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“Torah Study on Christmas Eve” free Torah in Motion lecture by Marc B. Shapiro

In the spirit of inyana de-yoma, Torah in Motion is offering, free of charge, Dr. Marc B. Shapiro’s lecture “Torah Study on Christmas Eve,” delivered on Christmas Eve, 2009. You can get it here.

We invite all those who download the lecture to visit Torah in Motion’s website www.torahinmotion.org where over a thousand other lectures are available for download (including lectures by Dan Rabinowitz, Eliezer Brodt, and Marc Shapiro’s bundle of 103 lectures on great rabbinic figures, available here). We also invite you to check out Marc Shapiro’s upcoming tours to Italy and Central Europe. Information is available here. Summer 2011’s tour was sold out and we expect the same thing this summer, so if you are interested, please act quickly.




The sukkah on Shemini Atzeret controversy

The sukkah on Shemini Atzeret controversy
by William Gewirtz

Introduction: Arguments about eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret outside of Israel have a long and somewhat baffling history.[1] While not the only example of practice in opposition to the Shulchan Aruch, it appears to be among the most argued. The gemara, Rambam, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, written in many locales, all seem to be as unambiguous as possible in requiring one to eat in the sukkah. The Gaon, incensed by the spreading Chassidic custom to eat outside the sukkah, perhaps lemigdar miltah, went so far as to mandate sleeping in the sukkah on the night of shemini atzeret, in opposition to the Maharil, the Magen Avraham and normative custom. Despite consensus among all major decisors to require eating in the sukkah, an undercurrent of opposition has existed from at least the times of the early rishonim. Support for that opposition has been based on a number of apparently legitimate points. However, despite some early and consistent opposition, despite the logic and halakhic rationale of those who did not sit in the sukkah, and despite the problematic nature of the gemara (as explained below), I hope to explain the basis for the concluding and declarative statement in the gemara: “we sit but do not make a berakha.” In fact, the assumption, explicitly found[2] as far back as the times of the rishonim, that the declarative ruling was interpolated at a later point, is fundamental to explain both sides of the controversy. Some, as early as the times of the rishonim, argue that we can discount such geonic interpolations in deference to the original text which, as will be demonstrated, concludes not to sit in the sukkah. My goal is to explain why the interpolation is to be followed despite its ostensible opposition to the remainder of the text. The major thesis proposed is that one has to differentiate between a period of doubt as existed in both the yerushalmi and bavli when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses and a later period when rosh chodesh was determined using a fixed calendar. The geonic interpolation into the text of the gemara occurred at that later point; its rationale and inconsistency with the texts of the gemara needs to be addressed from that perspective. If I am correct, then in the period when rosh chodesh was declared based on the observation of witnesses, as in the times of Rav Yochanon and Rav,[3] sitting in the sukkah was not always required. However, when the fixed calendar was in use, the rabbis (eventually) decreed that sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret was obligatory. It may well have been more akin to a gezairah required at their time versus a continuation of historic practice. The remainder of the paper focuses on:

  • An analysis of the primary texts of the gemarot that demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.
  • A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor.
  • Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shimini Atzeret when not required and why they were perhaps considered overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, there are critical factors that differentiate Shemini Atzeret from other cases of yom tov sheni.
  • The interpolation by the geonim, and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings.
  • The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices.
  • Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on Shemini Atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah.
  • A summary and a modest proposal.

Section 1 – An analysis of the primary text of the gemarot demonstrates opposition to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. The sugya in the bavli masechet sukkah beginning on 46b contains three parts:[4] A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav. R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath citing Rav ruled: The eighth day which may be the seventh is regarded as the seventh in respect of the sukkah and as the eighth in respect of the benediction. R. Yochanon, however, ruled: It is regarded as the eighth in respect of both. B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement. FIRST APPROACH: That one must dwell [in the sukkah on the eighth day] is agreed by all, they only differ on the question of the benediction. According to him who regards the day as the seventh in respect of the sukkah, we also recite the benediction [of the sukkah], while according to him who holds that it is regarded as the eighth in respect of both, we do not recite the benediction [of the sukkah]. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yochanan, since R. Huna b. Bizna and all the notables of his age once entered a sukkah on the eighth day which may have been the seventh, and while they sat therein, they did not recite the benediction. But is it not possible that they were of the same opinion as he who laid down that once a man has recited the benediction on the first day, he has no more need to recite it? — There was a tradition that they had just come from the fields. SECOND APPROACH: (the ikka de’amri) There are some who say that the ruling that one must not recite the benediction [of the sukkah] is agreed upon by both, and that they only differ on the question whether one must sit [inthe sukkah]. According to him who ruled that it is regarded as the seventh day in respect of the sukkah, we must indeed sit in it thereon, while according to him who ruled that it is regarded as the eighth day in respect of both, we may not even sit in it thereon. R. Joseph observed: Hold fast to the ruling of R.Yochanan. For who is the authority of the statement? R. Judah the son of R. Samuel b. Shilath [of course], and he himself sat on the eighth day which might be the seventh outside the sukkah. C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” And the law is that we must indeed sit in the sukkah but may not recite the benediction. A. The disagreement of Rav Yochanon and Rav: Rav states that Shemini Atzeret is treated as the seventh for “this” and the eighth for “that.” Rav Yochanon states it is the considered as the eighth for “this” and “that.” The two approaches differ as to what “this” and “that” refer.[5] B. Two approaches to interpreting the disagreement: The first alternative assumes that all agree that sitting in the sukkah is obligatory; the argument concerns whether to make a berakha. In this approach Rav is asserting that one makes a berakhaleishev ba’sukkah.” The phrase “the seventh for this” refers to this obligation for a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “The eighth for that” refers to the fact that the other prayers of Shemini Atzeretkiddush and tefillah – mention only the eighth day and make no mention of Sukkot. Rav Yochanon asserts we make no reference to Sukkot, making no berakha when sitting in the sukkah on the eighth. It is the eight for “this” refers to sitting in the sukkah without a berakha; “the eighth for that” is interpreted identically to Rav. According to both opinions, “this” refers to whether or not a berakha is made when sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to both opinions, “that” refers to the mention of only Shemini Atzeret in the prayers of the eighth day. This reading is rather forced in that there does not appear to be any disagreement about what holiday ought to be referred to in the various prayers and blessings of the eighth day. While the word “this” is informative, the word “that” is not. Stating both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret in one prayer/blessing would be contradictory; declaring a day to be both Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret was never even raised as a possibility and for good reason. The first approach then quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we are to follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon. The second approach assumes not making a berakha on sitting in the sukkah is undisputed; the argument is about even sitting in the sukkah. Thus the second part of the phrase – the eighth for “that” states that common view of both Rav and Rav Yochanon omitting a berakha on sitting in the sukkah. “This” refers to the obligation to sit in the sukkah. Rav maintains for “this” it is considered the seventh and hence one is obligated to sit in the sukkah. Rav Yochanon maintains it is the eighth for “this” as well with no obligation to sit in the sukkah. Note that in this approach of the ikaa de’amri, both parts of the sentence are informative. The second approach then also quotes practice that supports the view of Rav Yochanon, suggesting that we follow the opinion of Rav Yochanon Were the sugya to end at this point, the conclusion would be clear for two reasons. Each reason itself is two-fold, resulting from both a general principle as well as a detail present in this specific case.

  • First, generally, where there are two alternative approaches, the second, the ikaa de’amri, is assumed normative.[6] As well in this specific case, as indicated, the phrase of both Rav and Rav Yochanon is more informative in the formulation of the ikka de’amri.
  • Second, when there is a dispute between Rav and Rav Yochanon, we generally follow Rav Yochanon.[7]As well, in this specific case the text in both alternatives immediately includes an example of practice that follows the opinion of Rav Yochanon.

Taken together, we would assume to follow the second alternative and the opinion of Rav Yochanon – and not sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. According to many readings, this conclusion is made even more strongly by the yerushalmi.[8] While the bavli addresses the obligation to sit in the sukkah, the yerushalmi notes that one may not sit in the sukkah while making kiddush but one may enter the sukkah afterwards if he so desires. While some rishonim quote this yerushalmi as opposing the psak of the bavli,[9] others claim[10] that the yerushalmi is addressing a region of Israel where there was no doubt about what day the courts declared rosh chodesh. Rabbi Schacter, in support of the former opinion, observed that the yerushalmi uses the expression “leilai yom tov achron;” the plural, “leilai” is only relevant if there is a yom tov sheni on the ninth. Given this interpretation, the yerushalmi is making a rather strong point of equating the nights of the eighth and ninth, dismissing any possibility of an obligation to eat in the sukkah on the eighth.[11] C. A declarative ruling that “we sit but do not make a berakha:” Despite the reading of the gemara as outlined, the bavli concludes that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” This opinion is that of both Rav in the second alternative and Rav Yochanon in the first alternative. This ruling corresponds to two of four opinions quoted; the two alternative opinions – not sitting at all or sitting and making a berakha – are only supported by one amora and only according to one alternative. Despite that, this ruling is contradicted by the normal principles of psak where we would follow Rav Yochanon’s opinion in the second alternative, as well as the yerushalmi. The language of the gemarashemini safek shevii,” and in particular the various amoraim cited, place the gemara not in the period of calculation based on a fixed calendar, but still during a period where rosh chodesh was declared based on observation. During that period, yom tov sheni was observed because of real doubt and also, at some point, as a precaution even during those years where doubt did not exist. Given the establishment of a fixed calendar in 359 CE by Hillel II, it is not entirely clear in exactly what era yom tov sheni was firmly established and, more importantly, when it was extended to include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. It is entirely plausible, that this declarative ruling obligating sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret followed the period debated in the gemara by multiple centuries. This resolves the apparent contradiction in the text. Why this was not stated explicitly in the gemara is only problematic if one does not assume it was obvious. Section 2 – A conjecture that the level of doubt in the times of the gemara was minor. Returning now to the period of real doubt over which day was declared rosh chodesh, the question of why was sitting in the sukkah not considered mandatory? We will deal with a number of reasons that would argue against sitting in the sukkah in the next section. However, there are two factors that would reduce the level of doubt in the times of declaration based on observation.

  • First, atmospheric conditions in the Middle East around the beginning of Tishrai are normally excellent and the ability for a new moon crescent to be observed is very high.[12]
  • Second, the beit din had flexibility to reduce any doubt around Rosh HaShana. When necessary, the beit din could delay declarations of rosh chodesh Elul to guarantee that a moon’s crescent would always be present to be observed on the evening following the 29th of Elul.[13]

These two factors lowered the level of doubt considerably. In addition,

  • the late date in the month when Shemini Atzeret occurs and
  • the effort to determine Yom Kippur

would likely reduce the level of doubt even further. After fasting only on the 10th day of Tishrai as Yom Kippur, it is entirely possible that in spite of observing yom tov sheni on the first days of sukkot, the level of doubt was minimal and insufficient to overcome the objections covered in the next section.[14] Section 3 – Possible objections to sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret when not required and why they were overriding particularly given the level of doubt. Additionally, one can differentiate Shemini Atzeret from the more usual case of yom tov sheni on multiple grounds. There are two potential issues with sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret, tarti de’sasreh, acting in a contradictory manner[15] and violating the prohibition to add to a mitzvah, by adding an additional day of sukkah observance, particularly on Shemini Atzeret where sitting in a sukkah is not part of the observance.[16] In the case of sitting in the sukkah, a potentially neutral act, neither is violated if some aspect of performance is compromised; however, the degree of compromise required may be in dispute. Regardless of which of the two reasons[17] is invoked, in a case of limited doubt, one or the other or both may have been sufficient to make sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret either not obligatory or perhaps not even permitted without some restrictions. Both the yerushalmi and various opinions in the main text of the bavli, support this conclusion. At some point after a fixed calendar was established in the fourth century, a second day of yom tov was formalized (or maintained.)[18] As Rav Soloveitchik explained, an additional level of kedushat yom tov was applied to either an ordinary day (the day after a yom tov, isru chag) or the first day of chol hamoed because of sefaikah de’yoma. This additional level of kedusha, automatically invoked obligations for kiddush, tefillah, sippur yetziat mitzraim, etc. as well as prohibitions from work. Of course, such an approach could not be applied to Shemini Atzeret; it was already a holiday and one could not add to its kedusha, only change it. This was not done; note that we do not mention Sukkot nor do we observe the mitzvah of lulav. We simply sit in the sukkah without a berakha, something that is both different from a halakhic perspective from other observances of yom tov sheni that derive from the changed status of the day, and in Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion, less than satisfactory conceptually. He said, perhaps half-seriously, that despite his unwavering adherence to normative halakha, the position of the chassidim makes more sense. In any case, sitting in the sukkah is a unique observance with textual, historical and conceptual challenges. Section 4 – The interpolation by the geonim[19], and their insistence on sitting in the sukkah despite earlier halakhic rulings. I do not know the precise history of yom tov sheni. However, both reciting berakhot during yom tov sheni against normal halakhic practice,[20] as well as the assumed halakhic interpolation by the geonim requiring sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret may both have similar origin – the need to reinforce the observance of yom tov sheni. As Dr. Haym Soloveitchik points out,[21] the case of sukkah on Shemini Atzeret proves the wisdom of insisting on a berakha; the one mitzvah of yom tov sheni for which we do not recite a berakha, resulted in widespread non-observance. It seems more than likely that this interpolation was recognized as “outside the norm” if the practice during the period of doubt did not include sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Like berakhot, it may have been viewed as necessary particularly following a single day observance of Yom Kippur to strengthen the observance of yom tov sheni. One can only assume that the ruling’s discontinuity from the remainder of the text of the gemara was recognized and did not need elucidation; when first written, a then contemporary reader would recognize the change in practice. Section 5 – The objection to the gemara’s conclusion by some early authorities and their different practices. Given universal acceptance of the observance of yom tov sheni in the times of the rishonim, one would not have expected any deviation from the gemara’s definitive conclusion. Rabbi Schacter and Dr. Soloveitchik highlight a number of sources that illustrate the lack of universal acceptance of the gemara’s conclusion by Rashi’s rebbe and members of his family,[22] a distinguished member of the Maharil’s community,[23] and by a member of the Kolonymous family.[24] Citing the core sugya in the bavli and the yerushalmi, while certainly relevant does not in and of itself justify deviating from a clear conclusion even if it is of geonic origin. What is universally conjectured is that the cold climate of Northern Europe motivated a change. For the geonim omitting a berakha constituted enough of a heker to obviate either objection – either a tarti de’sasreh or violating a prohibition to add to a mitzvah by adding an additional day of sukkah observance. In a temperate climate, eating outside without a berakha renders sitting in the sukkah a more balanced act – clearly not a complete fulfillment of the obligation to sit in the sukkah, but, nonetheless, still honoring the institution of yom tov sheni shel galyot. However, in the cold climate of Northern Europe, even absent a berakha, either objection would, as it did in the times of real safek, make sitting in the sukkah (at least during kiddush) problematic. Note as well that the custom of returning to the sukkah during the day is consistent with this logic. During the day:

  • the temperature is milder,
  • there is no tarti de’sasreh from the recitation of kiddush, and
  • having been absent from the sukkah at night, as Rav Soloveitchik pointed out, creates a discontinuity of performance that renders sitting in the sukkah the following day a non-violation of adding to the mitzvah.

