?להשתכר על ידי יין בפורים, זו מצוה או עבירה

להשתכר על ידי יין בפורים, זו מצוה או עבירה?

נכתב ע”י משה צוריאל

Editor’s Note: Rabbi Moshe Zuriel’s latest book, Le-Sha’ah u-le-Dorot (two volumes) has just appeared. At over 800 pages, it deals with all sorts of Torah matters, both halakhah and hashkafah.

פסקו רבותינו: “חייב איניש לבסומי בפוריא עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי” (שו”ע או”ח סימן תרצ”ה, סעיף ב’). העיר עליו רמ”א: “ויש אומרים דאינו צריך להשתכר כל כך, אלא ישתה יותר מלימודו [מהרגלו] ויישן. ומתוך שיישן אינו יודע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי”. בדורנו ישנם כמה אברכים צעירים הבוחרים להיות שיכורים ממש. אצל חלק מהם אין הפסד גדול בדבר, אבל אצל הרבה מתחילים הם לומר שטויות ויש המתחילים לצעוק ברחובות. יש המקיאים מאכל שבמעיהם לעיני הרואים, ויש הנופלים ברחובות מפני מעידת רגליהם. חילול השם בדבר הוא רב. באנו כאן לברר בעזרת ה’ אם דעת רבותינו נוחה מכך, ונביא סקירה מן גדולי הראשונים והאחרונים (ולא לפי סדרי זמניהם). [א’] ראשית יש להבחין מה פירוש מלה זו “לבסומי”. יש בארמית שתי מילים עבור מי שמושפע נפשית ושכלית מהיין. השיכור “שכרותו של לוט” עד שאיננו מבין מה נעשה איתו, נקרא “רויא” כלשון “שבקיה לרויא דמנפשיה נפיל” (שבת לב ע”א) והוא לשון מקרא “למען ספות הרוה” (דברים כ”ט, י”ח). עיין רשימה גדולה ב”ערוך השלם” (קוהוט) ערך: ר”ו. לעומתו “בסם” הוא מלשון פרסית, ענינה “משתה ושמחה” (ע”פ הערוך), אבל טרם הגיע לאיבוד החושים. אמנם בלשון הקודש יש רק מלה אחת המתארת שני המצבים והיא “שיכור”. אמנם כיצד מחלקים ביניהם? ע”י תוספת המלים “הגיע לשכרותו של לוט” או “לא הגיע לשכרותו של לוט” (עירובין סה ע”א). ולכן רש”י (על מגילה ז ע”ב ד”ה ואיבסום) לא חילק ביניהם וכתב “נשתכרו”, אבל הדיוק בגמרא הוא “לבסומי” ולא כתוב “למרוי”, כלומר התכוונו לדרגא החלשה יותר. הביאור היקר הזה למדנו מדברי “קרבן נתנאל” על הרא”ש (מסכת מגילה פרק א’, ס”ק י) הכותב: “לא קאמר כאן מחייב למרוי, דהתרגום של “וישכר בתוך אהלו” [אצל נח] הוא רוי. אבל הכוונה שמחויב להיטיב לבו ע”י שתיית יין. עד דלא ידע, זהו עד ולא עד בכלל”. עד כאן לשונו. [אמנם רש”י על מגילה ז ע”ב כתב מלה אחת “להשתכר”, כי בלשון הקודש אין לנו הבדלי ניב בין בסומי לבין רויא]. [ב’] וכן כתב ספר של”ה (“שני לוחות הברית”) בסוף פרשת תצוה (מהד’ אמשטרדם, דף שכ”ט ע”ב): “יש לדקדק דקדוק הלשון שאמר ‘חייב לבסומי’. כי השכרות הגדול אינו נקרא ‘בסומי’, רק ‘מבוסם’ נקרא מי שאינו שיכור כל כך. על כן אני אומר שאדרבה, מאמרם זה הזהירנו באזהרה שלא (נשכר) [נשתכר] כל כך, רק חייב איניש להשאר מבוסם”. עד כאן לשונו. [ג’] ובאמת אחרי שפרשנים הללו האירו את עינינו בהבנת מלת “לבסומי”, אפשר כי גם ר’ יוסף קארו הבין גם הוא כך. כי בפירושו “בית יוסף” על הטור (סימן תרצ”ה) שכידוע שימש בסיס לדברי השו”ע שהוא רק קיצור מדבריו בבית יוסף, כתב: “וכתב הר”ן בשם רבינו אפרים דמההוא עובדא דקם רבה בסעודת פורים ושחט לר’ זירא (מגילה ז ע”ב) אידחי ליה מימרא דרבא, ולא שפיר דמי למיעבד הכי. [תוספת המעתיק: ובמיוחד שהרי לשנה הבאה כאשר רבה הזמין את ר’ זירא שוב לבוא לסעודתו, ר’ זירא סירב באומרו “לא בכל שעתא ושעתא מתרחיש ניסא” ובזה הגמרא מסיימת את הנידון. כדלהלן בשם הב”ח]. [ד’] כותב על זה הב”ח שם: “והנכון מה שכתב הרב הגדול רבינו אפרים דמהך עובדא דשחטיה רבה לר’ זירא אידחייא ליה מימרא דרבא, ולאו שפיר למיעבד הכי. וכן כתב בעל המאור והר”ן משמו. ונראה דמהך טעמא סידר בעל התלמוד להך עובדא דרבה ור’ זירא בתר מימרא דרבא, למימרא דהכי הוי הלכתא ולדחויי לרבא. ומיהו דוקא לבסומי עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי, הוא דדחינן לה. אבל מיהו צריך לשתות הרבה מלימודו שייטב לבו במשתה”]. [ה’] וכדברי הב”ח כתב “שבלי הלקט” (סי’ רא). וממשיך “בית יוסף” שם: ב”ארחות חיים” (לר’ יונתן לוניל, הל’ פורים אות לח כתב) חייב אינש לבסומי בפוריא, לא שישתכר, שהשכרות איסור גמור, ואין לך עבירה גדולה מזו, שהוא גורם לגלוי עריות ושפיכת דמים וכמה עבירות זולתן. אך שישתה יותר מלימודו [מההרגל שלו] קצת” עכ”ל “בית יוסף” וכנראה בזה סיכום דעתו כי לא הביא דיעה נגדית. ובכן בעל כרחנו כך היתה כוונתו גם במה שכתב בשולחן ערוך, “ביסומי” ולא “שכרות”. [ו’] וכדברי “ארחות חיים” כתב ג”כ בעל “המאורות” (על מגילה ז’). [ז’] וכן כתב כלשון זו ה”כל בו”. [ח’] והעתיק הדברים הנ”ל “אליהו רבה” (על אורח חיים, סימן תרצ”ה)

