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על שיבושי הצנזורה שנמצאים בהדפסות החדשות של התלמוד

הרב
ברוך אבערלאנדער
אב”ד
הבד”צ דקהילות החרדים דבודאפעסט
ורב
דקהילת חברה ש”ס – ליובאוויטש
בהמשך
לרשימה שהופיעה ב’ספרים-בלוג‘ אודות
הצנזורה הנני מפרסם כאן מתוך מה שרשמתי בענין.
הצנזורה
בתלמוד מאז ‘דפוס באסיליאה’
לפני קרוב
לארבע מאות וחמשים שנה, בשנים של”ח-שמ”א, נדפסה התלמוד הבבלי בעיר בזל
שבשוצריה. ש”ס זה ידוע בשם ‘דפוס באסיליאה’ של הנוצרי אמברוסיאו פרוביאנו. מהדורה
זו נדפסה על-פי ביקורת הצנזור מארקו מארינו, וזה השחית את תוכן המסכתות במאות
מקומות. מסכת עבודה זרה לא הדפיסו כלל – והטעם מובן. הדפוסים הבאים נמשכו אחרי
דפוס זו בלי לתקן השינויים ולהשלים ההשמטות שנעשו מפני הצנזורה.
אמנם קיים ספר
‘חסרונות הש”ס'[1], “והוא ספר קבוצת ההשמטות כולל כל
הדברים חסרים בתלמוד בבלי ורש”י ותוספות ורא”ש והג”א ופי’ המשניות
להרמב”ם… וכן השלמת החסרון חדושי הלכות ובח”א מהרש”א…”.
בהסכמתו לספר כותב הגאון בעל ‘הכתב והקבלה’: “איש נבון דעת ישתדל להוציא לאור
העולם את הספר הנקרא בשם ‘קבוצת ההשמטות’, וכל איש משכיל יודע התועלת הגדולה בל
ישכחו ברוב ימים, ומהראוי לעמוד בימין עזרתו ולסייעו להוציא מחשבתו הטובה מן הכח
אל הפועל”.
הלכה שלמד
הגר”מ פיינשטיין מתופעת הצנזורה
פסק
המהרש”ל ב’ים של שלמה’ (בבא קמא פ”ד סי’ ט, ע”פ גמרא שם לח, א
ותוד”ה קראו), שאם שאלו גוי על דין מדיני התורה ואינו יכול להישמט ממנו, ואם
יאמר לו את הדין יוכל לבוא לידי סכנה, אסור לו לשנות את הדין, שכל דבר ודבר מן
התורה נקרא תורת השם, ואם הוא משנה מפטור לחיוב וכיוצא בזה הריהו ככופר בכל התורה,
ולכן צריך למסור נפשו על זה, עיי”ש באריכות. (דברי המהרש”ל נעתקו בספרים שונים וכן ב’אנציקלופדיה
תלמודית’ כרך כב עמ’ ע והערה 193 שם.)
וכתב הרב
דוד קאהן בספרו ‘העקוב למישור’ (עמ’ לד) שהציע פעם את דברי היש”ש להגאון ר’ משה
פיינשטיין זצ”ל, “וענה לי הגר”מ זצ”ל דלית הלכתא כוותיה, שהרי
אנו רואים שהמדפיסים כתבו שכל מקום שנאמר עכו”ם או כותי בש”ס או בספרים
שונים אין המכוון לגוי שבימיהם ולא מיחו בידם חכמי הדור”[2].
אמנם יש
לציין שמצינו להגרמ”פ בכמה מקומות בספריו שהסתמך על דברי היש”ש
הנ”ל – שו”ת ‘אגרות משה’ (או”ח ח”ב סי’ נא), ‘דברות משה’
עמ”ס שבת (עמ’ קנט) ו’דברות משה’ עמ”ס כתובות (תשובה ג שבסוף הספר אות
ו).
‘שבט
הלוי’: “ההשמטות של הצנזורה… מצוה גמורה איכא להשלים החסר”
מעניין מאד
מכתבו של הגאון ר’ שמואל הלוי ואזנר זצ”ל, בשו”ת ‘שבט הלוי’ (ח”ח
סי’ רכה), ואעתיקו מפני חשיבותו:
כבוד ידידי המכובד
מאד פאר היחס והמעש הה”ג השלם כש”ת מוה”ר שבתי פרנקל שליט”א.
אחדשה”ט
וש”ת באה”ר.
העיר ה’ את כבודו
נ”י לפאר גם את התלמוד בבלי (אחרי שזכה לזה בהרמב”ם) בהוספות יקרות,
ולרגל עבוה”ק נולד ספק לכ”ת למעשה היות ידוע כי במשך הדורות גרמו הגוים
לשנות לשונות בהש”ס וגם להוציא קטעים שלמים ממנו, וגם בש”ס וילנא עם כל
הבקורת והגה עדין נשארו טעויות הדפוס למאות כידוע, ועד עכשיו כל המדפיסים לא
הסתכלו על זה רק מצלמים או מעתיקים הש”ס וילנא כמות שהוא עם המעלות וחסרונות
הטעויות, והיות כי ע”י טכניקה של היום אפשר לתקן את הסילופים של הצנזורה ואת
טעויות הדפוס שנשארו עדין אלא שעולה הרבה כסף, ע”כ נסתפק כ”ת לדינא, אם
מצלם את הש”ס כמות שהוא הוא [אי] ארוך להלכה כי כבר דשו ורגילים בו כלל ישראל,
או כיון שסו”ס אפשר בעולם לתקנו לגמרי ואם אינו מגיהו עד הסוף עדין עובר על
לא תשכון באהליך עולה שנדרש בכתובות י”ט ע”ב על המשהה ספר שאינו מוגה ל’
יום, ונפסק להלכה ביו”ד סי’ רע”ט. אלו דברי מכ”ת בתוס’ קצת, וגם
העיר מתשובת הרמ”א סי’ י’ שפסק כעין זה בנוגע לספרי הרמב”ם.
…פשוט בעיני
שכיון שהש”ס הזה הוגה בשעתו אלא לרבוי התיבות ואותיות לאלפי אלפים רבבות לא
יתכן בלי טעויות, מכ”מ הטעויות אינם יסודים בהלכה, ואין חשש שיצא מזה מכשול
בהוראה, בפרט לדידן שפוסקים מתוך השו”ע לא מהש”ס, א”כ אין בזה משום
אל תשכון באהליך עולה, ואפילו ההשמטות של הצנזורה נהי דמצוה גמורה איכא להשלים
החסר אבל גם בזה אין חסרון הזה יכול לגרום בלבול בהוראה וכיו”ב.
אבל בין בזה בין
בזה עכ”פ תבא עליו ברכה איכא בודאי, וגם מצוה לתקן, וע”כ השבושים
שמזדמנים לכם דרך עבודת הקודש שלכם בודאי מצוה וחיוב לתקן ובפרט במקום שרואים
בעליל שהוא מטעות המדפיסים, אבל לחפש עוד אין שום חיוב נגד מה שנדפס כזה כבר עשרות
פעמים, אבל בדרך תבא עליו ברכה אם אפשר כן ולהמציא לכלל ישראל דבר מושלם ומתוקן
ביותר מה טוב ומה נעים ותבא על כ”ת ברכת טוב.
ועל מה
שכתב ש”ההשמטות של הצנזורה… אין חסרון הזה יכול לגרום בלבול בהוראה”
יש להעיר מפסק הרמב”ם (הל’ ע”ז פ”ה ה”י): “ואפילו להזכיר
שם עבודה זרה שלא דרך שבועה אסור”, וכתב ב’הגהות מיימונית’ (סוף אות ג
במהדורת פרנקל): “…אבל שם הדיוטות כגון שמות בעלמא כשמות הגוים, אע”פ
שעשאוהו אלוה, כיון שבזה השם אין בו אלהות ואדנות וגם לא ניתן לו לשם כך מותר…
ובכמה מקומות בתלמוד הוזכרו ישו הנוצרי ותלמידיו, ואין אלוה גוים יותר ממנו”
(והועתק ב’ביאור הגר”א’ יו”ד סי’ קמז סק”ג). הרי שלומדים הלכה
מהסיפורים שבהם הוזכרו “ישו הנוצרי ותלמידיו” בתלמוד, הרי שגם סיפורי
ישו ותלמידיו חשובים להלכה.
דעתו של
כ”ק אדמו”ר זי”ע מליובאוויטש על הדפסת ההשמטות
בענין הדפסת
הקטעים שנשמטו על-ידי הצנזורה האריך פרופ’ יעקב ש’ שפיגל בספרו ‘עמודים בתולדות
הספר העברי – הגהות ומגיהים’ (מהדורה שניה עמ’ 584-588, 592-595), והביא הדברים
השונים שנכתבו בזה עיי”ש.
ואתעכב בזה
רק על פרט אחד, על מה שהביא בשמי שם (עמ’ 587 הערה 45) להעיר מדעתו של הרבי
מליובאוויטש בזה. ויש להוסיף ולתקן שהכוונה למבואר ב’תורת מנחם’ תשי”ב (ח”ב
עמ’ 46-47, 51-52). ואלו דברי הרבי שם:
“ספרתי כמה
פעמים שכאשר כ”ק מו”ח אדמו”ר ביקר בווינא נטפלו אליו יהודים
מהקהילה החרדית… שיש להם טענות על הנהגתו: ישנו סימן בשולחן ערוך [חו”מ סוף
סי’ תכה] – טענו הם –שיש בו פס”ד אודות אלה ש’לא מעלין ולא מורידין’, ויתירה
מזה, ‘מורידין ולא מעלין’, ח”ו, וכיון שכן – טענו הם – למה צריכים להחמיר
יותר מהשו”ע… ולהתעסק בהצלתם של יהודים כאלה שהם בגדר ד’לא מעלין ולא
מורידין’, ועאכו”כ להתעסק בהצלתם של יהודים כאלה שהם בגדר ד’מורידין ולא
מעלין’?!…
…אם לא די בכך
שפרטי הדינים הנ”ל הם באחד הסימנים האחרונים שבחלק האחרון
דהשו”ע (שבזה מודגש כאמור שלימודם צ”ל לאחרי לימוד וקיום כל
השו”ע) – היתה בזה גם השמטת ה’צענזור’ של הקיסר.
– הוא (ה’צענזור’)
בעצמו חשב שהסיבה לכך היא מפני שאין זה מתאים לחוקי המלכות של ממשלתו, אבל האמת
היא שישנה סיבה אחרת לדבר: כיון שהעלם והסתר הגלות התגבר ביותר עד כדי כך שקיימת
אפשרות לעשות שימוש בסימן הנ”ל בשו”ע… בנוגע לקיום הדברים בפועל
ממש
… לכן, סיבבו מלמעלה שיבוא גוי, שאינו בעל-בחירה, וישמיט חלק
מהתורה, רחמנא ליצלן, כדי שלא יהיו כאלה שיטעו להתנהג בהתאם לכך – ביחס
ליהודי אחר – בפועל ממש!”
וע”ז
כתב פרופ’ שפיגל שם:
“אמנם אפשר
שדברי האדמו”ר היו למקומם ולשעתם, והוא רצה בזה ‘להביא ראיה’ לגישת חסידות
חב”ד, שיש לקרב כל יהודי, וח”ו לומר לגביו ‘לא מעלין ולא מורידין’ וכד’.
אבל גם האדמו”ר יודה שאם נבוא להדפיס היום את השולחן ערוך יש להעדיף להדפיסו
ללא ההשמטות הללו”.
למרות
שפרופ’ שפיגל מהסס לקבוע דברים באופן ברור, לדעתי אין מקום לספק כלל שלדעת הרבי יש
להדפיס היום את ה’שלחן ערוך’ ללא ההשמטות. ושתי הוכחות ברורות לדבר.
א) בריבוי
מקומות בכתבי הרבי אנו מוצאים שמתייחס ל”דפוסים שלא שלטה יד הצענזור”,
וכן ש”יש לחפש בדפוסים ובכתבי-יד שלא שלטה בהם יד הצענזור”, ולדוגמא
אציין כמה הפניות ב’ליקוטי שיחות’ (חלק כה
עמ’ 56 הערה 29, חלק כו עמ’ 160 הערה 5, חלק ל עמ’ 130 הערה 34, חלק לד עמ’ 24
הערה 7), ב’אגרות קודש’
שלו (חלק יח עמ’ שלא, חלק
ל עמ’ עז) וב’תורת מנחם’ (תשי”א ח”א עמ’ 218 הערה ב,
תשט”ז ח”ב עמ’ 257, תשמ”ב ח”ד עמ’ 1951, תשמ”ג ח”ג
עמ’ 1333, תשמ”ה ח”ג עמ’ 2001, תשמ”ו ח”א עמ’ 608). ועוד.
ב) כשהרבי
התחיל להדיר מחדש בשנת תש”כ את שו”ע אדה”ז בעל ה’תניא’, ציין ב’פתח
דבר’ לחלק הראשון בין הדברים המיוחדים שנתחדשו בהוצאה זו: “לאחר חלק ששי בא
שער ההוספות, הכולל: א) השמטות בשו”ע רב[י]נו שנשמטו מפני יראת
הצענזאר…”. לפועל כשאכן נדפס החלק הששי בשנת תשכ”ח לא נכללו בו
ההשמטות הללו “מפני סיבות טכניות” (כפי שציינו מערכת ‘אוצר החסידים’ ב’הקדמה’
שם), אמנם אלו נתפרסמו
בסוף ספרי ‘מראי מקומות וציונים’ שנערכו לכל חלקי שו”ע אדה”ז, ויצאו
לאור ע”י הוצאת קה”ת[3].
על יסוד
דברי הרבי הנ”ל אכן תוקנו בפנים כל השינויים וההשמטות במהדורת קה”ת
החדשה (שנדפס משנת תשס”א ואילך).
ש”ס ‘נהרדעא’
לעומת הוצאת ‘עוז והדר’
בהוצאות
החדשות של התלמוד בבלי שיצאו לאחרונה ישנן מגמות הפוכות.
ב’מבוא
קצר’ שבראש מסכת ברכות של הש”ס ‘נהרדעא’, שיוצא לאור על-ידי הוצאת וגשל, כותב
המו”ל (בפרק “השלמת הגהות והערות”): “במהדורה זו הושלמו כל
חסרונות הש”ס שהושמטו על ידי הצנזור הנוצרי, ושייכים לגמרא, ובמהדורתינו
הושלמו להחזירם למקומם על הדף. (מלבד תיבות מיוחדות שסילפו בכל הש”ס במקום
‘גוי’ תיבת עובד כוכבים, ובמקום ‘משומד’ 
כתבו מומר, ובמקום ‘גמרא’ כתבו ש”ס, תלמוד[4]. דבזה לא החזרנו התיבות כבמקור ודי בהערה
זו כאן)”.
ואילו
ב’מבוא לתלמוד בבלי מהדורת עוז והדר’ שבראש מסכת ברכות (עמ’ ו) כתוב: “בגוף
הגמרא השארנו בדרך כלל את שבושי צנזורה שבש”ס וילנא (עי’ שו”ת ארץ צבי
ח”ב סי’ עד), והערנו עליהם בהגהות וציונים. במפרשים שבסוף מסכת תיקננו אותם
לפעמים”.
מי הורה
לעורכי ‘עוז והדר’ שלא לתקן את שיבושי הצנזורה?
אחי הרה”ח
ר’ שלום שי’ אבערלאנדער העביר לי צילום מאמר שהופיע בעיתון באידיש שיצא לאור בניו
יארק (‘דער איד’ ה’ טבת תשס”ח, צווייטע אפטיילונג ב/36), לכבוד סיום עריכת
והדפסת הש”ס מהדורת ‘עוז והדר’.
המאמר
מגולל חלק מההיסטוריה של הצנזורה בהדפסות התלמוד. ושוב מספר שעורכי ‘עוז והדר’ היו
להם ספיקות גדולות האם להחזיר עטרה ליושנה ולנקות את התלמוד משיבושי הצנזורה, ועל
כן הם פנו להגאון ר’ יצחק טובי’ ווייס שליט”א גאב”ד העדה החרדית
בירושלים, שהכריע נגד זה, כיון שגם היום יש לחשוש מעלילות מצד הנכרים למיניהם.
אני מסופק
מאד באמיתות הסיפור, נוסף לזה שידיעה חשובה זו לא מופיעה ב’מבוא’ הנ”ל, הרי
לפי שיטה זו מה הועילו חכמים בזה שלא החזירו את ההשמטות למקומם, הרי אחרי שאלו
מופיעים בלשונם בשולי הגליון, הרי שוב יש לחשוש מפגיעתם רעה של מחפשי רעתנו.

