levav (ed.), Shalom Vi-Milhamah Bi-Tarbut Ha-Yehudit (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2006): 85-97 (Hebrew). On p. 86, note 7 Professor Blidstein points out that the expression is “beloved of Rambam, and he uses it to denote humanity, generally in a spiritual or cultural context.”
[9] This debate was made the subject of a penetrating study by Marc (Menachem) Hirshman, Torah Lekhol Ba’ei Olam: Zerem Universali be-Sifrut ha-Tana’im ve-Yahaso le-Hokhmat he-Amim (Torah for the Entire World: A Universalist Stream in Tannaitic Literature and its Relation to Gentile Wisdom) (Tel Aviv; Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuhad, 1999). The book’s main findings were presented in English in idem., “Rabbinic Universalism in the Second and Third Centuries,” Harvard Theological Review 93:2 (2000): 101-15.
[10] A scan of the one hundred ninety one citations of this expression in the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project database of rabbinic literature shows that in the vast majority of cases it means human beings simply, and in many places it is used in explicit contradistinction to Jews.
[11] For a useful discussion of what is actually known about the poem (as opposed to what we have all been taught about Rabbi Amnon), see Ivan G. Marcus, “Kiddush HaShem in Ashkenaz and the Story of Rabbi Amnon of Mainz,” in Isaiah M. Gafni and Aviezer Ravitzky (eds.), Sanctity in Life and Martyrdom: Studies in Memory of Amir Yekutiel (Jerusalem; Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1992), 131-147 (Hebrew); Menahem Shmelzer, “Sefer Or Zarua and the Legend of Rabbi Amnon,” in Adri K. Offenberg (ed.), Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana: Treasures of Jewish Booklore: Treasures of Jewish Booklore Marking the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Leeser Rosenthal, 1794-1994 (Amsterdam University Press, 2003), available online; David Golinkin’s discussion online; as well as Jacob J. Schacter’s lecture, “U-Netaneh Tokef Kedushat Ha-Yom: Medieval Story and Modern Significance” (sources [PDF]).
[12] My latest book is an extended discussion of the implications of Rambam’s universalism. See Maimonides’ Confrontation With Mysticism (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006).
[13] For a very important discussion of the historical background to Rambam’s attack on Torah scholars who accept community funds in his commentary on Avot, see Mordechai A. Friedman, “Rambam, Zuta, and the Muqaddams: A Story of Three Bans,” Zion 70 (2005): 473-528 (Hebrew). This article supports Rabbi Leibowitz’s overall point by showing the specific historical back ground to Rambam’s spirited attack on those who accept (let alone demand) money for Torah study. On the subject in general I would also like to draw attention to: Ephraim Kanarfogel, “Compensation for the Study of Torah in Medieval Rabbinic Thought,” in Ruth Link-Salinger (ed.), Of Scholars, Savants, and Their Texts: Studies in Philosophy and Religious Thought: Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 135-47.



Part Five of the “The Eruv in St. Louis”

As previously noted at the Seforim blog, Eruv Online has an excellent series on the history of eruvin controversies. In his most recent offering, he has posted the fifth segment of “History of City Eruvin − The Eruv in St. Louis.” For earlier posts, see 1,2,3,4.

On a related topic, see Rabbi Adam Mintz’s earlier post about “The Manhattan Eruv” at the Seforim blog.



The Animals

“A man enters synagogue on Yom Kippur with his dog and tells the gabbai this is a very smart dog, he can talk. “If he will talk for you,” says the man, “will you let him sit next to me?” The gabbai says “let’s hear him.” Man turns to dog and says what is on top of this building which keeps the rain out? the dog says ruf ruf. The guy says see he said it was a roof. But if you are not satisfied with that, I will have him answer another question. He says to the dog, who was the most famous baseball player of all time? Dog says ruf ruf. Man says see he said Babe Ruth. The gabbai throws man and dog out. Dog looks up at the man and says, “Should I have said Willie Mays?”
— Jewish Joke

I thought it may be instructive to examine what Judaism says about animals. In the course, I hope to highlight some lesser known bibliographical items. The Torah appears to place significant obligation on people vis-à-vis animals. For instance, we are commanded to remove an overburdened animal (Deut. 22:4), we are told to feed one’s animals prior to one eating themselves (TB, Berachot, 40a), and finally there is a general injunction against mistreating animals. It is from this final prohibition – tzar ba’alei hayyim – that we continue with the remainder of our discussion.

Although we are commanded to treat animals well, Jews are also not prohibited from eating animals. The combination of these two ideas were for some rishonim an understanding of how and why shehita is the obligatory process for eating meat. They explain that purpose of shehita is to minimize pain to the animal even when we do kill it.[1] They point to law of a smooth knife as well as cutting specifically on the neck as trying to minimize pain. The issue of animal pain, was raised on numerous occasions for some to argue that shehita should be prohibited. In the defense of shehita the idea that it is the least painful method of killing was usually marshaled. In at least one instance, at the turn of the 20th century, this defense “caused even non-Jews to only use Jewish shehita and the Society for [the prevention] of Cruelty to Animals in America attempted to obligate this in all places.”[2]

