by Chaim Katz

In 1980, the late Rabbi Yehoshua Mondshine
published a manuscript, which was a list of chapters and paragraphs (halakhot  and se’fim), selected by Rabbi Shneur
Zalman of Liadi (RSZ), from the Shulhan Arukh (SA) of Rabbi Yosef Karo.[1]
(RYK)

R.
Isakhar Ber, who copied the original manuscript, explained the purpose of the
list in a preliminary remark:

A concise study method
of essential laws from the beginning of Shulhan Arukh  Orah Hayim until the end of the Shabbat laws – to know them
fluently  by heart, from Admur  (our master, teacher and Rebbe), our teacher
Zalman of Liozna.

R.
Isakhar also added an epilogue:

I copied all of the
above, from the beginning until the laws of Pesah, but I didn’t check it
completely to verify that I copied everything correctly and G-d willing when
there’s time I will check it. Prepared and researched by the Rabbi and Gaon,
the great light, the G-dly and holy, our teacher, Shneur Zalman, may his lamp
be bright and shine, to know it clearly and concisely, even for those people who
are occupied in business. Therefore I thought I won’t withhold good from the
good.  Isakhar Ber, son of my father and
master … Katz, may his lamp be bright, of the holy community of Shumilina and
currently in Beshankovichy.

The
manuscript was probably composed (or at least copied), between the years
1790-1801, when RSZ lived in Liozna. The existence of this list isn’t
acknowledged in any source that Rabbi Mondshine was aware of, and obviously the
list was never published in book form, either because RSZ
decided not to publicize it or because the list was simply put aside and
forgotten.

RSZ
wasn’t the first who envisioned a popular digest of the SA. Rabbi Yehuda Leib
Maimon lists four works that preceded the famous Kitzur Shulhan Arukh.[2]
They preceded RSZ’s work as well and are all quite similar although they also
have their differences.

Shulhan Tahor covers Orakh Hayim and Yore Deah.
Others have a narrower scope and cover only Orah Hayim. RSZ covers even less.
Some collections are abbreviated extensively; others include more details.[3]
There are variations in the language and content; some quote opinions of later
authorities, some quote Kabbalah, some re-cast the language of the SA and some
retain the language as much as possible.

The authors of each of these works possibly had
two goals in mind. One of the goals was to make the basic rules and practices
of the SA more accessible. To this end, certain subjects or details were left
out because they were too technical for the chosen audience. Other rules were
omitted because the situations to which they applied happened only infrequently
(בדיעבד). Many regulations
were left out because daily life and its circumstances had changed so much
since the sixteenth century.

The
tradition of memorizing practical laws goes back to RYK himself, and probably
goes back even earlier.[4]
RYK writes in the introduction to his Shulhan Arukh:

I thought in my heart
that it is fitting to gather the flowers of the gems of the discussions [of the
Beit Yosef] in a shorter way, in a clear comprehensive pretty and pleasant
style, so that the perfect Torah of G-d will be recited fluently by each man of
Israel. When a scholar is queried about a law, he won’t answer vaguely.
Instead, he will answer:  “say to wisdom
you are my sister”. As he knows his sister is forbidden to him, so he knows the
practical resolution of every legal question that he is asked because he is
fluent in this book…  Moreover, the
young (rabbinical?) students will occupy themselves with it constantly and
recite its text by heart…

I’m
working on a phone version of RSZ’s work using the first print of
RYK’s SA for that portion of the text. However, (aside from the difficulty of
text justification in an EPUB), there is one typesetting decision that I’m
wondering about.  The first edition of
the SA is punctuated with elevated periods and colons.  The colons always separate each halakha, but
infrequently colons appear in the middle of a halakha. Sometimes followed by a
new line and sometimes not. The periods may appear in the middle of a halakha,
sometimes followed by horizontal white space and sometimes not.

Hebrew printing (of holy books) hasn’t changed all that
much in the past 450 years; the colons at the end of each paragraph are present
in most current editions of the Shulan Arukh, but the periods, colons and white
space in the middle of the paragraphs have largely been ignored in subsequent
prints.[5]
Do I try and duplicate this punctuation or not? Here are two examples where I
replaced the elevated period and colons with modern periods, but tried to keep
the original layout.

Summary

רציתי לעמוד כאן על שני אמצעים חשובים היכולים להיות לעזר רב בהבנת הפיוטים, ודווקא אמצעים אלו נזנחו לצערנו בדורות האחרונים. האמצעי הראשון שייך לצורה החיצונית של הפיוט, והשני – לתוכן הפיוט. הצורה של הפיוט – הכוונה לתבנית שהפיוטים מופיעים בספרים הנדפסים לפנינו, וזו מוזרה מאוד! מאז שמשה רבינו כתב את התורה עד ימינו אנו מעולם לא עלה על דעתו של אדם – בן ברית ושאינו בן ברית – לכתוב שירה בשורות מלאות כמו פרוזה. טבעה של שירה שהיא נכתבת בשורות קצרות, איברים איברים. וזהו אכן המצב בכתבי היד של הפיוטים, הם נכתבים בצורה של שירה. בראשית הדפוס – אולי מחמת יוקר הנייר והעבודה, שינו והדפיסו את הפיוטים באופן מעוות, במגילה אחת כמו פרוזה. יחיד בדורו היה רבי דניאל גולדשמיד שהדפיס הפיוטים כתיקונם, אבל לצערנו אחרים לא הלכו בדרכיו. אין ספק שלו ישכילו מדפיסי דורנו לסדר את הפיוטים כתיקונם, זה כשלעצמו לבטח יועיל הרבה להבין את מבנה הפיוט, ומסתבר שגם יועיל להבנת פירוש המילות.

