1

Bitul ha-Tamid: the History and Application

Bitul ha-Tamid and Edgar Allan Poe* The Mishna in Tannit records that 5 bad events occurred on the 17th of Tamuz, one being the cessation of the daily sacrifice, the tamid.
The Talmud Bavli offers the background to the other four events. When it comes to the cessation of the Tamid, all the Bavli does is state “Gemara.” It is left to the Yerushalmi to fully explain the story. The Yerushalmi, (Tannit, 4:5), records that
the Jews to maintain the tamid worked out a deal with the Romans who were besieging the city. Everyday the Jews would lower down a basket full of
coins, and in its stead, the Romans would return the necessary animals. One day, the 17th of Tamuz, however, after the Jews gave the
requisite money, instead of the correct animals the Romans replaced
them with pigs. Thus, the Jews were unable to bring the tamid and the sacrifice stopped from that time on. As
mentioned, this story only appears in the Yerushalmi and not the Bavli. (Although the Bavli records a similar story, it is about the Hashmonaim and not the Roman’s, nor does it mention the bitul ha-tamid.)
Further, Josephus does not record it either (he briefly mentions that the daily sacrifice stopped on the 17th without giving details – see Wars of the Jews, book VI, chapter 2). Although these works do
not record it, Edgar Allan Poe does. Specifically, he has a story
titled “A Tale of Jerusalem” which, more or less, is this story
repackaged. You can read the whole story here. Basically, the story details the two priest whose job it was to lower
the baskets of gold. Poe ends with the pigs being raised instead. Not
only does Poe use this somewhat obscure story, he even injects some
detail that one would need to be versed in the original story to fully
appreciate. The priest in question are who belonged to the sect called
“The Dashers (that little knot of saints whose manner of dashing and
lacerating the feet against the pavement was long a thorn and a
reproach to less zealous devotees–a stumbling-block to less gifted
perambulators).” This is a play on the talmudic description of the
priests – that they are quick – kohanim zerizim hem. Poe assumes familiarity with the Hebrew alphabet to a degree that one would know the letter yud
is the smallest. As he says “thou canst not point me out a
Philistine–no, not one–from Aleph to Tau–from the wilderness to the
battlements–who seemeth any bigger than the letter Jod!” The question is where in the world did Poe get this. According to some it seems Poe got this from another novel from “1828, Zillah, a Tale of Jerusalem,
by Horace Smith (1777-1849). Poe incorporated whole phrases and
sentences from Smith’s story: “Poe’s story is more than a parody; it is
literally a collage of snatches of the Smith novel, cut out and pasted
together in a new order.”
That being said, it seems that Poe was still
more familiar with this story than Zillah
and we are left to wonder did Poe study Talmud? He wouldn’t be the
first famous American author to do so. Thomas Jefferson had a copy of a
volume or two of the Bavli. Although, here, it would appear Poe one
upped Jefferson by being a baki in Yerushalmi as well.
Bitul ha-Tamid in Later History Although the actual tamid stopped on the 17th of Tamuz, the phrase “bitul ha-tamid” continues to be used. According to some, Rabbenu Gershom, amongst the many takanot he was involved in, instituted bitul ha-tamid. Bitul ha-tamid as used in this sense means to stop the daily prayers. That is, if a person had a grievance, they could stop the prayers or public torah reading, until the community dealt with the issue. Some rishonim trace bitul ha-tamid to a Yerushalmi that records R. Yochanon telling someone to stop the prayers to have his way. (See Teshuvot ha-Rashba, vol. 4, no. 56). Bitul ha-tamid was a serious and well-recognized device. For example, the Or Zarua records that “on the week of parshat Emor, someone stopped the services, and there was no torah reading. Thus, they had to read both Emor and Behar the next week.” (Or Zarua, Laws of Shabbat no. 45). Note that there was no question about the legality of forcing the entire community, in this case Cologne Germany, skipping the torah reading. The only issue was how to make it up. The Sefer Hassidim records the process:

The one wishing to stop the prayers goes up either before barachu (or seder kedusha) to where the Hazan is standing. This person then closes the prayer book of the Hazan and announces “I am the one who stopped – [the word kalu or kalman possibly from clamour] and the hazan immediately stops the prayers. If he wants to stop the torah reading, he goes up to the steps before the ark and announces ‘I will not allow the torah to be removed.’ Some do this on the torah’s return – they stop the return. Sefer Hassidim no. 463.

Obviously, this device could not be used for any minor grievance, the question some deal with is exactly when this can be used. One of the teshuvot ha-Geonim records that in Bavel, they only allowed this to be used when a person refused to show up for bet din. That is, if someone sues someone and the party refuses to come to bet din, one can go to the recalcitrant person’s synagogue and make this announcement. In this same responsum, however, it records a different opinion that allows for one to collect on an outstanding debt – but, in the case of a debt collection to only do bitul ha-tamid once. The Sefer Hassidim, however, allows for bitul ha-tamid to collect necessary funds for the poor. As one would expect, it appears that this process became abused. The Sefer Hassidim, the source for much material on this topic also includes a warning to anyone who misuses this that they will have to pay for abuse of the process. Similarly, R. Efrahim Lunschintz in his Amudei Shesh explains that abuse of this process only harms god as he misses out on prayers he otherwise would have received. At base, it is understood that this is a powerful tool to get one’s grievances heard, but what is the rationale behind this custom? According to Goiten, and based on genizah materials, he explains that bringing one’s grievance before all – is demonstrative of the notion that bet din “were but representatives of the community, which, in principle, was the supreme judge. The biblical concept ‘the people shall judge’ (Numbers 35:24) was still very much alive.” Goiten notes that this process was not limited to men, and instead, the geniza preserves some “eloquently styled and beautifuly written appeals to the community by women.” Goiten posits that the women did not actually enter the men’s section but had someone reads these on their behalf. See Goiten, A Mediterranean Society, vol. II, pp. 324-26. A very different purpose for this procedure is espoused by a Lithuanian memoir. Basically, by this account, as “the Jewish townlets of Lithuania and Poland did not” have a well-developed press, “what weapon did the poor widow have at hand for calling public attention to the iniquities of, say, the money lender?” The answer, of course, “They delayed the reading of the weekly Portion on the Sabbath!” A story of a poor widow is provided to illustrate this point. She comes Shabbat morning, and is brought in to the main sanctuary on a cot where she moans

My child! My child! You are murderers! Take pity and give me back my child! . . . We children knew this woman quite well. . . All of us knew that this good old woman was now confined to her bed and quite helpless. And we also knew that the cause of her illness was due to the forcible drafting of her only son, Borukke the Tinsmith, into the army. We had also heard frequent comments at our homes on this heartless deed of the Town Elder in taking away this poor widow’s only son in exchange for the few hundred rubles he received from David Refoel’s for letting his own son – his fourth son- escape his duty, by finding a substitute for him in the son of the widow . . . The entire townlet knew of this iniquity and in the privacy of their homes had denounced it as a great outrage; but publicly they were afraid to speak of it. They were afraid to start a rumpus with the Elder who enjoyed the friendship of the town’s Chief of Police. Everyone in the Congregation immediately put aside his Pentateuch and paid the closet attention to the bed-ridden widow’s supplication. The only one in the assembly who pretended to be unconcerned in the matter and began to read aloud to himself the weekly Portion, was David Refoel’s. This painful scene lasted but a few brief minutes when from behind the Bimah there emerged Honeh the Shoemaker who, with his fists doubled, rushed over to the Elder and yelled out in a voice choking with anger: “If Borukke Tamar’s is not freed from military service you will all be sent in chains to Siberia! Do you think we don’t know that you have bought substitutes? Take care!” An informer usually was hated by the town folk. But in this case they all gave their approval to Honeh the Shoemaker . . . It took just about one week before Borukke’s claim to exemption on account of being an only son was properly recorded and he returned to his mother’s home, a free man. Saks, Worlds that Passed, pp. 79-85.

Although I haven’t seen this in print, I was told that when R. Solovetchik came to Boston there was no mikveah in Boston (there was one outside). R. Solovetchik instructed the women to stop the torah reading until sufficient funds were pledged for a mikveah. *A portion of this post appeared in a slightly different format a few years back. I have updated that portion and added about bitul ha-tamid generally. Additionally, much material on bitual ha-tamid appears in Simcha Assaf’s work, Battei ha-Din ve-Sidreihem (1924), pp. 25-29.




Forgetfulness & Other Human Errors a New Monography by Marc Shapr

As a religion based on tradition, Judaism places great stock in the words and opinions of its early Sages. This is so to the extent that there is great debate as to whether it is even possible that these early authorities could err. In fact, throughout Jewish literature one can find many areas where people argue for deference based on seniority. For instance, there is an extensive debate on the binding authority, and to what extent, with regard to the Rishonim or the Shulhan Arukh. Similarly, there are those who refuse to allow that the Rishonim or earlier authorities erred. Recently, some accused Rabbi Natan Slifkin of allowing that certain statements of Hazal require reappraisal and that those statements are wrong. In the case of Slifkin, his issues with the particular statements of Hazal were not novel and mainly he repeated some of the same arguments that have been bouncing around for the last 400 years or so without adding anything new to that particular debate. A more important case, however, was that of R. Hayyim Hirschensohn in his discussion of whether women are allowed to hold positions of power.[1]

In the early part of the 20th century there was a debate of the appropriateness of women taking part in elections – whether they can vote or run for office. (Of late, this debate has been renewed by the Young Israel stance regarding women becoming a synagogue president.) Most are aware that those who argue that women cannot hold positions of power rely upon the Rambam, hilkhot melakhim 1:5, who in turn in relying upon a Sifre 147 to Devarim 17:15. R. Hirschensohn, however, understood the Sifre in a radically different manner and in doing so allowed that the Rambam erred in his interpretation of the Sifre. Specifically, R. Hirschensohn argues that the Sifre that states “that the verse (Devarim 17:15) ‘You shall place upon yourselves a king’ limits the placement to a king and not a queen” should be understood that the requirement for a king does not require a queen. That is, should the queen die she need not be replaced; however, should the king die there is a commandment to replace him.” Furthermore, according to R. Hirschensohn, the Sifre has nothing to do with the other statement from Hazal (Yevamot 45b) based on this verse, that “any leadership you shall establish should only be from your brethren [they must be Jewish].”[2] Thus, the Rambam erroneously conflated the two statements and thereby misunderstood the Sifre and came to the incorrect conclusion – that women are barred from all positions of power. As R. Hirschensohn explains “that even one as great as the Rambam in his knowledge and wisdom is not immune from error, an which then caused many who followed after him to rely upon and led to other errors. It is without a doubt the Rambam relied upon memory regarding these statements, and did not have time to reexamine them again” (See Malki ba-Kodesh 2:194).

As one would expect, aside from taking issue with R. Hirschensohn’s position on women holding power, many took issue with R. Hirschensohn’s claim the Rambam erred. R. BenZion Uziel said that although he respects R. Hirschensohn — in fact R. Uziel ultimate held like R. Hirschensohn on this issue — R. Uziel “believed that [R. Hirschensohn] erred in hastily writing such things about our master, Maimonides. For, while we may indeed take issue with his position, we may not characterize him as having committed [elementary] errors in understanding the text, or as having been mislead by custom and historical context. [R. Hirschensohn’s] remarks to such effect are, no doubt, a slip of the pen.” Mishpetei Uziel, vol. 2, Hoshen Mishpat, no. 6 (the translation comes from this article). R. Uziel was not alone in disputing R. Hirschensohn’s assessment of the Rambam as is evidenced by the many letters to R. Hirschensohn and his responses on the issue of the Rambam erring. See, e.g. Malki ba-Kodesh 4:131, 6:103-104 (letter from R. Yosef Babad).[3] It is worth noting that R. Hirschensohn seemed to have tired defending this opinion saying in one letter “that any further argument about this point is only repetitive.” Malki ba-Kodesh 6:100.

Another more recent example was noted by R. Eliezer Brodt in the magazine Datza, no. 15 (19 Kislev 5368): 4, where he calls to attention the recent edition of R. Yosef Karo’s Maggid Mesharim edited with notes by R. Yosef Kohen. In the Maggid Mesharim, amongst the many halakhic statements from the Maggid — the legendary angel that visited R. Karo and whose remarks are recorded in this work — is that “on Rosh ha-Shana one should not eat meat or drink beer [wine] and one should be careful about other foods as well. And, although Ezra said [regarding Rosh ha-Shana] ‘go eat sweet food’ that was only said for the populace, I [the Maggid] am speaking to the special ones.” The problem with this specific statement is that, as many commentaries have noted, it contradicts various Talmudic statements – including a Mishna or two – that imply one should eat meat on Rosh ha-Shana. (For more on the topic of eating meat on Rosh ha-Shana see Eliezer’s post earlier post, available here, additionally, Eliezer’s forthcoming volume on many of the customs of Rosh ha-Shana will also discuss this custom amongst others.)

Amongst the many others who attempted to explain this statement of R. Hayyim of Volozhin explained that the entire power of the Maggid only came from R. Karo himself. Thus, if R. Karo forgot a Mishna or a source then the Maggid wouldn’t know it either. Therefore, “it is clear that at that moment the Bet Yosef [R. Karo] forgot the relevant Mishna, or there was some lack in his recollection or understanding, and due to that the light [understanding] of the relevant Mishna was also held back from the Maggid.” R. David Luria, Kadmut Sefer ha-Zohar 5:4 (Koenigsberg, 1856), p. 35a (quoting R. Hayyim). Thus, according to R. Hayyim, R. Karo could forget and make mistakes.

R. Hayyim of Volozhin’s understanding, however, is completely rejected by R. Yosef Kohen in his new edition of the Maggid Mesharim. R. Kohen commenting on R. Hayyim’s explanation says “I am extremely troubled, how is it possible to say that the great Rabbi Bet Yosef, who understood and was completely fluent in the entire Talmud and Mishna, that he forgot a simple Mishna or that he was weak in a particular Mishna.” Maggid Mesharim, R. Yosef Kohen ed. (Jerusalem, 2007), 418.

Again, we see the two camps clearly, those who allow for human error and forgetfulness and those who refuse to believe great Rabbis could fall prey to these human frailties. An examination of the relevant sources shows that those in the former camp have the greatest support. To return to the Rambam that R. Hirschensohn argued erred in his understanding of the Sifre. The Rambam himself in his famous answer to the Hakhmei Lunel, admitted that he had made a mistake. Similarly, the Rambam’s son, R. Abraham when presented with a contradiction between his father’s statement and a Talmudic passage said “it is possible that my father forgot this passage when he wrote this.”

Likewise, R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, author of Shu”t Havvot Yair, explains in a responsum “to one Godol who cast aspersions on [R. Bacharach] for claiming errors in the writings of the great earlier ones. That is, you asked how can I have the gall to dispute the earlier ones which we are much smaller. And, that I went further and said [at times] that they had forgotten the words of the Talmud and the Poskim.” R. Bacharach answered “I turn the question back on you, is not this language, that is, ‘you have forgotten [אשתמיטתיה]’ taken from the Talmud itself and applied to the greatest Amoraim . . . using [forgetfulness] is a respectful way to allege that one didn’t remember a relevant passage. Forgetfulness is human nature and affects everyone. Of course, how forgetful one is depends on the person.”

R. Bacharach then offers historical examples to support his contention. “Who is greater than Moshe the greatest prophet who forgot two laws (Shapiro notes that Bacharach erred – Moshe made three errors! (Shapiro, 52 n.220)) due to anger . . . and who is a greater Posek than the Rambam who understood the entire oral Torah as is evidenced by his work and who also authored a commentary on the entire six volumes of the Mishna based on the Talmud . . . who also forgot . . . and Rashi, who was a repository of Torah, but who writes in his commentary to the Torah . . . ‘I don’t know . . . and whom the Ramban wrote that [Rashi] forgot a passage from Midrash Ruth.” R. Bacharach continues to list other such examples. He concludes “there is no shame in saying that the Rishonim and the Achronim . . . forgot a Talmudic passage or Tosefot . . . and this position is evident from the writers in all the generations that precede me, they never held back from saying on the great ones before them.” R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, Shu”t Hut ha-Shuni, no. 20.

R. Ya’akov Hayyim from Baghdad, in the introduction to his responsa Rav Pealim, echos R. Bacharach’s sentiment. “In truth one can find that many great ones that they made terrific errors, errors that even children wouldn’t make, and at times they made mistakes in quoting biblical verse, as was the case with the goan, wonder of his generation the Hida [R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai, one of the most erudite scholars of his period] . . . on these sorts of errors the verse ‘that one is blameless from error’ (Psalms 19:13).” By way of example R. Ya’akov Hayyim highlights four such errors R. Yosef Shaul Nathanson, author of the Shu”t Shoel u-Meshiv made in his work. R. Ya’akov Hayyim concludes “therefore, do be surprised to find I disagree with the great ones . . . when I argue they erred because they forgot. Because, such allegations [of forgetfulness] are not unique and in no way take away from their greatness.”

It is particularly ironic that the Hida fell prey to this very type of forgetfulness as he wrote an entire book, Helem Davar, [4] showing exactly these types of mistakes in other’s works. The title of the Hida’s work, Helem Davar is rather instructive when discussing the possibility of sages erring. Helem Davar refers to the sacrifice the members of Sanhedrin would bring should they all err, indicating that even groups of great people are not immune from making mistakes.