שיבושי
הצנזורה בש”ס ‘נהרדעא’, בהוצאת ‘עוז והדר’ ובפירוש ‘שוטנשטיין’
דוגמא א
סנהדרין
מג, א
אודות משפט ישו
ותלמידיו הוא ודאי הדוגמא הכי בולטת על אופן ההתייחסות לדברים שנשמטו מפני צנזורה.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ החזירו את ההשמטה למקומה בפנים הגמרא, ובהערה (אות י) העירו: “מכאן
ועד סוף העמוד הושמט ע”י הצנזורה ונוסף כאן ע”פ ויניציאה ר”פ
וס”א”.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ לא החזירו את ההשמטה למקומה, אמנם העתיקו את זה ב’הגהות וציונים’ (אות
ב): “בדפו”י (שלפני הצענזור) נוסף… (כל הענין נשמט בדפוסים מפני
הצענזור והעתקנוהו מדפו”י עם הוספות ותיקונים ע”פ כת”י)”.
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק נדפס “תבנית ש”ס ווילנא מהדורת עוז והדר” מהדורה קמא
(שבו לא מופיע מדור ‘הגהות וציונים’) ששם זה לא מופיע. ובעמוד שממול בפירוש סתמו כתבו:
“המשך הדיון בענין אינו מופיע לפנינו בגמרא”. והוסיפו בשוה”ג (הערה
38): “בגירסת הש”ס של הדפוסים שלפנינו, חסר בגמרא החלק הבא אחר שאלה זו.
לנוסח השלם של הדברים, ראה דקדוקי סופרים”. הקורא אינו מקבל אפילו רמז לתוכן
ההשמטה הארוכה.
אציג עכשיו
לפי סדר הש”ס עוד דוגמאות שונות להשמטות ותיקונים והאופן שבו זה מופיע
בהוצאות השונות.
דוגמא ב
ברכות יב,
א:
וקורין עשרת
הדברות שמע והיה אם שמוע ויאמר אמת ויציב ועבודה וברכת כהנים. אמר רב יהודה אמר
שמואל: אף בגבולין בקשו לקרות כן, אלא שכבר בטלום מפני תרעומת המינין (שלא יאמרו
לעמי הארץ אין שאר תורה אמת, ותדעו שאין קורין אלא מה שאמר הקב”ה ושמעו מפיו
בסיני. רש”י). ומפרש רש”י: “המינין. עכו”ם”.
בדפוס
ונציה נדפס (תחילת ע”ב): “המינין – תלמידי ישו”.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות ט): “בס”א: תלמידי ישו”.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ז): “בדפו”י: תלמידי ישו”.
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק פירשו: “מפני תרעומת מינין (עובדי עבודה זרה)”, והרחיבו על
כך בשוה”ג (הערה 3): “רש”י. ואין הכוונה כאן לאותם ה’מינים’
הנזכרים לקמן עמוד ב, ובמקומות אחרים, שהם יהודים המאמינים בתורה שבכתב אלא
שכופרים בקבלת חז”ל והופכים דברי התורה שלא כהלכה. [עיין צל”ח
ומהר”ץ חיות; ועיין גם מגדים חדשים.]”
פיענוח
הדברים: הצל”ח מדייק בלשון רש”י שפירש “המינין. עכו”ם”,
שבא לשלול מינין שמאמינים בתושבע”פ. אמנם ה’מגדים חדשים’ העיר: “הצל”ח
כתב דבריו לפי מש”כ ברש”י לפנינו המינין עכו”ם. אמנם אין זה מלשון
רש”י, אלא הוא ‘תיקון’ מעשה ידי הצנזור” (וכן העירו על כך בהערה טו בצל”ח
שי”ל ע”י מכון ירושלים). ולפי
הגירסא האמיתית ברש”י הרי גם המינין שבעמוד א, וגם המינין שבעמוד, שניהם הם
תלמידי הנוצרי.
דוגמא ג
ברכות יב,
ב:
פרשת ציצית מפני
מה קבעוה? אמר רבי יהודה בר חביבא: מפני שיש בה חמשה דברים: מצות ציצית, יציאת
מצרים, עול מצות, ודעת מינים, הרהור עבירה, והרהור עבודה זרה וכו’. והרהור עבודה
זרה מנלן? דתניא: אַחֲרֵי לְבַבְכֶם [במדבר
טו, לט] – זו מינות.
ופרש”י: “ההופכים טעמי התורה למדרש טעות ואליל”.
בדפוס
ונציה נדפס (דף יג, א): “תלמידי הנוצרי ההופכים טעמי התורה למדרש טעות ואליל”.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות מ): “בס”א: תלמידי הנוצרי”.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ח): “בדפו”י: תלמידי ישו הנוצרי”.
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק לא העתיקו דברי רש”י, וסתמו לכתוב: “שלא להתבונן בדברי
מינות”.
דוגמא ד
ברכות יז,
ב:
אין פרץ – שלא תהא
סיעתנו כסיעתו של דוד שיצא ממנו אחיתופל, ואין יוצאת – שלא תהא סיעתנו כסיעתו של
שאול שיצא ממנו דואג האדומי, ואין צוחה – שלא תהא סיעתנו כסיעתו של אלישע שיצא
ממנו גחזי, ברחובותינו – שלא יהא לנו בן או תלמיד שמקדיח תבשילו ברבים.
בדפוס
ונציה נדפס (דף יח, א): “תלמיד שמקדיח תבשילו ברבים, כגון הנוצרי”.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ לא תוקן ואף לא העירו ע”ז.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ב): “בדפו”י ובכת”י ובע”י נוסף: כגון
ישו הנוצרי”.
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק לא העירו כלום.
דוגמא ה
גיטין נו,
ב–נז, א:
אונקלוס
בר קלוניקוס בר אחתיה דטיטוס הוה, בעי לאיגיורי, אזל אסקיה לטיטוס בנגידא וכו’. אזל
אסקיה לבלעם בנגידא וכו’. אזל אסקיה בנגידא לפושעי ישראל וכו’.
בדפוס
ונציה נדפס: “אזל אסקיה לישו בנגידא”.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות ב): “בס”א: ליש”ו”.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ג): “צ”ל אסקיה לישו בנגידא (דפו”י לפני
הצענזור)”.
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק פירשו: “ועלה באוב אחד מפושעי ישראל”, והרחיבו על כך
בשוה”ג (הערה 4): “לפי כתבי יד ודפוסים ישנים, מדובר בתלמיד רבי יהושע
בן פרחיה שיצא לתרבות רעה והסית והדיח את ישראל (ראה סוטה מז, א; סנהדרין קז,
ב)”.
דוגמא ו
סנהדרין יז,
א:
אמר רבי יוחנן:
אין מושיבין בסנהדרי אלא בעלי קומה, ובעלי חכמה, ובעלי מראה, ובעלי זקנה, ובעלי
כשפים. ופרש”י: “להמית מכשפים הבוטחים בכשפיהם להנצל מידי בית דין,
ולגלות על המכשפין המסיתין ומדיחין בכשפיהן, כגון המצרים“.
בדפוס
ונציה נדפס: “כגון [ישו] הנוצרי”.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות י): “בס”א: נוצרי או הנוצרים”.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות נ): “צ”ל כגון ישו נוצרי (דק”ס ע”פ
דפו”י שלפני הצענזור)”.
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק סתמו ולא העירו כלום.
דוגמא ז
סנהדרין קז,
ב:
תנו רבנן לעולם
תהא שמאל דוחה וימין מקרבת. לא כאלישע שדחפו לגחזי בשתי ידים.
בדפוס
ונציה נוסף בסוף דברי הברייתא: “ולא כרבי יהושע בן פרחיא שדחפו לישו בשתי ידים”.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ הוסיפו את זה בגליון (אות ז), וכתבו בסוף: “הושמט ע”י הצנזורה
ונוסף כאן ויניציאה ר”פ וס”א”.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ הוסיפו את זה בגליון (אות ג) וכתבו: “בדפו”י (לפני הצענזור)
נוסף…”.
אודות ‘שוטנשטיין’
ראה לקמן דוגמא ז.
דוגמא ח
בהמשך דברי
הגמרא שם נוסף בדפוס ונציה: ר’ יהושע בן פרחיה מאי היא? כדקטלינהו ינאי מלכא לרבנן
אזל רבי יהושע בן פרחיה וישו לאלכסנדריא של מצרים. [ובהמשך מובא סיפור ארוך שקרה
בין הרב והתלמיד.]
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ הוסיפו את זה בתוך דברי הגמרא, ובגליון (אות ט) כתבו: “מכאן עד את
ישראל הושמט ע”י הצנזורה והועתק ע”פ ויניציאה ר”פ וס”א”.
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ הוסיפו את זה בגליון (אות ג) וכתבו: “בדפו”י (לפני הצענזור)
נוסף…”.
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק הוסיפו תוכנו של קטע זה והקודם (דוגמא ז) בשוה”ג (הערה 17) בהשמטת
שמו התלמיד, וכתבו: “בהשמטות הש”ס מובא מקרה נוסף של רב שדגחה את תלמידו
בשתי ידיו והתוצאות הקשות שיצאו מאותה דחיה…”.
סיכום
העריכה במהדורות השונות
בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’
אפשר
להבחין בשיטה עקבית. ה’מהדורה קמא’ שלהם, שבו לא מופיע מדור ‘הגהות וציונים’, היתה
העתק מושלם של ש”ס ווילנא וההוצאות הקודמות לו, כולל כל השמטות הצנזור
והתיקונים שנשארו בתוך הטקסט בלי להעיר עליהם. גם ב’מהדורה בתרא’ שלהם לא תיקנו
כלום בתוך הטקסט של הגמרא או של פירושי הגמרא, אבל במדור ‘הגהות וציונים’ העירו באופן
עקבי על כל השינויים והעתיקו אותם בלשונם, ואף נתנו לקורא להבין שהשינויים הללו
קשורים ל”דפו”י שלפני הצענזור”.
בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’
אין שיטה
עקבית. יש שהחזירו את ההשמטה לתוך דברי הגמרא (דוגמא א), אמנם לפעמים השמיטו גם הם ואף לא העירו על
כך (דוגמא ד), אמנם ברוב המקרים לא החזירו את ההשמטה
לתוך דברי הגמרא אמנם העירו על השינויים בגליון והעתיקו אותם בלשונם (דוגמאות ב-ג, ה-ו). ויש שבאותו עמוד עצמו החזירוו קטע אחד
לתוך דברי הגמרא וקטע אחר העתיקו רק בגליון (דוגמאות
ז-ח). ברוב המקרים אין
לומד מבין ממה נובעים השינויים ש”בס”א [=בספרים אחרים]”, אמנם יש
והם מגלים שזה קשור לצנזורה (דוגמאות ז-ח).
ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק
החליטו
שאין להזכיר את שמו של הנוצרי כלל וכלל, ועל כן יש שמשמיטים לגמרי קטעים מהגמרא (דוגמא א, ד, ו), ויש שמצטטים את התוכן (ולא את לשון
הגמרא!) אבל משמיטים את שמו (דוגמא ה,
ח). בפירושם יש
שמתעלמים מדברי רש”י הלא מצונזרים (דוגמא
ג), ועוד יותר תמוה
לפרש לפי הגירסא המצונזרת דוקא (דוגמא ב)[5].
אמנם להעיר
שלפעמים כן מעירים לשיבושי הצנזורה וכגון: “הגירסא שלפנינו ‘לכותים’ היא
משיבושי הצנזורה, וצריך לומר ‘לגוים'” (ביצה
כ, ב הערה 16),
“כידוע ‘לעובדי כוכבים’ הוא משיבושי הצנזורה, וצריך לומר כאן ובכל הסוגיא
להלן ‘לגוים'” (שם כא, א
הערה 24). אמנם מסיימים:
“לא שינינו בפנים את הגירסא שלפנינו” (הוריות יא, א הערה 37).
“ליקוטי
רש”י” מיוסד על שיבושי הצנזורה
שיטתם של
עורכי מהדורת ‘עוז והדר’ להעיר על השינויים רק ב’הגהות וציונים’ גורם לטעויות,
וכגון בראש השנה (יז, א), ששם אומרת הגמרא ש”המינין… יורדין לגיהנם
ונידונין בה לדורות”, מפרש רש”י (כפי שנדפס בדפוסים שלפנינו):
“האנשים אשר הפכו דברי אלהים חיים לרעה, כגון צדוקים ובייתוסים”, ובצדק
העירו שם במהדורת ‘עוז והדר’ (הערה ע) שהגירסא הנכונה היא: “תלמידי ישו
הנוצרי אשר הפכו דברי אלהים חיים לרעה”.
אמנם
ב’ליקוטי רש”י’ שם ליקטו מדברי רש”י בכמה מקומות בש”ס:
“המינין. עכו”ם [ברכות
יב.]. משרתים לעבודה
זרה [שבת קטז.]. שאינם מאמינים לדברי רז”ל כגון
צדוקים [חגיגה ה:]. תלמידי ישו שאינם מאמינים לדברי רבותינו
זכרונם לברכה [שם
ע”פ רש”י ישן]. כומרין
לעבודת כוכבים בין עובדי כוכבים בין ישראלים [ע”ז כו:]”[6].
אמנם חלק
מהציטוטים אלו אינם אלא משיבושי הצנזורה, וכך זה יראה באם נגיה אותם ע”פ
הדפו”י שרובם נעתקו ב’הגהות וציונים’: “המינין. עכו”ם תלמידי ישו
[ברכות יב.]. משרתים משומדין לעבודה זרה [שבת קטז.]. שאינם מאמינים לדברי רז”ל כגון צדוקים
[חגיגה ה:]. תלמידי ישו שאינם מאמינים מודים לדברי
רבותינו
זכרונם לברכה חכמים [שם ע”פ רש”י ישן]. כומרין לעבודת כוכבים לעבודה זרה
בין עובדי
כוכבים גוים בין ישראלים [ע”ז כו:]”.
בָּרוּךְ הַמַּבְדִּיל בֵּין
קֹדֶשׁ לְקֹדֶשׁ.
[1] ב’בית עקד ספרים’ (ח”ב עמ’ 386) נרשמו הוצאות שונות של
‘חסרונות הש”ס’, ראשון ביניהם אמ”ד תס”ט. ולא ראיתי זכרם במקום
אחר.
[2]
ב’ספרים-בלוג‘ שם (הערה
28) ציין שכדברים האלו נמצא כבר ב”כתב התנצלות ותשובה מחכמי פראג על הדפסת
התלמוד עם השמטות בשנת תפ”ז לפ”ק” (נתפרסם ב’המגיד’ י”ח סיון
תרל”ז עמ’ 199), וכך כתבו: “…דעת מהרש”ל להחמיר אף במקום סכנה.
אמנם מעשים בכל יום שמהפכין הדין ומשנין מדרכי השלום בהפקעת הלואה וכדומה, ולא
שמענו פוצה פה לעולם. וכן נראה היפוכו בדברי מהר”ם רבק”ש [ב’באר הגולה’]
בש”ע ח”מ סי תכ”ה [ס”ק ש] ודברים המה מועתקים בספרים רבים”.
[3] ר”י מונדשיין מציין (‘תורת חב”ד’ ח”ב עמ’ לו):
“סעיפים שלימים וביאורים ארוכים שב’קונטרס אחרון’ נשמטו בעטיית
הצנזורה”. והוא ערך שם (עמ’ לז-מז) רשימה של רוב ההשמטות והשינויים של
הצנזורה.
[4]
זה כמובן טעות, ואדרבה, וכפי שכתב הרנ”נ רבינוביץ ב’מאמר על
הדפסת התלמוד’ (עמ’ עז במהדורת הברמן): “ותחת המלה תלמוד נדפס שם גמרא או
ש”ס או למוד”.
[5] דומה לזה נמצא ב’שוטנשטיין’ באנגלית (יומא נו, ב הערה 26) הסבר
מפורט למהות הצדוקים, מיוסד על שיבוש הצנזורה “אמר ליה ההוא צדוקי”,
במקום הגירסא הנכונה: “אמר ליה ההוא מינא”. הערה זו נשמטה מ’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק שם.
[6]
‘שוטנשטיין’ בלה”ק שם נמשכו אחרי ‘עוז והדר’ וכתבו בפירושם:
“אנשים המסלפים את התורה להפוך דברי אלהים חיים לרעה, כגון הצדוקים וכתות
אחרות כמותם”, וציינו מקורם (הערה 8): “עיין ליקוטי רש”י”.



The History and Dating of Onkelos

The History and Dating of Onkelos

By Israel Drazin
The Babylonian Talmud has the earliest report of the authorship and date of Targum Onkelos. It states that an individual named Onkelos composed the translation in the first third of the second century CE. Since the nineteenth century, scholars have generally rejected this recollection and dated the Targum, or its final redaction, in the third century CE. I will show that the proper date is more likely the late fourth or early fifth century CE. This dating is supported by seeing the consistent use of the targumist of the final version of tannaitic Midrashim that were not edited until the late fourth century.
The Traditional View and its Problems
The Babylonian talmudic scholars gave preference to the literal Aramaic translation of the Pentateuch, which they called targum didan (“our translation”), over other translations.[1] However, they had but a single unreliable memory of its author.
            A Palestinian Amora (in Megillah 3a) curiously states that Onkelos composed the authorized translation after it had been forgotten.
R. Jeremiah – or some say R. Hiyya b. Abba – also said: Onkelos the proselyte under the guidance of R. Eleazar and R. Joshua composed The Targum of the Pentateuch…. But did Onkelos the proselyte compose the targum to the Pentateuch? Has not R. Ika said in the name of R. Hananel who had it from Rab: What is meant by the text, “And they read in the book, in the law of God, with an interpretation, and they gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading” (Nehemiah 8:8)? “And they read in the book, in the law of God” this indicates the [Hebrew] text; “with an interpretation”: this indicates the Targum; “and they gave the sense” this indicates the verse stops; “and caused them to understand the reading” this indicates the accentuation; or, according to another version, the Masoretic notes? – These had been forgotten, and were not established again.[2]
            The Babylonian Talmud states that Onkelos was the son of Kolonikos, who was the nephew of the Roman Emperor Titus. He converted to Judaism. Several miraculous stories are revealed about him.[3] These tales are virtually identical with those conveyed of the Greek translator Aquilas, and, as we shall see, were confusedly ascribed to Onkelos.[4] Thus, according to R. Jeremiah and the Babylonian Talmud, Targum Onkelos was composed about 130 CE.
            There are several serious problems with R. Jeremiah’s opinion. The Babylonian Talmud translates pentateuchal words eighteen times using the term u’m’targuminun, “and it is translated,” or “the Targum states.”[5] Despite R. Jeremiah’s view of authorship, in none of these instances is Onkelos mentioned by name. Midrashim use the same formula seventeen times and Onkelos is cited only once, in a late twelfth-century midrash (Numbers Rabbah 9).[6] An opinion is attributed to an individual called Onkelos only once in the Talmud. This opinion is in no way related to the Targum.[7]
            There is good authority confirming that Aquilas translated the Bible into Greek about 130 CE. There is, however, no corroboration for connecting the Aramaic translation currently called Targum Onkelos with a person named Onkelos other than the single statement in the
tractate Megillah. The talmudic sages, R. Jeremiah or R. Hiyya, obviously confused the two translations.[8] It is hardly possible that R. Eleazar and R. Joshua had two students with virtually identical names, both of whom were born of the same noble lineage under highly unusual circumstances, and both of whom underwent remarkably similar miraculous events.
            It is more likely that the redactors of the Babylonian Talmud did not know who composed their “authorized” or “officially accepted” translation. They recalled that the Jerusalem Talmud of several generations earlier had stated that Aquilas composed the authorized Greek translation. They ascribed their Aramaic version to him as well.[9]
            The only essential difference between the names of Onkelos and Aquilas in Hebrew script is the addition of the letter nun, a characteristic insertion in Babylonian Aramaic. Onkelos is thus a Babylonian equivalent of the name Aquilas.[10]
            There are indicators that suggest, although admittedly they do not prove, that Targum Onkelos could not have been composed in the second century. If Onkelos existed, aside from the unbelievable circumstance that both he and Aquilas underwent the same curious life experiences, there must have been some differences. Why is no difference mentioned in the two stories? Moreover, why is there no allusion to Onkelos in the Talmud, where the Targum is extolled? If the Babylonian talmudic rabbis knew the author of the Targum, we would expect that Onkelos’ name should have been cited whenever the Targum is mentioned.[11] If Onkelos was a noted Palestinian scholar of the second century, he should have been included in the Jerusalem Talmud whose final redaction occurred at the end of the fourth century. Further, if the author of the Targum was known, there should have been no need for the tradition of R. Jeremiah, and the Talmud should never have questioned this tradition.
            Even more significantly, if Onkelos composed the Targum in the second century, why is his name not mentioned in the tannaitic midrashim that were edited in the late fourth century? Jewish tradition is meticulous about naming the source of every teaching.[12] Furthermore, the Mishnah in the Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 8b, edited after the traditionally held composition date of the Onkelos Targum, quotes R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who lived during and after the traditional composition date of Targum Onkelos. He identified only the Greek translation as being holy. The Mishnah knows nothing of Targum Onkelos. The Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 9b, comments upon this Mishnah and states in the name of R. Abbahu (circa 300 CE), who made his statement in the name of R. Johanan (circa 250 CE, both living several generations after the supposed composition of Targum Onkelos), that the halakhah follows R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
Modern Scholarship
 
The problems that refute the talmudic view of the dating of Targum Onkelos also confront and refute the views of modern scholarship. Some writers, such as M. H. Goshen-Gottstein and B. Grossfeld, accept the talmudic dating.[13] Grossfeld, for example, maintains that Onkelos and Aquila are the same person, argues that the parallels between the Targum and the midrashim point to a common tradition upon which both genres of scriptural interpretations rest, and concludes that where the school of R. Akiba and R. Ishmael differ, Onkelos upholds the views of R. Akiba’s school. Grossfeld knew only 153 cases in the Pentateuch where Targum Onkelos and the tannaitic midrashim parallel each other. He attributes Onkelos’ translation to the Akiban school because he notes that in 19 of these 153 instances the Targum’s deviation were like those of R. Akiba. Grossfeld did not know that Targum Onkelos parallels the tannaitic Midrashim in 698 instances, as we will show, in just four of the pentateuchal books, and he did not analyze the parallels or take note of the frequent times that the targumist differed with the Akiban school (e.g. Exodus 21:3, 19; 22:3).
            Most scholars reject the Talmud’s date and assign the date of composition to the first half of the third century CE. They rely on references to the Targum in a volume on targumic traditions collected in Die Masorah zum Targum Onkelos,[14] which is said to have been composed in the first half of the third century CE.[15] There is no evidence of the time of composition of this Masorah and no certainty that many elements were not added at later dates. A second proof for the third century dating is the existence of non-halakhic material in the Targum. The argument is that later rabbis could not have authorized divergences from halakhah. These scholars fail to note that rabbinic tradition has always tolerated dissident opinions as to the peshat, the literal sense of the text. Contra-halakhic biblical interpretations occur in the early midrashim and the Talmuds, as well as in the later commentaries of Rashi, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, Nachmanides, and others. There is no rabbinic statement indicating that Targum Onkelos has halakhic authority. The rabbis only forbade teachings which encourage “behavior” that is contrary to halakhah.
Dating Onkelos by means of the Tannaitic Midrashim
While studying, translating and commenting upon Targum Onkelos to the Pentateuch,[16] I noted the remarkable reliance of this Aramaic translation upon the present version of all of the tannaitic midrashim.[17] This has led us to date the Targum to a time following the final redaction of these midrashim.[18]
            I will illustrate this conclusion by focusing on the book of Numbers. A comparison of the words used in Targum Onkelos and Sifrei to Numbers shows the reliance of the author(s) of the Targum upon this late fourth-century midrash[19] and shows the many similarities between the two documents.[20] The findings are rather startling when one realizes that the two documents were not only written in different languages, but that their authors and editors, as will be seen, had totally different agendas. While space constraints restrict us from detailing the findings in the other pentateuchal books, we will also outline these findings briefly and show the consistency of the targumic borrowings.
            The method used in the following study of Numbers is relatively simple. Whenever the Onkelos translation replaces the biblical Hebrew word with a word that deviates from being an exact translation of the original, the tannaitic midrash is examined.
            We will see, for example, that there are five instances where our targumist relied on Sifrei to Numbers’ definitions. Sifrei defined words with what we may call a full definition formula: ein bakhal makom elah (‘there is no place that X means anything else but ‘Y’). Onkelos quotes Sifrei’s word definition each time this formula is used, except where the midrash differentiates dabeir, ‘speak’, from amar, ‘said’.[21]
            Similarly, Sifrei uses what we could call a short definition formula, in (‘There is no… but’), thirteen times.[22] Again, Onkelos incorporates Sifrei’s exact word or uses a synonym of the midrashic term in each instance. Thus, repeatedly and consistently, Onkelos defines the biblical terms exactly like the midrash whenever the midrash states that it is giving a definition. In each instance, the targumist used Sifrei as a dictionary.
            Additionally, our targumist repeats – one might even say “quotes” – Sifrei’s exact word in 53 other verses and is similar to the midrash an additional 35 times in the book of Numbers. Thus, when Onkelos parallels the midrash, it is more likely to repeat the midrash’s exact word than to use a synonym. These numbers are extraordinary since the Targum is an Aramaic translation and the midrash is a Hebrew documentary, and there is extant midrash on only a third of the biblical text.
            In total, Targum Onkelos parallels Sifrei to Numbers in 106 instances, in over a third of the verses where Sifrei has commentary. This is not happenstance. The Targum uses the word because the targumist drew it from the midrash.[23]
            The Onkelos targumist not only drew his translation, indeed his very words, from Sifrei to Numbers but did so as well with the tannaitic midrash Sifrei Zutta to Numbers.
 
            Sifrei Zutta does not use the full definition formula contained in Sifrei, but it has the short formula ein in five verses (7:3, 10:31, 11:3, 11:18 and 15:38). In each of these instances, our targumist deviates from the biblical text and uses an Aramaic synonym for Sifrei Zutta’s word.
            In addition, Onkelos quotes Sifrei Zutta’s exact word 61 times and is similar to the midrash 38 times. In total, the Targum parallels this midrash in 104 places.[24]
Lack of Similarities
 
Turning now to the opposite perspective, the following answers the question: why did the targumist not copy everything in the midrash and why did he include material not in the midrash? This will help us understand that the targumist consistently drew his material from the midrash and only failed to do so because of good reasons.
            As mentioned earlier, the targumist and the midrash compilers had different agendas. The targumist quotes the midrash when their purposes are the same, when the midrash translates the text’s simple meaning. He deviates from the midrash when the midrash goes beyond this task. He adds material that is not in the midrash when the midrash did not attempt to clarify the text’s meaning and his rendering does so.
            The following list catalogues some of the kinds of deviations inserted by the targumist to clarify the text that are not in Sifrei. These changes, which are explained in chapter 3 and in the author’s Targum Onkelos to Numbers, either did not concern the halakhic and aggadic-minded commentators of the midrash, or they are insertions that the compilers of the midrash did not feel compelled to add to every verse when they had already commented upon it elsewhere (e.g. Shekhinah or adding a preposition).[25]
Explaining the text with an Aramaic idiom
Replacing el, which means “God,” with “idol”
Changing the harsh “take” to the softer “lead”
Grammatical and tense replacements
Explanation of metaphors
Using words to avoid anthropomorphisms, such as memra
Treating a name as verb
Updating and thereby identifying a place name
Being more explicit than the Bible
Avoiding an anthropomorphism and anthropopathism
Changes to preserve Israelite honor
Changes to protect God’s honor
Removing redundancies
Replacing the plural Elohim with the Tetragrammaton
            Thus, the targumic insertions that are of not in the midrash are absent from the midrash because they do not concern the midrashic authors. Conversely, the targumist only incorporates Sifrei material that interprets biblical verses according to their literal meaning. He avoids using derash, interpretations trying to disclose the text’s hidden meaning, or where the midrash has halakhah, theology, legends, and parables.
            Examples of midrashic derash that Onkelos refrains from using are: the Massoretic Text’s (MT’s) “uncover the woman’s head” (Numbers 5:18) teaches that Israelite women should keep their heads covered. MT’s “place in her hands” (5:18) is required to tire her out so that she will repent. MT’s “two turtledoves and two young pigeons” (6:10) implies that people may not substitute turtledoves for pigeons or pigeons for turtledoves.
            Halakhic elements are on virtually every Sifrei page. They appear only rarely in the Aramaic translation, which also has contra-halakhic matter, and then only when they help readers understand the text’s simple meaning. MT’s “command” (5:2) is said to apply immediately and for future generations. MT’s “his sin” clarifies that one does not confess his father’s sins. MT’s “eyes” (5:11) excludes a blind person.
            Aside from its avoidance of anthropomorphisms, theology and morality are also generally absent from Onkelos, but abound in the midrash. Sifrei derives the lesson that strength is granted to those who are strong, and encouragement to those who are stout of heart (5:2), Aaron was righteous because he did exactly what Moses told him to do (8:1), and the Israelites were virtuous because they did what Moses instructed (9:1). Merit flows to the meritorious and humiliation to those who are disgraceful (9:1).
            Various legends and parables do not appear in Onkelos. For example, each of the seven days of preparing the Tabernacle, Moses set it up and then dismantled it (7:1). Aaron’s sons did not literally die before the Lord; they fell outside so as not to render the Tabernacle unclean. In fact, an angel sustained them after they had been struck with fire, helped them outside, and allowed them to fall in the courtyard (7:1). The Israelite desert leaders were the same individuals who were assigned as their supervisors while they were slaves in Egypt (7:3).
            In summary, the Onkelos targumist consistently drew the explanations and definitions from the late fourth century midrashim that helped explain the text’s simple meaning, and frequently even quoted the midrash. He ignored material that did not further this agenda. Thus he could not have composed his translation before the end of the fourth century.
Consistency With Other Biblical Books
 
