Review of a Recent work of Rav Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky

By: Eliezer Brodt

בית היין, על הלכות יין נסך עם ביאור קונדיטון, יצא לאור לראשונה מכתב יד, מאת הגאון רבי צבי הירש גראדזענסקי זצ”ל, מאנסי ניו יורק תשע”א, ש”ט עמודים.

In this post I would like to discuss an unknown Gaon – Rav Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky, and a recently published manuscript of his on Hilchos Yayin Nessech. Not much is known about him except for what has been collected in a very nice article about him written by Jonathan Rosenbaum and Myron Wakschlag, “Maintaining Tradition: A survey of the Life and Writings of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky,” AJH 82:14 (1994), pp. 263-288 which was of help to me when writing this post. R. Hirsch Grodzinsky was born in Lithuania in the year 1857. He was an older cousin of the famous Gadol Hador, Rabbi Chaim Ozer, and he learned by R. Chaim Ozer’s father for a few years. It is interesting to see what he writes about his younger cousin R’ Chaim Ozer:

ואת הגאון ר’ חיים עוזר ז”ל הייתי מכיר אותו מימי ילדותו… וכבר הכרנו אז הכשרונות של הילד הזה ר’ חיים עוזר ז”ל שעתיד להיות גדול בשיראל… (מקראי קודש, ג, הקדמה עמ’ 6).

In 1891 he moved to Omaha, Nebraska where he served as the Rav until he died in 1947 (and was known as Rabbi Henry Grodzinski). It is unclear why he chose to move so far out in the US rather than to a major Jewish center like New York City; perhaps it was so that he would be able to devote most of his time to his own learning rather than the pastoral duties of a rabbi in a large Jewish community. Evidently, this great gaon moved to the United States for parnassah, and is it perhaps due to this move he is basically unknown today. Had he remained in Europe he would likely have been better known and appreciated (but, of course, probably not with a peaceful end).

R. Grodzinsky was a prolific writer who authored many works on numerous topics. His first work, printed in 1898 was called Mikvei Yisrael, an in-depth work on Hilchos Mikvaos. He received haskamahs on this first work from various gedolim, among them R. Yitzchack Elchanan Spektor, (it is not established with certainty, but he might have even had semicha from him. According to one report R. Ephraim Oshry said that it was accepted as fact in the Litvishe yeshivos that R. Zvi Hirsch Grodzinsky had semicha from R. Yitzchak Elchanan). Either way, he was a great admirer of R. Yitzchak Elchanan, as he writes an incredible description about him in the introduction of his work on Hilchos Kriyas Hatorah, Mikroei Kodesh

לא כן רבותינו הרבנים והגאונים שהיו בדור שלפני דור זה, המה היו… ודעתם וסרותיהם הרחבה היה להלכה ברורה בכל מקצועות התורה בכל חלקי השלחן ערוך, כמו מרן הגאון האמתי רשכבה”ג מהרי”א זצ”ל אבד”ק קאוונא, שהיה ראשית דבר רב… בעל הוראה בכל ד’ חלקי השלחן ערוך, כבח”מ ואה”ע, כן בש”ע או”ח וי”ד כבש”ך וסמ”ע כן במג”א ופרמ”ג כבקצות ונתיבות, כן בחו”ד ודה”ח וח”א, כל רז לא אנס ליה, ומי כמוהו מורה ממנו יצא אורה בכל מקצועת התורה דבר קטן ודבר גדול, כמו בעניני עגונה כן בה’ ציצית ותפלין וקה”ת כו’, הכל גלוי וידוע לפני כסא כבודו מראשונים עד אחרון שבאחרונים, הוא היה בר סמכא, לסמוך על הוראותיו האמתי בכל הפרטים… פנו אליו בשאלות וספיקות לדינא בכל מקצעות התורה, ועל כולם השיב כהלכה לקטן ולגדולן גם לעת זקנותו… (מקראי קודש, ג, הקדמה עמ’ 5).

In 1916 he printed another work called Likutei Tzvi. In 1923 he printed another work called Mili Debrochos which is on part of Masseches Berachos (part two of this work was printed later). In 1936 he began printing his massive, three volume Mikraei Kodesh on Hilchos Kriyas Hatorah which he completed in 1941. This work is exceptional in both its breadth and depth. There are other important books on this topic from great gedolim such as the Chida and R. Ephraim Zalman Margolis, but none compare to this work. His later works do not have haskamos, as he writes against them in the introduction to the third volume of his Mikraei Kodesh.

ועתה בעו”ה נוהגין המחברים באמעריקא מנהג יפה מאד… לקבל הסכמה על חיבוריהם מהאי הדיוט בעל הלשון… דמיום שחרב בית המקדש גברו בעלי הלשון, ואל תהי הסכמת ההדיוט קלה בעינך ובדין הוא משום דלפנים היו מחברים ספרים בשביל ת”ח והיו צריכין להסכמת ת”ח הגדול בדורו, אך עתה במדינתנו שרוב המחברים מחברים ספריהם בשביל הדיוטים, לכן צריכין ליקח הסכמה ג”כ מהדיוט גדול, ובזכות זה יזכו שההדיוטים יקפצו לקנות חבוריהם ויראו שכר לעמלם, אשרי שככה לו, ואשרי הדור שיפתח בדורו כשמואל בדורו.

He left behind many complete manuscripts on different topics. After he died in 1947 his manuscripts were taken to Mechon Otzar Haposkim in Eretz Yisrael. Unfortunately almost nothing of his was printed except for a few teshuvos of his in various Torah Journals.[1] A few months ago a complete manuscript was printed, the Beis Hayayin, a complete work on Hilchos Yayin Nessech. This volume was published by Shalom Jacob, who has put out important and special works in the past (see here). The production of this work was a truly beautiful job. The work consists of two parts; the top is the Halachos in short, and the bottom part is called Kunditon. In the Kunditon, R. Grodzinsky goes through all the sources of each Halacha, starting from the Gemarah and going forward through the sugyos with the Rishonim and Acharonim. A small section was added by the editor at the bottom of each page called Mekorei Habayis which adds some additional sources and quotes related to the topics in the Kunditon section. The print and paper is beautiful, including small summaries on the side of each piece, making it a pleasure to use. Besides for these, there is an extremely thorough index of the work. To mention some of the interesting side points in this work; R. Grodzinski has a nice discussion of the way wine was made in the U.S. in his time (p. 42-43), as he was a rav hamachshir, he traveled to wine companies in California, to check out the exact way they made the wine. Another important piece is a lengthy discussion of the various levels of Mechalelei Shabbos in the U.S. (pp. 31-32, 190) in his time. This discussion gives us a sad but realistic glimpse of the level of American Jewish observance in those times. He writes that there were three categories; one group that came with the full intention of remaining frum, but due to the parnassah problem were forced to work on Shabbos, virtually having no other choice. This group he says, was very disturbed about having to be mechalel shabbos and whatever was not related to parnassah they were careful to observe the prohibitions. This group has a din of an oness. A second category were people who though initially forced to work on Shabbos due to parnassah issues kept on working on even when they became wealthy. Though they kept Shabbos in their homes, they do not have a din of an oness. The third category was people who besides working on Shabbos for parnassah never bothered to keep anything of Shabbos in their homes. These people, he writes, are the worst level of the three.
Another piece of interest to me was how he suggests a textual change in the girsa of a Yerushlami (p. 155). He is not one that is fast to do so in general, as a bit later where he quotes the Shach saying that there was a printing mistake, he goes out of his way to show that there is no need to suggest such a thing (p. 162). Another particular piece of interest for me was his using a piece of Rabbenu Chananel, from the fairly recently (in his time) printed manuscript on Avoda Zara (p. 54). There are two reasons why I found this interesting. One, in the journal Yeshurun (v. 2, pp. 202-205) there is a teshuva of his in regard to the custom of standing when the ba’al keriah recites the Aseres Hadibros (see here for more on this minhag). Someone had shown him a newly printed manuscript of the Shu”t Ha-Rambam who said it is improper to stand. R. Grodzinsky writes:

כי תשובות המיוחס להרמב”ם ז”ל לא נמצא אצלי ומעולם לא ראיתיו. רק פעם אחד הביא אלי השו”ב מק”ב את תשובות הנ”ל וראיתי כי נמצא שם כמה דברים הסותרים למ”ש הרמב”ם בספרו הגדול משנה תורה. ולבי אומר לי כי כמה דברים הנמצא שם ע”ש הרמב”ם הוא לא אמת רק איזה תלמיד טועה כתבם ויחסו ע”ש הרמב”ם ע”ד שאמרו חז”ל אם בקשת וכו’ התלה באילן גדול…

From this piece I generalized that he was opposed to “new rishonim” and the like. However, from this work I see it was not the case, or so simple, as he used the newly printed Rach. It is important to note that the Chazon Ish was against using the Rach[2] as he writes:

“וכן ראיתי בל’ ר”ח הנדפס בדפוס ראם, אבל לא ידענא אם אפשר לסמוך על הנדפסין מחדש שכבר הפסיקה המסורה בינינו, ואין אנו יודעין מי המה המעתיקים, שמלאכת ההעתקה כבדה מאד, ואף על ידי זריזין ומדקדקים מצוי ט”ס הרבה, ואם יעבור הדבר ע”י איזה רפיון בדקדוק הדברים יכול הדבר להשתנות לגמרי, ולכן הפוסקים שלא הפסיקה המסורה בינם ובינינו בכל הדורות, ששקדו עליהם חכמי דור דור, לשמרם ולנקותם, צריכים אנו לחשוב את ספריהם ליותר דוקנית, וכש”כ במקום שאין ללמוד מכונת הדברים אלא מדקדוק לשונם, שקשה לסמוך על החדשים…” (חזון איש, הל’ עירובין סי’ ס”ז, אות י”ב).

The Mishna Berurah argues, as we find numerous times he brings from the

ר”ח הנדפס מחדש [ביאור הלכה, סי’ ש”ב, ד”ה עליה; סי’ שט”ו, ד”ה טפח; סי’ תרכ”ו, ד”ה צריך; סי’ תרמ”ח, ד”ה מיהו, ועוד].

One thing I was rather surprised about was that there was no mention of the famous teshuva of the Rema on yayin nessech anywhere in this work. I was hoping to see his take on it. To summarize, this work is extremely important for anyone learning the complicated laws of yayin nessech and it is well worth the money.[3] The sefer is available for purchase at Biegeleisen in the U.S., and at Girsa and Otzar Haseforim in Jerusalem. I would just like to end by wishing Rabbi Jacob much success in printing the rest of the Rav Grodzinsky’s wonderful works from manuscripts.[4]

Introduction: Arguments about eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret outside of Israel have a long and somewhat baffling history.[1] While not the only example of practice in opposition to the Shulchan Aruch, it appears to be among the most argued. The gemara, Rambam, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, written in many locales, all seem to be as unambiguous as possible in requiring one to eat in the sukkah. The Gaon, incensed by the spreading Chassidic custom to eat outside the sukkah, perhaps lemigdar miltah, went so far as to mandate sleeping in the sukkah on the night of shemini atzeret, in opposition to the Maharil, the Magen Avraham and normative custom. Despite consensus among all major decisors to require eating in the sukkah, an undercurrent of opposition has existed from at least the times of the early rishonim. Support for that opposition has been based on a number of apparently legitimate points. However, despite some early and consistent opposition, despite the logic and halakhic rationale of those who did not sit in the sukkah, and despite the problematic nature of the gemara (as explained below), I hope to explain the basis for the concluding and declarative statement in the gemara: “we sit but do not make a berakha.” In fact, the assumption, explicitly found[2] as far back as the times of the rishonim, that the declarative ruling was interpolated at a later point, is fundamental to explain both sides of the controversy. Some, as early as the times of the rishonim, argue that we can discount such geonic interpolations in deference to the original text which, as will be demonstrated, concludes not to sit in the sukkah. My goal is to explain why the interpolation is to be followed despite its ostensible opposition to the remainder of the text. The major thesis proposed is that one has to differentiate between a period of doubt as existed in both the yerushalmi and bavli when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses and a later period when rosh chodesh was determined using a fixed calendar. The geonic interpolation into the text of the gemara occurred at that later point; its rationale and inconsistency with the texts of the gemara needs to be addressed from that perspective. If I am correct, then in the period when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses, as in the times of Rav Yochanon and Rav,[3] sitting in the sukkah was not always required. However, when the fixed calendar was in use, the rabbis (eventually) decreed that sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret was obligatory. It may well have been more akin to a gezairah required at their time versus a continuation of historic practice. The remainder of the paper focuses on:

• An analysis of the primary texts of the gemarot that demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.
• A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor.
• Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shimini Atzeret when not required and why they were perhaps considered overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, there are critical factors that differentiate Shemini Atzeret from other cases of yom tov sheni.
• The interpolation by the geonim, and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings.
• The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices.
• Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on Shemini Atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah.
• A summary and a modest proposal.

