Taliban Women and More

Taliban Women and More

Marc B. Shapiro

1. In this post I am going to respond to a number of emails and requests to deal with certain topics. I can’t get to everything I was asked about, and will only touch on some topics, but here is a start.
Let’s begin with the common practice in the Israeli haredi world of ignoring what the Sages tell us in Kiddushin 29a and not teaching young men a trade so that instead they can devote themselves to Torah study.[1] People assume that this is a late twentieth-century phenomenon. While it is true that the numbers of people who currently follow this approach is much larger than ever before in history, it must be noted that even in previous years there were those who acted in the same fashion. We see this from R. Pinhas Horowitz’ strong words against this approach in his Sefer ha-Berit, vol. 2, ma’amar 12, ch. 10.
R. Meir Mazuz has recently suggested that this negative attitude towards work explains a passage in one of the most popular Shabbat zemirot.[2] The following lines appear in Mah Yedidot.

חפציך בו אסורים וגם לחשוב חשבונות, הרהורים מותרים ולשדך הבנות, ותינוק ללמדו ספר למנצח בנגינות
Artscroll, Family Zemiros, translates as follows:

Your mundane affairs are forbidden on it [Shabbat] and also to calculate accounts; Reflections are permitted and to arrange matches for maidens; To arrange for a child to be taught Scripture, to sing a song of praise.

(R. Jonathan Sacks, in his siddur, p. 388, translates the last words similarly: “singing songs of praise.”)
The first thing to note is that the translation is incorrect. The words למנצח בנגינות do not mean “to sing a song of praise”. The word למנצח is not an infinitive (that would be לנצח, patah under the nun). It is a noun with a prefix, and means “to the choirmaster” or something like that. Artscroll, in its Tanach (Ps. 6:1), translates למנצח בנגינות: “For the conductor, with the neginos.” The note tells us that neginos are a type of musical instrument.
I sympathize with Artscroll when confronted with the need to translate the words למנצח בנגינות in the song. It is obvious that the words make no sense. Until then the passage was speaking about what was permitted on the Sabbath and then you have למנצח בנגינות .
This is an old problem and while a couple of forced answers have been suggested, others have argued that what we have here a mistaken reading, and instead of למנצח בנגינות it should read וללמדו אומנות (perhaps even reading אומנות with a final holam in order to make it rhyme). The entire paragraph in Mah Yedidot is derived from Shabbat 150a, and there it states: משדכין על התינוקות ליארס בשבת ועל התינוק ללמדו ספר וללמדו אומנות. After seeing this, can anyone still have a doubt that the standard version is incorrect?

R. Mazuz is apparently unaware that others before him had already suggested that וללמדו אומנות was the original version,[3] but he is the only one to suggest why the text was changed. Although it strikes me as a bit far-fetched, he assumes that when people stopped teaching their sons a trade this verse became problematic, and therefore someone took it upon himself to alter the text.
After criticizing Artscroll’s translation (and in future posts I will have more such examples), let me now mention an instance where of all the translations I have consulted, only Artscroll gets it right.

Every Friday night we say the following (which is based on Isaiah 52:1):
התנערי מעפר קומי לבשי בגדי תפארתך עמי
Sacks translates: “Shake yourself off, arise from the dust! Put on your clothes of glory, My people.” All the translations I have consulted render along these lines. The problem, however, is obvious. If “My people” is being addressed, then why are the verbs and the suffix of תפארתך  feminine?
Artscroll recognized the problem and translates: “Shake off the dust – arise! Don your splendid clothes, My people.” The translation is explained in the note: “Jerusalem – your most splendid garment is Israel. Let the redemption come so that they may inhabit you in holiness once more.” In other words, Jerusalem is being addressed, not the people of Israel. “My people” is therefore identified metaphorically with “your splendid clothes.” The stanza thus needs to be read as a continuation of the prior stanza – מקדש מלך עיר מלוכה – which is also addressed to Jerusalem.
Furthermore, if you look at Isaiah 52:1, upon which the text is based, it reads: לבשי בגדי תפארתך ירושלים עיר הקודש  “Put on your beautiful garments, O Jerusalem, the holy city.” So we see that also in the original verse it is Jerusalem that is being addressed. Artscroll cites this interpretation in the name of Iyun Tefillah (found in Otzar ha-Tefilot) and refers to it as “novel”. This understanding (which is actually the peshat of the words) was also suggested by R. Kook[4] R. Baruch Epstein,[5] and R. David Hadad.[6] 
2. A long time ago I was asked to deal with the so-called Jewish Taliban women, who completely cover their faces when they go out. I know that everyone has downplayed their significance and referred to them as crazy. I think that this is too optimistic an assumption. Although I am not predicting it, I would not be surprised if this turned into a real phenomenon. All these women need is one somewhat respected Torah scholar to support them and they will then become just another faction in extremist Orthodoxy. You will then have groups that don’t allow women to drive (or smoke, or use a cellular phone, etc.), and another group that also requires that they cover their faces when they leave home. The real difference today is that while with the other groups we have men telling women how to behave for reasons of tzeniut, the Taliban group is completely female driven and led.

The truth of the matter is that the Taliban women make a certain amount of sense. They are part of a community that forbids women’s (and even little girl’s) pictures to appear in printed matter because seeing this might arouse sexual thoughts in men.[7] Even though these women never studied Talmud, we know that one doesn’t need to be talmid hakham to derive a basic kal va-homer. Even these uneducated women can conclude that if men’s souls can be destroyed by seeing a picture of a woman or a little girl, how much more so can they be driven to sexual frenzy by seeing a live woman or girl? As such, it makes perfect sense that when they go out on the street they are completely covered and only their husband and children are permitted see their faces.[8] It is their opponents in the haredi word who have to explain why it is permitted to see the faces of real live women but forbidden to see their pictures. It doesn’t make a lot of sense, as the Taliban women have rightly concluded.
I am sure that any rabbinic authorities that come to support the Taliban women will be able to find relevant sources to defend this lifestyle. I know this will surprise readers, especially as many rabbis have declared that the Taliban women are completely distorting Jewish rules of modesty. These rabbis have claimed that unlike Arabs, Jewish women have never dressed this way (unless they were forced to) as the face is not ervah. Therefore, these rabbis have asserted, Jewish tzeniut has never, has ve-shalom, seen it as a value for women to completely cover their faces.

Lines like this are good for applause in a Modern Orthodox (and even a haredi) shul, among people anxious to be reassured that these Taliban women couldn’t possibly have any sources in our tradition for their actions. The truth of the matter is that, whether we like it or not, there are sources that are strong supports for the Taliban women, and there is no reason to deny that they exist.[9] Sotah 10b is clearly praising Tamar when it mentions that she was so modest that she covered her face in her father-in-law’s house. R. Joseph Messas (Mayim Hayyim, vol. 2, Orah Hayyim no. 140) points out that Shabbat 6:6 refers to Arabian Jewish women going out veiled, which means that their entire face was covered except for their eyes. He also points to Shabbat 8:3: כחול כדי לכחול עין אחת, which as explained in the Talmud refers to those women who were so modest that they were completely veiled, with only one eye showing in order for them to see (see Rashi, ad loc. See also Rashi to Isaiah 3:19.) Messas tells us that in his youth he personally saw Jewish women who dressed like this: וכן ראינו בימי נעורנו. R. Meir Mazuz’s mother testified that brides in Djerba would only show one eye, also for reasons of modesty.[10]

Here we have evidence that the Taliban dress was actually a traditional Jewish dress, just the sort of material that can be used to support the new dress code. In fact, one doesn’t even need to look to Morocco or Djerba, or even to talmudic literature, to find sources that women dressed this way. It is found right in the Song of Songs 4:9. This verse states: “Thou has ravished my heart with one of thine eyes.” The Soncino translation explains: “It is customary for an Eastern woman to unveil one of her eyes when addressing someone.” In other words, normally, for reasons of modesty, the woman is entirely covered (although this covering would be see-through so she could walk properly), and only at certain times would she remove it to reveal one eye. I know some people are thinking that this is exactly the sort of explanation you can expect from Soncino, which loves to quote non-Orthodox and even non-Jewish commentators, and if you look at the various traditional commentaries they do indeed provide all sorts of allegorical meanings for this verse. Yet the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 8:3, also understands the verse as giving an example of modest behavior on the part of the woman, that she only uncovers one eye. As explained by Korban ha-Edah:
מביא פסוק זה לראיה שדרך הצנועות לצאת באחת מעיניה מכוסה ואחת מגולה
(Korban ha-Edah and all the other traditional commentaries I have seen assume that the woman always goes with one eye uncovered, while Soncino explains that she only uncovers this one eye on special occasions.)
R. Baruch Epstein takes note of this passage in the Jerusalem Talmud in his commentary to Song of Songs, and adds.
לפנים בעת שהיו נוהגות הנשים ללכת עטופות היו מגלות רק עין אחת כדי לראות מהלכן, ומכאן רמז שמנהג כזה הוא מנהג כשר וצנוע, שהרי כן משבחה הכתוב שלבבתו בעין אחת.
If this practice is, as Epstein says, a מנהג כשר וצנוע, then I don’t think we should be surprised if some circles attempt to bring it back into style.
A few paragraphs above I quoted a responsum of R. Joseph Messas.[11] In this teshuvah he also explains why women can’t be given aliyotAs is well known, in earlier days this was permitted but the Sages later forbid it on account of kevod ha-tzibbur (Megillah 23a). There have been lots of interpretations of what kevod ha-tzibbur means, but Messas has a very original perspective. He claims that the reason women were banned from receiving aliyot is because this would lead to sexual arousal among the male congregants. Messas believes that this came from the actual experience of the Sages, who saw what happened when women received aliyot. He also assumes that these women would have been dressed in a Taliban-like fashion[12]: בהסתר פנים כמנהג נשים קדמוניות. But even such a woman, covered head to toe, still created problems with the sexually fixated men.[13]
ובדורות שאחריהם ראו שיש בזה מחשבת עריות, שהצבור היו שואלים זה לזה, מי זאת עולה . . . ואם היה קולה ערב מוסיף להבעיר אש היצר, ולכן עמדו ובטלו את הדבר.
Knowing how concerned the Sages were about avoiding situations that could lead to sexual thoughts, it makes sense that they would ban the practice if they thought that women’s aliyot would lead in this direction.[14] But Messas now has a problem, because the Talmud doesn’t give this as a reason for abolishing women’s aliyot. Instead, it states that they were abolished because of kevod ha-tzibbur. This leads Messas to offer one of the wonderfully original interpretations that can be found so often in his writings. He claims that because the Sages didn’t want to insult the (male) community by telling them the real reason why they abolished the aliyot, namely, that even during Torah reading men can’t control themselves from sexual thoughts, therefore they invented the concept of kevod ha-tzibbur! However, this is not the real reason, and therefore all attempts to explain the meaning of the term are irrelevant. The real reason is the male sexual desire which as Messas states, is always in need to being fenced in:[15]
וכדי שלא להראות את הצבור שחשדו אותם, תלו הטעם מפני כבוד הציבור, שלא תהא האשה הפטורה מן הדבר מתערבת עם האנשים המחוייבים בו וכן בכל דור היו גודרים גדרים בעריות
Based on this male weakness, Messas claims that the mehitzah has to be built in such a fashion that the men cannot see the women. He even has a most original way to explain to the women why they are placed in what amounts to a completely other room. Rather than being a sign of their insignificance, it is a sign of how important they are. The proof of this importance is that men are constantly drawn to look at them. Therefore, by building a high mehitzah we are able to save the men from themselves.
I haven’t yet mentioned the shawls that some women have started wearing (and which was the practice in the days of the Rambam; see Hilkhot Ishut 13:11) Most shawl-wearers are not so extreme as to completely cover their faces, and because of this the practice has been defended by some fairly mainstream people. According to R. Ovadiah Yosef’s son-in-law, R. Aharon Abutbol, and R. David Benizri, R. Ovadiah sees the practice in a positive light for those women who are able to take it on.[16] Among others who have spoken out in favor of the shawls are R. Yitzhak Ratsaby,[17] R. Avraham Baruch,[18] and R. Mendel Fuchs, a dayan for the Edah Haredit (who refers to the “heilige shawl”).[19] There is even a fairly recent book that discusses the matter in detail. It is Ahoti Kalah, by R. Avraham Arbel. Here is the title page.
Arbel is a great talmid hakham.[20] His book carries haskamot from mainstream figures, including R. Ovadiah, R. Neuwirth, and R. Nebenzahl. In the book, he explains the importance of the shawl, how women are not supposed to leave their home and if they must go out they should appear unattractive so that men are not drawn to them, and how it is absolutely forbidden for women to wear jewelry outside their home. (Recently, Arbel expanded the section of the book dealing with women’s tzeniut into a full-fledged book of its own.)