In America as well there was a question of the legitimacy of shehita as a humane method. A book was published, originally in Hebrew and subsequently to English, which bore the title Tub Taam, or Vindication of the Israelitisch Way of Killing Animals by R. Aaron Zev Friedman (downloadable here). According to a family legend, this book convinced Ulysses S. Grant to eat only kosher meat.[3]

While all the above is true, there appears to be an opposite view of animals, one which places less respect to the animal world. R. Moshe Isserles, in his commentary on Shulhan Arukh, states “Anything that is necessary for health, or for anything else there is no prohibition against inflicting pain on animals; therefore, it is permissible to pluck quills from live duck and there is no consideration of causing pain to the animal. But, it is best to avoid all this as it is heartless.”[4] Thus, according to Rama, whenever there is any need, there is no prohibition of causing pain. According to this understanding, one need not understand the commandment of shehita to have anything to do with minimizing pain, as there is no need to minimize pain as the meat will be used.[5]

The view of Rama was applied by R. Yaakov Reischer when he asked [in an undated responsum] whether it is permissible to use an animal to test the efficacy of a drug.[6] He responded that based upon this Rama, animal testing is permitted. He explained that the caveat of Rama, that “it is heartless” and therefore should be avoided, is inapplicable to this case; as in the case of animal testing, the animal may not feel pain immediately, and as a result, according to R. Reischer, poses less of an issue of tzar ba’alei hayyim.

R. Ezekiel Landau, in his Noda BeYehudah[7] similarly applies Rama to a different question. He was asked whether it is permissible for a Jew to hunt animals. R. Landau says based upon Rama, there is no issue of tzar ba’alei hayyim. While he counsels against this practice for other reasons[8] these reasons are not out of concern for animals. R. Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, in Haamek Davar, places Noah as the first to own pets. R. Berlin explains that the raven and dove were Noah’s own pets and not part of the animals he collected into the ark. R. Berlin alleges that the dove was actually trained similarly to a homing pigeon. (Haamek Davar, vol. 1, 8:7)

In discussing animals and Judaism there is a related discussion concerning the propriety of dog ownership and dogs in particular in Jewish thought. R. Jacob Emden rails against dog ownership.[9] He decries dog ownership solely for pleasure or as a companion and goes so far to claim that dog owners are suspect of engaging in bestiality.[10]

On the other hand, historically, the dog specifically, has actually been used as a positive icon. For instance, in the Hamburg Miscellany, there is a depiction of a wedding scene with a dog at the feet of the groom.[11] Similarly, the Washington Haggadah contains a depiction of a dog (see here).

The Sefer Hasidim claims that all animals can teach humans positive traits.[12] He singles out the dog for teaching loyalty, which is easily what the depiction in the Hamburg Miscellany could be depicting in the wedding scene – a scene which describes what is essentially a loyalty ceremony.

While the positive aspect of a dog can be found in some illustrations, the negative view of animals and specifically dogs can also be found in illustrations. In the Prague 1526 haggadah we find a depiction of a hare hunt being used for the mnemonic YaKNeHaZ (the order the blessing are recited when Pesach night falls on a Saturday night). The usage of the hare hunt is in German, the term for hare hunt or Jagen-has sounds like YakNeHaZ. In Augsburg, 1534 haggadah, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi notes it not only shows a hare hunt, but the hare escaping.[13] He says the hare is representative of the Jewish people and the dogs their enemies and therefore, “it is plausible to conclude that hate two successive representation of the Jagen-has are not only an innovation in themselves, but together comprise an allegory of the persecution and salvation of the Jewish people.”[14] In this depiction the dogs are actually the enemies of the Jews conforming with the prior negative views of dogs.

Finally, in the apocryphal work Tobit, in many versions there is a positive mention of a dog. In some editions, however, the dog is missing. One scholar posits the removal was deliberate in that, according to him — and as we have seen above this is not universal — Jews (and other Eastern cultures) do not depict dogs positively.[15] Thus, the dog had to go. Again, this follows the negative view of dogs.

In conclusion, there appears to be two schools of thought regarding animals and specifically dogs. Some view them and animals positively and is borne out in practice, while there is another tradition inapposite.

Notes:
I wanted to thank Eliezer Brodt and Menachem Butler for their additional insights and sources which added significantly to this post.