With the above introduction we now turn to Professor Marc Shapiro’s new book Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters (Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 2008), 205 pages, where one of the three articles is devoted to showing exactly the type of errors that must be attributed to forgetfulness or faulty memory that appear in the Rambam. This volume is an expanded discussion of Prof. Shapiro’s two earlier articles “Maimonidean Halakhah and Superstition” (2000) and “Principles of Interpretation in Maimonidean Halakhah: Traditional and Academic Perspectives” (2008), both of which originally published in Yeshiva University’s Maimonidean Studies, and includes a Hebrew section of several letters from two twentieth-century Torah giants (R. Joseph Kafih and R. Yehiel Yaakov Weinbeg), as well as from the nineteenth-century-maskil Nahman Isaac Fischmann to R. Samuel David Luzzatto zt”l (ShaDaL).

Shapiro provides many examples of persons who held Maimonides and others could err as well as many who hold that one cannot attribute difficult passages to error. For example, notes that the Hida (contrary to what we have seen above regarding his view of other scholars) held that one can not write off difficulties in Maimonides’ statements to error as “[i]f such approaches are adopted every insignificant student will be able to offer them, and what value is there in writing such thing?” (Shapiro, 8)[5]. On the other hand Shapiro marshalls numerous sources, including the Ramabam himself, who allow for the errors in the Rambam. In the letter to the sages of Lunel, the Rambam states that in his old age he suffers from forgetfulness. (See Shapiro 73 n.295, 76 nn. 308, 309 discussing the controversy over the authenticity of these letters). However, even explict statements from the Rambam himself have been disputed by later authorities. For example, although the Rambam condeeds regarding a law in Yad that he erred, the Gra says that the Rambam was erring is saying he erred. The Gra explains that the original law in Yad is indeed right contrary to the Rambam’s own position. (Shapiro 69 n.282). The Gra’s position is somewhat tenuos, aside from the obvious issue of ignoring the statement of the original author, as “a number of . . . achronim provided what they believed to be better proofs for Maimonides’ decisions than he himself was able to supply” but is has been shown “that the aharonim who adopted this approach erred in almost every example.” (Shapiro 54 n.227).

Included in the book is a short “Note on Maimonides and Muhammad” following censorship that occurred in his “Islam and the Halakhah,” Judaism 42:3 (Summer 1993): 332-343, about which Shapiro writes:

The “Note on Maimonides and Muhammad” found at the end of the English section requires a bit of explanation, as it speaks to the times in which we live and the sometimes precarious state of scholarship when it comes up against larger political forces. In 1993, I published an article in Judaism entitled “Islam and the Halakhah.” In the version of the article submitted to the journal, I mentioned that Maimonides referred to Muhammad as a “madman,” and in a few lines I also explained the origin of the term. When the article appeared in print, however, I was surprised to find that this had been removed without my knowledge. Naively, I thought that this was an innocent mistake, and I inquired as to what had happened. Imagine my shock when I was told that my article had been censored because the journal did not want to publish anything that could be seen as offensive to Muslims! While some may see this as understandable in the wake of the Salman Rushdie episode, it was nevertheless a betrayal of scholarship, which cannot be guided by political correctness. I would hope that any Muslims who see the “Note on Maimonides and Muhammad” will understand that its intent is not to insult their prophet, but rather to clarify a historical issue.

Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters is available for purchase here at Amazon.com.

The editors of the Seforim blog take great pride in the first post (of hopefully many frequent posts) at this new web address being able to discuss Professor Shapiro’s new work. This is so, as Professor Marc B. Shapiro has been (as many others) a frequent contributor to the Seforim blog. It is such contributions that make the blog so much better.

Notes:
[1] Much of the material on R. Hayyim Hirschensohn was brought to my attention by Marc Herman, “Orthodoxy and Modernity: Rabbi Hayyim Hirschensohn’s Malki ba-kodesh,” (BA thesis, Brandeis University, 2005), 18-51. For a recent review of the scholarly consensus on R. Hayyim Hirschensohn, see Marc B. Shapiro, “Review of Jewish Commitment in a Modern World: Rabbi Hayyim Hirschenson and His Attitude to Modernity by David Zohar,” The Edah Journal 5:1 (Tammuz 5765): 1-6. Additionally, parts of the material on this topic of claiming that people forgot, comes from R. Shmuel Ashkenazi’s article “Helem Davar u-Tous Sofer.” Ashkenazi’s article was originally supposed to appear in the journal Or Yisrael no. 15 (Nissan 5659), but at the last minute the editors decided not to publish it and instead the article was published separately in a run of 25 copies. Ashkenazi, himself an outstanding repository of material – it seems unlikely he forgets but he is human – in this article lists numerous examples of errors that can only be attributed to forgetfulness or printing error. For instance, Ashkenazi notes that R. Yechiel Epstein in his Arukh Ha-Shulhan states “it is surprising that the Rif does not mention the laws of yayin pagum, not in the eigth chapter of berakhot discussing the laws of wine for blessing, or in the tenth chapter of Pesachim regarding kiddush and havdalah.” In fact, however, the Rif in the tenth chapter of Pesachim does discuss the laws of yayin pagum.
Or, the case of R. Aryeh Leib ben Asher Gunzberg (author of Shu”t Shaagat Aryeh), who notes in his Turei Even, that “we never find anywhere that the reading of the Bikurim passage is called Vidyu.” Turei Even, Megilah, 20, s.v. mihu. Ashkenazi cites R. Yeruchum Fishel Perlow’s comments in the journal Noam who notes R. Gunzberg forgot the mishna in Bikurim 2:2 which calls this recitation “viduy” as well as the Rambam in the laws of Bikurim 3:5, who says “it is a mitzvah to preform viduy on the bikurim.” Ashkenazi adds the Tosefta in Bekurim chapter one and the Yerushalmi Bikurim, chapter 2 also refer to this process as viduy.

Another example, this one with the Hida. The Hida in Machzik Beracha (O.C. 468:10) and Lev David (end of chapter 10) states the author of the SeMaK is R. Yecheil. But, the real author is R. Yitzhak Corbeil. The Hida, in his own work on Hebrew bibliography, Shem ha-Gedolim, actually gets it right. But, it appears that he forgot that when he wrote these other works.

[2] R. Moshe Feinstein also argues the Sifre is not connected with the Talmudic statement. See Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah II, #44-45. R. Feinstein, however, ultimately comes to the opposite conclusion then that of R. Hirschensohn – the opinion of the Rambam must be followed and women cannot hold high office.

[3] As an aside, one of the many letters to R. Hirschensohn regarding women’s voting rights came from Yehiel Mihel Goldberg from Radom. Goldberg attempts to bolster R. Hirschensohn with the (now) well-known statement of R. Shmuel Archivolti in his Ma’ayan Ganim and recorded by R. Barukh ha-Levi Epstein in both his Torah Temimah and Mekor Barukh that supposedly is a halakhic statement which allows for women to study Talmud. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the Ma’ayan Ganim is not a responsa work or halakhic work. But, Goldberg’s use of the Torah Temimah for this point seems to be the earliest. While the Torah Temimah was first printed in 1902 and then reprinted in 1904, it was not reprinted until 1928 and Goldberg’s letter was written in 1921. Perhaps Goldberg’s use evidences that the Torah Temimah was well received soon after it was published.

[4] This work, Helem Davar was recently printed (Beni Brak, 2006) for the first time in book form from manuscript – it also was printed as part of the lager book Iggerot ve-Haskmot Rabbenu ha-Hida also in 2006. Prior to this 2006 publication, R. Yehuda Leib Maimon published Helem Davar in the journal Sinai 43 (1948): 301-15. The 2006 edition includes Maimon’s original article as well as a commentary on Helem Davar, Hokher Davar.

[5] This argument, essentially a slippery slope argument, is also applied to making textual emendations. See, e.g. R. Y. Landau, Noda be-Yehuda Kama, Even ha-Ezer, 32; this issue is discussed by Y.S. Spiegel, Amudim be-Tolodot Sefer ha-Ivri Haghot u-Maghim, Ramat Gan, 2007, pp. 255-56.




Hunted Bears, Cantonists and Nazi Victims

by Yitzhak, בין דין לדין.
I thank Dan Rabinowitz for graciously allowing me to post this essay.
Hunted Bears

This is the cover image of the Gary Larson collection Beyond The Far Side:

I have long found this cartoon profoundly depressing, in its humorous but acute portrayal of the moral degradation of which we are capable. עור בעד עור, וכל אשר לאיש יתן בעד נפשו 1; the desperate bear grins inanely as he attempts to persuade the hunter to shoot his companion instead of himself.

Several months ago, though, I had an epiphany; it is all very well to consider the matter from a literary-psychological perspective, but what is the view of the Halachah 2?

Cantonists and ‘Chappers’

The thought lay dormant in my mind, until I read the following paragraph in Dr. Marc Shapiro’s typically erudite and fascinating article Rabbis and Communism at The Seforim Blog:

When dealing with anti-clericalism in Russia, we must also not forget the masses’ long memory of how some (many?, most?) rabbis were silent during the era of the chappers. This was when children were grabbed for 25 years of military service in the Cantonists, often never again to see their parents and usually succumbing to incessant pressure (including torture) to be baptized. Yet it wasn’t the children of the rich or the rabbis who were taken, but the poor children. Jacob Lifshitz’ defense of the way the Jewish community dealt with the Cantonist tragedy – which he regards as worse than even the destruction of the Temple! – and his insistence that no one can judge the community leaders unless they themselves had been in such a difficult circumstance, is something we must bear in mind. Yet all such ex post facto justifications would have no impact on the outlook of those that actually suffered during the Cantonist era, and it is no wonder that many of the common people would not regard the rabbis in a sympathetic light. The rabbis were certainly able to come up with a justification why their sons, the future Torah scholars, should not be taken to the army, just as they continue to make this argument. Yet this would only serve to show the masses that some children’s blood was indeed redder than others.

This post shall attempt to clarify the relevant controlling Halachos for both scenarios: may a bear attempt to save his life at the expense of his comrade’s, and may a potential or actual draftee, or a friend of his, attempt to evade the draft if the consequence will be the drafting of another instead.3

The Yerushalmi

The locus classicus for this discussion is a passage in the Yerushalmi Bava Kama:

שור שעלה בחבירו ובא בעל השור ושמטו מתחתיו אם עד שלא עלה שמטו ונפל ומת פטור ואם דחהו ונפל ומת חייב

אמר רבי יוסי ותישמע מינה ראה אמת המים שוטפת ובאה לתוך שדהו רשאי לפנותן למקום אחר משנכנסו אין רשאי לפנותן למקום אחר
אהן כריסו ארגירא עד דלא ייתי אהן כריסו ארגירא שרי מימר פלן עביד עבדיתי פלן עביד עבדיתי. מן דייתי אהן כריסו ארגירא אסיר.

הדין אכסניי פרכא עד דלא ייתון רומאי שרי מיחשדוניה ומן דייתון רומאי אסיר.4

The Nimukei Yosef cites the second paragraph of the Yerushalmi, about the Amas Hamayim 5.
Rema rules:

היה רואה נזק בא עליו מותר להציל עצמו אף על פי שעל ידי זה בא הנזק לאחר6

Rema only cites the permissive component of the Yerushalmi; he omits the Yerushalmi’s stringency, prohibiting the shifting onto another of a misfortune that is considered to have already befallen. Sema does indeed cite the latter part of the Yerushalmi:

שם בנימוקי יוסף סיים וכתב דאם כבר בא עליו אסור לסלקו ממנו כשגורם בזה היזק לחבירו:7

but why does Rema omit it? This question is raised by Rav Haim Yehudah Leib Epstein, who infers that Rema does not actually accept the stringency of the Yerushalmi L’Halachah, a position for which he offers various justifications, which are beyond the scope of this post 8. Although we shall see that The consensus of the Poskim, however, seems to accept the Yerushalmi in its entirety as Halachah 9.
The Hafetz Haim discusses this Yerushalmi; he is curiously tentative about its application to the question of Lashon Ha’Ra that he is considering, the deflection of blame from oneself in a situation in which so doing will consequently cause another to be accused:

אבל אם על ידי זה [שמשיב מי שנחשד מחבירו בעשיית דבר שלא כהוגן נגדו שאכן הוא לא עשאו] ממילא יוודע לו העושה, כגון שלא היה לו הספק כי אם על שניהם, תלוי בזה: אם הוא באמת דבר שאינו הגון, נראה דמותר לדחות זה מעל עצמו, אף שממילא יתגלגל הדבר על חבירו. אבל אם באמת דבר זה איננו עוולה, רק להשואל נראה שהדבר הזה הוא עוולה, צריך עיון אם מותר להשיב לו אפילו בלשון: אני לא עשיתי את הדבר, כיון שעל ידי זה ממילא יתגנדר הדבר על חבירו.10

ונראה שדבר זה תלוי במה שמבואר בחושן משפט, בסימן שפ”ח (סוף סעיף ב) בהגהה … ועיין בסמ”ע שם … ומשמע מביאור הגר”א שם (אות כ”ט) שהוא מסכים להסמ”ע. והכא נמי אם הוא רואה שנחלט לעת עתה חשדא אצל השואל עליו, אסור לו לגלות כדי להסירה מעליו ולתיתה על חבירו, ועיין בביאור הגר”א שם, ואם אינו בגדר זה, מותר. ואף על פי כן, דבר זה אינו מבורר אצלי היטב למעשה.

Draft Evasion

Rav Yosef Ibn Lev discusses a case apparently very similar to one of the scenarios in the Yerushalmi:

שאלה ראובן היה לו אהבה עם השרים ויועצי המלכות ולפעמים היו תופסין מחמת המלכות לקצת יהודים עשירים והיו כותבין לשראפי”ש או לשאר אומניות כמנהג המלכות הלז וזה היהודי שיש לו אהבה עם השרים יש לאל ידו להציל איזה יהודי מאותה הצרה אבל ירא לנפשו שאם יציל לשמעון יקחו ללוי תחתיו ומאן לימא ליה דדמא דשמעון סומק טפי דילמא דמה דלוי סומק טפי ועל זה שאל אם הרשות בידו להציל לשמעון מצרתו:

תשובה עיקרא דהאי מילתא איתא ביבמות פרק הערל אמרינן התם מאי שנא הני אמר רב הונא העבירום לפני הארון כל שהארון קולטו למיתה כל שאין הארון קולטו לחיים מתיב רב חנה בר ביזנא ויחמול המלך על מפיבושת בן יהונתן בן שאול שלא העבירו וכי משוא פנים יש בדבר אלא שהעבירו וקלטו ובקש רחמים ופלטו ואכתי משוא פנים יש בדבר אלא שבקש רחמים שלא יקלטנו הארון מהך שמעינן בנדון דידן שאם כבר כתבו ליהודי אחד לשארא”ף ותפשו אותו והדבר ידוע שאם ימלט זה שיקחו אחר תחתיו אין להשתדל להצילו אבל אם יצתה גזרה לקחת קצת יהודים לאומנות המלך לשרא”ף וכיוצא בו הרשות נתונה להשתדל להציל לכל מי שירצה

והאי דכתבינא דאם כבר נכתב למלכות דאסור להשתדל להצילו כיון דמנהג הוא לקחת אחר תחתיו היינו דוקא היכא דהוי ודאי דלית ספיקא אבל היכא דאיכא ספיקא די עידנא ישתנה ויעבור זעם ולא יקחו אחר תחתיו אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי …11

Shach endorses Ibn Lev’s ruling distinguishing between where the royal decree specifies particular individuals and where it merely demands a quota, and he says that the inference from the Mefiboshes passage is compelling12. It is curious, though, that neither Ibn Lev nor Shach mention in this context the Yerushalmi that we have been discussing until now; Rav Akiva Eiger 13, Rav Baruch Frankel14, Rav Meir Ya’akov Ginzberg15, and Pis’hei Teshuvah16 all refer the reader to the Yerushalmi. We shall presently see a suggestion for why Ibn Lev and Shach do not cite the Yerushalmi.

Rav Shmuel Landau discusses whether it is permitted to take action to save particular individuals from a governmental draft, even though the result will inevitably be the seizure of others:

… ועל דבר שאלתו שאלת חכם חצי תשובה קשה להורות בדבר הנוגע לנפשות תחלה ומי ירים ראש בדברים כאלה. …

אבל לבי מהסס בדבר אם מותר לישראל להשתדל עבור איזה אנשים שלא יקחו אותם. ודבר זה מבואר בתשובות מהר”י בן לב .. הובא בש”ך … ואם כן גם בנדון דידן אם עדיין לא לקח השר ולא פרט מי שיהיה יכולים להשתדל דרך שלילה על אנשים ידועים שלא יקחו אותם:
ובאמת תמיה לי טובא על הש”ך בסימן [ק]ס”ג שהביא ממרחק לחמו מתשובת מהר”י בן לב הנ”ל הלא דבר זה מפורש בש”ע ברמ”א סימן שפ”ח סוף סעיף ב’ … הרי ממש כפסק של מהר”י בן לב וגם הסמ”ע שם כתב … הרי ממש כפסק של מהר”י בן לב:

ואפשר ליישב דמהרמ”א לקמן נשמע דאותו אדם עצמו כשרואה דהנזק בא עליו דמותר להציל עצמו אבל שיהיה לאחרים רשות להשתדל עבורו לא שמענו ולכך הביא הש”ך דברי מהר”י בן לב ופסק דגם אחרים יכולים להשתדל עבורו אם עדיין לא בא הנזק וראייתו מדוד שהתפלל על מפיבושת שלא יקלטנו הארון: [ועיין שם שהאריך לפלפל בסוגיא דיחדו לאחד מהם.]17

Rav Avraham Maskil Le’Eisan cites this responsum and suggests that one may permitted to save himself at another’s expense even if he has already been selected for misfortune:

ועיין בנודע ביהודה .. שכתב דאם כבר לקחו אנשים ידועים אסור להשתדל להצילם רק קודם שנלקח אף א’ מותר להשתדל להציל א’. וכמו שכתב הש”ך .. ובהג”ה שם (ש”פ) [לכאורה צ”ל שפ”ח].