3. In the last post I quoted R. Kook’s comments about the holiness of the am ha’aretz. This is not a sentiment that has been widely shared among the rabbinic elite, and negative comments about the am ha’aretz abound in rabbinic literature from all eras. Most of these comments appear in non-halakhic contexts, but there are plenty that are found in classic halakhic works. See for example Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 198:48, where R. Moses Isserles states that if a woman coming home from the mikveh enounters a דבר טמא או גוי , if she is pious she will immerse again. This is obviously not so applicable today, as in any big city in the Diaspora, where people walk to the mikveh, it is impossible not to come across a non-Jew on the way home. The formulation of Rama was made in an era when Jews lived in their own quarters, and at night it wouldn’t be common to come into contact with non-Jews. On this halakhah, the Shakh quotes the Sha’arei Dura who expands the lists of things a woman hopes to avoid on the way home to include an am ha’aretz. (This formulation obviously troubled some, and Pithei Teshuvah quotes the opinion that only an am ha’aretz gamur is meant, i.e., one who doesn’t even recite keriat shema [due to his ignorance]. This definition of an am ha’aretz is found in Berakhot 47b and Sotah 22a. Examination of rabbinic literature shows that the term “am ha’aretz” has a variety of meaning, ranging from a simple ignoramus to one who is actually quite wicked and hates the Sages.)
Speaking of the am ha’aretz, here is something interesting, as it includes both a difficult comment of Rashi (actually, the commentary falsely attributed to Rashi) and what might be is an example of Artscroll purposely omitting mention of it because of how problematic it would be to explain. Nedarim 49a states: “Rav Judah said: The soft part of a pumpkin [should be eaten] with beet; the soft part of linseed is good with kutah. But this may not be told to the am ha’aretz.”
Why don’t we tell this to the am ha’aretz? Artscroll quotes the explanation of the Ran that if the boors knew about this, they would uproot the plants before they could be harvested. Tosafot claims that the ignoramuses won’t believe what we tell them and they will mock the teaching of the Sages. “Rashi” has a completely different explanation. He writes:
משום דדבר מעולה הוא לרפואה ואסור לומר להם שום דבר שיהנו ממנו
What this means is that we don’t let the am ha’aretz know about the medicinal property of this plant. In other words, we don’t want the am ha’aretz, even though he is another Jew, to benefit, and he is thus treated no differently than an idolater. (Tosafot cites this explanation and rejects it.) Even though “Rashi” is referring to a real am ha’aretz, as per the Talmud’s description in Berakhot 47b, it is still quite a shocking explanation. It is true that there is a passage in Pesahim 49b which states: “R. Eleazar said: An am ha’aretz, it is permitted to stab him [even] on the Day of Atonement which falls on the Sabbath . . . R. Samuel b. Nahmani said in R. Johanan’s name: One may tear an am ha’aretz like a fish.” Still, these passages are according to almost everyone not meant to be taken literally,[21] while “Rashi,” on the other hand, means exactly what he says.
[1] Many have discussed why Maimonides doesn’t explicitly record this halakhah in the Mishneh Torah. See the interesting approach of R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira, Divrei Torah, Eighth Series, no. 18 (p. 974), which can be used to justify the Israeli haredi perspective.
[2] See Or Torah, Heshvan 5772, pp. 169-170. R. Mazuz’s own attitude towards yeshiva students preparing themselves to earn a living is seen in his haskamah to R. Hayyim Amsalem’s Gadol ha-Neheneh mi-Yegio. The book is available here.
Here is R. Mazuz’s haskamah.

Here is the letter of R. Mazuz that appears at the end of the volume.

There are numerous texts I could bring in opposition to the approach of Amsalem and Mazuz (which I believe is also the approach of the Sages). One noteworthy one is found in Ateret Menahem, p. 23a, where R. Menahem Mendel of Rimanov is quoted as follows:

אם א’ אומר לחתנו היושב ולומד תורה בהתמדה שיתחיל לעסוק במו”מ עבור כי איתא [אבות פ”ב מ”ב] יפה ת”ת עם דרך ארץ וכו’, זה הוא מערב רב חו”ש
[3] See e.g., Naftali ben Menahem, Zemirot shel Shabbat (Jerusalem, 1949), p. 134.
[4] See Zev Rabiner, Or Mufla, p. 92.
[5] Barukh She-Amar, p. 238.
[6] See R. Meir Mazuz, Darkhei ha-Iyun, pp. 127ff.
[7] Regarding not seeing women’s pictures, this position can also find sources to support it. R. Joseph Hayyim, Rav Berakhot, ma’arekhet tzadi (p. 137), writes quite strongly against women’s pictures, because men will come to look at them. Here is the page.

[8] For some, it is better if the women basically do not go out of the house at all at all. Such a position is held by R. Hayyim Rabbi, a mainstream Sephardic rabbi (who like all significant Sephardic rabbis, also has a website. See here).
Here is his haskamah to R. Hanan Aflalo’s, Asher Hanan, vol. 3, and see Aflalo’s response that a rabbi has to actually be part of a community and know its situation in order to properly decide matters for it.

While Aflalo’s reply is phrased very respectfully, his feeling that Rabbi is way off base comes through very clearly.

Rabbi’s position about a woman not leaving the house can find support in a variety of traditional texts (not least, the Rambam, Hilkhot Ishut 13:11). What makes it significant is that he offers this advice even today. While it is true that in the Islamic world Jewish women were more accustomed to stay inside than their co-religionists in Europe, we also find European rishonim who see this as something to strive for. See e.g.,, Radak to 2 Samuel 13:2: ודרך הבתולות בישראל להיות צנועות בבית ולא תצאנה החוצה. See also Rashi, Deut. 22:23: פרצה קוראה לגנב הא אלו ישבה בביתה לא אירע לה. For other relevant sources, see R. Mazuz’s comment in R. Raphael Kadir Tzaban, Nefesh Hayah, vol. 2, p. 267.
I was surprised to find that the Moroccan R. Raphael Ankawa, in the twentieth century, ruled that a husband could forbid his wife from leaving the house without his permission. If she didn’t listen, she would lose her ketubah. See Toafot Re’em, no. 3. In a letter of support for Ankawa by R. Shlomo Ibn Danan and R. Mattityahu Serero they go so far as to state that if the woman doesn’t go along with the husband’s command and take an oath binding herself in this matter, the husband can, if he wishes, refuse to divorce her and she will remain an “agunah” her entire life without any financial support from him! He, of course, will be given permission to remarry.
ואם לא ירצה לגרשה תשב עד שתלבין ראשה ונותנין לו רשות לישא אשה אחרת אחר ההתראות הראויות והיא אבדה כתוב’ ואין לה לא מזונות ולא פרנסה ולא שום תנאי מתנאי הכתובה.
(As late as 1965, another Moroccan posek, R. Yedidyah Monsenego, ruled that where the husband had reason to suspect his wife of being unfaithful, he could require her to never leave home without him, even to visit relatives, except when she had to go to work. See Peat ha-Yam, no. 24)
All I can say is that contemporary women should be thankful that the RCA beit din and many of the rabbinic courts in the State of Israel have realized that in modern times men and women must be treated equally in the divorce proceedings, and women can no longer be held prisoner in a dead marriage as was often the case in earlier times. With this in mind, let me remind people that in an earlier post, available here, I wrote as follows:
R. Hayyim Benveniste, Keneset ha-Gedolah, Even ha-Ezer 154, Hagahot Beit Yosef no. 59, in discussing when we can force a husband to give a divorce, writes:
ובעל משפט צדק ח”א סי’ נ”ט כתב דאפי’ רודף אחריה בסכין להכותה אין כופין אותו לגרש ואפי’ לו’ לו שחייב להוציא.
Can anyone imagine a posek, from even the most right-wing community, advocating such a viewpoint? I assume the logic behind this position is that even if the man is running after her with the knife, we don’t assume that he will actually kill her. He must just be doing it to scare her, and that is not enough of a reason to force him to divorce her. And if we are wrong, and he really does kill her? I guess the reply would be that this isn’t anything we could have anticipated even if we saw the knife in his hand, sort of like all those who have let pedophiles run loose in the yeshivot, presumably on the assumption that just because a man abused children in the past, that doesn’t mean that he will continue to do so.
(I will return to the issue of sexual abuse in a future post, because readers might recall that I expressed doubt that any rabbis would ever join the Agudah’s proposed rabbinic panel to determine if an accusation warranted going to the police. See here. The Agudah has just acknowledged that it was impossible to form such a panel precisely because of the legal jeopardy it would place the rabbis in. See here. Since it looks like all the public pressure will lead to clergy being made mandated reporters, it will be interesting to see what the Agudah response will then be. Will they instruct their followers to follow the law or expect them to go to jail in order to avoid mesirah?)
Regarding Aflalo’s point mentioned earlier in this note that a rabbi has to know the situation of a community, I recently found a very interesting comment by R. Levi Yitzhak of Berdichev, Kedushat Levi ha-Shalem (Jerusalem, 1958), Likutim, pp. 316-317. He asks why we say תשבי יתרץ קושיות ואבעיות, that in Messianic days Elijah will answer all problems. Since Moses will be resurrected, and he is the giver of the Torah, why don’t we say that he will provide the answers? R. Levi Yitzhak explains that only one who is living in this world knows what the situation is and how the halakhah should be decided. This is not the case with one who is dead and has lost his worldly connection. This explains why Elijah will provide all the answers, as he never died and was always part of the world. Therefore, unlike Moses, Elijah is the one qualified to decide matters affecting us. The lesson here is obvious, especially for those who think that every issue must be decided in Israel by authorities who really have really no conception of how American Jews live.