ומכאן להשמטה משמעותית יותר שנעשתה במשך דורות – השמטת הפסוקים שבאים דרך קבע אחרי פיוטים שונים. בכל כתבי היד, אחרי פיוטים מסוימים נהגו הפייטנים לשבץ שרשרות פסוקים. לדוגמא: בפיוטים לשחרית של ד’ פרשיות, (מערכת מהסוג הזה נקראת ‘קדושתא’, אומרים פיוטים רק בשלש הברכות הראשונות, והפיוט האחרון, הארוך, עולה [‘סלק’] לתוך הקדושה), בפיוטים מן הסוג הזה משתבצים שרשרות פסוקים בשלושה מקומות. הפייטנים הקדישו תשומת לב רבה לפסוקים האלה: הפסוק הראשון שבשרשרת נבחר תמיד בקפידה, בדרך כלל על פי מסורות קבועות, אחרי ה”מגן” (הפיוט של ברכת מגן אברהם) הביאו את הפסוק הראשון שבקריאת התורה של היום שלכבודו נכתבה הקדושתא, אחרי ה”מחיה” (הפיוט של ברכת מחיה המתים) הביאו את הפסוק השני, ואחרי ה”משלש” (הברכה השלישית) את הפסוק השלישי, או את ראש ההפטרה. במרבית הקדושתאות הפסוק הוא שקבע את עניינו של הקטע הפייטני שלפניו. בסוף הקטע אף דאגו הפייטנים לשלב לשונות מפורשים מן הפסוק המפויט. הפסוק האחרון שבשרשרת זכה אף הוא למעמד בולט, משום שתיבתו האחרונה פותחת תמיד את מחרוזת הסיום המעבירה לחתימת הברכה “מגן אברהם” או “מחיה המתים”, גם יתר פסוקי השרשרות קשורים תמיד באיזה דרך אל הפיוטים שקדמו להם. במידה מסוימת דומים פסוקים אלו לפסוקי ה’סליחות’ שאנו אומרים לפני הפיוט. מי שמתבונן בפסוקים תופס בדרך כלל את הנושא המרכזי של כל הפיוט. ופסוקי הקדושתאות קשורים הרבה יותר לתוכן הפיוט!

גם כאן עשה רבי דניאל גולדשמיד עבודת שמים והחזיר את הפסוקים למקומם. ובעקבותיו הלך בעל מחזור ווילנא (וכדי לא “להביא גאולה לעולם” לא הזכיר לטובה את גולדשמיד, כנראה לא להיכשל באבק האיסור החמור והנורא של ‘דחיקת הקץ’…), למחזור ווילנא היה רעיון חדש: הוא הדפיס את הפסוקים בצבע בהיר יותר, כך שמצד אחד יכולים  לקרוא את הפסוקים ומצד שני מבינים שאין אומרים את הפסוקים היום.

מדוע באמת השמיטו המדפיסים הראשונים את הפסוקים? מסתבר שהם הלכו בעקבות מנהג מקומם, וכיון שבמקומם כבר נהגו לדלג על הפסוקים – השמיטום אף מן הכתב. אבל השמטת הפסוקים היא ממש בכיה לדורות, משום שזה פגם וקלקל את כל מבנה הפיוט. וראוי מאוד שמדפיסי המחזורים והסידורים יחזירו אחר כבוד את הפסוקים האלו למקומם.

מתי התחילו לדלג על הפסוקים? בשנה האחרונה יצא לראשונה “פירוש רש”י ובית מדרשו” על פיוטים לארבע פרשיות וקרובץ לפורים. קשה להפריז בחשיבותו של הספר הזה, עוד לא נראה כבושם הזה, הפירוש נערך בידי אומן ידידי הרב יעקב לויפר שליט”א גדול המדקדקים שבדורינו, ויצא לאור ע”י מכון “ממלכת כהנים”. מחיבור זה אנחנו למדים שרש”י ז”ל בשעה שלמד את הפיוטים בפני תלמידיו, הוא לימד גם את הפסוקים שבתוך הפיוטים והרחיב את הדיבור על הפסוקים הללו, הן מצד עצמם, והן בנוגע לקישורם לתוכן הפיוט. ולא זו בלבד! בפירוש ה”מגן” של פרשת שקלים (פיוט “אז מאז”) מוכיח רש”י ז”ל את הפירוש הנכון של הפיוט – מכך שהפייטן לא קבע פסוק מסוים כאן בסוף הפיוט!

בתשב”ץ קטן (סי’ קב) מעיד על מנהגו של מהר”ם שלא היה אומר את הפסוקים שבקרובות, ויתכן מזה כנראה נשתלשל מנהג אשכנז לדלג על שרשור הפסוקים. אבל היום שהוצאת הדפוס הוזל משמעתית, למה לא להדפיס את הפסוקים שהם כלי עזר ראשון במעלה להבנת את הפיוטים?

בנוגע לזה יש לציין לשבח את מהדורת ‘סדר יוצרות המבואר – כוונת הלב’ שיצאה לאור הא שתא עם פירוש שנערך גם הוא על ידי ידידי הרב יעקב לויפר, ושם שובצו הפסוקים אחר כבוד בתוך הפיוטים, איש על מחנהו ועל דגלו, עם הערות ביאור המשרטטות את המבנה שלהם ומבארות את הקישור בין הפסוקים לתוכן הפיוט.

כדי לשבר את האוזן נביא כאן את הפיוט הראשון של הקדושתא לפרשת זכור בסידור נכון ומלא:

אַזְכִּיר סֶלָה זִכְרוֹן מַעֲשִׂים. בַּיָמִים הָאֵלֶּה נִזְכָּרִים וְנַעֲשִׂים. גָחוֹן גָּח מִבֵּין עֲכָסִים. דֵּרְאוֹנוֹ לְהַזְכִּיר לְרֶקֶב  כְּעָסִים:

הַחוֹחַ הֵנֵץ מִגַּלְגַּל וְדַרְדַּר. וּמִדּוֹר לְדוֹר גֻּלְגַּל וְדֻרְדַּר. זֵכֶר עֲוֹן אֲבוֹתָיו הָקְדַּר. חַטַּאת אִמּוֹ בְּלִי לְהַעְדַּר:

טָרַף אַף וַיַּשְׁחֵת רַחַם. יְחוּמָתוֹ מִקְּלוֹט בְּהֵרָיוֹן יַחַם. כְּהָפְקַד לְשָׁלִישׁוֹ חֵטְא נוֹחַם. לֻבַּט לְהִלָּחֵם בְּלוֹחֲמֵי לָחֶם:

מַהֲלַךְ אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת פַּרְסָה. נָע וְנָד מִכְמוֹרֶת לְפָרְסָה. סָע מִשֵׂעִיר וְהִכְמִין פְּרוּסָה. עָיֵף וְיָגֵעַ מְבוּשָׁיו לְסָרְסָה:

פּוֹעֵל שְׂטִימַת בְּכוֹרָה לַעֲכוֹר. צְמִיתוּת צֹאן קָדָשִׁים לִמְכּוֹר. קְלוֹנוֹ הָחֳרַט בָּעֵט לִזְכּוֹר. רֵאשִׁית גּוֹיִם לְגַלַּע בְּזָכוֹר:

שַׁדַּי זָכַר לַיְלָה חוֹלֵק. שֹׁרֶשׁ וְעָנָף בַּחֲלַקְלַק לְהַחֲלֵק: תְּמוּר כִּי חֲשָׁלָיו הִמְלֵק. תָּבַע לְהִזָּכֵר מַעַשׂ עֲמָלֵק:

ככתוב זָכוֹר אֵת אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְךָ עֲמָלֵק בַּדֶּרֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶם מִמִּצְרָיִם: ונאמר וַיַּרְא אֶת עֲמָלֵק וַיִּשָּׂא מְשָׁלוֹ וַיֹּאמַר רֵאשִׁית גּוֹיִם עֲמָלֵק וְאַחֲרִיתוֹ עֲדֵי אֹבֵד: ונאמר יִזָּכֵר עֲוֹן אֲבֹתָיו אֶל ה’ וְחַטַּאת אִמּוֹ אַל תִּמָּח: ונאמר זֵכֶר צַדִּיק לִבְרָכָה וְשֵׁם רְשָׁעִים יִרְקָב: ונאמר וְהַיָּמִים הָאֵלֶּה נִזְכָּרִים וְנַעֲשִׂים בְּכָל דּוֹר וָדוֹר מִשְׁפָּחָה וּמִשְׁפָּחָה מְדִינָה וּמְדִינָה וְעִיר וָעִיר וִימֵי הַפּוּרִים הָאֵלֶּה לֹא יַעַבְרוּ מִתּוֹךְ הַיְּהוּדִים וְזִכְרָם לֹא יָסוּף מִזַּרְעָם: ונאמר אֵין זִכְרוֹן לָרִאשֹׁנִים וְגַם לָאַחֲרֹנִים שֶׁיִּהְיוּ לֹא יִהְיֶה לָהֶם זִכָּרוֹן עִם שֶׁיִּהְיוּ לָאַחֲרֹנָה:

לָאַחֲרוֹנָה יִסְעוּ שֶׁבָּם שָׁלַט. כִּי הֶעָנָן מַטָּם פָּלַט: לְעֵת יִמָּחֶה וְלֹא יֻמְלַט. יְגוֹנֵן עַם גָּנוֹן וּמוּפְלָט: בָּרוּךְ אַתָּה ה’ מָגֵן אַבְרָהָם:

By Marc B. Shapiro

(This post was originally part of the previous one, but since I know people don’t like reading posts more than twenty pages long, I split it up into two parts.)

1. I know that every year around Christmas time some people read my article on Torah study on Christmas eve. At the end of the article I raise the possibility that the various Nittel practices were actually based on non-Jewish superstitions. My suspicion was proven beyond any doubt in a wonderful article by Rebecca Scharbach, “The Ghost in the Privy: On the Origins of Nittel Nacht and Modes of Cultural Exchange.”[1] I recommend that everyone add this article to their “holiday reading”. (Due to reasons beyond my control, this post was not able to appear, as planned, before Christmas.)

As for our own holiday of Hanukkah, let me share something that I think people will find interesting. When it comes to the dating of various Psalms, for those in the Modern Orthodox/Religious Zionist world there don’t appear to be any dogmatic issues involved, much like there are no dogmatic issues raised if one assumes that the prophecies beginning in Isaiah chapter 40 come from a later prophet than those in the first part of the book.[2] Nevertheless, I think people generally assume that traditionalists will not speak about “Maccabean Psalms”. (Truth be told, I don’t know if there are even any academic scholars that still identify some of the Psalms as belonging to the Maccabean period.)

See S.’s post here where he notes that Philip Birnbaum, in his siddur, seems to allude to a psalm as having been written in the Maccabean period. However, S. also quotes R. Samson Raphael Hirsch as stating that Orthodox Judaism rejects the notion of “Pseudo-Isaiah”, and of “Maccabean songs under the name of David.” On the other hand, R. Solomon Judah Rapoport believed that at least one psalm (and perhaps more) were written during the Maccabean period. He identified other psalms as dating from the Second Temple period and defended the religious legitimacy of this view. “If the sages of the Talmud advanced the date of a number of Psalms from the time of David to that of Ezra, a period of more than five hundred years, we must have no scruples in advancing them another two hundred years.”[3] R. Samuel Barukh Rabinkow also felt that “the religious value of any of the Psalms is independent of the time of its composition or any historical consideration or reflection.”[4]

I found a very interesting passage by R. Abraham Saba in his Tzeror ha-Mor.[5] He appears to be saying that Psalm 30, which we recite every day (and which many recite after Hanukkah morning tefillah and after lighting the Hanukkah candles) was written when the Temple was rededicated by the Hasmoneans.

אני סבור כי מזמור שיר חנוכת הבית לדוד נתקן על חנוכת הבית של חשמונאי . . . ולכן נעש’ נס בשמן והדליקו ממנה שמנה ימים ועל זה סדר מזמור שיר חנוכת הבית

R. Saba continues by explaining the various verses in line with this conception. Now I realize that one can argue that what he means is that David prophetically wrote the psalm with the Hasmonean rededication in mind, and this interpretation is actually stated by R. Abraham the son of the Vilna Gaon.[6]

Yet such an approach this does not appear to fit with the words of R. Saba:

נתקן על חנוכת הבית של חשמונאי

In his “translation” of this passage Eliyahu Munk writes: “I am convinced that David, in his holy spirit, foresaw such a period and dedicated Psalm 30, 1-13 to that period, therefore commencing with מזמור שיר חנוכת הבית לדוד ‘a song for the consecration of the House,’ the ‘house’ being the reconsecration of the Temple after the Hasmoneans’ victory.”[7] Yet all readers can see that in the original R. Saba does not mention David or his holy spirit.