[ט’] וכן כתב המאירי (על מגילה ז’, ע”ב) “ומכל מקום אין אנו מצווים להשתכר ולהפחית עצמנו מתוך השמחה, שלא נצטוינו על שמחה של הוללות ושל שטות אלא בשמחה של תענוג שיגיע מתוכה לאהבת השם יתברך והודאה על הנסים שעשה לנו”. [י’] ומפורש כתב “חיי אדם” (הלכות פורים) “ואמנם היודע בעצמו שיזלזל אז במצוה מן המצוות, בנטילת ידיים וברכה וברכת המזון או שלא יתפלל מנחה או מעריב או שינהוג קלות ראש, מוטב שלא ישתכר”. [י”א] ודבריו הובאו ב”ביאור הלכה” (“משנה ברורה”, סי’ צ”ה, ד”ה עד דלא ידע). [י”ב] והעתיק הדברים “קיצור שולחן ערוך” לר’ שלמה גנצפריד (קמב ס”ק ו). [י”ג] וכן כתב תוכחות קשות על המצב המופרז בימיו “מטה משה” (ר’ משה, תלמידו של מהרש”ל, בס”ק תתריב) “עד כי נדמה לרוב המון [עם] שבימים אלו הותר לכל אדם לפרוק עול תורה ומצוות, וכל המרבה להיות משוגע הרי זה משובח. וכל זה בלי ספק רע ומר והוא עון פלילי, כי לא הותר לנו רק שמחה, לא שחוק וקלות ראש” עכ”ל. [וכל הלשון הזו הועתקה ע”י ספר של”ה (סוף ענייני פורים), גם העתיק הביטוי “נדמה לרוב המון וכו’ וכל המרבה להיות משוגע הרי זה משובח” (דף רס”א). [י”ד] דעת הרמב”ם. הזכרנו כבר שהרמ”א פסק שהמצוה היא שישתה קצת יין ויירדם, ובזמן שינתו איננו מבחין בין “ארור המן” ל”ברוך מרדכי”. מה המקור לדבריו? הרמב”ם (הל’ מגילה, פ”ב הט”ו) שכתב: “ושותה יין עד שישתכר וירדם בשכרותו”. מפני מה הרמב”ם הוסיף שתי המלים האחרונות הללו? והרי אינן כתובות בגמרא? אלא בא לבטל פרשנות מוטעית שהכוונה שיכור בשכרותו של לוט (עיין דברים נמרצים נגד השכרות במורה נבוכים, חלק ג’, פרק ח’). אלא כוונת חז”ל שילך לישון, ובמשך זמן שינתו אינו מבחין בין מרדכי להמן. זהו ביאור לשון מליצית של חז”ל “עד דלא ידע”. ומכאן העתיק רמ”א. [והגאון ר’ עובדיה יוסף בספרו “חזון עובדיה” (על הלכות פורים, עמ’ קע”ה) מביא מהספר “סנסן ליאיר”, עמ’ קכא שהמלה “פוריא” היא “מטה” (בבא מציעא כג ע”ב). כלומר “חייב לבסומי בפוריא להיות מבוסם על מיטתו, ואז יירדם]. [ט”ו] גם הגר”א סבור שאין להשתכר כפשוטו. בביאורו לשו”ע (או”ח סימן תרצ”ה) מבאר את המצוה “עד דלא ידע” רוצה לומר [שלא ידע להבחין על מה יש להודות יותר] בין נקמת המן לבין גדולת מרדכי. והוא מה שאמרו (ברכות לג ע”א) גדולה נקמה שניתנה בין שתי אותיות [שמות קודש]. ואמרו גדולה דעה [שניתנה בין ב’ שמות קודש]. וכיון שניטלה דיעה, לא ידע”. כלומר יש כאן הבחנה במחשבת ישראל אם לשמוח על החיובי או על השלילי. היהודי האמיתי שמח מאוד על ביעור הרשעות, ויש בזה כבוד שמים, כדלהלן. כך כותב הגר”א בביאורו לספרא דצניעותא (תחילת פרק ב’, עמ’ י”ז-י”ח): “וענין הכבוד [של הקב”ה] כאשר נכפין כל הדינים, והרשעים כָלים [כ’ מנוקדת קמץ], ושמו מתגדל בעולם כמ”ש ‘הראיני נא את כבודך וכו’ (שמות ל”ג, י”ח) ויעבור ה’ על פניו וכו’ הנה אנכי כורת ברית, נגד כל עמך אעשה נפלאות’ (שמות ל”ד, י’). וכן בקריעת ים סוף וכו’ ‘ואכבדה בפרעה ובכל חילו’ (שמות י”ד, ד’) וכו’. וכן לעתיד לבוא וכו’ ונאמר ‘תכבדני חיית השדה וכו’ (ישעיה מ”ג, כ’). [תוספת המעתיק: שיאכלו את הפגרים של גוג ומגוג שבאו להתגרות בישראל]. והגידו את כבודי בגוים’ (ישעיה ס”ו, י”ט). כי לי תכרע כל בֶרֶך (ישעיה מ”ה, כ”ג). ועוד ‘והתגדִלתי והתקדִשתי לעיני גוים רבים” (יחזקאל ל”ח, כ”ג). והכל שהרשעים כָלים וכו’ לאכפייא דינין”. עד כאן לשון הגר”א. וכמו כן יתרו שהיה גר חדש לא ידע לשמוח על טביעת המצרים בים סוף. כתוב “ויחד ישראל על כל הטובה אשר עשה ה’ לישראל, אשר הצילו מיד מצרים” (שמות י”ח, ט’). הלא משה סיפר לו בפסוק הקודם גם את השלילה: “את כל אשר עשה ה’ לפרעה ולמצרים” (י”ח, ח’). ולמה יתרו לא שמח גם על הרעה שהגיעה למצריים הרודפים? (עיין שם רש”י י”ח, ט’). גם בעלי דעת שלימה ידעו לשמוח על זה. וברור שהבחנה זו בחסדי ה’ עלינו בהגדלתו של מרדכי הצדיק, ומפלתו של המן הרשע, על איזה מהם יש להתפאר יותר. עיון כזה נהיה מטושטש אפילו בשתייה מועטת של יין, ולזה אמרו חז”ל כי די בבסומי ולא צריכים להגיע לשכרותו של לוט. הרי לפנינו שהגר”א שולל שכרות גמורה. אחרת לא היה צריך להביא דברי פרשנות לגמרא דווקא כאן במקום שייעודו לציין לדברי הלכה למעשה בשו”ע. [טז] גם הגאון ר’ אפרים מרגליות (“יד אפרים” על גליון השו”ע או”ח סי’ תרצ”ה) כתב “אין לו להשתכר יותר מדאי, שיתבלבל דעתו ולא יכיר בתוקף הנס כלל. “עד דלא ידע” הוא עד ולא עד בכלל. ומן הגבול הזה והלאה הוא ביטול כוונת חיוב שחייבו חכמים. וכו’ ויש לבסומי רק עד הגבול הזה, ולא יעבור”. אבל לנגדנו עומדים פשטות דברי אריז”ל, שיש להיות שיכור גמור (“שער הכוונות”, ח”ב עמ’ שלב-שלג) לברך את הניצוץ של קדושה שיש בתוך המן “אחר שהוא שיכור ויצא מדעתו”. וזאת היא תמיהה גדולה. אבל כאשר נעיין בגוף הטכסט ניווכח כי אין אלו דברי אריז”ל עצמו. דברי אריז”ל עצמו מסתיימים ארבע פסקאות לפני זה (סוף טור הימני) שם כתוב “עד כאן הגיעו דרושי הרב זלה”ה”. ובהערה בתחתית הדף כתב המעתיק הרב שמואל ויטאל כי רק עד כאן העתיק דברי אריז”ל. ובכן מי הוא המחבר של המשך הדברים, שם כתוב שיש לאדם לצאת מדעתו ממש? אין מנוס מהמסקנה כי אלו הם דברי דרשן אחד שהוסיף הדברים על דברי אריז”ל. במהדורת “שער הכוונות” הקדמון (דף קט סוף ע”ב) כתוב שהם דברי ר’ יעקב ישרוליג”א, לא של אריז”ל. נוסיף לטיעוננו שיש בדבר חילול השם נורא כאשר אברך או רב הידועים לעיני שכניהם וקרובים בציבור הישראלי כמציגים ארחות התורה, אם יהיו שיכורים אין לך בוז וקלסה לתורה יותר מזה. ובמציאות החיים מכירים אנו כי כל הרבנים הגדולים, בין בני פלג הליטאים ובין גדולי אדמורי”ם וכן מקבוצות בני המזרח, אינם משתכרים בפורים. וגם בדורות שהיו לפנינו, לא נודע על מי מהרבנים המפורסמים שהשתכר ממש. גם מה שכותב ר’ יעקב עמדין (בביאורו לסידור תפילות, מהדורת אשכול, חלק ב’, עמ’ תקנ”ח) ששמע מאחרים שאביו ה”חכם צבי” היה מקיים בצעירותו מצוה זו כפשוטה, מזה עצמו יש ראיה לשלול התנהגות זו. כי למה הפסיק אח”כ לנהוג כך כל ימיו? אלא ודאי כי ראה “חכם צבי” שיש הפסד בדבר. כיון שלכל הפחות ששה עשר מגדולי הפוסקים (כפי שפירטנו לעיל) שוללים שכרות גמורה, עלינו ללכת בעקבותיהם. יש לערוך בכל דבר חשבון של ריווח והפסד, ובמיוחד בדבר שיש בו חילול בשם. “אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד בחילול השם” (אבות, פרק ד’).

New work by Rabbi Stahl

New work by Rabbi Stahl
by Eliezer Brodt

ספר סגולה, ספר ראשון, ירושלים תשע”ב, ר’ יעקב ישראל סטל, 153 עמודים.

As previously mentioned on the blog a new work by Rabbi Yakov Stahl was just printed (for reviews of some of his earlier works see here and here). This work is called Segulah (Hard cover, 153 pp.) Sefer Segulah is a collection of articles on disparate topics, related to Minhag, Halacha, Piyyut, Midrash and Aggadah. It is an excellent collection of articles on topics not often written about in seforim, by others, full of interesting observations from an extremely rich and wide range of sources. There is a special emphasis of usage of Piyutim in many of these articles, which are still an almost untapped mine for sources. Amongst the topics discussed in this work is about an old minhag to have a rooster in front of the darshan at weddings. Another is about staring at Rainbows. Still another is an interesting, possibly new early source for the minhag to say Shirat Hayam every day in davening. There are two nice original articles related to Purim. One deals with an old minhag to read the Megillah during the Shabbasim before Purim and another deals with the Tefilah הרב את ריבנו.

This sefer was printed in a limited edition of 350 copies. A full table of contents and a sample of a chapter are available upon request.

Copies are available while supplies last for shipping; in Eretz Yisroel the price is $13.50, including shipping. To the US and England the price is $16.50, including shipping. Contact me at Eliezerbrodt@gmail.com

Copies of Rabbi Stahl’s other works are still available, such as:

ספר גמטריות לרבנו יהודה חהסיד
אמרות טהורות חיצוניות ופנימיות לרבנו יהודה החסיד
סודי חומש ושאר לתלמידי רבינו יהודה החסיד על התורה שיר השירים איוב ורות
ספר קושית לאחד מהראשונים

Copies of אלפא ביתא תניתא דשמואל זעירא ב’ חלקים by R. Shmuel Ashkenazi and edited by Rabbi Stahl are also still available for purchase. Email me for the table of contents.

Review: Daniel Sperber, On Changes in Jewish Liturgy

Review: Daniel Sperber, On Changes in Jewish Liturgy

By Dan Rabinowitz and Eliezer Brodt

Daniel Sperber, On Changes in Jewish Liturgy, Options & Limitations, Urim Publications, Israel: 2010, 221, [1] pp.

The ever prolific Professor Daniel Sperber’s most recent book focuses on Tefillah. This book, as some of his others, has drawn some sharp criticism, most notably from Professor Aryeh Frimer in Hakirah (available here). To be sure, this post does not attempt to defend Professor Sperber or the feminist movement with regard to these issues, but, in the course of our review we hope to offer some relevant comments that will further this important discussion. Our main interest remains the substance of the book on this important topic – changes to the Jewish liturgy.

This book grew out of a lecture given at the Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance. Professor Sperber then decided to revisit the broader issue of the parameters of acceptable changes to the liturgy.