What is perhaps most surprising is that even after the period of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Yuzpa, the dayan in Frankfurt am Mein around the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century, when Rav Isaiah Horowitz, the Shelah HaKadosh, was Rav, in his sefer Yosef Ometz was still able to state that a family, descendant of Troyes, who does not sit in the sukkah, “has on what to rely.”[25] Section 6 – Reasons that would exempt you from sukkah in general, would certainly exempt you on shemini atzeret; mitztayer and kabbalat penai rabbo are analyzed as bases for not sitting in the sukkah. Mitztayer would exempt one from sitting in the sukkah not just on Shemini Atzeret but also on Sukkot proper. However, mitztayer is likely not binary. At one extreme, by living unnaturally in the sukkah one may not even fulfill one’s obligation, regardless of intent, as would be the case in extreme cold or very rainy weather. If, however, it is somewhat uncomfortable given the elements, sitting in the sukkah may no longer be obligatory, while it would still remain a fulfillment of one’s obligation. It seems logical as well to differentiate further the notion of mitztayer as it might apply to Sukkot versus Shemini Atzeret. Perhaps a yet lesser degree of mitztayer, not sufficient to allow eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot, might nonetheless, be more than sufficient to override and invalidate the level of heker made by not reciting a berakha. I have not seen any discussion of this notion by poskim, despite its apparent logic.[26] By analogy, one might not be legally drunk, but nonetheless it would be wise not to drive a car. Similarly, one might argue for eating outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in conditions that do not meet the halakhic definition of mitztayer on Sukkot proper. Thus, cold temperatures that might not justify eating outside the sukkah on Sukkot could nonetheless justify, and indeed perhaps mandate, not eating in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret. Rav Soloveitchik, in an attempt to justify Chassidic practice, noted the importance of the night of Shemini Atzeret, following the “guten kvitel” that Kabbalists associated with the day of Hoshana Rabbah. Like the exemption accorded to the celebration of sheva berachot even on Sukkot, when the sukkah does not comfortably provide adequate room, one can argue that the large celebrations by Chassidim where they are mekabeil penai rabbom, would similarly provide an exemption. I would add that here as well, a lesser degree of need might again be seen as voiding any heker provided by just omitting a berakha. Of course, while this explains why a tisch was held outside the sukkah, it does not in any way justify a general practice of avoiding the sukkah that has become widespread in many Chassidic circles.[27] Section 7 – A summary and a modest proposal. The discussion in the gemara covered a period of history where there was real doubt about the declaration of rosh chodesh, although in the case of Shemini Atzeret, that doubt was minimal. In the face of minimal doubt, the reasons not to sit in the sukkah prevailed. The geonim, perhaps in order to strengthen the notion of yom tov sheini, instituted the practice that “we sit but do not make a berakha.” It is not my intent to give halakhic advice; some might suggest that perhaps we ought to not even ask a local rabbi as much as follow family practice. In any case, for those who eat in the sukkah, I would consider situations of partial mitztayer that might arise, where eating in the sukkah may not be appropriate. On the other hand, given widespread laxity, one might argue that the stringencies of the geonim and the Gaon might again be particularly relevant. Of course, most fundamentally for those whose ancestors ate outside the sukkah in Warsaw, conditions are rather different in Miami,[28] or even in Baltimore or Boston.

[1] Shiurim by Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik ztl on the Bergen Torah Beis Medrash website, as well as by Rabbi Dr. Jacob Schacter on 10/02/2007 and by Rabbi Yosef Adler on 9/29/2009, both on the YU Torah website, provide important background. I benefited greatly from their analysis; elements of their perspective are reflected. Many of the sources referenced were assembled by Rabbi Schacter (including important sources cited by Dr. Haym Soloveitchik, whose seminal review essay is quoted extensively by Rabbi Schacter) in his comprehensive shiur on this subject. Most of the materials referenced below that are not available in standard editions of the gemara can be downloaded in the extensive maarei mekomot provided by Rabbi Schacter available on YU Torah in conjunction with his shiur.
[2] One might argue this was also known during the geonic period but assumed to be common knowledge.
[3] Certainly Rav Yochanon and Rav, the major disputants in the bavli as well as the text of the yerushalmi preceded the established use of a fixed calendar. We assume that the entire sugyah, quoting only Rav Yochanon and Rav and their students, was framed in the period prior to the determination of a fixed the calendar; the conclusions of the sugyah may have reflected practice that was followed for an even longer period.
[4] Translation below is from the Soncino Talmud.
[5] Analysis of the text of the gemara below, benefitted extensively from “Law and Custom in Hasidism” a translation by Shmuel Himelstein of Rabbi Dr. Aaron Wertheim’s original book, Ktav Publishing House, Hoboken, NJ. 1992, pages 279 – 286.
[6] See for example, Hasogot haRaavad, Taanit 11. Both the Rosh and Ran on Avodah Zarah 7a indicate that some geonim and rishonim always follow the second opinion. Others differentiate based on Torah, Rabbinic, monetary or religious law. For example, tosofot, s.v. Beshel Torah, in Avodah Zarah 7a, quotes Rashi in a case of an ikka de’amri as deciding according to the lenient view in cases of Rabbinic law. According to that view, given that sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in times of Rav and Rav Yochanon may be a real safek with respect to Torah law, one might follow the stricter view, the first opinion. In the times of fixed calendar, however, presumably sitting in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret is only Rabbinic, and we might also follow the second, more lenient view.
[7] Rif Baba Metziah, Chapter 4, 29a, in the dafei haRif.
[8] Sukkah Perek 4, halakha 5, 17b.
[9] Sefer HaPardes.
[10] Minhagim of Rabbeinu Yitzkhak MiDura.
[11] An uncontested view of the yerushalmi, versus contested views in the bavli, adds additional credence to a preference for the opinion of Rav Yochanon according to the second alternative – not to sit in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret.
[12] Note that the gemara in Beitzah 4b-5a records a singular event where witnesses were delayed in coming on the 30th of Elul to declare that day as the 1st of Tishrai. In early times they [the Sanhedrin] admitted the testimony about new moon throughout the [whole] day. Once, however, the witnesses were late in arriving and the Levites erred in the chant. Given how rare it is for the moon to be obscured by clouds throughout the night in the environs of Jerusalem, normally, one could expect witnesses to arrive earlier in the day. The Hebrew of the text of the gemara – “pa’am achat” appears to denote a rare event.
[13] Perhaps in our fixed calendar Elul always has 29 days in commemoration of prior practice.
[14] Ritva, in complete opposition to this approach, assumed that prior to a fixed calendar, one would likely be dealing with standard case of doubt with respect to a biblical commandment and sitting in the sukkah would clearly be mandatory.
[15] The Ran, in his commentary on the Rif, adds the element of zilzul of Shemini Atzeret by acting in a manner that would equate a holy day to a day of chol hamoed. Zilzul adds an additional dimension; the activity is not just conflicting, a tarti de’sasre, but demeaning of Shemini Atzeret as well. Perhaps, unlike other cases of a tarti de’sasre, absent an element of zilzul, a day might legitimately have a dual character. Furthermore, my nephew, Joshua Blumenkopf, noted that tarti d’sasri is not an independent principle; it merely means that you cannot use two contradictory kulot at the same time, something not present in this case.
[16] Were it not Shemini Atzeret it would be no different than eating matzah on the eighth day of Pesach because of sefaikah de’yoma.
[17] A reason to justify sitting outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret, cited by Rabbi Werthheim, based on the Midrash Tanchuma, parshat Pinkhas, that one has to pray sincerely for rain, would appear to be more a rationalization than a halakhic factor.
[18] The history and details of this complex and controversial topic are not addressed. One could assume that detailed halakhot varied across the various possible periods of history including: the original period of uncertainty when rosh chodesh was declared based on observation, a later period where rabbinic rulings mandated yom tov sheni even prior to the period of the fixed calendar, the initial period of a fixed calendar and various later periods in the fixed calendar. Aligning various sugyot to those periods could shed additional light on this topic. For example, consider the gemara in Beitzah 4b. Is the gemara referring to a period when the fixed calendar was already established or is referring to an earlier period where knowledge of sod haibur was used to reduce doubt? The latter seems to be more consistent with language that refers to knowledge of as opposed to use of the sod haibur.
[19] The interpolation is often ascribed to Rav Yehudai Gaon.
[20] Not reciting berakhot on a minhag.
[21] Haym Soloveitchik, “Olam Ke-Minhago Noheg: Review Essay,” AJS Review 23:2 (1998): 223-234.
[22] Sefer HaPardes.
[23] Maharil – Minhagim, Hilkhot lulav – 6.
[24] Yekhusai Tannaim ve Amoraim, (ed. Y. L. Maimon), pages 329-330, cited by Dr. Soloveitchik, makes (a less complete version of) the textual arguments outlined in Section 1.
[25] Yosef Ometz – 1058.
[26] The Aruch HaShulchan attempts to justify various customs for only partially observance of sitting in the sukkah as creating a yet greater heker given cold temperatures.
[27] In addition to attribution of the trend to sit outside the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret to the Chassidic celebrations of the evening following Hoshana Rabbah, see as well Rabbi Dr. Aaron Wertheim’s “Law and Custom in Hasidism,” pages 279 – 286 for attribution to other kabbalistic sources.
[28] Miami is closer to the equator than cities in the Middle East.



The Head Movements of Shema’

THE HEAD MOVEMENTS OF SHEMA’

by Bezalel Naor

Rabbi Bezalel Naor is a multifaceted scholar, recognized as the leading interpreter of R. Kook in the English language. His newest book is The Limit of Intellectual Freedom: The Letters of Rav Kook. It can be purchased from his website, www.orot.com.

The most important utterance in Judaism is the Shema’: Shema’ yisrael adonai eloheinu adonai ehad. (Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.) This declaration of the absolute unity of God is the cornerstone of our faith. By Biblical mandate, a Jew recites the Shema’ twice daily, be-shokhbekha u-ve-kumekha (“when you lie down and when you rise up”). See Deuteronomy 6:7.

All of the above is quite famous. What remains today a little known fact is that once upon a time this recitation was accompanied by head movements to the four directions, and up and down. This practice is recorded both in the Ge’onim (post-Talmudic Babylonian sages) and the Rishonim (medieval European sages).[1] The basis for this observance is the following statement in the Talmud:

Symmachus says: “Whoever prolongs the word ehad (“one”), his days and years are prolonged.

Said Rav Aha bar Ya’akov: “And [specifically] the letter dalet [of ehad].”

Said Rav Ashi: “Provided he does not speed up the letter het [of ehad].”

R. Yirmiyah was sitting before R. [Hiyya bar Abba]. He saw that he was prolonging overly much. He said to him: “Once you have proclaimed Him King above and below, and to the four winds of heaven, you need not any further.”[2]

Rashi, the eleventh-century exegete of Troyes, France, comments: “Proclaimed Him King above, etc. – You have prolonged the amount [of time] necessary to think in your heart that the Lord is one in heaven and on earth and its four directions.”

This is a disembodied approach; no mention in Rashi of actual body movements. The visualization of heaven and earth and the four cardinal points is purely mental.

However, if one consults the commentary of Rabbi Menahem Ha-Me’iri of Perpignan, Provence (1249-1306) one finds an added dimension: “The amount of lengthening the letter dalet is that required to picture in the heart that He, blessed be He, rules over heaven and earth and the four winds of the world. And for this reason, it is customary to tilt the head and move it to these sides. Nevertheless, if one prefers not to tilt the head, one need not, because the thing depends not on the tilting of the head and its movements, but rather upon the feeling of the heart.”[3]

Me’iri revisits this theme in his commentary to Tractate Sukkah when discussing the na’anu’im or waving of the lulav (palm frond) during the Sukkot festival. There, he opines that both in regard to the movement of the lulav during the recitation of Hallel and the movement of the head during Shema’, only a to-and-fro and up-and-down movement is called for (as opposed to the four directions, and up and down). “Even that which they said. . .to prolong the word ehad (“one”) sufficiently to proclaim Him King above and below and in the four winds of the world, even this necessitates only a movement to the two directions, and below and above. Furthermore, some say that in ehad no movement is necessary, only picturing in the heart.”[4]

Neither is Me’iri the only Provencal commentator to bear witness to the practice of head movements. His contemporary Rabbi David ben Levi of Narbonne writes: “How long? Long enough to proclaim Him King, etc. – Some interpret that one proclaims Him King by moving one’s head. And so interpreted Rabbenu Hai, of blessed memory.”[5]

In Provence, where we find most evidence of the head movements, there were some who found the practice ludicrous (huka ve-itlula).[6] Perhaps, these authorities took exception not so much to the movements themselves, as to the fact that as often happens in the case of rituals, the simple folk focus on the externals rather than on the inner awareness which is the essence.[7]

The German codifier Rabbi Jacob ben Asher (d. Toledo, Spain before 1340) defended the practice of the head movements accompanying Shema’:

One must prolong the dalet of ehad the amount [of time] necessary to think in one’s heart that the Holy One, blessed be He, is unique in His world, above and below, and in the four winds of the world. There are some accustomed to tilt the head according to the thought, above and below, and to the four directions. Some object to the practice because of the statement of the Rabbis, “He who recites Shema’ should not gesticulate with his eyes or lips.”[8] My father, of blessed memory, used to say that one need not heed [their words], for there, the gesticulations are for an extraneous purpose, and interrupt the concentration, but here, the gesture is a requisite of the concentration and brings it about (tsorekh ha-kavvanah ve-goremet otah).”[9]

Rabbi Joshua Boaz Baruch (Italy, d. 1557) offers a very graphic description of the head movements of Shema’:

This is the amount [of time] to prolong the word ehad: one third in the letter het and two thirds in the letter dalet. How does one proclaim the Kingship? Up and down during the het, and in the four directions during the dalet.[10] And one concentrates while moving the head up and down, to the east and to the west, to the north and to the south . . .[11]

One can only speculate what happened to these head movements. Whereas the movements of the lulav or palm frond continue in full force to this day, wherever Jews are found, we are not aware of any community that has retained the custom of moving the head during Shema’, though as we have seen, it was once widespread in communities as diverse as Babel (today Iraq), Provence, Spain and Italy.

One of the most provocative statements found in Rav Kook’s Orot is this:

We dealt much in soulfulness; we forgot the holiness of the body.[12]

Perhaps these head movements of Shema’ are a “mitsvah yetomah” (orphan mitsvah) due for revival.[13]

Notes

[1] These head movements of the Shema’ are not to be confused with those employed in the so-called school of “Prophetic Kabbalah” founded by Abraham Abulafia (b. 1240), although it is possible that Abulafia was inspired in this respect by the earlier tradition surrounding the Shema’. Prof. Gershom Scholem was struck by the similarity between the Abulafian technique (especially the technique of breathing) and Indian Yogic practices. Perhaps Scholem was unaware of the Judaic practice surrounding Shema’. It is possible though, that Scholem would have regarded even this practice, stretching back at least as far as Rav Hai Gaon, as influenced by Yogic or Sufic tradition. See Gershom G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York, 1971), pp. 139, 144; Aryeh Kaplan, Meditation and Kabbalah (York Beach, ME, 1985), pp. 55-114.

[2] Talmud Bavli, Berakhot 13b. The words “Hiyya bar Abba” are bracketed in the standard Vilna edition. In the parallel discussion in Talmud Yerushalmi, Berakhot 2:1, rather than R. Hiyya bar Abba, it is Ze’ira who apprises R. Yirmiyah that he needn’t overly prolong the recitation. R. Aryeh Leib Yellin (Yefeh ‘Einayim) suggests that the text of the Bavli be emended to “R. Zeira” to conform to the Yerushalmi.

[3] R. Menahem ben Shelomo ha-Me’iri, Beit ha-Behirah, Berakhot, Dikman ed. (Jerusalem, 1965), p. 42.

[4] R. Menahem ben Shelomo ha-Me’ri, Beit ha-Behirah, Sukkah, Liss ed. (Jerusalem, 1966), p. 133.

[5] R. David ben Levi of Narbonne, Sefer ha-Mikhtam in: Hershler ed., Ginzei Rishonim / Berakhot (Jerusalem, 1967), p. 28. This comment of Rabbenu Hai ben Sherira Gaon (939-1038) to Berakhot 13b first crops up in the Sefer ha-Eshkol of Rabbi Abraham ben Isaac, Av-Beit-Din of Narbonne (d. 1158). See Albeck ed., Sefer ha-Eshkol, p. 14; included in B.M. Lewin ed., Otsar ha-Ge’onim, Vol. I – Berakhot (Haifa, 1928), Perushim, p. 13. Cf. Rabbi Nathan ben Yehiel of Rome, Arukh, s.v. bar pahatei.

[6] Sefer ha-Mikhtam ibid.; R. Asher of Lunel, Orhot Hayyim, chap. 18.