R. Joseph Hayyim[8] believes that Psalm 30 as a whole was written by David, and he says it is possible that David also wrote the first verse. But he also says that it is possible that the first verse, which speaks of dedication of the Temple, was added to the psalm during the Maccabean period.

אפשר לומר לעולם דוד הע”ה לא אמר פסוק זה של חנוכת הבית, אלא גם הוא התחיל מן ארוממך, ופסוק זה בזמן בית שני כשעשה הקב”ה להם נסים וניצולו וחנכו הבית והמזבח מחדש הוסיפו על מזמור זה פסוק זה מפני שראו דכל דברי המזמור שייכים גם לעניינם.

He adds that this notion should not trouble anyone, as we know that according to one opinion in the Talmud the last eight verses of the Torah were added by Joshua, and he also notes that there were a couple of verses in the book of Joshua that were added after Joshua’s death. In other words, minor additions to abook after the death of the author are not religiously problematic.

Nevertheless, R. Meir Mazuz is indeed troubled by what R. Joseph Hayyim wrote.[9] He claims that the verses added to biblical books noted by R. Joseph Hayyim were added by prophets.[10] Yet in the case of Psalm 30, R. Joseph Hayyim is suggesting that an addition took place during Second Temple times after prophecy had already ceased and there was no longer the institution of anshei keneset ha-gedolah. According to R. Mazuz this is indeed religiously problematic. One can reply to R. Mazuz that while prophecy might have ceased, ruah ha-kodesh did not,[11] and therefore it was permissible for verses to be added to the book of Psalms even in the Maccabean period. After all, a standard view among rishonim is that the book of Psalms is not the product of prophecy but of ruah ha-kodesh.[12]

R. Mazuz adds a second reason why he cannot accept what R. Joseph Hayyim writes. He claims that R. Joseph Hayyim’s position will give support to the modern biblical scholars who believe that verses in the book of Daniel were added in the Maccabean period, a position he also finds religiously objectionable. I don’t understand this objection as the modern biblical scholars do not need, and do not look for, support from traditional commentators. They are completely oblivious to what rabbis like R. Joseph Hayyim have to say on these matters, and have no reason to cite his view as a support for their own position.R. Moses Isaac Ashkenazi discusses the authorship of Psalms in the introduction to his Ho’il Moshe on Tehillim (Livorno, 1880). Although he has his doubts, he says that one who assumes that Psalm 44 was composed during the Maccabean period “has what to rely on.”

So much for Maccabean psalms, but what about post-Davidic psalms in general? R. Ashkenazi identifies Psalms 79 and 137 as having been written during the Babylonian Exile. He also thinks that Psalms 126 and 129 might have been written then. He is led to his view because he can find no evidence that David was a prophet. While David had ruah ha-kodesh, it is only prophecy that reveals future events, and thus the psalms that reflect a post-First Temple era must indeed have been written centuries after David. 

As with R. Ashkenazi, his predecessor R. Eleazar ben Samuel Shmelke claims that Psalms 79 and 137 were composed after the destruction of the First Temple. He states that this was also Ibn Ezra’s opinion.[13] In Ibn Ezra’s introduction to Tehillim (which is not found in all mikraot gedolot editions) Ibn Ezra states that “others” held that Psalm 137 and a number of other psalms were written during the Babylonian Exile, yet he does not signal his acceptance of this view.

One of those Ibn Ezra had in mind who held that some psalms were written during the Babylonian Exile was R. Moses Ibn Gikatilla.[14] R. Raphael Berdugo also states that a number of psalms, including Psalm 137, were composed during the Babylonian Exile.[15]

In Rashbam’s commentary to Tehillim (which we can expect ArtScroll to censor if it ever publishes it), he points to psalms which were composed during the Babylonian Exile and also states that other psalms were written after Ezra’s return to Jerusalem. For example, Psalm 122:3 states: “Our feet are standing within thy gates, O Jerusalem. Jerusalem, that art builded as a city that is compact together.” According to Rashbam, these references to Jerusalem must date from after the return from exile.[17]

2. Here is a provocative passage quoted in the name of the hasidic master R. Uri of Strelisk (1757-1826).[18] Would any hasidic leader speak this way today?

והרה”ק מסטרעטן זצ”ל אמר משמו עה”פ שומר נפשות חסידיו מיד רשעים יצילם, שאמר: לפני ביאת המשיח יהיו רבי”ס רשעים גמורים ר”ל, אבל הן החסידים הם בתמימותם סוברים שרבם הוא עובד ה’ ולכן נוסעים אליו, לזאת התפלל דהמע”ה שומר נפשות חסידיו כי השי”ת ישמור את החסידים ומיד רשעים יצילם שלא שלא יכשלו ח”ו ברבי”ס כאלו

His comment was only applicable to the phony rebbes. But for an authentic rebbe it is worth travelling great distances and missing out on Torah and tefillah just to hear one bit of wisdom.[19]

אמר שיש ליסע לצדיק אמת אפילו אלפיים פרסאות ולבטל בהליכתו ובחזירתו מתורה ותפלה והכל כדי דיבור אחד של אמת אשר ישמע מפי צדיק אמת

3. Every year there is discussion about the moment of silence in Israel in memory of the soldiers and Holocaust victims, and we always hear about how this is not a Jewish thing to do. Here is a page from R. Ovadyah Hadaya’s Yaskil Avdi, vol. 6, p. 300 (hashmatot Yoreh Deah 2:2).

He regards the moment of silence as entirely appropriate, seeing it as similar to the silence in a house of mourning which shows acceptance of God’s decree.