ונראה שהוא עצמו יכול להשתדל אף שנלקח דחייך קודמין:18

This is incomprehensible; as we have seen, the entire point of Rav Landau is that the reason that Ibn Lev and Shach do not derive their permission to save someone at another’s expense from the Yerushalmi is because they are allowing a third party to save a victim, whereas the Yerushalmi is discussing efforts by the victim himself, and yet the Yerushalmi explicitly forbids even such efforts when the misfortune is specific to the victim! Perhaps Rav Maskil Le’Eisan holds like Rav Epstein, that the Rema’s omission of the Yerushalmi’s prohibition indicates that it is not normative, but given that the Sema does cite the prohibition, and none of the major commentaries reject it, if Rav Maskil Le’Eisan really held like Rav Epstein, he should have said so explicitly 19.

“At Risk” Youths

In his article, Shapiro comments that:

Michael Stanislawski notes that in one community the communal leaders wanted to grab a poor tailor since he wasn’t observant, but the local rabbi forbid it. …

In a strong defense of the rabbis against the charge that they collaborated with the rich people in order to ensure that the poor were taken, R. Moses Solomon Kazarnov calls attention to all that the rabbis did to defend the children of the lower class. But he acknowledges that the rabbis would hand over the non-religious kids, including their own!

In the continuation of his responsum, Rav Landau, no mere local Rabbi, issues an uncompromising rejection of religious laxity as a justification for handing someone over to the government. He unequivocally, passionately and eloquently rejects a suggestion of his questioner that the community satisfy the government’s demands with some “נערים קלים ופרוצים ביותר”; indeed, he seems horrified by the idea:

ומה שכתב מעלתו דיש שם איזה נערים קלים ופרוצים ביותר. אהובי ידידי אין אנו יכולים לדון דיני נפשות דעל כל פנים הנערים אינן בכלל מורידין אף שהם נוהגין בקלות קצת והרבה הילדות עושה וניתן להענישם בתפיסה ומכת מרדות וכדומה אבל חלילה למסור אותם בידים ואל ידח ממנו נידח להדיחם לגמרי מקהל עדת ישראל ואף שיש ביד טובי העיר והבית דין לדון בכל עונשים חמורים למגדר מלתא היינו אם העם פרוץ בו וגם לזה צריך שיהיה דוקא גדולי הדור או טובי העיר שהמחום רבים עליהם … אבל היכא דליכא משום מגדר מלתא שאין העם פרוצים רק איזה נערים הקלים מי ירים ראש לדון בזה. …

[ועיין שם שפלפל עוד בזה, והעלה:] ויהיה איך שיהיה … בנדון דידן אף שיש נערים קלים ועוברים על איזה מצות אין אנו רשאין בשביל כן להעניש אותם כפלי כפלים ככל חטאותם ולסכן אותם בידים ובפרט שלא נתברר בעדות ברורה אם עברו על עבירה חמורה בשאט נפש לכן שארית ישראל לא יעשו עולה כזו.20

We must note that Rav Landau’s unwillingness to countenance the seizure of the religiously dubious youths is apparently predicated on his assertion that they are not in the category of Moridin; if it were reliably established that they were thoroughly irreligious21, he may indeed not object to their seizure.
Rav Landau concludes with an apparent reiteration of his earlier ruling permitting action which is merely evasive:

אך את זה יכולים לעשות להשתדל דרך שלילה על אדם חשוב וכשר שלא יקחו את זה כל זמן שלא קראו לו בפירוש שאותו הם מבקשים אבל אם כבר בא הפקודה לאחד קשה להורות להתיר להשתדל עבורו אם על ידי שזה יוצא לחירות ילכד אחר במצודה זו ומאי חזית דדמי דהאי סומק טפי מדמי דאיש אחר אשר יבא אחריו.

וידעתי שבנדון זה קשה להורות ועל זה אמרו חז”ל כשם שמצוה לומר דבר הנשמע כן מצוה שלא לומר דבר שאינו נשמע והמשכיל בעת ההיא ידום אבל על כל פנים זה מחויב למחות ביד מי שרוצה למסור בידים.

The Hasam Sofer has a similarily strong denunciation of the unfair selection by the community of particular individuals, even alleged “פוחזים וריקים”, to be drafted:

ועל דבר עם בני ישראל הנלקחים לצבא המלחמה למלכיות השתיקה יפה מדיבורינו בזה וגדולי ישראל ע”כ יעלימו עין והניחו להם להממונים מקהל לעשות כראות עיניהם לפי הזמן ועת לחשות

ומכל מקום אומר כי גוף ענין דינא דמלכותא להטיל מס על כל עמו להעמיד מהם אנשים לצבא מלחמתו וזה הוא מחק מלכותו ודינו דין וממילא מוטל אקרקפתא דכל מי שראוי לצאת ושאין לו אשה ובנים כפי נימוס וחק מלכותו אך לא אבחורים לומדי תורה שאפילו לא פטרום המלכות בפירוש מכל מקום מדין תורה פטורים דאמרינן בפרק קמא דבבא בתרא ח’ ע”א הכל לכרי’ פתייא אפילו רבנן והני מילי דלא נפקי באוכלזא אבל נפקי באוכלזא רבנן לאו בני מיפק באוכלזא נינהו ומכל שכן שהמלכות יר”ה פטרם וכבר כמה פעמים כשנתתי אטעסט לבני מדינו’ פיהם ומעהר”ין שהם לומדים ויצליחו לנהוג ציבור נפטרו מלהעמיד עצמם לצבא ואם כן כל הנוגע בהם נוגע בבבת עין:

ואידך מהראוי שיעמדו עצמם כולם בשוה לפני העדה ויטילו גורל ועל מי שיפול עליו הגורל הוא ישתדל לעצמו במה שיכול לפטור בממון או להעמיד אחר במקומו או ילך בעצמו וכל ישראל מחויבים לסייעו ויקר פדיון נפשו אבל לאנוס אנשים בלי גורל ולומר שהם פוחזים ורקים אפילו מגלי עריות ומחללי שבת בעיני הוא כגונב נפש ומכרו כי מי נותן זה חליפי זה כיון שחיוב המלכות ופקודתו על כולם בשוה והמוסרו כמוסר לתוא מכמר אפילו מחוי אתיבנא חייב מכל שכן מוסר נפשו ורע ומר יותר כי הטובים הנאנסים עוברים על המצות באונס ולעתים רחוקים ואלו יעשו ברצון ואנו מדחים אחר הנופל עיין פרק קמא דקידושין לענין מכר עצמו לנכרים:

אך מה שנמצאים עתה למאות המוכרים עצמם מרצונם וברצי כסף ולכן אף על גב דהמה גריעי מכולהו שהרי בשאט נפשם מתנים לחלל שבתות ולאכול איסורים מכל מקום כיון דשכיחי טובא ולא הוה כתרי עיברא נהרי ואם אין קהלה זו קונהו ימכור עצמו במקום אחר אם כן קלקלתם בעו”ה תקנה קצת וכן עשו בכל גלילותינו והוא כעין בחירת הרע במיעוטו
והנה קצרתי מאוד כי אין ראוי להאריך בענין זה כמובן …22

Hasam Sofer prohibits seizing even youths who are מגלי עריות ומחללי שבת, but perhaps he is referring only to those who yield to temptation, and are therefore not considered Apikorsim, Minim or Meshumadim, and are not in the category of Moridin 23.
Although both Rav Landau and the Hasam Sofer are unequivocal in their condemnation of the unfair seizure by the community of particular individuals in order to save others, I do not know if their opposition would extend to a mere request to the government that it draft them, or to the attempt by the targeted bear in the Far Side cartoon to convince the hunter to shoot his companion instead of himself. Normally these actions might constitute Mesirah, but in these situations, where the government will inevitably seize some individuals, and the hunter will certainly shoot a bear, and the request is merely determining who the victim(s) will be, perhaps the permissive rulings of the Yerushalmi and Ibn Lev still apply, since in any event the Yerushalmi seems to be a dispensation of the law of Grama B’Nizakin, which would presumably normally forbid the causing of harm to another even in the indirect forms under discussion.

Kapos, Quotas and Cards

Rav Zvi Hirsch Meisels relates the following heartbreaking story:

מסחר נפשות עם הקאפו”ס

והנה ליום המחרת, שהיא יום א’ דראש השנה, אשר כל באי עולם יעברון לפניו כבני מרון, היה יום מהומה ומבוכה, ומפה לאוזן נתפשטה השמועה בכל המחנה, שלעת ערב יקחו את הנערים לבית המוקד, … ולהרבה אנשים שבמחנה הי’ להם בנם יחידם, אשר נשארו להם לפליטה, בתוך אלו הנערים או שאר בשרם הקרובים אליהם, או סתם ידידים אהובים אנשי עירם, והמה רצו כל היום בראש מבולבל מסביב הבלאק המוסגר, אולי יופתח איזה קרן אור להציל משם את הנער היקר להם עד שלא תחשך השמש.

אך השומרים הקאפו”ס לא שעו אל כל תחנוניהם ובכיותיהם להוציא איזה נער וילד, מבין המסוגרים אשר נדונים לשריפה, … במקרה הלזה הי’ גם טענתם בטענה צודקת בפיהם, היות שהם אחראים על סכום הילדים שהופקדו לשומרים אליהם, אשר היה במספר מדויק, ולעת ערב עליהם למסור אותם לידי אנשי הס’ ס’ ימ”ש במספר ובמנין כאשר מסרו להם, ואם יחסר אחד מהם אז דמם בראשם ויקחו אותם לשריפה, נפש תחת נפש.

אכן סוף סוף אחרי הרבה השתדלות ומו”מ של הקרובים עמהם גברה בהם תאות הממון, והסכימו בעד תשלום סכומים גדולים, לשחרר איזה נער וילד, ותיכף חטפו במקומו איזה נער אחר, מן הבא בידם בתוך המחנה, (מאלו שהצליחו להתחמק מהאוסף של אתמול או שנשתחררו בעת הבירור על ידי נגיעת ראשם בדף) וסגרוהו בהבלאק הנ”ל במקום הנער הפדוי כדי שיהיה המספר שלם.

והנה להרבה אנשים הי’ עוד סכומי כספים, או חתיכת זהב או מרגליות, טמון במטמונים ובמנעלים לעת הצורך, וכמובן שהי’ כמה אנשים פשוטים ובעלי קוצר השגה שלא עשו שום חשבונות מה נעשה במקום נער הנפדה, וקיבצו במסירת נפש כל הונם הנשאר להם או שהשתדלו לאסוף סכום הנצרך, מאחרים ידידים ומכירים, ופדו את בנם המסוגר מכליון בטוח, וככה נמשך סחר-מכר הלזה משך רוב יום הדין לעיני כל האנשים שבמחנה, …

אמנם כמובן שהי’ הרבה אנשים בעלי השגה, שלא רצו לפדות את בנם, על חשבון חייו של ילד אחר, כמאמר חכמז”ל מאי חזית, ולעולם לא אשכח עובדא נוראה אחת, אשר עיני ראו ואזני שמעו, אז בשעת ענין הנ”ל, אשר מעשה הלזה מסמל את קדושת בני ישראל, והתמסרותם לדרכי התורה הקדושה בתמימות אף בעת צרתם וסבלותם הנוראה.

מסירות נפש של אב מלהציל בנו יחידו

הנה ניגש אלי איש יהודי, שהיה נראה ליהודי פשוט מאויבערלנד, מתמימות הדברים שלו שאמר לי כדברים האלה.

רבי, הבן יחיד שלי, היקר לי מבבת עיני, נמצא שמה בתוך הנערים הנידונים לשריפה, ויש בידי היכולת לפדותו, והיות שידוע לנו, בלי שום ספק, שהקאפו”ס יתפסו אחר במקומו, על כן אני שואל מהרבי שאלה להלכה ולמעשה, לפסוק לי הדין על פי התורה אם אני רשאי לפדותו, וכאשר יפסוק כן אעשה.

[ועיין שם שלא רצה לפסוק הלכה בדבר זה, בלי ספרים, בלי רבנים אחרים ובלי ישוב הדעת, והתחנן אל השואל שאל יטיל עליו את האחריות הנוראה הזו. אולם האב השואל החליט, מתוך סרבנותו של הרב מייזליש להשיב תשובה ברורה, שהדבר אסור, ואמר שאם כן הוא מוכן להקריב את בנו יחידו על פי התורה וההלכה, ושהוא מקבל את זה באהבה ובשמחה, וכך עשה:] וגם ככה קיים דבריו ולא פדה את בנו, והיה כל היום, יומא דראש השנה, הולך ומדבר לעצמו בשמחה שזוכה להקריב את בנו יחידו לה’ כי אף שיש ביכולת בידו לפדותו עם כל זה אינו פודהו מחמת שרואה שהתורה לא התירה לו לעשות כזאת ויהיה חשוב לפני השי”ת כעקידת יצחק אבינו שהי’ גם כן ביום ראש השנה. …24

In a footnote, Rav Meisels analyzes the question Halachically. He begins by citing the Rema, Sema (citing the Nimukei Yosef citing the continuation of the Yerushalmi, as above), Shach (citing Ibn Lev), and Rav Landau, and he then proceeds as follows:

ונסתפקתי בנידן דידן אם האב לגבי בנו רשאי להשתדל לפדותו אף שיודע שעל ידי זה יותפס אחר. לפי מה שכתב בהגהות יד אברהם .. דנראה שהוא בעצמו יכול להשתדל בהצלתו אף אחר שנתפס, אף על גב שיודע שעל ידי זה יקחו אחר במקומו, מכל מקום אמרינן חייך קודמין, ודוקא לפדות לאחרים אסור להשתדל להציל, אם על ידי זה יקחו אחר במקומו ע”ש. ואם כן יש להסתפק אם אב לפדות את בנו בכי האי גוונא שיקחו אחר במקומו, אם האב נידון כאחר ואסור להציל בנו בכי האי גוונא או דגם האב לגבי בנו אמרינן חיי בנך קודמין לחיי אחרים. ועיין בבא בתרא (קל”ו ע”ב) פלוגתא אי בנו עדיף ליה מנפשיה ע”ש וצ”ע.

As I have argued earlier, the Yad Avraham’s assertion is quite puzzling, since it seems to contradict the Yerushalmi. Rav Meisel’s acceptance of it is even more baffling, since he has just cited both the Sema and Rav Landau’s responsum, which eliminates my earlier suggestion that the Yad Avraham disagrees with the Sema and does not accept the stringency of the Yerushalmi as normative.
Irving J. Rosenbaum cites the following discussion of Rav Efraim Oshry:

On the twenty-third of Elul, 5701 (September 15, 1941), the German supervisor of the Kovno ghetto (Jordan) provided the Aeltestenrat (Judenrat) five thousand “white cards” to be distributed to workers and craftsmen in the ghetto and their families. Only those having “white cards” would be allowed to remain. At that time there were about thirty thousand souls in the ghetto, of whom about ten thousand were such workers and their families. In consternation, those workers who were the strongest forcibly seized “white cards” for themselver from the Aeltestenrat. Rabbi Oshry perceived two halakhic questions involved in the matter. … The second: Was it permissible for a worker to snatch a card for himself, even though by so doing he would certainly be causing the death of another – since there were only five thousand cards for ten thousand workers? …

The second question – the permissibility of seizing a card and saving one’s own life at the expense of another – also has precedent in Jewish law. The first is found in the Shakh … However, Rabbi Oshry rejects this as a precedent for our case, since the Shakh’s decision applies only when the men have not yet been seized. Then it is permissible to try to prevent them from being taken, even though others would suffer as a result. However, the Shakh would most probably rule that if two men were already in custody, it would not be permitted to attempt to free them; for it would then be inevitable that two others would be taken in their stead. In the Kovno ghetto situation, one could say that the entire community was already “taken prisoner”. If so, the decision of the Shakh would not apply, and it would be forbidden for the workers to seize the “white cards.”