[9] I can’t tell you how often I have been with people (usually at Shabbat meals) who go on about how backwards the Muslims are, the proof being how they treat their women. This is usually contrasted to Judaism, which puts women on a pedestal. As an example of this “backwardness” people have pointed out that in Saudi Arabia (which is only one Muslim country, mind you), women are not even permitted to drive. I never have the heart to point out that there are hasidic sects, less than an hour away from where we are, that also don’t allow women to drive.
[10] See Ma’amar Esther, printed together with Va-Ya’an Shmuel (n.p., 2001), vol. 4, p. 19 (third numbering).
[11] Messas’ responsum is analyzed by Avinoam Rosenack, “Dignity of the Congregation” as a Defense Mechanism: A Halakhic Ruling by Rabbi Joseph Messas,” Nashim 13 (2007), pp. 183-206. On p. 201 n. 41, he provides references to scholarly literature that discusses medieval Jewish women’s adoption of Muslim modes of dress.
[12] Contrary to what Messas assumes, as far as I know there is absolutely no evidence that Jewish women generally dressed like this in the Rabbinic period. The fact that the Mishnah specifies the Arabian Jewish women shows that only one specific group dressed this way.
[13] Since he mentions women’s voices, let me return briefly to my second to last post which dealt with kol isha. I neglected to note the pesak of R. Abraham Yaffe-Schlesinger, Be’er Sarim, vol. 2, no. 54, who sees it as obvious that a woman is permitted to sing in front of non-Jews.
In the post, I mentioned three Modern Orthodox high schools that allow young women to sing solos. I was informed that the North Shore Hebrew Academy also has to be added to this list. See here.
My correspondent further wrote: “I wanted to let you know that the son of Rabbi _____ (former president of the RCA [name deleted by MS]) told me that his father used to go to see Broadway shows based on the Psak of the Rav, who felt that if you couldn’t totally make out the face of the female singer it would be permitted.”
One of the commenters on the post called attention to R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, Bnei Vanim, vol. 4, no. 7. In this responsum, he says a couple of things very relevant to the post. To begin with, he writes that it is permitted to listen to the singing of a single woman if this is something that you are used it, and it will not be sexually arousing.
לע”ד מדינא מותר לשמוע קול שיר של בתולות אם רגיל בקולן שאז שמיעתן זהה לראיית שערן
This is the same viewpoint I quoted from R. Jacob Pardo, who distinguishes between married women, whose singing is always forbidden, and single women whose singing is only forbidden if it is sensual song. Also noteworthy is that R. Henkin rejects the viewpoint found in various aharonim that a post-pubescent female (i.e., niddah) has the same status as a married woman, and her singing is therefore forbidden:
וכיון שנהגו להקל בשערן של בתולות ולא חלקו בין נדות לטהורות הוא הדין בקולן, כל שהוא רגיל בו ואינו מהרהר.
He concludes his responsum by stating that if the song is not sensual, and the woman’s voice is heard on the radio or out of a loudspeaker, since this is not really “her” voice it is permissible to listen. What this apparently means is that any time a woman sings into a microphone, it is permissible to listen to her (assuming her very appearance is not arousing). This basically gets rid of the entire kol isha prohibition in our time (when the songs aren’t sensual), since today every event with a woman singer uses a microphone. Based on R. Henkin’s responsum, all Modern Orthodox high schools could once more return to having young women sing solos (even though I am certain that this is not his intention).. Here is his conclusion (emphasis added):
ולא מפני שאנו מדמים נעשה מעשה להתיר לכתחילה לשמוע קול אשה המזמרת לפננו לבדה, אבל בשירה ברדיו או דרך רמקול וכו’ שעל פי דין אינה קולה ממש ובצירוף עוד טעמים [ראה להלן מאמר כ’] ובתנאי שהשירה אינה של עגבים נראה פשוט להקל.
In Bnei Vanim, vol. 2, p. 211, he quotes his grandfather as even permitting watching a woman sing on the television, because again, the voice is not her actual voice. He also notes that his grandfather later expressed doubt on this point.
שמעתי מפיו הקדוש שקול אשה על הרדיו אינו נקרא קול אשה ומותר לשמעו [בפעם הראשונה ששאלתי אותו על זה אמר בפירוש שגם בטלביזיה אינו נקרא קול אשה ומותר לשמעו, אבל כשחזרתי ושאלתי אותו על זה אחרי זמן לא היה ברור אצלו – ואולי מפני חולשתו]

In vol. 4, p. 30, he refers to a woman singing the national anthem, which based on his argumentation would, I think, be quite easy to permit, even watching on television. As he notes, this is not the sort of song that arouses sexual thoughts:
ורבים מקילים לשמוע קול שיר של אשה ברדיו כשהיא אינה לפניהם, ואינה שרה שירי עגבים אלא שירי מולדת וכיוצא באלה ורחוק שיהרהרו בה ואינו תלוי באם מכירה או לא.
I would also like to share an email I received from Benny Hutman which relates to R. Moshe Feinstein’s opinion. In my post I called attention to a responsum of R. Moshe Feinstein which I claimed cast doubt on R. Mordechai Tendler’s assertion that according to R. Moshe kol isha is entirely situational and depends on whether or not someone is aroused.
Benny writes:

It seems to me that R’ Moshe must hold that the prohibition on Kol Isha depends on whether a person is used to hearing women sing. R’ Moshe holds like the Aruch Hashulchan that nowadays one can say Shema in front of a woman with uncovered hair because the reality is that we are constantly confronted with such hair and therefore it is no longer arousing. For this to make sense we need to understand the Gemara in Berachos when it says “sear b’isha erva” to mean that hair could be ervah, meaning I would have thought that ervah by definition could only refer to parts of her body, ka mashma lan that hair despite not being skin can be ervah. However it won’t actually be ervah unless it is normally covered. Since the language of the Gemara is exactly the same (as is the source) it follows that the gemara means that Kol Isha could be ervah despite not physically being attached to the body at all. However, just as R’Moshe says that our constant exposure to uncovered hair makes sear no longer be ervah, the same logic dictates that if someone has been listening to women sing all his life kol isha will not be ervah. Arguably it can also be situational so that if someone has been going to the opera all his life such singing will not be kol isha, but pop music will be. It seems to me that this heter should apply to almost all Modern Orthodox men. This would explain how Rabbi Tendler could say that R’ Moshe held that the prohibition is situational despite R’ Moshe’s tshuva apparently holding it is forbidden. It depends on who is asking the question and the time, place and manner of the singing.

Finally, R. Hayyim Amsalem, in his recently published Derekh Hayyim, p. 45, states that it is a well known fact that great Torah scholars and chief rabbis have in the past been present at various official events that included women singing, and they did not walk out. As he explains:
הם ידעו לחשב שכר “מצוה” כנגד הפסדה, ושגדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה לא תעשה שבתורה (ברכות דף יט ע”ב), שלא לדבר על העלבת פנים העלולה להגרם, והרי המלבין פני חברו ברבים אין לו חלק לעוה”ב (בבא מציעא דף נט ע”א), יתכן וכשהיו יכולים להשתמט מלהופיע בטקס כזה שידעו מראש שיכלול גם שירת נשים היו נמנעים מלהופיע, אבל היכן שההכרח אלצם להשתתף הרי שמעולם לא נשמע רינון אחריהם על השתתפותם, או על העלבת המעמד ביציאה פומבית.
[14] Rosenack writes (“Dignity”, p. 190): “Messas’s remarks allow the inference that he knew of an ancient tradition—either from the days of his own ancestors, or from the time of the talmudic sages—of women going up to the Torah, before the institution of the [talmudic] prohibition discussed here.” This is incorrect. What Messas is doing in this responsum is describing what he imagines the situation was like in the era that women received aliyot, and why this was later prohibited. There is not even the hint that he knew of any ancient tradition in this regard, and he certainly did not.
In terms of women’s aliyot, in my post here I called attention to R. Samuel Portaleone’s opinion that in theory it is permitted to give a woman an aliyah in a private synagogue. Without knowing of Portaleone’s view, R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin concluded that ”if done without fanfare, an occasional aliyyah by a woman in a private minyan of men held on Shabbat in a home and not in a synagogue sanctuary or hall can perhaps be countenanced or at least overlooked.” “Qeriat Ha-Torah by Women: Where We Stand Today,” Edah Journal 1:2 (5761), p. 6. (Henkin also assumes that women’s aliyot on Simhat Torah are permissible.) There is another source in this regard that has been overlooked by those arguing for women’s aliyot in so-called partnership minyanim (I hate this term!). R. Moses Salmon, Netiv Moshe (Vienna, 1899), p. 24 n. 112, sees no problem with women getting aliyot today. As mentioned already, women are denied aliyot because of kevod ha-tzibur. Yet according to Salmon, since today men who get aliyot no longer read from the Torah, kevod ha-tzibur is no longer a concern. This was all theoretical for Salmon, as no one in his Hungarian town was dreaming of calling women up to the Torah, but from the standpoint of pure halakhah, he saw no objection. He also claims that according to Maimonides, women can be counted in a minyan. See ibid., n. 111. Here is the page from Salmon.
[15] The same approach is adopted by R. Matzliah Mazuz, Ish Matzliah, vol. 1 no. 10. He writes:
לע”ד כבוד ציבור דהתם, אינו כפשוטו, אלא לישנא מעליא, ועיקר הכוונה כאותה ששנינו בסוכה דנ”א תיקון גדול

[16] See here and here.
[17] See here and here. See also his Shulhan Arukh ha-Mekutzar, vol. 6, pp. 246ff., and here for a placard signed by some leading Sephardic rabbis.
[18] See here. He thinks that a woman who refuses to say good morning to her male neighbor is demonstrating proper tzeniut.
[19] See here.
[20] Incidentally, in no. 328:2, he states that there is no longer a problem taking medicine on Shabbat, since people today do not grind their own medicine.