[1] See Sefer haHinuch, commandment 451; see also Eshkoli, Tzaar Baalei Hayyim, [], 2002, 79-80 (collecting sources).
[2] See Greenwald, ha-Shohet ve-haShehita be-Safrut ha-Rabbunut (New York, 1955), p. 19.
[3] For the source and a description of this book in general see Yosef Goldman, Hebrew Printing in America (New York, 2006), 2:1092. See also, Shnayer Z. Leiman, “Montague Lawrence Marks: In a Jewish Bookstore,” Tradition 25:1 (Fall, 1989): 66, 69, nn.12-13.
For more on the German attempt to ban shehita and R. Y.Y. Weinberg’s response, see Hirsh Jakob Zimmels, The Echo of the Nazi Holocaust in Rabbinic Literature (New York, 1977), 181-193 and Marc B. Shapiro, Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy (Littman Library, 1999), 117-129; and regarding the highly controversial nature of R. Weinberg’s responsum, Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog hesitated to allow it in print at all, see p. 192. Shapiro also cites a letter where it is suggested that “Herzog later agreed that publishing the responsum would not create difficulties” (ibid., n.86).
[4] Rama, Even haEzer, 5:14; see generally Eshkoli, supra n.1, chapter 12.
[5] R. Yosef Toemim, in his introduction to Pri Megadim discussing shehita cautions against applying rationales generally for commandments, and specifically for shehita. Pri Megadim, Peshiha Kollelet l’Hilchot Shehita.
[6] R. Yaakov Reischer, Shevut Ya’akov, vol. 3, no. 71.
[7] R. Ezekiel Landau, Noda b’Yehuda, Mahdurah Tinyana, Yoreh Deah, no. 10.
[8] He offers that Biblically, the only hunters were Esau and Nimrod thus hunting is not a “Jewish pastime.” Further, he argues that one is prohibited from putting himself in danger. He goes so far to claim that the simple reading of Esau’s statement “I am going to die” as an expression that Esau was aware that he was involved in a dangerous profession.
David Katz recently noted that R. Ezekiel Landau “laughingly applied” to R. Jacob Emden the Talmudic dictum (BT, Yoma, 30b) concerning mad dogs: “They bark and bark but no one hears!” David Katz, “A Case Study in the Formation of a Super-Rabbi: The Early Years of Rabbi Ezekiel Landau, 1713-1754” (University of Maryland, 2004), 17, 420-421.
[9] R. Jacob Emden, She’elat Ya’avetz, vol. 1 no. 17; Eshkoli, supra n.1, pp. 221-224; id. 225-28 (discussing cats).
[10] There is a related discussion about the Antisemitic use of the dog to depict Jews. See Ruth Mellinkoff, Antisemitic Hate Signs in Hebrew Illuminated Manuscripts from Medieval Germany (Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 38-9; now, see generally, Kenneth Stow, Jewish Dogs: An Image and Its Interpreters (Stanford, California, 2006), 28-32 and passim. Additionally, it is worth noting that there is actually a Jewish explanation as to why non-Jews have called Jews dogs. See R. Y.Y. Stahl, ed., Sefer Kushiyot (Jerusalem, 2007), no. 128 p. 100 (finding scriptural basis for the dog epithet!).
[11] Bezalel Narkiss, Hebrew Illuminated Manuscripts (Israel, 1984) plate 59 p. 185; this illumination also appears in Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1967), vol. 16, opp. col. 616. Sperber notes other instances of dogs in Jewish items but attributes it to Christian ideology. See Daniel Sperber, Minhagei Yisrael, vol. 4 pp. 84-5, n.12. But, as is shown above from the Sefer Hasidim, the use of a dog to display loyalty has Jewish roots as well.
[12] Margoliyot ed., no. 47, p. 106. See also, Sefer Hasidim (Sefer HaMaskil) p. 12 “at all times one should have in their home animals or birds, at the very least a rooster or duck. One should then feed the animal first to fulfill the obligation to feed animals prior to one eating themselves.” For a discussion regarding this Sefer Hasidim vis-a-vis the Sefer HaMaskil, see R. M.M. Honig, in “al Mahduroso haHadasha shel Sefer HaMaskil (Sefer Hasidim) l’R’ Moshe Bar Eliezer HaKohen,” Yerushashanu, vol. 1 (2007): 196-240.
[13] Both of these are available in their entirety from the JNUL site.
[14] Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Haggadah and History (Jewish Publication Society 1997), plate 15. For a fuller discussion of this imagery, see Elliott Horowitz, “Odd Couples: The Eagle and the Hare, the Lion and the Unicorn,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 11:3 (August 2004): 243-258, and idem., “The People of the Image,” The New Republic 223:13 (September 25, 2000): 41-49.
[15] Israel Abrahams, “Tobit’s Dog,” Jewish Quarterly Review (old series), I, 3 (1888/1889): 288.


R. Yaakov Lipshitz and Heter Mechirah

R. Yaakov Lipshitz and Heter Mechirah
by R. Eliezer Brodt

As per Sheuy R’s request a short post on shemitah:

It is virtually impossible to write up a review of the literature out there on shemitah seforim as the seforim keep on coming out. For some odd reason people out there feel this is their place to contribute to our vast torah literature. As of last shemitah in the middle of the year I inquired at a local seforim store how many books did he get on the topic of shemitah. He said over seventy five! By now that number has certainly doubled. My personal recommendation is if someone is working on a sefer on shemitah, unless it is incredible, do not waste your time printing it.

I will list just one recent very important reprint, the sefer Torat Yonasan (originally printed in Vilna, 1888) written by R. Yonasan Abelmann (1854-1903). This sefer was not without critics. R. Abelmann , however, responded in his teshuvot, Zikhron Yonason, Vilna, 1904, Kuntres Devar HaShmita (see pages 158b-187b). He discusses, among others, the opinion of the Bet HaLevi.

Interestingly enough with all the reprints and new stuff coming, out the Madanei Eretz of R. Shlomo Zalman on Mesechtat Shmitta has yet to be reprinted. The sefer, as everything this godal Hador (not that he needs my recommendation) wrote is excellent and very important to many issues of Shemitah but being that it deals with R. Kook so chas vesholom they could not reprint it.

