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ArtScroll and More

ArtScroll and More
Marc B. Shapiro
In an earlier post here I discussed ArtScroll’s use of a censored talmudic text.[1] This happens quite a bit and it is not always clear if the translators were aware that they were working with an inauthentic text. However, for many passages there is no question that they realize that what they are translating is not authentic but was added because of fear of non-Jewish reaction. Here is a chart someone drew up showing how the various new Talmud editions deal with the matter of censorship.

It is significant that even in the Hebrew ArtScroll the text that is used is censored. ArtScroll has never publicly explained why they have adopted this approach, but I think it is obvious that unlike other publishers, ArtScroll is still worried about creating anti-Semitism and thus continues to print a censored Talmud. While I think everyone agrees that the ArtScroll Talmud translation is a masterpiece, opinions will obviously differ as to whether ArtScroll made a mistake in not restoring the Talmud to its pre-censorship state.[2]
ArtScroll’s approach is different than that of other publishers who are very happy that they can now include the complete uncensored words of the Talmud. Ezra Chwat’s words express the feeling of every publisher other than ArtScroll.[3]
אין צורך להדגיש את החשיבות של הנגשת הסוגיה המקורית לעשרות אלפי הלומדים את הגמרא כפי שיצא מפיהם הקדושים של האמוראים, ושלא יסתפקו ב”גירסא” שאושרה על ידי הכנסייה.
Yet R. Leopold Greenwald had the exact opposite approach, and he was upset when he heard that a new Talmud was being printed that reinserted the censored texts. His words reflect the approach later adopted by ArtScroll [4]:
ומה מאד דאבה נפשנו בראותנו, כי מכריזים גם עכשיו על “המציאה הגדולה”, כי בירושלים מדפיסים כעת תלמוד עם כל ההשמטות שהשמיטו הצנזורים במשך מאות שנים. ועל זה אנו קוראים: שקול טובתך! בני ישראל לא ישבעו עונג מהטובה הזאת, לא ספרותנו ולא חכמתנו יתעשרו מהשמטות הללו, לא בזמננו ולא בהדורות שאחרינו. כבר שבענו צרות ומכאובות. ולהיות בפי כל מחבל בודאי אסון הוא. איפוא הם חכמי ירושלים? האם אינם רואים כי מזה לא תושע יהודה וכי צוררי ישראל ישיגו חומר מסוכן חדש?
For those who are unaware of the details, let me just mention that I am not referring to a word here or there that was censored and has not been restored by ArtScroll. Sanhedrin 43a has a number of lines dealing with the execution of Jesus and his disciples. While the entire section is found in Soncino (in translation), Steinsaltz, Wagshal and Oz ve-Hadar, it is not to be found in ArtScroll. Both the English and Hebrew editions of ArtScroll tell the reader that a section has been deleted from the Vilna Shas. However, in Sanhedrin 67a, where another section has been deleted and is found in the other editions just mentioned, ArtScroll does not inform the reader of the deletion.
An allusion to the Sanhedrin 67a text is found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin, attributed to R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz. This explosive text, which remained in manuscript for almost three hundred years, has just appeared in print, edited by Pawel Maciejko.[5] Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin is very important to understanding the controversy over R. Eybeschuetz. (I hope that the manuscript Gahalei Esh, a treasure trove of documents dealing with eighteenth-century Sabbatianism, will also soon appear in a scholarly edition.) Quite apart from the radical theological notions found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin, Maciejko describes the work as follows: “[I]t is blatantly pornographic (in fact, it is possibly the only truly pornographic text ever written in the rabbinic idiom.)”[6]
Speaking of pornography let me add the following. Not long ago I was visiting a certain synagogue for Shabbat. When it came time for Torah reading I took out the chumash that was near me. It happened to be the one published by R. Aryeh Kaplan. I actually am not a fan of this chumash for use in synagogue as its focus is entirely philological, and doesn’t deal with any of the issues that a typical person would want explained in reviewing the Torah portion. But this was what I had so I used it. In Exodus 35:22 an unusual word appears: כומז. It means some sort of golden bodily ornament. The word also appears in Numbers 31:50. According to the Exodus passage, this was one of the items the Israelites in the desert donated at the time of the building of the Tabernacle. The passage is Numbers refers to booty taken from the Midianites. Among the different interpretations Kaplan offers for כומז is “a pornographic sculpture.” This is quoted in the name of R. Aaron Alrabi (fifteenth century). I was quite shocked when I saw this and later saw that this interpretation is also quoted by R. Kasher in Torah Shelemah, which must have been where Kaplan saw it.