[7] For example, Rabbi Hayyim El’azar Shapira of Munkatch (Munkacevo) explained the custom of reciting the verse Atah har’eita la-da’at [“Unto you it was shown, that you might know, that the Lord is the God; there is none else besides Him”] (Deuteronomy 4:35) on Simhat Torah at the opening of the Ark before commencing the hakafot or circumambulations with the Torah scroll in hand, as an antidote to any perverse notions that might creep into the common mind. By declaring the absolute unity of God, we stave off any misguided tendency to deify the Torah. See Rabbi Hayyim El’azar Shapira, Sha’ar Yissachar, Simhat Torah. Cf. Rabbi Meir Simha Cohen of Dvinsk, Meshekh Hokhmah (Riga, 1927), Exodus 32:19 who explains that Moses smashed the Tablets of the Law to prevent their deification by the worshipers of the Golden Calf.

[8] Yoma 19b. There, included in the prohibition is gesticulating with the finger(s).

[9] Rabbi Jacob ben Asher, Tur, Orah Hayyim.

[10] The Hebrew letters also signify numbers. Thus, het has the numerical value of 8; dalet, the numerical value of 4. The head movements up and down allude to the seven heavens and earth, a total of eight. It is appropriate that they occur during recitation of the letter het. The movements in the four directions of the compass occur during the recitation of the letter dalet.

On the practical level, one may question how it is possible to prolong the sound of the letter dalet (twice as long as the letter het!) when the consonant dalet is a stop or plosive. The question is based on ignorance of the correct pronunciation of the Hebrew letters. In the Ashkenazic community, the differentiation between dalet degushah (hard dalet, indicated by the dot or dagesh mark) and dalet rafah (soft dalet, lacking the dagesh or dot) was lost. In the Oriental communities, this tradition was maintained. In truth, only the hard dalet has the “d” sound; the soft dalet is pronounced “th” as in the English word “the.” In phonetics, such a sound is referred to as a “continuant,” as opposed to a “stop” or “plosive.” As the dalet of ehad is soft, the word is properly pronounced “ehath.” Adhering to these basic rules of the Hebrew language, the dalet of ehad may certainly be drawn out. See Rabbi Nahum L. Rabinovitch, Yad Peshutah (Jerusalem, 1984), Hil. Keri’at Shema 2:9 (p. 64). For the record, there were several Ashkenazic gedolim who were sensitive to the refinements of Hebrew pronunciation, as practiced by the Oriental communities. In the previous generation, Rabbis Joseph Elijah Henkin and Jacob Kamenecki expressed such concerns, to name but two.

[11] R. Joshua Boaz Baruch, Shiltei ha-Gibborim to Mordekhai, Berakhot (Vilna ed., 46a).

[12] See Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook, Orot (Jerusalem, 1950), Orot ha-Tehiyah, chap. 33 (p. 80); Naor trans., Orot: The Original 1920 Version (Spring Valley, NY, 2004), p. 189.

[13] Rabbi Jacob Moses Harlap, the eminent disciple of Rav Kook, wrote that the revival of mitsvot that have fallen into desuetude is a cure for the malady of our generation of neshamot she-be-‘olam ha-tohu (souls of the World of Chaos), whose vessel is too narrow to contain the great light due to penetrate it. This thought is expressed in a letter Rabbi Harlap wrote in 1946 upon the occasion of the renewed “Hakhel” ceremony. Published as an appendix to Rabbi J.M. Harlap, Mei Marom, Vol. V (Nimmukei ha-Mikra’ot) (Jerusalem, 1981). Cf. the essay entitled “Ha-Neshamot shel ‘Olam ha-Tohu” (The Souls of the World of Chaos) in: Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook, Orot (Jerusalem, 1950), pp. 121-123.

Postscript: In an email to Marc Shapiro, Rabbi Naor adds that R. Kalonymos Kalmish Shapira of Piaseczna advocated these head movements. Unfortunately, he can’t locate the precise source. Perhaps one of the readers can help out.

Postscript 2: Eliezer Brodt adds: See Eric Zimmer, Assufot 8 (1994), Tenuchos Vetenuot Haguf Beshaat Keriat Shema, pp. 343-368. For some reason it is not included in the collection of his articles called Olam Keminhago Noheg.




