The question of women receiving aliyyot, which lies at the center of Darka shel Halakha, is briefly discussed in a baraita cited in the Talmud Megilla (23a) which reads (Source 1):

(1) תלמוד בבלי מסכת מגילה דף כג עמוד א
תנו רבנן: הכל עולין למנין שבעה, ואפילו קטן ואפילו אשה. אבל אמרו חכמים: אשה לא תקרא בתורה, מפני כבוד צבור.

Despite the above negative ruling of the Talmud and, in its wake, of all subsequent codifiers,[2] within the last decade, there have been two major attempts to reopen this issue. One was penned by R. Mendel Shapiro[3] who argues that kevod ha-tsibbur is a social concept – and a woman’s general standing in society was lower than men’s. Nowadays when this is no longer true, a community can be mohel on its kavod – voluntarily set aside its honor. He errs, however, since the vast majority of rishonim and aharonim disagree with his analysis. Kevod ha-tsibbur has nothing to do with social standing. The vast majority of posekim maintain that kevod ha-tsibbur stems from women’s lack of obligation in keri’at haTorah, and expresses itself either in terms of tsniut or zilzul ha-mitsvah. The Tsniut School argues that women should not be at the center of communal ritual unnecessarily – and this is particularly true by keri’at haTorah, from which they are freed. The second school maintains that there is an issue of zilzul ha-mitsva in that the men who are duty-bound should fulfill the mitsva that is incumbent upon them – and not delegate it to those who are not obligated.[4]

The second attempt is that of R. Prof. Daniel Sperber,[5] in Darka shel Halakha, and I would like to focus on two major issues.

Kevod haTsibbur: Instruction or Recommendation?

Firstly, R. Sperber has suggested that the phrase in Megilla 23a “However, the Rabbis declared: a woman should not read from the Torah – because of kevod ha-tsibbur” describes what Hazal believed to be the preferred or recommended mode of conduct, the ideal way of performing keri’at haTorah.

Indeed, ke-darko ba-kodesh, Prof. Sperber surveys all the places where it states אבל אמרו חכמים and shows that some cases are merely expressions of the ideal, while others refer to things that are actually assur. Yet, he concludes [Note 19, p. 21] that that in the case of women’s aliyyot: “לא נראה שמדובר … בתקנת חז”ל אלא שאינו ראוי”

This position is very problematic, particularly in this case of women’s aliyyot which is one of kevod ha-tsibbur.

(1) Firstly, Meiri, Kiryat Sefer, Ma’amar 5, sec. a, writes (Source 2):

(2) מאירי, קרית ספר, מאמר חמישי חלק א
נמצאת למד …שהכל עולין למנין ז’ אפילו אשה וקטן…, אלא שמיחו באשה מפני כבוד צבור…

The word “מיחו” appears many times in the Mishnaic and Tamudic literature and it refers to strongly verbalized objection and public reproof. See for example, Source 3.

(3) מסכת פסחים פרק ד משנה ח
משנה: ששה דברים עשו אנשי יריחו על שלשה מיחו בידם ועל שלשה לא מיחו בידם
רמב”ם: אלו הששה דברים כולם היו שלא ברצון חכמים, אלא שעל שלשה מהם – והם הראשונים – לא מיחו בידם חכמים, ושלשה המנויים באחרונה מיחו בידם.

Clearly, from the Meiri’s perspective, the statement אבל אמרו חכמים by women’s aliyyot is not a simple recommendation.

(2) Secondly, there is a group of rishonim and aharonim who maintain that in the specific case of women’s aliyyot, women cannot receive aliyyot, even in cases of she’at ha-dehak or be-diavad. This school includes the Rambam and Semag and many subsequent aharonim (R. Abraham Pinso; R. Matsli’ah Mazuz; R. Ben-Zion Lichtman, R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg and R. Isaac Zilberstein). For example, Rambam (Sources 4 and 5) writes without any qualification that women may not receive aliyyot:

(4) רמב”ם הלכות תפילה ונשיאת כפים פרק יב, הלכה יז
אשה לא תקרא בציבור מפני כבוד הציבור…

(5) הרב מסעוד חי רוקח, מעשה רוקח שם
ורבינו כתב קיצור הדין ד-“אשה לא תקרא מפני כבוד הציבור”, א”כ נאסר לגמרי…

Semag (Source 6) records that minors may receive aliyyot, but makes no mention of women whatsoever. On the contrary, he maintains (Sources 7 and 8) that women cannot motsi men in megilla, even be-di-avad, just as they can’t receive aliyyot.

(6) הרב משה בן יעקב מקוצי, ספר מצוות גדול (סמ”ג), עשין סימן יט
כמה [הם] הקוראים, בשבת בשחרית שבעה .. וקטן היודע לקרות ויודע למי מברכים עולה בשבעה למניין.

(7) ספר מצוות גדול – מצוות מדרבנן, הלכות מגילה
…דאף על גב דנשים חייבות במקרא מגילה אינן מוציאות את הזכרים. ואל תשיבני נר חנוכה דאמרינן בפרק במה מדליקין (שבת כג, א) דאשה מדלקת משמע אף להוציא האיש. דשאני מקרא מגילה שהוא כמו קריאת התורה לכך אינה מוציאה את האיש.

(8) מגן אברהם סימן תרפט ס”ק ה
“וי”א שהנשים אינם מוציאות את האנשים “
אינם מוציאות – ול”ד לנרות חנוכה דשאני מגילה דהוי כמו קריאת התורה (סמ”ג) פי’ ופסולה מפני כבוד הצבור ולכן אפי’ ליחיד אין מוציאה דלא פלוג (רא”ם)

Clearly, according to these authorities, the statement אבל אמרו חכמים is not a simple recommendation.

(3) There is another very large group of posekim (perhaps the majority) led by the R. Yoel Sirkis (Ba”h; Sources 9 and 10) who maintain that one cannot be mohel on kevod ha-tsibbur – particularly in the case of women’s aliyyot. However, bi-she’at ha-dehak – where there is no alternative or no one else eligible – a woman can read, lest keri’at haTorah be cancelled. It is to such cases that the Gemara in Megilla was referring.

(9) הרב יואל סירקיס, בית חדש (ב”ח) טור או”ח סימן נ”ג ד”ה “ואין ממנין”
…אלא הדבר פשוט, כיון שכך תקנו חכמים דחששו לכבוד ציבור, אין ביד הציבור למחול.

(10) בית חדש, טור אורח חיים סימן קמ”ד
… מה שתיקנו חכמים .. משום כבוד הציבור לא תקנו מתחילה אלא היכא שאפשר

For example, in a case of a city with only kohanim cited by Rabbi Sperber himself, Maharam mi-Rothenburg (Source 11) permits women to receive the third through seventh aliya. Otherwise the Torah reading would not occur, for the lineage of the kohanim would be challenged were they to receive the remaining aliyyot. In the language of the Maharam:

(11) שו”ת מהר”ם מרוטנברג חלק ד (דפוס פראג) סימן קח
…ועיר שכולה כהנים ואין בה [אפי’] ישראל אחד נראה לי דכהן קורא פעמיים ושוב יקראו נשים דהכל משלימי’ למנין ז’ אפי’ עבד ושפחה וקטן (מגילה כ”ג ע”א). ונהי דמסיק עלה אבל אמרו חכמי’ לא תקרא אשה בתורה מפני כבוד הצבור, היכא דלא אפשר ידחה כבוד הצבור מפני פגם כהנים הקוראים שלא יאמרו בני גרושות.

Maharam mi-Rothenburg was only willing to permit bi-she’at ha-dehak. This certainly doesn’t sound like a recommendation המלצה. Rather it is permission given only bi-she’at ha-dehak.

It would seem to me that in Darka shel Halakha there is a blurring of the difference between le-khathila and be-di-avad. For example, Hazal say that one should not use a milchig spoon שאינו בן יומו (not used in last 24 hours) to stir hot chicken soup. Similarly, Hazal indicate that one shouldn’t eat out of utensils that haven’t been immersed in a mikva. In both cases, be-di-avad, the food remains perfectly kosher. Hazal’s ruling in both these cases is not a recommendation – but rather a clear directive how one is required to act; under normative conditions, it is assur to act otherwise. This is also true regarding women’s aliyyot – Hazal forbade it le-khathila, even though be-di-avad or bi-she’at ha-dehak the aliyya may be valid.