Yet it might be held, Rabbi Oshry continues, that in our case it would still be permissible. For as the Yad Avraham .. points out, it is only forbidden for others to try to rescue the imprisoned men when this will simply lead to different victimes being seized. However, it is certainly not forbidden for the prisoner himself to attempt to escape even though someone else will suffer. So too, here, the worker who seizes the card is saving himself, not another. But upon close examination this analogy proves imperfect. For the Yad Avraham is referring to a case where his action does not directly cause another to die. It is simply that if he escapes another is imprisoned in his place. Though the second man may ultimately die because of this, his death is not directly resultant from the act of the first. But in the Kovno ghetto, the seizure of the card by one workman would directly result in the death of one who was denied a card by his action.
It is possible to support this distinction between direct and indirect action from the classic case in the Talmud, Baba Metzia 62a.

If two men are traveling on a journey [far from civilization] and one has a pitcher of water, if both drink they will both die, but if one only drinks, he can reach civilization. Ben Patura taught: “It is better that both should drink and die, rather than that one should behold his companion’s death.” Until Rabbi Akiba came and taught: “‘that thy brother may live with thee’ (Lev. 25:36), thy life takes precedence over his life.”

As Rabbi Oshry explains Ben Patura’s point of view, it is the drinking by the one man that causes the death of the other. The saving of his own life is, thus, the direct cause of his fellow’s death. Ben Patura does not believe that the injunction of “and live by them” (Lev. 18:5) – not die by them – applies if one gains his own life by not attempting to save his comrade’s. And though Rabbi Akiba disagrees with Ben Patura, it is only in this case of the two travelers, where the one takes no direct physical action to injure his fellow, but simply refrains from giving him water, that Rabbi Akiba would sanction his behavior. However, in our case, where as a result of the direct action of seizing the card, a fellow workman will be delivered over to the murderers, it is quite possible that Rabbi Akiba would agree with ben Patura and forbid the action. … 25

Summary

To summarize, we have the following principles:

  • Actively, directly harming others, even קלים, ריקים, פוחזים, פרוצים ביותר, מגלי עריות ומחללי שבת, in order to save oneself is forbidden.
  • Mere evasive action, even with the inevitable consequence of harm to another, is permitted to both a potential victim himself as well as a friend of his, provided that the harm has not yet befallen the victim.
  • Once the harm has already befallen the victim, it is forbidden to shift it onto another. Some still allow the victim himself to take evasive action, but this view is problematic.

Postscript

The idea that Halachah allows the privileged, the rich and the well connected to utilize their wealth and influence to shift, even indirectly, the burden of military service onto their less fortunate brethren26 will very likely trouble those (such as me) with modern, Western value systems. This is apparently a classic example of the celebrated maxim of Rav Ya’akov Weil:

[פסקי] בעלי בתים ופסקי לומדים שני הפכים הם27

Notes

1 Job 2:4
2 One can, of course, consider the matter from an ethical perspective without invoking Halachah, and there may even be an ethic independent of Halachah, but our discussion will be limited to the Halachah.
3 Dr. Shapiro read a draft of this essay, and commented helpfully thereon.
4 בבא קמא פרק ג’ הלכה א
5 Bava Basra, p. 10 in the Rif pagination. He also cites the fourth paragraph, but he apparently understands it to be stating a different rule.
6 הגהת שו”ע חו”מ סימן שפ”ח סוף סעיף ב
7 שם ס”ק י
8 שו”ת פרי חיים חו”מ סימן ד
9 עיין בדברי החפץ חיים שנביא להלן, ובפתחי תשובה סימן קס”ג ס”ק כ”ז, ובתשובת רב שמואל לנדא שנביא להלן. ועיין להלן מה שנביא מהיד אברהם
10 ספר חפץ חיים הלכות לשון הרע כלל י’ באר מים חיים אות מ”ג
11 שו”ת מהר”י ן’ לב חלק ב’ סימן מ
12 חו”מ סימן קפ”ג ס”ק י”ח
13 גליון שו”ע שם
14 חדושי אמרי ברוך שם
15 חדושי מוהרי”ג שם
16 שם ס”ק כ”ז
17 שו”ת נודע ביהודה תנינא יו”ד סימן ע”ד, ציינו הפתחי תשובה חו”מ שם וגם הביא קצת מדבריו ביו”ד סימן קנ”ז ס”ק י”ג
18 יד אברהם, שו”ע יו”ד סימן קנ”ז סעיף א
19 But note that the introduction to the Shulhan Aruch states that the Yad Avraham was published posthumously from manuscript, so perhaps something was lost in transcription.
20 The objection of Rav Landau and of Hasam Sofer (see below) to the seizure of religiously lax youths is noted by Dr. Shapiro in footnote 16 of his article.
21 The question of Tinok She’Nishbeh is beyond the scope of this post.
22 שו”ת חת”ם סופר חלק ששי סימן כ”ט ד”ה ועל דבר, ציינו הפתחי תשובה חו”מ שם
23 עיין רמב”ם הלכות תשובה פרק ג’ הלכה ט’, הלכות רוצח פרק ד’ הלכה י’, שולחן ערוך יו”ד סימן קנ”ח סעיף ב’, אנצקלופדיה תלמודית ערך אפיקורוס
24 שאלות ותשובות מקדשי השם, שער מחמדים, עמודים ד – ו. Rav Meisel’s narrative is cited (in English translation) by Irving J. Rosenbaum, The Holocaust and Halakhah, pp. 3 – 5, and see his discussion of it in the endnote on p. 158. I thank Dr. Shapiro for bringing this story to my attention.
25 The Holocaust and Halakhah, pp. 24 – 30. He is citing Rabb Oshry’s Divre Efrayim, p. 95, a work to which I do not currently have access.
26 I have seen no discussion of whether there’s any ethical imperative, such as Lifnim Mi’Shuras Ha’Din or Middas Hassidus, to refrain from so doing.
27 שו”ת מהר”י ווייל סוף סימן קמ”ו, הובא בסמ”ע סימן ג’ ס”ק י”ג




Marc B. Shapiro – Responses to Comments and Elaborations on Previous Posts II

Responses to Comments and Elaborations of Previous Posts II
by Marc B. Shapiro
In a previous post I wrote as follows:
In Kitvei Ramban, vol. 1, p. 413, Chavel prints the introduction to Milhamot ha-Shem. The Ramban writes:
וקנאתי לרבנו הגדול רבי יצחק אלפאסי זכרונו לברכה קנאה גדולה, מפני שראיתי לחולקים על דבריו שלא השאירו לו כפי רב מחלוקותיהם ענין נכון בכל מה שדבר, ולא דבר הגון בכל מה שפרש, ולא פסק ראוי בכל מה שפסק, לא נשאר עם דבריהם בהלכות זולתי הדברים הפשוטים למתחיל פרק אין עומדין
In his note Chavel explains the last words as follows:
רק בסוף הפרק הזה נמצאה השגה אחת מבעל המאור
Yet what Ramban means by למתחיל פרק אין עומדין are the children who begin their talmudic study with Tractate Berakhot. In other words, it is only the explanations and pesakim of the Rif that are obvious even to the beginner that have not been challenged.[1]
Ephraim responded as follows

WRT the reference of Ramban to פרק אין עומדין, both you and R. Chavel are wrong. Ramban is clearly referring to the gemara’s explanation of the Mishnah’s ruling at the beginning of that chapter of אין עומדין להתפלל אלא מתוך כובד ראש, which is that one should learn an undisputed halakha prior to davening. It is only on those simple and undisputed halakhos that the Maor did not disagree.

Fotheringay-Phipps wrote:

The basic problem with Dr. Shapiro’s (or R’ Mazuz’s, as the case may be) pshat is that Ain Omdin is the fifth chapter of B’rachos, not the first. If the Ramban meant the perek that a kid starting out learns, why would he choose the fifth perek? I think R’ Chavel’s pshat is somewhat of a better pshat, since Ain Omdin is somewhat unusual in that there is only one haga’a from the Ba’al Hamoar in the whole perek, and I incline to think that this is what the Ramban meant.

I presented these comments to R. Mazuz and he replied as follows:

לפי פירוש כת”ר היל”ל הדברים הפשוטים שבתחלת פרק אין עומדין. אולם ידוע שבעדות המזרח התחילו ללמוד מסכת ברכות (וכ”ה בשו”ת הרי”ף סימן רג”ג). בניגוד לנהוג היום בתלמודי תורה להתחיל פרק אלו מציאות. ואבא זצ”ל התחיל לתלמידים בפרק תפלת השחר (ומסתמא כך נהגו בג’רבא) שהוא הפרק הכי קל בין הפרקים א’ ב’ ג’ ד’ במסכת ברכות. לכן יתכן מאד שבימי הראשונים התחילו דוקא בפרק אין עומדין (שהוא קל אפילו יותר מפרק תפלת השחר, ורובו דברי אגדה). וזוהי כוונת הרמב”ן

With regard to his point about the Sephardim beginning their instruction from Berakhot, in R. Mazuz’s new book, Arim Nisi, p. 364, he notes that R. Shakh, Shimushah shel Torah p. 88, refers to the Maskilim’s attempt to institute this in Europe as a “reform.” Yet in reality, this practice has a long history. R. Mazuz writes:

ונעלם ממנו במחכ”ת שכן מנהג הספרדים עד היום הזה, והוא מנהג קדמון מימי הרי”ף והגאונים, ואולי מימי רבי מסדר המשנה שהתחיל בסדר זרעים במסכת ברכות. ולפני כששים שנה הדפיסו באי ג’רבא מסכת ברכות בהשמתטת הקטעים שאין רגילים ללמדם לתלמידים בהסכמת רבני העיר וט”ו מרביצי תורה שבעיר, ויצאו מהם פירות ופירי פירות

Since I mentioned R. Mazuz’s comment vis-à-vis what R. Shakh wrote, I should add that he criticized him on other occasions as well. These criticisms were always offered with proper respect. Yet there are those in the Lithuanian world who have no interest in hearing what another gadol has to say if it not in line with current Daas Torah.[2] R. Mazuz states that he once sent a letter to Yated Neeman pointing out an error R Shakh made, and they refused to publish it. After this paper refused to publish two more of his letters, he stopped sending them, as the hazakhah had been established.[3]
He also tells us that if the editors had a different attitude, he would have also sent in something dealing with the proper way to pronounce the word אחד in Shema, since there was a great deal of discussion in the newspaper by people who didn’t know what they were talking about. The truth is that a dalet without a dagesh is very similar to a zayin[4] and is still preserved among the elders of Yemen and Iraq. He cites one of Ibn Gabirol’s poems which reads:
לאטך דברי שיר דבורה
אשר קרית שמע מפיך יקרא
מיחדת ומארכת באחד
In Peter Cole’s translation:

Take, little bee,
your time with your song,
in your flight intoning the prayer called “Hear”
declaring and stretching “the Lord is one.”[5]

In other word, the bee’s buzzing (zzz) shows us how one can extend the dalet. It is pronounced in the way that the letter can be extended, which cannot be done with a hard dalet.

R. Shakh was a man of truth, and he certainly would have wanted to be corrected. All true scholars are happy when this happens, and this is what intellectual honesty is all about. But Yated Neeman has never been interested in truth or intellectual honesty, but in pushing a religio-political agenda, and therefore not only do they refuse to print such corrections of their gedolim, but they have even published material which they know is untrue. I refer in particular to their slander of R. Kook, stating that he applied the verse Ki Mitzion Tetze Torah to the Hebew University. Even though the truth was pointed out to them they continued to print the slander. One can read all about this in Moshe Maimon Alharar’s book Li-Khevodah shel Torah.

Returning to R. Mazuz and R. Shakh. R. Shakh had written

Whence did Hazal know that the earth was forty-two times larger than the moon, and that the sun was approximately one-hundred-and-seventy times larger than the earth (as explained in the Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei Hatorah 3:8), if not from the power of the Torah?

Some might recognize this passage as it was subject to a very strong critique by R. Aharon Lichtenstein. I am sure that many in the haredi world were very upset by what R. Lichtenstein wrote, but it pales in comparison to what R. Shakh wrote about the Rav’s Hamesh Derashot.[6] Among his negative comments, he referred to Rav’s Zionist ideas as ממש דברי כפירה.

R. Lichtenstein actually has two replies to the quote from R. Shakh. They are both found in the same essay, but the essay has appeared in two different versions. In the original version he wrote as follows.

Upon reading the passage, one can only reflect, first, that the description cited is nowhere to be found in Hazal, but derives, rather, from medieval astronomers; second, that it is in conflict with the rudiments of contemporary scientific assumptions, and, third, that it hardly consorts with the fact that the selfsame Rambam had explicitly stated, with respect to these very issues, that they were beyond the pale of Hazal’s authority. . . . The high regard properly due the author of the Avi Ezri notwithstanding, one can only conclude that, evidently, when their reach exceeds their grasp, even acknowledged and esteemed talmdei hakhamim may falter.[7]

Yet when this essay was reprinted in Leaves of Faith, vol. 2, the criticism was softened:

In raising this question, he is wholly oblivious not only of the rudiments of astronomy but also of the fact that the selfsame Rambam explicitly states, with respect to these very issues, that they are beyond the pale of Hazal’s authority.

כן בדברי חז”ל. וכמבואר להדיא בהקדמתו לפירוש המשניות (בש”ס ברכות דפוס ווילנא דף נה סע”א וע”ב) שהמקור לזה מספר אלמגסט”י. והוא ספרו של בטלמיוס הידוע בחכמת האסטרונומיא. ועפ”ז כתב הרמב”ם בהלכות יסודי התורה (שם) שהשמש גדולה מן הירח פי 6800. ורלב”ג עה”ת (בפסוק ויאמר אלקים יהי מאורות) חולק על זה וכתב כי השמש גדולה מהירח פי חמשים אלף, כמו שביאר בח”א ממאמר חמישי מס’ מלחמות ה’ ע”ש. וכיום ידוע שהשמש גדולה מן הארץ פי מליון שלש מאות אלף

In response to this citation of R. Shakh in Yated Neeman, R. Mazuz wrote as follows (Or Torah, Adar 5753, pp. 461-462):

והנני להעיר שהרמב”ם כתב כן ע”פ חכמי המדע בימיו ולא נצמא כן בדברי חז”ל. וכמבואר להדיא בהקדמתו לפירוש המשניות (בש”ס ברכות דפוס ווילנא דף נה סע”א וע”ב) שהמקור לזה מספר אלמגסט”י. והוא ספרו של בטלמיוס הידוע בחכמת האסטרונומיא. ועפ”ז כתב הרמב”ם בהלכות יסודי התורה (שם) שהשמש גדולה מן הירח פי 6800. ורלב”ג עה”ת (בפסוק ויאמר אלקים יהי מאורות) חולק על זה וכתב כי השמש גדולה מהירח פי חמשים אלף, כמו שביאר בח”א ממאמר חמישי מס’ מלחמות ה’ ע”ש. וכיום ידוע שהשמש גדולה מן הארץ פי מליון שלש מאות אלף

R. Mazuz’s second letter deals with the nature of darkness. Yated Neeman had printed the Vilna Gaon’s opinion that darkness is not simply the absence of light but its own creation. R. Mazuz responded that this is in opposition to the opinions of the Rambam, Ramban, R. Joel Sirkes, R. Elijah Mizrahi and the Siftei Hakhamim. Subsequent to writing the letter he learnt that this view was also held by R. Saadiah Gaon, Ibn Ezra, Radak, and the Kol Bo (see ibid., p. 946) After pointing out that the Vilna Gaon’s view is held by R. Jacob Emden and the Hida. He concludes:
מכל מקום אין לקרוא לסברא. שהחשך הוא העדר “דברת המינים” ח”ו. ואלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים
As already mentioned, Yated Neeman does not like to print letters from those who are able to show that the newspaper has erred. Only newspapers interested in the truth do that.

In his Kovetz Ma’amarim, pp. 102ff., R. Mazuz includes another letter he sent to Yated which also was not printed. The paper had published the view of the Steipler and R. Chaim Kanievsky that even Sephardim should pronounce the final vowel of אד-ני as Ashkenazim pronounce the kamatz, since otherwise it appears as it if there is more than one God.

R. Mazuz shows how mistaken this is, and illustrates though various texts that the way the Sephardim pronounce the kamatz today is precisely how it was pronounced in medieval times. For example, he cites one of Ibn Gabirol’s Azharot:

אנכי ה’ / קראתיך בסינַי/ ולא יהיה על פנַי / לך אלהים אחרים
One can easily see that the words are designed to rhyme, so obviously the last syllable of Ado-nai was pronounced the same way as Sinai and panai.
2. Since I just mentioned R. Aharon Lichtenstein, let me quote something else he wrote that relates to what I noted in a previous post.[8] I pointed to the common phenomenon of people rejecting the authenticity of texts that don’t agree with their preconceptions. R. Lichtenstein states:

The Rav had no patience for philosophies that glorified passivity and reliance on miracles. At the beginning of the 1960’s, a few years after the launch of Sputnik, I had occasion to talk with the Rav about those people who claimed that man should not reach out for the heavens, for “the heavens are the heavens of God,” and only “the earth is given to human beings.” The Rav heaped scorn upon them. One of those present jumped up to protest: “But Rabbi, the Ramban in Bechukotai (Vayikra 26:11) speaks about how a person should have faith in the Holy One, and not to delve into matters that are too wondrous for him.” The Rav replied, “I heard from my father, in the name of my grandfather, that the Ramban never uttered that statement!”