Yom Tov Sheni and the Customs With Regard to Travelers

Yom Tov Sheni and the Customs With Regard to Travelers
By J. Jean Ajdler
J. Jean Ajdler of Brussels, Belgium, is a civil and structural engineer. He has published articles about medieval Jewish astronomy, the history of the Jewish calendar, and Talmudic metrology, and is the author of Hilkhot Kiddush ha-Hodesh al-pi ha-Rambam (Jerusalem: Sifriati, 1996).
This is his first contribution to the Seforim blog.
Abstract: In ancient times the customs of the communities were extremely variable the one from the other. Each community had its own customs and it was very jealous of them. Therefore very precise rules ensured the equilibrium between them at the level of the travelers between these communities. The introduction of the printing with the publication of the Shulhan Arukh in the sixteenth century constituted the globalization of the Jewish society and contributed to the standardization of the Jewish rules and customs and the progressive disappearing of the local minhagim. However one great difference between Israel and the Diaspora survived; Israel keeps only one festival day while the Diaspora keeps two festival days. It is today the greatest difference of custom still extant and the dramatic increase of travel has given more acuteness to the problem. The aim of this article is the examination of the rules of priority of the customs in general, and that of the second festival day in particular, at the level of the travelers. We first examine the general problem of the minhagim: we examine the Talmudic sources and their understanding and the consecutive rulings. We acknowledge a great confusion in the understanding of the reference texts and a great diversity in the rulings.
Afterwards we examine the problem of the second festival days with regard to the travelers. In the case of the travelers from Israel to the Diaspora the divergences remain restricted. The Israelis traveling abroad do not keep two festival days but they may not distinguish themselves from the local Jews. The problems still today under discussion are whether the Israelis traveling abroad are allowed to perform work secretly, how they should behave outside a Jewish settlement, how long and under which conditions they can take advantage of their quality of Israelis. As for the travelers from the Diaspora to Israel, It seems even likely that the problem was not grappled with in the Talmud. There is a great confusion among the rulers: the overwhelming majority ruled that the travelers behave completely like in the Diaspora, some ruled that the travelers behave completely like Israelis and some ruled that they should adopt the severity of the two first opinions. We show that the first opinion has also weak points and is not better justified than the two others so that the problem remains theoretically open.
I. Introduction.
Yom Tov sheni shel Galluyyot was definitively instituted in about 325 when the Palestinian rabbis, probably under the leadership of Rabbi Yosi, began to send to Egypt and Babylonia, in advance, the data of the coming year. But at the same time, they invited them to go on keeping two festival days, in order to be able to react in the case of a disruption of the communication of the calendar data. There is much discussion in the rabbinic literature about the status of the second festival day. According to one opinion, the second festival day has the status of a minhag i.e. a custom. It is even an important minhag;[1] the violator of the second festival day is punished by beating or excommunication by contrast with the violator of a plain minhag.
The institution of the second festival day is characterized by the recitation of the Hallel and of all the benedictions, including the Sheheheyanu, exactly as on the first festival day, although one does generally not recite a benediction on a minhag.[2]
According to a second opinion the observance of the second festival day is the result of a takana obliging us to go on keeping the second festival day as if we were still doubting, as it was the case when the Babylonians did not yet know the fixing of the month.
However the application and extension clauses of the second festival day seem to work like a minhag.
If we paraphrase R’ Solomon Meiri, we can say that yom tov sheni shel galluyyot is a
מנהג דרך תקנה, it is a minhag which was introduced through a formal takana, in other words it is a minhag which was upgraded to the status of a takana. The takana is thus to go on keeping the former minhag.
The difficulty of giving a precise juridical status to the second festival day is probably the origin of the great confusion existing in the application of the rules of the second festival day by the travelers between Israel and the Diaspora and vice versa.
This confusion is still increased by the divergences between the rulers about the laws of the observance of the minhag by the travelers. If it were a pure takana to keep a second festival day outside of Israel, then the observance of this second day would depend only on the geographical localization of the person. As mentioned above the rules of yom tov sheni work also like a minhag and its obligations, as for a minhag, seem more to be “personal obligations” or חובת גברא which follow the travelers in their travels through the customs.
A third element could interfere with the issue. The takana instituting the second festival day was sent to Babylonia and was accompanied by a justificatory message. Indeed we find in the next quotation from B. Beitsah 4b:
והשתא דידעינן בקביע דירחא מאי טעמא עבדינן תרי יומי, דשלחו מתם, הזהרו במנהג אבותיכם בידכם, זמנין דגזרו המלכות גזירה ואתי לאקלקולי.
And now, when we know the fixing of the moon, why are we observing two festival days? Because they sent from Palestine the following order: be careful to maintain the practice of your late parents. It could once happen that the authority enacts [unfair] laws [again the Jews] and you could be wrong [if you observe only one day].
It is thus possible that this message was intended for people living abroad exclusively while people traveling from Babylonia to Israel were perhaps excluded from the beginning on. Indeed there was no danger of disruption of the communications and the information about the calendar for people traveling in Israel. It is thus not certain at all that the takana instituting the second festival day was intended for those people traveling to Israel and staying temporarily during the festival.[3]
Finally it must be noted that the rabbinic thought was much influences by the position of Maimonides’ ruling that the obligation of keeping two festival days does not depend on the distance from Jerusalem nor from the position of the place in Israel or abroad but it depends only on the exact situation which prevailed at the examined place at the time of the messengers, whether the messengers came along at this place or not. According to Maimonides and some other authorities, in most modern settlements in Israel one should keep two festival days. Therefore, according to these authorities, the obligation of keeping two festival days is not restricted to the Diaspora.
We know also from R’ Estori ha-Farhi (Kaftor va-Ferah chap. 51) that during the fourteenth century the rule was according to Maimonides and therefore they kept two festival days in Ramla but in the neighboring Lod they kept only one festival day.
In B. Pesahim 51b the travel of Rav Safra from Israel to Babylonia was detailed directly after the study of the problem of the traveler between two places having different minhagim. Visibly the Talmud considers that there is a profound analogy between keeping the second festival when traveling from Israel to Babylonia and traveling from a town where they do work on the morning of the 14th of Nissan to a place where they don’t. By contrast we don’t find in the Talmud any evidence about the converse situation of a traveler coming from abroad to Israel. However the overwhelming majority of the rulers considered that the problem of the keeping of the second festival day by the travelers between Israel and the Diaspora and vice versa must be deduced from the rules applicable to the travelers between two towns with different positions about the minhag of working on the morning of the 14th of Nissan. Therefore, in a first stage we will examine thoroughly how the traveler must behave with regard of the minhag during his travels.
II. The Minhag and the Travelers.
A. Talmudic references.
The problem of the minhag and the travelers is raised in many quotations in the Talmud.
1. Mishna Pesahim IV: 1.
Where it is the custom to do work on the eve of Passover until midday [like in the Province of Judah], one may do [work]; where it is the custom not to do [work, like in the Province of Galil], one may not do [work]. He who goes from a place where they work to a place where they do not work, or from a place where they do not work to a place where they do work, we lay upon him the restrictions of the place from where he departed and the restrictions of the place where he has gone; and a man must not act differently [from local custom] on account of the quarrels [which would ensue]
2. B. Pesahim 51a.
When Rabbah bar Bar Hannah came [from Palestine to Babylonia] he ate of the stomach fat. Now Rav Awira the Elder and Rabbah son of Rav Huna visited him; as soon as he saw them he covered it [the fat] from them. When they narrated it to Abaye he said to them “he has treated you as Cutheans.” But does not Rabbah bar Bar Hannah agree with what we learned: “we lay upon him the restrictions of the place from where he departed and the restrictions of the place where he has gone”?
Said Abaye: That is only [when he goes] from [one town] in Babylonia to [another] in Babylonia, or from [a town] in Palestine to [another in] Palestine, or from [a town in Babylonia to [another in] Palestine; but not [when he goes] from a place in Palestine to [another] in Babylonia, [for] since we submit to them [and accept their jurisdiction] we do as they. Rav Ashi said: you may even say [that this holds good when a man goes] from Palestine to Babylonia; this is however where it is not his intention to return, but Rabbah bar Bar Hannah had the intention of returning.
3. B. Pesahim 51b.
Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: for instance I, who know the fixing of the month, in inhabitated places I do not work [when I happen to be in Babylonia] because it is a change [which would lead to] strife. How is it in the wilderness? – Said he to him: thus did Rabbi Ammi say: in inhabited regions [of Babylonia] it is forbidden; in the desert it is permitted.[4]
4. B. Hulin 18b.
When Rabbi Zeira went up [to Palestine] he ate there an animal [which was slaughtered in that part of the throat] which was regarded as a deflection by Rav and Samuel.
But does not Rabbi Zeira accept the rule: [when a person arrives in a town] he must adopt the restrictions of the place which he has left and also the restrictions of the place he has entered? – This rule applies only when one travels from town to town in Babylonia or from town to town in the land of Israel, or from the land of Israel to Babylonia; but when one travels from Babylonia to the land of Israel, inasmuch as we are subject to their authority, we must adopt their customs. Rav Ashi said: you may even hold that the rule applies when one travels from Babylonia to the land of Israel, but only when this person intends to return. Rabbi Zera, however, had no intention to return to Babylonia.
5. B. Hulin 110a.
Rami bar Tamri, also known as Rami bar Dikuli, of Pumbeditha, once happened to be in Sura on the eve of the Day of Atonement. When the townspeople took all the udders [of the animals] and threw them away, he immediately went and collected them and ate them. He was then brought before Rav Hisda who said to him: why did you do it? He replied, “I come from the place of Rav Judah who permits it to be eaten.” Said Rav Hisda to him,” But do you not accept the rule: [when a person arrives in a town] he must adopt the restrictions of the town he has left and also the restrictions of the town he has entered.” He replied, “I ate them outside the [city’s] boundary.”
B. The Exegesis of the Mishna.
At the first glance the meaning of the Mishna is evident. There is however a great confusion in the understanding of this Mishna. The great difficulty results from the existence in the Mishna of divergent impositions: laying upon the traveler the restrictions of the place from where he departed and the restrictions of the place where he has gone.
The problem is to decide whether these two impositions must be considered separately, in different situations, whether the one or the other, but not both together or if they must be considered together because they play simultaneously. In this last contingency, we must find genuine situations where both impositions can work together.
1. The understanding of Maimonides (Rambam Hilkhot Yom Tov VIII: 20),[5] R’ Nissim Gerondi (Ran) (Rif Pesahim 17a: .רבה בר בר חנה), R’ Ovadiah of Bertinoro (commentary on Mishna Pesahim IV: 1) and R’ Isaac bar Sheshet Perfet (Ribash no. 44).
The Mishna speaks about a traveler who does not intend to settle and who will go back to his place of origin. We lay upon the traveler the restrictions of his place of origin when he goes from a place where they do not work to a place where they work. Conversely we lay upon the traveler the restrictions of the place where he has gone when he goes from a place where they do work to a place where they don’t. By contrast if the traveler intends to settle at the new place he adopts the customs of the new place whether these customs are more restrictive or less restrictive. As for the consideration about the necessity that a man must not act differently than the local customs, Abaye considers that this consideration is related to the first case, when the traveler goes from a place where they do work to a place where they do not in order to avoid disputes. By contrast when the traveler goes from a place where they do not work to a place where they do, he really singularizes himself by not working. Rava said that this consideration can also apply to the second case, when the traveler walks from a place where they do not work to a place where they work. Indeed when a tourist walks and does not work and even if the countrymen walk and do not work it is not a singularity.[6] According to this explanation the two contradictory impositions do not work together, they work separately in different situations.
2. The understanding of Tossafot (B. Pesahim 51a רבה בר בר חנה and B. Hulin 18b הני מילי.), Tur (Orah Hayim 468:4) and R’ Jonathan ha-Kohen of Lunel (Rashba I:337).
The Mishna must be considered as taught in different cases:[7]
n When the traveler does not intend to settle and will go back home, we lay upon him the restrictions of the place from where he departed.
n When the traveler intends to settle at the new place, we lay upon him the restrictions of the place where he has gone.
3. The Provencal understanding (Meiri [Beit ha-Bekhira on B. Hulin 18b and on B. Pesahim 51a and b], Kolbo [end of the laws of Hamets and Matsah] and Orhot Hayim) or the introduction of an intermediate case.
n When the traveler intends to settle at the new place, we lay upon him the restrictions of the place where he has gone.
n When the traveler intends to go back home immediately,[8] he behaves according to the customs of the place from where he departed. But he is not allowed to behave according to the less restrictive customs of the place from where he departed before people who are not scholars.
n When the traveler intends to go back home later,[9] then he must behave according to the restrictions of both places; the place from where he departed and the place where he is now staying temporarily.
Meiri writes that this is his opinion and this was also the ruling of his teachers. He found afterwards that Rabad referred to this explanation. He writes also that there are other explanations and even reasoning that the right mind cannot endure.
Thus the Mishna, which speaks of both the restrictions of the place from where the traveler departed and the place where the travelers stays provisory, corresponds to the case of a traveler who intends to go back home after a certain delay (according to Meiri: thirty days). This explanation allows solving the apparent contradiction between Rav Ashi in the quotations 2 and 4. In quotation 2, Rav Ashi understands that the Mishna refers to a case when the traveler does not intend to return home. In quotation 4, Rav Ashi understands that the Mishna refers to a case when the traveler does intend to return home. In fact in both cases the traveler intends to go back home later, after a delay (of more than thirty days). In quotation 2 this situation is considered as if he does not intend to go back home with regard of going back home immediately. In quotation 4, the same situation, going back home after thirty days, is considered as intending to go back home with regard of settling in the new place.
4. There are other explanations of the Mishna but these explanations consider particular situations like going from a place in Babylonia to a place in Palestine or vice versa. These solutions seem farfetched because the Mishna seems to be general and not restricted to very special cases.[10]
C. The ruling of Maimonides (Hilkhot Yom Tov VIII: 20).
The ruling of Maimonides has been at the origin of many discussions about its true meaning.
He who goes from a place where they work to a place where they do not work should not work in a Jewish settlement because of the fear of quarrels but he is allowed to work in the desert. He who goes from a place where they do not work to a place where they do work should not work. We lay upon him the restrictions of the place from where he departed and the restrictions of the place where he has gone. However he should not appear in front of them as if he is idle because of the interdiction to work. A man must never act differently [from local custom] on account of the quarrels [which would ensue].
And similarly he who intends to come back to his place of departure, behaves according to the customs of his place, whether they are more or less severe than the local customs, yet at the condition that he does not do it in front of the local people on account of the quarrels.
This passage is constituted by two different parts. The first part is the transcription of the Mishna Pesahim IV:1[11] slightly adapted by the introduction of the concepts of settlement and desert which correspond to the influence of the passage about the query of Rav Safra in B. Pesahim. The second part seems similar but it presents differences. The two parts are connected by a coordination conjunction וכן מי that we translated by “and similarly.” The challenge is to explain these two passages and their coordination in the respect of all the Talmudic quotations.
This coordination conjunction means at the first glance “and similarly he who…” But its meaning was fiercely disputed. The use of a computer program shows that Maimonides used this conjunctionוכן מי 62 times in the Hibbur. It is used to connect two passages when the second corresponds to a case leading to a similar, but not necessarily identical, conclusion as in the first passage. He used also וכן כל מי three times but the first passage begins one time also by כל. Anyhow the two expressions seem to have the same signification. When there is no similitude but a real opposition between the two cases Maimonides uses the conjunction אבל מי (36 times in the Hibbur). Therefore the plain explanation of this quotation is to consider that both passages are parallel and deal with the case of the traveler who intends coming back home and not settling in the new place.
1. The Plain Understanding:
In the first passage we deal with working on the morning of the 14th of Nissan. Apparently working is a special activity that cannot be performed discretely and therefore it is absolutely forbidden. The second passage deals with other customs in general which can be hidden and performed discretely. The difficulty is that Maimonides must choose between the two contradictory statements of Rav Ashi; he accepts the statement of Rav Ashi in B. Hulin 18b that the Mishna refers to a traveler who wants to go back to the place from where he came and, although he rules like Rabba bar Bar Hanna he must reject the statement of Rav Ashi in B. Pesahim 51a; this remains also a difficulty. (Maimonides rules like Rabba bar Bar Hanna but rejecting the answer of Rav Ashi, he has no answer to the objection of the Talmud.) The great commentator R’ Nissim on Rif (Rif 17b entry רבה), and R’ Isaac bar Sheshet (Teshuvot, no. 44) understood the Talmudic passages according to this understanding, giving precedence to the statement of Rav Ashi in Hulin 18b. Among later authorities Magen Avraham, Ba’er Heitev, Be’er ha-Gola and Mishna Berura adopted the same understanding of this quotation of Maimonides, recopied in Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 468:4.
2. The Second Understanding:
A second understanding, at the first glance surprising, is to consider that the first passage and, necessarily, the Mishna deals with someone who will settle in the new place and not come back. By contrast the second passage deals with a traveler who will come back to the place from where he came. The consequences of this understanding are surprising and moreover not accepted by the halakha. Indeed, according to the first passage people settling in a new place must behold the customs of their place of origin all their life.[12] A consequence of this ruling would be that people coming from the Diaspora and settling in Israel would be obliged to go on keeping two festival days all their life. Conversely people coming from Israel with the intention to settle abroad would be allowed to perform work on the second festival day before reaching a Jewish settlement.[13]
This understanding was first championed by the Maggid Mishneh who considered that the first passage correspond to the case when the traveler wants to settle without the intention to come back. He must give the precedence to the statement of Rav Ashi in Pesahim 51a and reject the statement of Rav Ashi in Hulin 18b. This position was followed by Gra, Hok Yakov, Shakh (on Yoreh Deah 214) and Peri Hadash in their commentaries of Maimonides’ quotation in Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 468:4.
D. The ruling of Meiri, Orhot Hayim and Kolbo.
Their ruling is consistent with the Provencal understanding explained above, introducing a third intermediate case. It is important because it was influential. R’ David ibn Abi Zimra ruled according to this opinion in a responsum (Radvaz IV: 73 also called no. 1145) about the travelers from Palestine to Egypt.[14] It was for him the only manner to solve the contradiction between the two statements of Rav Ashi in B. Hulin 18b and B. Pesahim 51a.
In this responsum Radvaz distinguished three cases:
n Going back immediately.
n Going back later.
n Settling definitively.
R’ Joseh Karo copied this ruling of Orhot Hayim in Beit Yoseph (Tur Orah Hayim 496) and abridged it Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 496:3.
E. The Ruling of Tur.
His ruling is consistent with the ruling of Maimonides according to its plain understanding (opinion 1).
F. The Ruling of R’ Yoseph Karo in Shulhan Arukh.
Shulhan Arukh raised the issue at four different places.[15] Of special interest is the ruling of Orah Hayim 468:4, where he recopied the text of Maimonides (Hilkhot Yom Tov VIII:20, mentioned above), which seems to contradict the other rulings and more specifically Orah Hayim 496:3. It is accepted that the ruling of O.H. 468:4 is an abridged version of the original text of Orhot Hayim. We are dealing in this chapter with working on the morning of the 14th of Nisan and therefore the abridgment of the text of Orhot Hayim makes sense because it is forbidden to perform work whether the travelers comes back immediately or later. Therefore the text mentions only two cases, settling in the new place or going back to the first place without making the difference between going back immediately or later. But finally he never mentioned clearly in Shulhan Arukh the existence of three cases so that the doubt subsists about his definitive ruling; does he rule like Orhot Hayim, which he copied in Beit Yoseph O.H. 496 or does he rule like Tur and Maimonides (opinion 1)? Similarly the commentators differed about the meaning of the ruling of Orah Hayim 468:4 where he copied Maimonides.[16]
Anyhow the position of R’ Karo in Shulhan Arukh is problematic because he quoted two contradictory passages of two different authors.[17]
III. The Second Festival Day and the Traveler Going from Palestine to the Babylonia:
The quotation in B. Pesahim 51a about Rav Safra is generally considered as referring to his travel from Palestine to Babylonia. This is indeed the only plausible manner to understand how Rav Safra knew the fixing of the month before undertaking his travel.[18] Furthermore he asked his query to Rabbi Abba, a Palestinian Amora; this could only be before his undertaking of a travel to Babylonia.
There is a great unanimity between the rulers that in the direction Palestine-Diaspora, the obligation of keeping the second festival day is a personal obligation. Therefore Palestinians traveling to the Diaspora are not subjected to the obligation of the second festival day. However they are forbidden to perform work[19] on the second festival day when they are in a Jewish settlement. Outside of the techum around the town of this Jewish settlement they are allowed to perform work.[20]
Nowadays the dramatic increase of the travels is the cause of new responsa about the behavior of Israelis abroad. Because of the modern social conditions, with Israelis on mission abroad for one or even many years can prevail themselves of their status of Israelis, the tendency is to lengthen the delay allowing to prevail of the status of Israelis and even to be lenient about the interdiction of performing work discretely. However the rulers do not put at all the emphasis on the absolute necessity for Israelis abroad to behave officially as if they kept two festival days, as it is strictly required by the halakha. In weak communities, where a part of the attendance of the festival office is composed by Israelis (teachers and member of the Israeli mission), their absence at the offices on the second festival day is a very detrimental singularity. The danger is not anymore a possibility of dispute; it is the whole institution of Yom Tov Sheni which they endanger.
IV. The Second Day Festival and the Traveler Going from Babylonia to Palestine:
It is generally considered that this case was not considered in the Talmud and therefore we have not a model case which could allow solving the problem from the first source. However two important Rishonim have understood that the passage about the travel of Rav Safra in B. Pesahim 51a refers to a travel from Babylonia to Palestine.[21]
A. Foreigners Traveling to Israel Behave as in the Diaspora and keep two festival days.
The overwhelming majority of the rabbis compared the problem of the second festival day by the visitors of the Diaspora traveling in Israel to that of the observance of divergent minhagim between two different places. In responsa Yabi’a Omer VI: 40, we find an exhaustive enumeration of the main rulers championing this opinion. This approach considers that the foreigners keep two festival days abroad while Israelis keep one festival day in Israel. The case of the foreigners on a visit to Israel is solved according to the rules of the precedence of the minhagim. In other words, it seems that this particular problem had not been solved by the order sent from Israel to the Diaspora to go on keeping two festival days. In fact this comparison is strange because the status of the second festival day is certainly higher than a minhag like working on the morning of the 14th of Nissan, it seems more comparable to working on the same day after noon. Furthermore, if the behavior of the foreigners on a visit in Israel is regulated by the rule of the precedence of the minhagim, of rabbinic order, we can object that the positive obligation of tefilin of Torah order should have the precedence on this rule of rabbinic order.[22]
Therefore the responsum written on this issue by R’ Moses Feinstein shows originality and distinguishes itself from the others. He accepts the principle that during the period of the observation calendar, a foreigner visiting in Palestine had no doubt any more in the whole Diaspora about the true festival day and kept only one festival day. Now he says, after the institution of the second festival day, we have no more any doubt about the true festival day and we must however keep the second festival day although we know that it is a weekday. This obligation is personal and not territorial, there is no difference whether the foreigner is abroad or on a visit in Israel. As today we know all the fixing of the month, there is no more difference between Israel and abroad as it was the case before the institution of the second festival day.
In other words, according to this responsum, the obligation for the foreigner visiting in Israel, to keep two festival days derives directly from the order sent to the Diaspora, to go on keeping the customs of their elders and observing two festival days. Therefore the obligation is of the same nature than that of the foreigners living abroad and this explains why there are exempted from tefilin on this second festival day. The consequence of this special situation, as noted by R’ Moses Feinstein in his responsum, is that the condition of the foreigner visiting in Israel appears to be more sever today than at the epoch of the observation calendar.
However:
n Where does he know from that the obligation of keeping two festival days is personal and has not a territorial aspect?
n It seems that this responsum is based on the generally accepted explanation that the fear of forgetting the Thora and the rules of the calendar, which was the justification of the institution of the second festival day, exists not only abroad but also in Israel and therefore the order sent to the Diaspora is still valid in Israel. The only difference is that this order was not addressed to the Israelis. Now, as soon as we explain that in reality the fear was about the disruption between Israel and the Diaspora, it no more evident that the order was applicable upon the foreigners visiting in Israel.
n The fact that the conditions of the foreigner on visit in Israel would be more severe today than at the time of the messengers is problematic. Indeed Maimonides had met a similar situation about the late Eruv and he was objected by all the commentators, beginning with R’ Abraham ben David.[23] The argument was that the situation could never be more severe after the Takana than before. This principle was accepted by all the rulers and the Shulkhan Arukh did not follow Maimonides. Therefore the argumentation of R’ Moses Feinstein remains problematic.[24]
B. Foreigners traveling to Israel behave as Israelis and keep one festival day.
It is important to examine the commentaries of R’ Hananel and Ravan. Indeed these two authorities are generally considered as belonging to the supporters of the first opinion. Or analysis will show that they are supporters of the second opinion.
1. R’ Hananel.
R’ Hananel explains the passage as follows:
“In my situation, when I know the fixing of the month and the people of my place keep two festival days, when I want to come up from Babylonia, where we observe two festival days, to Palestine, where they observe only one festival day, in a settlement [in Palestine] I don’t observe the second festival day,[25] but in the desert [of Palestine where I am alone without other Jews, and I know for sure that the second festival day is a weekday] how should I behave?[26] Am I submitted to the strictness of the place from where I came? Rabbi Abba answered him: this was the ruling of Rabbi Ami. Among a Jewish settlement [in Palestine] it is forbidden [to observe the second festival day] but in the desert of Palestine it is allowed.[27]
Critical examination of this interpretation.
n Just before the passage about the query of Rav Safra occurs in the Mishna the passage: “the one who goes from a place where they do (“osin”) to a place where they do not perform (“ein osin”) work. The verb “osin” means to perform work and does not mean to observe the second festival day.
However the following references support the interpretation of R’ Hananel:
Kiddushin 31a: “avidna yoma tava le-rabanan.”
Kiddushin 39b: “de-avdin lei yom tov.”[28]
n Second, Rav Safra, in a settlement in Palestine does not observe the second festival day, why? Even if one is not allowed to distinguish oneself because of the fear of dispute, why should one not be allowed to respect discretely the second festival day according to the opinion of Rava? Rava has indeed said that the fact of walking idly (as opposed to walking with a purpose) is not to be considered as a singularity because there are always people in the streets and the market walking idly.
However R’ Hananel does not seem to have the reading “because of the fear of dispute” as in our Talmudic text. It is also likely that the reason why Rav Safra keeps only one festival day in a settlement in Palestine is because the messengers come along at this place and the people know the fixing of the month. He keeps only one festival day because otherwise it would appear as “mossif.” In the desert of Palestine, where the messengers don’t come along, keeping two festival days does not seem as “mossif.”
n Third the interpretation given for “be-yishuv assur, be-midbar mutar” is difficult.
In the desert, one is not allowed to observe the second festival day. One is either obliged or forbidden to observe a second day, but certainly one is not merely allowed.
However “mutar” could be the formal opposite of “assur”; but it would not mean
that he is allowed but he is obliged to keep two festival days in the desert.
Another possible explanation of the passage of Rav Safra could be the following:
Rav Safra says that he is not performing any work on the second festival day in a [Jewish] settlement [in Babylonia,[29] although he knows the fixing of the month]. He doubted however, when he is in the desert [of Palestine, i.e. when he has already reached Palestine but did not yet reach a settlement] whether he is forbidden to perform any work because of the severity of the place from where he came, or if he is allowed to perform work in the desert [of Palestine because he knows the fixing of the month]. Rabbi Abba answered: this was the ruling of Rabbi Ami, in a settlement in Babylonia it is forbidden to perform work; in the desert of Israel it is allowed.
We could then conclude that in a settlement in Palestine, where the messengers came along and all the population knew the fixing of the month, Rav Safra was, a fortiori, allowed to perform work on the second festival day and was not submitted to the severity of the place whence he came from.
This second interpretation is also acceptable; it solves the difficulties of the first interpretation but it introduces new difficulties:
n Why must Rav Safra mention that in a settlement in Babylonia he is not allowed to perform work on the second festival day?
In fact Rav Safra knows the fixing of the month and he could have imagined performing work discretely.
n Why is Rav Safra allowed to perform work in the desert of Israel and is he not submitted to the severity of the place from where he came as he is a traveler and intends to go back home?
Apparently in the desert of Israel, by contrast with Babylonia, the fact that he knows the fixing of the month is sufficient to allow him working on the second festival day.
The difference between these two interpretations is the status of Rav Safra in the desert of Israel: according to the first interpretation he keeps two festival days in the desert, according to the second interpretation he keeps only one festival day in the desert.
We will however see that the text of Ravan, although very similar to that of R’ Hananel, must necessarily be understood according to this second interpretation of the commentary of R’ Hananel.
2. R’ Abraham bar Nathan (Ravan).
Ravan often follows the commentary of R’ Hananel; this is also the case here. However, we note some minor, at the first glance, differences. They have a decisive influence of the interpretation.
Ravan writes: “I, who know the fixing of the moon and the people of my place hold two festival days, when I travel to Palestine, where they hold only one day, in a [Jewish] settlement in [Babylonia][30] I do not perform work [on the second festival day] because of the strictness of the place where I am.[31] In the desert of Palestine, am I allowed to perform any work during the second festival day, which I know is a weekday because of the severity of the place from where I came or not? Rabbi Abba answered: this was the ruling of Rabbi Ami. In a [Jewish] settlement [in Babylonia] it is forbidden to perform any work, in the desert [of Palestine] it is allowed. As Rav Safra[32] asked him about the desert in Palestine, we can conclude that in all the places of his land [Babylonia] it is forbidden [to perform work on the second festival day].”[33]
Thus in the desert of Israel and a fortiori in any settlement in Israel, Rav Safra was allowed to perform work on the second day of the festival.
In the case of a normal person who did not know the fixing of the month it is likely that in the desert of Israel he would not be allowed to work on the second festival day but in a settlement in Israel he was certainly allowed.
3. Conclusion.
The conclusion is clear: R’ Hananel and Ravan agree that Rav Safra was allowed to perform work on the second festival day when he was staying in a settlement in Palestine[34] during one of his travels from Babylonia to Palestine.[35] However in the desert of Israel the situation is less clear: according to Ravan he was allowed[36] but as for R’ Hananel the answer depends on the interpretation adopted.[37]
However all the other authorities[38] wanted to conclude that R’ Hananel and Ravan impose the keeping of two festival days by the travelers in Israel.
4. The responsum of Hakham Tsevi.[39]
You asked me about people of the Diaspora traveling to Israel; how should they behave during the festivals, like Israelis or like foreigners?
According to my humble view they must observe the festivals like Israeli people and this [matter] must not be considered as a severity of the place from where they came.
Not only this is the case for prayers, benedictions and Torah reading which are in fact no severities of the place from where he came; indeed if someone wants to adopt a more severe conduct and pray the prayer of the festival when it is not the time of this festival, he commits a transgression. But even on the level of the performance of work on the second festival day during their stay in Israel they are allowed. Indeed if all the inhabitants of the traveler’s place would settle in Israel they would certainly be forbidden to keep two festival days in the same way as someone who sleeps eight day in the sukkah is beaten. The same rule is valid for Pesah and Shavuot: if someone keeps an additional day he transgresses the interdiction of “bal tossif”. The rule that they gave “we lay upon him the severity of the place from where he came” is only valid in the case when the people living in the place of the severity are allowed to observe their more severe behavior even if they settle in the place of the leniency. But if they are forbidden to observe their more severe behavior in the place of the leniency, we do not impose this rule. Even the original statement [which represents the basis of the modern institution of Yom Tov Sheni] that they sent from Israel: be careful to maintain the practice of your late parents. It could happen that the authorities enact [unfair] laws [against the Jews] and you could be wrong [if you observe only one day] is only valid abroad. The possibility to be wrong because of the disruption of the communication of the calendar] exists only in their country outside of Israel but when the traveler is in Israel he cannot be wrong!
Now in Israel it is forbidden to add a festival day and Israeli people cannot add one day with regard of what is written in the Torah, they are forbidden to adopt a more severe attitude [than prescribed]. Therefore people traveling to Israel are forbidden to keep two festival days during their stay, even a provisory stay because the obligation to keep one festival day is dictated by the place where they are [Israel] and the rule about the severity of the place from where they came does not play in this case. And I wrote what seemed to me [correct]. Tsevi Askenazi s”t.[40]
5. Critical Analysis of this Responsum.
The responsum is based on the following arguments:
n Generally we compare this problem with the rule of the minhagim. But praying the prayer of the festival cannot be considered as a severity with regard of the prayer of a weekday.
n Forbidding the performance of work during the second festival day is certainly a severity but the rule of the severity of the minhagim does not play in our case. Indeed if a foreigner settles in Israel he will be forbidden to observe to festival days because of the order of “bal tossif”. In such a situation we cannot oblige a traveler to keep two festival days.[41] Thus in such a situation when the settler is forbidden to keep the second festival day, we cannot oblige the traveler to keep the second festival day and forbid him performing any work.
n The takana instituting the second festival day was introduced out of fear that the Jews of the foreign counties would lose the contact with Israel and would not keep the right festival day. Such a fear does not exist when these foreigners are on visit in Israel. The takana was not intended for them.
The responsum would perhaps have been more persuasive if it had been articulated as follows:
n From the motivation of the takana instituting the second festival day it appears that it was not addressed to the foreigners during their provisory stay in Israel because at this particular moment they could have no doubt about the Jewish calendar.[42]
n We must still examine the problem at the light of the rules of the priority of the minhagim. But the rule of the priority of the minhagim does not play in our case. Indeed if a foreigner settles in Israel he will be forbidden to observe to festival days because of the order of “bal tossif”. In such a situation we cannot oblige the traveler to keep two festival days.
n Even if one does not accept this reasoning we must still observe that as for the positive obligations of the second festival day (prayer, benedictions and Thorah reading) we cannot consider them as more severe customs.
n I would even add the following point. Yom Tov Sheni includes three points: first the positive obligations of the festival second the interdiction of performing work and third the suppression of the obligation of wearing tefilin.[43] But as soon as we are outside of the takana there is an obligation of tefilin and the rule of the priority of the minhagim must at least abide by this obligation.
6. The refutation of this Responsum by R’ Jacob Emden.
It is generally accepted that R’ Jacob Emden, the son of Hakham Tsevi refuted his father’s argumentation in responsa She’elat Yabets I, no. 168. The supporters of the first opinion have generally used the argument of the refutation of Hakham Tsevi by his son in order to eliminate the second opinion.[44] Let us examine this refutation and its main arguments.
n R’ Jacob Emden follows the theory of Rambam Hilkhot Kiddush ha-Hodesh III according which we keep today one festival day only in the places where we know that the messengers arrived and the people kept one festival day at the time of the calendar of observation. Therefore one must keep two festival days in all the new places. Therefore he argues, there is no interdiction, in principle, to keep two festival days in Israel.
n R’ Jacob Emden seems to understand Rambam, Hilkhot Yom Tov VIII: 20 according to the understanding of Maggid Mishneh that the traveler, even when he settles in a new place, must go on keeping the customs of his former place. Therefore he thinks that the Jews settling in Israel must go on keeping discreetly two festival days.
n R’ Jacob Emden ascertains that when there are two communities in a town with different customs or ruling there is no danger of dispute and of separation.[45] Therefore, he says, as soon as the number of foreigners, settling in Israel, is sufficient to have an independent quorum, they are allowed to celebrate publicly the second festival day. They should go on and keep the two festival days publicly.
n The message and order instituting the second festival day because of the fear of unfair laws against the Jews and the fear that they forget the Torah was not sent only to the Diaspora but it concerned also the inhabitants of Israel. Today there is no difference between Israel and the Diaspora; they know all the fixing of the month. The reason of the institution of the second festival day applies to all the Jews without distinction. If he did not fear [to introduce new habits] he would say that all the inhabitants of Israel must keep two festival days.
It appears that the responsum is based on very problematic early beginnings; first that one keeps two festival days in Israel in places which did not exist during the time of the Mishna and the Talmud (third century) and had not a Jewish population, second that one beholds always, after settling in a new place, the customs of the former place. These two principles are not accepted by the halakha. Further he ascertains that communities can go on and keep two festival days and former customs officially after settling in Israel.
This responsum accounts for the exalted and exaggerated positions adopted sometimes by R’ Jacob Emden. In any case it cannot be considered as a serious refutation of his father responsum. On the contrary this responsum is a model of logic, rigor, concision and originality.
7. Other authorities supporting the second opinion.
Only a little number of authorities supported the opinion of Hakham Tsevi. However, as we established above, Hakham Tsevi was probably preceded by R’ Hananel and Ravan who championed the opinion that foreigners visiting in Israel, keep only one day. Among these other authorities we can distinguish R’ Saul Nathansohn who adopted a similar position, at least in theory (Sho’el u Meshiv, 3rd edition no. 28). R’ Shneur Zalman of Liady in Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav ruled also that foreigners, on a visit to Israel, keep only one festival day.[46] He notes however that there are opponents.[47]
We must further notice that the problem of the foreigners visiting Israel was apparently not raised nor in the Talmud nor in the Rishonim. This could be considered as an indication that their status does not pose a problem and is identical with that of the Israelis. A similar consideration could be expressed about R’ Joseph Karo who did not raise the issue in Shulkhan Arukh. However he had raised the issue and followed the opinion 1 in his responsa Avkat Rokhel 26 and one should admit that he changed his mind.[48] When going from the Diaspora to Israel, the obligation of Yom Tov Sheni would be a territorial obligation and not a personal obligation.[49]
C. Foreigners traveling in Israel do not keep two festival days, they wear tefilin on the second day but they do not perform work on this day.[50]
This position was adopted by R’ Shmuel Salant, longtime chief rabbi of Jerusalem during the second part of the nineteenth-century. R’ Yehiel Mihel Tikochinsky, his pupil wrote in his book Ir ha-Kodesh ve ha Miqdash that R’ Salant was inclined to rule according to the ruling of Hakham Tsevi. R’ Salant considered as certain that during the period of the empirical calendar by vision and messengers, when they kept the second festival day out of doubt, foreigners on visit in Palestine had no doubt and kept only one festival day. Therefore, he argued, today the rule cannot be more severe than at that epoch. As he dared not ruling as Hakham Tsevi because his teacher R’ Israel of Shklov had ruled according to the opinion 1 (Pe’at ha-Shulkhan, Hilkhot Erets Israel, chap 2, $ 15), he adopted an intermediate position considering the most severe aspects of both opinions. Therefore he advised not to keep the second festival day and to wear tefilin but to refrain on the second festival day from any work, normally forbidden on the second festival day.
The contemporary posek R’ Nahum Eliezer Rabinovitch of Maale Adumim has a similar position and he considers that one must behave according to the ruling of R’ Shmuel Salant. R. Rabinovitch finds in the text of Maimonides an allusion to the status of the foreigner visiting in Israel and the Israeli visiting abroad. The Israelis keep two festival days even when they travel abroad and the foreigners keep only one festival day when they are in Israel (Yad Peshutah, Hilkhot Talmud Torah VI: 14, 11, p. 477-478).
In Yabia Omer VI: 40, R. Ovadiah Yosef mentions that R’ Abraham Isaac Kook ruled that one should adopt the severe points of the responsum of Hakham Tsevi, thus to behave like the severe aspects of both opinions.
It is interesting to note that the problem is still with us and new responsa are still written on this issue. Even the champions of the majority opinion are sensitive to the new situations. In many instances, a specific element like the ownership of a house in Israel or the regular celebration of the three festivals in Israel or even the rental of an apartment in Israel on annual basis are generally considered by the champions of the opinion 1, as a sufficient element allowing keeping the festivals as the Israelis.
V. General conclusion.
The aim of the present article was analyzing the complex problem of the priority of the minhagim and explaining the evolution from the Talmudic references until the halakha in Shulkhan Arukh. Today the general problem has lost its acuteness and has more a historical interest. The difficulty of the problem results from the difficulty to understand clearly the Talmudic sources and their apparent contradictions. We have seen that these difficulties were at the origin of a great number of interpretations.
We examined also the problem of Yom Tov Sheni shel Galuyyot with respect to the travelers between Israel and the Diaspora and vice-versa. It appears that the case of the travelers from Israel to the Diaspora is examined in the Talmud; the traveler in his quality of Israeli is dispensed from keeping the second festival day and therefore his conduct during this day is determined by the rules of the priority of the minhagim, in the respect of the susceptibility of the local population. The converse situation, the case of the traveler from the Diaspora to Israel was not considered in the Talmud (this is at least the general understanding, but there are opposed opinions) and Shulhan Arukh did not raise the issue. Therefore there is much uncertainty in the treatment of the problem. The general opinion was to treat the problem on the same way as the symmetrical problem and to assimilate it to a problem of priority of minhagim. Others considered that we are out of the scope of application of this rule and there was never a problem at all so that the issue depends only on the localization of the traveler. A foreigner keeps two festival days abroad but only one day in Israel. The absence of true evidence leads to the rare situation that the three possible attitudes have their champions. We show that the majority opinion has also its weak points and the minority opinion is theoretically much stronger that one could imagine.