The prayerbook has become – and this is not a new trend – a battleground. In 19th century, the battle lines were drawn between Reform and Orthodox movements. Of course, earlier heterodox movements had also created their own prayerbooks, such as the Karaites, but in those instance, the praybook was more a reflection and outgrowth of the movement and was not, in and of itself, one of the wedge issues. In the modern period, however, the advent of the Reform movement argued for a variety of changes to the prayerbook to account and adjust for modernity. In this instance, it was both the substance of the prayers as well as their execution (Hebrew or not) that was at issue See generally, Jacob J. Petuchowski, Prayerbook Reform in Europe, New York, 1968.

Earlier examples of prayerbook controversy touched upon other theological debates; for example, some questioned the inclusion of Machnesi Rachamim as it can be read as a request for assistance from angels and not God (see here). Others questioned the inclusion of piyutim generally. Ibn Ezra’s critical comments regarding this topic are well-known. Sometimes prayer itself was employed for polemical purposes. Naftali Weider discusses a version of the blessing over the Friday night candles that incorporated a polemic against Karaism (see N. Weider, Hisgavshos Nusach HaTefillah B’Mizrach U’BeMaariv, Jerusalem, 1998, 329). And, of course, one must mention the oft-discussed blessing against heretics [in some versions] in the Shemoneh Esrei (see, most recently, Ruth Langer, Cursing the Christians?: A History of the Birkat HaMinim, Oxford Univ. Press: 2011).

Thus, it is scarcely surprising that discussing changes to the prayerbook might arouse controversy. That said, we must note – and this is the essential point of this book – the texts of the prayers have never been static, and they have been constantly evolving. At times this evolution was controversial while at other times the evolution and changes to the liturgy appears to have passed almost without notice.

Dr. Sperber focuses in this book on historic changes in an effort to support change today, mainly changes that are more sensitive to women. Sperber discusses a variety of changes to the prayerbook that are non-standard. For example, we have added whole sections, a liturgy for Kabbalat Shabbat (essentially created in the 16th century), abbreviated others – yotzrot, piyutim – and changed texts for a variety of reasons – grammatical, Kabbalah, and nationalist. For the most part, to those familiar with the history of the prayerbook, as well as Sperber’s prior works, much of this book is well-tread territory. Moreover, as Sperber notes, the notion of a a fixed nusach is absurd insofar as a large segment for those professing orthodoxy regarding the siddur, themselves pray in an entirely new nusach, one developed in the the past 200 years, namely the rite known as nusach Sefard. While this nusach may have antecedents in the Sefad Kabbalistic movement, that only moves it back to the 16th centruy, a veritable spring chicken vis-a-vis the purported codifiers of tefilah, Anshe Kenneset ha-Gedolah.

Sperber’s focus is on changes that incorporate women more directly into the tefilot as well as adapting the tefilot to be more sensitive to women. He then discusses exactly what the acceptable parameters for change are and discusses specific examples of historical change. He provides detailed discussions both in the body of the work as well as the numerous appendixes.

Sperber does an admirable job distinguishing between permanently fixed language to which change is prohibited, and the lesser fixed portions for which change is permissible. Sperber notes that even is quasi-fixed prayers, like those appearing in the first three and last three blessing in Shemonei Esreh, historically, we have altered those blessings. On this point Professor Frimer takes issue with some of Sperber’s conclusions, but some of Frimer’s criticism is rather weak. Rather than directly addressing the issue, Frimer attempts to delegitimatize and discredit the manuscripts that Sperber relies upon. (p. 76 note 38) Frimer merely states that we know little about those manuscripts that Sperber relies upon, or, in other words, Frimer, without any compelling argument or proof doubts the veracity of the manuscripts. This argument has been used by many in what has been coined the Chazon Ish’s Shitta about new manuscripts and the like. In this case the attempt is really to go further and dismiss much of the Geonic literature that has been discovered in the past century and, and Frimer’s reliance upon this argument demonstrates a serious lack of awareness of the scholarship in the area of manuscript authentication (a topic which we hope to return to at length in a future post).

Indeed, independently of the manuscript sources, Sperber goes even further showing that during the Ten Days of Repentance, we add and alter the first and last (supposedly immutable) blessing, but those alterations cannot be dated to Hazel or the Anshei Kenest ha-Gedola but date rather to the Geonim. Some, however, have argued that changes by the Geonim or Rishonim proves nothing, as they are special but we are not. Their argument goes (and Frimer is an ardent supporter of this) that somehow those persons were allowed to change prayer. Unfortunately, this argument is unsatisfying. Simply put, that rationale begs the question of what power did those persons use to make changes? Was it based upon their own view that they were worthy of changing the prayers? That is, if the only rule is “great people can change prayer” who told them at the time that they qualified as “great people?” Or, is this entirely post-hoc rationale just the tautology that because they changed the prayers and only special people can change prayer they must be special people? Sperber, however, has surveyed the literature and offered concrete rules of when and how to change the prayers that do not fall prey to these logical infirmities. Indeed, he would concede that certain prayers are immutable.

Sperber’s also takes a more reasonable view of which prayers are ripe for change. His view is that if some find it offensive, we should, if we can, attempt to appease those persons. Others have taken the somewhat counter-intuitive position that even if some find a prayer offensive if there is a non-offensive explanation for the prayer, that is satisfactory. Of course, this position ignores the very real fact that some may be offended by those prayers, no matter how many explanations are offered. Sperber’s position is that insofar as there is no prohibition to change, why not attempt to remove the offensive text entirely?

One of the changes that Sperber suggests is related to the שלא עשני אשה controversy and concerns the suggestion to remove it completely as it is offensive toward woman. This suggestion has been discussed in numerous articles, and Sperber cites many of them. Everyone feels they can add their two cents on the suggestion, so we will too. I will begin by saying that having davened in many shuls of all kinds in my life, I have almost never even heard them say this berachah out loud in the first place. While many woman, especially today, find this Beracha offensive and for this alone there might be grounds to remove it (as other berachos were removed over the ages for similar reasons – see Tzvi Groner’s excellent book for a good list) I (EB) personally do not understand why this issue is so contentious.

I will just quote three ideas from others on the topic which I honestly believe is not apologetic but, of course, some may disagree.

R. Yaakov Emden writes:

מה ששמעו אזני בשבוע זו… כי ערל אחד חרש רעה על היהודים שמברכים בכל יום ברוך שלא עשני גוי, אמר היהודים אינם מחשיבים לגוי אלא כבהמה מפקירים דמו וקנינו רוכושו, אמרתי אני שגם זה הבל זה הערל לא לבד ערל בשר אלא גם ערל לב הוא, ושלא היה לו לב לדעת מה שאנו אומרים עוד שתי ברכות הסמכות לזו ברוך שלא עשני עבד, ברוך שלא עשני אשה, הלא בודאי אין אנו נוהגין מנהג הפקר לא אפילו בעבד כנעני שחייב במצות שאשה חייבת בהן, ואמר איוב אם אמאס משפט עבדי כו’, אצ”ל באשה שלנו שאנו חייבים בכבודה וכבדה יותר מגופינו, הלא יראה מזה שנשתבש אותו המוציא דבה עלינו בעבור זה, אבל הענין ברכה זו לפי שהגוי אינו מצווה בתרי”ג מצות כמונו יוצאי מצרים ולכן אינו מצווה גם כן על שביתת שבת ויום טוב כמונו, כמו שהוא ענין בברכותינו על ,שלא עשנו עבד ושלא עשנו אשה שהעבד גם כן אינו מחוייב במצות רק כאשה, ואשה אינה חייבת רק במצות עשה שאין הזמן גרמא, ונכנעת תחת בעלה והוא ימשול בה, מ”מ חביבין עלינו כגופותינו כן הוא הענין בגוי [הקשורים ליעקב, עמ’ ריט].

R. Reuven Margolios writes:

ולאשר האשה אינה נענשת על בטול המצות עשה שהזמן גרמא וחלקה בעולם הבא כחלק האיש הי’ מקום למי אשר לא הגיע לחזות בנועם ה’ לומר מי יתן והייתי אשה שאז נפטרתי מעול כל מצות אלו לכן תקנו חכמינו ע”ה שימסור כל איש מודעה כי המצות האלו כן תקנו גם הודאה כוללת לכל זרע ישראל שנתחייבו במצות הרבה בכדי להגיע לחיי עולם הבא בעוד אשר הנכרי המקיים מצותיו השבע הוא בן עולם הבא והי’ מקום להמתרשל לומר מי יתן והייתי בן לאחד מגוי הארצות ולא נתחייבתי בכל אלו, לשלול זה יודה כל בן או בת ישראל לה’ על שלא עשהו גוי להורות שעושה המצות מאהבה (טל תחייה, עמ’ מז).