  • [21] See the numerous explanations of these passages in R. Moshe Zuriel, Leket Perushei Aggadah, ad loc. Tosafot, ad loc., quotes one opinion that does take the passage literally, but this opinion assumes that the am ha’aretz spoken of is a violent person suspected of murder



Towards a Bibliography of seforim related to Shavous and Megilas Rus (new and old)


Towards a Bibliography of seforim related to Shavous and Megilas Rus (new and old)

By Eliezer Brodt

In this post I intend to start a list towards a more complete bibliography to the various seforim (new and old) and articles related to Shavous. I hope to update it much more in the future as my computer (with all my information just died).

When learning the Halachos of Shavous, one is struck how the Tur does not mention anything special for Shavous except for instructions related to davening and Keriyas Hatorah. The only custom he mentions that is unique to Shavous is saying Azharot. Rabbi Yosef Caro in both of his works, Beis Yosef and Shulchan Aruch pretty much follows in this path. In the Codes is not until the Rema that some of the famous customs related to this Yom Tov are brought down, such as the custom of placing flowers in shuls and houses, the custom of eating Milchigs and eating special lechem to remember the Shtei Halechem. Only afterwards through the writings of the Matteh Moshe, Knesses Hagedolah and especially the Magen Avraham are the other customs related to this Yom Tov brought forward, among  them, when exactly is one supposed to daven Maariv Shavous night, staying up the whole night learning, saying Akdamus, using a special Trope when leining the Aseres Hadibros,and leining Megilas Rus[1].

The first work worth mentioning, as its one of my all time favorites, is Rav Zevin’s Moadim Be-halacha. In this work he has four pieces, none of which needs my approval ! – related to Shavous. He has a general piece, one related to various issues about the Shtei Halechem, another related to Megilas Rus and one related to various aspects of Aseres Hadibros.

Regarding general aspects of Aseres Hadibros one should see the collection of articles in the volume called
Aseres  Hadibros
edited by B. Segal (Magnes Press, 1986) and the work
Aseres  Hadibros Ve-keriyas Shema
from Moshe Weinfeld (2001).

For a discussion of the special Trope used when leining the 
Aseres  Hadibros see the article from Amnon Shiloah in the volume
Aseres  Hadibros
edited by B. Segal. See also Rabbi Dovid Yitzchaki in the back of his edition of Luach Eresh pp. 524- 540; the series of articles of Y. Laufer (available here, here and here) [special thanks to my good friend Mr. Yisroel Israel for bringing this to my attention]; this article from Y. Ofer.

For discussion of the custom to stand during the leining of 
Aseres  Hadibros see this earlier post by Dan Rabinowitz available here and especially the sources listed at the end. To add to the usage of the Teshuvos Harambam mentioned there, see Rav Zevin, Moadim Be-halacha, p. 389-390. See also what I mention here, and also Rabbi Oberlander, Minhag Avosenu Beyadenu, pp.605-622.

Regarding Shtei Halechem see the excellent work Birchat Haaretz from Rabbi Y. Mashbaum available here.

Regarding the time when to daven Maariv Shavous night see Rabbi Binyomin Hamburger, Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz, 4:344-369.

Regarding staying up Shavous night, see R. Hamburger, Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz, 3:268-364, where he traces this minhag and deals with, at great length, the minhag of saying Tikun. See also Professor Moshe Chalamish, Ha-Kabalah, pp. 595- 612. See also J.D. Wilhelm, “Sidrei Tikkunim,” in Alei Ayin: Essays Presented to Salman Schocken (Jerusalem: Schocken 1948-1952), pp. 125-146, (Hebrew). Of course I must mention my good friend Menachem Butler’s favorite article relating to all this, Elliott Horowitz, “Coffee, Coffeehouses, and the Nocturnal Rituals of Early Modern Jewry,” AJS Review 14:1 (Spring 1989) pp. 17-46. For other Halachic issues related to staying up all night see the recent work, Ha-niyur Kol Ha-laylah.

Regarding saying Akdamot see this earlier post from Dan Rabinowitz available here. See also Rabbi Dovid Yitzchaki in the back of his edition of Luach Eresh, pp. 541-542. See also Jeffrey Hoffman, “Akdamut: History, Folklore, and Meaning,” Jewish Quarterly Review 99:2 (Spring 2009) pp. 161-183.

Regarding the custom of saying Azharot on Shavous see what I wrote here. I hope to update this post in the near future. Meanwhile, see what I wrote in Yeshurun 25:447-449.

Another area worth learning about is Bikurim. For this I recommend the volume of the Safrai Family from their series of Mishnas Eretz Yisrael.

Regarding the custom of placing flowers in Shul and at home, see the works of Rabbi Oberlander, Minhag Avosenu Beyadenu, pp. 573-604 and the collections of material found in Moadim Li-simcha and Pardes Eliezer.

Regarding the custom of eating Dairy on Shavous, much has been written. See the works of Rabbi Oberlander, Minhag Avosenu Beyadenu, pp. 623-647 and the collections of material found in Moadim Li-simcha and Pardes Eliezer. Recently Rabbi Moshe Dinin collected 160 reasons (!) for this custom in  Kuntres Matamei Moshe (2008). Even more recently Rabbi Yosef Ohev Zion printed a work called Yoma De-atzartah (2009) [thanks to Yissochor Hoffman for bringing this work to my attention]. For important discussion related to this topic see the articles of my friend Rabbi Yehudah Spitz available here and here.

Related to this one should read the great article by Aviad A. Stollman, “Halakhic Development as a Fusion of Hermeneutical Horizons: The Case of the Waiting Period Between Meat and Dairy,” AJS Review 28:2 (November 2005) pp. 1-30 (Hebrew) [expanded from his M.A. on Perek Kol Habassar.

Another custom that originally took place on Shavous was when a child turned three they used to conduct a special seder with eating cakes and reciting various pesukim and the like. This custom was dealt with by many; for a recent discussion of this topic, including sources, see my article in Yerushasenu 5 (2011), pp. 337-360. [A PDF is available upon request].

Another issue of interest worth mentioning related to Shavous is the plagiarism of the highly controversial Sefer Chemdas Yamim discussed many times on this blog (see here). Isaiah Tishbi in his various essays where he proves the plagiarism’s of the Chemdas uses many different topics related to Shavous. See the collection of his articles Chikrei Kabbalah Veshiluchoseh pp. 374-376 (regarding when to daven Maariv), 382-383 (which day was Matan Torah), pp. 389-391 (regarding standing during Aseret hadibrot), pp. 391-393 (regarding the Maggid visiting the Beis Yosef on Shavous night) and pp. 340-341 (regarding eating meat after milk).

Here is a listing of some general works related to Shavous that deal with many of the above aspects and more:

א. ר’ שלמה קלוגר, קהלת יעקב, ירושלים תשס”ו, תמז עמודים.

ב. ר’ פנחס שווארטץ, מנחה חדשה, תרצ”ז, נו עמודים.

ג. ר’ יצחק ווייס, בינה לעתים, בני ברק תשסד.

ד. ר’ שריה דבליצקי, קיצור הלכות מועדים, תשס”ו, פב עמודים.

ה. ר’ אבוגדר נבנצל, ירושלים במועדיה.

ו. ר’ עובדיה יוסף, חזון עובדיה, יום טוב, ירושלים תשס”ג.

ז. ר’ אהרן מיאסניק, מנחת אהרן, ירושלים תשס”ח, רצב עמודים.

ח. ר’ גדליה אבערלאנדער, מנהג אבותינו בידינו, מאנסי תשס”ו.

ט. פרדס אליעזר.

י. ר’ טוביה פריינד, מועדים לשמחה, ירושלים תשס”ח.

יא. ר’ יצחק טעסלער, פניני המנהג, מונסי תשס”ח, תצב עמודים, ספר זה כולל אלפי מקורות וס”ד פרקים על עניני החג.

יב. ר’ יוסף חיים אוהב ציון, יומא דעצרתא, ירושלים תשס”ח.

Over the centuries numerous works have been written explain this Megilah. Just to mention a few: until last year the best collection of Rishonim was in the Toras Chaim edition printed by Mossad Rav Kook. This edition has the commentaries of nine Rishonim printed based on manuscripts.

A few year ago the Even Yisrael company printed a nicely done edition which had a few Rishonim and Achronim. But I cannot offer an opinion if it does not have mistakes and the like. More recently they reprinted this, adding many more Rishonim and Achronim. If one is interested in buying any one volume related to Rus this is the best to buy for your money, as you get a bunch of commentaries all in one volume.

Another work worth mentioning is called Tosfos Haslem this is a collection from many different manuscripts of the Baalei Hatosfos on the Megilah.

Another work on Rus worth mentioning is the Shoresh Yeshai from Rabbi Shlomo Alkabetz. There are many editions of this work, but I recommend the one printed a few years ago edited by Rabbi Shmuel Askhkenazi, as it includes a very good introduction, many notes and some very useful indices.