[1] This expression is from R’ Zerahia ha-Levi on the Rif on B. Pesahim, p. 17a.
[2] See “Yom Tov Sheni Shel Galuyyot: The True Signification of the Second Day Festival,” the Seforim blog (forthcoming).
[3] Even today the overwhelming majority of the Rabbis believe that the reason invoked for the institution of the second festival day was the fear of unfair laws against the Jews causing to forget the Torah and the Jewish calendar. Such a fear exists everywhere, Israel included. Therefore the foreigners visiting in Israel are still subject to this danger and therefore they are submitted to the obligation of the second festival day. The Israelis should also fear the same danger but the takana instituting Yom Tov Sheni was not addressed to them.
[4] The translation is here according to the generally accepted understanding that Rav Safra was traveling from Palestine to Babylonia. Although he knew the fixing of the month, he did not perform work on the second festival day when he was in a Jewish settlement in Babylonia because of the fear of dispute. This reason did not exist in the wilderness and therefore Rabbi Ammi allowed him working on the second festival day because he knew the fixing of the month.
[5] In fact there are two different understandings of the meaning of Maimonides. We have adopted here what seems the genuine understanding. This problem will be examined later.
[6] See Novellae of R’ Samuel Strashun (Rashash) ad locum.
[7] .לצדדין
[8] Meiri writes: before thirty days.
[9] Meiri writes: after a delay of more than thirty days.
[10] Such special situations to which the Mishna must be reduced in order to satisfy both impositions, can be found in responsum I: 337 of Rabbi Solomon ben Adret (Rashbah) and in the novellae of R’ Hezekiah da Silva on Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 468:4.
[11] See quotation 1 above.
[12] We will see later that R’ Jacob Emden in responsa Yabets, no. 168, championed such an opinion and understood Maimonides according to this second opinion.
[13] This is the opinion of R’ Zerahia ha-Levi, see ha-Maor ha-Katan on the Rif on Pesahim. Rabad ad locum opposed vehemently this opinion.
[14] As for the definition of going back immediately he gives the examples of people coming to Egypt to buy merchandise or people going to Israel to visit tombs. As for going back later he proposes the examples of people coming to Egypt for an enterprise or trade or people going to Israel for learning.
[15] Shulhan Arukh: Orah Hayim 468:4 (about working on the morning of Nisan 14th), 496:3 (about Yom Tov Sheni and the travelers from Israel to the Diaspora), 574:1-2 (about fasting for travelers between two places having different fast days) and Yoreh Deah 214:2 (about the rules of the communities and the travelers).
[16] See above the two interpretations of the ruling of Maimonides Hilkhot Yom Tov VIII: 20.
[17] Even if we consider that R’ Yoseph Karo changed his mind and considered only two cases in O.H. 468:4 and if we consider that O.H. 496:3 must be understood according to the first and plain understanding, there remains even though a contradiction. Indeed in 496:3 (according to the text of Orhot Hayim) he writes that the traveler is allowed to work on the second festival day as long as he is outside a Jewish settlement, even if he intends to settle there. In O.H. 468:4 (according to the text of Maimonides) he writes that the traveler is allowed to perform work in the desert (outside the settlement) if he intends to come back and apparently not if he intends to settle.
[18] For a plausible explanation of his knowledge of the fixing of the month, see J. Jean Ajdler, “Rav Safra and the Second Festival Day: Lessons About the Evolution of the Jewish Calendar,” Tradition 38:4 (Winter 2004): 3-28.
[19] Even discretely. According to Tosafot it is impossible to perform work discretely.
[20] According to R’ Zerahia ha-Levi, even someone who wants to settle outside of Israel is allowed to perform work outside the tchum of the Jewish settlement as long as he did not reach the Jewish settlement. Ritva agrees with this ruling. R’ Nissim rules that the one who wants to settle is already forbidden to perform work in the desert of Israel. Rabad seems to rule that as soon as the Palestinian leaves the boundaries and enters the Diaspora, he is forbidden of performing any work on the second festival day.
[21] R’ Abraham Bornstein of Sochaczew asked himself (responsa Avnei Nezer Vol 1, no. 354; 43) why the great rulers did not rule the story of Rav Safra. In fact Maimonides certainly refers to this story in Hilkhot Yom Tov VIII: 20 when he writes .לא יעשה בישוב אבל עושה הוא במדבר From the same responsum n° 354; 50, it appears that he understood the ruling of Maimonides like Maggid Mishneh, i.e. the first part referring to the case that the traveler does not intend to come back.
[22] One could make the same objection for Yom Tov Sheni in the Diaspora. But here the answer is that the Rabbis have the power, when they make enactments, to suppress an order of the Torah, see response of R’ Solomon ben Aderet I:61. By contrast, for the foreigners visiting in Israel, if their obligation of keeping Yom Tov Sheni does not derive from the original takana but from a general rabbinic rule of priority of minhagim, then the positive order of the torah should have the precedence.
[23] Hilkhot Yom Tov VI: 14.
[24] I have already heard the following argumentation. Even at the time of the observation calendar, the foreigners on pilgrimage in Israel were keeping the second festival day according to the rule of the priority of the minhagim. Therefore, today, we must still behave according to their custom. In fact this argumentation seems rather a Yeshiva argumentation but it is not likely that this was really the conduct of the pilgrims. Now even if this were the case, it is certain that the pilgrims wore the tefilin on the second festival day during their stay in Palestine because it is a positive law of the Torah with precedence on a minhag. Therefore it is likely that either the pilgrims wore the tefilin and did not keep the second festival day because of its contradictory character or they abstained from performing work on this day. Anyhow this argumentation could sustain the opinions 2 or 3 but certainly not the opinion 1, according which the foreigners traveling in Israel keep two festival days.
[25] R’ Hananel does not mention in his text “because of the fear of dispute” as in our Talmudic text. It is not certain whether he had the same reading as us. Nevertheless from Nahmanides’ Milhamot Hashem on the Rif on B. Pesahim 17a, we see that this was indeed the Spanish reading.
[26] Whether I should not keep two festival days because I know the fixing of the month or I should because I am still submitted to the place whence I came from.
[27] This exegesis is in accordance with the ruling of R’ Tsevi Ashkenazi in response Hakham Tsevi no. 167. R’ Meir Don Plotski from Ostrow understood R’ Hananel on the same way. See Even Shelema on Ravan, who does not accept this interpretation.
[28] Furthermore R’ Hananel writes in the beginning of his commentary “and people of my place hold (“osin”) two festival days.”
[29] We cannot explain that he means a settlement in Palestine. Indeed, in a Jewish settlement in Palestine the messengers come along and the population knows the fixing of the month. If, despite these circumstances, Rav Safra does not perform work in this settlement, why would he be allowed to perform work in the desert of Palestine where there are not messengers coming along. Or conversely if Rav Safra is allowed to perform work in the desert of Israel, a fortiori he must be allowed to perform work in a settlement of Israel.
[30] R’ Moses Sofer in his Novellae on Pesahim and R’ Ehrenreich in Even Shelemah on Ravan understood that it speaks about a settlement in Israel. R’ Ovadia Yoseph in Yehaveh Da’at VI: 40 recopied their arguments. According to their explanations, Rav Safra was forbidden to perform work in a settlement in Israel, likely because of the strictness of the place from where he came. But why was he allowed to perform work in the desert of Israel? Rabbi Moses Sofer writes that in the settlement working is forbidden on the second festival day because of מנהג אבותינו בידינו . But in the desert there is no status, there is no tradition of the elders and the obligation of Yom Tov Sheni depends on the geographical localization but it is not a personal obligation. I could not, unfortunately, understand him. If Rav Safra is allowed to work in the desert where there is no tradition and no status, no messengers coming along, a fortiori that he is allowed to work in a settlement in Israel where there is a tradition, were the messengers come along, were the population knows the fixing of the month and where there is thus a status of holding only one day. Conversely, if Rav Safra, in a settlement in Israel, is still submitted to the strictness of the place from where he came, a fortiori in the desert, where the messengers do not come along, he should be forbidden to work on the second festival day.
[31] Those Rabbis who understand that we speak here about a settlement in Israel must correct the text and instead of שם they must correct into משם. By contrast the text of Ravan fits perfectly our interpretation.
[32] The reading of Ravan is Rav Hisda but we maintained Rav Safra in order not to complicate things.
[33] The reasoning of Ravan works only with our interpretation. Rav Safra does not perform work in a settlement in Babylonia but he asked whether he was allowed to perform work in the desert of Israel. Ravan concludes that it was clear for him that it was forbidden to perform work in the desert of Babylonia. But if we consider that Rav Safra began with the statement that he does not perform work in a settlement in Israel and he asked afterwards whether he was allowed to perform work in the desert of Israel, how can Ravan conclude that it was clear for him that he was forbidden to perform work in the desert of Babylonia?
This reasoning has no basis. Why was it more evident that it is forbidden in the desert of Babylonia than in the desert of Israel?
[34] R’ Shneur Zalman of Liady in his Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 496:11 ruled that a foreigner traveling in Israel observes one festival days but he added that there are authorities which oppose this ruling. Apparently he refers his ruling to Ravan; this is also the opinion of R’ Tsevi Pesah Frank in Mikra’e Kodesh, Pesah 2, p. 195 note 1. However all the other authorities wanted to conclude that R’ Hananel and Ravan impose the keeping of two festival days by the travelers in Israel.
[35] It is interesting to note that all the later commentaries did not follow this approach of a travel from Babylonia to Palestine but they considered a travel from Palestine to Babylonia. I had attributed this change to the difficulties of the exegesis of the commentaries following the first approach. But finally at the end of the study of the commentaries of R’ Hananel and Ravan, it seems that these commentaries are genuine and well argumentative. The change of approach could be justified by the fact that Rav Safra consulted Rabbi Abba, an eminent Palestinian Amora (born and educated in Babylonia). This could be only before a travel from Palestine to Babylonia.
[36] But it is likely that it was the case because he knew the fixing of the month.
[37] According to the first interpretation he was forbidden and according to the second interpretation he was allowed.
[38] R’ Moses Sofer in his Novellae on Pesahim, Commentary Even Shelemah on Sefer Ravan ad locum, R’ Ovadia Yoseph in Yabi’a Omer VI: 40.
[39] Responsum no. 167.
[40] Hakham Tsevi and later his son R’ Jacob Emden signed by Tsevi Ashkenazi s”t and Yabets S’t.Hakham Tsevi had learned under R’ Elijah Covo in Salonika, he assumed the Sephardi tittle hakham and adopted even Sephardi customs and the name Ashkenazi. S”t may be the common abbreviation of ספרדי טהור used by his teacher orסופו טוב or still סימן טוב.
[41] Imagine that in the middle of the second festival day he decides to settle in Israel. He would suddenly in the middle of Yom Tov Sheni, pass from the regime of “obliged to keep two festival days” to the regime of “forbidden to keep two festival days.”
[42] Hakham Tsevi understood thus correctly that the fear of the Palestinians leaders was that the disruption of the communication between Palestine and the Diaspora would endanger the calendar of the Diaspora. It is the first time that we meet an explanation of the reason of the institution of the second festival day different than that of Rashi in B. Beitsa 4b.This approach is very original. The incorrect understanding of the exact fear of the Palestinian Rabbis who sent the order of the second festival day to the Diaspora is at the origin of a great confusion, at such a point that R’ Jacob Emden thought that people settling in Israel should go on and keep two festival days in Israel.
[43] Those who consider that Yom Tov Sheni is a minhag and not a takana, cannot explain why we are exempted from the Tefilin. Only a takana, and certainly not a minhag, and the power of the sages to give to their enactments the same power as a Torah order, can explain that the order of keeping the two festival days includes the exemption and even the interdiction of wearing the tefilin. See response of R’ Solomon ben Aderet I: 61.
[44] This is indeed what we read in responsa Yabi’a Omer VI: 40.
[45] According to the principle: לא תתגודדו. This principle is generally accepted.
[46] In note 18 of the Shulkhan Arukh ha-Rav it refers to Ravan. However according to the commentary Even Shelema on Ravan (B. Pesahim 51b) the author, R’ Schneur Zalman refers to Hakham Tsevi. But in Miqra’e Kodesh, Pesah vol.2 p. 195 note 1, R’ Tsevi Pesah Frank refers to Ravan. In the new edition (New York 2007) of the Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav with new references, R’ Levine refers to R’ Hananel, Ravan and Hakham Tsevi. I thank R’ Samuel Pinson of Brussels who showed me this last edition.
[47] In note 19 of the Shulkhan Arukh ha-Rav it refers to Ravan. Of course it is impossible to have the same reference in both note 18 and note 19.
[48] A similar argumentation was proposed to explain the apparent contradiction about the time of the beginning of Bein ha-Shemashot between O.H. 261 and Yoreh Deah 266.
[49] In contradiction with the situation of the traveler going from Israel to the Diaspora where the obligation is a personal obligation and not a territorial obligation.
[50] We speak of those specific works that are normally forbidden on the second day.