Section 1 – An analysis of the primary text of the gemarot demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. The sugya in the bavli masechet sukkah beginning on 46b contains three parts:[4] A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav. R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath citing Rav ruled: The eighth day which may be the seventh is regarded as the seventh in respect of the sukkah and as the eighth in respect of the benediction. R. Yochanon, however, ruled: It is regarded as the eighth in respect of both. B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement. FIRST APPROACH: That one must dwell [in the sukkah on the eighth day] is agreed by all, they only differ on the question of the benediction. According to him who regards the day as the seventh in respect of the sukkah, we also recite the benediction [of the sukkah], while according to him who holds that it is regarded as the eighth in respect of both, we do not recite the benediction [of the sukkah]. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yochanan, since R. Huna b. Bizna and all the notables of his age once entered a sukkah on the eighth day which may have been the seventh, and while they sat therein, they did not recite the benediction. But is it not possible that they were of the same opinion as he who laid down that once a man has recited the benediction on the first day, he has no more need to recite it? — There was a tradition that they had just come from the fields. SECOND APPROACH: (the ikka de’amri) There are some who say that the ruling that one must not recite the benediction [of the sukkah] is agreed upon by both, and that they only differ on the question whether one must sit [inthe sukkah]. According to him who ruled that it is regarded as the seventh day in respect of the sukkah, we must indeed sit in it thereon, while according to him who ruled that it is regarded as the eighth day in respect of both, we may not even sit in it thereon. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R.Yochanan. For who is the authority of the statement? R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath [of course], and he himself sat on the eighth day which might be the seventh outside the sukkah. C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” And the law is that we must indeed sit in the sukkah but may not recite the benediction. A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav: Rav states that Shemini Atzeret is treated as the seventh for “this” and the eighth for “that.” Rav Yochanon states it is the considered as the eighth for “this” and “that.” The two approaches differ as to what “this” and “that” refer.[5] B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement: The first alternative assumes that all agree that sitting in the sukkah is obligatory; the argument concerns whether to make a berakha. In this approach Rav is asserting that one makes a berakha “leishev ba’sukkah.” The phrase “the seventh for this” refers to this obligation for a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “The eighth for that” refers to the fact that the other prayers of Shemini Atzeret – kiddush and tefillah – mention only the eighth day and make no mention of Sukkot. Rav Yochanon asserts we make no reference to Sukkot, making no berakha when sitting in the sukkah on the eighth. It is the eight for “this” refers to sitting in the sukkah without a berakha; “the eighth for that” is interpreted identically to Rav. According to both opinions, “this” refers to whether or not a berakha is made when sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to both opinions, “that” refers to the mention of only Shemini Atzeret in the prayers of the eighth day. This reading is rather forced in that there does not appear to be any disagreement about what holiday ought to be referred to in the various prayers and blessings of the eighth day. While the word “this” is informative, the word “that” is not. Stating both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret in one prayer/blessing would be contradictory; declaring a day to be both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret was never even raised as a possibility and for good reason. The first approach then quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we are to follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon. The second approach assumes not making a berakha on sitting in the sukkah is undisputed; the argument is about even sitting in the sukkah. Thus the second part of the phrase – the eighth for “that” states that common view of both Rav and Rav Yochanon omitting a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “This” refers to the obligation to sit in the sukkah. Rav maintains for “this” it is considered the seventh and hence one is obligated to sit in the sukkah. Rav Yochanon maintains it is the eighth for “this” as well with no obligation to sit in the sukkah. Note that in this approach of the ikaa de’amri, both parts of the sentence are informative. The second approach then also quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon Were the sugya to end at this point, the conclusion would be clear for two reasons. Each reason itself is two-fold, resulting from both a general principle as well as a detail present in this specific case.

• First, generally, where there are two alternative approaches, the second, the ikaa de’amri, is assumed normative.[6] As well in this specific case, as indicated, the phrase of both Rav and Rav Yochanon is more informative in the formulation of the ikka de’amri.
• Second, when there is a dispute between Rav and Rav Yochanon, we generally follow Rav Yochanon.[7]As well, in this specific case the text in both alternatives immediately includes an example of practice that follows the opinion of Rav Yochanon.

Taken together, we would assume to follow the second alternative and the opinion of Rav Yochanon – and not sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to many readings, this conclusion is made even more strongly by the yerushalmi.[8] While the bavli addresses the obligation to sit in the sukkah, the yerushalmi notes that one may not sit in the sukkah while making kiddush but one may enter the sukkah afterwards if he so desires. While some rishonim quote this yerushalmi as opposing the psak of the bavli,[9] others claim[10] that the yerushalmi is addressing a region of Israel where there was no doubt about what day the courts declared rosh chodesh. Rabbi Schacter, in support of the former opinion, observed that the yerushalmi uses the expression “leilai yom tov achron;” the plural, “leilai” is only relevant if there is a yom tov sheni on the ninth. Given this interpretation, the yerushalmi is making a rather strong point of equating the nights of the eighth and ninth, dismissing any possibility of an obligation to eat in the sukkah on the eighth.[11] C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha:” Despite the reading of the gemara as outlined, the bavli concludes that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” This opinion is that of both Rav in the second alternative and Rav Yochanon in the first alternative. This ruling corresponds to two of four opinions quoted; the two alternative opinions – not sitting at all or sitting and making a berakha – are only supported by one amora and only according to one alternative. Despite that, this ruling is contradicted by the normal principles of psak where we would follow Rav Yochanon’s opinion in the second alternative, as well as the yerushalmi. The language of the gemara “shemini safek shevii,” and in particular the various amoraim cited, place the gemara not in the period of calculation based on a fixed calendar, but still during a period where rosh chodesh was declared based on observation. During that period, yom tov sheni was observed because of real doubt and also, at some point, as a precaution even during those years where doubt did not exist. Given the establishment of a fixed calendar in 359 CE by Hillel II, it is not entirely clear in exactly what era yom tov sheni was firmly established and, more importantly, when it was extended to include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. It is entirely plausible, that this declarative ruling obligating sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret followed the period debated in the gemara by multiple centuries. This resolves the apparent contradiction in the text. Why this was not stated explicitly in the gemara is only problematic if one does not assume it was obvious. Section 2 – A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor. Returning now to the period of real doubt over which day was declared rosh chodesh, the question of why was sitting in the sukkah not considered mandatory? We will deal with a number of reasons that would argue against sitting in the sukkah in the next section. However, there are two factors that would reduce the level of doubt in the times of declaration based on observation.

• First, atmospheric conditions in the Middle East around the beginning of Tishrai are normally excellent and the ability for a new moon crescent to be observed is very high.[12]
• Second, the beit din had flexibility to reduce any doubt around Rosh HaShana. When necessary, the beit din could delay declarations of rosh chodesh Elul to guarantee that a moon’s crescent would always be present to be observed on the evening following the 29th of Elul.[13]

These two factors lowered the level of doubt considerably. In addition,

• the late date in the month when Shemini Atzeret occurs and
• the effort to determine Yom Kippur

would likely reduce the level of doubt even further. After fasting only on the 10th day of Tishrai as Yom Kippur, it is entirely possible that in spite of observing yom tov sheni on the first days of sukkot, the level of doubt was minimal and insufficient to overcome the objections covered in the next section.[14] Section 3 – Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret when not required and why they were overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, one can differentiate Shemini Atzeret from the more usual case of yom tov sheni on multiple grounds. There are two potential issues with sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret, tarti de’sasreh, acting in a contradictory manner[15] and violating the prohibition to add to a mitzvah, by adding an additional day of sukkah observance, particularly on Shemini Atzeret where sitting in a sukkah is not part of the observance.[16] In the case of sitting in the sukkah, a potentially neutral act, neither is violated if some aspect of performance is compromised; however, the degree of compromise required may be in dispute. Regardless of which of the two reasons[17] is invoked, in a case of limited doubt, one or the other or both may have been sufficient to make sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret either not obligatory or perhaps not even permitted without some restrictions. Both the yerushalmi and various opinions in the main text of the bavli, support this conclusion. At some point after a fixed calendar was established in the fourth century, a second day of yom tov was formalized (or maintained.)[18] As Rav Soloveitchik explained, an additional level of kedushat yom tov was applied to either an ordinary day (the day after a yom tov, isru chag) or the first day of chol hamoed because of sefaikah de’yoma. This additional level of kedusha, automatically invoked obligations for kiddush, tefillah, sippur yetziat mitzraim, etc. as well as prohibitions from work. Of course, such an approach could not be applied to Shemini Atzeret; it was already a holiday and one could not add to its kedusha, only change it. This was not done; note that we do not mention Sukkot nor do we observe the mitzvah of lulav. We simply sit in the sukkah without a berakha, something that is both different from a halakhic perspective from other observances of yom tov sheni that derive from the changed status of the day, and in Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion, less than satisfactory conceptually. He said, perhaps half-seriously, that despite his unwavering adherence to normative halakha, the position of the chassidim makes more sense. In any case, sitting in the sukkah is a unique observance with textual, historical and conceptual challenges. Section 4 – The interpolation by the geonim[19], and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings. I do not know the precise history of yom tov sheni. However, both reciting berakhot during yom tov sheni against normal halakhic practice,[20] as well as the assumed halakhic interpolation by the geonim requiring sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret may both have similar origin – the need to reinforce the observance of yom tov sheni. As Dr. Haym Soloveitchik points out,[21] the case of sukkah on Shemini Atzeret proves the wisdom of insisting on a berakha; the one mitzvah of yom tov sheni for which we do not recite a berakha, resulted in widespread non-observance. It seems more than likely that this interpolation was recognized as “outside the norm” if the practice during the period of doubt did not include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Like berakhot, it may have been viewed as necessary particularly following a single day observance of Yom Kippur to strengthen the observance of yom tov sheni. One can only assume that the ruling’s discontinuity from the remainder of the text of the gemara was recognized and did not need elucidation; when first written, a then contemporary reader would recognize the change in practice. Section 5 – The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices. Given universal acceptance of the observance of yom tov sheni in the times of the rishonim, one would not have expected any deviation from the gemara’s definitive conclusion. Rabbi Schacter and Dr. Soloveitchik highlight a number of sources that illustrate the lack of universal acceptance of the gemara’s conclusion by Rashi’s rebbe and members of his family,[22] a distinguished member of the Maharil’s community,[23] and by a member of the Kolonymous family.[24] Citing the core sugya in the bavli and the yerushalmi, while certainly relevant does not in and of itself justify deviating from a clear conclusion even if it is of geonic origin. What is universally conjectured is that the cold climate of Northern Europe motivated a change. For the geonim omitting a berakha constituted enough of a heker to obviate either objection – either a tarti de’sasreh or violating a prohibition to add to a mitzvah by adding an additional day of sukkah observance. In a temperate climate, eating outside without a berakha renders sitting in the sukkah a more balanced act – clearly not a complete fulfillment of the obligation to sit in the sukkah, but, nonetheless, still honoring the institution of yom tov sheni shel galyot. However, in the cold climate of Northern Europe, even absent a berakha, either objection would, as it did in the times of real safek, make sitting in the sukkah (at least during kiddush) problematic. Note as well that the custom of returning to the sukkah during the day is consistent with this logic. During the day:

• the temperature is milder,
• there is no tarti de’sasreh from the recitation of kiddush, and
• having been absent from the sukkah at night, as Rav Soloveitchik pointed out, creates a discontinuity of performance that renders sitting in the sukkah the following day a non-violation of adding to the mitzvah.

What is perhaps most surprising is that even after the period of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Yuzpa, the dayan in Frankfurt am Mein around the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century, when Rav Isaiah Horowitz, the Shelah HaKadosh, was Rav, in his sefer Yosef Ometz was still able to state that a family, descendant of Troyes, who does not sit in the sukkah, “has on what to rely.”[25] Section 6 – Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on shemini atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah. Mitztayer would exempt one from sitting in the sukkah not just on Shemini Atzeret but also on Sukkot proper. However, mitztayer is likely not binary. At one extreme, by living unnaturally in the sukkah one may not even fulfill one’s obligation, regardless of intent, as would be the case in extreme cold or very rainy weather. If, however, it is somewhat uncomfortable given the elements, sitting in the sukkah may no longer be obligatory, while it would still remain a fulfillment of one’s obligation. It seems logical as well to differentiate further the notion of mitztayer as it might apply to Sukkot versus Shemini Atzeret. Perhaps a yet lesser degree of mitztayer, not sufficient to allow eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot, might nonetheless, be more than sufficient to override and invalidate the level of heker made by not reciting a berakha. I have not seen any discussion of this notion by poskim, despite its apparent logic.[26] By analogy, one might not be legally drunk, but nonetheless it would be wise not to drive a car. Similarly, one might argue for eating outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in conditions that do not meet the halakhic definition of mitztayer on Sukkot proper. Thus, cold temperatures that might not justify eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot could nonetheless justify, and indeed perhaps mandate, not eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Rav Soloveitchik, in an attempt to justify Chassidic practice, noted the importance of the night of Shemini Atzeret, following the “guten kvitel” that Kabbalists associated with the day of Hoshana Rabbah. Like the exemption accorded to the celebration of sheva berachot even on Sukkot, when the sukkah does not comfortably provide adequate room, one can argue that the large celebrations by Chassidim where they are mekabeil penai rabbom, would similarly provide an exemption. I would add that here as well, a lesser degree of need might again be seen as voiding any heker provided by just omitting a berakha. Of course, while this explains why a tisch was held outside the sukkah, it does not in any way justify a general practice of avoiding the sukkah that has become widespread in many Chassidic circles.[27] Section 7 – A summary and a modest proposal. The discussion in the gemara covered a period of history where there was real doubt about the declaration of rosh chodesh, although in the case of Shemini Atzeret, that doubt was minimal. In the face of minimal doubt, the reasons not to sit in the sukkah prevailed. The geonim, perhaps in order to strengthen the notion of yom tov sheini, instituted the practice that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” It is not my intent to give halakhic advice; some might suggest that perhaps we ought to not even ask a local rabbi as much as follow family practice. In any case, for those who eat in the sukkah, I would consider situations of partial mitztayer that might arise, where eating in the sukkah may not be appropriate. On the other hand, given widespread laxity, one might argue that the stringencies of the geonim and the Gaon might again be particularly relevant. Of course, most fundamentally for those whose ancestors ate outside the sukkah in Warsaw, conditions are rather different in Miami,[28] or even in Baltimore or Boston.

The PETA website (accessed Aug 2, 2011) states:

“Jews are prohibited from wearing leather on Yom Kippur.”

“Jewish Vegetarians of North America President Richard H. Schwartz explains “One reason is that it is not considered proper to plead for compassion when one has not shown compassion to the creatures of G-d, whose concern extends to all of His creatures.” (see his website)

“Many rabbis through the ages have shared this view. Rabbi Moses Isserles (c. 1528-1572), aka the Rema, said, “How can a man put on shoes, a piece of clothing for which it is necessary to kill a living thing, on Yom Kippur, which is a day of grace and compassion, when it is written ‘His tender mercies are over all His works’?” (Psalms 145:9).”

I came across this while researching my Fall 2011 Jewish Action column on the misconception that it is prohibited to wear leather items, such as a leather belt or yarmulke, on Yom Kippur and Tisha B’av (see here). Actually, as I show in that article, there is no general prohibition against wearing leather on Yom Kippur. Furthermore, there is not even a prohibition of wearing “leather shoes.” Rather, the prohibition on Yom Kippur and Tisha b’Av is wearing “shoes”, which in normative halacha are defined as leather shoes, although not everyone agrees to that and many authorities assume the prohibition is to wear any protective shoe.[1] Thus, not wearing leather shoes has nothing to do with compassion to animals, but is rather an innui for us, not compassion for animals. In addition, these rules also apply on Tisha B’av when there is no “pleading for compassion” and when we also wear leather at Mincha – when we put on tefillin.

But most intriguing was this “quote” from the Rema that PETA cited from Richard H. Schwartz. It did not sound like the Rema, and indeed it does not exist. So I proceeded to track down its origin. (It seemed unlikely that Richard Schwartz would simply fabricate a quote.) The Rema (OC 223:6, cf KSA 59:13) does quote that verse, but in a different context. He records that it is customary that when someone acquires a new garment people wish him well by saying “tivale v’tichadash – may you wear it out and get a new one”, however some people say not to say that on leather garments because then another animal will need to be killed and God is merciful on all his creatures. Amazingly, the Rema then rejects that argument as weak. Thus, in the only place where the Rema cites that pasuk he rejects it as a reason.