Now it should be appreciated that from Prof. Sperber’s perspective it is important that אבל אמרו חכמים be only a המלצה. Prof. Sperber wants to maintain that there really is no “down side” to women getting aliyyot. However, to my mind, he errs – kevod ha-tsibbur is a takana le-khathila, not a recommendation.

In this regard, I would also like to briefly mention one further crucial point, relevant to both the papers of R. Mendel Shapiro and R. Daniel Sperber – but which we will not be able to develop fully here at the Seforim blog.[6] When Hazal talked about women getting aliyyot, they were referring to a system in which the oleh made the berakhot and read aloud – for himself and the community. However, nowadays, the job of the oleh is bifurcated: the oleh makes the berakhot and ba’al korei reads aloud. This raises a fundamental question: how can one person make berakhot, while another does the ma’aseh ha-mitsva. For there not to be a berakha le-vatalah there must be a mechanism to transfer the reading from the ba’al korei to the oleh. That mechanism is either shom’eah ke-oneh or shelihut. But both mechanisms require that both the oleh and ba’al korei be obligated – otherwise there is no areivut. Since women are not obligated in keri’at haTorah, they can serve neither as the oleh nor as the ba’al korei – me-ikkar ha-din – because the birkhot haTorah of the oleh will be berakhot levatalah. Note that all this has nothing to do with kevod haTsibbur. The only case in which the issue of kevod haTsibbur begins is in the uncommon case where a woman makes the berakhot and reads for herself.[7] Hence, under a bifurcated system, there is a clear downside in allowing women to read or serve as olot – a proliferation of berakhot le-vatala!

Does Kevod haBeriyyot Defer Kevod haTsibbur –
The Rules of Kevod haBeriyyot

Lets now turn to the second issue – and this is Prof. Sperber’s major hiddush in this book. Briefly, Prof. Sperber notes that there is a concept in halakha called kevod ha-beriyyot which refers to shame or embarrassment (בושה או בזיון) which would result from the fulfillment of a religious obligation. The view of the halakha is that kevod ha-beriyyot can defer rabbinic obligations and prohibitions. Hence, Prof. Sperber maintains that if there is a community of women who are offended by their not receiving aliyyot – because of the rabbinic rule of kevod hatsibbur, then kevod ha-beriyyot should defer kevod ha-tsibbur.

Professor Sperber’s book is devoted to describing the use of kevod ha-beriyyot in the halakhic literature. He is by no means the first to do this and the subject is extensively reviewed and analyzed by Rabbis Rakover,[8] Blidstein,[9] Lichtenstein,[10] Feldman,[11] and many others.[12]

Let’s begin with the Gemara in Berakhot 19b:

(12) תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף יט עמוד ב
(א) אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: המוצא כלאים בבגדו פושטן אפילו בשוק, מאי טעמא (משלי כ”א) “אין חכמה ואין תבונה ואין עצה לנגד ה'” – כל מקום שיש חלול השם אין חולקין כבוד לרב.
(ב) מתיבי: קברו את המת וחזרו, ולפניהם שתי דרכים, אחת טהורה ואחת טמאה, בא בטהורה – באין עמו בטהורה, בא בטמאה – באין עמו בטמאה, משום כבודו. [רוב הראשונים גורסים: באים בטמאה, בא עמהם משום כבודם] אמאי? לימא: אין חכמה ואין תבונה לנגד ה’. תרגמה רבי אבא בבית הפרס דרבנן
(ג)…תא שמע: גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה [את] לא תעשה שבתורה. ואמאי? לימא: אין חכמה ואין תבונה ואין עצה לנגד ה’! – תרגמה רב בר שבא קמיה דרב כהנא בלאו (דברים י”ז, יא) דלא תסור [מן הדבר אשר יגידו לך ימין ושמאל[ …כל מילי דרבנן אסמכינהו על לאו דלא תסור, ומשום כבודו שרו רבנן.
(ד) רש”י: כל מילי דרבנן וכו’ – והכי קאמר להו: דבר שהוא מדברי סופרים נדחה מפני כבוד הבריות, וקרי ליה לא תעשה – משום דכתיב לא תסור, ודקא קשיא לכו דאורייתא הוא, רבנן אחלוה ליקרייהו לעבור על דבריהם היכא דאיכא כבוד הבריות.

The upshot of this Gemara is that if one is wearing sha’atnez – the wearer is obligated to remove it even in the marketplace, despite any possible embarrassment. The Gemara explains that G-d’s honor/dignity takes priority over that of Man. However, if the garment is only rabbinically forbidden, one can wait until they return home to change. The reason is that kevod ha-beriyyot, the honor of the individual, can defer rabbinic prohibitions.

Prof. Sperber adequately shows that kevod ha-beriyyot has always been an important consideration in pesak. However, an in-depth survey of the responsa literature over the past 1000 years makes it clear that it cannot be invoked indiscriminately. Indeed, as the gedolei ha-posekim make apparent, there are clearly defined parameters which Prof. Sperber seems to ignore. Hence, R. Sperber’s application of kevod ha-beriyyot to the issue of women’s aliyyot is seriously flawed. In this brief presentation, we will discuss nine of the aforementioned principles.

(1) Firstly, kevod ha-tsibbur is merely the kevod ha-beriyyot of the tsibbur.[13] Hence it makes no sense that the honor of the individual should have priority over the honor of a large collection of individuals. Indeed, this is explicitly stated by the 13th century Meiri. [Source 13; Meiri is referring to Source 12ב]
(13) מאירי, בית הבחירה, ברכות דף יט עמוד ב:
{יש גורסים בא בטומאה באין עמו. ואין הדברים נראין} שאין כבוד רבים נדחה מפני יחיד או יחידים, [וכן הוא] באבל רבתי…ואף בתלמוד המערב…

(2) Secondly, The Meiri (Source 14) also emphatically states:
(14) מאירי, בית הבחירה, ברכות דף יט עמוד ב:
…שלא אמרה תורה כבד אחרים בקלון עצמך…

Giving women aliyyot by overriding kevod ha-tsibbur with kevod ha-beriyyot would effectively be honoring women by dishonoring the community – and, hence, cannot be done.

(3) R. Sperber’s suggestion would ask us to uproot completely the rabbinic ban on women’s aliyyot. However, kevod ha-beriyyot can only temporarily set aside a rabbinic ordinance. As stated in the Jerusalem Talmud (Source 15):

(15) תלמוד ירושלמי כלאים פ”ט ה”א, לב ע”א
הרי שהיה מהלך בשוק ונמצא לבוש כלאים, תרין אמוראין (שני אמוראים חולקים בדבר): חד אמר אסור; וחרנה (ואחר) אמר מותר. מאן דאמר אסור – דבר תורה; מאן דאמר מותר – כההיא דאמר רבי זעירא: גדול כבוד הרבים שהוא דוחה את המצוה בלא תעשה שעה אחת.

Many of the commentaries on the Yerushlami and posekim hold that this proviso of sha’ah ahat applies to Rabbinic mitsvot as well – including: Tosafot, Ketubot 103b, end of s.v. “Oto”; Or Zarua, Hilkhot Erev Shabbat, sec. 6; Penei Moshe; Vilna Gaon; R. David Pardo; Arukh haShulhan (Source 16); and others.

(16) ערוך השולחן, יו”ד סימן ש”ג, סעיף ב:
שאני הכא [בכלאים] דהוא לשעה קלה, דכשיבא לביתו יגידו לו ויפשוט. ..ואפי’ באיסור דרבנן תמידי נ”ל דמחוייב להגיד לו, ואין למנוע מצד כבוד הבריות

(4) Next, many posekim including R. Yair Hayyim Bachrach, R. Meir Simha of Dvinsk (Source 17), R. Jeroham Perlow, R. Moses Feinstein, R. Chaim Zev Reines indicate that the “dishonor” that is engendered must result from an act of disgrace – not from refraining to give honor. As Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk writes:

(17) אור שמח (הרב מאיר שמחה הכהן מדווינסק) הלכות יו”ט פרק ו, הלכה י”ד
גדול כבוד הבריות…זה דווקא במידי דבזיונא הוא לבריות, אבל…ענין של כבוד…מי שרי?