In regard to the topic of feminism in general see the Kesav ve-ha-Kabbalah who writes an important insight in his work on the Siddur:

והתבונן עוד כי מצות התורה יש להם סדר מיוחד לאיש איש כפי כח הכנתו הנפשית, יש מן המצות הערוכים ושמורים לכל נפשות זרע ישראל, ומהם נערכים במשקל ובמדה נאמנה לנפש זולת נפש, כי מהן המחוייבות רק לכהנים לבדם, ומהן ללויים לבדן ומהן לכהן גדול לבדו, ומהן לזכרים לבדם ולא לנקבות, כי לפי שהתורה מאת אדון כל היוצר רוח האדם בקרבו לא יפלא ממנו דבר, לחקוק חקים ומפשטים לפי ערך ומדרגת כל נפש, עד שיהיו מקובלים על לב כל אחד מהם, והם אפשרי הקיום לפי הכנת נפשו, עד”מ שאין ספק כי זרע אהרן הכהן מוכשרים הנפשות שנאצלו בהן כחות יקרות בשיעור רב מה שאין שאר זרע ישראל מוכשרים אליהן, וכן משפחות הלוי, וכפי הבדל נפשותיהן נבדלו בענין המעשים והעבודות המקבילות נגד נפשותיהן המעולות. וכן הכהן הגדול בעבור היות נפשו עוד נבדלת מכל אחיו הכהנים בכחות יקרות פנימיות הנודעות ליוצר כל ית’ , לכן מוכשר לקבל עוד מצות היתרות על שאר הכהנים, וכן הבדל כחות הנפש שבין זכרים לנקבות, הוא המסבב הבדל חיוביהן במצות, כי המצות הערכים במשקל ובמדה נאותה לפי הכנת על נפש ונפש, עד שאין מצות ממצותיה וחוק מחקותיה יוצא מגדר באפשרי משום נפש, לפי חלוף מצבי הנפשות בכחותיהן , ועל זה אמר ומתקן ומקבל. התורה במצותיה מתקנת ומסודרת, עד שהיא מתקבלת בלב כל איש ואיש לפי מצב נפשו וכח הכנתו, ואין אחד מהם יוכל לומר קיום דבר זה אצלי מסוג הנמנעות (עיון תפילה, דף נ ע”ב-נא ע”א).

Another offending passage Sperber discusses (pp. 46-47) is found in the Ve-hu Rachum tefilah where it says ושקצונו כטומאת הנדה. Sperber brings versions that did not have these words and suggests that we take it out. He then concludes (p. 50) that maybe this whole tefilah of Ve-hu Rachum should be made into a private tefilah and not obligatory, as its a late addition to the liturgy in the first place. Now it should be noted that although this sounds radical, in reality it is not. The omission of this prayer is common amongst Chassidm for far weaker reasons. Many omit it for any and all yarzheits of anyone who ever wore the mantel of “Rebbi.” Thus, Sperber appears to be in good company.
In regard to Sperber’s suggested change to add in the Imahot in the first bracha of Shemonah Esrei, although he does provide evidence that changes were made even in these berachos, I (EB) find it hard to accept these suggestions and I would have to agree with the issues Frimer raises in this regard.
One last point: while this study definitely shows that many changes were made in our liturgy, it is still not clear as to when and how and why. Exact guidelines, if there are any, need to be defined more clearly it is buried in a mass of amazing historical and bibliographical notes. Summaries and more exact conclusions should be written out more clearly, as this is such a dangerous topic as Sperber himself is well aware (see p. 129 and 124).
Here are some general notes and sources to add to Sperber’s plethora of sources. We would just like to mention that today, because of the internet, the study of Siddur has and will greatly change. Many rare and early printed siddurim and manuscripts related to Siddur are available for viewing in ones’s own home instead of being only available in far-flung libraries, available to professional scholars. Using these sources alone can revolutionize the study of the development of the Siddur.
Suggested Additions
p.9 on the Prayer for State of Israel see Joel Rappel, “The Identity of the Author of the Prayer for the State of Israel,” in Shulamit Eliash, Itamar Warhaftig, Uri Desberg, eds., Masuah Le-Yitzhak: Rabbi Yitzhak Isaac ha-Levi Herzog Memorial Volume (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav Herzog, 2008; Hebrew), 594-620, and his “The Convergence of Politics and Prayer: Jewish Prayers for the Government and the State of Israel,” (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 2008).
p. 23. regarding studies on Kabbalat Shabbat: to date the most comprehensive study on this topic is from Rabbi Y. Goldhaber, Kovetz Beis Aron V’Yisroel, 64: 119-138; 70: 125-146; 73: 119-13. Hopefully he will collect and update all this into a full length book in the near future.
p. 32 note 2 there is a typo it should read Shmuel Askenazi.
p. 36 see also D. Rabinowitz, “Rayna Batya and other Learned Women: A Reevaluation of Rabbi Barukh Halevi Epstein’s Sources,” Tradition 35 (2001).
p. 33-39:On the Shelo Asani Ishah controversy see E. Fram, My Dear Daughter, HUCP 2007, pp.37-41.
p. 34. On Rabbi Aaron Worms of Metz see the important article from Y. Speigel, Yerushasnu, 3, 2009, pp. 269-309; R. Dovid Tzvi Hillman, Yeshurun, 25, 2011, pp. 619-621.
p.40 and onwards; related to the שלא עשני אשה controversy see Yoel Kahn, The Three blessings Boundaries, Censorship, and Identity in Jewish Liturgy, Oxford 2010.
p. 41-42: On R Abraham Farissol see David B. Ruderman, The World of a Renaissance Jew, the life and thought of Avrhom Ben Mordechai Farissol, HUCP, 1981.
p. 52 D. Rabinowitz, “Is the Modern Placement of Bameh Madlikin A Polemic Against Hassidim?” Or Yisrael, 2007, 180-84.
p. 73 note 4 there is a typo, it should say R. Dovid Cohen.
p. 80 see D. Rabinowitz, “The Pitfalls of Changing the Liturgy: On Changes to the Nikkud of Kaddish,” Or Yisrael, 158-62, 2007.
p.100 See E. Brodt, The Avudraham and his usage of the Tur and Pirush of R Yehudah Ben Yakar (In print).
pp. 108-109: In regard to R. Emanuel Hai Ricchi see: B. Naor, Post Sabbatian Sabbatianism, pp. 53-57: Yeshurun, 24, p. 444.
p. 109: Darchei Noam is worth mentioning as this work is one of the only works that received a Haskamah from the Gra, see Eliach, Hagaon 3, p. 1257.
p. 133: It should say the brother of the Ketzot Ha-choshen, R. Yehudah author of the Terumot Ha-Kerei.
p. 157: On R. Yakov Emden’s Siddur and additions from others over the years. It is worth mentioning that a few years ago the printing house Eshkol printed a new version of the siddur including many new additions of R. Emden himself, from a manuscript of the siddur. One of the important features in this edition is they put all the material that was not R. Emden’s in different fonts so one can see exactly what was added by others over the years. Additionally, they provided a photo reproduction of the original siddur at the end of volume two.
p. 177: Sperber brings the special work of the Aderes on Tefilah. Sperber notes this books is full of textual changes, some based on manuscript but mostly on his own. To be more exact and correct, what Sperber writes about this work a very small part was printed in the Journal, Knesset Hagedolah. Many years later a few pieces of this work was printed in the journal Yeshurun. In 2002, Y. Amechi printed this work from manuscripts with many notes. In 2004 Ahavat Sholom printed this work again based on even more manuscripts. They also included other articles of his printed elsewhere related to Tefilah. The main thing worth noting is that this is a very special work related to Tefilah.
p. 179 on the well-known reason why during the week we say Magdil and on Shabbat we say Migdol, see: Shut Lev Shlomo, Siman 23; Noam Megidim, p. 13b; R. Reuven Margolios, Haggadah Shel Pesach p. 60; Y. Speigel, Yeshurun 6, 1999, pp. 759-762.
p. 189: A wealth of sources on the topic worthy of mention, regarding adding Zachrenu Lechaim during Aseret Yemei Teshuvah can be found in R. Dovid Zvi Rothstein, Sefer Torah Menukod, in Kovetz Ohel Sarah Leah, 1999, pp.632-771. See also the important article on this from U. Fuchs, Tarbitz 75 (2006), pp. 129-154.

Review of a Recent work of Rav Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky

Review of a Recent work of Rav Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky

By: Eliezer Brodt

בית היין, על הלכות יין נסך עם ביאור קונדיטון, יצא לאור לראשונה מכתב יד, מאת הגאון רבי צבי הירש גראדזענסקי זצ”ל, מאנסי ניו יורק תשע”א, ש”ט עמודים.

In this post I would like to discuss an unknown Gaon – Rav Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky, and a recently published manuscript of his on Hilchos Yayin Nessech. Not much is known about him except for what has been collected in a very nice article about him written by Jonathan Rosenbaum and Myron Wakschlag, “Maintaining Tradition: A survey of the Life and Writings of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky,” AJH 82:14 (1994), pp. 263-288 which was of help to me when writing this post. R. Hirsch Grodzinsky was born in Lithuania in the year 1857. He was an older cousin of the famous Gadol Hador, Rabbi Chaim Ozer, and he learned by R. Chaim Ozer’s father for a few years. It is interesting to see what he writes about his younger cousin R’ Chaim Ozer:

ואת הגאון ר’ חיים עוזר ז”ל הייתי מכיר אותו מימי ילדותו… וכבר הכרנו אז הכשרונות של הילד הזה ר’ חיים עוזר ז”ל שעתיד להיות גדול בשיראל… (מקראי קודש, ג, הקדמה עמ’ 6).

In 1891 he moved to Omaha, Nebraska where he served as the Rav until he died in 1947 (and was known as Rabbi Henry Grodzinski). It is unclear why he chose to move so far out in the US rather than to a major Jewish center like New York City; perhaps it was so that he would be able to devote most of his time to his own learning rather than the pastoral duties of a rabbi in a large Jewish community. Evidently, this great gaon moved to the United States for parnassah, and is it perhaps due to this move he is basically unknown today. Had he remained in Europe he would likely have been better known and appreciated (but, of course, probably not with a peaceful end).