The main point of this post is to share with you an incredible story relating to shemitah that I read a while back. This story is found in one of the best and most honest books (at least in my humble opinion) written about many gedolim from Yakov Mark. Dan has posted on this book a while back. There is much to add to what he wrote, perhaps I will return to it another time. For now just the story. Yakov Mark records a story (Gedolim fun Unzer Tzeit, New York, 1927, pp. 117-18 and translated into Hebrew, B’Mechtizah shel Gedolim, Jerusalem, 1958, p. 104) of a meeting he had with R Yakov Lipshitz, the famous secretary of R Yitchack Elchonon Spector (and for purposes of the story below, it is important to note that R. Lipshitz was an anti-Zionist):

פעם אחת היתה לי שיחה מענינת עמו בענין שאלת השמיטה. הדבר היה בשנת השמיטה של שנת תרמט, והוא גילה לי סוד, שלו חלק גדול בהיתר שהוציא ר’ יצחק אלחן מפני שהוא הפציר בו שיתן היתר ואם תאמר: איך זה מתיישב שיענקל ליפשיץ ישתדל עבור הציונים? מפזם לו ליפשיץ בניגון של גמרא, הענין הוא:שהציונים עשו נזק לעצמם בזה שחיפשו היתר יותר משהיה יכול להזיקם כל מתנגד שהוא. שער בנפשך, אלו היה הסטודנטים מכרכוב חוזרים ומקיימים את מצות השביעית אחרי אלף ושמונה מאות שנה, והרי מסורת היא שבעון שמיטה חרב הבית דומה שהיו מטילים על יענקל ליפשיץ כל האבנים הנמצאות ברחוב קובנה, כיצד הוא העיז לדבר על צדיקים כאלו? ומלבד זאת איזו פרסומת טובה היתה יוצאת מזה: כל העולם החרדי היה נושאם על הידים והיו ממש טובעים בזהבר, אבל יצרם הרע דחפם לבוץ ואני סייעתי בו



The Pitfalls of Disagreeing with the Gra

Sunday, the second day of Hol HaMo’ad, was the 210th yahrzeit of the Gra. The Gra, a towering figure in modern Judaism, was not immune from criticism. His views, like any other’s were subject to scrutiny. And, at times, there were those who disagreed with the Gra’s conclusions. While this criticism should come as no surprise (and especially so in light of the Gra’s dim view of deference to prior authorities), some felt the Gra should be immune from any criticism. Thus, we find the Gra’s dissenters taken to task for merely arguing with the Gra’s position.
Additionally, this post will be the beginning of a series of posts devoted to reviewing and highlighting one of the most important books in the history of the Jewish book to be published in recent memory. Dr. Yaakov Shmuel Spiegel (who has a terrific Hebrew Wikipedia entry here)has published two volumes of Amudim b’Tolodot Sefer HaIvri. Both volumes are tremendously rich in material and appear to have gone virtually unnoticed. (Unfortunately, Spiegel soon after the publication of the first volume came out with a revised edition. All citations are to the first edition of the first volume.)
As mentioned above, the first part of this post, is the first in a series discussing Spiegel’s book. The second part, although related to Spiegel is not discussed by Spiegel, and instead, is from another important bibliography work, Ohel Rochel.
There is but one review in HaMayaan [and in the latest AJS review of Spiegel’s second volume]. In fact, although those who have read it have recognized its import it has not stopped some from hiding their use of the book. Thus, a couple of weeks ago the Hiddushei HaBach were published on portions of the Talmud. Spiegel has an amazing discussion about the Hagot haBach. Spiegel discusses the history, what the Bach was doing, which edition of the Talmud he had. Perhaps most importantly, Spiegel discusses the errors that have crept into the Bach – mainly because the editors of the Vilna Shas removed the introduction to the work. The introduction explains certain devices that were employed to make clear which words the Bach was removing. Both the device (quotation marks) as well as the explanatory notes no longer appear, thus Spiegel provides numerous examples of people who based their Torah on an incorrect understanding of what the Bach was doing.

Returning to the new Hidushei HaBach, in the introduction they discuss the Bach’s other works. Of course, they discuss the Hagot HaBach and they rely heavily (read almost in entirety) on Spiegel. But, the only times they cite (p. 19 n. 1; p.43 n. 55; p. 46 n.65, n. 67) to Spiegel they use the following abbreviation עמודים בתולדות ה”ה. They do not provide what that means, and only a reader who was already aware of Spiegel’s book would have any idea. This is deliberate as although they are willing to use his book they are unwilling to let others know that.

In this post, however, I will not focus on the Bach, rather as mentioned above, we are going to discuss the Gra, and the first example focuses on the Hagot HaGra. This portion of the post mainly comes from Spiegel (Amudim: Haghot u’Maghim pp. 422-426, 461).