Another beautiful work on Rus worth learning through is the Meshivos Nefesh from the Bach. This perush goes through everything related to the megilah very thoroughly. He also wrote a work on Rashi called Be’er Mayim. This work was printed many times.

Another work is the Torah Sheleimah continuing in the path of Rabbi Menachem Kasher’s Torah Sheleimah on the Torah, collecting the many Midrashim on the Megilah. However the great notes of Rav Kasher are definitely missed by many.

Another work I enjoyed on Rus was from Rabbi Yosef Zechariah Stern – one of my favorite Gedolim – his bekius here is simply remarkable (as it is in all his other works).

Another collection of useful works on Megilas Rus was printed a few years ago by my good friend Rabbi Moshe Hubner. The title of the volume is Uryan Toilessyah (314 pp.). This volume contains four works, the first being his own called Uryan Toilessyah. The style of this work is to deal with many of the issues that come up while learning the Megilah.The questions and answers are based on a very wide range of sources. He also includes many nice ideas of his own to various problems. It is very organized clear and to the point. He also printed three other earlier works, the first being Invei Hagefen first printed in 1863, the second being Rishon Mekor Hachaim first printed in 1697. He also reprinted some Teshuvos and articles related to Shavous from his grandfather Rabbi Shmuel Hubner, author of the Nimukei Shmuel. [A few copies of this work are still available; email me for more details].

This year a few more important works related to Megilas Rus were just printed. First worth mentioning is the Mikraot Gedolot Haketer from Bar Ilan. This series began a few years back and has fallen asleep for awhile. Last week the project “woke up” and five volumes were released in the small size. The point of this series is to offer the most accurate texts of various Rishonim on Tanach based on all the manuscripts.

Another excellent work just printed is the Eshkol Hakofer from Rabbi Avraham Sbba, author of the Tzeror Hamor (259 pp.). This work had been printed many years ago based on one manuscript but this edition is printed based on numerous manuscripts and contains many pieces not found in the printed edition. This work is simply beautifully done, with a nice introduction and many useful notes.

Another great work that just was printed for the first time was the Toldos Shlomo by  Rabbi Shlomo Kluger (436 pp.).

Another new work on Megilas Rus is called Megilas Rus Im Otzros Hameforshim (482 pp.) This work contains a few sections the first part contains separate extensive perushim on Targum, Rashi, Rav Yosef Kara and Ibn Ezra’s perushim. Besides for this, it contains an extensive peuish on the Megilah. Another section has in-depth lengthy discussions on various topics related to the Megilah, Rus and David Hamelech. As the bibliography at the end of the sefer shows it is based on many seforim.

Another work worth mentioning is the Ke-Motzo Shalal Rav on Rus and Shavuos. This work continues in the path of Rabbi Rosenthal’s earlier works on chumash and Yomim Tovim with the same name, collecting and presenting nice material, written clearly, and easy to understand related to Rus and Shavous from famous and less famous works.

Regarding whether or not to stand for the recitation of the Aseres Hadibros, see here. Thanks thanks for Yissachar Hoffman for sending me this. In the work Shiurei Rav Elyashiv on Berachos (p. 93) it says that he says its assur to stand based on this teshuvah of the Rambam. I will add that I davened for many years at Rav Elyashiv’s minyan on shabbos. I always wanted to see if he would sit or stand but he almost always got that aliya – until one time he did not and I was able to see that he indeed stayed seated!

[i] The Rema mentions this minhag earlier (490:9) but not in hilchos Shavous.




Summary of Jordan Penkower on reading Zekher or Zeikher Amalek

Summary of Jordan Penkower on reading Zekher or Zeikher Amalek

This post originally appeared here. It is a summary of Prof. Jordan Penkower’s Minhag u-Mesorah: ‘Z-kh-r Amalek’ be-hamesh o be-shesh nekudot by his student Yosef Peretz. It appears here with permission, with some additions by the Seforim Blog editor.

It is common practice in most Ashkenazi congregations to read the words z-kh-r Amalek, in Deut. 25:19, twice: once with a tzere under the zayin (zeikher) and once with a segol (zekher). Sephardic congregations, however, who do not distinguish between the pronunciation of these two vowels, read it only once, and they point it with a tzere. What is the origin of this practice, when did it begin, and is this double reading necessary to fulfill the command of reading these verses of Parshat Zakhor, the special reading on the Sabbath before Purim? These questions are discussed in several articles by R. Mordechai Breuer and Dr. J. Penkower,[1] two of the most eminent among contemporary scholars of the masorah and Biblical text. In their opinion, zeikher with a tzere is beyond a shadow of doubt the original and correct pointing of the text; and that is how the verse should be read in Parshat Zakhor. It must be stressed that the custom itself of a double reading is quite surprising and completely unique in Torah reading, for it was customary to decide in favor of one reading or another whenever there was a conflict between variant readings, pointing of vowels, or assignment of cantillation marks (as in cases of kri and ktiv, where a word is written one way but read another). R. David Kimhi, in his Sefer ha-Shorashim (in the manuscript versions), was the first to note the discrepancies regarding the pointing of these vowels in Sephardic biblical manuscripts. Under the root z-kh-r he says: “‘blot out the memory (zekher) of Amalek’ (Deut. 25:19), with six dots (i.e., segol twice), but ‘praise [in remembrance of (le-zekher)] His holy name’ (Ps. 30:5), with five dots (i.e., a tzere and a segol), and this occurs nowhere else; thus it appears in some books [i.e. manuscripts of the bible containing the Masorah]. But in others, z-kh-r is always pointed with five dots.” In other words, Radak noted that in some books he found z-kh-r pointed with segol and in others, with tzere. In printed editions of Sefer ha-Shorashim, however, beginning with the Venice edition and carrying through the 19th century, Radak’s remark concludes with the words “and this occurs nowhere else.” In other words, he found zekher in Parshat Zakhor always pointed with double segol.[2]
Here is a typical example in a manuscript (from 1481):
And here is the Venice edition:Here is the manuscript text restored in Biesenthal and Lebrecht’s Berlin 1847 edition:
Various prayer books and Pentateuchs published in the 16th, 17th and early 18th centuries were redacted according to Radak’s remark as it appears in these printed editions; for example, the siddur of R. Shabtai Sofer (in the word zekher in the Ashrei prayer and in the prayers on the eve of the New Year), and Meor Einayim, the Pentateuch published by R. Wolf Heidenheim.*
The Basel 1579 Seder Tefillot Mi-kol Ha-shanah (Ashkenaz):
The manuscript of R. Shabtai’s siddur:
In 1832, about fifteen years after publication of Heidenheim’s edition, a book by R. Issachar Baer appeared, entitled Ma`aseh Rav, containing a description of the practices of the Vilna Gaon. The author mentions that the Gaon’s disciples disagreed over the way their teacher used to read the word zekher in Parshat Zakhor. The author attested as follows: “When he would read Parshat Zakhor, he would say zekher, with a segol under the letter zayin. R. Hayyim of Volozhin, however, whose endorsement is on the book, wrote there, `As for his writing that in Parshat Zakhor one should read [z-kh-r] with six dots, I heard from the saintly person [i.e., the Gaon of Vilna] that he read with five dots (=zeikher).’ I do not know whether those hearing him were mistaken, and thought they heard segol twice, or whether he changed his practice in his later years.”
Here is the text, with the footnote referring to R. Hayyim of Volozhin’s testimony:

Here is R. Hayyim’s testimony in his approbation at the beginning of this work:

Approximately eighty years later, R. Israel Meir Ha-Cohen, otherwise known as the Hafetz Hayyim, came out with his Mishnah Berurah on the Shulhan Arukh. Since the special reading of Parshat Zakhor is a command from the Torah, and there was some doubt as to the correct reading, he ruled that the words z-kh-r Amalek should be read twice. In his own words, “Some people say it should be read as zeekher Amalek (Deut. 25:19) with a tzere, and others say that it should be read as zekher Amalek with a segol; therefore the correct practice is to read both ways, to satisfy them both” (Mishnah Berurah 685.18). Later, a variety of customs emerged in this regard. Some readers only repeat the two words, z-kh-r Amalek, while others repeat the entire phrase, timhe et z-kh-r Amalek, and still others repeat the entire verse.[3]
Here is the Mishnah Berurah:
As mentioned above, Rabbi Breuer and Dr. Penkower note that the correct pointing of z-kh-r is with a tzere and the custom of double reading is unfounded. This follows from the arguments they cite from the masorah, from the ancient and highly precise Tiberian manuscripts and teachings of the Masoretes. R. Jedidiah Solomon Norzi, a seventeenth century masoretic scholar, held to be the final arbiter on the text of the Bible,[4] wrote a work entitled Minhat Shai, in which he remarks on inaccuracies that entered all the books of the Bible in the 1547-1548 Venice edition of Mikraot Gedolot and other editions published around then.[5] He says nothing about zekher ,which is pointed with a tzere followed by segol, from which it follows that he agreed with this pointing and had no doubts about it being correct.[6]
Minhat Shai from the first edition (Mantua 1742-4):

The most conclusive proof is found in ancient manuscripts, dating to the time of the masorah, and held to be very precise in their pointing and cantillation marks: the Leningrad manuscript (known as B19),[7] the Sassoon 1053 manuscript and others. All point z-kh-r with a tzere under the zayin.[8]
Leningrad manuscript:
Today we have in our hands a famous ancient manuscript, the Keter Aram-Tzova,[9] the most ancient and best authorized text of the entire Bible. The pointing and masoretic annotation of this manuscript were done in Israel over one thousand years ago by Aharon Ben-Asher, considered the greatest Masorete of all generations. Due to Ben-Asher’s precision and reputation, Maimonides chose to base his Hilkhot Sefer Torah on Ben-Asher’s work.[10] In the 15th century, at the latest, the Keter manuscript was transferred to Aleppo, Syria, where it was stored in the Sephardic synagogue until the riots against the Jews of Aleppo (Aram Tzova) that broke out in 1948, during which the manuscript was damaged, most the entire Pentateuch being lost, including Parshat Zakhor. Because the Keter manuscript was so special, the Jews of Aleppo did not allow others to photograph the manuscript or to examine it. Whoever wished to clarify a question of variants in the text had to write down the query and the person in charge would relay the version found in the Keter. The most famous of those addressing queries was R. Jacob Saphir, who submitted over five hundred questions, seeking to find out what variant appeared in the Keter. Fortunately, one of his questions pertained to the pointing of z-kh-r in Parshat Zakhor. The question and response were as follows: “(Deuteronomy) 25:19 z-kh-r h”n [question]. Yes [response].” In other words, is the word z-kh-r pointed in the Keter with five dots [h”n = hamesh nekudot, five dots,i.e., tzere followed by segol]? The answer provided by the keeper of the manuscript, R. Menashe Sitton, was” yes”.[11]
The entry in the published version of this manuscript (Rafael Zer Meorot Natan Le-rabbi Ya’akov Saphir, Leshonenu 50:3,4 Nisan-Tamuz 5746):