R. Grodzinsky was a prolific writer who authored many works on numerous topics. His first work, printed in 1898 was called Mikvei Yisrael, an in-depth work on Hilchos Mikvaos. He received haskamahs on this first work from various gedolim, among them R. Yitzchack Elchanan Spektor, (it is not established with certainty, but he might have even had semicha from him. According to one report R. Ephraim Oshry said that it was accepted as fact in the Litvishe yeshivos that R. Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky had semicha from R. Yitzchak Elchanan). Either way, he was a great admirer of R. Yitzchak Elchanan, as he writes an incredible description about him in the introduction of his work on Hilchos Kriyas Hatorah, Mikroei Kodesh

לא כן רבותינו הרבנים והגאונים שהיו בדור שלפני דור זה, המה היו… ודעתם וסרותיהם הרחבה היה להלכה ברורה בכל מקצועות התורה בכל חלקי השלחן ערוך, כמו מרן הגאון האמתי רשכבה”ג מהרי”א זצ”ל אבד”ק קאוונא, שהיה ראשית דבר רב… בעל הוראה בכל ד’ חלקי השלחן ערוך, כבח”מ ואה”ע, כן בש”ע או”ח וי”ד כבש”ך וסמ”ע כן במג”א ופרמ”ג כבקצות ונתיבות, כן בחו”ד ודה”ח וח”א, כל רז לא אנס ליה, ומי כמוהו מורה ממנו יצא אורה בכל מקצועת התורה דבר קטן ודבר גדול, כמו בעניני עגונה כן בה’ ציצית ותפלין וקה”ת כו’, הכל גלוי וידוע לפני כסא כבודו מראשונים עד אחרון שבאחרונים, הוא היה בר סמכא, לסמוך על הוראותיו האמתי בכל הפרטים… פנו אליו בשאלות וספיקות לדינא בכל מקצעות התורה, ועל כולם השיב כהלכה לקטן ולגדולן גם לעת זקנותו… (מקראי קודש, ג, הקדמה עמ’ 5).

In 1916 he printed another work called Likutei Tzvi. In 1923 he printed another work called Mili Debrochos which is on part of Masseches Berachos (part two of this work was printed later). In 1936 he began printing his massive, three volume Mikraei Kodesh on Hilchos Kriyas Hatorah which he completed in 1941. This work is exceptional in both its breadth and depth. There are other important books on this topic from great gedolim such as the Chida and R. Ephraim Zalman Margolis, but none compare to this work. His later works do not have haskamos, as he writes against them in the introduction to the third volume of his Mikraei Kodesh.

ועתה בעו”ה נוהגין המחברים באמעריקא מנהג יפה מאד… לקבל הסכמה על חיבוריהם מהאי הדיוט בעל הלשון… דמיום שחרב בית המקדש גברו בעלי הלשון, ואל תהי הסכמת ההדיוט קלה בעינך ובדין הוא משום דלפנים היו מחברים ספרים בשביל ת”ח והיו צריכין להסכמת ת”ח הגדול בדורו, אך עתה במדינתנו שרוב המחברים מחברים ספריהם בשביל הדיוטים, לכן צריכין ליקח הסכמה ג”כ מהדיוט גדול, ובזכות זה יזכו שההדיוטים יקפצו לקנות חבוריהם ויראו שכר לעמלם, אשרי שככה לו, ואשרי הדור שיפתח בדורו כשמואל בדורו.

He left behind many complete manuscripts on different topics. After he died in 1947 his manuscripts were taken to Mechon Otzar Haposkim in Eretz Yisrael. Unfortunately almost nothing of his was printed except for a few teshuvos of his in various Torah Journals.[1] A few months ago a complete manuscript was printed, the Beis Hayayin, a complete work on Hilchos Yayin Nessech. This volume was published by Shalom Jacob, who has put out important and special works in the past (see here). The production of this work was a truly beautiful job. The work consists of two parts; the top is the Halachos in short, and the bottom part is called Kunditon. In the Kunditon, R. Grodzinsky goes through all the sources of each Halacha, starting from the Gemarah and going forward through the sugyos with the Rishonim and Acharonim. A small section was added by the editor at the bottom of each page called Mekorei Habayis which adds some additional sources and quotes related to the topics in the Kunditon section. The print and paper is beautiful, including small summaries on the side of each piece, making it a pleasure to use. Besides for these, there is an extremely thorough index of the work. To mention some of the interesting side points in this work; R. Grodzinski has a nice discussion of the way wine was made in the U.S. in his time (p. 42-43), as he was a rav hamachshir, he traveled to wine companies in California, to check out the exact way they made the wine. Another important piece is a lengthy discussion of the various levels of Mechalelei Shabbos in the U.S. (pp. 31-32, 190) in his time. This discussion gives us a sad but realistic glimpse of the level of American Jewish observance in those times. He writes that there were three categories; one group that came with the full intention of remaining frum, but due to the parnassah problem were forced to work on Shabbos, virtually having no other choice. This group he says, was very disturbed about having to be mechalel shabbos and whatever was not related to parnassah they were careful to observe the prohibitions. This group has a din of an oness. A second category were people who though initially forced to work on Shabbos due to parnassah issues kept on working on even when they became wealthy. Though they kept Shabbos in their homes, they do not have a din of an oness. The third category was people who besides working on Shabbos for parnassah never bothered to keep anything of Shabbos in their homes. These people, he writes, are the worst level of the three.
Another piece of interest to me was how he suggests a textual change in the girsa of a Yerushlami (p. 155). He is not one that is fast to do so in general, as a bit later where he quotes the Shach saying that there was a printing mistake, he goes out of his way to show that there is no need to suggest such a thing (p. 162). Another particular piece of interest for me was his using a piece of Rabbenu Chananel, from the fairly recently (in his time) printed manuscript on Avoda Zara (p. 54). There are two reasons why I found this interesting. One, in the journal Yeshurun (v. 2, pp. 202-205) there is a teshuva of his in regard to the custom of standing when the ba’al keriah recites the Aseres Hadibros (see here for more on this minhag). Someone had shown him a newly printed manuscript of the Shu”t Ha-Rambam who said it is improper to stand. R. Grodzinsky writes:

כי תשובות המיוחס להרמב”ם ז”ל לא נמצא אצלי ומעולם לא ראיתיו. רק פעם אחד הביא אלי השו”ב מק”ב את תשובות הנ”ל וראיתי כי נמצא שם כמה דברים הסותרים למ”ש הרמב”ם בספרו הגדול משנה תורה. ולבי אומר לי כי כמה דברים הנמצא שם ע”ש הרמב”ם הוא לא אמת רק איזה תלמיד טועה כתבם ויחסו ע”ש הרמב”ם ע”ד שאמרו חז”ל אם בקשת וכו’ התלה באילן גדול…

From this piece I generalized that he was opposed to “new rishonim” and the like. However, from this work I see it was not the case, or so simple, as he used the newly printed Rach. It is important to note that the Chazon Ish was against using the Rach[2] as he writes:

“וכן ראיתי בל’ ר”ח הנדפס בדפוס ראם, אבל לא ידענא אם אפשר לסמוך על הנדפסין מחדש שכבר הפסיקה המסורה בינינו, ואין אנו יודעין מי המה המעתיקים, שמלאכת ההעתקה כבדה מאד, ואף על ידי זריזין ומדקדקים מצוי ט”ס הרבה, ואם יעבור הדבר ע”י איזה רפיון בדקדוק הדברים יכול הדבר להשתנות לגמרי, ולכן הפוסקים שלא הפסיקה המסורה בינם ובינינו בכל הדורות, ששקדו עליהם חכמי דור דור, לשמרם ולנקותם, צריכים אנו לחשוב את ספריהם ליותר דוקנית, וכש”כ במקום שאין ללמוד מכונת הדברים אלא מדקדוק לשונם, שקשה לסמוך על החדשים…” (חזון איש, הל’ עירובין סי’ ס”ז, אות י”ב).

The Mishna Berurah argues, as we find numerous times he brings from the

ר”ח הנדפס מחדש [ביאור הלכה, סי’ ש”ב, ד”ה עליה; סי’ שט”ו, ד”ה טפח; סי’ תרכ”ו, ד”ה צריך; סי’ תרמ”ח, ד”ה מיהו, ועוד].

One thing I was rather surprised about was that there was no mention of the famous teshuva of the Rema on yayin nessech anywhere in this work. I was hoping to see his take on it. To summarize, this work is extremely important for anyone learning the complicated laws of yayin nessech and it is well worth the money.[3] The sefer is available for purchase at Biegeleisen in the U.S., and at Girsa and Otzar Haseforim in Jerusalem. I would just like to end by wishing Rabbi Jacob much success in printing the rest of the Rav Grodzinsky’s wonderful works from manuscripts.[4]

[1] Worth noting is the teshuvos printed in the Sefer Zicrhon Iyunim Beta’anis, pp. 174-183 regarding the fast that the Rabbonyim made during World War Two.

[2] For more on this topic see what I wrote in the Yeshurun 24 (2011), pp. 430-431

[3] I cannot neglect to mention that besides for this new work on YN, one’s understanding of the sugyos of YN, in the rishonim and the realia of their time would be greatly enhanced by using the special works of Professor Haym Soloveitchik on the topic (which will hopefully be translated into English in the future).

[4] Some of the notebooks have gone “missing” in recent years. If anyone knows their whereabouts it would be greatly appreciated if they would let me know.