The significant and unswerving reliance by Targum Onkelos on the tannaitic midrashim to Numbers to clarify the simple meaning of the biblical text also occurred in the other books of the Pentateuch. The Onkelos deviations from the literal Hebrew translation consistently reflect the late fourth century tannaitic midrashim in about a third of the verses where midrashic commentary are present.
Exodus
 
Although the tannaitic midrash Mekhilta d’R. Ishmael exists for only about fourteen Exodus chapters, Targum Onkelos deviates from rendering the biblical text literally 158 times. It consistently and remarkably uses midrashic words, including 95 instances where the targumist quotes the Mekhilta’s exact word, an average of eight times in each chapter. He parallels Mekhilta in more than thirty per cent of the verses where midrashic comments occur. This is startling since most of the midrash is derash, comments that are contrary to his purpose and which he avoids.
            The targumist never explains Exodus contrary to Mekhilta’s peshat, the text’s plain and explicit meaning. He uses all, or virtually all Mekhilta interpretations that are peshat and neglects only the Mekhilta’s derash, halakhah, theology, legends and parables, since the Targum, as we said, is a translation and not a commentary. The reverse is not true: He deviates to add clarifications that are not in Mekhilta since it was composed after this midrash.[26]
Leviticus
 
The findings for Numbers and Exodus are repeated in Leviticus and Deuteronomy: The targumist relied on the late fourth century tannaitic midrashim for the translation of the biblical text. His deviations in Leviticus parallel the midrash Sifra’s interpretation in 129 instances, including 82 times that he uses Sifra’s word. Again, he never explains Leviticus contrary to Sifra’s peshat, he incorporates all, or virtually all, of Sifra’s interpretations that are peshat and neglects its derash, halakhah, theology, legends and parables, and he has deviations that clarify the text that are not in Sifra.[27]
Deuteronomy
 
In Deuteronomy as well, Onkelos’ deviations remarkably reflect the late fourth century tannaitic midrash Sifrei’s interpretation in about a third of the verses in the less than half of Deuteronomy where there is extant midrash. The Targum deviates 201 times using words reflecting interpretations in Sifrei. This represents about thirty percent of Sifrei’s interpretations.
            A few statistics will demonstrate how remarkable this is. There are, for example, 489 verses in the first 17 chapters, the first half of Deuteronomy. Only 186 of these sentences, about 38 percent, have comments by Sifrei. The targumist’s deviations from a literal rendering of Deuteronomy parallel Sifrei in 56 passages (in 60 instances) or about thirty per cent. The sentences where he does not reflect Sifrei are all instances, as we noted previously, where the midrash has derash. Thus, again, Onkelos contains all of virtually all of the non-aggadic Sifrei material, and there is no instance where the Targum differs with this midrash except where the latter has derash or there is a scribal error in the Targum.[28]
Genesis
 
H. Albeck[29] noted that the author or authors of the fourth-century midrash Genesis Rabbah did not use Onkelos despite having difficulty in understanding verses that the targumist understood and translated. For example, Genesis Rabbah cites an incident where rabbis wanted to know the Aramaic equivalent of a biblical word and had to travel to a place where Aramaic was spoken, and they did not look at Onkelos where the word is explained in Aramaic. Albeck’s observations are supplemented in the author’s Targumic Studies.[30] We now know that the midrash’s authors could not have utilized Onkelos as a source because it did not exist when the midrash was composed.
Conclusion
 
My studies of the Targum Onkelos Aramaic translation of the Hebrew Bible compared the words used in the Aramaic translation when the translator did not render the Bible literally with the language used in the late fourth century midrashim. The study showed that Onkelos consistently used the language in the midrashim.  There were a total of 698 similarities between Targum Onkelos to the four biblical books that we studied (excluding Genesis) to the text contained in the five midrashic volumes that we analyzed, most of which were exact quotes.[31] The Targum parallels these midrashim in a third of the verses where there are midrashic comments. Since the targumist drew material from these volumes, his Targum Onkelos had to have been composed after the end of the fourth century CE.
Since the editors of the Babylonian Talmud had Targum Onkelos in hand and were unable to recall its author, it stands to reason that the Targum must have been completed before the editing of this Talmud began in the fifth century. Thus a dating of 400 CE is probably very close to the exact date of our Targum’s composition.
An afterword
 
It is worthwhile repeating the following from Targum Onkelos to Deuteronomy.
As to which composition, Sifrei or Targum Onkelos, is earlier there are four possibilities. First, Sifrei was composed after Targum Onkelos and follows an interpretative tradition that originated with or was incorporated into the Targum. This is possible, but in view of the subtle, concise, and often ambiguous nature of Targum Onkelos’s deviations, it is doubtful that the editor of Sifrei sat down, examined every deviation, found a reason for it, and then wrote an expansion of it, proving his point by citing the opinion of tannaitic sages who lived over a period of many generations. Furthermore, this would fail to explain Sifrei’s derash, the material in Targum Onkelos not included in Sifrei, the collection of divergent tannaitic views, and so forth.
            The second possibility is that both Sifrei and Targum Onkelos were composed during several generations, by a series of authors, with mutual borrowing, both basing their interpretations on the same rabbinic tradition, which was transmitted orally or which was in written form, but is no longer extant.
            Thirdly, it is similarly possible that both Sifrei and Targum Onkelos are based on an earlier, more expansive Targum that is no longer extant. While both (2) and (3) are possible, they are unlikely because of the remarkable and consistent parallels between the two documents and for the other reasons mentioned above. Furthermore, if Sifrei drew from a Targum, one would expect some mention of a Targum among the many other sources that are cited, but there is none in Sifrei.
            The fourth possibility is that Sifrei preceded Targum Onkelos and the author(s) of the Targum translated with “one finger in the MT and another in Sifrei.” This would explain the remarkable parallelism and the additional material in Targum Onkelos.
            The author recognizes that his late fourth or early fifth century CE date for Onkelos depends upon the generally accepted scholarly dating of the tannaitic midrashim. A point can be made that versions of these midrashim existed at an earlier time. The author would dismiss this idea because the targumist follows the present midrashic text consistently and must have used the final version. Another argument could insist upon the minority view of an earlier redaction date for the midrashim. In any event, however one dates the midrashim, the author’s contribution remains. The Onkelos targumist borrowed from the tannaitic midrashim and must be dated after them.’
Dr. Israel Drazin is the author of thirty-three books, twelve of which are on Targum Onkelos. His website is www.booksnthoughts.com

 


[1] The word
“Targum” means “translation”, “interpretation”, or “version.” See Targum
Onkelos to Genesis 42:23; Exodus 4:16, 7:1; Targum to II
Chronicles
32:31; and Targum Sheni to Esther 3:8, 7:5. The words
“Targum Onkelos,” as we shall see, denote “the Translation of Aquilas.”
In the Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 49a, Rabbi Judah said: “If
one translates a verse literally, he is a liar; if he adds thereto, he is a
blasphemer and a libeler. Then what is a proper translation? Our
translation.”
 
The first mention of Targum Onkelos after the Babylonian Talmud does not
occur until the seventh century. Sar Shalom in Sefer Shaarei Teshuvah,
ed. F. Hirsch (Leipzig. 1858), 29c, and Seder Rab Amram (1865), 29.
[2] The translation
is from The Babylonian Talmud, ed. I. Epstein, Soncino Press (London,
1938). This passage, it is important to note, is the only source for this
legend. The verse itself is discussed again in the Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 37b. If Onkelos received
guidance from R. Eleazer and R. Joshua, who lived around 130 C.E, this opinion
would date the translation to the early part of the second century.
[3] In the
Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 11a
and Gittin 56a, b, and 57a. Cf. Tosefta Shabbat 7(8):18; Haggigah 3:2 and 3; and the midrashim Genesis Rabbah 70:5 and Tanchuma 41a, Mishpatim 3.
[4] The Jerusalem
Talmud, Megillah 1, 71c; Kiddushin 1, 59a; Haggigah 2:5, 77a. Although the contemporary English spelling is
Aquila, the name is Aquilas in Greek and Hebrew. Those familiar with rabbinic
studies will recall that errors in names frequently occur in the Talmud. While
writing this note, the author was studying the Babylonian Talmud Bava Kamma and found the following
errors in a few pages; R. Abba v. R. Abin in 112a; R. Ashi v. R. Assi in 112b,
113a, 114a; Rava v. Rabba in 114a, R. Huna v. R. Kahana in 114a, Rav v. Abbahu
in 114b; and the Talmud itself was unsure of a name in 114b.
[5] See M. M.
Kasher, Torah Shelemah 24 (Jerusalem, 1974), pages 155-161; and J.
Reifman, Sedeh Aram (Berlin, 1875), pages 8-10.
[6] See Kasher, op.
cit
., pages 195-238, and Reifman, op. cit., pages 12-14. Numbers Rabbah is hardly older than the
twelfth century. See The Jewish Encyclopedia, volume II, page 671, and Encyclopedia
Judaica
, volume 12, column 1261.
[7] Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Bathra 99a: “Onkelos the
proselyte said, the cherubim were of tza’atzu’im (image work) and their
faces were turned sideways, as a student who is leaving his teacher.” The
statement is somewhat obscure. It probably comments upon II Chronicles 3:10 (where the word is spelt with ayins) by
referring to a similar word in Isaiah
22:24 (spelt with alephs). Targum Jonathan translates the latter word
“son,” which suggests “student.” The reference to Onkelos is certainly
incorrect. There is no Targum Onkelos to either the Writings or the Prophets,
and Onkelos in the Pentateuch never translates “cherubim.” It always repeats
the biblical Hebrew word. It is possible that the Talmud is referring to
Jonathan ben Uzziel or Aquilas and not Onkelos.
[8] R. Jeremiah
lived about 350 CE and his teacher R. Hiyya b. Abba, a generation earlier. It
is likely that he did not make the statement that tradition attributes to him.
First of all, the talmudic tradition is itself uncertain as to who made the
statement. Secondly, since both R. Jeremiah and R. Hiyya b. Abba were scholars
of Eretz Israel and not Babylon; the tradition, if correct, probably referred
to the Eretz Israel Greek translation of Aquilas, and not the Babylonian
Aramaic translation of “our translation.” Thirdly, in the Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 9b, R. Hiyya b. Abba is clearly
speaking about the Greek Bible translation and seems to know nothing of the Aramaic
version.
[9] H. Graetz, History
of the Jews
(Philadelphia, 1893), volume 2, pages 387, 581, 582, argues
that the Aramaic translation “was made partly from that of Akylas (sic)
on account of its simplicity, and was called Targum Onkelos.” See the author’s Targum
Onkelos to Deuteronomy
(Ktav, 1982), pages 2, 14, 15, and A. E.
Silverstone, Aquila and Onkelos (Manchester University Press, 1970), and
other volumes cited therein.
[10] Note, for
example, that תגי and מדע in Palestinian Aramaic are תנגי and מנדע in Babylonian
Aramaic.  Another difference is that
Onkelos is spelt with an aleph and Aquilas with an ayin. Many
Palestinian words with an ayin were transposed in Babylonia to an aleph
because Babylonians had difficulty pronouncing laryngeals; for example, עד=אד.
[11] See notes 4 and
5, and related text.
[12] See for example
Mishnah Aboth 6: 6; Babylonian
Talmud, Yevamot 97a; Jerusalem
Talmud, Berachot 2:1 (4b). Also, many
talmudic discussions are based on the idea that Amoraim never dispute a subject
that was previously disputed in a Mishnah without citing the earlier dispute.
See for example Babylonian Talmud, Gittin
4a and 16b, middle of pages.
[13] M. H.
Goshen-Gottstein, “The Language of Targum Onkelos and the model of Literary
Diaglossia in Aramaic,” JNES 37 (1978), pages 169-179; B. Grossfield,
“Onqelos, Halakhah and the Halakhic Midrashim,” in D. R. G. Beattie and M.
McNamara (editors), The Aramaic bible (1994), pages 228-46.
[14] See edition by
A. Berliner (Leipzig, 1877).
[15] See for example
P. Kahle, The Cairo Geneiza (Oxford, 1959), pages191-228; H. Albeck, Jubilee
Volume to B. M. Lewin
(1940), pages 93-104; A. Diez Macho, Neophyti,
I: Genesis (1968), page 98;
Leopold Zunz, Die Gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden (Berlin, 1832). These views and others
are discussed in I. Drazin, Targum Onkelos to Deuteronomy (Ktav, 1982),
pages 2-6, and B. Grossfeld, Targum Onqelos to Genesis (Michael Glazier,
1988), pages 30-35. No critical evaluation was ever made of Berliner’s Masorah and every modern author refers
to it without comment. The book and the conclusions drawn from it require
extensive study. It should be noted that there was or were early Aramaic
translations of parts of the Hebrew Bible, as confirmed by the fragments found
in Qumran. See J. T. Milik, Discoveries in the Judean Desert, Volume 6: Qumran
Grotte 4
, II: Tefillin, Mezuzot, et Targums (4Q128-4Q157) Oxford,
1977. The comparison between these finds and Onkelos are discussed in I.
Drazin’s Targum Onkelos to Leviticus (Ktav, 1994), pages 36, 146, 149,
151.
[16] With the
participation of the Center for Judaic Studies of the University of Denver, the
author published, through the Ktav Publishing House, Targum Onkelos to
Deuteronomy
in 1982, Targum Onkelos to Exodus in 1990, Targum
Onkelos to Leviticus
in 1993, and Targum Onkelos to Numbers in 1998.
Targum Onkelos to Genesis was written by Moses Aberbach and Bernard
Grossfeld, and was published in 1982. The latter authors ascribe a dating of
Onkelos “towards the end of the third century CE” (page 9).
[17] A tannaitic document
is one that transmits the views of the Jewish sages from the period of Hillel
to the compilation of the Mishnah. This period began about 20 BCE and ended
about 200 CE, although the documents may not have been committed to writing
until a later time. The tannaitic midrashim were not redacted until the end of
the fourth century.
    The tannaitic midrashim are Mekhilta deR. Ishmael and Mekhilta deR. Simeon b. Yochai to Exodus; Sifra to Leviticus; Sifrei and Sifrei Zutta to Numbers; and Sifrei and
Midrash Tannaim to Deuteronomy.
Each is individualistic in halakhic view,
style, and character.
    Although the tannaitic midrashim appear, by
their name, to have been composed during the tannaitic period, ending in the
early third century, later scholars are mentioned therein. The tannaitic
midrashim, in their present form, were unknown to the scholars in the two
Talmuds and must have been composed in Eretz Israel no earlier than the end of
the fourth century, after the completion of the Jerusalem Talmud. They were
unknown in the Jerusalem Talmud because they were not yet composed. They were
unknown in the Babylonian Talmud because of their composition in Eretz Israel.
See Encyclopedia Judaica for sources regarding the dating of each
midrash.
    J. Neusner, Midrash in Context (Fortress
Press, 1983), dates the tannaitic midrashim in the fifth and sixth centuries.
We will see in this study that (1) our targumist drew material from the
midrashim, which must have pre-existed the Targum, and (2) the scholars of the Babylonian
Talmud, composed and edited in the fifth and sixth century, mention our Targum
but did not know the name of its author. Therefore, the Targum must have been
composed before the Babylonian Talmud. Thus, a sixth-century date for the
composition of the midrashim is incorrect.
[18] This was done
first in the Deuteronomy volume in
pp. 8-10. This book showed the reliance of Onkelos upon the midrash Sifrei. The subsequent studies did the
same with the other midrashim.
[19] The midrash Sifrei to Numbers comments on parts of
nineteen of the thirty-six biblical chapters of Numbers (5-12; 15; 18-19; 25:1-13; 26:52-31:24; and 35:9-39), less
than a third of the biblical text. It contains a considerable amount of aggadah
and halakhah, items that Onkelos avoids, and has little narrative, areas
where Targum Onkelos deviations abound.
[20] Onkelos has
many Hebraisms because its audience’s language included many Hebrew words. They
were used in the translation whenever the Hebrew was more familiar or
understandable to the reader than the Aramaic equivalent. Similarly, although
the midrash was composed in Hebrew, there are many Aramaic words in it.
[21] שקר twice, 5:6; כיור, 5:17; יפרש used in
6:2 to help define גזר; equals Sifrei’s pisqahs
7, 10, and 23, respectively.
    The exception of דבר in 12:1 (=pisqah 99) is
understandable. Sifrei interprets דבר as “harsh
speech.” This is derash, a homiletical exposition, and not a true
definition; and Onkelos only translates according to the peshat, the
simple meaning of the text. Yet, even in this instance, although the Targum
does not quote the adjective “harsh,” it differentiates the two words,
rendering מלל
for “speak” and retaining אמר for the second.
[22] A chart of
these instances is in I. Drazin, “Dating Targum Onkelos by means of the
Tannaitic Midrashim,” Journal of Jewish
Studies
, Autumn 1999.
[23] The 106
instances are listed in the Journal of
Jewish Studies
article.
[24] Like Sifrei, Sifrei Zutta was composed at the
end of the fourth century CE. But, unlike the former, the latter disappeared
and only fragments were rediscovered in the Genizah, in Yalkut Shimoni, Midrash ha-Gadol, and other works. H. S. Horovitz
compiled these findings and published them in Sifrei al Sefer be-Midbar
VeSifrei Zutta
(1917). Later, J. N. Epstein published an additional large
fragment in Tarbiz 1/1 (1930). Sifrei
Zutta
contains many halakhot that are not mentioned elsewhere and many that
differ with those in the Mishnah. Its style and terminology are unique.
[25] These deviations
are identified and explained in the author’s Targum series. See Note 16. Targum
Onkelos’s understanding and use of peshat will be addressed in the next
chapter.
[26] See the
author’s Targum Onkelos to Exodus (Ktav), pages 8-11, 32-33, for
details.
[27] See the
author’s Targum Onkelos to Leviticus (Ktav), pages 9-11, 26-28, for
details.
[28] See the
author’s Targum Onkelos to Deuteronomy (Ktav), pages 9-10, 43-44, for
details.
[29] “Mekoroth
Ha-Bereshit Rabbah,” Einleitung und Register zu Berechit Rabba volume 3
(Jerusalem 1965), pages 44-54. Albeck did not reach the author’s discovery that
the Onkelos targumist took material from the tannaitic midrashim.
[30] See the
author’s Targumic Studies, “Analysis of Targum Onkelos Deviations to
Genesis” (University Microfilms International, 1981), pages 1-76.
[31] No study was
made of Bereshit Rabbah, Mekhilta deR.
Simeon b. Yochai
and Midrash Tannaim.
The author believes that more parallels will be found between Targum Onkelos
and the other tannaitic midrashim when these books are studied.



Rabbi Zeira – Forgetting the Teachings of Babylon

Rabbi Zeira – Forgetting
the Teachings of Babylon

By Chaim Katz
We read in the Talmud (Baba Metziah
85a):

R. Zeira, when he moved to the land of
Israel, observed a hundred fasts to forget the teachings of Babylonia, [1] so
that they should not disturb him.
He fasted another hundred times so that R.
Elazar should not die during his years and the responsibilities of the
community not fall upon him.He fasted another hundred times so that
the fire of Gehenna should have no power over him.

Figure 1 From the first print of Baba Metziah Soncino, Italy 1489
There are some difficulties with R. Zeira
forgetting the teachings of Babylonia:
1) Both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmud
contain many interactions between sages who travelled from the land of Israel
to Babylon or from Babylon to the land of Israel. These sages shared their own teachings
and traditions with their counterparts. By forgetting Babylonian teachings, R.
Zeira is choosing not to participate in this knowledge transfer. Why? [2]
2) R. Zeira is mentioned many times in
the Jerusalem Talmud and sometimes he transmits in the name of his Babylonian
teachers. Many of these exchanges clearly took place when he already was in the
land of Israel. How can he transfer Torah information that he has supposedly forgotten?
[3]
3) The Talmud (Shabbat 41a) relates that
when R Zeira was about to leave for the land of Israel, he went out of his way to
hear one more teaching from his teacher, Rav Yehuda.  Why would he go to the trouble of amassing
more Babylonian teachings if he intended to immediately forget them?
4) Forgetting one’s learning purposefully
isn’t a pious thing to do. The Mishna Pirkei Avot 3:10 strongly discourages it,
as does the Talmud:  R. Elazar said:  One who forgets a word of his learning (Talmud)
causes his descendants to be exiled – Yoma 38b. Resh Laqish said:  One who forgets a word of his learning (Talmud)
transgresses a negative commandment – Menachot 
99b.
We can find a simple solution to these
questions in one of the manuscripts of Baba Metzia, written around 1137
and housed in the National Central Library in Florence. The manuscript disagrees
with the premise that R. Zeira ever forgot his learning:
R. Zeira fasted so that he would not
forget the teachings of Babylon.
He observed another forty fasts so that
R Il’a should not die in his lifetime.
He observed another forty fasts that the
fire of Gehenna should have no power over him.

Figure 2 Florence
Manuscript BM 85a

As far as I know, this manuscript is unique among the
manuscripts that exist today in defining “not to forget” as the purpose R.
Zeira’s fast. [4] The manuscript is also attractive for a couple of other reasons:

The passage is shorter here
than in the standard version. The explanations “when he moved to the land of
Israel”, “so that it should not disturb him”, [5] “so that the responsibilities
of the community not fall upon him” are all missing. This reduction most likely
indicates that the manuscript reflects an early version of the story – a
version in which marginal commentary had not yet been copied (inadvertently) into
the text.
The paragraph that precedes the story of
R. Zeira (in all versions) tells of Rav Yosef (R. Zeira’s colleague) who also observed
a series of three sets of forty intermittent fasts. The purpose of Rav Yosef’s
fasts was to guarantee that the knowledge of the Torah would not depart from
himself, from his children and from his grandchildren. The goal of Rav Yosef’s
fasts seems to agree with the goal of R. Zeira’s fasts; to remember (i.e., not
forget) the teachings of Babylonia.
According to this manuscript, all of R.
Zeira’s fasts have something in common with each other. He fasted so he would
not forget, he fasted so that R. Ila’i would not die, and he fasted so that the
fire of Gehina would not harm him. He always seems to be fasting so that
something should not happen.
However, many authorities have discussed
the standard version, and no one (as far as I know) has relied on this reading
to resolve the original questions. [6]
Here
are some of the classical interpretations that attempt to solve the problems of
R. Zeira’s forgetting.
Rashi
writes (BM 85a) that the students in the land of Israel were not בני מחלוקת, were not contentious, ונוחין זה לזה, they were pleasant to each other]  . . .   ומיישבין את
הטעמים בלא קושיות ופירוקין and they explained their reasoning without challenging each
other with difficulties and rebuttals.
According
to Rashi , R. Zeira forgets the “atmosphere” of the Babylonian academies.  [7]
Maharsha (1555-1631), disagrees with
Rashi. He argues that the sages in the land of Israel do engage in questioning
and answering like their counterparts in Babylonia.  He cites the Gemara (Baba Metzia 84a) where
R. Yohanan says about Reish Laqish:  he
would raise twenty-four objections, and I would reply with twenty-four answers.