Only in cases where kavod is obligatory (e.g., for a King or mourner) is the absence of kavod considered embarrassing, as indicated by R. Isaac Blazer (Source 18),

(18) שו”ת פרי יצחק, נד (הרב יצחק בלזר)
צריך לומר דסבירא להו לגמרא במקום שהכבוד מחוייב גם העדר כבוד הוא בכלל כבוד הבריות, דהעדר כבוד הוא כמו גנאי… ועיין בכתובות (דף סט) מניין שאבל יושב בראש….

Prof. Yaakov Blidstein discusses burial on Yom Tov sheini shel galuyot, which is permitted because Yom Tov sheni is de-rabbanan, while not burying is kevod ha-beriyyot.[14] However, a long list of posekim will not permit 20 individuals to violate Yom Tov sheni to attend to a burial, when only 10 are required to bury the deceased and the additional 10 would be coming along out of honor. Only the first 10 are permitted.

Similarly, in the case of aliyyot, no act of shame has been performed to all those not called to the Torah (both men and women); they are simply not honored. Kevod ha-beriyyot cannot be activated under such conditions.

R. Daniel Sperber in his book Darka shel Halakha (p. 77, note 104) attempts to challenge this principle – that kevod ha-beriyyot is inapplicable when no act of shame has been performed. He cites the fact that a bride is permitted to wash her face on Yom Kippur (Source 19).

(19) מסכת יומא פרק ח משנה א
משנה: יום הכפורים אסור באכילה ובשתיה וברחיצה ובסיכה ובנעילת הסנדל ובתשמיש המטה והמלך והכלה ירחצו את פניהם והחיה תנעול את הסנדל דברי רבי אליעזר וחכמים אוסרין:
רשי והכלה – צריכה נוי עד שתחבב על בעלה, וכל שלשים יום לחופתה היא קרויה כלה.
ר’ עובדיה מברטנורא: והכלה – צריכה נוי כדי לחבבה על בעלה. וכל שלשים יום קרויה כלה:

R. Sperber assumes that the prohibition against washing on Yom Kippur is rabbinic (when many authorities hold it is biblical) and that the permission to wash stems from kevod ha-beriyyot. Based on this, he wants to demonstrate that the shame here results from something that was not done.

This analysis is in error because the leniency for a bride has nothing to do with kevod ha-beriyyot. What was forbidden was rehitsa shel ta’anug, but not washing of necessity, e.g., for cleanliness. A bride is permitted to wash her face on Yom Kippur, so that her face would not be displeasing in her new grooms eyes – and this is considered laving of necessity. As Rashi and Rav write (Source 19 above), a bride requires beauty.

R. Sperber (p. 83) further cites a responsum of R. Isaiah of Trani, Resp. haRid, sec. 21 which permits the lighting of candles in the synagogue on Yom Tov because of “kevod ha-beriyyot.” R. Sperber attempts to use this example to demonstrate that kevod ha-beriyyot can set aside prohibitions even if it is only to honor those who are attending synagogue.

Unfortunately, he errs in his analysis here as well. Similar teshuvot are found from the Rid, Rosh and Maharam of Rothenburg.[15] And their goal is to show that lighting candles in the synagogue come under the rubric of tsorekh okhel nefesh because they honor people (Rid), the synagogue (Maharam) or the holiday (Rosh). Once it its tsorekh okhel nefesh, it is the tsorekh okhel nefesh which defers the prohibition.

(5) Nearly all authorities – including, inter alia, R. Naftali Amsterdam (Source 20), R. Elhanan Bunim Wasserman, R. Makiel Tsvi haLevi Tannenbaum, Rav Yitzchak Nissim (Source 21), R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, R. Elijah Bakshi Doron (Source 22), R. Israel Shepansky – maintain that kevod ha-beriyyot requires an objective standard that affects or is appreciated by all.

(20) שו”ת פרי יצחק, נג
הרב נפתלי אמשטרדם: כי הנה כבוד הבריות לא נאמר רק על דבר שהוא גנאי לכל מין האנושי יהיה מאיזה מין שיהיה, כמו מת מצוה או לילך ערום שרוב בני האדם מתביישים מזה. אבל בדבר שהבזיון מתייחס רק לאדם הזה לפי תכונתו, כמו לישא שק או קופה, בזה לא שייך כלל לפטור מטעם כבוד הבריות.

(21) הרב יצחק ניסים, תשובה כתב יד, מרחשון תשכ”ד (יד הרב ניסים)
וכמובן שתלך [הבת מצווה] לפני כן לבית הכנסת להתפלל, אבל לא לעלות לתורה. הלכה מפורשת היא שאין אשה קוראת בתורה בציבור, ואין משנים את ההלכה לפי הרגשות של בני אדם.

(22) הרב אליהו בקשי דורון, שו”ת בנין אב, ח”ב, סימן נ”ה, אות ג’
…כבוד האבל דין הוא שיש לכבד כל האבלים, ובכגון זה כבוד הבריות שיכבדו האבל… אבל אדם פרטי שמחליט לכבד את עצמו…כבודו משיקולים פרטיים אינו יכול לפטור אותו, או לדחות איסור דרבנן.

This view explicitly rejects subjective standards – in which what is embarrassing results from the idiosyncrasies or hypersensitivities of an individual or small group. The vast majority of religiously committed women are not offended when they do not receive an aliyya. Indeed, they understand and accept the halakhic given, although some might clearly have preferred it to be otherwise.

More importantly, does it make halakhic sense that if a group of women – nay, any group, says: “this Rabbinic halakha offends me” – be it mehitsa, tsni’ut, kashrut, stam yeynam, many aspects of taharat ha-mishpahah, who counts for a minyan, and who can serve as a hazzan – then we should have a carte blanche to go about abrogating it. Such a position is untenable, if not unthinkable.[16]

(6) Many leading scholars[17] emphasize that, as in the cases of kevod ha-beriyyot discussed in Berakhot 19b and elsewhere, the shame must result from extraneous factors. Thus, removing the kilayyim garment per se’ is not what causes the shame. Rather, it is that one has no other garment underneath and, hence, remains naked. In such cases, kevod ha-beriyyot can be invoked to nullify the rabbinic commandment which leads to the dishonor. However, kevod ha-beroyyot cannot be invoked to nullify a rabbinic commandment, where the shame comes from the very fulfillment of the rabbinic injunction itself.

Take for example one who is invited to dine with his colleagues or clients, would we allow him to avoid embarrassment by eating fruit and vegetables from which terumot and ma’asrot (which nowadays is Rabbinic) have not been removed, or by consuming hamets she-avar alav haPesah, or by drinking stam yeynam (wine touched or poured by a non-Jew). Or alternatively, suppose someone is at a meeting and is ashamed to walk out in order to daven Minha. And what about prayers at the airport in between flights. Would we allow him to forgo his rabbinic prayer obligation because of this embarrassment?

The answer is that in those cases where acting according to halakha – be it to not eat terumot and ma’asrot, or to not drink stam yeynam, or to fulfill ones prayer obligation – creates the embarrassment, then kevod ha-beriyyot cannot set aside the Rabbinic prohibition. One should be proud to be fulfilling the halakha. Similarly, kevod ha-beriyyot cannot be invoked to uproot the rabbinic consideration of kevod ha-tsibbur which prevents women’s aliyyot. This is because the dishonor stems directly from the very fact that women are not given aliyyot in accordance with the rabbinic guidelines.

(7) That the rabbis of the Talmud were sensitive to women’s spiritual needs is evident from the rabbinic concept of nahat ru’ah (spiritual satisfaction), which was invoked in a variety of instances to permit certain special dispensations for women.[18] R. Sperber maintains that this concept is an expression of kevod ha-beriyyot.[19] Yet, despite this admitted sensitivity, Hazal themselves were not concerned about kevod ha-beriyyot when they ruled that, because of kevod ha-tsibbur, women should not le-khathila receive aliyyot. Hence, how can we?

This argument is all the more true according to the explanation of Rashi on the mechanism of kevod ha-beriyyot deferments. Rashi (Source 12ד cited above) explains that in instances of kevod ha-beriyyot the Rabbis “forgo their honor to allow their edict to be violated.”

(12) תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף יט עמוד ב
….. כל מילי דרבנן אסמכינהו על לאו דלא תסור, ומשום כבודו שרו רבנן.
(ד) רש”י כל מילי דרבנן וכו’ – והכי קאמר להו: דבר שהוא מדברי סופרים נדחה מפני כבוד הבריות, וקרי ליה לא תעשה – משום דכתיב לא תסור, ודקא קשיא לכו דאורייתא הוא, רבנן אחלוה ליקרייהו לעבור על דבריהם היכא דאיכא כבוד הבריות.