The sukkah on Shemini Atzeret controversy

The sukkah on Shemini Atzeret controversy

by William Gewirtz

Introduction: Arguments about eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret outside of Israel have a long and somewhat baffling history.[1] While not the only example of practice in opposition to the Shulchan Aruch, it appears to be among the most argued. The gemara, Rambam, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, written in many locales, all seem to be as unambiguous as possible in requiring one to eat in the sukkah. The Gaon, incensed by the spreading Chassidic custom to eat outside the sukkah, perhaps lemigdar miltah, went so far as to mandate sleeping in the sukkah on the night of shemini atzeret, in opposition to the Maharil, the Magen Avraham and normative custom. Despite consensus among all major decisors to require eating in the sukkah, an undercurrent of opposition has existed from at least the times of the early rishonim. Support for that opposition has been based on a number of apparently legitimate points. However, despite some early and consistent opposition, despite the logic and halakhic rationale of those who did not sit in the sukkah, and despite the problematic nature of the gemara (as explained below), I hope to explain the basis for the concluding and declarative statement in the gemara: “we sit but do not make a berakha.” In fact, the assumption, explicitly found[2] as far back as the times of the rishonim, that the declarative ruling was interpolated at a later point, is fundamental to explain both sides of the controversy. Some, as early as the times of the rishonim, argue that we can discount such geonic interpolations in deference to the original text which, as will be demonstrated, concludes not to sit in the sukkah. My goal is to explain why the interpolation is to be followed despite its ostensible opposition to the remainder of the text. The major thesis proposed is that one has to differentiate between a period of doubt as existed in both the yerushalmi and bavli when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses and a later period when rosh chodesh was determined using a fixed calendar. The geonic interpolation into the text of the gemara occurred at that later point; its rationale and inconsistency with the texts of the gemara needs to be addressed from that perspective. If I am correct, then in the period when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses, as in the times of Rav Yochanon and Rav,[3] sitting in the sukkah was not always required. However, when the fixed calendar was in use, the rabbis (eventually) decreed that sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret was obligatory. It may well have been more akin to a gezairah required at their time versus a continuation of historic practice. The remainder of the paper focuses on:

An analysis of the primary texts of the gemarot that demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.
A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor.
Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shimini Atzeret when not required and why they were perhaps considered overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, there are critical factors that differentiate Shemini Atzeret from other cases of yom tov sheni.
The interpolation by the geonim, and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings.
The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices.
Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on Shemini Atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah.
A summary and a modest proposal.

Section 1 – An analysis of the primary text of the gemarot demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. The sugya in the bavli masechet sukkah beginning on 46b contains three parts:[4] A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav. R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath citing Rav ruled: The eighth day which may be the seventh is regarded as the seventh in respect of the sukkah and as the eighth in respect of the benediction. R. Yochanon, however, ruled: It is regarded as the eighth in respect of both. B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement. FIRST APPROACH: That one must dwell [in the sukkah on the eighth day] is agreed by all, they only differ on the question of the benediction. According to him who regards the day as the seventh in respect of the sukkah, we also recite the benediction [of the sukkah], while according to him who holds that it is regarded as the eighth in respect of both, we do not recite the benediction [of the sukkah]. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yochanan, since R. Huna b. Bizna and all the notables of his age once entered a sukkah on the eighth day which may have been the seventh, and while they sat therein, they did not recite the benediction. But is it not possible that they were of the same opinion as he who laid down that once a man has recited the benediction on the first day, he has no more need to recite it? — There was a tradition that they had just come from the fields. SECOND APPROACH: (the ikka de’amri) There are some who say that the ruling that one must not recite the benediction [of the sukkah] is agreed upon by both, and that they only differ on the question whether one must sit [inthe sukkah]. According to him who ruled that it is regarded as the seventh day in respect of the sukkah, we must indeed sit in it thereon, while according to him who ruled that it is regarded as the eighth day in respect of both, we may not even sit in it thereon. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R.Yochanan. For who is the authority of the statement? R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath [of course], and he himself sat on the eighth day which might be the seventh outside the sukkah. C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” And the law is that we must indeed sit in the sukkah but may not recite the benediction. A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav: Rav states that Shemini Atzeret is treated as the seventh for “this” and the eighth for “that.” Rav Yochanon states it is the considered as the eighth for “this” and “that.” The two approaches differ as to what “this” and “that” refer.[5] B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement: The first alternative assumes that all agree that sitting in the sukkah is obligatory; the argument concerns whether to make a berakha. In this approach Rav is asserting that one makes a berakha “leishev ba’sukkah.” The phrase “the seventh for this” refers to this obligation for a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “The eighth for that” refers to the fact that the other prayers of Shemini Atzeret – kiddush and tefillah – mention only the eighth day and make no mention of Sukkot. Rav Yochanon asserts we make no reference to Sukkot, making no berakha when sitting in the sukkah on the eighth. It is the eight for “this” refers to sitting in the sukkah without a berakha; “the eighth for that” is interpreted identically to Rav. According to both opinions, “this” refers to whether or not a berakha is made when sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to both opinions, “that” refers to the mention of only Shemini Atzeret in the prayers of the eighth day. This reading is rather forced in that there does not appear to be any disagreement about what holiday ought to be referred to in the various prayers and blessings of the eighth day. While the word “this” is informative, the word “that” is not. Stating both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret in one prayer/blessing would be contradictory; declaring a day to be both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret was never even raised as a possibility and for good reason. The first approach then quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we are to follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon. The second approach assumes not making a berakha on sitting in the sukkah is undisputed; the argument is about even sitting in the sukkah. Thus the second part of the phrase – the eighth for “that” states that common view of both Rav and Rav Yochanon omitting a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “This” refers to the obligation to sit in the sukkah. Rav maintains for “this” it is considered the seventh and hence one is obligated to sit in the sukkah. Rav Yochanon maintains it is the eighth for “this” as well with no obligation to sit in the sukkah. Note that in this approach of the ikaa de’amri, both parts of the sentence are informative. The second approach then also quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon Were the sugya to end at this point, the conclusion would be clear for two reasons. Each reason itself is two-fold, resulting from both a general principle as well as a detail present in this specific case.

First, generally, where there are two alternative approaches, the second, the ikaa de’amri, is assumed normative.[6] As well in this specific case, as indicated, the phrase of both Rav and Rav Yochanon is more informative in the formulation of the ikka de’amri.
Second, when there is a dispute between Rav and Rav Yochanon, we generally follow Rav Yochanon.[7]As well, in this specific case the text in both alternatives immediately includes an example of practice that follows the opinion of Rav Yochanon.

Taken together, we would assume to follow the second alternative and the opinion of Rav Yochanon – and not sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to many readings, this conclusion is made even more strongly by the yerushalmi.[8] While the bavli addresses the obligation to sit in the sukkah, the yerushalmi notes that one may not sit in the sukkah while making kiddush but one may enter the sukkah afterwards if he so desires. While some rishonim quote this yerushalmi as opposing the psak of the bavli,[9] others claim[10] that the yerushalmi is addressing a region of Israel where there was no doubt about what day the courts declared rosh chodesh. Rabbi Schacter, in support of the former opinion, observed that the yerushalmi uses the expression “leilai yom tov achron;” the plural, “leilai” is only relevant if there is a yom tov sheni on the ninth. Given this interpretation, the yerushalmi is making a rather strong point of equating the nights of the eighth and ninth, dismissing any possibility of an obligation to eat in the sukkah on the eighth.[11] C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha:” Despite the reading of the gemara as outlined, the bavli concludes that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” This opinion is that of both Rav in the second alternative and Rav Yochanon in the first alternative. This ruling corresponds to two of four opinions quoted; the two alternative opinions – not sitting at all or sitting and making a berakha – are only supported by one amora and only according to one alternative. Despite that, this ruling is contradicted by the normal principles of psak where we would follow Rav Yochanon’s opinion in the second alternative, as well as the yerushalmi. The language of the gemara “shemini safek shevii,” and in particular the various amoraim cited, place the gemara not in the period of calculation based on a fixed calendar, but still during a period where rosh chodesh was declared based on observation. During that period, yom tov sheni was observed because of real doubt and also, at some point, as a precaution even during those years where doubt did not exist. Given the establishment of a fixed calendar in 359 CE by Hillel II, it is not entirely clear in exactly what era yom tov sheni was firmly established and, more importantly, when it was extended to include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. It is entirely plausible, that this declarative ruling obligating sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret followed the period debated in the gemara by multiple centuries. This resolves the apparent contradiction in the text. Why this was not stated explicitly in the gemara is only problematic if one does not assume it was obvious. Section 2 – A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor. Returning now to the period of real doubt over which day was declared rosh chodesh, the question of why was sitting in the sukkah not considered mandatory? We will deal with a number of reasons that would argue against sitting in the sukkah in the next section. However, there are two factors that would reduce the level of doubt in the times of declaration based on observation.