See also my post here where I wrote that in November 1965 R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg gave a hesped for four recently deceased rabbis, among them R. Yerucham Warhaftig and R. Eliezer Yehudah Finkel. These latter two were good friends of R. Weinberg, and R. Weinberg’s friendship with R. Finkel went back to their youth. After the eulogy R. Weinberg asked everyone in the room to stand up. They stood silently for around ten seconds and then he asked them to sit down.

In this post I wrote: “I presume this was intended as a show of respect rather than as a moment of silence, since the latter could be done sitting down.” I now think that my statement is probably incorrect, because a moment of silence is also intended as a show of respect, i.e., the two are not in contradiction. In thinking of the story now, it appears that R. Weinberg’s request to stand in silence is really no different than what takes place in Israel.

4. A haredi biography on R. Isaac Blazer has recently appeared. Here is its title page.

Needless to say, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg is quoted a good deal in the book. Here is page 410 which contains a picture of R. Weinberg.

 

The book does not mention that this picture first appeared on the Seforim Blog; see my post here.

In the quotations from R. Weinberg, the book has no problem making “improvements”. For example, R. Weinberg sometimes refers to R. Isaac Blazer as רי”ב, and the new book has altered this to הגרי”ב. R. Weinberg certainly regarded R. Blazer as a gaon, and he sometimes does refer to him as הגרי”ב. However, he did not feel that it was necessary to always refer to R. Blazer this way. The author of the book therefore decided to “correct” what R. Weinberg wrote. I guess this author (who is unnamed) did not think that R. Weinberg showed proper kavod to R. Blazer, which itself is a crazy thought.

Speaking of R. Weinberg and kavod, I think readers will find the following interesting. R. Weinberg stated: “We are all human. I too like kavod. I try not to chase after it, but if it is put on my plate, I will take it.”[20] How many other great rabbis would be honest enough to admit that they are not at the level of the Hafetz Hayyim and R. Elijah David Rabinowitz-Teomim,[21] and that they too like kavod? What R. Weinberg was saying is that this is normal and nothing to be ashamed of, and that for “mere mortals” what is important is not to chase after kavod.5. In my post here. I discussed Haym Soloveitchik’s newly published volume 2 of his collected essays. I neglected to mention that on pp. 285-287 he deals with R. Yitzchak Grossman’s criticism of one of his essays, criticism that appeared on the Seforim Blog here here. Soloveitchik shows his scholarly honesty in that he is prepared to acknowledge that in two of his criticisms Grossman is correct. He also responds to another criticism of Grossman, and I ask people to read what Soloveitchik says very carefully. It was precisely this sort of interpretation, now standard in the academy, that R. Samson Raphael Hirsch was so opposed to. You can be sure that if these words were stated by R. Dov Linzer or R. Ysoscher Katz, that a certain author, on a certain website, would go after them for “undermining the mesorah”.

Ben sorer u-moreh, according to the setam mishnah, nidon al shem sofo. This runs contrary to every principle in Jewish law and, indeed, in most Gentile law. People are executed for crimes that they have committed, not for crimes that they might commit–preventive detention for the criminally inclined perhaps, but preventive execution?! If I find tanna’im attempting to make the implementation of this law impossible, does it strain the imagination to think that they did so because it contradicts their elementary sense of right and wrong? I, for one, think not.

Rabbi Grossman argues that we find a similar ruling about nig’ei battim and there is no ethical problem in this realm. Indeed, there isn’t; however, no one claimed that all instances of “never was and never will be” (lo hayah ve-lo nivra) are a result of ethical issues. Only those in which we find this type of problem, such as ben sorer u-moreh and, to add to the roster, the “apostate city” (ir ha-niddahat) as R. Eliezer Berkovits has contended (as noted by R. Grossman). . . . An exegesis that makes execution of a law more difficult may be simply a matter of interpretation; an exegesis that makes execution impossible has that in mind to begin with. One plausible reason that one might have sought to render a Divine directive inoperable is that such a dictate appeared inconceivable for a just God.

6. I want to call readers attention to the recently published Kovetz ha-Mashbir, vol. 1, edited by Yissachar Dov Hoffman and Ovadyah Hoffman. This volume is devoted to the writings and teachings of R. Ovadiah Yosef and is full of valuable articles. It can be purchased at Biegeleisen.

More on R. Kook’s Recently Published Writings

by Marc B. Shapiro

In my post here here I mentioned that R. Kook argued that there is good reason to observe mitzvot even if one does not have a traditional view of the Torah’s authorship. On the one hand, there is nothing surprising in this. After all, would anyone tell a non-Orthodox Jew that it is OK if he eats on Yom Kippur?[1] R. Kook’s originality is therefore not seen in the bottom line, but in the argument he uses.[2] He notes that Maimonides and other medieval greats used arguments that they themselves did not accept in order to make religious points. For example, Maimonides used an argument that assumed the eternity of matter in order to prove the existence of God.[3] This was valuable in that those who accepted the former point would also be forced to acknowledge the latter point, i.e., God’s existence. Only then could he attempt to weaken the belief in eternity. Similarly, R. Kook is prepared to argue for the binding nature of Torah law even on the assumption that it was not given to Moses. This is valuable since, in his day at least, it was the acceptance of biblical criticism that encouraged people to give up the observance of mitzvot. If R. Kook can therefore show that even an acceptance of biblical criticism does not mean that there is no place for mitzvot, it will be a great achievement.[4]

R. Kook notes that traditional Jews observe rabbinic laws and even customs. His point is that these are regarded as valuable and help form the religious personality Yet no one believes that they were given to Moses by God. Why, then, should believers in biblical criticism not feel bound to other laws, which while traditionally seen as from Sinai, can also be regarded as rabbinic or even as customs (“folkways” in Mordecai Kaplan’s language). In other words, the mitzvot should be seen as having value regardless of their origin.

I have to say, however, that the weakness in R. Kook’s argument should be apparent. For those who accept the entire system, it makes sense that on top of the divinely revealed Torah laws, that rabbinic laws and customs are also added. But if one rejects the basis of Torah law, then the other two components simply fall away.