Alrabi wrote a commentary on Rashi which was published in Constantinople in 1525. In this work, on Exodus 35:22, Alrabi writes:
יראה לי שהוא תכשיט מצוייר צורת רחם האשה כדי שישתוקק רואהו לפועל המשגל והצנועות היו מביאות אותו עליהן בחדריהם לתת תשוקה לבעליהן העין רואה והלב חומד בו, והיה זה לכונה טובה לכן הותרו לשרת בקדש
What this means is that the item in question had a picture of a woman’s private parts. The Israelite women would have their husbands look at it in order to sexually excite them before they had marital relations. Since this pornographic viewing was for a good purpose, it was permitted for these items to be donated for use in building the Tabernacle. Here is the original text.
Those who want to see the book in its entirety can view it here.
I find this explanation quite strange. I don’t know what led Alrabi to his original understanding and why he did not find any of the prior explanations compelling.
Incidentally, one of the other explanations cited by Kaplan is that כומז means a chastity belt. R. Ephraim ben Shimshon (12th-13th centuries) writes[7]:
הכומז היה כלי כמנעול שקושרת האשה פתחה שלא יודעו להם שם אדם, כי אם בעלה לבד, והוא גודר הערוה.
This is how he understands Shabbat 64a which states that כומז means דפוס של בית הרחם. Soncino translates this as “cast of the womb” and ArtScroll translates it the exact same way. Koren translates “a mold [in the shape] of the womb.” In general I would say that disagreeing with these three translations is not a smart thing to do, yet in this case I must do just that. The translations I have cited are incorrect as they do not reflect what the Talmud is saying. בית הרחם in Shabbat 64a does not mean “womb” but rather something else. In order not to cause problems for those with internet filters I won’t spell it out completely, but I think the reader already understands.[8]
Rashi, Exodus 35:22, in summarizing the Talmud leaves no doubt in this matter:
כלי זהב הוא נתון כנגד אותו מקום לאשה
The very text in Shabbat 64a also lets us know that this matter has nothing to do with a “womb”, as immediately following the explanation of דפוס של בית הרחם the Talmud explains that the wordכומז  is an acronym of כאן מקום זימה “here is the place of lewdness”, and there is no issue of lewdness with the womb. ArtScroll itself, in its note on this latter passage, explains the matter well: “The place encased by this ornament is the part of the body which is the focus of lewdness.” In other words, in its commentary ArtScroll tells us that we are not dealing with the womb at all, but with another part of a woman’s anatomy. As such, it was a mistake for ArtScroll in its translation to adopt Soncino’s rendering of כומז as “cast of the womb”.
In his commentary to Berakhot 24a s.v. תכשיטין שבפנים, Rashi explains that a כומז is a chastity belt. From the context of this talmudic passage we see that it also had ornamental significance:
כומז דפוס של בית הרחם שהיו עושין לבנותיהן ונוקבין כותלי בית הרחם כדרך שנוקבין את האזנים ותוחבין אותו כדי שלא יזדקקו להן זכרים
In its commentary, ibid., ArtScroll summarizes Rashi as follows: “The kumaz was an ornament that covered a woman’s private parts.”