Therefore, Maharsha explains that
possibly the Babylonian piplul was faulty and similar to a style of piplul
that existed in his own time דוגמת חילוקים
שבדור הזה. He objects to this style of questioning and answering because it
distances one from the truth, and can’t help one rule on halakhic issues. Accordingly,
R. Zeira fasted in order to forget how to piplul the Babylonian way.
Abravanel (1437-1508) in his commentary
on Pirkei Avot (on the Mishna in chapter 5 which begins: There are four types
who study with the sages) writes somewhat similarly. The problem with the one who
is compared to a sponge, who soaks up everything – is that he retains things
that are untrue. In the search for truth, there are necessary steps which themselves
are untrue:  כי לא תברר האמת כי אם בהפכו truth can only
be evaluated when compared with its opposite. R. Zeira fasts to forget the stages in
the arguments of the Babylonian Talmud that were untrue.
In summary, all three of these
interpretations agree that R. Zeira didn’t literally forget the Babylonian
teachings. He forgot the “atmosphere” of the Babylonian academies or the
interim discussions that took place there.  [8]
I’d like now to give some examples of
how the story of R. Zeira is presented in some early Hassidic sermons, to show
how the Rebbes and their audiences understood the story of R. Zeira. These
sources aren’t concerned with explaining our Gemara; R. Zeira’s story is cited
to support an ethical or moral lesson.
Torah Or is a collection of sermons by
R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi (1745-1812). On
page 69c, in a discussion about spiritual worlds, the author says:

The purpose of the river diNur, (fiery
river (or maybe fiery light)), in which the soul submerges itself as it passes from
this world to Gan Eden, is to erase its memories of this physical world. If the
soul remembers its encounter with materiality, it can’t experience Gan Eden.
And when the soul goes from the lower Gan Eden to the higher Gan Eden it also must
pass through a river diNur to forget the comprehension and pleasures of the
lower Gan Eden. (Zohar part 2 210a) This is the idea in the Gemara: R. Zeira
observed 100 fasts to forget the Talmud of Babylonia even though he had studied
it with devotion.

In Likutei Moharan (ch. 246), R. Nachman
of Bratslav (1772 – 1810) writes:

A
person sometimes has to feel self-important גדלות, as it says (2
Chronicles 17:6) His heart was elevatedויגבה לבו  in
the service of G-d.  This helps the same way
as fasting helps. For when one needs to attain an understanding or needs to
reach a higher level, he has to forget the wisdom he had previously acquired. R.
Zeira fasted to forget the Talmud of Babylon in order to reach a greater level
of comprehension – the level of the Talmud of the land of Israel.  Similarly through self-importance, one forgets
his wisdom . . . 

In these examples of Hassidic thought there
is no difficulty with the idea that R. Zeira forgets his learning in order to reach
higher spiritual plateau. Forgetting is a purification process that is both
necessary and exemplary. [9]
Returning now to the literal sense of the
Gemara:
R. Issac Halevi (Rabinowitz)
(1847-1914), the author of Dorot Harishonim addresses our problem in a footnote
(Dorot II p 427 footnote 93). He posits that in R.  Zeira’s time there were already two canonized
collections of Talmudic material arranged around the Mishna; each in its own
distinct form and style.

כבר הי׳ להם סתמא דהש”ס על המשנה שגרסו כבר במטבע קבועה,
וכן הי׳  להם אז כבר גם בארץ ישראל.

R. Zeira chose to
forget the Babylonian Talmud (as it existed in his time), because it interfered
with his studies in the land of Israel.
According to this
interpretation, R. Zeira forgot only the redaction or arrangement of the
teachings he had learned.  He didn’t forget
the teachings themselves (or the study method). [10]
I’d like to suggest
an original explanation. It’s based on passages in the Talmud about R. Zeira
and additionally can explain why only R. Zeira decided to forget the teachings
of Babylon when he moved to the land of Israel.

1)     
R.
Yitzhak b. Nahmani said in the name of R. Eleazar: The halakha agrees with R.
Jose b. Kipper.  R. Zeira said: “If I
merit, I’ll go there and learn the halakha from the Master himself”. When R.
Zeira came to the land of Israel he found R. Eleazar and asked him: “Did you
say: The halakha is in agreement with R. Jose b. Kipper?” – Nidda 48a
2)     
R.
Zeira said to R. Abba b Papa: When you go there, detour around the Ladder of
Tyre and visit R. Yaakov b Idi. Ask him if he heard from R. Yohanan if the
Halakha is like R. Aqiba or not – Baba Metziah 43b
3)     
R
Zeira, commented: How can you compare R Binyamin b Yefet’s version of R.
Yohanan’s statement with the version of Rabbi Hiya b Abba. R Hiya b Abba was
precise when he studied the halakhic traditions from R Yohanan but R. Binyamin
b Yefet was not precise. Moreover, R Hiya b Abba reviewed his learning (Talmud)
with R. Yohanan every thirty days.  – Berachot
38b
4)     
R.
Nathan b. Tobi quoted R. Johanan . . . Rabbi Zeira asked: “Did
R. Johanan say this?” Yes, he answered. Rabbi Zeira recited this teaching forty
times. R. Nathan said to R. Zeira: Is this the only teaching that you have
heard or is it a teaching that is new to you? R. Zeira replied: “It’s new to
me. I wasn’t sure if it was taught in the name R. Yohanan or R Yehoshua b
Levi.” – Berachot 28a
We
see that the teachings of the land of Israel (especially R. Yohanan’s) did
reach R. Zeira while he was still in Babylon [11]. R. Zeira, however, didn’t really
trust these teachings. Sometimes he thought they were attributed incorrectly,
or their content was not accurate. He doubted if a statement in the name of R.
Eleazar was correct. [12] He was unsure if R. Yohanan agreed with R. Aqiba’s
position or not. He distinguished between the different amoraim who
transmitted teachings. In general he looked at Torah that reached Babylon as
something that was possibly unreliable, inaccurate or “damaged in transit”.
  
R. Zeira was
only able to resolve his doubts when he moved to the land of Israel and learned
the Torah of the land of Israel there. He then forgot the imprecise version of
these teachings that he had previously memorized in Babylon – “the teachings of
Babylon”. He could forget them because they were superseded by accurate
teachings that he now received in the land of Israel. [13]

I’d like to thank Reb Gary Gleam who
provided the cabbage rolls and coffee, and the late night sounding board.

————————————————————————————————————————–

[1] תלמודא בבלאה is sometimes translated
as Babylonian Talmud, which I think is an anachronism. I will use the translation
“Babylonian teachings”. All the available manuscripts have תלמודא דבבל  =  the teachings of Babylonia. The phrase Talmuda
dBabel
or Talmuda Babelah occurs only here
(Google). Talmud in the sense of teachings occurs many times, often in
comparison to mikra or mishna.
 [2]
Compare Rosh Hashana 20b: “When R. Zeira went up [to the land of Israel], he
sent [a letter] to his colleagues [in Babylonia]  . . .”  R.
Zeira didn’t break off all contact with the old country. He taught them what he
heard and learned in the land of Israel.
[3] See Goldberg, Abraham. “Rabbi Ze’ira
and Babylonian Custom in Palestine” (Hebrew) Tarbiz vol. 36 1967 (pages
319-341), for examples of Babylonian traditions that R. Zeira brought to the
land of Israel. The following quote is from the online abstract:
“R.
Zeira is the outstanding figure among many who came from an area of unmixed
Babylonian tradition and who tried to impose their own Babylonian practice upon
Palestinian custom.”
[4]
The crucial word דלא, is crossed-out
in the manuscript, but I’m assuming that the strikethrough is not the work of
the original sofer. (Didn’t scribes write dots on top of the words they
wanted to erase?) The facsimile shows a number of other emendations that were written
after the manuscript’s creation.
[5] The words “so that it should not disturb
him” would be out of place in this version of the story, since according to
this version, R. Zeria never forgot the Babylonian teachings, but the idea is
that the text is short. There is a geniza fragment from The Friedberg
Project for Talmud Bavli Variants and it is equally as short. (Note
that it matches the standard editions with regard to the goal of R. Zeira’s
fast.)

 Figure
3 Geniza fragment
of our Baba Metziah 85a

Translation of the geniza fragment:
R. Zeira observed forty fasts to forget
the teachings of Babylon.
He fasted another forty times that R
Il’a should not die in his lifetime.
He fasted another forty times that the fire of
Gehenna should have no power over him.
[6]
The author of Dikduke Soferim mentions this version but doesn’t suggest that its
reading is better than the standard one. Dikduke Sofreim has written elsewhere
that this specific manuscript belonged to Christians who translated (into Latin)
passages that were regularly used against Jews in inter-faith disputations.
There’s no Latin on this page, but you can see Latin on some other pages.
[7]
Rashi mentions his source as Sanhedrin 24a. He understands that the students of
Babylon were antagonistic to each other unlike the students in the land of
Israel who were pleasant to each other. Rashi apparently was thinking of this in
his commentary on the prayer of R. Nehunya ben HaKanah – Berachot 28b. The
prayer reads: “May it be Your will that I don’t make a mistake in a halakhic
ruling, and that my colleagues rejoice with me  . . .”  Rashi
understands the prayer this way – May it be Your will that I don’t make a
mistake in a halakhic ruling and my colleagues make fun of me.
[8]
The explanations of Maharsha and Abravanel have prompted subversive
interpretations by the school of the German Jewish historians of the
Talmud.  In the Soncino translation of
Shabbat 41a, the translator, Rabbi DR. Freedman (1901-1982) writes:  “Weiss, Dor, III, p. 188, maintains that R.
Zera’s desire to emigrate was occasioned by dissatisfaction with Rab Judah’s
method of study; this is vigorously combatted by Halevi, Doroth, II pp. 421 et
seq.”

Jacob Neusner’s
in his book A History of the Jews in Babylonia page 218, also questions the
idea that sages of the land of Israel rejected the Babylonian methods of study,
and finds “Halevi’s strong demurrer quite convincing”.
[9]
In this context, the Talmudic statement: גדולה עבירה לשמה ממצווה שלא לשמה   – מסכת הוריות י’ ע”ב may be somewhat
relevant.
[10] I’m not sure, according to R.
Halevi,  did R. Zeira also forget the
anonymous Talmudic layer (stam or redactor) that existed in his time? 
[11]
The first of these conversations definitely took place in Babylon. The fourth
interaction occurred in the land of Israel but revises a teaching that R. Zeira
probably heard in Babylonia. The middle two quotes are may describe R. Zeira in
Babylon, but even if they occurred when R. Zeira was already in the land of
Israel, they reflect doubts that he had while in Babylon.  The number 40 in the last example is also
remarkable. He repeats something 40 times in order to remember. He fasts 40
times to forget. 
[12]
R. Eleazar teaches without citing his source but everyone knows that his
teachings are R. Yohanan’s (Yerushalmi Berakot 2:1 and Yerushalmi Shekalim 2:5).
[13] R. Zeira didn’t forget the native
Babylonian teachings, authored and recorded by the Babylonian amoraim. He
never doubted their accuracy. He brought those teachings to the land of Israel
and enriched the Torah of the land of Israel with them. 



The Seven Nations of Canaan

                                     THE SEVEN NATIONS OF CANAAN[1]
By Reuven Kimelman
This study deals with the war and the
seven Canaanite nations.[2] It complements my previous post on Amalek of March 13, 2014, “The Ethics of the Case of Amalek: An
Alternative Reading of the Biblical Data and the Jewish Tradition. “The popular
conception in both cases is that the Bible demands their extermination thereby
providing a precedent for genocide.[3] The popular reading of the Canaanites filters it through the prism of
Deuteronomy. The popular reading of
Amalek filters the Torah material through the prism of Saul’s battle against
Amalek in the Book of Samuel. In actuality, the biblical data is much
more ambiguous making the most destructive comments the exception not the rule as
will be evident from a systematic analysis of the Canaanite material in the
Bible as was previously done with Amalek.  
            This
post will deal with the following seven questions with regard to the nations of
Canaan:
a). What are the different biblical
approaches to the native nations of Canaan?
b). According to the Bible, what
actually happened to them?
c). What is the evidence that the
Bible is sensitive to the moral issues involved?
d). How has the Jewish tradition
removed the category of the seven nations from its ethical agenda?
e). What is the role of the
doctrine of repentance?
f). What is the relevance of the
“Sennacherib principle”?
g). How relevant is the category
“holy war”?
            With
regard to the extermination of the seven nations of Canaan,[4] sometimes called Canaanites sometimes Amorites, the biblical record is also not
of one cloth. The clarification of their status in the Bible requires a
systematic treatment of all the data book by book. 
Genesis (12:6, 15:16) is aware that the
Canaanites were in the land when Abraham arrived and would remain for
generations.  From Genesis 38 and the end
of The Book of Ruth we learn that from the progeny of Abraham’s great grandson
Judah and the Canaanite Tamar will issue King David. Also  Simeon’s son is identified as “Saul the son
of a Cannanite women” (Genesis 46:10, Exodus 6:15) without comment.
Exodus (23)’s position on the
elimination of the Canaanites (v. 23) is a gradual dispossession by God, not by
the Israelites:[5]
27 I will send forth My terror before
you, and I will throw into panic all the people among whom you come, and I will
make all your enemies turn tail before you. 28 I will send a plague ahead of
you, and it shall drive out before you the Hivites, the Canaanites, and the
Hittites.[6] 29 I will not drive them out before you in a single year, lest the land become
desolate and the wild beasts multiply to your hurt. 30 I will drive them out
before you little by little, until you have increased and possess the land.
Leviticus (18) refers to God casting out
of the nations:
24 Do not defile yourselves in any of
those ways, for it is by such that the nations that I am casting out before you
defiled themselves. 25 Thus the land became defiled; and I called it to account
for its iniquity, and the land spewed out its inhabitants.
Here there is a coordination between God
and land.  The land spews out its
inhabitants for defiling it and God expels them.  
Numbers (33) refers to the Israelites
deporting the local inhabitants:
51 Speak to the Israelite people and say
to them:
When you cross the Jordan into the land
of Canaan, 52 you shall dispossess all the inhabitants of the land; you shall
destroy all their figured objects; you shall destroy all their molten images,
and you shall demolish all their cult places. 53 And you shall take possession
of the land and settle in it, for I have assigned the land to you to possess.
It is clear that the issue here is not
ethnic but religio-cultural. The fear is that Israel will be ensnared,
especially through intermarriage, by the local moral and cultic practices
Exodus 34 emphasizes the religious
factor:
12b Beware of making a covenant with the
inhabitants of the land against which you are advancing, lest they be a snare
in your midst. 13 Rather you must tear down their altars, smash their
pillars,and cut down their sacred posts; 14 for you must not worship any other
God, because the Lord, whose name is Impassioned, is an impassioned God. 15 You
must not make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, for they will lust
after their gods and sacrifice to their gods and invite you, and you will eat
of their sacrifices. 16 And when you take wives from among their daughters for
your sons, their daughters will lust after their gods and will cause your sons
to lust after their gods.[7]
Leviticus 18 emphasizes the moral
factor:
26 But you must keep My laws and My
rules, and you must not do any of those abhorrent things, neither the citizen
nor the stranger who resides among you; 27 for all those abhorrent things were
done by the people who were in the land before you, and the land became
defiled. 28 So let not the land spew you out for defiling it as it spewed out
the nation that came before you. 29 All who do any of those abhorrent
things—such persons shall be cut off from their people. 30 You shall keep My
charge not to engage in any of the abhorrent practices that were carried on
before you, and you shall not defile yourselves through them: I the Lord am
your God.
Numbers 33 warns Israel against
assimilating Canaanite norms lest they share their fate of expulsion. “55 But if
you do not dispossess the inhabitants of the land, those whom you allow to
remain shall be stings in your eyes and thorns in your sides, and they shall
harass you in the land in which you live; 56 so that I will do to you what I
planned to do to them.”

            The exception is Deuteronomy 7
which demands total destruction:
1 When the Lord your God brings you to
the land that you are about to enter and possess, and He dislodges many nations
before you— the Hittites, Girgashites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites,
Hivites, and Jebusites, seven nations much larger than you—2and the Lord your
God delivers them to you and you defeat them, you must doom them to
destruction: grant them no terms and give them no quarter.
Even according to Deuteronomy the fear
is not of their DNA but moral assimilation, for it goes on to say:  “Lest they lead you into doing all the
abhorrent things that they have done for their gods and you stand guilty before
the Lord your God” (20:18). For Deuteronomy (12:31; 18:9-12), the abhorrent
things include child sacrifice.
Strangely, Deuteronomy continues with a
provision against intermarriage:
3 You shall not intermarry with them: do
not give your daughters to their sons or take their daughters for your sons.
4 For they will turn your children away from Me to worship other gods, and the
Lord’s anger will blaze forth against you and He will promptly wipe you out.
5 Instead, this is what you shall do to them: you shall tear down their altars,
smash their pillars, cut down their sacred posts, and consign their images to
the fire.

Apprehension about intermarriage or coming to terms with an eradicated people
is strange unless Deuteronomy is aware that its demand to doom them will not be
(or was not) implemented. And, in fact, as we shall see the evidence from
Judges 3 is that they did intermarry.
 Alternatively, ḥerem does not entail
the elimination of the Canaanites only their isolation, that is, they are to be
quarantined. This understanding follows its Semitic cognates where it means to
separate, to set aside.[8] The goal is to exclude any intercourse with them. Thus verse 5 only refers to
the elimination of their objects of worship not their persons. This opens the
possibility that “What we have is a retention of the … traditional language
of ḥerem, but a shift in the direction of its acquiring significance as
a metaphor … for religious fidelity.”[9]
 Even stranger is the description of the
confrontation with Sihon king of the Amorites. Within the context of
Deuteronomy, one would expect an outright attack when God says to Moses: “See,
I give into your power Sihon the Amorite, king of Heshbon, and his land. Begin
the occupation: engage him in battle” (2:24). Instead, what does Moses do:
26 Then I sent messengers from the
wilderness of Kedemoth to King Sihon of Heshbon with an offer of peace, as
follows, 27 “Let me pass through your country. I will keep strictly to the
highway, turning off neither to the right nor to the left. 28 What food I eat
you will supply for money, and what water I drink you will furnish for money;
just let me pass through.”
Sihon rejects the offer and attacks
Israel. They are destroyed only in the counterattack.
If there is no evidence for the
expulsion of the Canaanites, whence the position of Deuteronomy 7:1-2?
It has been speculated that Deuteronomy took “both the expulsion law of Exodus
23:20-33, directed against the inhabitants of Canaan, and the ḥerem
(total destruction) law of Exodus 22:19 (“Whoever sacrifices to a God other
than the Lord shall be proscribed), directed against the individual Israelite,
and fused them into a new law that applies ḥerem to all idolaters,
Israelites and non-Israelites alike.”[10] In other words, the ḥerem is not against Canaanites as Canaanites, but
idolaters as idolaters. Thus Deuteronomy (13:13-19) imposes the very punishment
on Israelite idolaters. The choice of the word ḥerem also promotes a
sense of quid pro quod, for, according to Numbers 14:45, the Canaanites and the
Amalekites pummeled Israel to Hormah a word which could simply designate a
place or also serve as a toponym since ad haḥormah could be
rendered “to utter destruction.”[11] The point of the paronomasia is that the Canaanites and the Amalekites got as
they gave.
In any case, except for some sources in
Joshua (6:21 and chapters 10-11) the later biblical sources follow the earlier
biblical books from Exodus to Numbers rather than Deuteronomy. Even the Joshua
material raises some questions. According to Joshua 10:33, Joshua totally
destroyed the people of Gezer. Yet Joshua 16:10 (like Judges 1:29) states: “They
failed to dispossess the Canaanites who dwelt in Gezer; so the Canaanites
remained in the midst of Ephraim, as is still the case. But they had to perform
forced labor.” In actuality, they stayed there until the reign of Solomon only
to be killed off by Pharaoh as noted in I Kings 9:16. Apparently, once the
people were defanged by having its army destroyed, they were given quarter.[12] As a subject nation they apparently present no religious threat. In fact, save
for the peculiar case of Judges 3:5, the surrounding nations, not the
Canaanites, are blamed for Israelite apostasy.[13] In fact, according to Joshua 8:29 and 10:27, the bodies of Canaanite kings hung
by Joshua were buried by nightfall just as Deuteronomy 21:23 enjoins.
Apparently, Human dignity is inalienable even for Canaanite kings.
The triumphal picture of Joshua is
undermined by the facts on the ground. For example, Joshua 11:12 gives the
impression that Joshua wiped out all the cities in the area of Hazor and burned
them to the ground. Yet the next verse says: “However, all those towns that are
still standing on their mounds were not burned down by Israel; it was Hazor
alone that Joshua burned down.” In fact, only two other cities were burned —
Jericho and Ai.
Similarly, Joshua 11:23 claims: “Thus
Joshua conquered the whole country, just as the Lord had promised Moses,”
whereas 13:1 concedes “and very much of the land still remains to be taken
possession of.” Even where Israel spread out much of the native population was
allowed to remain in their midst, as it says later in the same chapter: “the
Israelites failed to dispossess the Geshurites and the Maacathites, and Geshur
and Maacath remain among Israel to this day” (13:13). The sparing of the
Canaanite population was common. With regard to southern Israel, Joshua 15:63
says: “But the Judites could not dispossess the Jebusites, the inhabitants of
Jerusalem; so the Judites dwell with the Jebusites in Jerusalem to this day.”
With regard to central Israel, Joshua 16:10 says: “However, they failed to
dispossess the Canaanites who dwelt in Gezer; so the Canaanites remained in the
midst of Ephraim, as is still the case. But they had to perform forced labor.”
And with regard to northern Israel, Joshua 17:12-13 says: “The Manassites could
not dispossess [the inhabitants of] these towns, and the Canaanites stubbornly
remained in this region. When the Israelites became stronger, they imposed
tribute on the Canaanites; but they did not dispossess them.”
Judges 1:27-36 follows suit. It begins:
27 Manasseh did not dispossess [the
inhabitants of] Beth-shean and its dependencies, or [of] Taanach and its
dependencies, or the inhabitants of Dor and its dependencies, or the
inhabitants of Ibleam and its dependencies, or the inhabitants of Megiddo and
its dependencies. The Canaanites persisted in dwelling in this region. 28 And
when Israel gained the upper hand, they subjected the Canaanites to forced
labor; but they did not dispossess them. 29Nor did Ephraim dispossess the
Canaanites who inhabited Gezer; so the Canaanites dwelt in their midst at
Gezer…
All these sources mention the failure to
dispossess the Canaanites, despite the Israelites’ power to do so. No mention
is made of any extermination.[14] Joshua 24:13 does mention the expulsion of two kings but without resorting to
the sword and bow, a point reiterated in Psalm 44:5. Most remarkable is the
story in Judges 4. There it is told that God punished the Israelites by handing
them over to Yabin the king of Canaan and Sisera his general. In the divinely
commanded revolt against them, God promised to deliver them into the hands of
the Israelites not to wipe them out.
Joshua concedes in his farewell address
the failure of his policy. The most he can hope is that “The Lord your God
Himself will thrust them out on your account and drive them out to make way for
you” (Joshua 23:5). In the meantime, they are exhorted to be resolute not “to
intermingle with these nations that are left among you. Do not utter the names
of their gods or swear by them” (23:7). He them mentions the apprehension of
Deuteronomy of intermarriage: “For should you turn away and attach yourselves
to the remnant of those nations — to those that are left among you–and
intermarry with the you joining them and they joining you, know for certain
that the Lord your God will not continue to drive these nations out before you;
they shall become a snare and a trap for you” (23:12-13).
In fact, Judges 3 states that they did
intermarry: “The Israelites settled among the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites,
Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites; they took their daughters to wife and gave
their own daughters to their sons, and they worshiped their gods” (5-6).
Intermarriage was likely a factor in the absence of biblical or extra biblical
evidence for Israel’s expulsion of the Canaanites. 
The archaeological record confirms that
Israel primarily settled in previously unoccupied territory in the central
highlands rather than rebuilt towns on destroyed Canaanite cites. In Judges 2,
they are threatened with the consequences of not dispossessing them:
1 An angel of the Lord came up from
Gilgal to Bochim and said, “I brought you up from Egypt and I took you into the
land which I had promised on oath to your fathers. And I said, ‘I will never
break My covenant with you. 2 And you, for your part, must make no covenant with
the inhabitants of this land; you must tear down their altars.’ But you have
not obeyed Me—look what you have done! 3 Therefore, I have resolved not to drive
them out before you; they shall become your oppressors, and their gods shall be
a snare to you.”
The Israelites not only did not drive out the inhabitants, they concluded
treaties with them. Their expulsion by God was contingent upon Israel’s refusal
to conclude a treaty with them. Neither took place.
Even at the height of ancient Israelite
power under the reign of Solomon there was no move to do away with them only to
subject them to forced labor, as I Kings 9 (= 2 Chronicles 8:7-8) states:
20All the people that were left of the
Amorites, Hittites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites who were not of the
Israelite stock—21those of their descendants who remained in the land and whom
the Israelites were not able to annihilate—of these Solomon made a slave force,
as is still the case.[15]
Nonetheless, Uriah the Hittite not only
marries Bathsheba but also serves as a trusted officer in David’s army.
            Psalm
106 laments the total failure of the policy. According to it, everything that
Joshua warned against, they did and more. Following Deuteronomy 12:31, it also
provides the moral basis by documenting the abhorrent behavior of the
Canaanites to their own children:
34 They did not destroy the nations as
the Lord had commanded them, 35 but mingled with the nations and learned their
ways. 36 They worshiped their idols, which became a snare for them. 37 Their own
sons and daughters they sacrificed to demons. 38 They shed innocent blood, the
blood of their sons and daughters, whom they sacrificed to the idols of Canaan;
so the land was polluted with bloodguilt. 39 Thus they became defiled by their
acts, debauched through their deeds.[16]
Verses 34-35 attest to the non
implementation of the policy of Deuteronomy 20:17-18.
            Remarkably,
the Rabbis explain the non implementation through the conversion of the
nations: 
R. Samuel bar Nahman began his discourse
with the verse: “But if you will not drive out the inhabitants
of the Land before you, then shall those that remain of them be as thorns in
your eyes and as pricks in your sides” (Numbers 33:55). The Holy One reminded
Israel: I said to you, “You shall utterly destroy them: the
Hittite and the Amorite” (Deuteronomy 20:17). But you did not do so; for “Rahab
the harlot, and her father’s household, and all that she had, did Joshua save
alive” (Joshua 6:25). Behold, Jeremiah will spring from the children’s children
of Rahab the harlot and will thrust such words into you as will be thorns in
your eyes and pricks in your sides.[17]
Irony of ironies, the thorny and prickly
issue is no longer the continuity of pagan practices but the pointed prophetic
barbs from the progeny of converts.
The tendency to blunt the impact of the
seven-nations policy of Deuteronomy is also furthered by two other comments in
rabbinic literature. The first contends that Joshua sent three missives before
embarking on the conquest of the Land of Israel. The first said: “whoever wants
to leave — may leave;” the second: “whoever wants to make peace — make
peace;” and the third: “whoever wants to make war — make war.”[18] War was only conducted against those who opted for war.[19]