So where did PETA find this “quote”? In Schwartz’s book Judaism and Vegetarianism (p. 21 in the 1988 ed.) he includes this –

– and in footnote 34 he tells us that his source for this amazing quote is Samuel Dresner, The Jewish Dietary Laws (p. 33-34, 1966 ed). Unfortunately, Schwartz misread Dresner, misunderstood where quotes ended, did not look up Dresner’s source, and thereby fabricated a quote from the Rema.

Dresner’s point of departure was the law cited above regarding the good wishes offered upon putting on a new garment. He then cites a novel reason for the prohibition of leather shoes, but does not give much detail about his source. It turns out that this reason is found for the first time in Toldot Esther, a commentary by Rabbi Shlomo Tzvi Shück (1844-1916) on the Siddur haMinhagim of Rabbi Yitzchak Isaac Tirna (64a in the 1880 ed. link).

Dresner may or may not have understood where the quotes end, but it is indeed confusing in his English rendition.

He quotes the Rema regarding leather clothing along with the pasuk from Tehillim (and following Shick, leaves out the Rema’s rejection). He then quotes the Rema regarding no shechiyanu on shechita and, without opening or closing quotes, proceeds into Shick’s novel reason for not wearing leather shoes on Yom Kippur.

Rav Shick (see scan below) was very clear in how he explained himself. He wrote that he had his way of explaining the prohibition of wearing (leather) shoes on Yom Kippur. He then cited the Rema on new clothes and the Rema on shehechiyanu on a first occasion, and based on those asked rhetorically how on Yom Kippur which is a day of chesed v’rachamim one can wear a garment that necessitated killing an animal. He had no fabricated quotes, but he does offer a perplexing explanation for something that was not looking for one. As noted above, the prohibition on Yom Kippur is to wear shoes, which some people understand to mean leather shoes. But the prohibition is derived from the fact that going shoeless is an innui. It also therefore applies on Tisha b’Av and to mourners, obviously unrelated to chesed v’rachamim. Furthermore, leather may be worn on Yom Kippur.

Thus, a novel, difficult to understand explanation for a straightforward prohibition has spawned a fabricated quote from the Rema that is now fairly widespread on the web.

Sukkot is fast approaching. For many this means selecting a “mehudar” etrog. Depending upon where one is this task can involve not only selecting an etrog with or without a pitum, bumpy or smoother, with or without a gartel, or a host of other considerations, but also selecting which type, Berman or Hazon Ish. Indeed, today, there are variety of types of etrogim identified by the farm or personalities that have ostensibly certified them as Kosher for use during the holiday. But, how do we know that any of these types are preferred? Where did these etrogim originate? Are they really Kosher?
Until recently, the answers to many of these questions have been shrouded in mystery. Sure one may have been told that so-and-so decided (mostly by merely looking at a particular tree) this etrog is Kosher. Today, however, Zohar Amar, who has written extensively on agriculture and other issues involving mesorah as it relates to Kashrut, has published a book where he investigates these questions, Etrogei Eretz Yisrael, Israel, 2010, 85 pp.
In reality, this latest book complements his book published last year discussing all the four species, Arbat ha-Minim, Israel, 2009, 101 pp. The earlier book, as it relates to etrogim focuses on how and when we identified the etrog with the biblical commandment of “prei etz hadar.” Amar seeks to disprove the notion that etrogim were not native to the Middle East until far after the Jews were present. This is important as some want to argue that the use of etrogim for araba minim is of late origin and thus undermine the mesorah associating etrog with prei etz hadar. Amar’s thesis is can be summed up using the talmudic expression “lo raenu enu rayah.” That is, much of what has been said about this point is predicated on the lack of etrogim seeds or evidence that can be dated to an early period – i.e. when Jews were in Israel practicing the Torah.
Amar provides the earliest evidence that we have of etrogim and their use on Sukkot. For example, etrogim appear on some Jewish coins and in mosaics. While some may associate the “gartel” or figure eight shaped etrogim with hassdim (probably because some hassidim wear such belts all year-round), in reality, many of these early depictions show etrogim with a gartel.
Additionally, Amar discusses the development of using etrogim from outside of Israel and then their importation and eventual grafting of those etrogim. The reason these foreign etrogim were used were because, for the most part, etrogim that are indigenous to Israel aren’t what we would consider mehudar today. Typically they lacked the pitum and weren’t shaped nicely and were smoother than our bumpy etrogim. Thus, some began to use etrogim from outside of Israel. This in turn created a controversy as to whether those etrogim were Kosher as well as whether there is a preference for Israeli etrogim over those from outside of Israel.
As part of this controversy the issue of grafted etrogim became a much larger issue. Indeed, the issue of grafting etrogim doesn’t appear in Jewish literature until 16th century. Amar, discusses the development and application of this concept as it relates to etrogim.
Returning to Amar’s latest book, Etrogei Eretz Yisrael. This time around Amar turns his focus to the mesorah of Israeli etrogim. He has extensively researched this topic and his research included visiting the etrogim farms and speaking with the farmers. What emerges is that for most of the etrogim available today, the best we can trace their pedigree is 100 years. For many, it is less than that. That. is, while many claim significantly longer pedigrees, the stories fail to match with fact. That is not to say that today’s etrogim aren’t Kosher or that many are grafted, only that we don’t have evidence that today’s etrogim are the same as were used more than 100 years ago. Amar concedes that more research, including genetic and other scientific testing is necessary to determine which etrogim are pure and ungrafted.
In all, this latest book is an important one as it sets the baseline for further research regarding etrogim, and, additionally, provides more background on the specific types of etrogim currently available in the marketplace today.
The books are distributed by Girsa and Shalem in Israel and is available at Beigeleisen in the US.

This is the last of four posts based on a forthcoming monograph by Dr. William Gewirtz that addresses the period of bein hashemashot, the most fundamental area of dispute in the area of zemanim.

The previous post summarized the main sections of the monograph; this post summarizes some of the areas of innovation and is followed by concluding observations.

Much of what was proposed tacitly made two basic assumptions:

 First, both halakhic practice and its conceptualization were influenced by the migration of Jews from the Middle East to Central and Northern Europe during a period when the impact of latitude on zemanim was not yet understood.
 Second, with the subsequent growth of clocks, increasingly, halakhic practice was specified using time in preference to observation of natural events.

It is probable that both of these factors were consequential. (Increasingly, time replaced observation as the basis for specifying halakhot. Preference for a time based halakhic rule (72 minutes, for example) over the underlying event from which the interval of time was derived has become increasingly common. More subjectively defined phenomena like misheyakir or the approximate boundary between a medium and a small star were less often utilized and, as a result, became less well understood.)

The PDF of the entire epilogue is attached. The epilogue includes a complete list of the innovations that have been proposed and a more extensive version of post 3. A subset of the innovations proposed and a concluding example and remarks follow below:

1. The dispute between the geonim and Rabbeinu Tam revolves around placing the interval of bein hashemashot, whose length is the time to walk ¾ mil, within the interval between sunset and tzait (kol) hakokhavim whose length is the time to walk 4 mil. It is normally assumed that:

 the opinion of the geonim places bein hashemashot at the start of the interval, while
 Rabbeinu Tam places it at its end.