Although not identical to the Ramban’s position, there was also a medieval Jewish view that doctors should only be consulted for things like sprained arms, but that when it came to internal diseases one should only resort to prayer. Lest one think that this idiosyncratic position has totally disappeared, I have even found a twentieth-century author who adopts it,[9] leading R. Ovadiah Yosef to strongly reject this view in his haskamah.

3. In a previous post[10] I called attention to an error made by H. Norman Strickman and Arthur Silver. They claimed that according to Radak’s commentary to Gen. 14:14, after the conquest of the Land of Israel the reading of this verse was changed to read “and pursued as far as Dan.” Dr. Strickman has informed me that in the Afterword to his translation of Ibn Ezra to Leviticus, p. 291, he himself corrected the errror. The correct reference is to Radak’s commentary to I Sam. 4:1. Here Radak leaves no doubt that he indeed believes that the text of the verse was changed.
על האבן העזר: כמו הארון הברי’ והכותב אמר זה כי כשהיתה זאת המלחמה אבן נגף היתה ולא אבן עזר ועדיין לא נקראה אבן העזר כי על המלחמה האחרת שעשה שמואל עם פלשתים בין המצפה ובין השן שקרא אותה שמואל אבן העזר שעזרם האל יתברך באותה מלחמה אבל מה שנכתב הנה אבן העזר דברי הסופר הם וכן וירדף עד דן
With this text, we can now understand Radak’s commentary to Gen. 14:4 as also referring to a post-Mosaic change. Without this text, there would be no reason to assume that Radak in Gen 14:14 is not referring to Moses’ prophetically writing the word “Dan.”

As I pointed out in my previous post, in the introduction to his Commentary on the Torah Radak insists on complete Mosaic authorship. In order that there be no contradiction between the sources, we must assume that Radak means that no sections (or even verses) were written by someone other than Moses, but not that there are no minor post-Mosaic changes. In my book I pointed out that Radak understood tikkun soferim literally, that is, the Scribes actually made minor changes to the text of the Torah.[11]

(With regard to false ascription of critical views vis-à-vis the Torah’s authorship, I should also mention that Abarbanel, Commentary to Numbers 21:1, accuses both Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides of believing that the beginning verses of this chapter are post-Mosaic. Yet Abarbanel must have been citing from memory, since neither of them say this. In fact, Ibn Ezra specifically rejects the notion that the verses were written by Joshua.)

4. In a previous post I mentioned R. David Zvi Hillman’s strong attack on R. Kafih. It is only fair to point out that Hillman’s letter was the impetus for an even sharper attack on Hillman. See here, here, and here for the relevant documents.

R. Kafih was a follower of the Rambam who wrote that one should be “among those who are insulted, but not among those who are insulting” (Deot 5:28). While the articles make many good points, the crude language used is entirely unacceptable.

5. With regard to the Netziv and reading newspapers on Shabbat, Dr. Yehudah Mirsky has called my attention to the Netziv’s article in R. Kook’s journal, Ittur Soferim (1888), pp. 11-12, where the Netziv offers halakhic justification for this practice. Unfortunately, this short article was not included in Meshiv Davar, vol. 5, which appeared in 1993. (Presumably, the editors were unaware of it.) This most recent volume of Meshiv Davar is a bit strange, because the editors don’t tell us anything about where they found previoiusly unpublished responsa included here. From a historical standpoint, the most interesting responsum is no. 44. Here the Netziv blasts the new analytic approach of R. Isaac Jacob Reines, which is found in his Hotam ha-Tokhnit and Urim Gedolim.

Other than an anonymous article in Ha-Peles 5 (1903), pp. 673-674, in which Reines’ approach is regarded as falling into the category of “that which is new is forbidden by the Torah,” I don’t know of any other attacks on him. For some strange reason, Saul Lieberman thought that R. Yaakov David Wilovsky’s famous attack against the Brisker method, found in the introduction to his Beit Ridbaz, was directed against Reines. Shaul Stampfer quoted this in Lieberman’s name in the first edition of his masterpiece, Ha-Yeshivah ha-Lita’it be-Hithavutah (Jerusalem, 1995), p. 113 n. 29, but omits Lieberman’s comment in the second edition of this book (Jerusalem, 2005).

6. In a previous post I wrote about the issue of kosher sturgeon. Shortly after the post appeared I read David Malkiel’s article on R. Isaac Lampronte’s Pahad Yitzhak.[12] Malkiel, p. 129, points out that the most famous entry in the work deals with the authority of customs, and focuses on whether a certain type of sturgeon is kosher. Lampronte tell us that the custom in Ferrara was to eat it.

I wrote the post without doing an internet search, which is now the first place people go when beginning their research. Only after the post appeared did I do such a search and I came up with the following very interesting post by Rabbi Seth Mandel.[13] He writes as follows:

I have asked several rabbonim about how it came to pass that if the Noda’ biY’hudah paskened unequivocally that sturgeon is kosher, every book says black on white that it is not. Of the two rabbonim who even were aware of the issue, one said that of course sturgeon is kosher, and the fact that there is none with a hekhsher is either because the rav hamakhshir doesn’t know about the issue, or you can’t get a rav hamakhshir to the fishing plants. . . . The other rov said that of course, no recognized halakhic authority would contradict the Noda’ biY’hudah on this, but since Jews believe they are not kosher, and the only ones pushing their kashrut are the C or R, why should an O rov fight to show they are kosher, as if we accept the way they arrive at their decision? . . . 

I challenge anyone to find a posek who deals with the issue and refutes the Noda’ biY’hudah. I am _not_ saying that I “know” that there is no one; what I am saying is that I have been looking for years, and have found no one. Please do not hesitate to correct me if anyone knows of a source (but one that knows that the Noda’ biY’hudah had a t’shuva on this). The books on the kashrus of fish just take it as a given that since sturgeon, as R. Josh says, do not have scales but rather bony tubercules, they are not kosher. My bottom line is I don’t care if people hold that they are not kosher (I don’t like fish eggs, anyway), but it seems to me inexcusable for these books to distort the Torah by giving the impression that everyone agrees on this issue. The Noda’ biY’hudah is not just anyone. My goodness, he is not even MO, L, or Chareidi, so there go most of the opportunities for saying “WADR to the Noda’ biY’hudah, he is MO/L/ wears a grey hat, and so cannot be representative of true Torah.” The only thing you can say is that he was an opponent of chasidus, but even according to the Chasidim, that is not an issue, since a famous story of the Chasidim is that he repented on his deathbed from all the not nice things he said condemning chasidus (and the story _must_ be true, since it is retold in the CIS Shulman “authorized” biography of him).

Rabbi Mandel wrote this before he was appointed to his current important position in the OU kashrut organization. Somehow, I don’t think he would have expressed himself this way if he was then working in the kashrut industry.[14]

7. I was fortunate to spend back-to-back Shabbatot with Prof. Daniel Sperber. I learnt much from my conversations with him, and I think people will enjoy listening to his presentations. He is currently president of the Jesselson Institute for Advanced Torah Studies at Bar Ilan University, and was kind enough to give me a recent volume published by them, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit by Shlomo Kassierer and Shlomo Glicksberg. This book analyzes the relationship between the written and oral law, and the nature of rabbinical authority. What makes the book significant is the combination of traditional and academic study. Anyone who wants to understand the latest thinking on this topic would be wise to consult this book.

8. Many people contacted me following my last post on Rabbis and Communism, so let me add a few further comments. R. Baruch Oberlander called my attention to Likutei Sihot, vol. 33, pp. 248-249. Here the Lubavitcher Rebbe states that there is no contradiction between Judaism and socialism. He adds that in Russia, before the Revolution, he knew many socialists, even radical ones (which I assume means real communists), who were completely Torah observant. See also Iggerot Kodesh, vol. 22, p. 497.

Since my last post mentioned R. Jacob Emden and Abraham Bick’s communist ties, I should also mention Mortimer Cohen, the author of Jacob Emden: A Man of Controversy. This was the first academic defense of Emden, and was subjected to withering criticism by Scholem. Marvin Antelman, who has made attacking Eybschuetz one of his life’s goals, also sets his guns on Cohen, accusing him of having been the “’rabbi’ of a secret sect of Sabbatean communists, who carried on the Frankist conspiracy in Philadelphia” (Bekhor Satan, p. 44).

R. Nathan Kamenetsky wrote to me pointing out that when R. Dovid Leibowitz was let go from Yeshiva Torah va-Daas in the 1930s, one of the complaints against him was that he was promoting communism (whether the complaint was justified I cannot say. Kamenetsky continues: “My son, R’ Yoseph, pointed out that the Torah divides wealth evenly when it sets the law of Yovel. At the conquest of Canaan, the land was divided evenly, and every fifty years thereafter, by which time there would be wealthy lanlords and poor ones, the Torah redistributed the land in its original lots. (The difference between large estates and small ones would then result only from family sizes, by which families with many children would have smaller fields than and those with many children.)”

I had wondered about the meaning of the word ,סוללים and suggested that it refers to a white-collar profession. Kamenetsky writes:

You do not base your suggestion on philology – and nor will I. I also do not think that you are correct sociologically that white-collar workers were assumed to be less religiously observant than other Jews. I believe that Rabbi Graubart meant pharmacists, because, like doctors, they were not expected to be observant. I know this from my father’s attitude (which was grounded in the pre-World War I Jewish environment). For example, when my father would speak of my native Tzitevian, the town where he served as rabbi, and telling an involved story about how a Jewish woman who was suspected by my mother of not using the mikveh found that her husband was carrying on with their goyisheh maid, he added, (not in these exact words) “Naturally, besides the pharmacist’s wife, all the women in the shtetl used the mikveh.” Insofar as doctors, and likely pharmacists too, they weren’t trusted to be profesionally reliable if they were observant! See my Making of a Godol, page 557, (within my discussion about Dr. Einhorn, a mysterious figure), where I quote an article about that doctor which said, “The [townspeople] realized that [Dr. Einhorn’s] way of life, his devoutness, did not harmonize with his profession.”

9. Dr. Yehudah Mirsky called my attention to Mordechai Zalkin, “Bein ‘Bnei Elohim’ li-Vnei Adam’: Rabbanim, Bahurei Yeshivot ve-ha-Giyus le-Tzavah Ha-Russi ba-Meah ha-19,” in Avriel Bar-Levav, ed., Shalom u-Milhamah be-Tarbut Ha-Yehudit (Jerusalem/Haifa, 2006), pp. 165-222. I was unaware of this fabulous article which is a detailed survey of the issue of rabbis and the Cantonist problem. Let me just quote his concluding paragraph, which I was happy to see supports a suggestion I made. Coming from Zalkin, who is an expert in the history of Russian Jewry, it should be taken very seriously.

אין בידינו כלים לבחון את מידת השפעתו ארוכת הטווח של תהליך זה על מערך היחסים הבסיסי בחברה היהודית המזרח אירופית משלהי המא התשע-עשרה. אולם יש מקום להניח שלתחושת האכזבה והתסכול מאופן תפקודה של הרבנות המזרח אירופית בפרשת הגיוס היה חלק לא מבוטל במגמות החילון ובנהייה אחר תנועות אידאולוגיות שהציעו מודלים מנהיגותיים אחרים, שרווחו בקרב יהודי מזרח אירופה במחצית השנייה של המאה התשע-עשרה
Notes
[1] See R. Meir Mazuz’ note in R. Hayyim Amselem, Minhat Hayyim, vol. 2, p. 15.
[2] I stress the “current” Daas Torah, since Daas Torah has been known to change. For example, Yated Neeman will, for obvious reasons, no longer mention the Daas Torah set forth by the Brisker Rav, the Steipler, and R. Shakh, and which was the official haredi position for many decades, namely, that one is not permitted to serve in the Israeli government batei din. With regard to Daas Torah, the quote from R. Itzele that I mentioned in my last post is very interesting
החלק הפוליטי נחוץ, כי על ידו נמשוך את בני הנעורים והרחוב להסתדרותנו. גם הלא אנו רואים, כי כלל ישראל חפץ בו, בוודאי מאת ד’ הייתה זאת. וכלל ישראל הוא גבוה ונעלה מגדולי התורה. ישראל אם אינם נביאים, בני נביאים הם
In the haredi version of Daas Torah, the opinions of the masses are meaningless, indeed they are said to be – by definition – in opposition to Daas Torah (which always makes me wonder how laypeople such as Jonathan Rosenblum are able to understand and explain Daas Torah). Yet R. Itzele places the opinion of the religious masses on a higher level than that of the rabbis (à la kol hamon ke-kol shadai). One reader informed me that R. Avraham Shapira quoted this passage in defense of Zionism, i.e., the religious intuition of the people, who supported Zionism, trumped the view of the gedolim, most of whom opposed Zionism.
[3] Or Torah, Adar 5753, pp. 461ff., 946.
[4] See Shamma Friedman, “Le-Inyan ha-Devorah be-Shiro shel Ibn Gabirol, u-Minhag Ehad bi-Keriat Shema,” Lashon ve-Ivrit, Dec. 6, 1990, p. 31.
[5] Selected Poems of Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Princeton, 2000), p. 69.
[6] See Mikhtavim u-Ma’amarim, vol. 4, p. 107. See also his strong attack on the Rav’s ideology, ibid., pp. 35ff.
[7] “Legitimization of Modernity: Classical and Contemporary,” in Moshe Z. Sokol, ed., Engaging Modernity (Northvale, 1997), pp. 21-22
[8] See here.
[9] R. Reuven ben David, Meshiv Davar (Jerusalem, 1979), no. 2.
[10] http://seforim.blogspot.com/2008/01/clarifications-of-previous-posts-by.html
[11] Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 99. I also note that Radak doesn’t usually mention the various tikkunei soferim, which probably means that he did not accept them.
[12] “The Burden of the Past in the 18th Century: Authority, Custom and Innovation in the Pahad Yitzhak,” Jewish Law Annual 16 (2006), pp. 94-132
[13] See here.
[14] In a future post I hope to deal with the history of the kashrut industry. For now, let me just note that among the many ways we are more fortunate than those of previous generations is that we can even buy toilet bowl cleaner with a hashgachah (it is parve.). See here. Here is the actual letter of certification.

[15] See http://torahinmotion.org/store/store.htm



A Puzzling Example of Plagiarism

One of the strange facts connected with plagiarism is that, at times, it is hard to discern what the motivation is to plagiarize. For example, we have seen a person today that continuously plagiarizes entire books even though he is well-known and, if the approbations on his books are any indication, well-respected. Still, he has plagiarized, in their entirety at least three books and seems to continue to do so. While monetary gain may be a reason, I don’t see this as making him rich.

Another example where it is hard to figure out why the person plagiarized is an earlier case, a case from the early 19th century. Again, we are dealing with a book that was plagiarized in its entirety. Such examples, where the whole book is appropriated, makes it easy to show that this is a case of plagiarism and not merely that a sentence or two was not cited properly. This particular example also has the benefit that although an entire book was stolen and then republished under the very same title, it appears that detection of this eluded some experts in the field of Jewish books. Specifically, as we shall see that Israel Zinberg, had no knowledge of this. First, the original.

The book in question is a small work, Ha-Matzah Hadasha, published in Amsterdam as part of a collection of works. The entire collection, that includes three other works, is Shir Emunim. The author of these works is R. Moshe Piza. Ha-Matzah Hadasha is a book whose purpose is to demonstrate and list the words that contain the letter Shin and to distinguish between a Shin and a Sin. Additionally, R. Piza included a short commentary on the bottom that provides translation for some of the words he lists. Finally, R. Piza includes a poem of sorts at the end that lists the Sins in Tanach.


Ha-Matzah Hadasha, Amsterdam, 1793

Now, the plagiarized version. For this we travel from Amsterdam to Vilna. Zinberg, (A History of Jewish Literature, New York, 1975, vol. 6, pp. 282-84) in discussing the early rumblings of the Haskalah movement points to an “interesting person” Naftali Hertz Shulman. Shulman was very well-read and may have been proficient in Russian, German and Latin, something very uncommon for Jews of the time. He gave classes in the Rambam’s Moreh Nevukim and was a teacher to many wealth students. Shulman attempted to start a journal that would provide information “about commerce and political events, and the lover of science about scientific discoveries.” The stated purpose of the journal was so that “much knowledge in the realm of various languages, mathematics, geography, the natural sciences, etc. will be disseminated among our people.”

Now, in 1804, Shulman published R. Benyamin Mussafia’s lexographic work, Zekher Rav. Additionally, in 1804, under his own name, Shulman published Ha-Matzah Hadasha. On the title page Shulman states that “he gathered the information [in Ha-Matzah Hadasha] from many places” but never says that the entire work is word for word from R. Piza’s earlier work. Zinberg, in his three pages on Shulman – most of glowing with Shulman’s accomplishments – never mentions this fact. This is so, although the fact that Shulman plagiarism was already noted by Roest in his catalog of the Rosenthal collection, Yodeh Sefer no. 520. Roest notes that Shulman plagiarized Piza’s entire work. It is worth noting that in truth Shulman did not plagiarize R. Piza’s entire work – Shulman left out the final poem (I have provided it below).