That war was not waged against those who did not opt for war may be supported
by the following verse in Joshua:
When all the kings of the Amorites on
the western side of the Jordan, and all the kings of the Canaanites near the
Sea, heard how the Lord had dried up the waters of the Jordan for the sake of
the Israelites until they crossed over, they lost heart, and no spirit was left
in them because of the Israelites (5:1).
No war no killing. Similarly, Joshua 9
mentions that all six nations of Cannaan mobilized for war against Israel as
opposed to the Gibeonites who made peace with them. Even though the peace was
made under false pretenses, Joshua in chapter 10 honored his “treaty to
guarantee their lives” (9:15) by rescuing them from the attack of the five
Amorite kings. The treaty here entails security arrangements in exchange for
submission.  Also in the beginning of
chapter 11 Joshua defeats those nations that had mobilized for war against him.
None of these accounts attribute their destruction to their religious
depravity, only to their initiation of attack on Israel.[20]
The other rabbinic comment rules that by
transplanting and mingling the populations he conquered, the Assyrian king
Sennacherib dissolved the national identity of the Canaanite nations in ancient
times.[21] Accordingly, Maimonides ruled that all trace of them has vanished.[22] Harav Abraham Kook, former chief rabbi, attained the same goal by limiting the
commandment to expel the Canaanites to the generation of Joshua. He writes:
If it were an absolute duty for every
Jewish king to conquer all the seven nations, how would David have refrained
from doing so? Therefore, in my humble opinion, the original duty rested only
on Joshua and his generation. Afterwards, it was only a commandment to realize
the inheritance of the land promised to the patriarchs.[23]
Moreover, non-Canaanites captured along
with a majority of Canaanites were to be spared just as Canaanites caught with
a majority of non-Canaanites were to be spared[24] reducing possibilities of any wholesale slaughter. In fact one commentator
contends that the destruction of a city is predicated upon the unanimous
opposition to submission to the Israelites for “we cannot impose a death
penalty on them (women and children) because of the sin of their fathers and
the guilt of their husbands.”[25] Finally, the Maimonidean ruling that all war must be preceded by an overture of
peace and that only the nations of Canaan that maintained their abhorrent ways
are to be doomed reduced the possibility of any war of total destruction.[26] His position is rooted in the repeated classical rabbinic comment to the verse
“Lest they lead you into doing all the abhorrent things that they have done for
their gods and you stand guilty before the Lord your God” (20:18) — “This
teaches that if they repent they are not killed.”[27] The assumption is that the Canaanites got special attention not only because of
their geography, but also because “they were enmeshed in idolatry more than all
the nations of the world.”[28]
Similarly, The Wisdom of Solomon notes that the
Israelites did not wipe out the Canaanites “at once, but judging them gradually
You gave them space for repentance” (12:10).
The best biblical example of judging
Canaanites by their behavior and not by their genes is the case of Rahab of
Jericho. Since she acknowledged the God of Israel as “the God of heaven and
earth” (Joshua 2:12) and threw her lot in with Israel, she and her household
were not only spared but were welcomed “into the midst of Israel” (Joshua
6:25). Rabbinic tradition extended this welcome to marrying Joshua and becoming
the progenitor of priests and prophets.[29] Moreover, based on the fact that “The young men . . . went in and brought out
Rahab . . . and her brethren . . . all her kindred also” (Joshua 6:23), it was
understood that her immediate relatives, and also their relatives totaling many
hundreds were also spared.[30] The other salutary example is the Canaanite Tamar who not only trumped Judah
morally (see Genesis 38:26), but, according to the genealogy at the end of the
Book of Ruth, became the progenitress of King David. The other progenitress was
Ruth the Moabite who is linked to Tamar in Ruth 4:12. That behavior or
life-style trumps genes explains the permissibility of marrying the captured
woman in Deuteronomy 21:10. Having left her previous ways she no longer
presents a temptation of apostasy. Rabbinic tradition following suit
specifically included a Canaanite as long as she had shed her idolatrous ways.[31]
In the same vein, rabbinic tradition
held that the descendants of the Canaanite general Sisera became Torah teachers
in Jerusalem,[32] and that Abraham’s servant Eliezer was removed from the category of Canaanite
due to his loyalty to Abraham,[33] indeed, deemed his peer in piety,[34] worthy of entering Paradise alive.[35]
In the light of the biblical doctrine of
repentance (“For it is not My desire that anyone shall die—declares the Lord
God. Repent, therefore, and live!” — Ezekiel 18:32), it is hard to contemplate
an alternative. Such a doctrine does not sit well with the possibility of
irredeemable evil. A lesson that Jonah had a hard time learning. According to
The Book of Jonah, even Nineveh, the capital of the empire that brought ruin on
the lost tribes of Israel and annihilated everything in its path (see Isaiah
37:11), could avert destruction by engaging in repentance. Finally, the
evidence that the issue was all along ethical and not ethnic lies in the fact
that Abraham was prevented from taking possession of the land in his day
“because the iniquity of the Amorites was not yet complete” (Genesis 15:16),
whereas his descendants were allowed to take possession because of the
“wickedness of these nations” (Deuteronomy 9:4-5).
The midrashic tradition followed the
biblical categorization of groups through a combination of ethics and
ethnicity. With regard to repentance, the Midrash pointed out that the Torah
was given in the third month whose Zodiac symbol is twins to make the point
that were Jacob’s twin Esau to repent and convert and study Torah God would
accept him.[36] In fact, God looks forward “to  the
nations of the world repenting so that He might bring them nigh beneath His
wings.”[37] Kindness is also a criterion for inclusion; its absence a criterion for
exclusion. The Cannanite Rahab is allowed in for her act of her kindness.[38] Even Egyptians, according to Deuteronomy 23:8b-9, are accepted after
three generations apparently for having initially extended kindness to Israel.[39] The case of the Moabite Ruth is exemplary. According to Deuteronomy 23:4-5,
Moabites are not allowed into the Congregation of the Lord because of their
lack of human decency and hospitality to Israel after the Exodus. In contrast,
Ruth is accepted because of her decency and kindness to her Jewish
mother-in-law.[40] Her example led to the wholesale exemption of women from the Deuteronomic
prohibition.[41]
She in fact is a latter day Tamar. Both Tamar and Ruth are erstwhile barren
foreign widows of Israelite men who insinuate themselves into the messianic
line through linking up with prominent progenitors of David through a
combination of feminine wiles and moral rectitude.
In the same vein, Eliezer’s criterion,
according to Genesis 24:14, for incorporating a woman into Abraham’s family was
precisely kindness and hospitality to strangers. In fact, the midrash lists ten
biblical women of Egyptian, Midianite, Cannanite, Moabite, and Kenite origin
whose kindness accounts for their acceptance as converts.[42] As noted, kindness qualifies one for inclusion as its absence qualifies one for
exclusion, as the Talmud says, “Anyone who has mercy on people, is presumed to
be of our father Abraham’s seed; and anyone who does not have mercy on people,
is presumed not to be of our father Abraham’s seed.”[43]  Maimonides follows suit by defining
charitableness as “the sign of the righteous person, the seed of Abraham our
Father. Indeed if someone is cruel and does not show mercy, there are grounds
to suspect his or her lineage.”[44] Obviously, Abrahamic lineage has also an ethical DNA marker. 

            In sum, there are basically
four strategies for removing the seven-nations ruling from the post-biblical
ethical agenda and vitiating it as a precedent for contemporary practice:

1. The recognition that the mandate for their extermination was a minority
position in the Bible, significantly limited to Deuteronomy 7:1-2, and was only
thought to be partially implemented in parts of the Book of Joshua.
2. The realization that since the threat was posed by their religion and ethics
a change in them brings about a change in their status.
3. The limitation of the jurisdiction of the ruling to the conditions of
ancient Canaan at the time of Joshua.
4. The application of the “Sennacherib principle” that holds that under the
Assyrian empire conquered peoples lost their national identity.

 These four stratagems of the biblical and
post-biblical exegetical tradition mitigate if not undermind the ruling
regarding the destruction of the Canaanites. In both cases, ethics end up
trumping genealogy. This understanding helps account for the absence of any
drive to exterminate or dispossess the seven nations even when Israel was at
the height of its power under the reigns of David and Solomon. 
                                                Postscript
According to John Yoder’s When War Is Unjust, holy wars differ from just
wars in the following five respects:
1. holy wars are validated by a
transcendent cause;
2. the cause is known by revelation;
3. the adversary has no rights;   
4. the criterion of last resort need not
apply;
5. it need not be “winnable.”[45]
This study illustrates how the antidotes
to 3-5 were woven into the ethical fabric of the biblical wars of destruction.
In most cases the resort to war even against the Canaanites was only pursuant
to overtures of peace or in counterattack, and even the chances of success
against Midian were weighed by the Urim and Tumim. It is therefore not
surprising that the expression “holy war” is absent not only from the Bible but
also from the subsequent Jewish ethical and military lexicon.[46]
[1] For a survey of
alternative ways of dealing with the history of the problem outside of Jewish
exegesis, see Ed Noort, “War in the Book of Joshua: History or Theology,”
Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook: Visions of Peace and Tales of
War
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), pp. 69-86, at 72-76. For an
assemblage of material on ḥerem, see P. D. Stern, The Biblical
Herem: A Window on Israel’s Religious Experience
, Brown Judaic Studies 211;
Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991.
[2] For the whole
subject of  war in the Bible, see Charles
Trimm, “Recent Research on Warfare in the Old Testament,” Currents in
Biblical Research 10 (2012), pp. 171-216.
[3] On the practice
of genocide in antiquity, see Louis Feldman, “Remember Amalek!”: Vengeance,
Zealotry, and Group Destruction in the Bible according to Philo, Pseudo-Philo,
and Josephus
, (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2004), pp. 2-6.
[4] Sources differ
on the number. For seven, see Deuteronomy 7:1, Joshua 3:10, 24:11. For six, see
Exodus 3:8, 17; 23:23, 33:2, etc. For five, see Exodus 13:5, 1 Kings 9:20, 2
Chronicles 8:7. For three, see Exodus 23:28. The most comprehensive list is
Genesis 15:19-20 with ten.
[5] The Septuagint
and PseudoJonathan have, in Exodus 33:2, the angel expelling
them.
[6] This is
apparently behind the historical recollection of Psalm 4:2.
[7] See 23:32, 33:2.
[8] See Baruch
Levine, Numbers 1-20 (AB 4a) (New York: Doubleday, 1993), p. 446f.,with
Leviticus 27:28, and Ezekiel 44:29.
[9]  R. W. L.
Moberly, “Toward an Interpretation of the Shema,” ed. Christopher Seitz and
Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Theological Exegesis: Essays in Honor of Brevard
S. Childs
(Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 124-144, at 136. For
an expansion of this metaphor thesis, see Nathan MacDonald, Deuteronomy and
the Meaning of “Monotheism
”, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 108-123.
[10] Jacob Milgrom, Numbers,
The JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,
1990), p. 429; see idem, Leviticus (AB 3) ( New York: Doubleday,
1991-2001) 3:2419. Alternatively, see Ziony Zevit, “The Search for Violence in
Israelite Culture and in the Bible,”
eds.
David Bernat and Jonathen Klawans, Religion and Violence: The Biblical
Heritage
(Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2007), pp. 16-37, at 25, and 31.
[11] Baruch Levine, Numbers
1-20
(AB 4a) (New York: Doubleday, 1993), p. 372; see Targum Jonathan,
ad loc. Similarly, the last word of Numbers 21:3 can be rendered as Hormah or
“Destruction;” see Milgrom, ibid., Numbers, pp.172, 456-48. According to
Judges1:17, Hormah was destroyed later; see Tigay, Deuteronomy, p. 348,
n. 121.
[12] See Yehezkel
Kaufmann, Sefer Yehoshua (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer,1959), pp. 146-47.
[13] See Yehezkel
Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylonian
Exile
(New York: Schocken,1960), p. 248. With regard to Judges 3:5-6, see
ibid., n. 4.
14] Judges 11:23,
Psalm 44:3, 80:8b, 2 Chronicles 20:7, Fourth Ezra 1:21, and
The Testament
of Moses 12:8 mention only dispossession.
[15] For the presence
of Canaanites in King David’s administration, see the chapter “King David’s
Scribe and High Officialdom of the United Monarchy of Israel,” in Benjamin
Mazar, The Early Biblical Period: Historical Studies, eds. Shmuel Aḥituv
and Baruch A. Levine, Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1986.
[16] The prophetic
harangue against Canaanite practices focused on their abhorrent behavior to
their children; see Isaiah 57:5; Jeremiah 
2:23; 3:24; 7:31-32; 19:5-6, 11; 32:35; Ezekiel 16:20-21; 20:25-26,
30-31; 23:36-39. According to Deuteronomy (12:31; 18:9-12) such practices
include child sacrifice. The Wisdom of Solomon
(12:5-6) extends this to slaughtering children and feasting on human flesh and
blood.
[17] Pesiqta de-Rav
Kahana

13.5, ed. Mandelbaum, 1:228f.
[18] Leviticus Rabbah 17.6; see Deuteronomy
Rabbah 5.13-14; P. T. Sheviit 6.1, 36c; and
Maimonides, “Laws of Kings and Their Wars,” 6.5. According to the midrash, the
Girgashites took up Joshua’s offer and settled in Africa. Accordingly, there is
no mention of their defeat in the conquest narratives of Joshua 6-12, albeit
they are listed in Joshua 24:11 among the seven nations handed over to Joshua.
[19] See Sifrei
Deuteronomy 200, ed. Finkelstein, p. 237, l. 10. This refers to the
thirty-one kings of Canaan whose defeat is narrated in Joshua 12
[20] See Lawson
Stone, “Ethical and Apologetic Tendencies in the Redaction of the Book of
Joshua,” CBQ 53 (1991), pp. 25-36.
[21] See M. Yadayim
4:4, T. Yadayim 2:17 (ed. Zuckermandel, p. 683), T. Qiddushin
5:4 B. T. Berakhot 28a, B. T. Yoma 54a, with Oṣar HaPosqim,
Even HaEzer 4.
[22] Mishneh Torah,
“Laws of Kings and Their Wars,” 5.4; “Laws of Prohibited Relations,” 12.25. See
idem, The Book of Commandments #187: “They
[Amalek(?) and the seven nations] were finished off and destroyed in the days
of David. Those that survived were dispersed and assimilated into the nations
so that no root of them remained.”
[23] Abraham Kook, Tov
Ro’i
(Jerusalem 5760), p. 22.
[24] See Sifrei
Deuteronomy 200, ed. Finkelstein, p. 237, with n. 10; and Joseph Babad, Minḥat
Ḥinukh
to Sefer Ha-Ḥinukh, mitzvah #527,
[25] Yaakov Zvi
Mecklenburg, HaKtav VeHaKabbalah (New
York: Om Publishing Co., 1946), p. 52a, to Deuteronomy 20:16.
[26] “Laws of Kings
and Their Wars,” 6.1,4; see Leḥem Mishnah ad loc.; and Shlomoh
Goren, Meishiv Milḥamah, 3 vols. (Jerusalem: Ha-idrah Rabbah,
1986), 3:361-366.
[27] Sifrei Deuteronomy
202, T. Sotah  8:7, B. T.
Sotah 35b with Tosafot, s.v., lerabot
[28] See Sifrei
Deuteronomy 60, ed. Finkelstein, p. 125, lines 11-12, with n. 12.
[29]See Sifrei Numbers 78, ed. Horovitz,
p. 74; Sifrei Zutta, ed. Horovitz, p. 263; Midrash Ruth
Rabbah 2.1; Pesikta DeRav Kahana 13. 5, 12,
ed. Mandelbaum, 1:228, 237; and Yalqut Shimoni, Joshua 9, Nevi’im
Rishonim
, ed. Heyman-Shiloni (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1999), p. 16f.,
n. 4f.,  along with Michael Fishbane, The
JPS Bible Commentary Haftarot
(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication
Society, 2002), p. 232, n. 11; p. 482, n. 11.
[30] See Ruth
Rabbah
2:1 and parallels.
[31] Sifrei Deuteronomy
211; see B. T. Sotah 35b and Tosafot, s.v. lerabot.
[32] B. T. Gittin
57b, B. T. Sanhedrin 96b, Midrash Psalms
1.18.  Sennacherib got a similar
comeuppance (ibid.), while the Moabite king Balak became the progenitor of
Ruth; see B. T. Sotah 47a with parallels.
[33] See Genesis
Rabbah 60.7, p. 647; and Leviticus Rabbah 17.5, p. 383.
[34] Beit HaMidrash,
ed. Jellinek, 6:79.
[35] Derekh Erets Zutta
1.18, ed. Sperber, p. 20.
[36] Pesikta DeRav
Kahana 12.20, ed. Mandelbaum, 1:218.
[37] Song Rabbah
5.16.5, and Numbers Rabbah 1.10 (middle).
[38] See Joshua 2:2
with Pesikta DeRav Kahana 13.4, ed. Mandelbaum,
1:227.
[39] See Rashi ad
loc., and Philo, On the Virtues, 106-108.
[40] See Ruth
2:11-12, 3:10. R. Zeira (Ruth Rabbah 2:14) attributes the
composition of The Book of Ruth to its acts of kindness.
[41] B. T. Yevamot
77a; See M. Yevamot 9:3; Sifrei Deuteronomy 249,
ed. Finkelstein, p. 277, and parallels.
[42] See Yalqut
Shimoni, Joshua 9, Nevi’im Rishonim, ed. Heyman-Shiloni (Jerusalem:
Mossad Harav Kook, 1999), p. 17, line 15.
[43] B. T. Beṣah
32b.
[44] Mishneh Torah, “Gifts to the
Needy,” 10:1-2.
[45] John Howard
Yoder, When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-war thinking
(Minneapolis: Ausburg Pub. House, 1984), p. 26f.
[46] This point is
even conceded by Reuven Firestone in the Preface to his book titled Holy
War in Judaism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
The biblical “wars of God” (Numbers 21:14; I Samuel 17:47, 18:17, 25:28) are
simply battles fought by the people of God. Although Maimonides (“Laws of Kings
and Their Wars,” 4:10) does take them as wars fought for God in the sense that
they are fought to promote God’s unity or to sanctify the Name, he does not
categorize them as commanded wars; see Gerald Blidstein, “Holy War in Maimonidean
Law,” in Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and
Historical Issues, ed. Joel Kraemer (The Littman Library of
Jewish Civilization, 1991), pp. 209-220, esp. 220, n. 33. Nonetheless, there is
no case in the Bible of a war for spreading the Israelite religion to
foreigners or compelling then to accept it nor is there an example of wars of
conquest being dubbed holy even when booty is dedicated to God. For the
insinuation of “holy war” into Protestant, primarily German, biblical
scholarship based on the model of the Islamic Jihad, see Ben
Ollenburger’s Introduction to Gerhard von Rad, Holy War in Ancient Israel
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 1-33;
and John Wood, Perspectives on War in the Bible (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1998), p. 16 with note. 