R. Kook picks up with his theme in a later passage.[5] Before dealing with the matter of biblical criticism, he briefly discusses the so-called dispute between science and Torah that caused so much difficulty in his day. In a passage that is very similar to one that appears in his letter to Moshe Seidel,[6] R. Kook explains that the Torah makes use of the “science” of its day, and writes about such matters in a simple and understandable fashion. The Torah makes no attempt at scientific accuracy (which would not have been understandable in earlier days). As R. Uri Sharki, a follower of R. Kook, puts it, the creation story (which contains great secrets) is presented in the language of myth בסגנון המיתי.[7] Most people today who have examined the matter accept this approach, but since the average person does not understand what myth is (seeing it as synonymous with fairy tale or legend), you don’t have a typical Orthodox rabbi using this language in his sermon on parashat Bereshit.

I have discussed this matter in detail in an earlier post here so there is no need to repeat what I have already said. Let me only add that the use of the term “science” in this context is not really accurate. What R. Kook is discussing is the early history of the universe, knowledge of which we have arrived at by means of science. R. Kook is saying that we should not treat the Torah’s descriptions as “history”, as that is not the Torah’s purpose. As I have pointed out in the post mentioned above, I believe that R. Kook’s approach was not only intended to answer problems dealing with the first chapters of Genesis but with any problems that might arise between what historians conclude and what appears to be the peshat in the Torah, e.g., the lifespans recorded in Scripture, the description of the Flood, and the huge number of people who took part in the Exodus, to mention just a few that are often discussed.[8]

Following this matter, R. Kook returns to the issue of Torah mi-Sinai. He states that even if one believes that the Torah was written after Moses or that the text has been corrupted, this does not affect his obligation to observe the mitzvot, since the acceptance of the Torah was dependent on its acceptance by the nation. Therefore, an individual cannot remove himself from this group. This is no different than a host of other matters where we say that an individual cannot choose a separate path from that which was decided by the group.[9]

Regarding the revelation of the Torah, it is important to also cite R. Kook’s words in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:633, about which an entire post could be written. I ask readers to focus carefully on the implications of what he says.

There is denial that is like an affirmation of faith, and an affirmation of faith akin to denial. A person can affirm the doctrine of the Torah coming from “heaven”, but with the meaning of “heaven” so strange that nothing of true faith remains. And a person can deny Torah coming from “heaven” where the denial is based on what the person has absorbed of the meaning of “heaven” from people full of ludicrous thoughts. Such a person believes that the Torah comes from a source higher than that! . . . Although that person may not have reached the point of truth, nonetheless this denial is to be considered akin to an affirmation of faith. . . . “Torah from Heaven” is but an example for all affirmations of faith, regarding the relationship between their expression in language and their inner essence, the latter being the main desideratum of faith.[10]

Since we are speaking about R. Kook, let me also call attention to a few more significant passages in the newly published Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor. I previously referred to this text which a few years ago was somehow illegally placed online. In 2014 R. Shahar Rahmani published the work with notes, and it is to this edition that everyone should now refer. In studying Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, readers should remember that it was written before R. Kook came to the Land of Israel.

In chapter 13 R. Kook acknowledges that in a future era, when we will have a Sanhedrin, there will be a need for new derashot in halakhah, which will respond to the then current circumstances, something we at present cannot do. In this future era people will no longer be able to complain, as they do now, that the rabbinic obligations are not suitable for the current time. This is an acknowledgment that there are indeed aspects of rabbinic law that should, and will, be changed. But R. Kook falls back on the procedural problem of doing this prematurely, before the mechanism to do so exists (i.e., the Sanhedrin).

I have no reason to assume that R. Kook is speaking about the messianic era, since he does not mention this, instead writing about the “far off future”. Had he intended the messianic era, he would have said so. What this means is that when the Jews are once again dwelling in their land there is a possibility for the revival of a living halakhah, by means of a Sanhedrin which would create derashot. See, e.g., these two sentences, where he responds to suggestions by those living in Europe to alter halakhah. He insists that no changes in halakhah can take place at present, but it is significant that he does not mention the messianic era (and note the positive way he describes the רגש of the advocates of halakhic change). In other words, while haredim push off all such talk to the messianic era, R. Kook is not bound by such conservatism and could imagine halakhic change via a Sanhedrin in the pre-messianic era as well.

אבל הרוצה לדחוק את הקץ, ולהתנהג בדרישות שאנו חייבים ויכולים לקיימן רק בהיותינו בבית חיינו, גם לעת פזורינו ודלדולינו, ופורץ גדר של המרכז הלאומי הנשגב, התלמוד וחתימתו, בשביל קורת רוח של חיי שעה ודרישת אסתתיקא זמנית, הוא מחליף עולם קיים בעולם עובר בכלל האומה ומביא אנדרולומוסיא לעולם

ידעתי אמנם שהדעה הנשאה הזאת תוכל להיות למפגע לקלי דעת החפצים לדחוק את הקץ ורודפים את העתיד הרחוק בלא זמנו, אלה הם השועלים המחבלים, שאף שהרגשתם היא הרגשה רוממה ונעלה, אבל רוחם אינו רוח שוקט הראוי לכל איש ישר היודע את אשר לפניו

The future Sanhedrin will be able not only to overturn talmudic halakhot, but it will also be able uproot Torah laws if it finds it necessary. R. Kook further tells us that if the Sanhedrin is able to change our understanding of a biblical law by means of a derashah, it is not even to be regarded as an “uprooting.” It is by means of derashot that the Sanhedrin would be able to permanently alter the way of Torah observance. Consider for example the matter of women not being accepted as witnesses for certain matters. Rather than using apologetics to explain this to contemporary women, R. Kook’s approach allows people to say that indeed, this can be changed by a future Sanhedrin by means of a new derashah, but that today there can be no change since we do not have the mechanism to do so. The matter is thus turned into a technical problem rather than an ideological one.[11]

R. Kook also elaborates on the idea that the closing of the Talmud was a historical phenomenon brought on by the difficulties of the galut. But the Jewish people only accepted such a closure until the time that they returned to their land and the nation was once again rejuvenated.