It is one thing if the clash is unexpected, unanticipated and accidental. But in the case of keri’at haTorah, it was Hazal themselves who knowingly set up the rule of kevod ha-tsibbur which precludes women from aliyyot. Why would we expect them to forgo their honor in such a case?

(8) The Rivash (Resp. Rivash, sec 226) forbade sewing baby clothes during hol ha-moed for a newborn’s circumcision despite the parents’ desire to dress him properly and festively for the event. One of Rivash’s rationales is that since all understand that new clothes cannot be sewn on hol ha-moed – because Hazal forbade it, kevod ha-beriyyot cannot be invoked to circumvent this rabbinic prohibition. Similarly, one cannot invoke kevod ha-beriyyot to allow women to receive aliyyot, because all understand that this has been synagogue procedure for two millennia and that the Rabbis of the Talmud themselves prohibited it.

(9) Rivash (ibid.) and Havot Yair (sec. 95) and others rule against extending the leniency of kevod ha-beriyyot beyond those instances explicitly discussed by Hazal – honor of the deceased (כבוד המת), personal hygiene dealing with excrement, undress, and the wholeness of the family unit. New cases may not be comparable in their nature or severity to the original examples. Indeed, as noted by Prof. Blidstein and R. Aharon Lichtenstein,[20] throughout the two millennia of post-Talmudic responsa literature, kevod ha-beriyyot is rarely if ever cited as the sole or even major grounds for overriding a bona fide rabbinic ordinance. It always appears as one of many additional reasons to be lenient (snif le-hakel). This is indeed the case in nearly all the instances cited at length by R. Daniel Sperber in his book Darka shel Halakha.

What’s more, in those instances where kevod ha-beriyyot is invoked essentially alone, it is because the matter being deferred is a mere, often unbased, stringency (humra be-alma). For example, the custom in some communities prohibiting menstruants to enter the synagogue – which Prof. Sperber has returned to repeatedly (Sperber, pp. 74) – is what the posekim call a humra ve-silsul be-alma. Hence, the fact that even in such stringent communities, menstruants visited the sanctuary on the High Holidays – would be a classic example of kevod ha-beriyyot overruling a humra be-alma.

Now Prof. Sperber will respond, that he too would only invoke kevod ha-beriyyot in the case of women’s aliyyot. After all, there is no real down side – at most we have only violated a recommendation. However, as we have argued above, “aval amru hakhamim” is not a recommendation by women’s aliyyot – but a prohibition le-khathilla. What’s more, a woman who gets an aliyya without reading for herself or who is only the ba’alat keria is responsible for generating berakhot levatala. We have also argued that Prof. Sperber has improperly invoked kevod ha-beriyyot for the case of women’s aliyyot because he has not taken into consideration the kelalim of the gedolei ha-posekim.

I would like to close with one last point. Despite the fact that we strongly disagree with Prof. Sperber’s conclusion, he after all did what a Torah scholar is bidden to do. He made a creative suggestion, documented his arguments, published his suggestion in the rabbinic literature for all to examine, and awaits criticism or approval. After thrashing out the issue, back and forth – one hopefully will be able to discern where the truth lies.[21]

However, we take issue with those who would enact women’s aliyyot in practice, hastily undoing more than two millennia of halakhic precedent – simply because an article or two has appeared on the subject. Considering the novelty of this innovation, religious integrity and sensitivity requires serious consultation with renowned halakhic authorities of recognized stature – prior to acting on such a significant departure from normative halakha. It often takes several years time before a final determination can be reached as to whether or not a suggested innovation meets these standards. But that cannot provide adequate justification for haste.

The halakhic process has always been about the honest search for truth – Divine truth.[22] To adopt one particular approach – simply because it yields the desired result, lacks intellectual honesty and religious integrity. It is equivalent to shooting the arrows and then drawing the bull’s-eye. To paraphrase Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz: we must always ask ourselves whether we are in reality serving the Divine will or our own.[23]