First, atmospheric conditions in the Middle East around the beginning of Tishrai are normally excellent and the ability for a new moon crescent to be observed is very high.[12]
Second, the beit din had flexibility to reduce any doubt around Rosh HaShana. When necessary, the beit din could delay declarations of rosh chodesh Elul to guarantee that a moon’s crescent would always be present to be observed on the evening following the 29th of Elul.[13]

These two factors lowered the level of doubt considerably. In addition,

the late date in the month when Shemini Atzeret occurs and
the effort to determine Yom Kippur

would likely reduce the level of doubt even further. After fasting only on the 10th day of Tishrai as Yom Kippur, it is entirely possible that in spite of observing yom tov sheni on the first days of sukkot, the level of doubt was minimal and insufficient to overcome the objections covered in the next section.[14] Section 3 – Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret when not required and why they were overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, one can differentiate Shemini Atzeret from the more usual case of yom tov sheni on multiple grounds. There are two potential issues with sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret, tarti de’sasreh, acting in a contradictory manner[15] and violating the prohibition to add to a mitzvah, by adding an additional day of sukkah observance, particularly on Shemini Atzeret where sitting in a sukkah is not part of the observance.[16] In the case of sitting in the sukkah, a potentially neutral act, neither is violated if some aspect of performance is compromised; however, the degree of compromise required may be in dispute. Regardless of which of the two reasons[17] is invoked, in a case of limited doubt, one or the other or both may have been sufficient to make sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret either not obligatory or perhaps not even permitted without some restrictions. Both the yerushalmi and various opinions in the main text of the bavli, support this conclusion. At some point after a fixed calendar was established in the fourth century, a second day of yom tov was formalized (or maintained.)[18] As Rav Soloveitchik explained, an additional level of kedushat yom tov was applied to either an ordinary day (the day after a yom tov, isru chag) or the first day of chol hamoed because of sefaikah de’yoma. This additional level of kedusha, automatically invoked obligations for kiddush, tefillah, sippur yetziat mitzraim, etc. as well as prohibitions from work. Of course, such an approach could not be applied to Shemini Atzeret; it was already a holiday and one could not add to its kedusha, only change it. This was not done; note that we do not mention Sukkot nor do we observe the mitzvah of lulav. We simply sit in the sukkah without a berakha, something that is both different from a halakhic perspective from other observances of yom tov sheni that derive from the changed status of the day, and in Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion, less than satisfactory conceptually. He said, perhaps half-seriously, that despite his unwavering adherence to normative halakha, the position of the chassidim makes more sense. In any case, sitting in the sukkah is a unique observance with textual, historical and conceptual challenges. Section 4 – The interpolation by the geonim[19], and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings. I do not know the precise history of yom tov sheni. However, both reciting berakhot during yom tov sheni against normal halakhic practice,[20] as well as the assumed halakhic interpolation by the geonim requiring sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret may both have similar origin – the need to reinforce the observance of yom tov sheni. As Dr. Haym Soloveitchik points out,[21] the case of sukkah on Shemini Atzeret proves the wisdom of insisting on a berakha; the one mitzvah of yom tov sheni for which we do not recite a berakha, resulted in widespread non-observance. It seems more than likely that this interpolation was recognized as “outside the norm” if the practice during the period of doubt did not include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Like berakhot, it may have been viewed as necessary particularly following a single day observance of Yom Kippur to strengthen the observance of yom tov sheni. One can only assume that the ruling’s discontinuity from the remainder of the text of the gemara was recognized and did not need elucidation; when first written, a then contemporary reader would recognize the change in practice. Section 5 – The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices. Given universal acceptance of the observance of yom tov sheni in the times of the rishonim, one would not have expected any deviation from the gemara’s definitive conclusion. Rabbi Schacter and Dr. Soloveitchik highlight a number of sources that illustrate the lack of universal acceptance of the gemara’s conclusion by Rashi’s rebbe and members of his family,[22] a distinguished member of the Maharil’s community,[23] and by a member of the Kolonymous family.[24] Citing the core sugya in the bavli and the yerushalmi, while certainly relevant does not in and of itself justify deviating from a clear conclusion even if it is of geonic origin. What is universally conjectured is that the cold climate of Northern Europe motivated a change. For the geonim omitting a berakha constituted enough of a heker to obviate either objection – either a tarti de’sasreh or violating a prohibition to add to a mitzvah by adding an additional day of sukkah observance. In a temperate climate, eating outside without a berakha renders sitting in the sukkah a more balanced act – clearly not a complete fulfillment of the obligation to sit in the sukkah, but, nonetheless, still honoring the institution of yom tov sheni shel galyot. However, in the cold climate of Northern Europe, even absent a berakha, either objection would, as it did in the times of real safek, make sitting in the sukkah (at least during kiddush) problematic. Note as well that the custom of returning to the sukkah during the day is consistent with this logic. During the day:

the temperature is milder,
there is no tarti de’sasreh from the recitation of kiddush, and
having been absent from the sukkah at night, as Rav Soloveitchik pointed out, creates a discontinuity of performance that renders sitting in the sukkah the following day a non-violation of adding to the mitzvah.

What is perhaps most surprising is that even after the period of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Yuzpa, the dayan in Frankfurt am Mein around the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century, when Rav Isaiah Horowitz, the Shelah HaKadosh, was Rav, in his sefer Yosef Ometz was still able to state that a family, descendant of Troyes, who does not sit in the sukkah, “has on what to rely.”[25] Section 6 – Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on shemini atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah. Mitztayer would exempt one from sitting in the sukkah not just on Shemini Atzeret but also on Sukkot proper. However, mitztayer is likely not binary. At one extreme, by living unnaturally in the sukkah one may not even fulfill one’s obligation, regardless of intent, as would be the case in extreme cold or very rainy weather. If, however, it is somewhat uncomfortable given the elements, sitting in the sukkah may no longer be obligatory, while it would still remain a fulfillment of one’s obligation. It seems logical as well to differentiate further the notion of mitztayer as it might apply to Sukkot versus Shemini Atzeret. Perhaps a yet lesser degree of mitztayer, not sufficient to allow eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot, might nonetheless, be more than sufficient to override and invalidate the level of heker made by not reciting a berakha. I have not seen any discussion of this notion by poskim, despite its apparent logic.[26] By analogy, one might not be legally drunk, but nonetheless it would be wise not to drive a car. Similarly, one might argue for eating outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in conditions that do not meet the halakhic definition of mitztayer on Sukkot proper. Thus, cold temperatures that might not justify eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot could nonetheless justify, and indeed perhaps mandate, not eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Rav Soloveitchik, in an attempt to justify Chassidic practice, noted the importance of the night of Shemini Atzeret, following the “guten kvitel” that Kabbalists associated with the day of Hoshana Rabbah. Like the exemption accorded to the celebration of sheva berachot even on Sukkot, when the sukkah does not comfortably provide adequate room, one can argue that the large celebrations by Chassidim where they are mekabeil penai rabbom, would similarly provide an exemption. I would add that here as well, a lesser degree of need might again be seen as voiding any heker provided by just omitting a berakha. Of course, while this explains why a tisch was held outside the sukkah, it does not in any way justify a general practice of avoiding the sukkah that has become widespread in many Chassidic circles.[27] Section 7 – A summary and a modest proposal. The discussion in the gemara covered a period of history where there was real doubt about the declaration of rosh chodesh, although in the case of Shemini Atzeret, that doubt was minimal. In the face of minimal doubt, the reasons not to sit in the sukkah prevailed. The geonim, perhaps in order to strengthen the notion of yom tov sheini, instituted the practice that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” It is not my intent to give halakhic advice; some might suggest that perhaps we ought to not even ask a local rabbi as much as follow family practice. In any case, for those who eat in the sukkah, I would consider situations of partial mitztayer that might arise, where eating in the sukkah may not be appropriate. On the other hand, given widespread laxity, one might argue that the stringencies of the geonim and the Gaon might again be particularly relevant. Of course, most fundamentally for those whose ancestors ate outside the sukkah in Warsaw, conditions are rather different in Miami,[28] or even in Baltimore or Boston.

[1] Shiurim by Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik ztl on the Bergen Torah Beis Medrash website, as well as by Rabbi Dr. Jacob Schacter on 10/02/2007 and by Rabbi Yosef Adler on 9/29/2009, both on the YU Torah website, provide important background. I benefited greatly from their analysis; elements of their perspective are reflected. Many of the sources referenced were assembled by Rabbi Schacter (including important sources cited by Dr. Haym Soloveitchik, whose seminal review essay is quoted extensively by Rabbi Schacter) in his comprehensive shiur on this subject. Most of the materials referenced below that are not available in standard editions of the gemara can be downloaded in the extensive maarei mekomot provided by Rabbi Schacter available on YU Torah in conjunction with his shiur.

[2] One might argue this was also known during the geonic period but assumed to be common knowledge.

[3] Certainly Rav Yochanon and Rav, the major disputants in the bavli as well as the text of the yerushalmi preceded the established use of a fixed calendar. We assume that the entire sugyah, quoting only Rav Yochanon and Rav and their students, was framed in the period prior to the determination of a fixed the calendar; the conclusions of the sugyah may have reflected practice that was followed for an even longer period.

[4] Translation below is from the Soncino Talmud.

[5] Analysis of the text of the gemara below, benefitted extensively from “Law and Custom in Hasidism” a translation by Shmuel Himelstein of Rabbi Dr. Aaron Wertheim’s original book, Ktav Publishing House, Hoboken, NJ. 1992, pages 279 – 286.

[6] See for example, Hasogot haRaavad, Taanit 11. Both the Rosh and Ran on Avodah Zarah 7a indicate that some geonim and rishonim always follow the second opinion. Others differentiate based on Torah, Rabbinic, monetary or religious law. For example, tosofot, s.v. Beshel Torah, in Avodah Zarah 7a, quotes Rashi in a case of an ikka de’amri as deciding according to the lenient view in cases of Rabbinic law. According to that view, given that sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in times of Rav and Rav Yochanon may be a real safek with respect to Torah law, one might follow the stricter view, the first opinion. In the times of fixed calendar, however, presumably sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret is only Rabbinic, and we might also follow the second, more lenient view.

[7] Rif Baba Metziah, Chapter 4, 29a, in the dafei haRif.

[8] Sukkah Perek 4, halakha 5, 17b.

[9] Sefer HaPardes.

[10] Minhagim of Rabbeinu Yitzkhak MiDura.

[11] An uncontested view of the yerushalmi, versus contested views in the bavli, adds additional credence to a preference for the opinion of Rav Yochanon according to the second alternative – not to sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.