Even auction catalogers, whose job presumably is to increase the value of auction items, were unaware of this fact. In the Judiaca Jerusalem catalog (April, 2008) they had Shulman’s work for sale. They merely note that Shulman probably wrote this work – a work to differentiate between a the two similar letters of Shin and Sin – due to the unique Lithuanian pronunciation. Not only do that not mention the work is not original to Shulman, their explanation fails to account for the fact the work was never written in response to Lithuanian pronunciation as it was originally written in Amsterdam by a Sefardic author, R. Piza.


Ha-Matzah Hadasha, Sklov, 1804

Now, in light of Zinberg’s description of Shulman, Shulman appears to have been well respected in Vilna, as I mentioned he taught many wealthy children, Shulman published his own works and was involved with many members of the early Haskalah even going so far as to suggest publishing the journal mentioned above. It is therefore perplexing then he would plagiarize an eight page book that for the most part is merely a list of words from Tanach that merely highlights whether there is a Shin or a Sin. Below, are scans from the original and Shulman’s edition.


A Page from Shulman’s edition

The same page from Piza’s original version

The poem that appears at the end of Piza’s Version

Note
Additionally, it may be that he actually plagiarized another book as well. While this is highly speculative, another book, discussed here, was plagiarized from R. Abraham ben HaGra in 1804 by a Yehuda ben Naftali Hertz. I don’t know if this Yehuda ben Naftali Hertz is related to the Naftali Hertz above but the similarity in name, place of publication, as well as the timing may be an indication that either it is the same person or somehow connected.




Marc B. Shapiro – Rabbis and Communism

Rabbis and Communism
By
Marc B. Shapiro
I had intended my newest post to be on the Rav’s famous essay “Confrontation,” but I recently received the latest issue of Tradition with Rabbi Yitzchak Blau’s article “Rabbinic Responses to Communism,” so let me make a few comments about it. First, I must say that it is a good read, like all of Blau’s writing, and I was impressed with the range of topics he attempts to tackle. My only suggestion for improvement would have been to examine the larger context of Jewish communist anti-clerical sentiment, which made it very hard for the rabbis to be sympathetic to communism.
Yet this anti-clerical feeling did not arise in a vacuum. Quite apart from the traditional Marxist aversion to religion, the rabbis, like their non-Jewish religious counterparts, were generally aligned with the aristocracy, who paid their salary and took their sons as marriage partners for their daughters. The rabbis were thus seen as standing in the way of economic justice. In fact, there has been a long plutocratic tradition in the Jewish world, which meant complete disenfranchisement of the poor from all communal decisions. I don’t know of any Jewish community in history where people who could not afford to pay taxes were given communal voting rights. (This would be the modern equivalent of not giving welfare recipients the right to vote – wouldn’t the Republicans love to make this the law of the land!)
R. Samuel de Medina goes so far as to argue that the wealthy are qualitatively superior to the poor, citing in support of this horrible notion Eccl. 7:12: “For wisdom is a defense, even as money is a defense.” For him, money and wisdom are two sides of the same coin. [1] He also gives another proof to support his pro-wealth point of view. Gen. 41:56 states: “And the famine was over all the face of the earth (פני הארץ).” Upon this the Midrash comments that the face of the earth refers to the rich people (Tanhuma, ad loc.). From this we see, says de Medina, that the rich are at the head of the community and everyone else in the rear, not a position from which one leads.[2] As he puts it (and note how the poor and the ignorant are treated as one group):
Accepting the will of the majority, when that majority is composed of ignorant men, could lead to a perversion of justice. For if there were one hundred men in a city, ten of whom were wealthy, respected men, and ninety of whom were poor, and the ninety wanted to appoint a leader approved by them, would the ten prominent men have to submit to him regardless of who he was? Heaven forbid, this is not the accepted way (“the way of pleasantness”).[3]
None of this means that de Medina was insensitive to the needs of the poor. This was not the case at all, and he has a responsum in which he requires people to contribute to the building of houses that will be used, among other things, for poor visitors to spend the night.[4] Yet we see in him a sense of paternalism that was common in traditional societies all over the world, and was one of the factors which convinced the lower class that it was time to take matters into their own hands.[5]
When dealing with anti-clericalism in Russia, we must also not forget the masses’ long memory of how some (many?, most?) rabbis were silent during the era of the chappers. This was when children were grabbed for 25 years of military service in the Cantonists, often never again to see their parents and usually succumbing to incessant pressure (including torture) to be baptized. Yet it wasn’t the children of the rich or the rabbis who were taken, but the poor children. Jacob Lifshitz’ defense of the way the Jewish community dealt with the Cantonist tragedy – which he regards as worse than even the destruction of the Temple![6] – and his insistence that no one can judge the community leaders unless they themselves had been in such a difficult circumstance, is something we must bear in mind.[7] Yet all such ex post facto justifications would have no impact on the outlook of those that actually suffered during the Cantonist era, and it is no wonder that many of the common people would not regard the rabbis in a sympathetic light. The rabbis were certainly able to come up with a justification why their sons, the future Torah scholars, should not be taken to the army, just as they continue to make this argument. Yet this would only serve to show the masses that some children’s blood was indeed redder than others.[8]
In his memoir of this era, Yehudah Leib Levin wrote:
“I was relatively calm and personally did not fear the chappers, because my father was an important landlord, distinguished in Torah and highly regarded by everyone. My mother was the daughter of the most famous tzaddik (righteous person) of his generation, Rabbi Moshe Kabrina’at. And I, I was one of the “good children,” a prodigy the likes of whom were not touched by the hand of the masses. Free both of fear and of schoolwork, because the teachers and pupils had all gone into hiding and the chedarim [schools] were closed, I wandered daily around the city streets seeing the little “Russians,” and my heart burst when I realized they were in the hands of non-Jews, who forced them to eat pork – oh dear me!”[9]

Elyakum Zunser was seized when he was away from his hometown. Many years later he wrote:

“Many private individuals engaged in this traffic, seizing young children and selling them to the Kahal “bosses.” Reminiscent of the sale of Joseph by his own brothers, these betrayals occurred daily. Lesser rabbis of small towns assented to such transactions, rationalizing that it was more “pious” to save the children of their own towns than to concern themselves with the fate of strangers.