Those two alternatives represent opposite extremes. Two modifications were suggested throughout:

 First, separate the dispute between the geonim and Rabbeinu Tam into two distinct components; the first concerns the beginning and the second the end of the bein hashemashot period, subject to a constraint on the length of the bein hashemashot interval.
 Second, assume that there are multiple hybrid / intermediate positions, bracketed by these two alternatives. (These positions might be more properly characterized as variants to the position of the geonim as they are all much closer to their bein hashemashot interval.)

This allows:

 an interpretation of the gemara in Shabbat similar or more likely identical to that of the overwhelmingly compelling position of the geonim relative to the end of the bein hashemashot period,

 while defining the beginning of bein hashemashot using a variant of the textual approach of the Shulchan Aruch and Rabbeinu Tam.

While I have not seen this conceptualization formulated explicitly (Throughout R. Kapach’s commentary on Mishneh Torah, however, he asserts that this is the position of Rambam.) in the classic halakhic literature, practice and a number of pragmatic opinions are supportive of such an approach. This approach impacted sections 5 – 8 and is central to many of the suggested innovations. The opposite implication:

 Anyone who rejects the start of Shabbat precisely at or even some number of minutes after sunset must embrace the approach of Rabbeinu Tam

which does not follow logically, is often found in the literature.
2. It is preferable to read the gemara in Shabbat assuming that all opinions vary insignificantly concerning the end of Shabbat; this is the opinion of almost all rishonim and independent of the position of Rabbeinu Tam. The gemara’s focus is primarily on the beginning of bein hashemashot on Friday evening, and that point is in dispute.

3. Modern practice, contemporary halakhic literature, as well as colloquial idiom, typically refers to time intervals calculated from sunset. Assuming that way of thinking when reading specific sources, we fail to consider that the gemara, various rishonim and achronim (we referenced R. Lorberbaum, R. Adler and R. Sofer) refer to intervals of time counting backward from the end of Shabbat as well, not always counting forward from sunset.

4. Rabbah’s interval, the time to walk ¾ mil, is more likely an upper bound on the length of bein hashemashot (the length of bein hashemashot in the summer) counting back from the point of chashekha versus a lower bound (the length of bein hashemashot in the spring) counting forward from sunset. Treating the gemara in Shabbat similar to the gemara in Pesachim as referring only to the (fall and) spring equinox is unnecessary when thinking of the interval as a practical upper bound. (First suggested by the Gaon in OC 261 and widely assumed in recent halakhic literature. Note while the gemara in Pesachim assumes an average that occurs at both the spring and fall equinox, the Gaon’s argument assumes, not an average, but a minimum and referring only to the spring, but not the fall equinox. No rishonim, who limit the gemara in Pesachim to the equinox periods in the fall and spring, make any such assertion with respect to the gemara in Shabbat. A maximum, as opposed to a minimum, would apply year round, as one might also conclude from the lack of commentary.) All the other measures in the gemara of chashekha, the appearance of the horizon, or the visibility of three stars apply year-round. Some of the arguments in favor of such a position include:

 The gemara in Shabbat is discussing Friday night and the beginning of bein hashemashot, as opposed to its end. If the time to walk ¾ of a mil were a minimum, counting forward from the beginning of bein hashemashot, it would address the end of bein hashemashot and the end of Shabbat, as opposed to its beginning.
 The three fractions of the time to walk a mil that are given as alternatives for the length of bein hashemashot would all have identical semantics counting back from the assumed point of chashekha.
 The interval of bein hashemashot is of practical consequence providing a useful upper-bound as opposed to a theoretical lower bound.
 If someone were countering the position of Rabi Yosi, who says bein hashemashot is instantaneous, it is more likely that he would say that it can be as long as opposed to as short as.

5. Shmuel’s assertion about 1, 2 and 3 stars is likely to mean that one star can still occur during daytime, but two stars only (If we assume that bein hashemashot begins 14 -15 minutes after sunset then “only” should be replaced with “almost always.” Though proposed by R. Kapach in his interpretation of Rambam, it would make Shmuel’s assertion slightly less useful. The suggested meaning of Shmuel’s statement is more elegant if we assume that bein hashemashot starts at most 12 – 13 minutes after sunset in the Middle East.) appear after the beginning of bein hashemashot (whose start may also precede the appearance of the first star) and three stars confirm that the transition to the next day has occurred.

6. Moving the beginning of bein hashemashot forward from sunset even according to Rabbah, a variant of the generally assumed opinion of the geonim, successively solves the following issues:

 at 4 – 5 minutes, the minimal time reported as the custom of Jerusalem as well as the opinion of R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the point when the sun disappears from the highest elevations around Jerusalem, Shmuel is consistent at least in a limited sense with R. Yosef while remaining completely inconsistent with Rabbah.
 at 6 minutes, the opinion of R. Chaim Volozhiner and the appearance of a single star in the spring to an expert observer, Shmuel is more easily consistent with R. Yosef but consistent with Rabbah only in a limited sense.
 at 7 – 15 minutes depending on a variety of factors, Shmuel is entirely consistent with Rabi Yehudah and the time to walk ¾ mil can be easily considered a practical upper bound.

7. While many equate and then struggle to resolve Rambam’s approach to Shabbat and Kiddush Hachodesh; I assume they are dissimilar. (Why so obvious an approach was not considered may be related to the assumption that safek chashekha and bein hashemashot are coincident. Though the two notions may be practically coincident, they are certainly not conceptually the same. For those following an opinion akin to the geonim for the end of Shabbat, they may not even be practically coincident. Within the halakhic literature there are differing opinions about the relationship between safek chashekha and bein hashemashot.) In both instances, Rambam considers chashekha as defining the end of a day. For a beit din declaring the beginning of a new month, Rambam sees no necessity to impose an interval of bein hashemashot. Thus, Rambam in hilkhot Kiddush Hachodesh states the halakha in (2:8) and then the recommended practice in (2:9). However, in hilkhot Shabbat, as noted in our opening paragraph, when dealing with a community, Rambam utilizes a notion of bein hashemashot, an interval that he defines practically as opposed to theoretically.

8. While the appearance of the horizon and the visibility of stars are difficult to reconcile with the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, the argument between Abaye and Ravah, looking east and west at the same point in time, is most challenging. I cannot conceive of anyone in the Middle East detecting any change looking at the eastern sky 50 – 60 minutes after sunset. This is perhaps the greatest challenge to Rabbeinu Tam’s definition of the end of Shabbat.

9. It is probable that R. Adler’s 24/35 minute period of bein hashemashot is computed counting back from Rabbeinu Tam’s conceptual end of Shabbat. The alternatives, either counting back from the time that the Frankfurt community typically observed as the end of Shabbat or counting forward from any point in time, are less plausible. While this formulation faces textual challenges, other attempts to explain R. Adler’s opinion including that assumed by the editors referenced by Dr. Leiman as well as multiple suggestions of R. Benish face far more difficulty.

10. A number of recent essays on zemanim, including those by R. Kotler and R. Willig, suggest specific dependencies linking

 the dispute between the geonim and Rabbeinu Tam,
 the dispute whether shaot zemaniot are calculated from sunrise or from alot hashachar,
 and in the case of R. Willig even the time to walk a mil.

I see no such logical dependency and found that custom and / or authorities supported almost every possible combination of alternatives.