R. Gershon Henoch Leiner, the Radzyner Rebbi, published Sidrei Tahros. Sidrei Tahros is an attempt to fill a gap in the talmud. There are some mesechtot that do not have any talmudic commentary. While some, Zeraim for instance, have at least Yerushalmi, the mesechtot of Tahoros do not. Thus, R. Leiner culled the corpus of Rabbinic literature, Talmud, Midrash, Zohar, etc. and collected the relevant statements to create a “talmud” (it is even labeled as such – the legend on the page reads Gemara) on the two mesechtot of Ohelot and Kelim. Additionally, he wrote his own commentary on these volumes. The volume on Kelim was published in 1873 and included a map that can be seen here. The volume on Ohelot was published in 1903. After that both books were not republished until 1960 in a photomechanical reproduction.

Soon after it came out, people took issue with the entire concept – the concept of “creating” a gemara. Those who came out against him, did so in the newspaper Halevonon (available here – see the 1875 nos. 34, kovod levonon (machberes sheni year 11) 6 tamuz edition and see Ir Vilna vol. 1 p. 60 n. 7 for some choice quotes). Someone responded in Hamaggid (also available online see 17 Av, 1875). Much of this criticism was more focused on the concept of the Sidrei Taharos, (creating a “new” gemara) for our purposes, however, we are going to focus on one point, R. Leiner’s disagreements with the Gra.

In his commentary, R. Leiner takes issue with some of the Gra’s textual emendations. For instance R. Leiner states:
ודע דדברי הגר”א ז”ל בזה בספרו . . . לא איתברר לן ולא זכינו לעמוד בסוד דבריו ז”ל . . . דרכו בקודש נסתרה ונעלמה מאתנו

This is but one of the times R. Leiner disagrees with the Gra. At one time, R. Leiner is willing to attribute his disagreement not to the Gra, but instead, R. Leiner claims that perhaps the difficult statements in the Gra were not made by the Gra. Instead, a student misunderstood and thus it is now necessary to figure out what in fact the Gra said. Setting aside this justification (which, when it comes to the Gra’s notes on the Talmud is difficult to believe in light of the fact much comes from the Gra’s hand itself), R. Leiner still disagreed with the Gra for whatever reason it may be.

R. Yosef Refael and R. Betzalael HaKohen, Dayanim in the Vilna Bet Din were against the whole notion of the Sidrei Tahros. But, they also singled out R. Leiner’s disagreements with the Gra. Specifically, they say

ובהשגות המחבר [ר’ גרשון] על רבינו מאור הגולה הגר”א ז”ל כתב הרבה נגד כבוד הגר”א ז”ל בכמה מקומות ומדקדק עליו בדקדודי עניות לבד אשר אין מהצרוך להשיב עליהם כלל, וגם במהלליו את רבינו הגר”א ז”ל התנכר כנגדו כובד וכאילו היה חלילה אחד מחבריו . . . ובכמה מקומות תלה דברים זרים בפירוש הגר”א ז”ל, אשר לא יטעה כל המתחיל ללמוד לפרש כזאת

Another example is that of R. Barukh Brody in his book Bet Ya’akov where he states:

ועל של עתה באתי כי זה לא כביר נדפס ילקוט על מס’ כלים . . . והנה בעברי על פני דבריו באיזה מקומן ראיתי כי יצא בילקוטו באבני נגף נוכח תורת הגר”א ופגע ונגע בכ”מ [= בכמה מקומות] בכבוד רבינו הגר”א ומשיג על דבריו בעזות וחוצפה מאד, ושמתי עיוני על השגותיו ומצאתי ראיתי כי מלבד שאין קטן ערך כמוהו ראוי להתוכח עם ארי ארי[ה] דבי עילאה הגר”א ז”ל, בר מכל דין לא הבין ולא רצה להבין דברי הגר”א הקדושים רק שנאה וחוצפה מדברת מתוך גרונו . . . חכמתו המעט נסתקלה ממנו ולא הבין אפילו פשט הפשוט שבדברי הגר”א ז”ל

R. Brody thus accuses R. Leiner of brazeness, chutzpah, and that R. Leiner “is unable to understand even the simplest explanations.” Harsh words indeed all for disagreeing with the Gra.

The second example deals with a recently discussed book. In our discussion of Teffilah Zakah, we noted that various editions of the Hayye Adam were altered. In this case, we are going to deal with R. Danzig’s other well-known work the Hokhmat Adam. In the prior discussion the removal was due to the inclusion of a controversial book, in this case it was R. Danzig’s own words. [1]

The Hokhmat Adam was published after the Hayye Adam. In the Hayye Adam at various times, he take issue with the opinions of the Gra. R. Danzig was no stranger to the Gra, R. Danzig’s son married the grand-daughter (Gittel Vilner) of the Gra. It appears that R. Danzig’s disagreements with the Gra did not go unnoticed or unopposed.