ArtScroll and More

ArtScroll and More
Marc B. Shapiro
In an earlier post here I discussed ArtScroll’s use of a censored talmudic text.[1] This happens quite a bit and it is not always clear if the translators were aware that they were working with an inauthentic text. However, for many passages there is no question that they realize that what they are translating is not authentic but was added because of fear of non-Jewish reaction. Here is a chart someone drew up showing how the various new Talmud editions deal with the matter of censorship.

It is significant that even in the Hebrew ArtScroll the text that is used is censored. ArtScroll has never publicly explained why they have adopted this approach, but I think it is obvious that unlike other publishers, ArtScroll is still worried about creating anti-Semitism and thus continues to print a censored Talmud. While I think everyone agrees that the ArtScroll Talmud translation is a masterpiece, opinions will obviously differ as to whether ArtScroll made a mistake in not restoring the Talmud to its pre-censorship state.[2]
ArtScroll’s approach is different than that of other publishers who are very happy that they can now include the complete uncensored words of the Talmud. Ezra Chwat’s words express the feeling of every publisher other than ArtScroll.[3]
אין צורך להדגיש את החשיבות של הנגשת הסוגיה המקורית לעשרות אלפי הלומדים את הגמרא כפי שיצא מפיהם הקדושים של האמוראים, ושלא יסתפקו ב”גירסא” שאושרה על ידי הכנסייה.
Yet R. Leopold Greenwald had the exact opposite approach, and he was upset when he heard that a new Talmud was being printed that reinserted the censored texts. His words reflect the approach later adopted by ArtScroll [4]:
ומה מאד דאבה נפשנו בראותנו, כי מכריזים גם עכשיו על “המציאה הגדולה”, כי בירושלים מדפיסים כעת תלמוד עם כל ההשמטות שהשמיטו הצנזורים במשך מאות שנים. ועל זה אנו קוראים: שקול טובתך! בני ישראל לא ישבעו עונג מהטובה הזאת, לא ספרותנו ולא חכמתנו יתעשרו מהשמטות הללו, לא בזמננו ולא בהדורות שאחרינו. כבר שבענו צרות ומכאובות. ולהיות בפי כל מחבל בודאי אסון הוא. איפוא הם חכמי ירושלים? האם אינם רואים כי מזה לא תושע יהודה וכי צוררי ישראל ישיגו חומר מסוכן חדש?
For those who are unaware of the details, let me just mention that I am not referring to a word here or there that was censored and has not been restored by ArtScroll. Sanhedrin 43a has a number of lines dealing with the execution of Jesus and his disciples. While the entire section is found in Soncino (in translation), Steinsaltz, Wagshal and Oz ve-Hadar, it is not to be found in ArtScroll. Both the English and Hebrew editions of ArtScroll tell the reader that a section has been deleted from the Vilna Shas. However, in Sanhedrin 67a, where another section has been deleted and is found in the other editions just mentioned, ArtScroll does not inform the reader of the deletion.
An allusion to the Sanhedrin 67a text is found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin, attributed to R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz. This explosive text, which remained in manuscript for almost three hundred years, has just appeared in print, edited by Pawel Maciejko.[5] Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin is very important to understanding the controversy over R. Eybeschuetz. (I hope that the manuscript Gahalei Esh, a treasure trove of documents dealing with eighteenth-century Sabbatianism, will also soon appear in a scholarly edition.) Quite apart from the radical theological notions found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin, Maciejko describes the work as follows: “[I]t is blatantly pornographic (in fact, it is possibly the only truly pornographic text ever written in the rabbinic idiom.)”[6]
Speaking of pornography let me add the following. Not long ago I was visiting a certain synagogue for Shabbat. When it came time for Torah reading I took out the chumash that was near me. It happened to be the one published by R. Aryeh Kaplan. I actually am not a fan of this chumash for use in synagogue as its focus is entirely philological, and doesn’t deal with any of the issues that a typical person would want explained in reviewing the Torah portion. But this was what I had so I used it. In Exodus 35:22 an unusual word appears: כומז. It means some sort of golden bodily ornament. The word also appears in Numbers 31:50. According to the Exodus passage, this was one of the items the Israelites in the desert donated at the time of the building of the Tabernacle. The passage is Numbers refers to booty taken from the Midianites. Among the different interpretations Kaplan offers for כומז is “a pornographic sculpture.” This is quoted in the name of R. Aaron Alrabi (fifteenth century). I was quite shocked when I saw this and later saw that this interpretation is also quoted by R. Kasher in Torah Shelemah, which must have been where Kaplan saw it.
Alrabi wrote a commentary on Rashi which was published in Constantinople in 1525. In this work, on Exodus 35:22, Alrabi writes:
יראה לי שהוא תכשיט מצוייר צורת רחם האשה כדי שישתוקק רואהו לפועל המשגל והצנועות היו מביאות אותו עליהן בחדריהם לתת תשוקה לבעליהן העין רואה והלב חומד בו, והיה זה לכונה טובה לכן הותרו לשרת בקדש
What this means is that the item in question had a picture of a woman’s private parts. The Israelite women would have their husbands look at it in order to sexually excite them before they had marital relations. Since this pornographic viewing was for a good purpose, it was permitted for these items to be donated for use in building the Tabernacle. Here is the original text.
Those who want to see the book in its entirety can view it here.
I find this explanation quite strange. I don’t know what led Alrabi to his original understanding and why he did not find any of the prior explanations compelling.
Incidentally, one of the other explanations cited by Kaplan is that כומז means a chastity belt. R. Ephraim ben Shimshon (12th-13th centuries) writes[7]:
הכומז היה כלי כמנעול שקושרת האשה פתחה שלא יודעו להם שם אדם, כי אם בעלה לבד, והוא גודר הערוה.
This is how he understands Shabbat 64a which states that כומז means דפוס של בית הרחם. Soncino translates this as “cast of the womb” and ArtScroll translates it the exact same way. Koren translates “a mold [in the shape] of the womb.” In general I would say that disagreeing with these three translations is not a smart thing to do, yet in this case I must do just that. The translations I have cited are incorrect as they do not reflect what the Talmud is saying. בית הרחם in Shabbat 64a does not mean “womb” but rather something else. In order not to cause problems for those with internet filters I won’t spell it out completely, but I think the reader already understands.[8]
Rashi, Exodus 35:22, in summarizing the Talmud leaves no doubt in this matter:
כלי זהב הוא נתון כנגד אותו מקום לאשה
The very text in Shabbat 64a also lets us know that this matter has nothing to do with a “womb”, as immediately following the explanation of דפוס של בית הרחם the Talmud explains that the wordכומז  is an acronym of כאן מקום זימה “here is the place of lewdness”, and there is no issue of lewdness with the womb. ArtScroll itself, in its note on this latter passage, explains the matter well: “The place encased by this ornament is the part of the body which is the focus of lewdness.” In other words, in its commentary ArtScroll tells us that we are not dealing with the womb at all, but with another part of a woman’s anatomy. As such, it was a mistake for ArtScroll in its translation to adopt Soncino’s rendering of כומז as “cast of the womb”.
In his commentary to Berakhot 24a s.v. תכשיטין שבפנים, Rashi explains that a כומז is a chastity belt. From the context of this talmudic passage we see that it also had ornamental significance:
כומז דפוס של בית הרחם שהיו עושין לבנותיהן ונוקבין כותלי בית הרחם כדרך שנוקבין את האזנים ותוחבין אותו כדי שלא יזדקקו להן זכרים
In its commentary, ibid., ArtScroll summarizes Rashi as follows: “The kumaz was an ornament that covered a woman’s private parts.”
Let me return to Shabbat 64a where כומז is explained as being an acronym for כאן מקום זימה. The Maharal, Gur Aryeh, Ex. 35:11, writes:
מפני שהוקשה להם לרז”ל שאין דרך לשון הקודש לקרא שם מיוחד לדברים שהם ערוה . . . כל דבר ערוה אין הכתוב נותן לו שם מיוחד . . . וכאן למה קרא כומז שם מיוחד אל הכלי הזה שהוא דפוס בית רחם, ולכך דרשו רז”ל שהוא כאן מקום זימה והשתא אין שם מיוחד לכלי זה רק כאילו נקרא כאן זימה.
I don’t understand the Maharal’s point. Just because there are no words in leshon ha-kodesh for sexual organs, why should we assume that there is no name for an item designed to cover a sexual organ?
Returning to the matter of “pornographic viewing” as described by Alrabi, I wonder if this could also have halakhic significance. I mention this only because of the controversy some years ago by an answer given by R. Shlomo Aviner that in a she’at ha-dehak (i.e., there are serious marital sexual issues) it would be permitted for a husband and wife to together view explicit pictures in a book. See here.
The entire conversation with R. Aviner was a set-up, and the anti-Aviner website used it to attack R. Aviner, and portray him as permitting viewing of pornography. Yet it is obvious that he was referring to sexual self-help books (which would have explicit pictures) since he refers to books found in Steimatzky. R. Moses Feinstein had earlier permitted a soon-to-be-married man to read sexual self-help books.[9] There is no indication in R. Feinstein’s responsum that he is also including the viewing of pictures in such books, but I do not know if he would regard this as a problem if the pictures are not of real people but are drawings.
Let us return to the subject of chastity belts. In the Wikipedia entry for “Chastity Belt” one finds the following:
Gregory the Great, Alcuin of York, Bernard of Clairvaux and Nicholas Gorranus all made passing references to ‘chastity belts’ within their exhortatory and public discourses, but meant this in a figurative or metaphorical sense within their historical context.
The first detailed actual mention of what could be interpreted as “chastity belts” in the West is in Konrad Kyeser von Eichstätt’s Bellifortis (1405), which describes the military technology of the era.
As we have seen, Rashi and R. Ephraim are not referring to chastity belts in a metaphorical sense. Thus, their mention of the item is of general historical significance, and Rashi (1040-1105) might be the earliest recorded example of someone referring to a chastity belt. Eric John Dingwall wrote an entire book on the subject of chastity belts entitled The Girdle of Chastity (Scranton, 1959). On p. 14 he writes: “There can be little doubt that the idea of such a device, at least in a somewhat modified form, was current at least as early as the second half of the twelfth century.” He then cites the late twelfth-century Guigemar Epic, written by Marie de France, as a source of this. Yet Rashi’s mention of the chastity belt predates this source by around a century.
See also here where as part of a museum exhibition on chastity belts it states:
Until the 12th century, there are no textual memories related to chastity belts at all (not even any allusions without actually using the term) where the reference is not in a theological or mythological context.
This sentence is incorrect, for as we have seen Rashi referred to chastity belts many decades before Marie de France, who is also cited in the museum exhibition as the first one to refer to the item. What we have here is a good example where scholars make judgments based exclusively on their knowledge of medieval Latin, Romance and Germanic literature. Exposure to what appears in medieval Hebrew texts would have caused them to alter these judgments.
Returning to ArtScroll, here is an example where I believe that ArtScroll has printed something that they know is incorrect, but did so in the interest of good Jewish-Gentile relations. I think it is a noteworthy example as it has nothing to do with a censored text, but focuses on the explanation of the Talmud. Avodah Zarah 6a states that according to R. Yishmael it is forbidden to do business with idolaters because of Sunday. Rashi explains that this means that one can never do business with idolaters since one cannot do business with them three days before and three days after their holiday, and this includes the entire seven-day week.
It doesn’t take much imagination to realize what the Talmud is referring to by “Sunday”, and in the uncensored text it actually has  נוצרי, נוצרים or  יום הנוצרי instead of “Sunday”. Yet ArtScroll in its translation states that the Talmud is referring to “Babylonian pagans who observe a sun-worshiping festival every Sunday.” It is true that Meiri states as much.[10] Meiri also claims that when the Talmud uses the word נוצרים it does not mean followers of ישו הנוצרי, but refers to the use of the term in Jeremiah 4:16, which Meiri claims is derived from the word נבוכדנצר.[11] While it is true that R. David Kimhi also sees the word in Jeremiah 4:16 as related to נבוכדנצר, it is Meiri alone who claims that this is also intended when the Talmud refers to נוצרים.
It is certainly appropriate that ArtScroll cited Meiri’s explanation in a note, but how is it that this is the only explanation cited, when other than Meiri everyone else has assumed, with good reason, that נוצרים refers to Christians? This can only be an example of ArtScroll shading the truth for apologetic reasons. People can debate the appropriateness of this, but there can be no doubt that ArtScroll is not being frank in its presentation here.
In the ArtScroll Hebrew edition it also quotes Meiri and states the that Talmud is not referring to Christians. Yet unlike in the English edition, in the Hebrew ArtScroll there is a note which states: “See Rambam, Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 9:4”. If you open up the Mishneh Torah what you find is that the Rambam states:
הנוצרים עובדי עבודה זרה הן ויום ראשון יום אידם הוא
In other words, by referring to the Mishneh Torah after mentioning Meiri, ArtScroll is alerting readers to the fact that the Rambam does not agree with Meiri and believes that the passage in Avodah Zarah 6a indeed refers to Christians. Yet this is never spelled out in ArtScroll, and you need to take their suggestion to consult the Mishneh Torah in order to learn that not everyone agrees that when the Talmud mentions those who make Sunday their holiday that it is referring to Babylonian pagans. (In fact, as already mentioned, only Meiri advocates this position.) Does the average person who learns daf yomi realize this?
In case anyone has any doubts as to what I am saying, please note the following. After referring to Maimonides, the note in the Hebrew ArtScroll calls attention to the Venice edition of the Talmud with Rashi, and to Dikdukei Soferim. Again, only one who examines these sources will learn that they offer an interpretation at odds with Meiri. If you look at the Venice Talmud or Dikdukei Soferim (or even Steinsaltz) you will find that in Avodah Zarah 6a Rashi explains:
נוצרי, ההולך בטעותו של אותו איש שצוה להם לעשות להם יום איד בא’ בשבת
In other words, Rashi tells us, just like Maimonides, that when the Talmud refers to those who celebrate נוצרי יום it means the Christians who follow Jesus.I find it significant that even in the Hebrew edition ArtScroll feels the need to only allude to the explanation of Rashi and Maimonides, while presenting Meiri’s explanation as the standard understanding of the text. ArtScroll certainly knows that this is not the standard understanding, and ArtScroll itself cannot believe that Meiri’s understanding is what the Talmud really means. After all, every other medieval commentator agrees with Rashi and Maimonides. In this case, the only explanation is that ArtScroll is following a long apologetic tradition, which was based on fear of what the non-Jews would say if they knew the true meaning of certain talmudic passages.

Another example of this tendency was called to my attention by R. Moshe Maimon. Ketubot 15a discusses the case of A killing B, when A actually intended to kill another person. In its discussion the Talmud refers to “Canaanites”, which in the current context simply means non-Jews. In fact, in all manuscripts and early printings what appears is not “Canaanites” but “goyim”.[12] “Canaanites” is simply a “correction” of the censor. Yet ArtScroll has a note explaining that “The Canaanites were the pagan people who lived in Eretz Yisrael before the Israelites entered the land.” The implication of this comment is that the halakhah stated in the Talmud was only applicable with the ancient Canaanites but not with regard to other non-Jews. This is false and ArtScroll knows it is false, but it is no different than the “note to reader” found in many seforim that all the halakhot about non-Jews only refer to the pagans in faraway places. In the latter case everyone knew (and knows) that these words are not to be taken seriously, but I would assume that the typical user of the ArtScroll English Talmud does not realize this. It is noteworthy that the ArtScroll Hebrew Talmud does not include the note about the Canaanites.[13]
In 1728, an era in which Jewish-Gentile relations were not the best, R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz printed Tractate Berakhot with many deletions, as this was the only way he was given permission to publish the volume. Here is the title page.
The volume can be found at hebrewbooks.org here. True to form, R. Jacob Emden accused R. Eybeschuetz of being in league with the bishop of Prague and intent only on making money from his new printing.[14] There was also a lot of controversy about this edition, not only because of the many deletions but even more so because of the instances where the talmudic text was rewritten. While non-Jewish censorship has a long history, this latter practice, of Jews agreeing to rewrite sections of the talmudic text, was a new and more dangerous phenomenon. Other tractates were later printed, but R. Eybeschuetz had nothing to do with them, and in any event the controversy focused on Berakhot as the other tractates simply printed the censored text from the earlier Basel edition, but did not add anything new.[15]
In his recent outstanding study of this episode, which makes use of manuscript sources, Pawel Maciejko writes:
In both academic scholarship and Jewish collective memory, the best-known controversies concerning Rabbi Jonathan Eibeschütz (1690-1764) are those about his kabbalistic tract Va-avo ha-yom el ha-‘ayin . . . and about the allegedly Sabbatean amulets that he distributed to the members of the communities of Metz and Altona, Hamburg, and Wandsbeck in the 1750s. However, during his early years, the most important controversy concerning Eibeschütz was not the dispute surrounding his suspected Sabbateanism and the heterodox writings attributed to him but rather the outrage engendered by his friendly relations with the local Catholic clergy and his alleged involvement in the publication of heavily censored editions of the Pentateuch, the Talmud, and the prayer book. In the eyes of many contemporaries, the damage caused by the appearance of these latter publications vastly overshadowed any harm stemming from the heretical views expressed in Eibeschütz’s kabbalistic works and amulets.[16]
Maciejko notes that R. Moses Hagiz was so outraged by R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud that he asked other rabbis to issue a ruling that it be burnt!
Shortly after the publication of R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud someone wrote a defense of it, explaining why it was necessary to print a censored Talmud.[17] Raphael Kirchheim, who published this document, cites another who states that its author was none other than R. Eybeschuetz, since the author refers to R. Abraham Broda as his teacher.[18] R. Broda had served as rosh yeshiva in Prague, and later rav of Metz and Frankfurt.
While Maciejko also accepts this view,[19] the reference to R. Broda as the author’s teacher, מורי ורבי, would appear to show that R. Eybeschuetz could not have written the letter, since he was not a student of R. Broda.
We have good information about R. Eybeschuetz’s life, but there still is a lot we don’t know. Even though R. Eybeschuetz is not recorded as R. Broda’s student in the standard biographies, one could claim that it is possible that he studied for a short time under him, and for some reason this fact was not known to the biographers.[20] Yet in this case we can indeed make the definitive statement that R. Eybeschuetz did not study with R. Broda since R. Eybeschuetz tells us this himself. Some thirty years after R. Broda’s death in 1717 his Eshel Avraham was published (Frankfurt, 1747). Here is the title page.
Among those who provided an approbation was R. Eybeschuetz, who at that time was in Metz. His respect for R. Broda is great, but he leaves no doubt that he never studied with him:
ממש רובי חכמי ישראל בדור הזה השלימי’ המה שותי מימיו ואף אני אם לא זכיתי לאורו לחזות לרבי מקמא כי בבואי לפראג שנת תע”ל כבר חמק דודי ופנה הודו לכאן ק”ק מיץ היא העיר אשר כעת אני יושב בה בתוך עמי, מ”מ נפתולי נפתלתי עם גדולי תלמידיו הרבני’ וחכמי’ מובהקים ושלימים במדע אשר נשארו שם ושמעתי’ תמיד בבי מדרשי’ בדיבוק חברי’
Returning to the document published by Kirchheim, it describes the history of the banning of the Talmud in the years before R. Eybeschuetz printed his volume. Interestingly, it tells about the confiscation of Jewish books from the Jews of Prague, which were then handed over to the Jesuits to be examined for anything against Christianity. From other sources we know that the Jesuits burnt the copies of the Talmud they confiscated, and “[i]n the 10 years from 1715 to 1725, very few copies (according to some sources, none) of the Talmud existed in Bohemia.”[21]
This need for copies of the Talmud explains why R. Eybeschuetz had to take the step he did. The document also tells of the punishment of a man from Nikolsburg who was caught smuggling Talmuds into the Prague ghetto. He was forced, in chains, to clean the streets for a year. The smuggled Talmuds were supposed to be burnt, but this was somehow prevented (probably with a good bribe).
The only way to print a Talmud in Prague was to remove everything the Jesuits viewed as offensive to Christianity. They also viewed certain aggadot as objectionable, such as the description of God wearing tefillin in Berakhot 6a, and these too had to be removed.[22] The document tells us that having the Church agree to publication of the Talmud, even with these restrictions, was regarded as a great achievement. It also tells us that all the important rabbis in Prague permitted the publication of the bowdlerized Talmud.[23]
וכאשר הגיעו לידינו רשימה אספנו להגאון מורנו ורבנו האב”ד ור”י נר”ו בצירוף כל חכמי רבינו [!] עירנו אשר ת”ל המה גדולים בחכמה ובמנין וטבעם יצא בכל ארץ לעיון במילין אם כשר ונאות לעשות כן אם לא ואחר הלנת דין פעמים ושלש ומשא ומתן עלתה הסכמה להדפיס מס’ ברכות הנודע הגהתן וסדר זרעים אשר לא יחסר בו דבר, אך ממסכת שבת והלאה לא עבר הסכמתן כי לא נודע עדיין טיב הגהות נוצרים בו אם מעט אם רב
The document then quotes a statement issued by the scholars of Prague defending their decision, a statement that was only intended to be viewed by other learned Jews. In justifying their decision to publish a censored Talmud – since this was all they were permitted and it was a censored Talmud or nothing – we find the following very interesting passage:[24]
ודאי שנכון הדבר לעשות לבלי כושל ועיכוב כלל כי ודאי שניתן הש”ס להצילו באחד מאיבריו ולא יהיה הש”ס חמור מג”ע וש”ד אשר ק”ל יהרג ואל יעבר קימו לן אם מיחדים על אחד ימסר להם ואל יהרגו וכ”ש הדבר בש”ס שבזמן שמיחדים לומר השמיטו דא מאתכם שיהא הנשאר לפליטה שישמיטו זאת ולא יצאו כולם לבית השריפה מבלי שריד באהלינו אהל תורה ובפרט כי חז”ל שיסדו התלמוד לא על זה יסדו להיותו בדפוס גלוי לכל עמים כי אם כתבוהו בכתיבה תמה ומסרו זאת לזרע אמונים להנחיל לבניהם אחריהם לחלקם ביעקב ולהפיץ בישראל.
The last sentence is making the point that there are certain things in the Talmud that should not be published for all to see, as these are the sorts of things that could create great problems with non-Jews. The Prague scholars then state that it is actually a good thing to cut out certain passages from the Talmud. In other words, they are acknowledging that even without Christian demands, it would be best in internally censor certain passages so as to prevent problems from arising. This is exactly what ArtScroll is doing today. No one is forcing them to self-censor, but they see matters as the sages of Prague who wrote (emphasis added)[25]:
וזה לערך ר’ שנה שהחל להתפשט ספרינו בדפוס לתקנות אחינו למען יהיו להם הספרים בנקל ומצוי, אמנם בדברים כאלו תקנתם קלקלתם שגורמים סכנה לכל ספריהם ומטילים איבת הנוצרים עלינו ודאי ראוים שדברים אלו יהיו חוזרים לאיתנם הראשון מבלי לחוקקם בעט ברזל ועופרת.
They are not saying that the censored matters should be forgotten about. Rather, they should be only be passed on in a non-published form (“Torah she-Ba’al Peh”) to advanced students who study the Talmud; they should not be put down in print for all to see and thus create a Christian backlash. The sages of Prague make the same point about strange Aggadot that are not to be taken literally and can only be understood by a few, and which have become subject to Christian mockery. These too should be omitted[26] להציל דברי חז”ל. When possible, the Prague sages state, one should not delete an entire passage but simply change certain words. In this way the sense of the passage is not changed for any learned person, but problematic words are removed thus helping to blunt anti-Semitic attacks:[27]
ומכ”ש לשנות הלשון במילות ושמות נרדפים באופן שלא ישתנה הענין פשיטא שמותר
The Prague sages then state that if necessary it is even permitted to alter (i.e., falsify) halakhic rulings that appear in the Talmud in order to prevent anti-Semitism (which obviously could lead to real danger). They note that R. Solomon Luria disagrees but that the accepted practice is not in accord with what he wrote, a point that was later made by R. Moses Feinstein:[28]
דעת מהרש”ל להחמיר אף במקום סכנה. אמנם מעשים בכל יום שמהפכין הדין ומשנין מדרכי השלום בהפקעת הלואה וכדומה ולא שמענו פוצה פה לעולם וכן נראה היפוכו בדברי מהר”ם רבק”ש בש”ע ח”מ סי תכ”ה ודברים המה מועתקים בספרים רבים.
It is interesting that the Prague sages quoted the famous words of R. Moses Rivkes in his commentary to Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:5, who responds to a particular anti-Gentile law as follows:
The Rabbis said this in relation to the pagans of their own times only, who worshipped stars and the constellations and did not believe in the Exodus or in creatio ex nihilo. But the people in whose shade we, the people of Israel, are exiled and amongst whom we are dispersed do in fact believe in creatio ex nihilo and in the Exodus and in the main principles of religion, and their whole aim and intent is to the Maker of heaven and earth, as the codifiers have written. .  . . So far, then from our not being forbidden to save them, we are on the contrary obliged to pray for their welfare.[29]
Some, such as Jacob Katz,[30] have seen R. Rivkes’ words as reflecting a new tolerant approach. However, the sages of Prague, who were closer to the time R. Rivkes lived, saw his words as merely designed for non-Jewish eyes and not to be taken seriously by Jews. R. Rivkes’ comment would therefore be no different than the declarations found at the beginning of many seforim that all negative statements about non-Jews are only directed towards pagans but have nothing to do with the Christians of Europe who worship God and allow the Jews to dwell among them.
Unlike what has been described by the Prague sages, Maciejko does not view the “corrections” in R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud as simply defensive. He writes:
Eibeschütz believed that there was no final, fixed, and canonized text of the Talmud. . . . Eibeschütz put himself in the shoes of the ancient sages and saw himself not as expurgating but rather as creating the text of the Talmud.[31]
Maciejko further writes:
Eibeschütz seems to have been the only early modern Jewish author who believed that the talmudic sages needed to be edited for style. For themselves, such changes were only possible thanks to the editorial freedom Eibeschütz granted himself in his “Apology and Answer of the Rabbis Prague”: Eibeschütz considered the talmudic text open and unfinished and therefore felt free to “correct” it even in instances in which he experienced no external pressure from the church or from any other powerbrokers. As for the character of these changes, one thing can be said with certainty: most of them aimed to create a neater and simpler text of the Talmud, one that avoids intricate grammatical constructions or potentially misleading expressions.[32]
It is hard for me to accept that R. Eybeschuetz could have viewed himself as “updating” the Talmud. Yet Maciejko is correct that we are confronted with the fact that R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud contains linguistic and stylistic changes that were not required by the censor. Unlike Maciejko, I would explain matters in the following way: Since the Talmud was already being published in a censored fashion, with numerous passages deleted or rewritten, R. Eybeschuetz saw no reason not to make other changes that would create a more user-friendly text. However, this has nothing to do with the talmudic text being “open and unfinished” as Maciejko puts it. It wasn’t that he was improving on the original Talmud or seeking to replace it, but since the Talmud he was publishing was already “damaged”, as it were, he did not see a problem making other changes if these changes could be of assistance to the reader. Furthermore, everyone who bought this Talmud knew that it was a she’at ha-dehak publication and that it was only to be used if one had no access to an uncensored text. I have no doubt that R. Eybeschuetz felt the exact same way, and thus I would need more evidence before accepting Maciejko’s theory.
Maciejko makes a further claim that R. Eybeschuetz’s “editing” of the Talmud hints to his secret universalist religious views that are also found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin. This is a much more provocative claim than what I discussed in the previous paragraph, and I am curious as to what other scholars will have to say about it.
In addition to being given permission to print an expurgated Talmud, the non-Jewish authorities also permitted “strange” aggadic passages to remain if a good explanation could be provided for them. In R. Eybeschuetz’s edition of Berakhot such explanations are found at the back of the volume, and the reader is alerted to them by a note on the talmudic page.[33]
Until Hebrewbooks.org put the Prague edition of Berakhot online, it was a very rare book, and Maciejko knows of only three copies in existence.[34] In 1981 Professor Shnayer Leiman republished R. Eybeschuetz’s explanations to Berakhot.[35]
To be continued