Chapter 13 of Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor can stand alone as an essay. It is a very important statement of how R. Kook understood Jewish law, and I hope someone will translate it into English. I think what R. Kook was talking about is the same thing later advocated by R. Eliezer Berkovits, although I am not claiming that R. Kook would have supported Berkovits’ ideas as practical in our time. However, the concept that Berkovits was speaking about, of an Eretz Yisrael halakhah, is exactly what R. Kook had in mind.[12]

If this wasn’t enough, R. Kook has more to say in chapter 13. He discusses how the great stress on Talmud study in recent centuries has brought much that is positive to the Jewish people. However, he also notes the downside of this single-minded focus on Talmud study, a criticism that (for those who accept it) would be even more applicable in our day. He says that this focus on Talmud study has led to a weakness of the body for many students, a point already known from Orot. He also states that the Talmud-only curriculum has led people to be unaware of those secular studies that are indeed essential.[13]

חסרון המדעים הנחוצים לאדם באשר הוא אדם

Most interesting, however, is the additional problem R. Kook sees with the exclusive focus on Talmud study. He says that it has led to ethical problems, problems that arise when people spend their time focused only on halakhic details without seeing the broader picture, that of the heart which cannot be encompassed in halakhic details but only in a broad ethical vision.

וגם חסרונות מוסריים שבאו לרגלי התיחדות העסק השכלי רק בפרטי ודקדוקי הלכות מאין שם לב לרגשי לב והגיוני מוסר כלליים

R. Kook is quick to point out that it is not the study of Talmud per se that is responsible for the problem he mentions, but rather the single-minded focus on Talmud to the exclusion of all else, meaning that there is no room for secular studies, physical exercise, and exposure to the larger ethical teachings of the Torah.

אמנם כל המגרעות האלה לא באו לנו מצד השקידה על למוד התלמוד וקיומו, כי אם מצד ההפרזה הקיצונית על שלא הנחנו מקום לחלקי החינוך האחרים להכשרת החכמות והמדעים, לחוזק הגוף, להרחבת הדעה וההגיון המוסרי שבתורה, שעל זה כבר צוחו גם כן גדולי הדורות, ומקוצר רוח לא היה להם שומע

For good measure R. Kook adds that extremism, be it in actions or beliefs, is always bad for us.

והנטיה הקיצונית היא לעולם מכאבת בנו כל חלקה טובה, הקיצוניות בחינוך ובמעשים וכמו כן הקיצוניות בדעות

I will continue with more from Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor in future posts, but for now I would like to add one more comment about R. Kook. At least one reader is upset that I haven’t focused on R. Kook’s halakhic and talmudic writings, as he thinks that this is the main aspect of R. Kook, while his philosophical writings were only done on the side, as it were. This exact same point has been made with regard to R. Soloveitchik. That is, people have criticized certain academics for portraying the Rav as primarily a philosopher for whom his talmudic studies were a secondary element. In this case the criticism is certainly correct, as when it came to the Rav his talmudic studies were the main focus and it was his philosophical writings that were secondary.

Yet this is not the case when it comes to R. Kook. It is true that he was a great posek, however this was not where his heart was. In his inner essence he was a thinker and kabbalist, not a talmudist or halakhist. This is not just my own speculation. R. Kook himself said as much to both R. Reuven Margaliyot and R. Moshe Zvi Neriyah. Here is what he told R. Neriyah:[14]

שעה שחפץ היה הפילוסוף קנט להנפש מקצת ממחקריו הפילוסיפיים, עסק בגיאוגרפיה. וכך היה אומר: “מחמת שאני איש האבסטרקים, חש אני הרגשת-נופש וחילוף כחות כשאני מעיין בדברים מוצקים כגון: הר, נחל, עיר כפר וכדומה,” אף אני כך – ציין הרב – הרי אני מטבעי איש המחשבה והרגש, אולם בבואי להנפש, אני עוסק בהלכה ואני חש שרגלי עומדות על קרקע מוצק.

R. Kook told R. Margaliyot the same thing:[15]

מטבעי “בעל מחשבות” אנכי ושורש נשמתי היא “המחשבה”, וכשאני זקוק למנוחה והחלפת כוח הנני מתעסק בהלכה.

See also my post here where I discuss R. Kook’s belief that the nitty-gritty of halakhic study can have a negative effect on great people’s spiritual life. 

All that I have just mentioned is far removed from R. Soloveitchik’s understanding of the role of halakhic study and its place in his own spiritual personality.[16]

Based on what I have cited, we can also reject what Hillel Goldberg has written in a generally very positive review of Yehudah Mirsky’s new book on R. Kook.

R. Kook’s status as a major halakhic decisor was not just something added onto an already impressive resume. It was not just one more remarkable thing he did. It was of his essence. And the elevation and illumination it entailed were of a piece with, perhaps even a spur to – certainly not in opposition to – the strivings of his soul.[17]

These are very nice words by Goldberg, but the problem is that they are contradicted by none other than R. Kook himself who denies that halakhic study is “of his essence” and confesses that halakhic study was at times indeed in opposition to “the strivings of his soul.”

In previous posts I have quoted all sorts of amazing passages from R. Kook, and here is another one. It appears in Shemonah Kevatzim 2:34.

At the beginning of the passage R. Kook refers to those special tzaddikim who do not need to learn Torah or pray on a regular basis. (When he speaks of learning Torah he is referring to traditional talmudic learning.) That there are some individuals who are so close to God that they don’t need to learn is not that surprising, as one can find the idea in certain hasidic texts that learning Talmud removes one from devekut with God. Some hasidic texts also state that the tzaddik does not need to heed the proper times of prayer, as he is above time. Yet I don’t know if there are any hasidic texts that go as far as R. Kook in assuming that that since the tzaddik is so closely connected to God that he can go for weeks without praying. I assume all this was only theoretical for R. Kook. I stress this since when one studies the totality of his writings it is obvious that R. Kook includes himself among the special tzaddikim he speaks of.

Now look at how this passage appears in Arpilei Tohar,[18] p. 16. 