In the first edition of the Hokhmat Adam, R. Danzig addresses criticisms. R. Danzig notes, inter alia, that the Gra himself would be more than happy to have people disagree with him. It appears, however, that only one copy remains of R. Danzig’s original words. This copy was discovered by Chaim Lieberman, one of the great bibliographers of the past generation, in what was R. Shmuel Straushun’s former library (a portion of the library is now housed in YIVO). The page, in relevant part, reads as follows:

והנה לא נמצא בחיבור זה מדברי מחותני הגאון רשכבה”ג מו’ אלי’ החסיד, והוא לסיבת כי שמעתי דבת רבים המתרעמים עלי שהשגתי עליו באיזה מקומות בחיבורי [חיי אדם] ובלתי ס[פק] שהאנשים המתרעמים לא ידעו דרך הפוסקים שכך דרך תה”ק זה בונה וזה סותר והתלמיד חולק על הרב כמש”כ בש”ע [יו”ד ס’ רמ”ב סע’ ג] ודרך זה היה נוהג אף בזמן תנאים ואמורים, ובודאי ניחא להגר”א מה שאני מפלפל בדבריו ממי שהוא אומר שפיר קאמר כדאר”י [=כדאמר רבי יוחנן] על בר לקישא. ולכתוב דבריו אף אם לא יהיה נ”ל זה לא אוכל, ולכן אחזתי במדת השתיקה להסיר תלונתם מעלי והם עתידים ליתן את הדין כי מנעו נ”ר [=נחת רוח] להגר”א לפלפל בדבריו, ודין אותי לכף זכות ידונו אותו משמים לזכות

This is not the text that appears in Hokhmat Adam, rather a slightly different text appears. These changes, however, as been demonstrated by Ch. Lieberman are significant. The following is how it appears (prior to the Binat Adam section):

והנה דברי מחותני גאון ישראל וקדושו אשר מימיו אנו שותים המקובל אלקי החסיד המפורסם מהו’ אלי’ חסיד דקהילתינו לא הבאתי כלל דבריו כמעט רק איזה גרגרים והוא לסיבה כי שמעתי דיבת רבים המתרעמים עלי על שבאיזה מקומות בחיברי חיי אדם השגתי עליו, ובלתי ספק שאנשים האלה אינם בקיאי’ בלימוד הפוסקי’ שכן דרך תה”ק זה בונה וזה סותר והתלמוד חולק על הרב והטור על אביו הרא”ש כמש”כ בש”ע ובפוסקי’, וזה ניחא להון כדאמר ר’ יוחנן על ר”ל דמיני ומיני’ רווח שמעתתא, ובודאי זהו נחת רוח להגואן יותר ממי שיאמר שפיר קאמר ועתידין ליתן את הדין על שמונעים נחת רוח מהגואן, והדן לכף זכות ידונו משמים לזכות

Lieberman points to four major changes. First, the honorifics surrounding the first mention of the Gra. Second, in the first iteration, R. Danzig decided to totally avoid any mention of the Gra while in the second iteration he cites “some small statements” of the Gra. Third, in the later iteration the statement of R. Yochonon is filled in. That is it provides the text. Lieberman allows that perhaps this was done to avoid “confusion” with another statement of R. Yochonon. R. Yohonon (Ketubot 84,b) says about Resh Lakish “what can I do my peer disagrees with me.” Rashi explains that “peer” means equal. Thus, perhaps the reader would think that R. Danzig was comparing himself with the Gra. Instead, the reader is now directed to the statement of R. Yohonon (Pesachim 88,a; Megilah 14,b) generally discussing Resh Lakish providing numerous answers to questions. Finally, in the later iteration the language “it is impossible for me to write what I don’t actually believe” is missing in it entirety. (For Lieberman’s article see Ohel Rochel, vol. 1, 473-74 [first printed in Kiryat Sefer, 37 (1962) pp. 413-14]).

Note:
[1] For examples of R. Danzig’s disagreements and some responses see Eliach, HaGoan, vol. 2 pp. 706-09.



Shaving on Chol HaMo’ad the Never-ending Controversy

While we are generally aware that denominations other than Orthodox changes and adapt to the times, in reality Orthodoxy has also made significant changes. Of course, these changes are all within the parameters of Halakah, but they are in part concession to the times.

By way of example, the Mishha and in turn the Gemera record various practices when a person is an אבל (mourner). One such practice is עטיפת הראש winding or wrapping of the head. Tosefot, however, note that although this practice is recorded without controversy – in their time, as it was uncommon to wrap one’s head there is no longer an obligation to do so.

At the time Tosefot offered this decision – a decision which took into account then modern sensibilities – it was fairly unremarkable. This would change significantly when a movement sprung up which took conforming Judaism to modernity to the extreme. The Reform movement which altered numerous, significant practices precipitated a greater hesitancy to effect change – even legitimate change within Orthodoxy.
One example of the battle over changing long established practices relates to Hol haMo’ad. The Mishna in Mo’ad Koton [1] enumerates but a small class of people who are permitted to shave on Hol haMoad. This class is comprised of people, who for reasons out of their control were unable to shave before the holiday. One who is released from prison on the Holiday is one example. But, anyone other than this small class of persons according to the Mishna, are prohibited from shaving on Hol haMo’ad. The Gemera explains the restriction in light of human nature. One, in theory, has more free time on Hol HaMo’ad (assuming one is not working) thus one may procrastinate to shave and get a haircut until Hol HaMo’ad. This would mean that they would begin the holiday unkempt, unshaven. Thus, to avoid this sort of procrastination, one is prohibited from shaving on Hol haMo’ad thus removing any temptation to delay until Hol HaMo’ad.

The question which we will now turn out focus to – is whether this reason is dispositive. That is, assuming one did in fact shave before the holiday can he then shave on Hol HaMo’ad as he did comply with the law.