“Though many important rabbis wept at these outrages, most dared not protest. They were afraid of the consequences if the Jewish community would defy the Tsar’s quota. The rabbis held their positions at the discretion of the Kahal leaders and feared the consequences of displeasing them. They were afraid to be denounced to government officials and exiled to Siberia.[10]”
Michael Stanislawski notes that in one community the communal leaders wanted to grab a poor tailor since he wasn’t observant, but the local rabbi forbid it. Stanislawski also tells us that in Vilna the communal leaders had their sights on a larger prize.
[T]he traditionalist kahal authorities later attempted to forestall the opening of the government-sponsored rabbinical seminaries by drafting the sons of several of its proposed teachers, but this was discovered by the local administration and forbidden.[11]
He also quotes the Hebrew writer Y. L. Katsenson, who describes his grandmother’s shock when she discovered that the chappers in her town were not Gentiles:
No, my child, to our great horror, all khappers were in fact Jews, Jews with beards and sidelocks. We Jews are accustomed to attacks, libels, and evil decrees from the non-Jews – such have happened from time to time immemorial, and such is our lot in Exile. In the past, there were Gentiles who held a cross in one hand and a knife in the other, and said: “Jew, kiss the cross or die,” and the Jews preferred death to apostasy. But now there come Jews, religious Jews, who capture children and send them off to apostasy. Such a punishment was not even listed in the Bible’s list of the most horrible curses. Jews spill the blood of their brothers, and God is silent, the rabbis are silent. . . .[12]
What is incredible is that after all the pressure to convert, some Cantonists remained Jewish. In fact – and here I mention something that I only learnt after my book on R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg was published – Weinberg’s grandfather was a Cantonist. His father was also a soldier in the post-Cantonist Czarist army.[13] In the book I mentioned that Weinberg’s family was undistinguished, yet if I was writing it now I would speak about how the two generations of army service signifies that this was in fact a very low-class family, and shows how significant Weinberg’s rise to fame was. As I pointed out, while in theory the yeshivot were equal-opportunity institutions, in reality the aristocratic element in them was generally well established and self-perpetuating.[14]
In a strong defense of the rabbis against the charge that they collaborated with the rich people in order to ensure that the poor were taken, R. Moses Solomon Kazarnov calls attention to all that the rabbis did to defend the children of the lower class.[15] But he acknowledges that the rabbis would hand over the non-religious kids, including their own![16] (While I have no doubt that the rabbis joined with the parnasim to hand over the non-religious youth, it strains imagination to believe that there were more than a few who did this with their own irreligious sons.) As Kazarnov puts it (51-52, in words that must cause loathing in any contemporary parent, and I would assume in virtually all parents even one hundred years ago):
והרבנים איפא כבנים נאמנים לתלמודם הורו למעשה את אשר מצאו כתוב להלכה, ותמיד הורו לא אך לאחרים, אך גם לעצמם, אם בניהם לא נהגו כשורה, לנדותם להבזותם ולתת גם את חלקם לטובים מהם; כמה אבות רבנים או חרדים גרידא הנך זוכר קורא יקר, אשר בניהם יצאו לתרבות רעה ואשר התפללו לה’ תמיד כי יחמול ה’ עליהם ויקח את בניהם אלה מהם, כמה מהם השתדלו בעצמם להשיג את בניהם שנתפקרו למען מסרם לצבא תחת יתר בניהם הרודים עם א-ל?
Talk about conditional love! I don’t even want to imagine what it did to the mental state of a child who knew that his father would hand him over to the Czar’s army if he decided that he no longer wanted to be Orthodox. Kazarnov continues:
ואם כן אפוא מי זה יאשימם על הוראתם למסור למלכות לעבודת הצבא את החטאים תחת הכשרים? . . . הלא לא עשו לבני העניים יותר מאשר עשו לבניהם המם. את הכשרים שמרו כבבת עינם, אם שלהם ואם של אחרים, ואת החוטאים מסרו לצבא אם מירכם יצאו או מירך זולתם! . . . במאכלות אסורות ובנבלות, זמה ורשע, בזדונות כאלה שמו החרדים את פניהם להמעיטם מקרב עמם, מקרב משפחתם ומקרב בני ביתם, ומה היא כל החרדה הזאת?
Concerning the general issue of the rabbis being allied with the wealthy, Dan Rabinowitz called my attention to what R. Judah Margaliot wrote in his Beit Middot:
Some of the leaders of Israel do not think of the glory of their Creator but only of their own. They employ all their power merely to terrorize the community. [He then elaborates on how they do this] . . . Do not think that one can turn for help to the great figures of the generation, to our rabbis, whose duty it is to be the protectors and defenders of the people. For they are in league with the oppressors, walk together with the powerful men and rulers of the city, become collaborators of every mischief-maker, give protection to every swindler. They exploit the rabbi’s title and authority for all kinds of evil deeds. Everything obtains the approval of the community rabbi. He who ought to be the guardian of righteousness and justice becomes the protector of robbers and bandits. The righteous judge joins the league of the swindlers. . . . . And these are our judges and lawgivers! Calmly they look on at the robberies and injustices that take place in the community and flatter the rich and powerful from whom every quarrel and plague come.[17]
Returning to the issue of poverty, which de Medina sees as a disqualifier for communal leadership, we can also find more positive evaluations of it. Nedarim 81a tells us not to neglect the children of the poor, for the Torah goes out from them. If you examine the commentaries on this passage you will certainly find those who point out that it is easier for a poor person to study Torah, as he does not have the same attachment to the material world as does the wealthy man, and it is this attachment that prevents one from focusing on Torah. I read these sources as designed to be encouraging. In other words, they are ex post facto judgments of the positive that can be found in poverty, so that people in this unfortunate state don’t think that all is lost.
Yet in the entire history of the Jewish people I don’t know of any source that says that it is good to be poor, and that this is something that one should strive for. In fact, the Talmud states that one who is poor is like one who is dead (Nedarim 64b), and puts poverty in the same category as childlessness, leprosy, and blindness, all things that we hope we never have to deal with. Similarly, R. Phineas b. Hama stated: ”Poverty in one’s home is worse than fifty plagues” (Bava Batra 116a). In Eruvin 41b extreme poverty is listed as one of the three things that “deprive a man of his senses and of a knowledge of his Creator.”
The notion that it is harder for a rich person to get into heaven than to put a camel through the eye of a needle has never been a Jewish teaching, and Jews have regarded wealth as a blessing. It is a challenging blessing, but a blessing nonetheless.
Yet when questioned by those who pointed out how difficult poverty is for the kollel students in Israel, R. Aryeh Leib Steinman responded with what, to my knowledge, is a completely new approach, one which idealizes poverty in a manner not very different than the Christian notion of “Blessed be ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.” (Luke 6:20):
While everyone must distance themselves from unnecessary expenditures and luxuries just as they would be careful of fire, Bnei Torah have an especial obligation as the simple life is recommended for acquiring Torah, and they have it better if they live a life of simplicity and tsnius, and even poverty and want. It says: This is the way of Torah – eat bread with salt. But it is important to stress that what is necessary is strengthening emunoh and dedication to Torah. One should definitely not look for solutions that might cause avreichim to leave learning, G-d forbid.
I was asked if it would be a good idea to open offices for chareidi men in the large chareidi cities so that they could work in an appropriate atmosphere. It is obvious that the idea is a bad one though the intentions are good. The fact that the workplaces would be especially suited to the needs of chareidi men, and set up by chareidi people, might encourage people in difficult financial situations to leave learning. It is a spiritual stumbling block for the community at large. It would be terrible even if it would cause just one man to leave full-time learning. . . .
What are the effects of poverty? The answer is that it is better to be poor than to be rich, as Torah comes forth from the poor; they are the ones that become talmidei chachomim. The Jewish People has always undergone difficult trials. Historically, it’s been the poor people who have maintained their commitment to Judaism, despite the difficulties. It was among the rich people that some failed to withstand the temptations and trials. They are the ones that lost their children and grandchildren to Torah. It was the poor who remained especially steadfast in their dedication.
I have personally witnessed, and history testifies, that in all of the places where people learned Torah in poverty, they were able to maintain the Mesorah. In the places where the people had a comfortable standard of living, their learning was not immune to the Haskalah’s influences and many abandoned the Jewish and Torah way of life.[18]
Returning to Blau’s article, I was happy to see that he cited R. Jacob Emden who expressed admiration for shared property. I would just note that as with so many other issues in his writings, Emden had an alternate opinion as well, and here he comes out looking like his contemporary, Adam Smith. Emden explains how poverty is essential to a successful economic order. He notes that without the motivating factor of those who are in need – what Gordon Gekko would call “greed”[19] and what others will call “self-interest” – no economic progress will ever be made. If people are not able to improve their economic state, they will not take the risks that stand behind all new ideas and discoveries, which are precisely what keeps the economic engine of a society going. Communism, which took away the hope of personal gain, stifled all of this creativity.
Showing keen insight, Emden writes that if everyone had sufficient economic security, no one would travel on ships to far-away places and bring back the goods that are so important to people, no one would agree to do the back-breaking work required to build society’s great structures, and no one would take the time to come up with new inventions such as clocks and מחזות, which Azriel Schochet[20] suggests means glasses but I think telescopes is just as likely.
The passage appears in Birat Migdal Oz, 138b, but since the edition I have access to (on Otzar ha-Hokhmah) does not have page nos., I will cite it as it appears in Schochet, Im Hillufei Tekufot, 224-225:
והפלא מהשגחת הבורא הפרטית לתועלת עולמו ולהשלים תקנת בני אדם דרי תבל למלא חסרונם בהמצא בהם עניים ודלים. כי זולתם לא היתה הארץ נעבדת לתת יבולה ופריה, ולא היו מתגלים מחצבי הכסף והזהב ואבנים יקרות וסממני הרפואה ומיני הצבעים הנחפרים מן הארץ להודיע טובה ושבחה ושפעה הרב, לא תחסר כל בה. ואם היו כולם שבעים ומושפעים בשוה לא היה אחד מהם טורח להשיג דבר מן הדברים הנזכרים, ואצ”ל שלא היה שום אדם מסכים לרכוב אניות ולדרוך אניות להביא לחמו ממרחק ולמלא חסרון המדינות נעדרי התבואות והדברים היקרים וראשי בשמים והסמים הפשוטים, ולא היה מי מהם שירצה להעמיס על עצמו המלאכות הכבדות כבנית הבנינים הגדולים והיכלות תמלכים ומגדלים, ערים בצורות וחפירות הבורות והבארות, והיה העולם שמם. וכל שכן שלא היה אחד טורח בשכלו ובכח ידו להמציא תחבולות ואומניות נפלאות, כמו כלי השעות והמחזות והדומה להם מהאריגה והציורים ופתוחי חותם, והרבה מה שיארך זכרו, ולא היה ניכר שוע לפני דל, ובסיבת העוני ישיגו בני אדם כל הטובות הגדולות הרבות ההנה, והעני והחסר ישיג בהם די מחיתו והשלמת חסרונו ברצונו. מלבד מה שישיגו ע”י כך אורחות חיים כי יחלץ עני בעניו ע”י שנצרף בכור העוני, והעושר זוכה בו ומהנהו מנכסיו, מאיר עיני שניהם ה’.
I was also happy to see that Blau mentioned R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg’s views, although he overlooked Li-Frakim (2002 ed.), 578-582 and Kitvei ha-Rav Weinberg, vol. 2, 404-408,[21] the latter of which is devoted to Marx.
As can be expected, the rabbinic figures Blau surveys in his recent article in Tradition were no great fans of communism.[22] He writes: “My research failed to turn up a single Rabbi [!] of recognized stature who endorsed the communist program.”
.יגעתי ומצאתי After the February 1917 Russian Revolution which brought Kerensky to power, the Orthodox formed a group called Masoret ve-Herut. It contained both Zionists and non-Zionists and was supposed to send a delegation to the All Russian Jewish Congress, which because of the Bolshevik revolution never took place. The group also envisioned itself becoming a real political power with the establishment of the new government. On the seventeenth of Tamuz, 1917, over fifty rabbis came to Moscow for discussions about this, including R. Avraham Dov Shapiro of Kovno, R. Abraham Aaron Burstein of Tavrig,[23] R. Isaac Rabinowitz of Ponovezh (R. Itzele), and R. Aaron Walkin of Pinsk. The Hafetz Hayyim sent greetings but was too ill to attend.
Since the masses did not have any property, one of the issues the new group would have to take a stand on was agrarian redistribution. With the Czar overthrown, it was possible to take not just his land but also the land that belonged to the wealthy princes, noblemen, and magnates and redistribute it, and this was certainly what the average person wanted. However, is this in accord with Jewish law? Can one confiscate another’s property? This was a subject of great controversy among the rabbis, and as can be imagined, many opposed this step. R. Itzele got up and, as recorded by R. Judah Leib Graubart,[24] said the following
החלק הפוליטי נחוץ, כי על ידו נמשוך את בני הנעורים והרחוב להסתדרותנו. גם הלא אנו רואים, כי כלל ישראל חפץ בו, בוודאי מאת ד’ הייתה זאת. וכלל ישראל הוא גבוה ונעלה מגדולי התורה. ישראל אם אינם נביאים, בני נביאים הם.
In other words, if the Jewish people think that the concentration of land in the hands of a minority is unjust and should be redistributed, even if the rabbis claim that redistribution of the land is robbery, the opinion of the Jewish people overrides that of the rabbis.[25] Certainly, all would agree that R. Itzele is a rabbi of recognized stature.
Zalman Alpert called my attention to Jacob Mark’s discussion of R. Itzele in his Bi-Mehitzatam shel Gedolei ha-Dor, 116. Mark mentions that R. Itzele was greatly respected by the radicals (which included at least one of his own sons who was arrested in 1905 for revolutionary activities).[26] He was also very interested in socialism and carefully went through Marx’s Das Kapital. He was greatly impressed by Marx’s ideas, yet Mark notes that he commented: “I cannot agree with his positions, because they oppose the Torah law that protects private property.” I don’t deny that he said as much to Mark, but as we see from Graubart’s book, at the time of the Revolution he had a different perspective.[27] As to how, from a halakhic standpoint, he could have supported redistribution of wealth if the Torah protects private property, this is not a difficult problem. After all, as far as the Rabbis are concerned, governments have the right to engage in all sorts of taxation and redistribution of wealth.[28]
Eliezer Brodt called my attention to R. Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, Rabbi Moshe Shmuel ve-Doro (New York, 1964), 134-135, who tells an interesting story about R. Menashe of Ilya, one of the great students of the Vilna Gaon. (I can’t say whether the story is apocryphal.) R. Menashe was greatly bothered by the terrible poverty in the Jewish community and came up with a revolutionary idea long before Marx. He proposed organizing a meeting of all the great rabbinic and lay leaders in the Jewish community, and their job would be to divide the Jewish wealth evenly. By doing so, the poverty problem would be solved and all would be equal. It is said that he turned to R. Hayyim of Volozhin and asked him to put his stature behind such a gathering. R. Hayyim replied that he is willing to be involved in one half of the program, i.e., the part where the poor receive the money, but the second part, in which the rich have to give up their money, he leaves to R. Menashe. Supposedly, R. Menashe understood from this answer that his plan had no hope.
R. Judah Leib Ashlag was another great rabbi who supported communism (see here ). It is very ironic that today Ashlag’s torch is carried by a few capitalist entrepreneurs, who have become very rich through the Kabbalah Centre.[29]
Isaac Steinberg, while not a rabbi, is a figure that should be mentioned. He was a leader of the Social Revolutionary Party and served as commissar for law in the first Soviet government. There is a lengthy article and picture of Steinberg in the Encyclopedia Judaica. Here is another picture of him.
Steinberg was also an Orthodox Jew. His ability to combine revolutionary views and Torah might be due to the influence of his teacher, the brilliant Rabbi Shlomo Barukh Rabinkow, who was himself “a convinced socialist and revolutionary.”[30]
Abraham Bick (Shauli) is also worth mentioning. He was the brother of R. Moshe Bick, who was a leading posek in the Bronx and later in Boro Park. (This is incorrect. A family member has pointed out that they were distant cousins, not brothers). An early musmach of RIETS (in the days of R. Moshe Soloveichik), he was well accepted in the haredi world.[31] (I recall how happy I was to once stumble upon his shul in Boro Park, having finally found a place that davened nusach ashkenaz.) The Bick brothers were direct descendants of R. Jacob Emden, and Abraham Bick is known for publishing a new edition of Emden’s autobiography, Megilat Sefer. He also published a biography of Emden, Rabbi Yaakov Emden (Jerusalem, 1974).
As has already been pointed out on at the Seforim blog,[32] Jacob J. Schacter commented about Bick’s biography that “is uncritical, incomplete and simply sloppy. It is barely more useful than an earlier historical novel in Yiddish about Emden by the same author with the same title published in New York, 1946. In general, all of Bick’s work is shoddy and irresponsible and cannot be taken seriously.” In R. Meir Mazuz’s recently published Arim Nisi (Bnei Brak, 2008), 42-43, he strongly criticizes Bick’s edition of Emden’s Zoharei Ya’avetz (Emden’s notes to the Zohar). He was unaware that R. M. M. Segal-Goldstein has an article in Or Yisrael 43 (5756): 208ff., in which he deals with Bick’s fraudulence in this work, and much more. Following this article, Yehoshua Mondshine added his condemnation as well.[33] Schacter’s judgment is that Bick’s work is “shoddy and irresponsible.” While there is certainly a good deal of this, the more serious problem with Bick is that he was a forger, pure and simple. (Unlike Chaim Bloch, he didn’t forge complete works, only small sections of otherwise authentic works)
Bick also has an article on religious life in the Soviet Union[34] and he co-edited a volume of Torah writings of rabbis in the Soviet Union.[35] Yet what is most fascinating is that he himself was a communist, and even published a Hebrew volume on Marx.[36] In his early years he also published two volumes on religious socialism, both of which had contributions from Steinberg.[37] According to one source, his attraction to communism began when he was a young man in Eretz Yisrael, during which time he was also close to R. Kook.[38] In 1947 Bick was even identified in Congressional testimony, before the Committee on Un-American Activities, as being on the board of the communist School of Jewish Studies (Institut far Yidisher Bildung) located in New York.[39] In 1950 this institution was placed on the Attorney General’s list of Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist and Subversive Organizations.[40] During World War II Bick was also involved with the Jewish Committee for Assistance to Soviet Russia.[41]
R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski in a 1923 letter refers to someone whom the communists called “the Bolshevik Rrabbi.”[42] R. Chaim Ozer speaks of him with contempt, and regards him as a phony. Yet this rabbi obviously had an audience, as R. Chaim Ozer writes as follows:
וגם בהיותם פה דרוש דרש כמה פעמים והי’ מטיף להתאחדות הסוחרים הקטנים ללמוד מלאכה, ובתוך הדברים הרבה להטיף בשבח הקומוניסטים ולהביא ראי’ מן התורה ומדברי חכז”ל לשיטתם.
Wouldn’t it be interesting to know whom R. Chaim Ozer was talking about? The reason we don’t know is because the editors of the volume have removed the name. Unlike the Chazon Ish’s letters, names are not generally removed in the letters of R. Chaim Ozer. Does the fact that in this case the name was removed mean that we are dealing with someone who is not an unknown figure, maybe someone who later regretted his actions and became a more conventional rabbi? I have no doubt that examination of the Yiddish press of the period would enable one to identify the figure pretty easily.
In fact, thanks to Zalman Alpert’s assistance, I suspect that R. Chaim Ozer was referring to R. Chaim Faskowitz. Faskowitz studied in Eishishok, Lida, Slobodka and Brisk. He then was a preacher in Vilna and later served as a rabbi in Star-Daragi and Minsk before going on Aliya. He was known as the “Red Rabbi” for his sermons supporting the Soviet Union.[43]
Yet for the best of all quotes in this regard, one which really needs to be unpacked, no one can do better than R. Kook (Shemonah Kevatzim 1:89-90):
הנשמה הפנימית, המחיה את השטה הסוציאלית כפי צורתה בימינו, היא המאור של התורה המעשית, במלא טהרתה וצביונה. אמנם שהשטה בעצמה עומדת היא באמצע גדולה, ואיננה יודעת עדיין את יסוד עצמיותה. אמנם ימים יבאו ותהי למוסר נאמן לאמץ התורה והמצוה, במלא שיגובם וטהרתם.
האנרכיה היא נובעת מיסוד יותר נעלה מהסוציאלי[ו]ת. איננה יסוד לתורה המעשית וקיומה, כי אם להדבקות האלהית, העליונה מכל מעשה וסידור חיובי. על כן היא עוד יותר רחוקה ממקורה, שהוא עומד רחוק מאד משפלות החיים של ההוה, מהסוציאליות, ובמצבה של עכשיו, ומצב החיים של ההוה, היא פרועה כולה, למרות הניצוץ האלהי הנשגב המסתתר בתוכיותה.
Regarding opposition to communism, the following interesting passage is found in Eliezer Zweifel, Sanegor (Warsaw, 1885), 164:
הרב הגדול ר’ יוסף חיים קרא אבד”ק וולאצלאוועק יאריך ה’ ימיו, אמר לי שלדעתו כנו חז”ל את כת הקומוניסטים בשם ע”ה, והם אותה האומרים כיס אחד יהיה לכולנו והכל יהיו עמלים לאמצע, וכמו שהממלכות שבימינו מוצאות אנשי הכת הזו להורסים שלום המדינה, ולמנתקים קשרי החבורה האנושית, כן הרחיקו חז”ל את החבורה המזקת הזו, ולפי דעתו השערתו זו מבוארת היא בדחז”ל עצמה, שהם ז”ל הגדירו תאר ע”ה בזה, באמרם בפרקי אבות, שלי שלך ושלך שלי עם הארץ ע”כ. הנה כללו את כל השטה הזו במלות קצרות, ע”כ.
Returning to Graubart’s Sefer Zikaron, it is actually quite a fascinating text and an important source for Orthodox history during the final days of Czarist Russia and the post-Revolution era. In addition, he includes letters from various rabbis and descriptions of numerous figures in East European Jewish life. He also records the following joke in the name of R. Solomon Zalman Lipshitz (1765-1839), the first chief rabbi of Warsaw (217):
מחבר “חמדת שלמה”, הרב מוורשה, כתב מכתב לרב אחד ויתיארהו בשם “גאון”. וכאשר נשאל: “מה ראה על ככה, הן האיש ההוא אין העטרה הולמתו”? השיב בבדיחות: “הלא הגאונים )אחרי רבנן סבוראי) לא ידעו מה שנאמר ברש”י ותוספות וכמוהם כמוהו איננו יודע. ואם כן, הוא משרידי “הגאונים” הקדמונים.
On the previous page, Graubart asks where the practice arose of addressing people with all sorts of elaborate titles that are a standard feature of the rabbinic literary world, especially in the introductory sections of letters. His answer is very interesting and also relates to the issue of sensual medieval Hebrew poetry, which I have mentioned in a few previous posts at the Seforim blog:
וקרוב לאמת, כי זאת השפעה מן הערביים, שהיו מספיקים בגוזמאות והפרזות, וכמו שחקו אותם משוררינו הספרדים לפנים בשירי יין ואהבה, אף שהמשוררים ההם שתו יין ארבע כוסות אחת בשנה ומעודם לא טעמו טעם חטא, ורק מודה ספרותית היתה בזה.
With regard to elaborate titles and the extreme respect generally shown to halakhic authorities with whom one disagrees, it is worth noting what appears in the recently published Or Bahir of R. Moses Samuel Glasner, concerning whom has recently been two posts on the Seforim blog (here and here). He writes (25):
הסיבה לזה הוא שבדורנו השפל האמת נעדרת, ואין מי שיתחמם בעבורה כבדורות שלפנינו, ולעומת זה גדלה החנופה, ובשלה פרי רעל לדבר אחד בפה ואחד בלב, ומלא הארץ חנף וצביעות בתוארים שונים מגוזמים ומופרזים המחרידים אוזן השומע ועין הקורא.[44]
As I mentioned, Graubart’s book is fascinating reading, but I think many will be upset by the reason he gives for the exclusion of women’s testimony in court (208):
להרוג נפש או להוציא ממון מבעליו, צריך עדות ברורה ואין לסמוך על דברי נשים, שטבען נוטה לדמיונות, הזיות וגוזמאות והן רפות רוח ורכות לבב; ויוכל היות כי מה שאומרות ומעידות שראו עיניהן, הן מרבין לשער אומדות.
To support this understanding he also quotes a few non-Torah sources. One is Josephus who wrote: “Let not the testimony of women be admitted, on account of the levity and boldness of their sex” (Jewish War 4:8). He also quotes Socrates who is said to have made three blessings every day, one of which was that he was not made a woman. The other two blessings were that he was not made a barbarian or a slave – sound familiar?[45]
(To those women who are bothered by the blessing shelo asani ishah, R. Zvi Yehudah Kook has the answer, but you will have to wait until Messianic days! [Ittturei Kohanim, no. 167 (5759), 4-5]):
[ ]הברכות נקבעו על פי ההרגשה האנושית היחסית . . . לעומת זאת, ההשקפה האלהית, האמת המוחלטת, אינה ענין של הרגשה חולפת, אלא האמת הנצחית מראשיתה ועד סופה. לעתיד לבוא, כאשר גם האדם יכיר את האמת, ויהיה כולו מבחינת “הטוב והמטיב”, לא יוכל לברך “שלא עשני אשה”, שהרי אז יכיר שבניינה של האשה יותר רם, יותר אלהי ופחות אנושי, ממצבו הוא.
Following this logic, what about all those men who even in pre-Messianic days don’t regard women as second class in any way? Shouldn’t they be able to dispense with the blessing as early as tomorrow morning?)
Graubart, 65, also notes that many great scholars make simple grammatical errors וכמעט שלשון .עלגים היא סימן ללמדנות
He then tells the following joke, in the name of the Hakham Zvi, which everyone can repeat at their Passover seder.
רבים שואלים, בהגדה של פסח, למה מגנים ומחרפים את הרשע, על אמרו לכם ולא לו, הלא גם החכם אומר “אתכם” ולא “אותנו” – אך באמת, כונת החכם (הלמדן) הוא “אותנו” ורק מפני טרדתו בלמוד הגמרא והפוסקים הוא טועה בכנויים ומבטא “אתכם” תחת “אותנו” שלא בדקדוק, ואין לחשוד אותו כי בכונה אומר “אתכם”. לא כן הרשע שאיננו עוסק בגמרא, והוא מבעלי הדקדוק ויודע את ההבדל בין לכם ולו וב”דעת” שפתיו ברור מללו, אם הוא אומר “לכם” בכונה הוציא את עצמו מן הכלל.
Graubart also explains why Poland wasn’t blessed with the sort of great figures who were found in Lithuania, men who were able to be true rabbinic leaders and respond to problems as the times demanded. He places the blame with the Hasidim. In a passage that could well be written today (although it would then also have to include the contemporary Lithuanian “courts”) Graubart writes (173):
אבל “רבי החסידים”‘, אשר שפכו את ממשלתם על ההמון, קצצו את כנפי הרבנים ולא נתנו להם להרים ראש ולהראות פעלם והדרם. מפני הרביים רפו ידי הרבנים ולא יכלו לעשות תושיה; ואמת נתנה להגיד, כי לא את הרבי היו יראים לעשות דבר, אך מפני בני הרבי וחתניו, והגבורים שומרי משמרת החצר, השוקלים ומודדים את המעשים והפעולות, אם הם מתאימים עם שיטתם ומטרתם הם, והם אשר נתנו חתיתם על הרבנים ומוראם עליהם, כי כל דבר לא יבצר מהם לכבוד שמים, היינו לכבודם ולכבוד בית אביהם. ומי יקשה אליהם וישלם? והרבנים שפטו, כי אם יפרוץ סכסוך בינם לבין חצר הרבי, אז אף אם לא יהי הנצחון על צד השני, ולא ידיחום משאתם, אבל – הלא תהי מריבה בישראל, וגדול השלום.
Among the ideas of new Masoret ve-Herut organization Graubart helped organize was to open new schools (gymnasiums) where all the Jewish studies would be taught in Hebrew, and also to teach secular studies. Graubart tells us that the Lubavitcher Rebbe, R. Shalom Dov Ber Schneersohn, was opposed. This aroused the anger of R. Itzele who declared that anyone who opposes the approach of Masoret ve-Herut is destroying the nation. Graubart then tells us about his own dealings with the Lubavitcher Rebbe, and reveals a little known historical fact that certainly will never appear in any Lubavitch historical literature (120-121):
הגדתי לו, כי אחשוב שאינו יודע כי רוב אנשי חסידיו, היושבים בערים הגדולות, שולחים את בניהם ובנותיהם לבתי ספר העמים ומחללים שבת. וכאשר שאלני: “מנין אתה יודע, שאין אני יודע זאת?” עניתיו: “אם כן יגדל התמהון יותר; מדוע אתה מתנגד לגימנזיות עבריות, אשר תהיינה תחת השגחת חרדים?” ויחשה ולא ענה דבר.
The approach of the Rebbe is not surprising, and a similar thing occurred in Lithuania where, as R. Dessler explained, the rabbinic elite was prepared to see many “go off the derekh” rather than institute any changes in the “Torah-only” approach that dominated in yeshivot.[46]
Yet Graubart’s own approach is seen in the following, which shows his more enlightened Orthodox perspective (98):
התורה קוראת תגר: למה כל הרופאים והסוללים [47] היהודים אינם שומרי דת? בשום אופן אין אנו מודים, כי מי שהוא מתפלל ומניח תפילין, אי אפשר לו להיות רופא אמן, וכי המדקדק בשמירת שבת ובאכילת בשר כשר, לא יהיה למהנדס ותוכן; כל העבר שלנו מעיד נגד זה: רב סעדיה גאון, רמב”ם, רמב”ן, ר’ אברהם זכות, אברבנאל, ר’ יש”ר, ר’ מנשה בן ישראל, יתנו עדיהם כי לא בחלול שבת – פילוסופיה ותכונה – ולא באכילת טרפה – חכמה הרפואה.
His description (55) of his interaction with R. Joseph Rozin is also worth quoting, as it is line with so many other portrayals of the Rogochover, especially that of Rav Tzair in his Pirkei Hayyim.
הוא איש מופת יחיד בדור (וגם בדור ודור) יודע את כל תלמוד בבלי וירושלמי רש”י תוספות ורמב”ם בעל-פה. מן הראשונים הוא מחזיק לאוטוריטטים רק את רש”י ורמב”ם. הוא מכיר היטב את ערך עצמו ומבטל את גדולי הדור, מזכירם בשמם בלי תואר “רבי” ואיננו חושש להוציא עליהם משפט, שאינם יודעים את התורה כלל . . . הוא איש טוב ותמים כילד: שוקד על למודו תמיד; בהוויות עולם איננו בקי. חסידי לובוויץ מפרנסים אותו, ולא בהרחבה כראוי לשר התורה כמוהו, כי ראיתי כלי ביתו מעטים וקלי-ערך.
Notes
[1]Teshuvot Maharashdam, Orah Hayyim no. 37:
שחמשה או י’ אנשים חשובים עולים לאלף בין מצד החכמה ובין מצד העושר כי העושר קרוב למעלת החכמה . . . שמה שאמרו רוב הוא רוב טובי העיר בעלי כיסים הם מה שנקראים רוב אפי’ הם מיעוט בערך דלת העם מ”מ הם הנקראים רוב . . . והעיק’ לילך אחר רוב מנין כשיהיו רוב בנין דאז ודאי לא יבחרו אלא האמת והיושר משא”כ ברוב ההמון
[2] Note how de Medina is arguing from Aggadah to prove a halakhic point, a fact already discussed by Menachem Elon, “Modes of Halakhic Creativity in the Solution of Legal and Social Problems in the Jewish Community” (Hebrew), Yitzhak F. Baer Memorial Volume [= Zion 44] (1979): 259ff. Since Aggadic sources and darshanut can be easily manipulated to say what one wants, do we not really have here an early version of Daas Torah? The only real difference between the modern exponents of Daas Torah and the earlier ones seems to be that the earlier authorities felt the need to support their opinions, which they came to based on logic and intuition, with Scriptural and Aggadic proofs. The modern exponents often feel no need to offer any justification of their views.
[3] Translation in Menachem Elon, “On Power and Authority: The Halakhic Stance of the Traditional Community and Its Contemporary Implications,” in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Kinship and Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses (Washington, D.C., 1983), 309.
[4] Orah Hayyim, no. 20.
[5] R. Shabbetai Hayyim strongly supported de Medina’s approach. See Torat Hayyim, vol. 2, no. 40.
ופוק חזי בעירנו זאת שאלוניקי עיר ואם בישראל מימי קדם בימי איתני גאוני עולם, הממונים המפקחים על ענייני צבור הם העשירים מביני מדע בעצת החכמים השלמים, ואינם משגיחים על דברי רוב רובי דלת העם, והדעת נותן כן שהרי רוב ענייני הצבור הם בהוצאות ופרעונות ולראות ולדקדק להוציא בעת הצורך ובמקום הצורך שלא יצא הממון לאיבוד, ומי יחוש על זה לכוין ולדקדק חוץ מהם שמוציאים הממון.
Yet this opinion was not unanimous, and the poor found at least one defender in R. Isaac Adarbi, de Medina’s Salonikan colleague. According to Adarbi, only in matters concerning outlay of money do the wealthy have authority. In other matters there is no such discrimination. In line with this understanding, he comes to the defense of a community that ousted its parnasim who were ruling in a dictatorial fashion and not responding to the needs of the poor. See Divrei Rivot, Yoreh Deah, no. 224.
[6] See Zikhron Yaakov, vol. 2, p. 196:
אני קורא מגילת איכה, חורבן בית המקדש, אינקוויזיציות ופוגרומים, משא נמירוב, כל הצרות והפגעים שעמדנו בהם כאין נחשבו נגד גזרת הקנטאָניסטין
[7] See Zikhron Yaakov, vol. 1, 122f
[8] R. Barukh Epstein describes how his grandfather stood up to the chappers. See Mekor Barukh, vol. 2, 964ff. I see no reason to doubt the general thrust of his story, although, as is often the case with regard to Esptein, fictional details have no doubt been added to create a better story. Hayyim Karlinsky, Ha-Rishon le-Shoshelet Brisk (Jerusalem, 2004), 214ff., has a long description of how R. Joseph Baer Soloveitchik (the Beit ha-Levi) also stood up to the communal leaders and demanded to know why only the poor kids should be taken. Regarding the future Torah scholars, see ibid., 217: תועבה נעשתה בעיר סלוצק למסור לעבודת הצבא בן-תורה שעתיד להיות גדול בישראל. As with Mekor Barukh, I see no reason to doubt the basic story Karlinsky presents, but this book – which the author tells us in the preface took him over forty years to write – also has all sorts of fictional details added for literary purposes. One might even say that Epstein, Karlinsky and Judah Leib Maimon, the author of Sarei ha-Meah, are midrashic writers, in that they take a story and elaborate on it, thus creating a nice tale that keeps the reader’s interest. While the original story would leave many things unexplained, the midrashic “historian” provides the answers. For Yehoshua Mondshine’s attack on Karlinsky’s reliability, see here.
In “Polmos ‘ha-Rabbanim ve-ha-Shohetim’ be-Harkov,” Zekhor le-Avraham (1999), 383 n. 10, Mondshine writes the following about Karlinsky’s book:
מבחינת ערכו לתיאור ההיסטוריה, משתווה ספר זה לספרים “מקור ברוך” ו”שרי המאה”, שכל דמיון בין המתואר בהם לבין המציאות הוא מקרי בהחלט.
[9] Larry Domnitch, The Cantonists: The Jewish Childrens’ Army of the Tsar (Jerusalem, 2003), 70.
[10] Ibid., p. 127.
[11] Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews. The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia 1825-1855 (Philadelphia, 1983), 29.
[12] Ibid., p. 33.
[13] See Malkah Peles (Maisler) Va-Yehi ([Haifa], 1988). I thank Dr. Amihai Mazar for sending me the relevant pages from this privately printed volume. Weinberg was a cousin of the Mazar (Maisler) family (famous for its archaeologists).
[14] See my Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy: The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, 1884-1966 (London, 1999), 4.
[15] Ha-Peles 2 (1902): 49ff.
[16] R. Samuel Landau and the Hatam Sofer opposed this approach and believed that that all should be included in the lottery when the community was required to meet a draft quota. (The one exception to this statement is that the Hatam Sofer states that Torah students must be exempted.) See Judith Bleich, “Military Service: Ambivalence and Contradictions,” in Lawrence Schiffman and Joel Wolowelsky, eds., War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition (New York, 2007), 423 (called to my attention by Menachem Butler).
[17] Israel Zinberg, A History of Jewish Literature, vol. 6, pp. 218-219.
[18] See here
[19] See here.
[20] Im Hillufei Tekufot (Jerusalem, 1960), 225.
[21] Volumes 1 and 2 of this set have recently been reprinted. See here.
[22] R. Isaac Bunin, Hegyonot Yitzhak (New York, 1953), no. 2, has a fascinating responsum from 1908, when he was a rabbi in Russia. This was the era of anarchist communists terrorizing the population for “contributions” to the cause. It was this circle that gave us the slogan “From each according to his means, to each according to his needs.” One man decided to shoot the anarchists the next time they came to his town, and the question for Bunin was if he is also permitted to shoot them on Shabbat. The rabbi decided in the affirmative.
[23] Although he is entirely forgotten today, during his lifetime Burstein was regarded as one of the Torah world’s top scholars. Nathan Kamenetsky, Making of a Godol: A Study of Episodes in the Lives of Great Torah Personalities (Jerusalem: Hamesorah Publishers, 2002), 400, quotes a source that “he was considered the third-greatest rosh yeshiva of his time – after R. Hayyim Soloveitchik and R. Itzel Ponivezher.” When R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg was asked in 1925 about the problem of Austritt, he recommended that his questioner turn to a few different East European gedolim, one of whom was Burstein. See Kitvei ha-Gaon Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, vol. 2, 235 (In this letter, Weinberg states that R. Meir Simhah of Dvinsk is a גדול-הדור באמת.) Towards the end of his life, Burstein went on aliyah and taught at Merkaz ha-Rav. His Ner Aharon is currently sold by the yeshiva. See here. Burstein’s son was Reuven Barkat, an important Labor party figure in Israel who also served as speaker of the Knesset. See here
[24] Sefer Zikaron (Lodz, 1926), 107.
[25] See R. Avraham Shapira, Morashah (Jerusalem, 2005), 15.
[26] Mark writes . לר’ איצל היה צער גידול בנים ולא שבע נחת מבניו This is a polite way of saying that his sons did not remain Orthodox, which was a very common phenomenon in those days.
[27] Mark, Bi-Mehitzatam, 118, claims that R. Itzele concluded his speech at the Moscow gathering by stating that the government should only be able to remove property from landowners if payment was made, but this is not what appears in Graubart’s record of his speech and I don’t believe it is correct.
[28] R. Joseph Elijah Henkin used this logic in his defense of rent control laws, which are a terrible intrusion into the rights that a landlord has over his private property. R. Henkin wrote as follows, unfortunately falling into some Democratic class warfare rhetoric (Kitvei ha-Gaon R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, vol. 2 [New York, 1980], 175):
חוק הדירות של הממשלה הוא ישר, מתוקן ומקובל בפרט בערים הגדולות, כי הוא מכוון נגד מפקיעי שערים ופושטי עורות עניים. ואף שלפעמים נראה כעול נגד בעלי בתים שאינם עשירים, הנה כן דרך החוק שלפעמים נפגע ביושר ואזלינן בתר רובא. ומה שהחק מפלה בין דירות עניים לבתי לוקסוס אינו מגרע כח החק אלא מעדיפו ומטהו אל צד היושר, וכן מה שהחק משתנה מזמן לזמן.
For a recent attempt by rabbis to enforce a rent control scheme, see here, here, and here. There is an inverse proportion between these rabbis’ talmudic knowledge and their knowledge of economics and what drives markets.
[29] Jody Myers has recently published an entire book about the Kabbalah Centre. See Kabbalah and the Spritual Quest: The Kabbalah Centrein America (Westport, 2007).
[30] See Jacob J. Schacter, “Reminiscences of Shlomo Barukh Rabinkow,” in Leo Jung, ed., Sages and Saints (Hoboken, 1987), 102, 106.
[31] There was one time, however, when he broke ranks with them and this created some controversy. When the divorce rates in the Orthodox world began to move up, R. Bick publicly declared that a few dates were not enough to determine that one had found one’s life partner and people should therefore should stop hurrying to get engaged but take more time to get to know each other better.
[32] Dan Rabinowitz, “Mayim Hayyim, the Baal Shem Tov, and R. Meir the son of R. Jacob Emden,” the Seforim blog (January 29, 2008), available here.
[33] See here
[34] “Glowing Embers: Maintaining Religious Life in the U.S.S.R.,” Tradition 24:1 (Fall 1988): 91-103.
[35] Bick and Zvi Harkavy, eds., Shomrei ha-Gahelet: Divrei Torah me-et Rabbanei Berit ha-Moatzot ve-Artzot ha-Demokratyah ha-Amamit (Jerusalem, 1966).
[36] Netser mi-Shorashav: Motsa’o ve-Olamo ha-Yehudi shel Karl Marx (Tel Aviv, 1984). See also his Me-Rosh Tzurim: Metaknei Hevrah al Toharat ha-Kodesh: Shalshelet ha-Yuhasin shel Avot ha-Socialism (Jerusalem, 1972), and “Between the Holy Ari and Karl Marx” (Hebrew), Hedim 110 (1980): 174–181. I don’t have access to the volume at present, but in Shvut 7 (1980), Bick also has an article on the Jewish roots of various communist figures.
[37] Grunt-Printsipn fun Religyezn Sotsyalizm (New York, 1938), Kemper un Hiter: Di Sotsyaletische Idee in der Yidisher religyezer Literatur un Lebn (New York, 1940).
[38] See here
[39] See here
[40] See here and here