Hadaran: Who is going down to the pit of destruction?

Hadaran: Who is going down to the pit of destruction?
by Leor Jacobi
A siyum of a masechet of gemorah is truly a joyous occasion, usually the culmination of many weeks of rigorous group study; challenging, edifying, and uplifting. The centerpiece of the siyum is undoubtedly the customary recitation of the unique kaddish and special additional prayers framing the accomplishment as an integral link in the chain of dissemination of Torah – from the tannaim and amoraim whose divine words we ponder, to the great rishonim and ahronim who guide us in revealing their talmudic treasures and infusing them into the modern world.
Fortunate is our lot! Our gratitude is expressed in the prayer of Rabbi Nehunia Ben HaKana[1]:
מודים אנחנו לפניך ה’ אלהי ששמת חלקינו מיושבי בית המדרש ולא שמת חלקינו מיושבי קרנות שאנו משכימים והם משכימים אנו משכימים לדברי תורה והם משכימים לדברים בטלים אנו עמלים והם עמלים אנו עמלים ומקבלים שכר והם עמלים ואינם מקבלים שכר אנו רצים והם רצים אנו רצים לחיי העולם הבא והם רצים לבאר שחת שנאמר וְאַתָּה אֱלֹהִים תּוֹרִדֵם לִבְאֵר שַׁחַת אַנְשֵׁי דָמִים וּמִרְמָה לֹא יֶחֱצוּ יְמֵיהֶם וַאֲנִי אֶבְטַח בָּךְ
Our exalted state can only be fully appreciated when contrasted with that of those not fortunate enough to join us in the beis hamidrash. The Yoshvei Kranos, identified by Rashi as idle shopkeepers who waste their time in frivolous conversation, are deprived of the rich rewards of Torah study, both in this world and in the next. They are to be pitied and even disdained for their boorish lack of concern for lofty matters.
The prayer proceeds a step further, however, in the concluding verse from Tehillim 55:24, cursing the ignorant with early death, destruction, and perhaps even damnation! And you, HaShem, lower them into the pit of destruction, murderous swindlers, may they not live out even half their expected lifespan. Are they really so wicked? At our joyous simcha, shouldn’t we rather be resolving to help inspire and mekarev these poor folk?
Did the creator of this prayer, Rabbi Nehunia Ben HaKana, or anyone from Hazal recite this verse? (If so, there would certainly be a a good reason for it.) A survey of the sources reveals a resounding: no. Not only does it not appear in Gemara Brachos 28b, but it does not appear in any of the known manuscripts, Rambam[2], or any of the many poskim rishonim that quote the prayer. Early versions of the Hadaran prayer do not include the verse either! See the attached photo of the early Venice and Soncino editions of the Talmud.[3] Nowhere. Gornisht.



In his Sefer Divrei Torah (Mahadura 5)the Munkasczer rebbe, an avid bibliophile, indicates that the verse should be omitted.

The verse only appears in one known halachic source: Halachot of Rif (Rabbi Yitzhak Alfasi). See below (1st edition, Constantinople 1509):

Why would Rif add this verse? He is usually involved with editing away verses from the Gemorrah, not adding them! Does it reflect an ancient custom of his? Why didn’t any of the great Rishonim who studied Rif cite this verse?[4] Ra’ah in his commentary on Rif quotes the entire prayer without mentioning the verse! None of the many known manuscript versions of Rif mention the verse![5] Its earliest known appearance in this prayer is in the first printed edition of Rif (published almost exactly 500 years ago, רס”ט, in Constantinople). Why did the publishers include the verse?
The answer may lie in a marginal gloss of one lone manuscript version of Rif[6].



In the left hand side of the manuscript, one can see that a later scribe added a citation to a verse. Only a few letters are visible in the microfilm: שנ’ כי לא ת
This is clearly referring to a different verse! Without a doubt, it is the same verse cited at the end of the version of the prayer found in the Talmud Yerushalmi:
כִּי לֹא תַעֲזֹב נַפְשִׁי לִשְׁאוֹל לֹא תִתֵּן חֲסִידְךָ לִרְאוֹת שָׁחַת[7]
“For you will not abandon my soul to the grave, you will not allow your pious one to see (his) destruction.”
This verse is most fitting and proper here as a conclusion of the prayer. It lacks all of the problematic vitriol of the commonly found verse. This scribal addition undoubtedly represents an ancient custom[8], which the printers of Constantinople may have been unfamiliar with.[9] The verse they substituted, however, was certainly most familiar to them in a different context:
משנה מסכת אבות פרק ה
אבל תלמידיו של בלעם הרשע יורשין גיהנם ויורדין לבאר שחת שנאמר (תהלים נ”ה) ואתה אלהים תורידם לבאר שחת אנשי דמים ומרמה לא יחצו ימיהם ואני אבטח בך:
The students of Bilaam are certainly deserving of such a curse, for they are involved in sorcery, treachery, and other wickedness – if only they would be idle as the shopkeepers, that would be a tremendous improvement!
The custom of reciting Pirkei Avos on Shabbos afternoon dates back to time immemorial, and as a result of the regular study, many have mastered its teachings literally by heart. It doesn’t seem at all far-fetched to assume that the printing of this verse in Rif was a simple oversight. Eventually the verse entered into the hadaran prayer as we know it.
The prayer of Nehunia Ben HaKana is also found in many printed prayer-books in its original form, to be recited upon leaving the Beis HaMidrash. It is usually located just after shaharith.[10] Many of these contain the verse, such as the prayerbook printed by Rav Ya’akov Emden on his private press[11]. But many do not contain the verse.[12]
Rambam ruled that upon entering and exiting it is obligatory to recite the prayer of Nehunia Ben HaKana[13]. The Shulhan Aruch also follows his psak. In order to further facilitate the fulfilment of this duty, printers have recently begun printing the prayer in the inside front covers of their gemorrahs and mishnayos, including the verse. The editors of Artscroll are the most democratically accommodating – they include the verse in parenthesis. You can decide whether to say say it or not.