For hundreds of years the answer to this question was no. Rabbenu Tam (1100-1171) did allow for someone who shaved before the holiday to do so on hol haMoad. This position, however, was uniformly rejected by everyone who voiced an opinion on this matter until the 18th century. The 18th century, however, saw an increase in emancipation and closer contact between Jews and non-Jews. This was on an unprecedented level, Jews did not want to appear strange and thus many Jews began, what is common today, dressing in contemporary style and the like. Jews also, although there were also examples earlier, began to appear clean shaven. Now, during the rest of the year, maintaining a clean shaven look did not pose too significant of a problem. But, there was one time where, based upon precedent, it would be difficult to remain clean shaven – during Hol HaMo’ad.

The first to readdress this issue was R. Yehezikel Landau, the author of the Noda B’Yehuda and one of the greatest Rabbis of his time. In approximately, 1775, R. Landua was asked (O.C. Tinyaha, no. 101) if there was any way for those who shave year round, and did so prior to the holiday, to do so on Hol HaMo’ad. R. Landau ruled in the affirmative, with one important condition – that it be done with a poor barber. This condition was an attempt to conform with the various prior opinions. Namely, R. Landau understood the rejection of Rabbenu Tam’s opinion limited to instances which the person would shave themselves. But, a poor person who needed this to survive and thus was able to do work on Hol HaMo’ad anyways, everyone would agree shaving would be permitted. As R. Landau was highly respected his opinion did not go unnoticed. With the publication of this responsa in his work Noda B’Yehuda, the reaction was almost immediate and negative. From all over Europe various people either directly addressed R. Landau or wrote their own private responses expressing their opinion to maintain the status quo. In the end, R. Landau included four responsa on this topic. The reaction was summed up by R. Hayim Yosef Azulai, the Hida (Yosef Ometz, no. 7),

ואולם בו בפרק ראיתי אשר תיכף אזרו חיל הגאונים רב של ברלין ורב של אמשטרדם וחלקו עליו, ונדפס בספר בינן אריאל. גם ידעתי נאמנה שרבני גאוני פולין ואשכנז היטב חרה להם היתר זה וכמעט נגעו בכבוד הרב. ואין ספק כי רבני ארץ ישראל . . וכל טורקיאה ומצרים . . . וערי המערב . . . כולם יסמכו עם רבני אשכנז ופולין

“During that time I heard immediately they quickly girded themselves, the great ones, the Rabbi of Berlin, the Rabbi of Amsterdam and they disagreed [with R. Landau] and this was printed in Binyan Areiel. I also heard from trustworthy sources that the Rabbis of Poland and Germany were extremely disturbed by this leniency and they went so far as to disparage R. Landau. And I have no doubt that the Rabbis in Israel, Turkey, Egypt, and all the Eastern lands agree with the Rabbis of Poland and Germany.”

There were those, who could not reconcile their high esteem of R. Landau with his permissive stance on shaving, and thus made the claim (which has no support) that R. Landau retracted his statement. [Such a claim – that the author retracted or an errant student was the author of a controversial respona – is rather common. See Speigel, cited below, pp. 271-75 for other examples.]

One particularly fantastic (and well-known) explanation attempting to reconcile the R. Landau’s position was offered by R. Moshe Sofer, the author of Hatam Sofer. R. Sofer (Shu”t Hatam Sofer O.C. no. 154) wants to understand R. Landau’s position in light of another shaving question. One is prohibited from using a straight edge razor on their face. But, as this was before electric shavers many of the other options for shaving were not appealing to some and they used a straightedge anyways. R. Landau was offered a possible justification for this practice, which R. Landau in turn rejected. The justification was one is prohibited from removing “hair” with a straight edge. Hair is only hair, for many other laws, if it is long enough to turn back on itself. Thus, if one shaved every day or so, even with a straightedge they would not be removing hair as it was too short. Now, as I mentioned R. Landau rejected this, however, R. Sofer claims as this position was perhaps the only available understanding of what many did to not consider them sinners, R. Landau in fact accepted this. But, R. Landau also knew that if he came out that shaving was prohibited on Hol HaMo’ad many people even those who use a straightedge will follow that opinion. Thus, at the end of the holiday they would have long enough facial hair to be shaving “hair.” While ascribing such motivation to R. Landau is somewhat far-fetched, it does demonstrate how far people would go to reconcile their views of R. Landau with this position.

This, as would be expected was not the end of this issue. Soon after the Noda B’Yehuda was published, another book – which was controversial in its entirety – was published. This book, Besamim Rosh, (previous discussions here) was published in 1793 but attributed to R. Asher b. Yehiel who lived at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries. Almost immediately after its publication there were those who questioned this attribution and instead said it was not the RoSH who wrote this but instead it was the publisher, R. Saul Berlin. Although there were many controversial statements in this book, R. Saul Berlin retracted only one – his statement regarding shaving on Hol HaMo’ad (no. 40). This was the only pronouncement R. Saul agreed was not from the RoSH.