Dr. Penkower examined the pointing of z-kh-r in dozens of medieval manuscripts and found that in those manuscripts reputed to be more precise (some of the Sephardic ones) it was pointed with a tzere, and in those reputed to be less precise (some of the Sephardic ones and most of the Ashkenazi ones) it was pointed with a segol. These findings led him to note, “If we were to start taking into account the pointing in manuscripts far removed from the precise Tiberian ones, and were to begin reading doubly all instances of variation between them and the precise manuscripts, the Torah reading each week would last an inordinately long time.”[12] All editions of the Bible today point z-kh-r with tzere followed by segol, leaving no vestige of the double segol variant. One cannot but agree with R. Breuer and Dr. Penkower that there is no need for Ashkenazim to read zekher, for zeikher will suffice. To sum up: * R. David Kimhi mentions two methods of pointing which he observed in Sephardic manuscripts: zekher and zeikher. * The disciples of the Vilna Gaon disagreed about how their Rabbi used to read this word in Parshat Zakhor, whether with a tzere or a segol. * Because of uncertainty as to which was correct, the Mishnah Berurah ruled that z-kh-r Amalek should be read twice, once with tzere and once with segol. * The findings presented by R. Breuer and Dr. Penkower prove conclusively that the correct and original pointing of this word is zeikher (with a tzere). Therefore, in their opinion, one should return to the ancient practice, and all Jewish communities ought to read the word only once, as zeikher. [1] M. Breuer, “Mikraot she-yesh lahem hekhre`a,” Megadim 10 (1990), pp. 97-112; J. S. Penkower, “Minhag u-Mesorah: ‘Z-kh-r Amalek’ be-hamesh o be-shes nekudot” (with appendices, in R. Kasher, M. Tzippor and Y. Tzefati, eds., Iyyunei Mikra u-Farshanut, 4, Bar Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan 1997, pp. 71-127. [2] Penkower (loc. cit., p. 80 ff.) discusses at length the differences between manuscript and printed versions of Sefer ha-Shorashim. [3] On other practices, see Penkower, loc. sit., p. 71, n. 1. [4] Y. Yevin, Mavo la-Masorah ha-Tverianit, Jerusalem 1976, p. 101 ff. [5] J. S. Penkower, Ya`akov Ben Hayyim u-Tzmihat Mahadurat ha-Mikraot ha-Gedolot I-II (Dissertation), Jerusalem 1982. [6] R. Jedidiah Solomon Norzi was preceded by another important masoretic scholar, R. Menahem de Lonzano, author of Or Torah. In his book, he remarks on the same editions of Mikraot Gedolot on the system of vowel pointing and cantillation marks, but also says nothing about z-kh-r being pointed with a tzere followed by segol. [7] The printed Bible published for the IDF, prepared by Prof. A. Dothan, is based on this manuscript.[8]For further detail, see R. Breuer’s article (cited in n. 1), p. 110, and Penkower’s article (cited in n. 2), p. 101. [9] This manuscript is also known as the Aleppo Keter, or simply the Keter for short. [10] Several printed Bibles based on the Keter are available today. The most important of these is undoubtedly the Mikraot Gedolot- ha-Keter, redacted and edited by Prof. Menahem Cohen, Bar Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan 1992 and following years. Thus far five volumes have been published, covering the following six books of the Bible: Joshua-Judges (including a general introduction to the edition), Samuel I and II, Kings I and II, Isaiah, and Genesis vol. 1. [11] The manuscript containing these questions and responsa is known as Meorot Natan. See here.
[12] At the Project on Bible and Masorah at Bar- Ilan University, headed by Prof. M. Cohen, dozens of medieval manuscripts of the Bible were examined, and the findings of these studies reinforce Penkower’s conclusions regarding variant pointings in the manuscripts.
* Seforim Blog editor note: the issue is discussed in the En Hakore commentary included by Heidenheim in Humash Meor Einayim, only in the parashah of Amalek in Exodus 17, not in Deuteronomy. En Hakore is a masoretic commentary by R. Yekutiel (or Zalman) Ha-nakdan who lived in Prague in the 13th century. Here is how it appears in Heidenheim’s Humash Meor Einayim. However, it appears to be a misstatement to say that Heidenheim was among those whose work was “redacted according to Radak’s remark,” for while there is no example of Zekher from Psalms to compare with in his Humash Meor Einayim, Zekher is also pointed with tzere , rather than segol, in the Ashrei prayer included in Humash Moda Le-vina. This would seem to indicate that he did not follow the Radak. He merely published En Hakore, which dealt with the issue raised by Radak.




New work by Rabbi Stahl

New work by Rabbi Stahl
by Eliezer Brodt
ספר סגולה, ספר ראשון, ירושלים תשע”ב, ר’ יעקב ישראל סטל, 153 עמודים.

As previously mentioned on the blog a new work by Rabbi Yakov Stahl was just printed (for reviews of some of his earlier works see here and here). This work is called Segulah (Hard cover, 153 pp.) Sefer Segulah is a collection of articles on disparate topics, related to Minhag, Halacha, Piyyut, Midrash and Aggadah. It is an excellent collection of articles on topics not often written about in seforim, by others, full of interesting observations from an extremely rich and wide range of sources. There is a special emphasis of usage of Piyutim in many of these articles, which are still an almost untapped mine for sources. Amongst the topics discussed in this work is about an old minhag to have a rooster in front of the darshan at weddings. Another is about staring at Rainbows. Still another is an interesting, possibly new early source for the minhag to say Shirat Hayam every day in davening. There are two nice original articles related to Purim. One deals with an old minhag to read the Megillah during the Shabbasim before Purim and another deals with the Tefilah הרב את ריבנו.

This sefer was printed in a limited edition of 350 copies. A full table of contents and a sample of a chapter are available upon request.

Copies are available while supplies last for shipping; in Eretz Yisroel the price is $13.50, including shipping. To the US and England the price is $16.50, including shipping. Contact me at Eliezerbrodt@gmail.com

Copies of Rabbi Stahl’s other works are still available, such as:

ספר גמטריות לרבנו יהודה חהסיד
אמרות טהורות חיצוניות ופנימיות לרבנו יהודה החסיד
סודי חומש ושאר לתלמידי רבינו יהודה החסיד על התורה שיר השירים איוב ורות
ספר קושית לאחד מהראשונים

Copies of אלפא ביתא תניתא דשמואל זעירא ב’ חלקים by R. Shmuel Ashkenazi and edited by Rabbi Stahl are also still available for purchase. Email me for the table of contents.




“Torah Study on Christmas Eve” free Torah in Motion lecture by Marc B. Shapiro

In the spirit of inyana de-yoma, Torah in Motion is offering, free of charge, Dr. Marc B. Shapiro’s lecture “Torah Study on Christmas Eve,” delivered on Christmas Eve, 2009. You can get it here.

We invite all those who download the lecture to visit Torah in Motion’s website www.torahinmotion.org where over a thousand other lectures are available for download (including lectures by Dan Rabinowitz, Eliezer Brodt, and Marc Shapiro’s bundle of 103 lectures on great rabbinic figures, available here). We also invite you to check out Marc Shapiro’s upcoming tours to Italy and Central Europe. Information is available here. Summer 2011’s tour was sold out and we expect the same thing this summer, so if you are interested, please act quickly.




The sukkah on Shemini Atzeret controversy

The sukkah on Shemini Atzeret controversy
by William Gewirtz

Introduction: Arguments about eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret outside of Israel have a long and somewhat baffling history.[1] While not the only example of practice in opposition to the Shulchan Aruch, it appears to be among the most argued. The gemara, Rambam, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, written in many locales, all seem to be as unambiguous as possible in requiring one to eat in the sukkah. The Gaon, incensed by the spreading Chassidic custom to eat outside the sukkah, perhaps lemigdar miltah, went so far as to mandate sleeping in the sukkah on the night of shemini atzeret, in opposition to the Maharil, the Magen Avraham and normative custom. Despite consensus among all major decisors to require eating in the sukkah, an undercurrent of opposition has existed from at least the times of the early rishonim. Support for that opposition has been based on a number of apparently legitimate points. However, despite some early and consistent opposition, despite the logic and halakhic rationale of those who did not sit in the sukkah, and despite the problematic nature of the gemara (as explained below), I hope to explain the basis for the concluding and declarative statement in the gemara: “we sit but do not make a berakha.” In fact, the assumption, explicitly found[2] as far back as the times of the rishonim, that the declarative ruling was interpolated at a later point, is fundamental to explain both sides of the controversy. Some, as early as the times of the rishonim, argue that we can discount such geonic interpolations in deference to the original text which, as will be demonstrated, concludes not to sit in the sukkah. My goal is to explain why the interpolation is to be followed despite its ostensible opposition to the remainder of the text. The major thesis proposed is that one has to differentiate between a period of doubt as existed in both the yerushalmi and bavli when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses and a later period when rosh chodesh was determined using a fixed calendar. The geonic interpolation into the text of the gemara occurred at that later point; its rationale and inconsistency with the texts of the gemara needs to be addressed from that perspective. If I am correct, then in the period when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses, as in the times of Rav Yochanon and Rav,[3] sitting in the sukkah was not always required. However, when the fixed calendar was in use, the rabbis (eventually) decreed that sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret was obligatory. It may well have been more akin to a gezairah required at their time versus a continuation of historic practice. The remainder of the paper focuses on:

  • An analysis of the primary texts of the gemarot that demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.
  • A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor.
  • Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shimini Atzeret when not required and why they were perhaps considered overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, there are critical factors that differentiate Shemini Atzeret from other cases of yom tov sheni.
  • The interpolation by the geonim, and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings.
  • The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices.
  • Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on Shemini Atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah.
  • A summary and a modest proposal.