It’s well worth noting that a precedent to this custom of the printers is found in the Pesicha to the famous Tosafos Yom Tov commentary on the mishna by Rav Yom Tov Lipman Heller. He writes that since the recitation of these prayers is obligatory, and since many are unfamiliar with them, as they do not appear in the siddur (of his time), that he is printing them, according to the nusach of the RIF. And his nusach follows the printed version of RIF. He does not explain why he chose the RIF’s version over that of the Talmud, but it seems clear that he did not have access to manuscripts of RIF, and, unfortunately, relied on corrupted printed versions. It’s also unclear as to whether his concerns for proper nusach were with the concluding prayer at all, or with the prayer recited upon entering the House of Study, whose wording is much more varied between different manuscripts and printed versions. It could be that this “endorsement” of the Tosafos Yom Tov to the printed version of RIF contributed to the eventual inclusion of the verse in later printings of the Hadaran prayer at the end of tractates and later, in prayer-books.
Hopefully, our good friends, the “yoshvei kranos” will be taking part in a daf yomi shiur and joining us at the next siyum, reciting the Hadaran along with us, and meriting Olam HaBa!
Appendix
Theaters and circuses, the Talmud Yerushalmi (and Rav Kook)
(By a happy coincidence, David Segal recently posted at the Seforim Blog on this very topic!)

We are not the first ones to find the prayer in the hadaran to be overly contentious. No less an illuminary than Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook, OBM, the first chief Rabbi of Israel, was deeply disturbed by this prayer’s tone. Yoshvei Kranos are today’s ba’alei batim. They keep mitzvos and give tsdakah. The takanah to read the torah on Monday and Thursday is for them, so they should not go too long without hearing words of torah. It goes completely against the grain of Hazal to curse them! In fact, even without the verse, why should they be punished at all?
Rav Kook proposed a truly fantastic solution. A corruption occurred in the text: the yoshvei קרנות of the Talnud Bavli are really yoshvei קרו”ת, roshei teivos for קרקסיות andתרטיות , those who patron theaters and circuses, which in fact, is the exact nusach of the version of the prayer found in the baraisa of the Talmud Yerushalmi!
What exactly goes on in these theaters and circuses? The gemarah in Avodah Zara 18b states that they are essentially a moshav leitzim, foolish and irreverent. Another opinion cited there is that these were much more nefarious centers of Avodah Zara and Shfichus Damim, gladiator sports, public executions and like. Historically, both of these opinions seem correct – theaters and circuses where occasionally more pernicious activities took place. All in all, they don’t seem to be much too different than the modern versions of popular “entertainment”[14].
The curse of Rav Nehunia’s prayer is directed against these insidious people who waste away their free time in such sordid foreign entertainments, as opposed to the Torah-true who spend their free time immersed in learning in the beis hamidrash or in prayer in the beis kneses, even if during the work-day they are but simple “idle” shopkeepers. In this context, even the dubious additional verse is somewhat appropriate[15].
Rav Kook went so far as to call for “correcting” the nusach of the prayer and adopting the version of the Talmud Yerushalmi! That proposition certainly has merit, but is it really the true intention of the Talmud Bavli itself?[16] Perhaps this is not the only suggestion of his that, in retrospect, seems a bit far-fetched.[17] However, it seems that his insight into the tradition of the Talmud Yerushalmi and its stark opposition to “theaters and circuses” teaches a lesson which is especially pertinent today, and can deepen our appreciation of the importance of this truly enigmatic prayer.

Here are Rav Kook’s words (you may click this image to read a larger copy):

The original version of the prayer appears to be found in the Talmud Yerushalmi, produced under the glare of Greco-Roman culture with its ubiquitous theaters and circuses. In Sasanian Babylon, these cultural expressions were unheard of, hence they were restated as the more familiar yoshvei kranos. In contrast, our modern secular culture of entertainment is, for the most part, a western one, and hence the version of the Talmud Yerushalmi takes on crucial added significance today.

Many thanks to Moshe Bloi, Ezra Chwat and Shamma Friedman. All errors are, of course, mine.

Note: This article is based on one which originally ran in Kolmos of Mishpacha magazine and they take no responsibility for the content here. You can read the original article here.

UPDATE 8/18/2011: A song has recently been composed as a result of this article and discussions surrounding it’s Hebrew and English versions. The song lyrics consist of only the two verses and highlights the contrast between them musically.

Here the composer explains the composition in Hebrew and provides a link to the previous Hebrew discussion which inspired it:

[1] Brachos 28b. The Hadaran prayer has been adapted to the inclusive plural form, מודים אנו, rather than the original singular מודה אני
[2] See attached photo of the Tefillah in Commentary on the Mishna, that Rambam himself copied by his own hand!


[3] Note that the order in the prayer is switched around, probably in order to end on an upbeat, good note.
[4] In the back of the new Oz V’Hadar gemarras, the Magid Ta’alumos is cited, who explains that the verse is included in order to end the prayer on a positive note (!), v’ani evtah boch, insead of be’er shachas. The same explanation is offered by the Dinover rebbe, the the author of the classic Bnei Yesoschar, in his Maggid Ta’alumah (פרעמישלא תרל”ו) in his commentary v’Heye Bracha, referring to the inclusion of the verse by the Tosafot Yom Tov in the introduction to his monumental commentary on the Mishna. He makes no reference to the Rif. Perhaps he thought that the verse was added to the Rif according to the Tosafos Yom Tov? It’s worth noting that both the Maggid Ta’alumos and the Maggid Ta’alumah have the same observation on the inclusion of this verse, independently!
[5] Thanks to Dr. Ezra Chwat, of the Israel National Library Manuscript Department, who is preparing a new critical edition of Rif (scheduled to be used in the upcoming edition of Shas Lublin), for allowing me to utilize his forthcoming work. Further, he guided me to four additional “less reliable” manuscripts which are not utilized centrally in preparing his new edition. None of them contain the verse either.
[6] Oxford Huntington 135:
[7] תהלים פרק טז, י
[8] A fascinating new Teshuva by Rav Yitzhak Ratsaby of Benei Brak has been published (Ma’ayan Nissan 5770) on the exact question addressed in this article, the inclusion of the concluding verse in the prayer of Rav Nehunia ben Hakana (link). There, Rav Ratsaby cites Yemenite prayer-books and Teshuvot which demonstrate that the custom of reciting the verse from the Talmud Yerushalmi (like the scribe of the RIF manuscript) continued among certain Yemenite kehillot until almost the present day. Unfortunately, Rav Ratsaby did not check manuscript versions of RIF, and thus understands that the talmud of the RIF himself contained the problematic verse, leading him to propose far-fetched justifications for the custom. Here is my response (Ma’ayan Tammuz 5770).
[9] Although it seems quite doubtful that the printers had this exact manuscript in front of them, it seems likely that they had a similar manuscript. Dr. Ezra Chwat doubts that the Oxford Huntington manuscript was used by the printers as there are many discrepancies between it and the printed version of Rif. It serves as the primary manuscript for Dr. Chwat’s new edition of RIF. According to Dr. Chwat, the manuscripts can be used to resolve many seeming contradictions between RIF and RAMBAM!
[10] So that one may go מחיל אל חיל, from the beis hakneses to the beis hamidrash.
[11] Rav Yitzhak Ratsaby, in his recent tshuva (see note above) argues that the custom in Rav Emden’s siddur was only to recite part of the verse, but it seems more likely that this was simply a printer’s abbreviation. The reliability of the wordings found in this siddur are quite questionable, based on Rav Ya’akov Emden’s own testimony in the introduction that many texts were simply copied from other prayer-books.
[12] Among current prayer-books: the accurate Tefillas Yosef and Ezor Eliahu do not include the verse. Siddur Vilna, on the other hand, does contain the verse.
[13] Commentary on the Mishna. See Levush and Aroch HaShulhan (Orach Haim 110) for explanations as to why many do not recite the prayers.
[14] Internet anyone?
[15] This fact was noted independently in the recent Responsa of Rav Yitzhak Ratsaby, Ma’ayan Nisan 5770
[16] The Aderes in Tefilas Dovid, p.12, states that yoshvei kranos are also engaged in nefarious activities, as seen in the Talmud Yerushalmi. He claims that yoshvei kranos here doesn’t follow its normal meaning, going against Rashi. Rav Kook was the Aderes’ son-in-law so its not surprising that they both have the same approach in understanding the Bavli according the the Yerushalmi. Rav Kook probably favored Rashi’s interpretation of yoshvei kranos, and hence, was forced to actually alter the text of the Bavli.
[17] Rav Kasher, in Torah Shleima, Vol 15 page 140, dismisses Rav Kook’s theory entirely, claiming that the version of the Talmud Bavli is the original one! His proof is the fact that a parallel to the bavli appears in Pirkei Avot d’Rebi Nathan A. However, that collection is widely recognized to post-date the Bavli itself, which it widely quotes from.



Shaul Magid – ‘Uman, Uman Rosh ha-Shana’: R. Nahman’s Grave as Erez Yisrael

“‘Uman, Uman Rosh ha-Shana’: R. Nahman’s Grave as Erez Yisrael” Shaul Magid Indiana University/Bloomington Professor Shaul Magid is the Jay and Jeannie Schottenstein Chair of Jewish Studies at Indiana University. This text below was originally a talk delivered in Winnipeg, Canada, in commemoration of the 200th yahrzeit of R. Nahman of Bratslav. A revised and expanded version will hopefully be included in Interpreting Hasidism: Essays in Hasidic Textuality from The Baal Shem Tov to the Present. Special thanks to the editors (and readers) of the Seforim blog for their gracious consideration of this essay. His published volumes include Hasidism on the Margin: Reconciliation, Antinomianism, and Messianism in Izbica/Radzin Hasidism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), From Metaphysics to Midrash: Myth, History, and the Interpretation of Scripture in Lurianic Kabbala (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), and a volume tentatively entitled Interpreting Hasidism: Essays in Hasidic Textuality from The Baal Shem Tov to the Present.