Notes:
[1] R. Daniel Sperber, Darka shel Halakha – Keri’at Nashim baTorah: Perakim biMediniyyut Pesikah (Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 2007). The phrase “lo zu ha-derekh” used in the title of this book review appears in Bava Metsi’a 37b and Kalla Rabati 9:19. This critique is essentially the combined text of two lectures given at Bar-Ilan University (17 March 2008) and at Lander Institute, Jerusalem (4 May 2008), and is based on a forthcoming article by Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women, Kri’at haTorah and Aliyyot” (in review). A complete list of sources and references will be fully delineated therein. The author would like to acknowledge the kind and gracious support of this research afforded by The Bellows Family Foundation. The author also wishes to express heartfelt thanks to Prof. Dov I. Frimer for reviewing the manuscript and for his many valuable and insightful comments.
[2] See, for example, Maimonides, Yad, Hil. Tefilla, sec. 12, parag. 17; R. Joseph Karo, Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 282, parag. 3.
[3] R. Mendel Shapiro, “Qeri’at ha-Torah by Women: A Halakhic Analysis,” The Edah Journal 1:2 (Sivan 5761): 1-55 – available online here; R. Mendel Shapiro and R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, “Concluding Responses to Qeri’at ha-Torah for Women,” ibid., 1-4 – available online; R. Mendel Shapiro, “Communications,” Tradition 40:1 (Spring 2007): 107-116.
[4] See Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women, Kri’at haTorah and Aliyyot,” (forthcoming).
[5] (a) R. Daniel Sperber, “Congregational Dignity and Human Dignity: Women and Public Torah Reading,” The Edah Journal 3:2 (Elul 5763): 1-14 – available online; (b) R. Daniel Sperber, “kevod ha-tsibbur uKhevod haBeriyyot,” De’ot 16 (Sivan 5763, June 2003): 17-20 and 44 – available online; (c) R. Daniel Sperber, Darka shel Halakha – Keri’at Nashim baTorah: Perakim biMediniyyut Pesikah (Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 2007). (d) See also a recording of a lecture given by R. Sperber in Modi’in, Israel, July 3, 2006 – available online.
[6] See note 4, supra.
[7] See, inter alia, R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, miBeit Midrasho shel ha-Rav, Hilkhot Keri’at haTorah, p. 31; Shiurei haRav haGaon Rabbi Yosef Dov haLevi Soloveitchik zatsa”l al Inyanei Tsitsit, Inyanei Tefillen veHilkhot Keri’at haTorah, p. 154.
[8] (a) R. Nahum Rakover, haHagana al Kevod haAdam (Jerusalem: Misrad haMishpatim, 5738); (b) R. Nahum Rakover, “Kevod haBeriyyot,” Shana beShana (5742): 221-233; (c) R. Nahum Rakover, Gadol Kevod haBeriyyot: Kevod ha-Adam ke-Erekh-Al (Jerusalem: Sifriyat ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, 1998).
[9] (a) R. Ya’akov (Gerald J.) Blidstein, “Gadol Kevod haBeriyyot – Iyyunom beGilguleha shel Halakha,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri 9-10 (5742-5743): 127-185; (b) R. Ya’akov (Gerald J.) Blidstein, “Kevod ha-Beriyyot uKevod haAdam,” in Joseph David, ed., She’eila shel Kavod – Kevod haAdam keErekh Mussari Elyyon baHevra haModernit (haMakhon haYisraeli leDemokratiya and Magnes Press: Jerusalem, 2006), 97-138 – available online.
[10] (a) R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Kevod haBeriyyot,” Mahanayim 5 (Iyar 5753): 8-15; (b) R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Kevod Ha-beriyyot: Human Dignity in Halakha” – this is an English translation of reference 10a – available online; (c) R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Kevod haBeriyyot” – available online; (d) R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “‘Mah Enosh’: Reflections on the Relation between Judaism and Humanism,” Torah u-Madda Journal 14 (2006-2007): 1-61, p. 30ff – available online.
[11] (a) R. Daniel Z. Feldman, The Right and the Good: Halakha and Human Relations (Brooklyn, NY: Yashar Books, 2005 – Expanded edition), 197-214 (chapter 14); (b) R. Daniel Z. Feldman, “K’vod haBeriyyot – Human Dignity,” shiur (18 March 2005) available online; (c) R. Daniel Z. Feldman, “Kavod haBeriyos,” audio shiur (26 June 2007) available online.
[12] (a) “Kevod haBeriyyot,” Encyclopedia Talmudit 27, pp. 477-542; (b) R. Chaim Zev (Wolf) Reines, “Kevod haBeriyyot,” Sinai 27:7-12 (159-164; Nisan-Elul 5710): 157-168; (c) R. Israel Shepansky, “Gadol Kevod haBeriyyot,” Or haMizrah 33:3-4 (118-119; Nisan-Tammuz, 5745): 217-228; (d) Danny Eivers, “Kevod haBeriyyot,” Talelei Orot 7 (5757): 125-135 – available online; (e) R. Benayahu Broner, “Kevod haBeriyyot keBitui leHofesh haPerat,” Talelei Orot 8 (5758-5759) – available online. (f) R. Mark Dratch, “The Divine Honor Roll: Kevod ha-Beriyyot (Human Dignity) in Jewish Law and Thought,” (2001; revised 2006) – available online; (g) R. Hershel Schachter, “Kavod haBriyot,” audio shiur available online; (h) R. Mosheh Lichtenstein, “G-d’s Handiwork: Human Dignity as a Halakhic Factor (Part 2)” – available online; (i) Hershey H. Friedman, “Human Dignity in Jewish Law,” 2005 – available online; (j) R. Daniel Sperber, supra, note 5; (k) Eliezer ben-Shlomo, “kevod haAdam mul Shelom haTsibbur beHashpalat Asir,” Tehumin 17 (5754): 136-144.
[13] Rabbi Judah ben Isaac Ayash, Resp. Bet Yehuda, O.H. 58, s.v. “veKhi teima”; R. Israel Shepansky, supra, note 12c based on Rabbenu Nissim and R. Eliezer ben Nathan (Ra’avan).
[14] Rabbi Judah ben Isaac Ayash, Resp. Bet Yehuda, O.H. 58, s.v. “veKhi teima”; R. Israel Shepansky, supra, note 12c based on Rabbenu Nissim and R. Eliezer ben Nathan (Ra’avan)
[15] Resp. Rosh, Kelal 5, Din 8; Resp. Maharam ben Barukh, III, sec. 387.
[16] See the comments on point of R. Aharon Lichtenstein, supra note 10a and b.
[17] R. Meir Simha of Dvinsk, Or Same’ah, Bava Metsia 32b; Resp. Mishpitei Ouziel, I, Y.D., sec. 28, s.v. “Ulam ma she-katav” – reprinted in Piskei Ouziel biShe’eilot haZeman, sec. 32, s.v. “Ulam ma she-katav,” pp. 175-176; R. Joseph B. Soloveitchick, Divrei Hashkafa, pp. 234-235; R. Joseph B. Soloveitchick cited by R. Zvi (Hershel) Schachter, “miPeninei Rabbenu,” Beit Yitshak 36 (5764): 320ff; R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky, Karaina deIggarta, I, secs. 162 and 163; R. Avigdor Nebenzahl, “Without Fear of G-d there is nothing,” Parsha Values (Yeshiva Netiv Aryeh) – vaYera 5762, available online; R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, “Amirat sheLo Asani Isha beLahash,” mi-Peirot ha-Kerem: An Anniversary Book for Yeshivat Kerem BeYavneh (5764): 75-81, sec. B.1, s.v. “laAharona”; R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, Resp. Bnai Vanim, IV, sec. 1, no. 3, “laAharona”; R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, personal communication to Aryeh A. Frimer (26 November 2007); R. Ari Friedman, Kavod haBerios, Parsha Encounters (Chicago Community Kollel), 8 Tammuz 5765 (15 July 2005) – available online.
[18] Sifra, Parsheta 2; Hagiga 16b.
[19] R. Daniel Sperber, Darka shel Halakha, supra, note 5, pp. 72-74 and note 98 therein.
[20] See: R. Ya’akov (Gerald J.) Blidstein, supra, note 9a, pp. 170-172; R. Aharon Lichtenstein, supra, note 10a, pp. 14-15 and note 10b.
[21] A series of critiques of the analyses of R. Shapiro and R. Sperber have recently been published; see: (a) R. Eliav Shochetman, “Aliyyat Nashim leTorah,” Sinai 135-136 (2005): 271-349; (b) R. Gidon G. Rothstein, ”Women’s Aliyyot in Contemporary Synagogues,” Tradition 39:2 (Summer 2005): 36-58, and R. Gidon Rothstein, “Communications,” Tradition 40:1 (Spring 2007): 118-121. (c) R. Ephraim Bezalel Halivni, Bein haIsh laIsha (Jerusalem: Shai Publishers, 5767): 58-71, 102-105, and in the English section, 12-21. In addition, two prominent religious Zionist rabbis have published responsa highly critical of the practices of Jerusalem’s Kehillat Shira Hadasha in which women are given aliyyot. See: R. Jacob Ariel, “Bet Kenesset Shira Hadasha” available online; R. Jacob Ariel, “Aliyyat Nashim laTorah: Hillul haKodesh,” Hatsofe (12 July 2007) – available online; R. Dov Lior, “Minyanim Mehudashim beHishtatfut Nashim” available online. See also the recent responsa of R. Ahiyya Shlomo Amitai (rabbi of Kibbutz Sedei Eliyahu), “Madu’a Nashim Lo Olot laTorah,” available online; R. Rami Rahamim Berakhyahu (rabbi of Yishuv Talmon), Resp. Tel Talmon, II, sec. 91, note 1, p. 113.
[22] See: R. Aryeh A. Frimer, “Feminist Innovations in Orthodoxy Today: Is Everything in Halakha – Halakhic?” JOFA Journal, 5:2 (Summer 2004/Tammuz 5764): 3-5 – available online.
[23] R. Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, “On Faith and Science,” Rabbi Moshe Zev Kahn – Mr. Samuel G. Bellows Memorial Lecture, Rabbi Jacob Berman Community Center – Tiferet Moshe Synagogue, Rehovot Israel (April 1986).

By way of introduction, in the past few years, the field minhaghim, specifically the research and investigation of sources and reasons for custom has expanded exponentially. To be sure, from early rishonim and onwards we have many books discussing minhag. But, only more only more recently, did the systematic study and collecting of sources as they relate to minhag really start. The basic idea underlying this particular area of research involves digging up as many sources as one could related to a particular minhag and then to try and put together a comprehensive picture of the development of the specific minhag. This is a time consuming process. To begin with, one has to carefully track down early sources, figure out who is earliest source, and then try to understand the reasons given for the custom on the whole. Additionally, one has to be mindful of who influenced whom, separate the development from the original unadulterated custom, as customs, being the product of human development tend to themselves to develop over time. The older a minhag is, the more difficult a challenge as the possible source texts multiply and patience is required to put together the whole puzzle.

The recent interest in the field has produced many articles and books. Although many of these articles rely on one another, proper attribution varies widely. Some authors always give credit, while others just “borrow” sources and still others take entire text portions without any attribution. At times, to obscure this misappropriation, the order of the original article is changed although the text remains the same.

Bar-Ilan University professor Daniel Sperber, in the introduction to his eighth and final volume of his Minhagei Yisrael, catalogues and comments on many recent works minhag. In an earlier volume he published a bibliography on minhagim by Prof. Yosef Tabory.

The Moadim le-Simcha Series

In this genre, one of the more recent and popular books is Moadim le-Simcha, by R. Tuviah Freund. The sixth volume of this series has just been published. The volumes follow the yearly holiday cycle and this latest volume covers the holidays appearing in the months of Iyyar and Sivan.

R. Freund first publishes portions of the books in the newsweekly Hamodia (Hebrew). Then, he updates them and collects and arranges them according to the months. Overall, the material found in this collection is excellent. R. Freund uses a wide range of sources and it is obvious that he works hard to put out a good product. Moreover, just collecting this disparate material in one place is admirable.

But, aside from doing his own research – a task that is obviously quite time consuming – R. Freund employs two other methods that ultimately allow him to produce these books. As I have elaborated on in the past, Machon Otzar ha-Poskim has a card catalogue comprising thousands of topics with a phenomenal amount of sources related to those topics. R. Freund, as other contemporary authors, uses these cards to get a head start (alternatively, sometimes the cards provide everything) on the articles in Moadim le-Simcha. R. Freund freely acknowledges, at the beginning of each volume, that he relies on these cards.