[12] Note that the gemara in Beitzah 4b-5a records a singular event where witnesses were delayed in coming on the 30th of Elul to declare that day as the 1st of Tishrai. In early times they [the Sanhedrin] admitted the testimony about new moon throughout the [whole] day. Once, however, the witnesses were late in arriving and the Levites erred in the chant. Given how rare it is for the moon to be obscured by clouds throughout the night in the environs of Jerusalem, normally, one could expect witnesses to arrive earlier in the day. The Hebrew of the text of the gemara – “pa’am achat” appears to denote a rare event.

[13] Perhaps in our fixed calendar Elul always has 29 days in commemoration of prior practice.

[14] Ritva, in complete opposition to this approach, assumed that prior to a fixed calendar, one would likely be dealing with standard case of doubt with respect to a biblical commandment and sitting in the sukkah would clearly be mandatory.

[15] The Ran, in his commentary on the Rif, adds the element of zilzul of Shemini Atzeret by acting in a manner that would equate a holy day to a day of chol hamoed. Zilzul adds an additional dimension; the activity is not just conflicting, a tarti de’sasre, but demeaning of Shemini Atzeret as well. Perhaps, unlike other cases of a tarti de’sasre, absent an element of zilzul, a day might legitimately have a dual character. Furthermore, my nephew, Joshua Blumenkopf, noted that tarti d’sasri is not an independent principle; it merely means that you cannot use two contradictory kulot at the same time, something not present in this case.

[16] Were it not Shemini Atzeret it would be no different than eating matzah on the eighth day of Pesach because of sefaikah de’yoma.

[17] A reason to justify sitting outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret, cited by Rabbi Werthheim, based on the Midrash Tanchuma, parshat Pinkhas, that one has to pray sincerely for rain, would appear to be more a rationalization than a halakhic factor.

[18] The history and details of this complex and controversial topic are not addressed. One could assume that detailed halakhot varied across the various possible periods of history including: the original period of uncertainty when rosh chodesh was declared based on observation, a later period where rabbinic rulings mandated yom tov sheni even prior to the period of the fixed calendar, the initial period of a fixed calendar and various later periods in the fixed calendar. Aligning various sugyot to those periods could shed additional light on this topic. For example, consider the gemara in Beitzah 4b. Is the gemara referring to a period when the fixed calendar was already established or is referring to an earlier period where knowledge of sod haibur was used to reduce doubt? The latter seems to be more consistent with language that refers to knowledge of as opposed to use of the sod haibur.

[19] The interpolation is often ascribed to Rav Yehudai Gaon.

[20] Not reciting berakhot on a minhag.

[21] Haym Soloveitchik, “Olam Ke-Minhago Noheg: Review Essay,” AJS Review 23:2 (1998): 223-234.

[22] Sefer HaPardes.

[23] Maharil – Minhagim, Hilkhot lulav – 6.

[24] Yekhusai Tannaim ve Amoraim, (ed. Y. L. Maimon), pages 329-330, cited by Dr. Soloveitchik, makes (a less complete version of) the textual arguments outlined in Section 1.

[25] Yosef Ometz – 1058.

[26] The Aruch HaShulchan attempts to justify various customs for only partially observance of sitting in the sukkah as creating a yet greater heker given cold temperatures.

[27] In addition to attribution of the trend to sit outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret to the Chassidic celebrations of the evening following Hoshana Rabbah, see as well Rabbi Dr. Aaron Wertheim’s “Law and Custom in Hasidism,” pages 279 – 286 for attribution to other kabbalistic sources.

[28] Miami is closer to the equator than cities in the Middle East.

A Quotation Fabrication: What the Rema did Not Say on Wearing Leather Shoes on Yom Kippur

A Fabricated Rema Quotation on Wearing Leather Shoes

by Rabbi Ari Z. Zivotofsky

The PETA website (accessed Aug 2, 2011) states:

“Jews are prohibited from wearing leather on Yom Kippur.”

The site continues by stating:

“Jewish Vegetarians of North America President Richard H. Schwartz explains “One reason is that it is not considered proper to plead for compassion when one has not shown compassion to the creatures of G-d, whose concern extends to all of His creatures.” (see his website)

They further assert:

“Many rabbis through the ages have shared this view. Rabbi Moses Isserles (c. 1528-1572), aka the Rema, said, “How can a man put on shoes, a piece of clothing for which it is necessary to kill a living thing, on Yom Kippur, which is a day of grace and compassion, when it is written ‘His tender mercies are over all His works’?” (Psalms 145:9).”

I came across this while researching my Fall 2011 Jewish Action column on the misconception that it is prohibited to wear leather items, such as a leather belt or yarmulke, on Yom Kippur and Tisha B’av (see here). Actually, as I show in that article, there is no general prohibition against wearing leather on Yom Kippur. Furthermore, there is not even a prohibition of wearing “leather shoes.” Rather, the prohibition on Yom Kippur and Tisha b’Av is wearing “shoes”, which in normative halacha are defined as leather shoes, although not everyone agrees to that and many authorities assume the prohibition is to wear any protective shoe.[1] Thus, not wearing leather shoes has nothing to do with compassion to animals, but is rather an innui for us, not compassion for animals. In addition, these rules also apply on Tisha B’av when there is no “pleading for compassion” and when we also wear leather at Mincha – when we put on tefillin.

But most intriguing was this “quote” from the Rema that PETA cited from Richard H. Schwartz. It did not sound like the Rema, and indeed it does not exist. So I proceeded to track down its origin. (It seemed unlikely that Richard Schwartz would simply fabricate a quote.) The Rema (OC 223:6, cf KSA 59:13) does quote that verse, but in a different context. He records that it is customary that when someone acquires a new garment people wish him well by saying “tivale v’tichadash – may you wear it out and get a new one”, however some people say not to say that on leather garments because then another animal will need to be killed and God is merciful on all his creatures. Amazingly, the Rema then rejects that argument as weak. Thus, in the only place where the Rema cites that pasuk he rejects it as a reason.

So where did PETA find this “quote”? In Schwartz’s book Judaism and Vegetarianism (p. 21 in the 1988 ed.) he includes this –

– and in footnote 34 he tells us that his source for this amazing quote is Samuel Dresner, The Jewish Dietary Laws (p. 33-34, 1966 ed). Unfortunately, Schwartz misread Dresner, misunderstood where quotes ended, did not look up Dresner’s source, and thereby fabricated a quote from the Rema.

Dresner’s point of departure was the law cited above regarding the good wishes offered upon putting on a new garment. He then cites a novel reason for the prohibition of leather shoes, but does not give much detail about his source. It turns out that this reason is found for the first time in Toldot Esther, a commentary by Rabbi Shlomo Tzvi Shück (1844-1916) on the Siddur haMinhagim of Rabbi Yitzchak Isaac Tirna (64a in the 1880 ed. link).

Dresner may or may not have understood where the quotes end, but it is indeed confusing in his English rendition.

He quotes the Rema regarding leather clothing along with the pasuk from Tehillim (and following Shick, leaves out the Rema’s rejection). He then quotes the Rema regarding no shechiyanu on shechita and, without opening or closing quotes, proceeds into Shick’s novel reason for not wearing leather shoes on Yom Kippur.

Rav Shick (see scan below) was very clear in how he explained himself. He wrote that he had his way of explaining the prohibition of wearing (leather) shoes on Yom Kippur. He then cited the Rema on new clothes and the Rema on shehechiyanu on a first occasion, and based on those asked rhetorically how on Yom Kippur which is a day of chesed v’rachamim one can wear a garment that necessitated killing an animal. He had no fabricated quotes, but he does offer a perplexing explanation for something that was not looking for one. As noted above, the prohibition on Yom Kippur is to wear shoes, which some people understand to mean leather shoes. But the prohibition is derived from the fact that going shoeless is an innui. It also therefore applies on Tisha b’Av and to mourners, obviously unrelated to chesed v’rachamim. Furthermore, leather may be worn on Yom Kippur.

Thus, a novel, difficult to understand explanation for a straightforward prohibition has spawned a fabricated quote from the Rema that is now fairly widespread on the web.

[1] Safrai, Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, demonstrates that the earliest prohibition was to wear any shoe, leather or otherwise. They point to the Tosefta which prohibits “even empilia of cloth.” They understand that to mean a cloth shoe. The Yerushalmi, that distinguishes between leather shoes is modifying the original prohibition, as found in the Tosefta, that prohibited all shoes. According to this, it is somewhat understandable how one could shun all shoes today.[2] Another source does give a reason why specifically leather shoes are prohibited. Shu”t Maharshag (#110 in 5743 ed.) (Rav Shimon Greenfield, 1860 – 1930; one of the leading rabbis in post-Word War I Hungary. A student of Rav Moshe (“Maharam”) Shick, a cousin of Rabbi Shlomo Tzvi Shick) parenthetically quotes that the Pri Eitz HaChaim quotes the AriZal gave a kabbalistic reason why on Yom Kippur specifically leather shoes are prohibited. Again, it has nothing to do with leather or compassion to animals.Rav Yehuda Aszod (1796-1866; Shu”t Yehudah Ya’aleh 1:164) was asked whether one may shecht on Rosh Hashana. It is clear from Tanach (Nechemia 8:10) and the Mishna (Hullin 5:3) that meat was commonly eaten on Rosh Hashanah. Nonetheless, Rav Aszod noted that all shechita includes an element of tzar ba’alei chaim and without the Torah’s explicit permission would be prohibited. On the yom ha-din when we are asking for mercy it is inappropriate to shecht an animal.