Section 1 – An analysis of the primary text of the gemarot demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. The sugya in the bavli masechet sukkah beginning on 46b contains three parts:[4] A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav. R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath citing Rav ruled: The eighth day which may be the seventh is regarded as the seventh in respect of the sukkah and as the eighth in respect of the benediction. R. Yochanon, however, ruled: It is regarded as the eighth in respect of both. B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement. FIRST APPROACH: That one must dwell [in the sukkah on the eighth day] is agreed by all, they only differ on the question of the benediction. According to him who regards the day as the seventh in respect of the sukkah, we also recite the benediction [of the sukkah], while according to him who holds that it is regarded as the eighth in respect of both, we do not recite the benediction [of the sukkah]. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yochanan, since R. Huna b. Bizna and all the notables of his age once entered a sukkah on the eighth day which may have been the seventh, and while they sat therein, they did not recite the benediction. But is it not possible that they were of the same opinion as he who laid down that once a man has recited the benediction on the first day, he has no more need to recite it? — There was a tradition that they had just come from the fields. SECOND APPROACH: (the ikka de’amri) There are some who say that the ruling that one must not recite the benediction [of the sukkah] is agreed upon by both, and that they only differ on the question whether one must sit [inthe sukkah]. According to him who ruled that it is regarded as the seventh day in respect of the sukkah, we must indeed sit in it thereon, while according to him who ruled that it is regarded as the eighth day in respect of both, we may not even sit in it thereon. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R.Yochanan. For who is the authority of the statement? R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath [of course], and he himself sat on the eighth day which might be the seventh outside the sukkah. C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” And the law is that we must indeed sit in the sukkah but may not recite the benediction. A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav: Rav states that Shemini Atzeret is treated as the seventh for “this” and the eighth for “that.” Rav Yochanon states it is the considered as the eighth for “this” and “that.” The two approaches differ as to what “this” and “that” refer.[5] B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement: The first alternative assumes that all agree that sitting in the sukkah is obligatory; the argument concerns whether to make a berakha. In this approach Rav is asserting that one makes a berakhaleishev ba’sukkah.” The phrase “the seventh for this” refers to this obligation for a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “The eighth for that” refers to the fact that the other prayers of Shemini Atzeretkiddush and tefillah – mention only the eighth day and make no mention of Sukkot. Rav Yochanon asserts we make no reference to Sukkot, making no berakha when sitting in the sukkah on the eighth. It is the eight for “this” refers to sitting in the sukkah without a berakha; “the eighth for that” is interpreted identically to Rav. According to both opinions, “this” refers to whether or not a berakha is made when sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to both opinions, “that” refers to the mention of only Shemini Atzeret in the prayers of the eighth day. This reading is rather forced in that there does not appear to be any disagreement about what holiday ought to be referred to in the various prayers and blessings of the eighth day. While the word “this” is informative, the word “that” is not. Stating both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret in one prayer/blessing would be contradictory; declaring a day to be both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret was never even raised as a possibility and for good reason. The first approach then quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we are to follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon. The second approach assumes not making a berakha on sitting in the sukkah is undisputed; the argument is about even sitting in the sukkah. Thus the second part of the phrase – the eighth for “that” states that common view of both Rav and Rav Yochanon omitting a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “This” refers to the obligation to sit in the sukkah. Rav maintains for “this” it is considered the seventh and hence one is obligated to sit in the sukkah. Rav Yochanon maintains it is the eighth for “this” as well with no obligation to sit in the sukkah. Note that in this approach of the ikaa de’amri, both parts of the sentence are informative. The second approach then also quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon Were the sugya to end at this point, the conclusion would be clear for two reasons. Each reason itself is two-fold, resulting from both a general principle as well as a detail present in this specific case.

  • First, generally, where there are two alternative approaches, the second, the ikaa de’amri, is assumed normative.[6] As well in this specific case, as indicated, the phrase of both Rav and Rav Yochanon is more informative in the formulation of the ikka de’amri.
  • Second, when there is a dispute between Rav and Rav Yochanon, we generally follow Rav Yochanon.[7]As well, in this specific case the text in both alternatives immediately includes an example of practice that follows the opinion of Rav Yochanon.

Taken together, we would assume to follow the second alternative and the opinion of Rav Yochanon – and not sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to many readings, this conclusion is made even more strongly by the yerushalmi.[8] While the bavli addresses the obligation to sit in the sukkah, the yerushalmi notes that one may not sit in the sukkah while making kiddush but one may enter the sukkah afterwards if he so desires. While some rishonim quote this yerushalmi as opposing the psak of the bavli,[9] others claim[10] that the yerushalmi is addressing a region of Israel where there was no doubt about what day the courts declared rosh chodesh. Rabbi Schacter, in support of the former opinion, observed that the yerushalmi uses the expression “leilai yom tov achron;” the plural, “leilai” is only relevant if there is a yom tov sheni on the ninth. Given this interpretation, the yerushalmi is making a rather strong point of equating the nights of the eighth and ninth, dismissing any possibility of an obligation to eat in the sukkah on the eighth.[11] C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha:” Despite the reading of the gemara as outlined, the bavli concludes that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” This opinion is that of both Rav in the second alternative and Rav Yochanon in the first alternative. This ruling corresponds to two of four opinions quoted; the two alternative opinions – not sitting at all or sitting and making a berakha – are only supported by one amora and only according to one alternative. Despite that, this ruling is contradicted by the normal principles of psak where we would follow Rav Yochanon’s opinion in the second alternative, as well as the yerushalmi. The language of the gemarashemini safek shevii,” and in particular the various amoraim cited, place the gemara not in the period of calculation based on a fixed calendar, but still during a period where rosh chodesh was declared based on observation. During that period, yom tov sheni was observed because of real doubt and also, at some point, as a precaution even during those years where doubt did not exist. Given the establishment of a fixed calendar in 359 CE by Hillel II, it is not entirely clear in exactly what era yom tov sheni was firmly established and, more importantly, when it was extended to include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. It is entirely plausible, that this declarative ruling obligating sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret followed the period debated in the gemara by multiple centuries. This resolves the apparent contradiction in the text. Why this was not stated explicitly in the gemara is only problematic if one does not assume it was obvious. Section 2 – A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor. Returning now to the period of real doubt over which day was declared rosh chodesh, the question of why was sitting in the sukkah not considered mandatory? We will deal with a number of reasons that would argue against sitting in the sukkah in the next section. However, there are two factors that would reduce the level of doubt in the times of declaration based on observation.

  • First, atmospheric conditions in the Middle East around the beginning of Tishrai are normally excellent and the ability for a new moon crescent to be observed is very high.[12]
  • Second, the beit din had flexibility to reduce any doubt around Rosh HaShana. When necessary, the beit din could delay declarations of rosh chodesh Elul to guarantee that a moon’s crescent would always be present to be observed on the evening following the 29th of Elul.[13]

These two factors lowered the level of doubt considerably. In addition,

  • the late date in the month when Shemini Atzeret occurs and
  • the effort to determine Yom Kippur

would likely reduce the level of doubt even further. After fasting only on the 10th day of Tishrai as Yom Kippur, it is entirely possible that in spite of observing yom tov sheni on the first days of sukkot, the level of doubt was minimal and insufficient to overcome the objections covered in the next section.[14] Section 3 – Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret when not required and why they were overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, one can differentiate Shemini Atzeret from the more usual case of yom tov sheni on multiple grounds. There are two potential issues with sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret, tarti de’sasreh, acting in a contradictory manner[15] and violating the prohibition to add to a mitzvah, by adding an additional day of sukkah observance, particularly on Shemini Atzeret where sitting in a sukkah is not part of the observance.[16] In the case of sitting in the sukkah, a potentially neutral act, neither is violated if some aspect of performance is compromised; however, the degree of compromise required may be in dispute. Regardless of which of the two reasons[17] is invoked, in a case of limited doubt, one or the other or both may have been sufficient to make sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret either not obligatory or perhaps not even permitted without some restrictions. Both the yerushalmi and various opinions in the main text of the bavli, support this conclusion. At some point after a fixed calendar was established in the fourth century, a second day of yom tov was formalized (or maintained.)[18] As Rav Soloveitchik explained, an additional level of kedushat yom tov was applied to either an ordinary day (the day after a yom tov, isru chag) or the first day of chol hamoed because of sefaikah de’yoma. This additional level of kedusha, automatically invoked obligations for kiddush, tefillah, sippur yetziat mitzraim, etc. as well as prohibitions from work. Of course, such an approach could not be applied to Shemini Atzeret; it was already a holiday and one could not add to its kedusha, only change it. This was not done; note that we do not mention Sukkot nor do we observe the mitzvah of lulav. We simply sit in the sukkah without a berakha, something that is both different from a halakhic perspective from other observances of yom tov sheni that derive from the changed status of the day, and in Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion, less than satisfactory conceptually. He said, perhaps half-seriously, that despite his unwavering adherence to normative halakha, the position of the chassidim makes more sense. In any case, sitting in the sukkah is a unique observance with textual, historical and conceptual challenges. Section 4 – The interpolation by the geonim[19], and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings. I do not know the precise history of yom tov sheni. However, both reciting berakhot during yom tov sheni against normal halakhic practice,[20] as well as the assumed halakhic interpolation by the geonim requiring sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret may both have similar origin – the need to reinforce the observance of yom tov sheni. As Dr. Haym Soloveitchik points out,[21] the case of sukkah on Shemini Atzeret proves the wisdom of insisting on a berakha; the one mitzvah of yom tov sheni for which we do not recite a berakha, resulted in widespread non-observance. It seems more than likely that this interpolation was recognized as “outside the norm” if the practice during the period of doubt did not include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Like berakhot, it may have been viewed as necessary particularly following a single day observance of Yom Kippur to strengthen the observance of yom tov sheni. One can only assume that the ruling’s discontinuity from the remainder of the text of the gemara was recognized and did not need elucidation; when first written, a then contemporary reader would recognize the change in practice. Section 5 – The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices. Given universal acceptance of the observance of yom tov sheni in the times of the rishonim, one would not have expected any deviation from the gemara’s definitive conclusion. Rabbi Schacter and Dr. Soloveitchik highlight a number of sources that illustrate the lack of universal acceptance of the gemara’s conclusion by Rashi’s rebbe and members of his family,[22] a distinguished member of the Maharil’s community,[23] and by a member of the Kolonymous family.[24] Citing the core sugya in the bavli and the yerushalmi, while certainly relevant does not in and of itself justify deviating from a clear conclusion even if it is of geonic origin. What is universally conjectured is that the cold climate of Northern Europe motivated a change. For the geonim omitting a berakha constituted enough of a heker to obviate either objection – either a tarti de’sasreh or violating a prohibition to add to a mitzvah by adding an additional day of sukkah observance. In a temperate climate, eating outside without a berakha renders sitting in the sukkah a more balanced act – clearly not a complete fulfillment of the obligation to sit in the sukkah, but, nonetheless, still honoring the institution of yom tov sheni shel galyot. However, in the cold climate of Northern Europe, even absent a berakha, either objection would, as it did in the times of real safek, make sitting in the sukkah (at least during kiddush) problematic. Note as well that the custom of returning to the sukkah during the day is consistent with this logic. During the day:

  • the temperature is milder,
  • there is no tarti de’sasreh from the recitation of kiddush, and
  • having been absent from the sukkah at night, as Rav Soloveitchik pointed out, creates a discontinuity of performance that renders sitting in the sukkah the following day a non-violation of adding to the mitzvah.