As we have previously noted, another source of R. Freund’s materials, however, goes unacknowledged. On many topics, not necessarily all, he locates a key article of a talmid hakham or academic scholar, and then R. Freund proceeds to use their material. At times he mentions the original source in a random footnote while on other occasions he makes no mention at all.

Of course, there is no problem using someone else material so long as the source is clearly noted at the outset of the chapter that you used it and you are adding on your own finds. To be sure R. Freund is not the only who fails to properly note all of his sources; many authors do this today both in the traditional rabbinic and academic communities, and this is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, below, we will see another such example.

Setting aside this methodological issue, Moadim le-Simcha also suffers from lack of proper organization. Chapters do not flow into one another like they should, content is not put in chronological order and many times sources are not given. One other issue is one can always find more material touching on the topics covered in Moadim le-Simcha. Although this is not a criticism of R. Freund but is an issue anytime someone attempts to collect material on minhagim. Overall, however, Moadim le-Simcha is well worth one’s money as it does have a wealth of information some of which will not be found else where on many interesting topics relating to the months of the year.

Moadim le-Simcha, volume 6 – The Customs relating to the Months of Iyyar & Sivan

As mentioned above, the latest volume of this series covers Iyar and Sivan. The first article is a lengthy one covering the issues of becoming bar-mitvah during the sefirah period. This one section is over ninety pages. The next topic is Pesach Sheni. The next eight articles cover topic that are connected with Lag Ba-Omer. The final section covers Shavous topics.

It is the Lag Ba-Omer section, however, that will be the focus of our discussion. Topics covered include the recent minhag called ח”י רוטל (pp. 146- 148), bows and arrows on Lag Ba-Omer (pp. 155-58),[1] and the origins of bonfires on Lag Ba-Omer and burning clothing. There is then a detour to discuss the more general custom of lighting candles at graves year-round. Then we return to Lag Ba-Omer with a discussion of Upsherin and a section on peyos, after which he discusses the custom of learning at the kever of the Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (“Rashbi”), followed by a chapter on the halakhic discussions relating to Kupas (charity) of Rashbi. On the topic of Rashbi, R. Freund turns to the controversial topic of authorship of the Zohar, as well as some general aspects of studying Kabbalah. Then we have another detour to discuss visiting graves of Tzadkim in general. He concludes this section with a discussion of the minhag to go to the kever of Shmauel ha-Navi on the forty-third day of Sefirat ha-Omer.

We now turn to the content of these chapters and Lag Ba-Omer generally.

Traditionally, the sefirah period is considered a time of mourning. The most well-known reason given – offered by the rishonim – is the mourning is due to the death of students of R. Akiva who died during this time of the year. Because this is deemed a mourning period, we refrain from shaving, taking haircuts, dancing, listening to music and making weddings, etc. Interestingly, some seem to think that there is an additional minhag during this time of abstaining from purchasing new clothes in order to avoid making a shehecheyanu; however, this is wrong. Many poskim write that people erroneously confuse the sefirah period restrictions with those customarily applied during the three weeks. Indeed, during the three weeks, one should refrain from buying new clothes to avoid a shehecheyanu, but during sefirah no such halakha applies. For example, the Mishnah Berurah writes that if during sefirah [493:2]:

The source for this ruling is the Ma’mar Mordechai who writes:

While this is the halakha, today we do know that in fact there is some bases for refraining from shehecheyanu during sefirah. As many manuscripts have come to light, one of these manuscripts reflects this customs. In fact, this topic was comprehensively covered by R. Gedaliah Oberlander in his journal Ohr Yisroel, and later reprinted in his collection on minhaghim called Minhag Avosenu be-Yadenu (Merkaz Halakhah, 2005). There is much to add on this topic and I hope to return to it in a future post at the Seforim blog. While on this topic of shehecheyanu during sefirah, it is worth noting that one of the earliest sources reflecting this custom is the Leket Yosher. R. Zilber, quoted by R. Ben David, in his article in Tzohar, uses this example to question the authenticity of the Leket Yosher. Basically, they argue the Leket Yosher must be a forgery as this custom is only attested to in recent times. But, as I mentioned R. Oberlander demonstrates that there are many sources for the shehecheyanu restriction aside from the Leket Yosher. (Also, R. Ben David, in a later issue of Tzohar admitted that the fact the Leket Yosher may confirm what was believed to be a later custom is meaningless and disavowed his reliance on R. Zilber.)

Prof. Daniel Sperber (Minhagei Yisrael 1:101-117) posits that the mourning customs during sefirah are mainly due to the crusades, as many of the most horrific events of the crusades took place during the sefirah period. As evidence, Sperber notes that in Ashkenaz there was a custom to refrain from cutting one’s nails – a terrific extension of symbolic mourning. Moreover, in Sefer Assufot [printed in a few places- see Meoros ha-Rishonim p. 89] it says:

In Spanish sources, however, we find that they were much more lenient some going so far to permit marriage during the sefirah period. (For one example of this leniency, see the manuscript published by Meir Benayahu,Yosef Bechiri [Jerusalem, 1991], 518-20).

Now for some reason or reasons all these prohibitions are lifted on Lag Ba-Omer. Additionally, there is a custom to celebrate on Lag Ba-Omer, while to a more limited degree in many places, but especially in Meron at the Kever of Rashbi. In Meron there are great celebrations with music and dancing and the like on Lag Ba-Omer. The obvious question, however, is why?

Now I will not even attempt to provide all the answers offered, but in a moment I will point the interest reader to additional sources. There are many early sources for simcha on Lag Ba-Omer, also that tachanun is omitted, marriages are allowed and so is shaving. In some rishonim the reason given is because the students of Rabbi Akiva stopped dying on Lag Ba-Omer. This reason, however, provides no insight into the connection between Meron and specifically Rashbi and Lag Ba-Omer.

One of the most famous reasons explaining the connection between Rashbi and Lag Ba-Omer – if you ask anyone this will probably be their reply – is because the Rashbi died on Lag Ba-Omer. Assuming for a moment this is factually correct, it is quite strange that we celebrate Rashbi’s death. We don’t find any other yahrzeit that we celebrate it in such a way and we had many other great people die besides for Rashbi, Avraham, Moshe, David HaMelech, etc. – none of whose death we celebrate with bonfires. Another problem is that neither chazal nor any of the rishonim mention Rashbi dying on Lag Ba-Omer. These questions and others were addressed by the Hatam Sofer in his teshuvot. In fact, because of these problems, he was very skeptical – to put it very mildly – of this celebration that takes place at Meron.

As an aside, an unknown sources about this whole topic is a statement found in some versions of Toledot Ha-Arizal (Sefer ha-Ari, 219) it is also found in a manuscript of the Chida which says:

With this introduction regarding Lag Ba-Omer, we can now turn to the Moadim le-Simcha’s discussion of Lag Ba-Omer customs.

He starts the topic of Lag Ba-Omer with a nice list of issues regarding Lag Ba-Omer giving the impression that this list indicates the progression of the articles. The reader is quickly disabused of this notion as R. Freund jumps from topic to topic at times returning to earlier topics with no discernable order. After carefully reading the Lag Ba-Omer section, I decided to compare R. Freund’s work with that of R. Betzalel Landau’s [author of ha-Goan mi-Vilna] on Lag Ba-Omer called מסע מירון. R. Landau’s sefer is a collection of articles printed in 1966 and as is the case with R. Freund, R. Landau’s articles also first appeared in the Hebrew weekly Hamodia. R. Landau’s work is printed along with the Maseh Meron of R. Mendel Rabin. R. Landau’s articles deal with everything connected to Lag Ba-Omer, from the visiting of Meron and the accompanying celebration to Upsherin and much more. It is written beautifully, well organized and has excellent sources including manuscripts and many rare seforim.

After comparing the material, I noticed that R. Tuviah Freund basically lifted all the material from R. Betzalel Landau with one big difference: where R. Landau presents the material in very organized fashion, R. Freund does not. To be sure, Freund adds much material to the topics discussed by Landau and Freund covers areas not covered by Landau. On the other hand, Freund omits many interesting topics and sources relating to this day that he should have dealt with such as discussion of the song Bar-Yochai.[2] The point is not that Freund used the sources collected by Landau but rather at the outset of the articles Freund should note his debt to Landau and reference the reader to Landau’s work for its additional materials. In fact, in passing on at least two occasions Freund mentions “Mase Meron” indicating that indeed he was aware of and used Landau’s work. To make this even more bizarre, the only times Freund cites Landau, in truth, Landau was merely quoting from Avraham Yaari, Iggerot Eretz Yisrael (Tel Aviv, 1943), a work that Freund uses directly in other places (379-384). In other words, the times he does mention Landau’s work it was almost unnecessary while where Freund should mention it he does not. Is it to say that only here he used Landau work and the rest he found himself? I find it hard to believe and quite silly – there is no problem to use someone else’s material as long as you give them proper credit.