There is a Talmudic adage that teaches: “evil-doers are dead even when they are alive; righteous individuals are alive even when they are dead.” Setting aside the obvious metaphoric intent of this comment, in the case of Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav who left this world on the intermediate days of Sukkot 200 years ago, this teaching has a more literal flavor. Nahman was one the few zaddikim who meticulously planned his death – suffering for years with tuberculosis – advising his disciples how to behave after his passing and urging them that if they visit his grave he will “pull them up from the netherworld by their sidelocks.” Almost immediately after his untimely death at the age of 39 and burial in Uman in the Ukraine, his gravesite became a place of pilgrimage for Bratslaver Hasidim, often under harsh weather conditions, vehement and often violent harassment by other Hasidic sects, and later harsher political realities. There were times when there was barely a minyan at his gravesite on Rosh ha-Shana, the most auspicious days of pilgrimage. Today there are close to 20,000 souls, religious, secular, men, women and children who flock to Uman on Rosh ha-Shana to pray at the grave of this enigmatic Hasidic master. The Ukrainian government recently refurbished an old military airstrip in Uman to accommodate the jumbo jets that arrive from Israel, Europe, and the US, and the city magistrate built hotels to accommodate pilgrims just for this two-day festival. Tonight I want to explore this seemingly odd phenomenon of Nahman’s grave, paying close attention to the strange but not unprecedented notion that this gravesite is considered, for Bratslaver Hasidim, not only a holy place but “Erez Yisrael.” Grave veneration and its significance in the larger schema of devotional life is shared by many religious traditions including Judaism. The Torah, beginning with the descriptions and the importance of the gravesites of the biblical characters in Genesis, culminating with the ambivalence about knowing the site of Moses’ grave at the end of Deuteronomy, emphasizes the sanctity of the grave as sacred space. The importance of the gravesite was not adopted by post-biblical Judaism as merely a theoretical notion but had practical implications as well. Rabbinic tradition understood the graveyard as a place of meeting between the living and the dead, thus serving as a place imbued with a highly charged spiritual energy where penitential prayers could more easily be efficacious. The rabbis believed both in the sacredness of the place (i.e., the graveyard) coupled with the more general notion (not limited to the space of the graveyard) that the righteous in heaven could serve as intermediaries and petition the celestial court for mercy. Maimonides codifies as law that if one wishes to ask forgiveness before Yom Kippur from someone who has died he or she should visit their grave and ask forgiveness there. The medieval kabbalistic tradition, from the Zohar through Lurianic Kabbalah in the sixteenth century, developed this rabbinic notion of the graveyard as a highly charged spiritual place to a holy site for pilgrimage, whereby the journey to the grave of the righteous was viewed as a holy ascent (e.g. Zohar). The graves of the righteous became the place where one could actually absorb the spiritual energy of the departed Zaddik by means of prostrating oneself on the grave. The Lurianic contribution to the development of this idea suggests that the grave of the righteous is a place of transparency between this world and the next whereby the living are transformed and purified by embodying the souls of the dead through bodily prostration on the grave. The earlier rabbinic and zoharic notion that the grave is the place where the dead interact with the living and prayers are more readily heard via the mediation of the parted one becomes, for Luria, something far more profound. The grave becomes the place where the worshipper is purified through contact with the dead/living Zaddik and transformed by embodying the soul of the Zaddik which hovers above the grave itself, freed from its corporeality of the physical body. This phenomenon of “soul hovering” is limited to the righteous ones who, having achieved otherworldliness in this life, are able to maintain a connection to this world after death. (This may be his reading of the talmudic passage cited above that the righteous are alive even after death.) The transparency model of the grave initially suggested by the rabbis becomes, for Luria, the place where the dead, as it were, embody the living and thus purify the living soul from sin and impurity. The pilgrimage model of the Zohar coupled with the transformative model in Luria serve as the foundation for R. Nahman of Bratslav’s theory of his grave as the transparent creative center, the place which holds the power of creation and the place from which redemption will ensue. Although grave veneration had already taken on a devotional component in the Zohar and more prominently in Luria’s re-construction of Judaism, the Bratslav tradition is unique in that its entire Hasidic ideology is centered around the grave of their venerated master Nahman of Bratslav. Although this idea only bears fruit in post-Nahman Bratslav literature, beginning with the first Rosh Ha-Shana after his death, it’s importance begins years before, soon after Nahman’s return from his journey to Erez Yisrael in 1798-99. It was only then that he began to speak simultaneously about his impending death and the importance of visiting his grave, all within the larger schema of the transformative experience of his journey to the Holy Land. His death, place of burial and the unique character of his grave become increasingly prominent in his teachings as his tuberculosis worsened and his death drew near. One familiar with zoharic literature will immediately notice that Nahman’s pre-occupation with the importance of his own death reflects the discourse of the Idrot, the opaque yet highly influential sections of the Zohar which focus on R. Shimon bar Yohai’s death at the hands of the Romans. It is somewhat surprising that post-Nahman Bratslav literature never makes mention of this highly charged and seemingly obvious connection. Perhaps it is due in part to the Bratslav position, inspired by Nahman himself, that he is an unprecedented figure in Jewish history, one who owes allegiance to no one. This is exhibited by the almost complete absence of any reference in his collected teachings, Likkutei MoHaRan, to any other Hasidic master, including his great-grandfather, the Baal Shem Tov. In any event, the connection between Nahman’s pre-occupation with his death and the discourse of the death of R. Shimon bar Yohai in the Zohar should not be underestimated precisely because the messianic impulse of the Zohar (Idrot), a phenomenon already documented by Yehudah Liebes, is alive in Nahman’s discussion as well. It is therefore curious that Liebes who does draw our attention to the messianic underpinnings of Nahman’s Tikkun Ha-Kelali (the Ten Psalms Nahman directed his students to recite daily as a tikun for sin) and its connection to Sabbateanism, never develops the extent to which the recitation of the prescribed Psalms which comprise Tikkun Ha-Kelali are meant to be recited at Nahman’s grave as part of the ritual of purification in conjunction with visiting his burial place (known as his “zion”). In my view this is of utmost importance in the Bratslav tradition precisely because Nahman’s grave represents a manifestation of the Holy Land, a place even more transparent than the land itself, which is quite peculiar and serves as a the basis of his messianic vision. My claim here is that Nahman’s grave as the centerpiece of the Bratslaver’s devotion life and Erez Yisrael as the center of Nahman’s spiritual life are inextricably intertwined. Although the correlation between his trip to Erez Yisrael in his development as a Zaddik has received close scholarly attention – a more nuanced understanding of Nahman’s relationship to Erez Yisrael, his vocation as an unprecedented Zaddik coupled with his messianic strivings, cannot be achieved without understanding the significance of his grave in his own mind as well as in the larger trajectory of Bratslav Hasidism. In fact, it is my belief that the significance of his grave as Erez Yisrael serves as the cornerstone of his entire ideational edifice and contribution to Jewish thought. As I mentioned above, earlier kabbalistic sources (rooted in more opaque rabbinic comments on the matter) present the grave as the transparent space between this world and the next, the place where one can embody the soul of the dead precisely because the soul is no longer confined by the physicality of the body. Nahman universalizes this idea by suggesting that the grave of the Zaddik as a transparent place also holds the potential to draw unmitigated mercy into the world, thus bridging the distance between exile and redemption. This is based on his utilization of the kabbalistic mapping of the emanation of divine effluence into the world as it relates to the death of a righteousness individual. His assumption is that death is the liberation from the confines of the Intellect or worldliness, and entry into the realm of Pure Spirit. Yet the deaths of all individuals are not identical. It is only the Zaddik who can draw this realm of Pure Spirit into the world, because the Zaddik, by means of what he has achieved in this world, easily traverses between this world and the next, even during his life. The transparency of the gravesite of the Zaddik is already forged by the devotion of the Zaddik during his life. Although others may benefit from the glory of the next world, their knowledge of and communication with this world ceases once they pass through the opaque and final barrier of death. But Nahman maintained that life and death for the Zaddik are not mutually exclusive categories. This attitude is exhibited in Nahman’s sarcastic remarks about the simpletons who he witnessed visiting the graves of their ancestors in Uman, crying and begging for mercy as if their ancestors could hear them. Only the Zaddik can hear prayer from the world beyond, Nahman comments, because the Zaddik has achieved the next world while still alive in this world. Hence, he describes his journey from life to death as “going from one room to the next.” This transparent space which is embodied in the grave of the Zaddik is also the creation point, the place where the finite and the infinite meet. (Likkutei MoHaRan 48). He develops this midrashic idea by taking the infinite-finite modality of creation and presenting it within the framework of creation and redemption. The sacredness of space, which is determined by its transparency, is simultaneously the place of creation and redemption because it is the place where Wisdom (Hokhma) is overcome by the higher dimension of Spirit (Keter), a movement whereby the finite is overcome by the infinite. This movement is only achieved and maintained by the true Zaddik (only Nahman!) who embodies this pure spirit during his lifetime. Nahman claimed to have achieved this state of purity as the result of his trip to Erez Yisrael in 1798. Thus, upon his return from Erez Yisrael he describes his experience as one of achieving “expanded consciousness’ (mohin d’gadlut), which is defined sometimes as “utter simplicity” (p’shitut) and complete loss (read: overcoming) of knowledge. This dimension of “not-knowing” always holds a higher and more refined status than “knowing” in Nahman’s highly anti-rationalist orientation. This new level of consciousness achieved during his brief but cathartic encounter with the Holy Land resulted in his utter abandonment of anything he had taught prior to his trip, which he determined was the product of Hokhma, or knowledge, as opposed to Keter, or Pure Spirit. Most of his teachings collected in Likkutei MoHaRan were delivered in the decade after his return from Erez Yisrael in 1799 until his death in 1810 (he remarked to his disciple R. Nathan that all his teaching from before his journey to the Holy land are null and void). The elevation of the Intellect to Spirit, which is nothing less than the overcoming of humanness and exile, was thus achieved by Nahman, in his own estimation, during the last decade of his life. This transformative experience is not attained merely by his presence in the Land, although the physical Land does play a central role. (e.g. Shivhei Ha-Ran where he stresses the literalness what he means by the Holy Land, “the houses” etc.). Such an achievement is the result, rather, of absorbing the Land (not merely encountering it), of becoming a human embodiment of Erez Yisrael thus enabling him to transport its sanctity beyond its physical boarders. This transference of sanctity from the Land to an individual is only true of the Zaddik who, as a pure vessel, can receive, be transformed and integrate that sanctity into his life. Much has been made of Nahman’s distinction between the physical Land of Israel and the “aspect” (behina) of Erez Yisrael, a spiritualized idea which may be related to but not identical with the Land itself. Discussions by Martin Buber and Eliezer Schweid about Nahman as a proto-Zionist rest on these slippery distinctions in his writings. I would suggest that these two formulations in Nahman’s writings are hinged together by means of the Zaddik in general and the Zaddik’s grave in particular. That is, the aspect of Erez Yisrael (behinat Erez Yisrael) arises when the Zaddik visits the physical Land, absorbs it, and transports its spiritual essence outside its borders. His teaching becomes the transmission of Keter (Spirit) rather than Hokhma (Knowledge), the result of his embodiment of Pure Spirit drawn from the Holy Land thus overcoming the more human and exilic dimension of Hokhma. However, this “new” Torah (his teachings after he returns from Erez Yisrael), which for Nahman is the true Torat Erez Yisrael – an idea originating in rabbinic literature but completely transformed in Nahman’s imagination, uprooted from any territorial limitations – is a necessary but not sufficient condition to complete the (redemptive) process from Erez Yisrael to behinat Erez Yisrael. His torah only prepares his listeners for what is to come. The completion of this transformative messianic process occurs via the death and burial of the unique Zaddik in the earth of Huz l’Aretz and the encounter of his disciples with the grave whereby they too absorb elements of this sanctity. His death and burial sanctifies the land outside of Erez Yisrael, widening the boarders of sanctity from the sacred place of Erez Yisrael to the new transparent place, which is the grave of the Zaddik. The spiritualization of the land (behinat Erez Yisrael) carries messianic implications which lie at the heart of Nahman’s discussion about his grave, accompanied by the liturgical formula of the Ten Psalms (Tikkun Ha-Kelali) which were initially given to be recited at his gravesite. (Liebes) There is an important distinction implicit in Nahman’s teaching between the Land itself and the aspect of the Land (behinat Erez Yisrael) which arises via the Zaddik’s interaction with it. When the true Zaddik visits Erez Yisrael, absorbs it and gives rise to the spiritualized aspect of Erez Yisrael (behinat Erez Yisrael) activating a spatial transparency, which the Land itself cannot produce without the aid of the Zaddik’s visit. In some sense, his visit to Erez Yisrael and his subsequent return to Huz l’Aretz (a component of great significance which we will see below) transforms not only the Diaspora, via his grave, but transforms the Land itself by released the spiritualized energy contained within it. The Land itself is thus brought to life, as it were, by the Zaddik’s visit, and it is the Zaddik who takes the sanctity of the Land beyond its borders. The notion that in the messianic era the entire world will become Erez Yisrael has precedent in medieval kabbalistic literature (e.g. Avraham bar Hiyya’s Megilat ha-Megaleh). Another important component in his journey to Erez Yisrael and subsequent return to the Ukraine is his acquisition of “Torat Erez Yisrael” which serves as the arc between his visit to the Land and his subsequent death and burial. In various places Nahman is said to have made the provocative statement that he had achieved Torat Avot, (lit. the Torah of the Patriarchs) a curious term which he never explains. Various accounts reflecting his new achievement resulting from his trip, one of which takes place on a Turkish warship just before Passover on which he and a disciple were traveling from Acre to Turkey. Being erev Pesah, Nahman was unsure whether they would reach port in time for the holiday and thus unsure whether they would be able to fulfill the mitzvah of eating matza. Nahman asserted that he was now (in the wake of his trip to Erez Yisrael), if necessary, able to fulfill mitzvot in a purely spiritual manner, that is, without physically performing the mitzvah itself. Although we are told they did arrive in time for the festival, this assertion may illuminate his opaque statements about achieving Torat Avot. Commenting on the talmudic claim that the Patriarch’s fulfilled the entire Torah, even erev tavshilin, a rabbinic decree utilizing a legalistic loophole permitting one to cook on Yom Tov for the upcoming Shabbat, many Hasidic texts speak of the a spiritualized Torah before Sinai whereby the biblical characters in Genesis (specifically Abraham) were able to fulfill the entire Torah because they were evolved enough to intuit divine will without the commandments. It is my feeling that this was the ideational foundation of Nahman’s statement on the Turkish warship mentioned above. His assertion about Torat Avot is a formulation of his more developed notion of Torat Erez Yisrael. He held that his becoming Erez Yisrael via his journey resulted in the acquisition of Torat Erez Yisrael which is the pre-Sinaitic Pure Spirit of Torat Avot, an embodiment of the sephirah Keter. The fact that (1) the Patriarchs largely dwelled in Erez Yisrael, (2) revelation was in Huz l’Arez, resulting in the suggestive dichotomy between Sinai and Zion, and (3) Moshe, the arbiter of Torah, never entered the Land of Israel, all play an important role in Nahman’s imaginative thinking. Torat Moshe or revelation as the Torah of Hokhma verses Torat Elohim, or Torat Erez Yisrael, which is the Torah of Spirit, is an idea implicit in R. Nahman’s discourse developed in a different manner by his great grandfather the Baal Shem Tov and later in Polish Hasidism, which was significantly influenced by Nahman’s Likkutei MoHaRan. His suggestion that his encounter with Erez Yisrael unlocked the spiritualized Torat Avot, which itself may be yet another layer of his more ambiguous behinat Erez Yisrael, is an idea which had far reaching influence. We find similar ideas in Zionist thinkers such as Abraham Isaac Ha-Kohen Kook and Aaron David Gordon, both of whom were influenced by the teachings of Nahman. Yet I maintain that these readers of Nahman mis-read his idea of Erez Yisrael precisely because they are not cognizant of the fact that this “new” component of sanctity whereby the Zaddik becomes the Land, necessitates returning to Huz l’Aretz to complete the messianic process. Hence his journey home, his subsequent teaching and his death and burial all congeal to push the impending messianic era toward fruition. Nahman’s view of himself as the true Zaddik, one who has no authoritative spiritual lineage precisely because he is sui generis, lies at the foundation of his thought. This claim was not only true of how he viewed himself vis-à-vis his contemporaries but more importantly his position as a figure in widest span of Jewish history. His uniqueness becomes manifest through his unprecedented journey to the Holy Land, a trip which he held introduced a new dimension into the exilic world. What I am about to suggest has no source in Bratslav literature and thus may be construed as speculative or, at best, midrashic in nature. However, it illuminates the extent to which his grave became the centerpiece of his entire life, the culmination of his journey, and the prism through which his messianic vocation must be seen. Nahman makes various comments throughout his writings about what he determined as his spiritual lineage, beginning with Moses, R. Shimon bar Yohai, R. Isaac Luria ending with his grandfather, the Baal Shem Tov. Yet Nahman maintains in subtle and not-so-subtle ways that he transcends them all, including Moses. Moses’ grave is unknown and will remain so. R. Shimon bar Yohai and Luria’s graves are both in Erez Yisrael. The grave of the Baal Shem Tov is in Hutz l’Aretz and, as opposed to Moses’ grave, became a shrine which Nahman visited many times in his youth. Although the graves of these masters were held in high esteem by Jewish pilgrims, according to the Bratslav tradition, none contained the sanctity and redemptive quality of Nahman’s grave in Uman. The reason for this, I believe, lies in Nahman’s journey to Erez Yisrael, the completion of which was his return and subsequent death in Huz l’Aretz. Moshe is born and dies in Huz l’Aretz, never entering the Land. R. Shimon bar Yohai resides in Erez Yisrael his entire life and is buried there. Luria is born in Erez Yisrael, spends most of his life in Egypt and returns to Erez Yisrael where he dies and is buried in 1570. The Baal Shem Tov is born in Hutz l’Aretz and attempts unsuccessfully to reach Erez Yisrael, dying in Mezybuzh. Of the four, only R. Nahman is raised in Hutz l’Aretz, reaches Erez Yisrael and successfully returns to Hutz l’Atretz to spread Torat Erez Yisrael and is subsequently buried in Uman. This cycle of immigration and emigration (aliya and yerida) is the focal point of Nahman’s life and, in my mind, is the foundation of his messianism. His journey is reminiscent of Rabbi Akiba’s to Pardes, to experience the sanctity of God’s glory and emerge unscathed. In Nahman’s mind, however, his return carries far greater weight. Whereas we are not told of any significant change in R. Akiba’s torah after his ascent into Pardes, Nahman’s journey resulted in the acquisition of Torat Erez Yisrael, an apprehension of the pre-Sinaitic Torat Avot, the rise of the spiritualized nature of Erez Yisrael s behinat Erez Yisrael and began the widening of the boarders of Erez Yisrael in the sanctification of his burial place in Uman. In the Bratslav tradition, conventional notions of grave veneration have been transformed, making the grave the transparent place where new light brightens the world, new Torah descends from behind the curtain of Sinai and the Zaddik as axis mundi absorbs and transforms the sanctity of the Land. In sum, I would suggest that the Bratslav pilgrimage tradition has at least three components that are unique to the phenomena of religious pilgrimage in general. First, the devotee’s pilgrimage to Nahman’s grave is predicated on Nahman’s own pilgrimage to Erez Yisrael. That is, one could ask, given Nahman’s insinuation that his trip gave rise to the importance of visiting his grave, why isn’t a trip to Erez Yisrael proper preferred to a pilgrimage to his grave. A preliminary answer may be that Nahman held that one who is not a Zaddik cannot achieve in Erez Yisrael what he achieved. A true journey to Erez Yisrael, one which could in some sense replicate Nahman’s journey, can only be accomplished by visiting the Erez Yisrael of his grave, the source of behinat Erez Yisrael. In fact, Nahman was adamant about not being buried in Erez Yisrael, fearing that his disciples wouldn’t visit his grave and thus the efficacy of his journey and return would be for naught. For him, the pilgrimage to his grave in Hutz L’Aretz is more important than the pilgrimage to the Land itself. His journey to the Land, resulting in his absorption and embodiment of Erez Yisrael, had at least two consequences that make his grave more prominent than the Land itself. First, it widened the boundaries of the Holy Land, a redemptive sign born out of previous kabbalistic literature that the messianic age will result in widening the boundaries of Erez Yisrael. Second, it activated the source of the sanctity of Erez Yisrael, behinat Erez Yisrael, a spiritualization of the Land which enabled the Land itself to fulfill its holy destiny. Finally, his grave became a representation of his messianic vocation. As both Art Green and Yehudah Liebes have noted, Nahman’s messianic vision was not centered on being the Messiah but, closer to the model of R. Shimon bar Yohai in the Zohar (Idrot), as forging the path toward revealing the Messiah. Just as the Zohar was viewed as the doctrine that unlocked the esoteric nature of Torah, Nahman’s grave was envisioned by him and then his disciples as unlocking the esoteric power of Erez Yisrael. Finally, his journey and subsequent teaching enabled the Land to speak, as it were, as his teachings reflected the true Torat Erez Yisrael, the Torah rooted in the Pure Spirit of Keter which is revives the pre-Sinai Torah of the Patriarchs. It may seem odd today that thousands of Bratslaver Hasidim leave their families behind and travel from Israel to the small city of Uman in the Ukraine to celebrate Rosh Ha-Shana. One would think Israel and not the Diaspora should be the spiritual destination of Jews during this time of year. But when asked about his impending trip from Israel to Uman for Rosh ha-Shana, the Jerusalemite Bratslav manhig Schmuel Shapiro obliquely responded, “From Erez Yisrael to Erez Yisrael.” I have tried here to shed some light on those five words.