11. It is puzzling that when calculating the opinion of the Magen Avraham / Trumat Hadeshen attention to the impact of latitude and/or seasonality is rarely taken into account. In addition to morning zemanim, like the latest time for kriat shema, being earlier, this approach would also provide an alternative for plag haminkha (that many communities in US latitudes might find useful.) Similarly, adjusting alot hashachar would often imply an earlier start for those fast days that start at daybreak (particularly the 17th of Tammuz.) (While not a Magen Avraham specific issue since alot hashachar is applicable according to all opinions, invariance of the 72/90 minute interval is likely inherited from similar practice applied to the position of Rabbeinu Tam with respect to the end of Shabbat which then influenced the calculation of shaot zemaniot according to the Magen Avraham. (See summary for category 3. where this is further explained.) Though conceptually challenging in both contexts, a fixed 72/90 minutes does not create obvious observational issues, except for alot hashachar and only at latitudes further from the equator, like northern Europe.) That would avoid a practice that allows eating on the morning of a fast as late as (or even after) the time of misheyakir.

A concluding example:

The migration of Jews from the Middle East to other locations required adjustment in practice that often necessitated creating concrete concepts in areas that might have otherwise been left unexplored. That process contributed to a wealth of material with which many poskim have had to grapple. Both the categorization and the new approaches that have been proposed should make this vast halakhic literature more understandable.

As I mentioned in the preamble, criticism within the rabbinic literature has been muted, (There are a few very notable and important exceptions.) and potential inaccuracies have often not been identified and discussed adequately. As a result, it is impossible (perhaps even for great poskim who are unacquainted with astronomy or the impacts of season and /or latitude) to read the literature without intense effort.

Let me illustrate using the most widely followed posek of our times, and conclude with a few words, which I hope will be taken as they are meant. I choose R. Feinstein because I assume that many will conclude that if his responsa illustrate my concerns, I could have easily chosen any number of other poskim.

Consider five decisions of R. Feinstein:

1. In the New York area, Shabbat ends 50 minutes after sunset even in accordance with Rabbeinu Tam.
2. One can pray as early as 90 minutes before sunrise under special circumstances.
3. Perform a brit the following week on Wednesday, for example, for a baby born late Wednesday afternoon until 9 minutes after sunset.
4. In the New York area, allow specific activities forbidden only at a rabbinic level on the Shabbat until 40 minutes after sunset on Friday.
5. Unlike other zemanim, chatzot is always at the same time (that varies by location) and does not vary throughout the year.

Summarizing issues discussed previously, these tshuvot are challenging in six (R. Feinstein’s mention of the time to walk 4 mil as 96 minutes while given no practical consequence is also problematic.) different areas:

1. Like R. Pimential approach to Holland, R. Feinstein’s derivation of 50 minutes for New York, reasons by analogy on the appearance of stars, using Lithuania as his base for 72 minutes. Were R. Feinstein to have used Babylonia, certainly a more logical choice, he would undoubtedly have reached a radically different conclusion. R. Willig expresses a similar point, albeit less directly. (This issue was raised directly in a recent sefer by R. D. Heber, Shaarei Zemanim, page 90.) Generally, this psak is quoted without hesitation or comment. (Perhaps new meaning for the term chassid shoteh can be ascribed to the publishers of a sheet I picked up at the Kotel, that provide R. Feinstein’s 50 minute zman for New York for use in Jerusalem.)
2. As R. Feinstein is following the conceptual approach of Rabbeinu Tam, then the end of Shabbat and the time for alot hashachar ought to be treated identically. Instead, R. Feinstein:

 relies on a 22.5 versus 18 minute time to walk a mil for alot hashachar but never even suggests a 22.5 minutes based stringency for Shabbat,
 adjusts only Shabbat’s end but not alot hashachar based on latitude (R. Feinstein does briefly mention the possibility of latitude adjustments for alot hashachar in the tshuva but chooses not use it.) and
 never addresses the relationship between his rulings that, according to the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam that he is following, are conceptually linked.

3. Adjusting zemanim based on latitude to correlate to a physical occurrence like the appearance of stars or the degree of light is strongly supported. However, directly adjusting the time to walk a mil whose length is linked neither to latitude nor to season by location, has no logical basis and leads to conclusions that are in fundamental conflict with observation. (While there exists imprecise language in the literature prior to R. Feinstein that talks in terms of such adjustments, using it as a basis for a psak that reduces / equates 13.5 minutes to 9.375 minutes is inexplicable. As we have noted, this is logically equivalent to asserting a watch that moves 72 minutes in Lithuania, only moves 50 minutes in New York.)

4. Deriving the beginning of bein hashemashot by subtracting from the time that Shabbat ends is common in psak and rooted in the text of the gemara. However, it requires that the end of Shabbat be accurately established. The time that R. Feinstein uses for the end of Shabbat is his (and R. Y. M. Tukitzinsky’s) calculation that is among the most stringent methods for calculating what is already a stringency based on three small stars and not the point that the gemara uses, three medium stars. This is further impacted by R. Feinstein’s use of a “truncated / adjusted” time to walk ¾ mil of 9.375 minutes (as opposed to 13.5 minutes) for the New York area, resulting in a significant leniency. To be concrete, as opposed to the 40 minutes (50 minutes and subtracting 9.375 minutes for bein hashemashot) after sunset that R. Feinstein derives, three medium stars are visible approximately 27 – 32 minutes after sunset, safek chashekha and certainly bein hashemashot precedes that point by some number of minutes. Of course, R. Feinstein, operating within the framework of Rabbeinu Tam, may not consider 50 minutes as a stringency.

5. Chatzot varies slightly day to day (given the tilt of the earth in its orbit) according to the all methods for calculating the hours of the day; the variation is approximately 20 minutes in the New York area.

6. At a very fastidious level, R. Feinstein calculates adjustments based on latitude without regard for the non-linear relationships that exist between the duration of different sub-intervals of bein hashemashot.

In all but the third item above, R. Feinstein had an extensive literature from which to derive support. As was noted, R. Soloveitchik carefully recast the opinion Rabbeinu Tam to avoid these and other issues. However, he ended up with a conceptual approach to Rabbeinu Tam as well as a personal chumrah, which is almost unheard of in the halakhic literature and widely divergent from practice. However, given that this is an area with a long tradition of practice, great poskim, of which R. Feinstein is a unique example, exhibit an impeccable sense (In addition to or perhaps as a result of siyatta di’shemaya.) that guides them in how to decide. I remain struck by the accuracy of the psakim, independent of their problematic rationale. Let us reexamine the five decisions and how they might be alternatively justified:

1. Shabbat ends 50 minutes after sunset in the New York area. Despite this not being the conceptual opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, as R. Feinstein assumes, it is precisely the opinion of the geonim as calculated by R. Yechial Michal Tukitzinsky, the first major contemporary figure to write extensively on this topic combining knowledge of both halakha and astronomy. (R. Belsky’s (re)interpretation of R. Feinstein makes this correspondence precise. See the commentary supporting the www.myzmanim.com website.)
2. One can pray as early as 90 minutes before sunrise in special circumstances. A latitude and seasonal adjustment of 90 minutes provides a basis for yet greater leniency. Beyond the reliance on a 22.5 minute mil, 90 minutes in New York is close to both the scientific point of first light (approximately 90 to 120 minutes), and, more importantly, a latitude/season adjusted 72 minutes (approximately 80 to 110 minutes). The fact that R. Feinstein was willing to rule so differently on the end of the Shabbat and alot hashachar aligns with tradition, albeit in conflict with the conceptual viewpoint of Rabbeinu Tam.
3. Perform a brit the following week on Wednesday, for example, for a baby born late Wednesday afternoon until 9 minutes after sunset. Clearly, this psak is in perfect alignment with the views developed and similar to the tradition of Jerusalem over the generations that assumed that a baby born a few minutes after sunset has his brit on the same day the following week. (See Minhagei Eretz Yisrael by R. Yaakov Gliss, pages 102 and 282 who mentions 4 – 5 minutes and Zemanim Kehilkhatam by R. Boorstyn, chapter 2, section 1, footnote 7, who claims that R. Shmuel Salant, would rule that a baby born after sunset but before the call of the mugrab, seven to ten minutes after sunset, has his brit on the same day the following week.) Even rejecting Rabbeinu Tam’s late end of Shabbat based on the overwhelming arguments of the Gaon and others, a start to a day a few minutes after sunset is supported by generations of practice. Even R. Feinstein’s reliance on Rabbeinu Tam for a slightly delayed beginning to bein hashemashot is often rejected.
4. Allow specific activities forbidden only at a rabbinic level on the Shabbat until 40 minutes after sunset. Perhaps the most challenging given the undisputed assumption that the gemara meant bein hashemashot to extend back from three medium stars (a depression angle of about 6 degrees) versus R. Feinstein’s roughly 8.5 degrees and R. Feinstein’s use of a “truncated / adjusted” 9.375 minutes to walk ¾ mil. Nonetheless, being exceedingly liberal with respect to a rabbinic prohibition, especially, in the face of need, has a long tradition. Unfortunately, in most, if not all seasons of the year, 40 minutes after sunset, is well past the point of chashekha, in the New York area.
5. Chatzot is always at the same time. As with R. Feinstein’s 50 minutes, there is a need for seasonal adjustment. It appears, like a number of Rabbis who oppose this type of complexity in psak, R. Feinstein’s tradition was to use a single time.

On the first three rulings, R. Feinstein’s psak can be easily justified on other grounds. The last two are somewhat less critical and more problematic. However, it is often dangerous for Rabbis to apply or extend elements of R. Feinstein’s logic to other areas where zemanim are critical without his innate sense of psak.

Final Comments:

This monograph was intended to address seminal issues relevant to bein hashemashot without covering in depth many important sub-topics. Hopefully, the approach and observations will make this vast literature easier to study. While I did not want to address explicitly either philosophic issues or practical issues of psak, I suspect that my personal opinions on both are clear. I was strongly motivated to defend minhag Yisroel, a mimetic tradition that for many centuries, even until the Second World War, relied on the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam in many parts of Europe.

As I studied this topic, I was repeatedly revisiting three issues:

 If in ancient times, sunset, a very easily identified occurrence, was considered the precise starting time for Shabbat, how could it have ever been forgotten and / or abandoned? If Shabbat started sometime after sunset, then the position of Rabbeinu Tam and an overwhelming number of rishonim is more plausible. As Jews migrated northward, the required beginning to Shabbat separated even further from sunset, particularly if bein hashemashot was thought to have an unchanging maximum length – the time to walk ¾ of a mil.

 If observation challenged only Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion while leaving the approach of the geonim free of any issues, why did major figures living in southern Europe and even the Middle East, including Ramban and (likely) R. Yosef Caro, adhere to Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion?

 How could generations of practice that relied on the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam or some related variant be so easily discounted? In my mind, the modern bias to treat sunset as a given (and reject even R. Feinstein’s limited reliance on the position of Rabbeinu Tam) is unwarranted.

I hope that what I have written, at least partially, addresses these questions.

The approach developed posits that bein hashemashot begins after sunset, later than many assume, while its end is somewhat earlier than current practice. (R. Y. C. Sonnenfeld’s tshuva 33 (an approbation to a sefer on zemanim) on this topic is remarkably supportive. While speculating that we may have to wait for Elijah to defend the fundamental difficulties with Rabbeinu Tam’s end to bein hashemashot and Shabbat, he raises issues with the approach of the Gaon as to the beginning of bein hashemashot from texts of gemara that imply that the day extends past sunset. While suggesting that we follow both chumrot and stating a personal preference not to attempt to decide on a matter so long in dispute, he expresses hope that this will be clarified one day. I believe that I have taken a step in that direction. In any case, regardless of his suggested practice, like this monograph he raises issues with both the end time of Rabbeinu Tam and the start time of the geonim. While R. Sonnenfeld suggests that one adopt the stringencies of both positions, the approach developed and generations of practice often made use of the leniencies of a hybrid approach.) While some will contend that the criticism, suggested innovations, and conclusions do not exhibit sufficient deference to recent generations of psak, I hope that this monograph demonstrates a commitment to integrity, clarity, simplicity, consistency with basic astronomic observations, faithfulness to basic texts and respect for generations of halakhic insights and in particular, practice.

In summary, a fulsome defense for a later start to Shabbat is anchored on three points:

1. Mishetishkeh hakhamah refers to a point after sunset.

2. The time to walk ¾ of a mil is the maximum length of bein hashemashot not the minimum.

3. When applying the gemara’s interval of bein hashemashot to other locations, its length need not be extended.

The first is the preferred reading of the gemara in Shabbat according to most rishonim. The second is strongly supported by simple logic and arguably by the statement of Shmuel, though certainly at variance with the prevalent contemporary interpretation. The third is clearly debatable, but the viewpoint of some major poskim. All three are needed to defend fully historical practice. However, even the first, or certainly the first two points, should influence contemporary psak in extenuating circumstances.

Those familiar with R. Kapach’s approach to Rambam throughout Mishnah Torah, will recognize that his conclusions as to Rambam’s position on the twilight period and much of this monograph are consistent. While R. Kapach’s approach tacitly assumed stars, as opposed to darkness, as defining both the beginning and the end of bein hashemashot, something I believe that Rambam did not support, R. Kapach’s practical conclusions and insights into Rambam aligns Rambam across Mishnah Torah closely with the ideas that have been developed. (1. R. Kapach also insists on bein hashemashot beginning at 15 minutes after sunset, something we are not convinced that Rambam necessarily maintained. 2. As has been mentioned previously, objections to the approach of the geonim derive from sugyot where sunset does not appear to be a precise delimiter. Similarly, despite Rambam’s clear identification with the position of the geonim, some try to align his position with Rabbeinu Tam based on the fact that he did not consider sunset as critical as many assumed that an approach like that of the geonim had to maintain. As has been argued throughout this monograph, the “either-or” assumption of either Rabbeinu Tam or the geonim, without intermediate positions is an assumption that I find neither conclusive nor correct. 3. Building on R. Kapach’s approach, a future paper will attempt to demonstrate that Rambam maintained a hybrid / intermediate position, similar to the position of the geonim, consistent with the text of the gemara, astronomic observation and supportive of the approach taken in this monograph.)

It should also be clear, that while their rationales were entirely different, many poskim who in practice followed R. Pimential’s approach supported a position akin to what has been suggested throughout the monograph. In practice, they allowed work after sunset proper and awaited only three (small) stars, not a full 72 minutes. As well, they would never allow work on Friday, anywhere near as late as Rabbeinu Tam’s conceptual position would suggest.

Both the practice suggested by these poskim and R. Kapach’s interpretation of Rambam conceptually aligns with the approach developed throughout this monograph.

Clearly, in the study of zemanim, one has to “look up” as well as “look in.” Over the last few hundred years, careful observation of the skies has often been replaced with a fixation on time and timepieces. This contributed a false sense of accuracy as opposed to enhanced clarity to an already complex area.