A Revisionist History of Lag Ba-Omer and Another Example of Plagiarism.

Before returning to the rest of R. Tuviah Freund’s Moadim le-Simcha, we need to examine another recent article that appeared in the journal Yeshurun (no. 15) authored by R. Moshe Blau. R. Blau’s article is devoted to Lag Ba-Omer and is well organized and clearly written – a model for R. Freund to learn from. While these facts distinguish R. Blau’s article from Freund’s, Blau actually has something in common with Freund – Blau too plagiarized.

Again, Blau uses information that appears elsewhere without mentioning the sources. Specifically, Blau plagiarized from Avraham Yaari, Meir Benayahu, Betzalel Landau, and possibly even R. Yaakov Hillel, as I will demonstrate below.

As I mentioned earlier many traditionally many claim the yarzheit of Rashbi is on Lag Ba-Omer. While this claim is well-known the source of this tradition is more difficult to locate. Avraham Yaari and Meir Benayahu show that the earliest source to mention Lag Ba-Omer as the yarzheit of Rashbi is none other than the Hemdat Ha-Yamim. (R. Yaakov Hillel also confirms this on page 13 in his Aid ha-Gal ha-Zeh.)

There were some, however, who attributed the Lag Ba-Omer death date of Rashbi not to Hemdat Ha-Yamim but to R. Hayyim Vital, whose source was the Arizal. In truth, it is a mistake to give R. Vital credit for this. The source of this mistake was based on a simple printing mistake in one version of the Prei Etz Chaim which was first printed in 1782 – available here. (For more on this edition see R. Yosef Avivi, Binyan Ariel, pp. 68-71.) That edition reads:

The Chida already writes that this is a mistake and instead of שמת, one letter is missing and the correct reading is שמחת רשב”י. So it is not a reference to Rashbi’s death day at all. Avraham Yaari demonstrates that other sources aside from the Prei Etz Chaim confirm this reading of שמחת. Meir Benayahu also concludes this is the correct reading using manuscripts. Finally, R. Yakov Hillel also writes that it is clear from viewing many manuscripts of the Prei Etz Chaim that it is a mistake. [3]

Turning to the origins of going to Meron, again, Avraham Yaari, in an article in Tarbiz 22 (1951) has a very detailed piece showing how the custom of going to Meron was taken from an earlier custom of going on Pesach Shnei to the kevarim of Hillel and Shamai in Meron. Soon after Yaari published this article, Meir Benayahu penned a strong rebuttal (Sefunot 6 pp. 11-40), and is again summarized in Sefer Vilnai 2:326-330). According to Benayahu, the custom of going to Meron was begun by the “Mekubeli Sefat.” Irrespective of whose side one falls, both articles are full of interesting facts about the development of this Lag Ba-Omer. In my opinion, Benayahu appears to have the upper hand. More recently, Tel Aviv University professor Elchanan Reiner revisited this topic in his incredible dissertation, “Pilgrims and Pilgrimage to Eretz Yisrael (1099-1517),” (PhD dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1988), 295-320. (Hopefully, Dr. Reiner will publish this in book form.)

Returning to Freund’s article on Lag Ba-Omer, there is no doubt he used both Landau and Benayahu, as he quotes them in his notes. At the end of his article, Freund raises the older, although less known, custom of going to the grave of Shmuel ha-Navi (again close to Lag Ba-Omer) (p. 384). In doing so Freund quotes an early source for this custom, a source that is only in manuscript. But, Freund provides no citation where this source can be found. In fact this comes from Yaari (neither Landau or Benayahu mention it) who notes that this was originally published in Jacob Moses Toledano, “Teudot mikkitvey-yad,” Hebrew Union College Annual 4 (1927): 449-466, quote at 458. So either Freund was perusing random old copies of HUCA or more likely, he found Yaari’s article on Lag Ba-Omer and neglected to mention that.

Coming back to Blau’s article, the general idea of Blau in his article is after dealing with all the sources of why Lag Ba-Omer is different than the rest of Sefirat ha-Omer. His new ideas which he brings to the table are that 1) the earliest source for Lag Ba-Omer being the death of Rashbi is from Hemdat ha-Yamim. This point was already made by both Yaari and Benayahu. 2) The printings of Prei Etz Chaim contains a printing error (Blau shows this to be the case from various manuscripts he checked). Again, not a new point, while it is nice that he prints in the article copies of the various manuscripts but this also was already shown to be the case by Benayahu much earlier. 3) Finally, at the end of his article he brings from a manuscript that R. Yosef Karo wanted to stop the going to Meron but did not. Blau, however, concludes that this fact is not mentioned by the Chida because the Chida did not believe this manuscript was legitimate. This whole major manuscript is brought by Yaari and Benayahu. The text itself is printed in Benayahu’s Sefer HaChida. Additionally, R. Landau also discusses this point. None of this is noted by Blau. All in all this leads to the conclusion that much of Blau’s article is premised, without attribution, on Yaari’s, Benayahu’s, and Landau’s works on the topic.

As an aside both R. Yaakov Hillel and R. Ovadiah Yosef (Yabia Omer 5:35 and Hazon Ovadiah, p. 274) do not encourage going to Meron on Lag Ba-Omer due to the situation of pritzus there. R. Hillel is also against going on these types of hilulas throughout the year.

In actuality, while it is difficult to connect with the death of Rashi, there is another important person who perhaps did die on Lag be-Omer, Yehoshua ben Nun. (See R. Hamberger, Shoreshei Minhag Ashkenaz 3:262). In Meglias Ta’anis, the last section, there is a part titled Meglias Ta’anis Batra. In many versions of this text, it places Yehoshua ben Nun’s death on Lag be-Omer. Professor Shulamis Elitzur, in her excellent book, Lamu Tzamnu, deal with the death date of Yehoshua ben Nun at length. She cites to many early piyutuim that mirror this reading found in Meglias Ta’anis. (See Lamu Tzamnu pp. 18, 26, 34, 39, 66, 120, 126, 172.) Generally, Lamu Tzamnu is a scientific edition of Megilas Tannit Batra. For further on this, see also her Piyyutei R. Pinchas ha-Kohen, pp. 240 & 693. See also, Landau, p. 71, who errs in this regard based on a faulty manuscript; S. Leiman, “The Scroll of Fasts: The Ninth of Tevet” in J.Q.R., vol. 74, pp. 174-95, esp. pp. 174-79; Reiner, op. cit., pp. 289-90.

Moadim le-Simcha on Upsherin and Peyos

Now that we have covered the two latest discussions of Lag Ba-Omer and their similar faults, we return to the rest of Moadim le-Simcha. Freund’s next major topic is that of Upsherin. The problem with this article is that it is not objective.

The source for the Upsherin custom is highly problematic. R. Benyamin Shlomo Hamberger, Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz 3:251-267, attacks it for the following reasons: there is no mention of this custom in any of the rishonim. Now do not say they did not bother to write it down as we have very detailed discussions from the rishonim about this time period in a Jewish boy’s life how to take him to cheder etc. (discussed by R. Hamburger at great length in volume two of his Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz 2:502-532) but there is no mention of the Upsherin custom.[4] Furthermore, he shows from many places in the times of the rishonim they cut their hair long before three years old. Another big question dealt with by Yaari and later on in more detail by Hamberger is the attributing the custom of Upsherin on Lag Ba-Omer to the Arizal. This attribution is problematic as it is documented that the Arizal did not cut hair the entire sefirah – including Lag Ba-Omer. This particular issue M. Benayahu does not find to be such a problem as it could be what he did to his son and what he himself did were two different things. Another issue R. Hamberger raises is even if there is such a minhag what does it have to do with Rashbi and where do we find such a thing to give a haircut in a grave yard? Further more he brings sources [amongst them a National Geographic Magazine!] which claim that it come from outside – Arabic influences. R. Hamburger does defend it a little that it still makes sense to keep if it comes from outside sources. However after seeing all this documentation of R Hamburger notes that it makes sense why we can not find sources in litvishe or Hungarian sources – as there are no early sources in rishonim!