 

[1] See also Jeremy Brown’s post here and regarding Brown’s post see David Zilberberg’s earlier post here.
[2] Only in the last year or so have I started to examine the ArtScroll Talmud on a regular basis and I am continuously impressed. This has to be one of the most significant Torah publications of the twentieth century. Since that is the case, I don’t see why such effort is being put into producing the new Koren Talmud. While it sometimes has points that do not appear in ArtScroll, I don’t know why anyone would prefer it over ArtScroll. I have had a chance to use both ArtScroll and Koren in reviewing some sugyot in Berakhot with my son, and in my mind ArtScroll always comes out on top. I even found one place where Soncino is to be preferred to Koren (although generally this is not the case). In Berakhot 29a it states: “Corresponding to what were these twenty-four blessings of the Amida prayer of the fast days instituted?” Unlike Soncino, Koren provides no note to this sentence and most people who read it will have no clue what it is talking about since when they look in the siddur they will not find twenty-four blessings in the Amidah on fast days (as they will assume that the fast days referred to are Yom Kippur, Tisha be-Av, etc.). ArtScroll helpfully explains as follows: “On certain public fast days decreed in times of drought, an additional six blessings, enumerated in the Mishnah in Taanis 15a, are added to the eighteen regular blessings of the Shemoneh Esrei, for a total of twenty-four blessings.” I would only add that the proper transliteration of עשרה is esreh, not esrei.
[3] See here where Chwat also posts a page of R. Hananel from the censored Sanhedrin 43a.
[4] See his letter in Moshe Chaim Ephraim Bloch, Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgameihem (New York, 1948), p. 8. For more opposition to publishing the censored talmudic texts, see Eliezer Zvi Zweifel, Saneigor (Warsaw, 1885), pp. 265-266
[5] (Los Angeles, 2014). Regarding the Sanhedrin 67a text, see Maciejko’s English introduction, pp. xlviii-xlix.
[6] P. xix.
[7] Perush ha-Torah (Johannesburg, 1950), p. 69.
[8] David Brodsky also discusses בית הרחם as a synonym for “va–na”. See A Bride Without a Blessing (Tübingen, 2006), pp. 55, 65, 84. In Alcalay’s English-Hebrew dictionary, s.v. va–na, it gives three Hebrew definitions, one of which is .בית הרחם
[9] Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer 1, no. 102. This appears in the second to last paragraph of the responsum. The last paragraph is where R. Moshe presents his famous view that living in the Land of Israel is not an obligatory mitzvah, a mitzvah hiyuvit, but rather a mitzvah kiyumit.Here is a good time to cite an email I received from a Lakewood scholar which I think is quite insightful, and relates to the “immodest” title pages I discuss in my recent book. This scholar writes:

There is one comment that I want to make right now regarding the pictures of the topless women that appeared and then disappeared in seforim. In addition to a point that I already once made that perhaps in earlier times the breasts were associated more with breastfeeding than with romance (it certainly was associated with that as well as can be seen from the Song of Songs, but not exclusively as today; perhaps it was more like a woman’s hair which can be seen in pictures), I would like to add a stronger point regarding these pictures.

It would seem to me that before photography when it wasn’t possible to produce real live looking pictures, people would be inclined to consider drawing an ערוה. But after the advent of real photographs, one gets the feeling that he is looking at a real image of a woman. It is for this reason, perhaps, that pictures of topless women became taboo. Once photographs began to be associated with ערוה, paintings and drawings followed since they are so similar to photographs. In other words, they became guilty by association.

If there is any merit to this argument (or speculation) then one can go a step further and say that the advent of color motion pictures which is more alive caused further stringency in this area. A picture of a woman is not that “problematic”, but to watch her video is already more like “mingling without a mechitza”. Once the women are struck from the videos, it is natural that they should be expunged from the magazines as well. It is worth noting that both the laws outlawing pornography and the invention of photography coincided with one another. It would seem that it wasn’t outlawed as long as it was only in the form of a drawing, painting, or sculpture.

While it is true that earlier sources do speak of the sexual nature of breasts (see my post here note 19), I think that my correspondent has put his finger on a very important point. It would appear that breasts were more commonly associated with breastfeeding which meant that it was not problematic to show them in pictures. We even find such a portrayal on two tombstones in the old Sephardic cemetery in Altona. Here are the pictures as they appear in Michael Studemund-Halevy and Gaby Zuern, Zerstoert die Erinnerung Nicht. Der Juedische Friedhof Koenigstrasse in Hamburg (Munich, 2002), p. 109.

There are also a whole series of paintings and sculptures showing the Virgin Mary breastfeeding, obviously showing that this was not regarded as immodest in Christian circles.

The non-sexual nature of breasts also explains Shabbat 13a:

 עולא כי הוי אתי מבי רב הוה מנשק להו לאחוותיה אבי חדייהו
(Perhaps because he found this text so strange, the Hatam Sofer interpreted it allegorically: היה מנשק החכמה. See Hiddushei Hatam Sofer, ad loc.)In response to the email from the Lakewood scholar, S. commented as follows

Another point which I think needs to be brought up about nude art is just how ubiquitous it was in Europe, statues, frescoes, and title pages in books, etc., very much influenced by Classical culture, which was of utmost importance in European learning and culture. If you’re in Venice or Prague or any major city in Europe you can’t avoid seeing it. The style of title pages may have changed, as styles do, so it is not surprising that Jewish printing culture changed as well. And eventually these seforim became one, two, and three centuries old and were only seen by individuals. Nudity in art was not ubiquitous in Eretz Yisrael and America, and it is not surprising that we woke up in the 20th century in American and EY and found these things surprising. My point is that it doesn’t necessarily have to do with them seeing breasts as sexual or not (what about thighs and bare midriffs? And seforim even depicted nude women bathing in the mikveh.) It is also important to note that in the writing of many great people they refer to specific editions they used, and it is clear that they saw it and neither defaced or said anything about it. So attitudes might be a European city vs. non-European city thing as well.

In an earlier post here I dealt with this picture which appears in the Venice 1574 edition of the Mishneh Torah.

Jacob D. called my attention to Shlomo Zalman Havlin’s comment in Yeshurun 29 (2013), p. 791 n. 7. Here Havlin states that when he attended the Chevron yeshiva its library had the Venice 1574 Mishneh Torah, but the yeshiva attempted to keep this edition from students due to the “immodest” picture reproduced above. Havlin also notes that some great rabbis were involved in the publication of this edition of the Mishneh Torah, including R. Menahem Azariah of Fano and R. Moses Provencal.

[10] Meiri to Avodah Zarah p. 4.

[11] Meiri to Avodah Zarah p. 4, Ta’anit 27b (p. 97). Regarding Meiri’s claim, see Lawrence Zalcman, “Christians, Noserim, and Nebuchadnezzar’s Daughter,” JQR 81 (1991), pp. 411-426. Zalcman argues that Meiri did not just make up his interpretation for apologetic reasons, but was aware of Mandaeans who were known as natzurai and were linked to Nebuchadnezzar.
[12] See Dikdukei Soferim ha-Shalem, ad loc.
[13] The Talmud pages used by ArtScroll in its most recent printings are taken from Oz ve-Hadar’s edition (minus certain notes that appear only in the Oz ve-Hadar Talmuds). This means that ArtScroll omits the Shitah Mekubetzet, citing Meiri’s and R. Jonathan of Lunel’s tolerant comments, which appears in the standard Vilna edition, Bava Kamma 38a and 113a.
[14] Hit’avkut, p. 2a.
[15] See R. Raphael Rabbinovics, Ma’amar al Hadpasat ha-Talmud, ed. Haberman (Jerusalem, 1952), pp.112ff.; David Leib Zuenz, Gedulat Yehonatan (Petrokov, 1930), vol. 1, pp. 12ff.
[16] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit” On Rabbi Jonathan Eibeschütz and Father Franciscus Haselbauer Editing the Talmud,” Jewish Social Studies 10 (Winter 2014), pp. 147-148.
[17] The defense was published in installments in Ha-Magid, May 9, 16, 23, 30, 1877. Sections of the document appear in  Zweifel, Saneigor, pp. 264-265, and in Saul Pinchas Rabinowitz’s edition of H. Graetz, Divrei Yemei Yisrael, vol. 8, p. 464 in the note. The complete document was published in Zuenz, Gedulat Yehonatan, pp. 135ff., but he does not identify its source, leading the reader to assume that he is quoting from a manuscript.
[18] See Ha-Magid, May 9, 1877, pp. 170-171. (The reference to R. Broda as his teacher appears on p. 171.) As we shall see, R. Eybeschuetz had a great deal of respect for R. Broda. Yet R. Jacob Emden’s father, the Hakham Zvi, had a different perspective. See Yehezkel Duckesz, Ivah le-Moshav (Cracow, 1903), p. 14.
[19] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 166.
[20] S. points out an interesting source which gives an unknown, but presumably true, biographical detail of R. Eybeschuetz’s life in the spiritual autobiography of an apostate Jew named Salomon Duitsch, A Short Account of the Wonderful Conversion to Christianity of Solomon Duitsch … Extracted from the Original Published in the Dutch Language (London 1771).S. wrote to me as follows:

Prone to mystical visions and ascetic practices like fasting, he was regarded locally as a tzadik, but he eventually became convinced of Christianity. When this became known was forced to divorce his wife. After a period of wandering he ended up in Altona. He still looked Jewish and his issues were unknown there. He writes of meeting and staying the night at R. Eybeschuetz, who was very delighted to host him on account that R. Eybeschuetz was educated and taken care of as an orphan in the house of his great-grandfather in Nikolsburg. This information about a Nikolsburg period in R. Eybeschuetz’s life, and who this great-grandfather might be, is not mentioned in the biographies, and is a reminder that much information about people’s lives is not necessarily in books.

[21] Maciejko, p. 150.
[22] For details see ibid., pp. 169ff.
[23] Ha-Magid, May 16, 1874, p. 180.
[24] Ibid., May 23, p. 188.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., May 30, 1877, p. 199.
[27] Ibid. In my post here I discussed how R. Jehiel Michel Epstein engaged in self-censorship in the Arukh ha-Shulhan in order not to have problems with the non-Jewish authorities. Rabbi Shalom Baum called my attention to Arukh ha Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 480:1, for another example of this. I have underlined the words which any educated reader would understand were not to be taken seriously (since how could contemporary Jews ask God to pour out his wrath on the Babylonians who departed the historical stage over two thousand years ago?):
ואחר ששתו הכוס השלישי נוהגין לומר שפוך חמתך וגו’ ולפתוח הדלת כדי לזכור שהוא ליל שמורים ובזכות אמונה זו יבא משיח וישפוך חמתו על הבבליים שחרבו בהמק
[28] Ha-Magid, May 30, 1877, p. 199. Regarding the views of R. Luria and R. Feinstein, see my Changing the Immutable, p. 42.
[29] I have used the translation in Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), p. 165.
[30] Ibid., pp. 164ff.
[31] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 167.
[32] Ibid., pp. 173-174.
[33] I don’t know why this procedure was not required for the other tractates published in Prague.
[34] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 179
[35] Or ha-Mizrah 29 (1981), pp. 418-428. Leiman’s publication remains valuable because of his introduction and notes.



Truth be Told[1] Comments on Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro

Truth be Told[1] 
by Aryeh A. Frimer*
Comments on Changing the ImmutableHow Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro (Oxford – Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2015).
*Rabbi Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer holds the Ethel and David Resnick Chair of Active Oxygen Chemistry at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel; email: Aryeh.Frimer@biu.ac.il. He has lectured and published widely on various aspects of “Women and Halakha;” see here. His most recent paper is: “Women, Kri’at haTorah and Aliyyot (with an Addendum on Partnership Minyanim),” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 46:4 (Winter, 2013), 67-238, available online here.
            I found R. Prof. Marc Shapiro’s new book Changing the Immutable a fascinating read and very hard to put down. The first seven chapters deal with censorship of halakhic and philosophical works, while the eighth focuses on lying and misrepresentation in pesak. As we know from his previous works, Shapiro has a very fluid writing style and the subject matter is always well researched. He does his best to be honest, unbiased and complete in his presentation. He is, moreover, intrigued with exploring the limits of the traditional consensus, which makes for some captivating reading. Yet, despite all these wonderful qualities – or perhaps, because of them, I found the present volume particularly unsettling and disconcerting.
R. Jacob J Schacter’s classic article “Facing the Truths of History” had already sensitized me to the fact that publishers censor and even rewrite portions of the books they bring to press.[2] They do so because they find some of their author’s positions “unacceptable” – views which don’t fit the publishers’ or the intended reader’s “party line.” That such censorship continues unabashedly in the 21st century is disappointing, but then “there is no shame anymore.” But these are, by and large, sins of omission; somehow, with that I could live.
            But what I found particularly troubling with Changing the Immutable was the last chapter, which deals with lying in pesak. After going through the many examples Shapiro cites, the reader is left with one clear impression. One sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek, since he may well be misrepresenting something in his ruling. It could be the source and authority of the prohibition. For example, is the prohibition based on a biblical commandment (positive or negative), rabbinic edict, custom or mere public policy (slippery slope) considerations? Alternatively, the expressed reason may not be the real grounds for the prohibition. In addition, the application may be much broader than halakhically permitted. To my mind these are shocking revelations: these are not sins of omission but commission; the perpetrators are scholars and religious leaders; and these deviations constitute intellectual dishonesty at its worst.
Our author is not insensitive to this dissonance. In an attempt to explain how these scholars justify not being fully honest in pesak, Shapiro writes in the last two pages of the book (pp. 284-285) about “redefining truth.” He indicates that these decisors see nothing wrong in what they are doing, since their ultimate goal is the “higher good”. As they see it, they have ultimately prevented their respective communities and congregants from sinning and deviating from the proper path of shemirat mitsvot. The fact that these scholars have bent the truth, and distorted Jewish law in the process, is of lesser importance. The ends in these cases, justify the means.
It is with these jarring observations that the book comes to an abrupt end, without any further comment or soul-searching. This is despite the fact that on page 239ff, Shapiro brings one citation from Hazal after another about the centrality of truth, and the seriousness of the sin of lying. After all, the Torah itself commands us: “mi-Devar sheker tirhak” – “From untruthfulness, distance thyself” (Exodus 23:7). If what the author writes in the last chapter is true, then Hazal’s eloquent statements about the importance of honesty have become nothing but a mockery. It raises serious moral questions with insufficient and unsatisfying answers. How are we now supposed to educate our children and talmidim as to the cardinal nature of truth and truthfulness?! How are we to live with such a clash between theory and practice?
In the course of our own study of Women’s Tefilla Groups, my brother R. Prof. Dov Frimer and I researched misrepresentation in pesak in the context of women’s issues.[3] Many leading Rabbis were deeply and justifiably concerned that some of the feminist practices introduced were ultimately “bad for the Jews” on public policy grounds.[4] But instead of saying so clearly, some rabbis adduced reasons that were not halakhically sound. Our own research has led us to the clear conclusion that the vast majority of the gedolim do not condone this type of misrepresentation or that discussed in the last chapter of Changing the Immutable. Giving an erroneous ruling – despite one’s good intentions, or even misstating the reason or source for a prohibition, violates the prohibition “mi-Devar sheker tirhak“, if not a variety of other issurim.
We begin our discussion of this issue with the famous Pesak Din (halakhic ruling) promulgated by a conference of rabbis who met in Michalowce Hungary in 1865. This edict initially signed by twenty-five leading rabbinic figures and subsequently by many more, ruled that nine practices (including, inter alia, synagogue choirs, sermons in the vernacular, synagogues weddings, absence of a central bima, canonical robes for the Hazan) were halakhically forbidden. Leading rabbis Moses Schick and Esriel Hildesheimer and many of their colleagues refused to sign. The fundamental claim of Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer was that, contrary to the impression given by the Pesak Din, the only grounds for some of the edicts were public policy (mi-gdar milta) – not halakhic – considerations.[5] The term “Pesak Din” (legal ruling) was in fact a conscious misnomer, an attempt to hide the truth, and, hence, a flagrant deviation from Jewish law with which they could take no part. R. Schick also argued that, since the Pesak Din was promulgated by a Jewish court, it violated bal tosif, adding a mitsva to the Torah.[6]
Similarly, R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes[7] argues that it is forbidden to call a rabbinic edict a biblical prohibition because it violates not only bal tosif but also mi-devar sheker tirhak. Similarly, R. Chayim Hirschensohn[8] charges those rabbis who forbid women to become involved in politics with violating both bal tosif and lying. R. Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk[9], maintains that both Ra’avad and Rambam agree that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” forbids a posek from claiming that a rabbinic injunction is biblical. R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky,[10] refuting the suggestion that it is forbidden to take part in elections in the secular State of Israel, writes: “…And your Honor should know that even to be zealous, it is forbidden to teach Torah not according to the halakha (Avot V:8), and that which is not true will not succeed at all.” R. Haim David Halevi[11] prohibits a posek from misrepresenting halakha and/or giving an erroneous reason for a prohibition for two basic reasons: (1) the biblical prohibition of “mi-devar sheker tirhak” and (2) a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority would result should the truth become known (see more below). [See also the related opinions of Rabbis Ehrenberg, Rogeler and Sobel cited below.]
As Prof. Shapiro documents in Changing the Immutable, some posekim dissent. They argued, on various grounds, that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” is not applicable to cases where halakha is misrepresented so as to prevent future violations of Jewish law. Other scholars argue that the dispensation to modify the truth in order to maintain peace (me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalomYevamot 65b) also applies to misrepresenting halakha in order to maintain peace between kelal Yisrael and the Almighty. Yet others maintain that if a posek believes an action should be prohibited because of mi-gdar milta, he may misrepresent the reason for or source of a prohibition; since there will be no change in the legal outcome, mi-devar sheker tirhak does not apply.[12] Finally, some have argued that mi-devar sheker tirhak only refers to lying in court.[13]
But these arguments have been seriously and vigorously challenged. Thus, R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg[14] demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose (ve-afilu li-devar mitsva). Similarly, R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin[15] chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble. R. Ovadiah Yosef[16] discusses at length whether a judge, maintaining a minority position on a three judge panel, can lie and say “I do not know what to rule,” – so that two more judges will be added to the panel and his minority opinion will have a chance to become the majority view; he concludes that it is forbidden. R. Solomon Sobel[17] explicitly states that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom only allows one to change the facts, not the halakha. Both R. Jacob Ettlinger and R. Reuben Margaliot[18] maintain that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom allows one only to obfuscate by using language which can be understood in different ways, but not to lie; hence, misrepresenting halakhic reasons or sources would also be forbidden.
Also unmentioned is the long list of posekim (including the Radba”z)[19] who maintain that even if one is theoretically permitted to misrepresent Halakha, under certain unique circumstances – one is nevertheless forbidden to do so in practice. This is because “the truth will out.”   Not only will this revelation ultimately lead to a terrible hillul Hashem, but it will undermine peoples’ trust in the rabbinic establishment. In this regard R. Benjamin Lau has observed:[20]
The rabbi is expected to know and present the various aspects of each issue and not to conceal those aspects that are inconsistent with his own point of view. If a rabbi is untrue to the sources and reaches his decision without taking account of conflicting views, he will be seen to be untrustworthy. And a lack of trust between a rabbi and his community of questioners will drive a wedge between that community and the Torah overall. Stating the truth, of course, does not require the decisor to remain neutral; his role requires him to reach a decision one way or the other. But the decision must be reached through disclosure, not concealment, of the alternatives….. Now, when everyone has access to the [Bar Ilan] Responsa Project data base and Google provides answers to all imaginable questions, everyone can check every responsum and examine its trustworthiness. A rabbi who rules in an oversimplified way, whether strictly or leniently, in a area of halakhic complexity will be caught as untrustworthy.
Having lived through the crises and confrontations of women’s prayer groups, women on religious councils, women in communal leadership roles and women’s aliyyot – I can testify that there is great need for both in-depth knowledge and truthfulness. The “hillul Hashem and loss of trust” argument is not just hype – but painfully all too accurate! Many of the rabbis in the 1970s lost control of the religious leadership of their communities because they were unprepared or unwilling to deal with the challenges honestly and head on. Many rabbis simply tried to stonewall the situation, while others were not forthright about the real reason for forbidding such practices. As previously noted, the Rabbis may well have been correct that many of the feminist practices introduced were halakhically unsound or “bad for the Jews” on a variety of public policy grounds.[21] But instead of saying so clearly (as Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt”l had urged and himself practiced), some rabbis waffled, while others prevaricated. But the halakhic truth quickly became known – a consequence of the “information age.” And as a result, many balebatim lost trust in the religious leadership as a whole. For them the conclusion was simply: “Everything boils down to politics.” 
            It is, therefore, critically important to reiterate that the cases cited by our author, exemplify neither pesak in general, nor the consensus view of the posekim. It is forbidden to misrepresent in halakhic rulings as a matter of law and policy.  In essence, then, Prof Shapiro’s scholarly and well-documented book presents the reader with a most fascinating review of an approach within halakhic decision making, which has been rejected by mainstream pesak. Indeed, such cases need to be actively addressed if they are to be uprooted.
Response by Marc B. Shapiro
I understand why Professor Frimer is troubled by what I wrote, and to a large extent my conclusions diverge from his own. All I would say is that the matter is complex, and rather than attempt to simplify matters, as I feel Frimer has done, we must attempt to understand how the same Sages who spoke about the importance of truth could at times countenance departure from it. This is a challenge that requires sensitivity and nuance, and appreciation of changing times and values. When Frimer sees a text that permits false attribution, he sees prevarication and hypocrisy. But a historically attuned outlook would seek to understand rather than condemn. Ironically, it is Frimer who is judging the Sages and decisors, because if their ideas do not conform to his understanding then these ideas are regarded by him as problematic.
Thus, Frimer cites the famous 1865 pesak din of Michalowce and tells us that R. Moses Schick and R. Esriel Hildesheimer opposed it since they saw it as departing from the truth. While their position is certainly significant, what about the fact that among Hungarian rabbis they were a minority, and most of the leading Hungarian rabbis supported the pesak? How is my argument refuted by citing Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer if they were opposed by most of their colleagues? Doesn’t the fact that most of the Hungarian rabbis opposed Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer support my position? 
As for the various rabbinic opinions cited by Frimer, I don’t deny that these opinions exist, and in my book I refer to Frimer’s famous article on women’s prayer groups in which he cites these opinions. But I also make the point that there is an alternative tradition which allows much more leeway for authorities to at times diverge from the truth. I also believe, contrary to Frimer, that this is a mainstream position. Since this position is held by R. Ovadiah Yosef and R. Hayyim Kanievsky, I don’t see how it is possible for one to state that it is not a mainstream position.
The point of the chapter, however, was not to advocate for one position or the other, but to focus on the alternative tradition, the existence of which is more or less suppressed today. I was explicit that my aim was to show how far some were willing to go in sanctioning deviations from the truth, and I indicate that there are views in opposition to these. However, my intent was to study the views of those with a “liberal” perspective on the importance of truth. It is this tradition that I wished to explore, and to rescue it, as it were, from the well-intentioned apologetics. I never state that this is the only authentic position. On the contrary, one can find the opposite perspective presented in numerous articles. This is why I thought it was important to present alternative views, from the Talmud until the present, views which I think show that there is a rabbinic conception of the Noble Lie.
I also must dispute the following statement by Frimer: “R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose.” How can Frimer state that R. Ehrenberg “demonstrates” such a thing? What R. Ehrenberg does is present an argument, and everyone can evaluate its cogency. The fact is that numerous authorities do not accept R. Ehrenberg’s position, which means that they would not agree that he has proven his case.
To Frimer, and others like him who have the same reaction after reading chapter 7, I can only say that modern views of how to understand texts, and what we today regard as truth, cannot be used as a measure with which to judge people who lived in a very different time and had a very different understanding of these sorts of matters. It is their understanding that I seek to explore, rather than foisting my own value judgments upon them. Unlike Frimer, who is involved in halakhic writing and attempting to influence the community in religious matters, I write from a more “objective” perspective, without such concerns. As such, while Frimer wishes to “uproot” what he regards as unacceptable views of certain poskim. I seek to understand the phenomenon and to describe it.
When, on p. 284, I speak about redefining truth, I am not speaking about poskim per se but about how to understand the entire phenomenon that I have documented in the book. The question is how does the importance of truth coexist with what we have seen, and it is in this context that I discuss how truth need not be seen as equivalent to factual or historical truth.
I agree with Frimer that none of the great poskim supported lying in pesak as a normative option on a regular basis. Yet as I have already indicated,  I believe that there is a tradition that allows for not being frank at certain times, when it is thought that other values are at stake. In the book I state that we should understand this position in a sympathetic fashion even if it is at odds with how today we generally approach matters.
Frimer asks how are we supposed to educate our children and students as to the importance of truth and truthfulness if what I say is correct. This is a good question with which educators need to struggle, but it is not a refutation of what I have written. If my position is correct, the world will not collapse. It will just be one more Torah matter, alongside Amalek, yefat toar, slavery, homosexuality, etc., that at certain times is not in line with contemporary values.
Here are some more comments relevant to the issue of truth.
1. Amichai Markowitz called my attention to a talmudic text that I overlooked. Nedarim 23b states: “The Tanna has intentionally obscured the law, in order that vows should not be lightly treated.” This relates to the issue of the truth not being made available to all. See also Kovetz Iggerot Hazon Ish, vol. 2, no. 78, that one should not reveal to the masses that the Sages forbade things that the Torah permitted.[22]
2. R. Joseph Ibn Caspi writes that at times it is appropriate for members of the intellectual elite to lie.[23] This explains how Joseph lied to his brothers when he accused them of being spies (Gen. 42:9). In support of this view Ibn Caspi cites both Maimonides and Aristotle.[24] The mention of Maimonides no doubt refers to the latter’s notion of “necessary beliefs”, but it is not clear where Ibn Caspi got his quote from Aristotle, since as far as I can determine Aristotle says no such thing.[25]
3. R. Abraham Arbel writes as follows[26]:
ואם מצא לנכון המגדל עז לשבח חכם כהרמב”ם שלא שקר והיה אמיתי, משמע דפשיטא ליה שגם אצל חכם בדרגתו אפשר למצוא שישקר משום כבודו.
R. Arbel also adds the following passage which I am sure will be very troubling to Frimer (as Frimer rejects the notion that “one sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek”). R. Arbel’s words should be understood in line with the many sources I cite in the last chapter of my book.
וע”ע טהרת ישראל (סי’ קפה אות סו) בדין אשה שאמרה שהחכם טהר לה הכתם ועתה מכחיש אותה החכם לומר שלא שאלה אותו, דחישינן שהחכם רואה עתה שטעה שטהר, ובוש לומר שטעה, ולכן משקר עתה לומר שלא שאלה אותו. וכ”כ בהפלאה (קונ’ אחרון סי קטו סק”א( שהחכם לא נאמן להכחיש אשה, שאומרת שהחכם טהר, כשהכתם לפנינו והוא טמא, שהרי הוא נוגע בדבר שהרי טעה.
4. R. Ovadiah Yosef stated that if X tells you something he wrote, you can tell others that you read it in X’s book, and this is not considered a lie.[27]
5. In Changing the Immutable, p. 253, I cite a passage from Devarim Rabbah which states that for the sake of peace, even “Scripture itself” recorded something false. I should have also cited Midrash Tanhuma 96:7, which is even more striking, attributing the falsehood directly to God (as opposed to merely speaking of “Scripture”):
ארשב”ג גדול הוא השלום שהכתיב [שכתב] הקב”ה דברים בתורה שלא היו אלא בשביל השלום.
6. Let me offer another example of censorship in halakhic matters, the sort of thing that Frimer claims must be battled against and “uprooted” for the sake of Torah truth.[28] Here is page 141 from R. Yitzhak Zilberstein’s and R. Moshe Rothschild’s Torat ha-Yoledet.

The matter dealt with is whether a husband can be in the delivery room. The authors quote the opinion that if there is a need the husband can be in the room. In note 2, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah II, no. 75, is quoted as follows:
הנה אם יש צורך, איני רואה איסור. אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .
However, if you look at the actual text of Iggerot Moshe, what he says is something different.
הנה אם יש צורך איני רואה איסור ואף בלא צורך איני רואה איסור, אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .
I have underlined the words that are deleted by Torat ha-Yoledet. This deletion allows them to present R. Moshe Feinstein as saying that only if there is a need for the husband to be in the room can be there. Yet R. Moshe explicitly states that even if there is no “need”, he can still remain with his wife.

I know that there are some who are thinking that I am making a big deal out of nothing, and that it must have been an accident that the words were deleted as that no one would dare to purposely alter what R. Moshe wrote. I am sorry to say that this is not the case. Here are two pages from R. Pesach Eliyahu Falk’s Levushah shel Torah.[29]

From it we see that someone asked R. Zilberstein about the words that were deleted, and R. Zilberstein did not say that they were deleted in error. On the contrary, he tells the questioner that the words were deleted on purpose, after consultation with “gedolei ha-poskim”. In other words, these poskim disagreed with R. Moshe and therefore instructed R. Zilberstein that when he quoted Iggerot Moshe he should censor R. Moshe’s words so that people should not learn the extent of R. Moshe’s lenient view. After all that I have written in my book, I don’t think people will be surprised by this. Frimer, however, who has assured us that this sort of thing is not “mainstream”, and indeed is “forbidden”, will have to explain how it is that a respected posek like R. Zilberstein, acting on the instruction of other great poskim, could adopt such an approach, an approach which stands as a refutation of Frimer’s point.
As I have said already, I am not claiming that this sort of distortion is an everyday phenomenon. But I do claim that many poskim believe that they have the authority to alter the truth when they think that this is necessary. We can’t pretend that the texts I have cited don’t exist.
7. In his post Frimer writes: “R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin  chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble.” I don’t think the word “chastises” is appropriate in this case. R. Elijah disagrees with the other rabbi, but the disagreement is not strident. For example, R. Elijah writes as follows in Yad Eliyahu, no. 62:
ע”ד אשר האריך רום מעלתו בלשונו בשפת אמת להעמיד שפת שקר במקומי אני עומד שאינו כדאי להיות רגיל בכך ואף שמותר בו מאיזה טעם שיהיה.
8. In the next issue of Masorah le-Yosef my article on “necessary beliefs” will appear. In this article I discuss how Maimonides and other figures say things that do not reflect their true opinion, but are merely “necessary beliefs”, i.e., “beliefs” that the masses should accept but which are not really true at all. If these authorities think that the masses can be fed false ideas when it comes to theology, why should halakhah be any different?

9. See R. Mordechai Eliasburg, Shevil ha-Zahav (Warsaw, 1897), p. 27-28, who claims that both Nahmanides and R. Jacob Emden recorded things in their writings that they did not really believe.

10. R. Chaim Sunitzky called my attention to R. Israel Weltz, Divrei Yisrael, vol. 3, no. 170, who doesn’t see such a problem with false stories if they lead people in a good direction.

.אין זה נורא כ”כ בספורי מעשיות כאלה כשהכוונה היא לטובה ללמוד ממנה מוסר ודרכי הי”ת
And now for some comic relief. A few weeks ago Ezra Glinter reviewed my book for the Forward. See here.
He used this opportunity to take some hits at the haredi world, focusing on matters that are not mentioned in the book. Rabbi Avi Shafran, who is paid to respond to this sort of thing, penned his own piece for the Forward available here.
The comedy starts in the first two paragraphs which read:
Psst! I’ve got a secret to share. It’s from deep inside the Orthodox Jewish world. Come closer… Okay, here it is: Orthodoxy changes!
It’s not much of a secret, actually. At least in these here parts. But it seems to be an unfamiliar concept for Marc Shapiro, a University of Scranton professor and author of the recent book, “Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History.”
It is obvious that Shafran has never even looked at my book and is only basing his comments on what appears in Glinter’s review. Those who have read the book know that a major theme of it is precisely how Orthodoxy changes. In fact, there is no one in the world today whose scholarship is more associated with the thesis that Orthodoxy changes than me. Much of the criticism of me is on precisely this point, that I have exaggerated the amount of change. Yet here Shafran comes and says that I am ignorant about how Orthodoxy changes. This is what I mean by comic relief.
Shafran then writes:
If a biography of Bertrand Russell can choose to elide the great philosopher’s serial marital infidelities and not be accused of rewriting the past, a hagiography of a great rabbi should certainly be permitted to overlook judgments he made with the best of intentions that in retrospect might seem misguided to some today. Such acts of civility are at times portrayed as scandalous by Shapiro and his reviewer.
A biography of Russel that chooses to omit his marital infidelities would indeed be rightly accused of rewriting the past. As for the second part of the sentence, I agree that a hagiography can leave out material of the sort Shafran mentions, but that is because it is a hagiography! If it intended to be a biography, then no, it cannot overlook mistaken judgments made by the subject, or else it ceases to be biography. I also do not think that it is an act of civility to refrain from writing about such mistaken judgments (as for example, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg’s early misjudgment of the Nazi regime).
Shafran provides a few examples of how practice in Orthodoxy has changed, none of which I disagree with. But then again, my book has nothing to do with this. He writes:
One opinion in the Talmud, for example, permits fowl and milk to be cooked together and eaten. Just try ordering milk-braised chicken in your local kosher eatery these days; they’ll sic the mashgiach on you in a Borough Park moment. Men using mirrors was once forbidden as a “womanly” act, a once-true assessment that, for most Orthodox men today, is no longer considered applicable.
Let us say that a new edition of the Talmud was published that deleted the lines that tell us that one opinion permitted fowl and milk to be cooked and eaten together? Would Shafran be OK with this? I assume not, and it is thus unfortunate that he doesn’t know that it is precisely this sort of censorship that my book is focused on. What we have here is not only criticism without having read the book, but criticism without having any clue as to what the book is about. 
And then, to top off the comic relief, Shafran ends his piece as follows:

“Why is that so hard for Orthodoxy’s critics to understand?”

I have been called some different things in my life, but this is the first time I have been referred to as one of “Orthodoxy’s critics”.

Let me also add that Changing the Immutable has sold very well in the haredi world, and this is not surprising since it is not an anti-haredi book at all.

[1] AAF would like to thank Dov I. Frimer, Shael I. Frimer, David A. Kessler and Joel B. Wolowelsky for their insightful comments and suggestions on previous drafts.
[2] R. Jacob J. Schacter, “Facing the Truths of History,” Torah u-Madda Journal, 8 [1998-1999]: pp. 200-273.
[3] Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women’s Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 – Theory,” Tradition, 32:2 (Winter 1998), pp. 5-118. PDF available online
here. See in particular Addendum, part 6.
[4] See our discussion in Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Section E therein.
[5] R. Moses Schick in Likutei Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, R. Israel Stern, ed. (London, 1965), sec. 82, pp. 73-75; Meir Hildesheimer, “She’eilot u-Teshuvot Maharam Schick,” Tsefunot, 2:2(6) (Tevet 5750), pp. 87-95, at p. 93; Yona Emanuel, “Me’a Shana lePetirat haRav Azriel Hildesheimer Zatsal,” haMa’ayn, XXXIX, 4 (Tammuz 5759), pp. 1-7, “Al Kinus haRabbanim be-Mikhalovitch” pp. 2-4; Michael K. Silber, “The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Invention of a Tradition,” In The Uses of Tradition, Jack Wertheimer, ed. (New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1992), p. 23-84; Mordechai Eliav, “Mekomo shel Rav Azriel Hildesheimer be-Ma’avak al Demutah shel Yahadutr Hungariah,” Zion 27 (1962), 59-86; Nethanel Katzburg, “Pesak Din shel Michalovitch 5726,” in Perakim be-Toldot ha-Hevrah ha-Yehudit be-Yemei ha-Beinayim u-be-Et ha-Hadashah, Emanuel Etkes and Yosef Salmon, eds. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1980), 273-286; Jacob Katz, The Unhealed Breach: The Secession of Orthodox Jewry from the General Community in Hungary and Germany (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1994 – see especially Chapter 8.
[6] See Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Addendum, part 5.
[7]  R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Darkei Hora’asiman 6, first footnote,
[8]  R. Chayim Hirschensohn Resp. Malki baKodesh, II, sec. 4, p. 13.
[9] Cited in R. Zvi [Hershel] Schachter, Nefesh haRav (Jerusalem: Reishit Yerushalayyim, 1994), p.178.
[10] R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky, Keraina deIggarta, letter 203, pp. 219-220.
[11] Responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 and published in RespMayyim Hayyim, III, sec. 55.
[12] R. Chaim Kanievsky, Masekhet Kutim, 1:14, Me-taher, note 30, and conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer (February 20, 1995),
[13] R. Zelig Epstein, in a conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Noach Dear (March 8, 1996). R. Jerucham Fishel Perlau, Commentary to Rav Sa’adia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvot, I, p. 156b.
[14] R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg, Resp. Devar Yehoshua, I, addendum to sec. 19, no. 6 (see also V, Y.D. sec 12). See also R. Nahum Yavruv, Niv Sefatayyim (Jerusalem, 1989) Niv Sefatayyim, kelal 1; R. Eliezer Judah Waldenberg, Resp. Tsits Eliezer 15:12:2.
[15] R. Elijah Rogeler, Resp. Yad Eliyahu, sec. 61 and 62
[16] R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, II, H.M., sec. 3
[17] R. Solomon Sobel, Salma Hadasha, Mahadura Tinyana, Haftarat Toledot; cited in R. Jacob Yehizkiyah Fisch, Titen Emet leYa’akov (Jerusalem, 1982), sec. 5, no. 36.
[18] R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh leNer, Yevamot 65b, s.v. she-Ne’emar avikha tsiva” and “Ko tomeru leYosef,” and R. Reuben Margaliot, Kunteres Hasdei Olam, sec. 1061, at the end of his edition of Sefer Hasidim (Mossad haRav Kook: Jerusalem, 5724). See also R. Moses David Maccabbi Leventhal, “Shinui beDevar haShalom,” Zohar, 3 (Spring 5760), pp. 49-64.
[19] R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Resp. Benei Vanim, I, sec. 37, no. 12, argues that such misrepresentation most often results in gossip, hate, unlawful leniencies in other areas, hillul Hashem, and a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority should the truth become known. (This despite the fact that R. Y.H. Henkin maintains that when a posek upgrades a prohibition for a just cause, there is no prohibition of either bal Tosif or lying). Similar views are expressed by Resp. Torah liShma, sec. 371; R. Moses Jehiel Weiss, Beit Yehezkel, p. 77; R. Abraham Isaac haKohen Kook, Orah Mishpat, no. 111 (pp. 117-120) and 112 (pp. 120-129); R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, Teshuvot Ivra, sec. 52, no. 3 (in Kitvei haGri Henkin, II); R. Haim David Halevi, responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 – published in Resp. Mayyim Hayyim, III, sec.55; and R. David Feinstein, conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, March 19, 1995. See also the commentary of Radbaz to M.T., Melakhim 6:3, where even normally permitted lying is forbidden lest it result in hillul Hashem should the truth be discovered. Similarly, in discussing Sanhedrin 29a and the cause of Adam and Eve’s sin, R. Hanokh Zundel, Eits Yosefad loc., s.v. Ma,” comments that one must be particularly careful how a stringency and its rationale are formulated, for if no distinction is drawn between a stringency and the original ordinance, any error found in the stringency may lead the masses to believe that there is an error in the original ordinance itself.
[20] R. Benjamin Lau, “The Challenge of Halakhic Innovation,” Meorot 8 Tishrei 5771, pp 43-57 at pp. 45-46, available online here.
[21] See our discussion in Section E of Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3.
[22] It could be that the Hazon Ish would not be opposed if this information was revealed in a responsible way. I say this since his language is
והבא להכריז בין המון העם כי חכמים גזרו עלינו דברים שהתורה לא אסרתן כונתו ידועה . . . והתוצאות ידועות
(Emphasis added) This might mean that it is only objectionable if someone makes a big deal out of the fact that a certain prohibition is only rabbinic
[23] Mishneh Kesef (Cracow, 1906), vol. 2, to Gen 42:12 (pp. 93-94).
[24] His quote of Aristotle is: נכון לגדול הנפש שיכזכ בהיות זה הכרחי
[25] See Jane S. Zembaty, “Aristotle on Lying,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993), pp. 7-29.
[26] Ahoti Kalah (Jerusalem, 2007), p. 149.
[27] Eliyahu Sheetrit, Rabbenu (Jerusalem, 2014), p. 266.
[28] This example, and also R. Falk’s Levushah shel Torah, were called to my attention by R. Yonason Rosman.
[29] (Jerusalem, 2007), vol. 2, pp. 783-784.