Thus far, this discussion was limited to single or a few responsa, however, in the 19th century we have the battle of the books. Isaac Samuel Reggio (1784-1855) (mentioned previously here), an Italian Rabbi and admitted maskil, devoted an entire work, Ma’amar HiTeglachat (Vienna, 1835), to the issue of shaving on Hol HaMoad. Reggio was one of the most accomplished Rabbis of his day, he was fluent in numerous languages, founded the Rabbinic Seminary in Padua and was an amazingly prolific writer (and he also went clean-shaven as is evidenced by the portrait accompanying the article on him in the Jewish Encyclopedia here). Perhaps his most accessible book is a translation in Italian and commentary in Hebrew (titled Torat HaElokim, Vienna, 1818)of the bible based upon the simple meaning (pehsat)was recently reprinted. [It appears the sponsor of this reprint was unaware of Reggio’s maskilik leanings and – as the story was related to me – was horrified to find this out and thus this edition is now difficult to obtain.]

Reggio takes the position of R. Landau one step further. You will recall that R. Landau allowed for a poor Jew to cut one’s beard but not the person himself. Reggio, however, offers that even the person themselves can shave. This is so, as he understands that in the time of the original enactment, it was highly uncommon to shave weekly and certainly daily. From this assumption Reggio notes that (1) those who shave more often the hair returns quicker and thus before it was no big deal not to shave over 8 days but today, even in such a short time the hair returns too quickly and (2) since everyone now shaves often this is not the set of circumstances the original enactment was aimed at. That is, only for those for whom shaving was infrequent was there a true fear of forgetting or pushing off shaving but today that is not nearly as much of a consideration. Of course, Reggio notes that if one did not shave prior to the holiday he can not shave on Hol HaMa’od.

This being the most sweeping ruling on this issue and the most comprehensive, an immediate reaction was not short in coming. In fact, there were two books written for the sole purpose of refuting Reggio’s position. The first, a play on Reggio’s title was Tegalachat haMa’amar (Livorno, 1839), was published anonymously. However, we now know that in fact the author was R. Avrohom Reggio, R. Yitzhak’s father!

To this day, shaving on Hol HaMoad remains a contentious issue. R. Moshe Feinstein one of the greatest American Rabbis post-Holocaust allowed for similar reasons to Reggio, one to shave on Hol HaMo’ad. R. Feinstein explains (O.C. vol. 1 no. 163) that “today for those who shave daily, they can shave on Hol HaMo’ad.” Although there is again a permissive opinion, one from a highly respected person it still did not end this issue. In the Shmerat Shabbat K’Helchata (vol. 1 p. 274), on the top portion of the text he records that it is prohibited to shave on Hol HaMo’ad. Then in a footnote he is willing to only cite to R. Feinstein’s responsa without explaining what it contains.

Additionally, in an English book devoted to the laws of Hol HaMo’ad [2] they have taken it one step further by judiciously quoting R. Feinstein to give a different impression than the actual respona. As is provided in this book, R. Feinstein concludes his responsa with “I only offer this permissive opinion to those who have a great need or are in pain from not shaving.” (p. 26 n. 7). This is where the quote ends in the English book [of course, this does not actually appear in the English section, rather this is all relegated to a Hebrew footnote – in the English portion, the authors only allow that if refraining from shaving would result in a loss – davar ha’avod – only then is it permitted]. But R. Feinstein actually continues with “if one wishes to rely upon my permissive stance for appearances sake only [i.e. not only for ‘great need’ or ‘pain’] there is no need to stop him as in reality this is permitted.”

אבל מ”מ איני נוהג להתיר אלא למי שיש לו צורך ביותר או מצטער ביותר, ואם אחד ירצה לסמוך ע”ז גם בשביל היפוי לבד אין למחות בידו כי מעצם הדין הוא מותר לע”ד

Sources: The vast majority of the above comes from M. Samet article on the topic of shaving on Hol HaMo’ad. This article appears in M. Benayhu, Tegalachat B’Holo shel HaMo’ad, Jerusalem, 1995. Benayhu’s book also reprints both Reggio’s books as well as a significant amount of material from manuscript and he provides a history as well. Interestingly, Benayahu attempted to convince R. Shlomo Zalman Aurebach that today it would be permissable to shave on Hol HaMo’ad. Benayahu, however, notes that right when he finished this book, he was planning on showing it to R. Aurebach for his thoughts and comments but R. Aurebach passed away.
[Of course, the primary material contains additional important information]. This book is the most comprehensive discussion on the topic. Samet’s article has now been reprinted in his Hadash Assur min HaTorah, Jerusalem, 2005. Samet, among other things, discusses R. Feinstein and the controversy over his opinion. There are others who discuss this topic, however, as they mainly use the two above sources (with and without attribution), and they do not add much of anything I have not provided additional citations.

I want to thank M. Solomson for providing both editorial corrections and material for this post.

Notes
[1] On the name of this Mescheta and whether it is Mashkim or Mo’ad Koton, see Y. S. Speigel, Amudim b’Toldot Sefer HaIvri, Kitvah v’HaTakah, pp. 326-27; 348-56 (discussing which rishonim referred to it as Mashkim and which referred to it as Mo’ad Koton and whether any conclusions can be drawn from that data).

[2] D. Zucker & M. Francis, Chol HaMoed, Brooklyn, NY, 1981. The book even contains an approbation from R. Feinstein, although R. Feinstein says he did not look in great detail at the book and instead his approbation is based upon the reputation of the authors.