Professor Sperber [Minhagei Yisrael 8: 13-30] takes Hamberger’s discussion much further documenting how this comes from many completely outside ancient sources. R. Yechiel Goldhaber (author of the Minhagei ha-Kehillos) told me that he just saw a manuscript of a letter of R. Akiva Yosef Schlesinger who writes very sharply that this whole custom is taken form outside sources. Generally, Freund has no problem mentioning R Hamburger as he quotes this very same volume in another chapter of his in this sefer – saying Tikun on shavuos night. But when it comes to using Hamberger to question or examine Upsherin, Freund seems unable to do so.

After this chapter Freund has a section all about the customs of peyos including different opinions about wearing it behind ones ears. A careful reading of this chapter shows he stole much [and he could of stolen even more] from Yitzchak (Eric) Zimmer’s chapter in his Olam Keminhago Noheg (Mercaz Zalman Shazar, 1996) devoted to these topics.

Freund continues with a chapter on the development of the tomb over Rashbi’s kever and its history. He has a lot of important information on it. I would add to it the last section of M Benayhu previously mentioned article (which I think for sure Freund was well aware of on this topic of Meron in general).

The Zohar and its History

In connection with Rashbi, Freund examines the Zohar, its authorship and other topics related to the learning of the Zohar. This topic really deserves its own series of posts but for now I will just point out three issues. He does not mention that there was any opposition to the authorship of the Zohar. Now I understand perfectly well why he does not mention Yehudah Aryeh (Leon) Modena and others but there is one work which definitely deserves mention and that is the Mitpachat Seforim from R. Yaakov (Jacob) Emden. This work is not an attempt to undermine Kabbalah at all but rather it shows that there was some tampering done to the Zohar by different people. To be sure this work was considered very important by many as the Hatam Sofer writes in a teshuvah [Choshen Mishpat Likutim, 59] to someone:

Interestingly enough a few years back this sefer was printed by someone than it was put in cherem by the badatz! The printer was cursed by sefardi mekubalim and he died within the year! This edition of the sefer is now considered very rare. Indeed, included in the introduction to this edition, are other sources attesting to the importance of the Mitpachat Seforim. Additionally, R. Eliezer Waldenberg, in his Tzizt Eliezer cites the Mitpachat Seforim. (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51 and 21:5).

Another issue I have with this chapter is he does not even mention the famous discussion of the poskim regarding contradictions between Kabbalah and halakha; much has been written on this I will not even bother to cite sources.

One other issue with this chapter is at the end he lists commentaries on the Zohar although he does not claim to make a comprehensive list there are some strange omissions. One is the work of R. Reuven Margoliyot on the Zohar it is extremely important with all his comments as he draws parallels from all over chazal another thing he does is he references many halakhic discussions from the Zohar. Besides for this R. Margoliyot deals with all the questions which R Emden raises in his Mitpachat Seforim. R. Shlomo Zevin, Soferim ve-Seforim, has a beautiful review of R. Margoliyot’s work. One other important work that is not listed is Tiferet Zvi from R. Spielman. Thus far it is only six volumes, going up until chumash Vayikra. This work is literally an encyclopedia on the Zohar dealing with the hundreds of halakha and kabbalistic topics relating to the Zohar [see the comment of Professor Yisrael M. Ta-Shma, ha-Niglah she-b’Nistar, 109 n. 13]. It is very ironic that during R. Spielman lifetime he had to peddle his seforim going door to door begging people to buy them and now it is a very hard to find to purchase.

Finally, Freund discusses visiting kevarim in general – he includes a special section about Kohanim. Here Freund writes openly at the outset that he used an earlier work but he should have been aware there is a much more through and important work on the topic from R Spielman called Zion Lenefesh Chayah.

General sources:
All about Lag Ba-Omer (much of the material overlaps) see R. Shlomo J. Zevin, Moadim Bahalcha pp. 359-64; S Ashkenazi in Avnei Chain pp. 103-11; Pardes Eliezer.

For personal accounts of Lag Ba-Omer see Chanina Mizrachi Yehudei Paras (Tel Aviv, 1959), 29-34. For a Christian traveler account from 1838 see Maseh ha-Notzrim, 496 see id., 517-18 for another account.

Others used to go to Kever of Shimon Hazadik see: Nachlas Yosef [2: 42]; Eiyur Hakodesh ve-Yoshveha p. 43. See a Christian traveler account from 1838 in Maseh ha-Notzrim p. 448 – he mentions that they cut the hair there.

On going to Meron in general see: Kivrei Avos pp. 179-81; The excellent collection from Z Vilani in his Mazavos be-Eretz ha-Kodesh pp. 117-150.

On Shmuel ha-Navi and visiting his grave, see Lamu Tzamu pp. 177-180; Reiner op. cit. pp. 306-320

Notes:
[1] On using bow and arrows on Lag Ba-Omer: see the sources listed by Landau, ibid pp. 124-26 [At this point I am unable to find the source for the riddle of the Malbim that Landau brings.] Moadim le-Simcha pp. 155-59; Pardes Eliezer pp. 229-49; ha-Koton ve-Halachosov chapter 24 p. 59 n. 22; Kundes p. 49 [see here on this work]; Zikhronot Av u-Beno p. 231; Zikhronot me-Rav Litai p. 245 [on this work see here]; A.S. Sachs, Worlds that Passed (Philadelphia, 1928), 112.

[2] About the song Bar-Yochai (which he choose not to talk about it at all), see Landau piece in Maseh Meron; the excellent study by Professor Moshe Hallamish, in Hakabblah, 507-531. See also Hallamish’s Hanageios Kabbalios be-Shabbat pp. 300-03. On general songs composed for Rashbi see Hallamish in Hakabblah pp. 259-83.

[3] R. Yaakov Hillel deals with all this in his sefer Aid ha-Gal ha-Zeh printed two years ago. This is a nice sefer all about Lag Ba-Omer and the Zohar. He has many interesting chapters including the origins of the Zohar the importance of learning Zohar and how to learn it. Another chapter he has is on the topic of contradictions between Kabbalah and halakha. He also has a chapter on Torah Lav Min hashamaayim and its relation to pesak halakha. He also deals with this topic in a few other places in his notes on Moreh Betzbah of the Chidah. It is worth seeing the latest edition, page 159 and onwards, as it is updated from the 1980 edition. He also dealt with this in his journal Mekabtzeal (25: 45-59). R. Hillel definitely saw what Benayahu writes on the topic but he does not credit him at all.

[4] For more on this see Ivan Marcus in Rituals of Childhood (Yale, 1996) and in his Jewish Lifecycle (Washington, 2004).

I. Introduction

II. Origins

In one of the scenes the following conversation take place:

יקטן: גם זה ראיתי אני וכבר תרץ הקושיא הזאת רב בלעם בן בבי בשם אביו: כי מה שאמרה התורה “ויאכלו את המן” היא אזהרה וציווי לנו שנאכל בימי הפורים האלה מאזני המן – הן המה הרקייקם הנעשים בסולת בלולה בשמן, וזהו שאמר אחרי כן “וטעמו כצפיחית בדבש”.

יאיר: יפה פירוש בן ביבי זכור לטוב!

The next source I have located is in the poetry of the brothers Yakov and Emanuel Pranosish (1618- 1703) in one piece [4] they write:

כי יום פורים זה בא, נכין לו מעדנים,

נכין מרקחות ממתקים מכל מינים,

נגדיל אזני המן מאזני השפנים,

Thus, from the above, it seems that the original word was aznei Haman the name Hamantashen only came later.

One year in the beginning of the month of Adar he [my grandfather] noticed that the bakeries were not selling hamentashen. When he inquired as to why this was so, he discovered that there was a shortage of flour. He promptly went ahead and gave the biggest bakers in the city a large sum of money to enable them to buy flour to bake hamantsashen.[8]

III. Other possible early origins for Hamentashen

וזרש? לא תקלל חרש!

So to conclude it seems from all this that the original word was aznei Haman the name Hamantashen only came later and earliest origins are from Italy. [22]

IV. Ta’am ha-Hamentashen

* This article has been heavily updated from last year’s version with many important additions and corrections.

by Eliezer Brodt