[41] See here

[42] Iggerot R. Chaim Ozer, vol. 2, 69.
[43] See David Tidhar,Entziklopeyah la-Halutzei ha-Yishuv u-Vonav, 1875.
[44] Just glancing through the book, I also found a fascinating passage on p. 31. Here Glasner daringly suggests that the reason for keeping kabbalistic considerations out of halakhic decision-making – and he is referring specifically to a pesak of R. Hayyim Halberstam – is that it permits non-halakhic subjectivity to enter the halakhic process.
ומי שמכוון פסקיו לחכמת הקבלה, מי יודע איזה רעיון קדמה בזמן. ואם הוא מופשט מן החומר וקרוב לשמים ואדוק בעולמות העליונים קרוב לודאי שרואה תחילה בסוד אלקי, וממילא משוחד הוא לכוון ולהתאים הנגלה להאי סוד שראה. לכן לאו דסמיכנא הוא מהאי טעמא גופא.
For a discussion of R. Halberstam’s perspective on the role of Kabbalah on halakha, see Iris (Hoyzman) Brown, “Rabbi Hayyim Halberstam of Sanz: His Halakhic Ruling in View of His Intellectual World and the Challenges of His Time,” (PhD dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, 2004), 162-164 (chap. seven).
[45] See Martin Hengel, “The Interpenetration of Judaism and Hellenism in the pre-Maccabean Period,” in W. D. Davies and Louis Finkelstein, eds., Cambridge History of Judaism (Cambridge, 1989), 184. R. Aharon Lichtenstein commented that some people, upon learning of Socrates’ blessings and the corresponding Jewish blessings, will find that their attitudes towards the latter are “undermined.” He continues: “A different mentality could of course, as did Newman analogously, revel in the scope of its tradition’s prevalence – even if, as with respect to gender here, for radically different reasons – and not feel threatened at all.” See “Torah and General Culture: Confluence and Conflict,” in Jacob J. Schacter, ed., Judaism’s Encounter with Other Cultures: Rejection or Integration (Northvale, 1997), 278. I am certain that R. Lichtenstein knows that there are indeed voices in the “tradition” that approximate the common Greek view of women. R. Lichtenstein is in general opposed to positing outside influences on Hazal’s outlook. See, for example, the following (“Of Marriage, Relationship and Relations,” in Rikvah Blau, ed., Gender Relationships In Marriage and Out [New York, 2007], 23):
To be sure, post-Hazal gedolim, rishonim, or aharonim may be affected by the impact of contact with a general culture to which their predecessors had not been exposed and to whose contact and direction they respond. Upon critical evaluation of what they have encountered, they may incorporate what they find consonant with tradition and reject what is not. In the process, they may legitimately enlarge the bounds of their hashkafa and introduce hitherto unperceived insights and interpretations.
Note how outside influence upon Jewish thought is limited to the post-Hazal era. While this may be good theology, and in some circles is even viewed as obligatory, it is certainly bad history. To mention only one example, Yaakov Elman’s groundbreaking work is revealing all sorts of influences that provide us with a completely new picture of talmudic law and thought. See Yaakov Elman, “The Babylonian Talmud in Its Historical Context,” in Sharon The Talmud in Translation” in Sharon L. Mintz & Gabriel M. Goldstein, eds., Printing the Talmud: From Bomberg to Schottenstein (New York: Yeshiva University Museum, 2005), 19-27; now available online here.
[46] Mikhtav me-Eliyahu, vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 1963), 355ff.
[47] I have no idea what this word means, but it clearly refers to some white-collar profession.