What is perhaps most surprising is that even after the period of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Yuzpa, the dayan in Frankfurt am Mein around the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century, when Rav Isaiah Horowitz, the Shelah HaKadosh, was Rav, in his sefer Yosef Ometz was still able to state that a family, descendant of Troyes, who does not sit in the sukkah, “has on what to rely.”[25] Section 6 – Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on shemini atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah. Mitztayer would exempt one from sitting in the sukkah not just on Shemini Atzeret but also on Sukkot proper. However, mitztayer is likely not binary. At one extreme, by living unnaturally in the sukkah one may not even fulfill one’s obligation, regardless of intent, as would be the case in extreme cold or very rainy weather. If, however, it is somewhat uncomfortable given the elements, sitting in the sukkah may no longer be obligatory, while it would still remain a fulfillment of one’s obligation. It seems logical as well to differentiate further the notion of mitztayer as it might apply to Sukkot versus Shemini Atzeret. Perhaps a yet lesser degree of mitztayer, not sufficient to allow eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot, might nonetheless, be more than sufficient to override and invalidate the level of heker made by not reciting a berakha. I have not seen any discussion of this notion by poskim, despite its apparent logic.[26] By analogy, one might not be legally drunk, but nonetheless it would be wise not to drive a car. Similarly, one might argue for eating outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in conditions that do not meet the halakhic definition of mitztayer on Sukkot proper. Thus, cold temperatures that might not justify eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot could nonetheless justify, and indeed perhaps mandate, not eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Rav Soloveitchik, in an attempt to justify Chassidic practice, noted the importance of the night of Shemini Atzeret, following the “guten kvitel” that Kabbalists associated with the day of Hoshana Rabbah. Like the exemption accorded to the celebration of sheva berachot even on Sukkot, when the sukkah does not comfortably provide adequate room, one can argue that the large celebrations by Chassidim where they are mekabeil penai rabbom, would similarly provide an exemption. I would add that here as well, a lesser degree of need might again be seen as voiding any heker provided by just omitting a berakha. Of course, while this explains why a tisch was held outside the sukkah, it does not in any way justify a general practice of avoiding the sukkah that has become widespread in many Chassidic circles.[27] Section 7 – A summary and a modest proposal. The discussion in the gemara covered a period of history where there was real doubt about the declaration of rosh chodesh, although in the case of Shemini Atzeret, that doubt was minimal. In the face of minimal doubt, the reasons not to sit in the sukkah prevailed. The geonim, perhaps in order to strengthen the notion of yom tov sheini, instituted the practice that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” It is not my intent to give halakhic advice; some might suggest that perhaps we ought to not even ask a local rabbi as much as follow family practice. In any case, for those who eat in the sukkah, I would consider situations of partial mitztayer that might arise, where eating in the sukkah may not be appropriate. On the other hand, given widespread laxity, one might argue that the stringencies of the geonim and the Gaon might again be particularly relevant. Of course, most fundamentally for those whose ancestors ate outside the sukkah in Warsaw, conditions are rather different in Miami,[28] or even in Baltimore or Boston.

[1] Shiurim by Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik ztl on the Bergen Torah Beis Medrash website, as well as by Rabbi Dr. Jacob Schacter on 10/02/2007 and by Rabbi Yosef Adler on 9/29/2009, both on the YU Torah website, provide important background. I benefited greatly from their analysis; elements of their perspective are reflected. Many of the sources referenced were assembled by Rabbi Schacter (including important sources cited by Dr. Haym Soloveitchik, whose seminal review essay is quoted extensively by Rabbi Schacter) in his comprehensive shiur on this subject. Most of the materials referenced below that are not available in standard editions of the gemara can be downloaded in the extensive maarei mekomot provided by Rabbi Schacter available on YU Torah in conjunction with his shiur.
[2] One might argue this was also known during the geonic period but assumed to be common knowledge.
[3] Certainly Rav Yochanon and Rav, the major disputants in the bavli as well as the text of the yerushalmi preceded the established use of a fixed calendar. We assume that the entire sugyah, quoting only Rav Yochanon and Rav and their students, was framed in the period prior to the determination of a fixed the calendar; the conclusions of the sugyah may have reflected practice that was followed for an even longer period.
[4] Translation below is from the Soncino Talmud.
[5] Analysis of the text of the gemara below, benefitted extensively from “Law and Custom in Hasidism” a translation by Shmuel Himelstein of Rabbi Dr. Aaron Wertheim’s original book, Ktav Publishing House, Hoboken, NJ. 1992, pages 279 – 286.
[6] See for example, Hasogot haRaavad, Taanit 11. Both the Rosh and Ran on Avodah Zarah 7a indicate that some geonim and rishonim always follow the second opinion. Others differentiate based on Torah, Rabbinic, monetary or religious law. For example, tosofot, s.v. Beshel Torah, in Avodah Zarah 7a, quotes Rashi in a case of an ikka de’amri as deciding according to the lenient view in cases of Rabbinic law. According to that view, given that sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in times of Rav and Rav Yochanon may be a real safek with respect to Torah law, one might follow the stricter view, the first opinion. In the times of fixed calendar, however, presumably sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret is only Rabbinic, and we might also follow the second, more lenient view.
[7] Rif Baba Metziah, Chapter 4, 29a, in the dafei haRif.
[8] Sukkah Perek 4, halakha 5, 17b.
[9] Sefer HaPardes.
[10] Minhagim of Rabbeinu Yitzkhak MiDura.
[11] An uncontested view of the yerushalmi, versus contested views in the bavli, adds additional credence to a preference for the opinion of Rav Yochanon according to the second alternative – not to sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.
[12] Note that the gemara in Beitzah 4b-5a records a singular event where witnesses were delayed in coming on the 30th of Elul to declare that day as the 1st of Tishrai. In early times they [the Sanhedrin] admitted the testimony about new moon throughout the [whole] day. Once, however, the witnesses were late in arriving and the Levites erred in the chant. Given how rare it is for the moon to be obscured by clouds throughout the night in the environs of Jerusalem, normally, one could expect witnesses to arrive earlier in the day. The Hebrew of the text of the gemara – “pa’am achat” appears to denote a rare event.
[13] Perhaps in our fixed calendar Elul always has 29 days in commemoration of prior practice.
[14] Ritva, in complete opposition to this approach, assumed that prior to a fixed calendar, one would likely be dealing with standard case of doubt with respect to a biblical commandment and sitting in the sukkah would clearly be mandatory.
[15] The Ran, in his commentary on the Rif, adds the element of zilzul of Shemini Atzeret by acting in a manner that would equate a holy day to a day of chol hamoed. Zilzul adds an additional dimension; the activity is not just conflicting, a tarti de’sasre, but demeaning of Shemini Atzeret as well. Perhaps, unlike other cases of a tarti de’sasre, absent an element of zilzul, a day might legitimately have a dual character. Furthermore, my nephew, Joshua Blumenkopf, noted that tarti d’sasri is not an independent principle; it merely means that you cannot use two contradictory kulot at the same time, something not present in this case.
[16] Were it not Shemini Atzeret it would be no different than eating matzah on the eighth day of Pesach because of sefaikah de’yoma.
[17] A reason to justify sitting outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret, cited by Rabbi Werthheim, based on the Midrash Tanchuma, parshat Pinkhas, that one has to pray sincerely for rain, would appear to be more a rationalization than a halakhic factor.
[18] The history and details of this complex and controversial topic are not addressed. One could assume that detailed halakhot varied across the various possible periods of history including: the original period of uncertainty when rosh chodesh was declared based on observation, a later period where rabbinic rulings mandated yom tov sheni even prior to the period of the fixed calendar, the initial period of a fixed calendar and various later periods in the fixed calendar. Aligning various sugyot to those periods could shed additional light on this topic. For example, consider the gemara in Beitzah 4b. Is the gemara referring to a period when the fixed calendar was already established or is referring to an earlier period where knowledge of sod haibur was used to reduce doubt? The latter seems to be more consistent with language that refers to knowledge of as opposed to use of the sod haibur.
[19] The interpolation is often ascribed to Rav Yehudai Gaon.
[20] Not reciting berakhot on a minhag.
[21] Haym Soloveitchik, “Olam Ke-Minhago Noheg: Review Essay,” AJS Review 23:2 (1998): 223-234.
[22] Sefer HaPardes.
[23] Maharil – Minhagim, Hilkhot lulav – 6.
[24] Yekhusai Tannaim ve Amoraim, (ed. Y. L. Maimon), pages 329-330, cited by Dr. Soloveitchik, makes (a less complete version of) the textual arguments outlined in Section 1.
[25] Yosef Ometz – 1058.
[26] The Aruch HaShulchan attempts to justify various customs for only partially observance of sitting in the sukkah as creating a yet greater heker given cold temperatures.
[27] In addition to attribution of the trend to sit outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret to the Chassidic celebrations of the evening following Hoshana Rabbah, see as well Rabbi Dr. Aaron Wertheim’s “Law and Custom in Hasidism,” pages 279 – 286 for attribution to other kabbalistic sources.
[28] Miami is closer to the equator than cities in the Middle East.