The words לפי מדרגתם have been added to the original. This entirely alters the passage’s meaning, turning it on its head. R. Kook is now saying that there are tzaddikim who only rarely need to learn or pray at their special level (meaning that on a daily basis they learn and pray at a lower level, like everyone else). This alteration completely removes the antinomian sense of the passage, since one reading Arpilei Tohar will have no way of knowing that in the original text R. Kook’s point was that the tzaddikim only rarely need to learn or pray at all.

There has been a great deal of discussion about the changes made in Arpilei Tohar, and how they subverted R. Kook’s original intent. In this example, however, it was R. Kook himself who made the change,[19] obviously because he regarded his initial formulation as too provocative to appear in print.

Returning to the matter of Torah mi-Sinai, I was recently asked the following question. In Genesis 46:23 it says ובני דן חושים. “And the sons of Dan: Hushim.”[20] Many commentators discuss why it says “the sons” and not “the son”, since only one son is mentioned.[21] We find the same issue in 1 Chronicles 2:7-8 where it states ובני כרמי and ובני איתן but in each case only one son is listed. The Malbim wrote a commentary on Chronicles entitled Yemei Kedem. In this commentary, ibid., he explains that Carmi and Eitan had more sons, but Ezra, the author of Chronicles, was simply copying this information from an earlier source and only gave the name of the son that was important for his purposes. However, he kept the earlier part of the sentence, which mentions “sons”, and in the original source from which he was quoting other sons’ names also appeared.

Say what you will about this explanation, there is nothing radical in it. However, following this the Malbim says that the phenomenon he just described also explains the verse in Gen. 46:23: ובני דן חושים as well as the verse in Num. 26:8: ובני פלוא אליאב. That is, there were other sons but “he” only included the names that were important for his purpose.[22]

The questioner wondered, who is the “he” that the Malbim is referring to? Is it possible that he has Ezra in mind? I find this most unlikely, as everything that I know about the Malbim argues against the notion that he could have thought that Ezra had a role in the writing of the Torah. This leads me to assume that when the Malbim writes ולא חשיב רק הצריך לו לענינו that he is referring to Moses, and saying that just like Ezra only included the information that he needed, so too Moses chose to leave off the additional names since it wasn’t important for the story he was telling. This preserves complete Mosaic authorship, which I believe the Malbim genuinely affirmed (i.e., I don’t think he is hinting to a more radical view here). 

Some will still see the Malbim’s explanation as problematic in that it assumes that Moses independently made choices about what to include in the Torah. But in truth, even from a traditional perspective this is not problematic, and no different from the many other sources that speak of Moses formulating passages in the Torah on his own. As I pointed out in Limits, p. 113, the traditional view has always been that God’s imprimatur, as it were, was later given to those words originally stated by Moses on his own. So too the Malbim would say that while Moses originally chose what to include here, when the Torah was later given to the Children of Israel this was done at God’s direction, and this is what sanctified the text. So there is really nothing radical about what the Malbim is saying.[23]

Regarding the Malbim, R. Mordechai E. Feuerstein shares the following from R. Soloveitchik.[24]

He told me about the Malbim, the great Torah commentator, who in 1834 paid a visit to the Chasam Sofer in Pressburg. The Malbim was a younger person, about twenty-five years old at that time, while the Chasam Sofer was at the zenith of his career, one of the greatest rabbanim of the 19th century and of the whole period of the Acharonim. The Chasam Sofer accorded much honor to the Malbim, seating him on his right side at the Shabbos table, enabling them to speak together at greater length.

Apparently, after the Shabbos-day meal, the Malbim was so engrossed in what he had heard from the Chasam Sofer that he wandered back to the shul, lost in thought. It was quite dark inside the empty shul, and the Malbim found a place to stand near what seemed to be a wall, and remained there in profound contemplation.

Later when the congregants began returning to shul for Mincha, they were stunned to see the Malbim standing near the aron, still deep in thought, right in the makom kavua of the Chasam Sofer! An angry murmur swept through the crowd; people were about to step forward to rebuke the Malbim when the Chasam Sofer walked in. Quickly sizing up the situation, he stopped them and said: Zol ehr blaiben shtayn (“Let him remain standing there”). The Malbim awoke from his trance and, horror-struck to discover that he had inadvertently been standing in the Chasam Sofer’s place, offered the Chasam Sofer profuse apologies, which were accepted.

For the rest of his life, the Rov told me, the Malbim used to sequester himself in a room for a period of time, right after Shabbos Mincha. Afterwards, he would emerge red-eyed from weeping. With the passage of years, he gradually came to interpret the Chasam Sofer’s words, Zol ehr blaiben shtayn as a punitive decree: Let him remain standing where he is now—his qualitative advance in Torah knowledge is over. Where he is now is where he will stay. The Malbim sensed that the divine gift of creative inspiration which he had experienced before his inadvertent slight to the honor of the Chasam Sofer, had been irrevocably taken away.

R. Hershel Schachter, Nefesh ha-Rav, pp. 251-252, also tells the story, as he heard it from R. Soloveitchik, and in his version there are some differences. To begin with, he records that the Malbim came to Pressburg to request a haskamah on his halakhic work Artzot ha-Hayyim, which the Hatam Sofer provided. According to R. Schachter’s version, the mistake happened not when the Malbim returned to the synagogue before minhah, but when he returned for maariv. Furthermore, the Malbim was not standing in the Hatam Sofer’s place, but actually sat in his seat. As he explains, this was an understandable mistake as it was dark and throughout Shabbat he has been sitting in the seat next to that of the Hatam Sofer. When one of the laypeople tried to point out to the Malbim that he was in the Hatam Sofer’s seat, the latter was so involved in his learning that he did not even realize that someone was speaking to him. It was then that the Hatam Sofer said to leave him be. From that time on the Malbim’s main area of hiddush was in the study of Tanakh but not in halakhah[25]:

וכאילו לשונו של הח”ס שאמר לו “שישאר שמה” היה מוסבת על דרגת הלימוד שלו, שלא יעלה עוד הלאה בהלכה

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I was hoping to discuss the recent political developments that revolve around R. Meir Mazuz, but I see that the post is already quite long as it is. I will therefore postpone this discussion until a future post.