Let me return to Shabbat 64a where כומז is explained as being an acronym for כאן מקום זימה. The Maharal, Gur Aryeh, Ex. 35:11, writes:
מפני שהוקשה להם לרז”ל שאין דרך לשון הקודש לקרא שם מיוחד לדברים שהם ערוה . . . כל דבר ערוה אין הכתוב נותן לו שם מיוחד . . . וכאן למה קרא כומז שם מיוחד אל הכלי הזה שהוא דפוס בית רחם, ולכך דרשו רז”ל שהוא כאן מקום זימה והשתא אין שם מיוחד לכלי זה רק כאילו נקרא כאן זימה.
I don’t understand the Maharal’s point. Just because there are no words in leshon ha-kodesh for sexual organs, why should we assume that there is no name for an item designed to cover a sexual organ?
Returning to the matter of “pornographic viewing” as described by Alrabi, I wonder if this could also have halakhic significance. I mention this only because of the controversy some years ago by an answer given by R. Shlomo Aviner that in a she’at ha-dehak (i.e., there are serious marital sexual issues) it would be permitted for a husband and wife to together view explicit pictures in a book. See here.
The entire conversation with R. Aviner was a set-up, and the anti-Aviner website used it to attack R. Aviner, and portray him as permitting viewing of pornography. Yet it is obvious that he was referring to sexual self-help books (which would have explicit pictures) since he refers to books found in Steimatzky. R. Moses Feinstein had earlier permitted a soon-to-be-married man to read sexual self-help books.[9] There is no indication in R. Feinstein’s responsum that he is also including the viewing of pictures in such books, but I do not know if he would regard this as a problem if the pictures are not of real people but are drawings.
Let us return to the subject of chastity belts. In the Wikipedia entry for “Chastity Belt” one finds the following:
Gregory the Great, Alcuin of York, Bernard of Clairvaux and Nicholas Gorranus all made passing references to ‘chastity belts’ within their exhortatory and public discourses, but meant this in a figurative or metaphorical sense within their historical context.
The first detailed actual mention of what could be interpreted as “chastity belts” in the West is in Konrad Kyeser von Eichstätt’s Bellifortis (1405), which describes the military technology of the era.
As we have seen, Rashi and R. Ephraim are not referring to chastity belts in a metaphorical sense. Thus, their mention of the item is of general historical significance, and Rashi (1040-1105) might be the earliest recorded example of someone referring to a chastity belt. Eric John Dingwall wrote an entire book on the subject of chastity belts entitled The Girdle of Chastity (Scranton, 1959). On p. 14 he writes: “There can be little doubt that the idea of such a device, at least in a somewhat modified form, was current at least as early as the second half of the twelfth century.” He then cites the late twelfth-century Guigemar Epic, written by Marie de France, as a source of this. Yet Rashi’s mention of the chastity belt predates this source by around a century.
See also here where as part of a museum exhibition on chastity belts it states:
Until the 12th century, there are no textual memories related to chastity belts at all (not even any allusions without actually using the term) where the reference is not in a theological or mythological context.
This sentence is incorrect, for as we have seen Rashi referred to chastity belts many decades before Marie de France, who is also cited in the museum exhibition as the first one to refer to the item. What we have here is a good example where scholars make judgments based exclusively on their knowledge of medieval Latin, Romance and Germanic literature. Exposure to what appears in medieval Hebrew texts would have caused them to alter these judgments.
Returning to ArtScroll, here is an example where I believe that ArtScroll has printed something that they know is incorrect, but did so in the interest of good Jewish-Gentile relations. I think it is a noteworthy example as it has nothing to do with a censored text, but focuses on the explanation of the Talmud. Avodah Zarah 6a states that according to R. Yishmael it is forbidden to do business with idolaters because of Sunday. Rashi explains that this means that one can never do business with idolaters since one cannot do business with them three days before and three days after their holiday, and this includes the entire seven-day week.
It doesn’t take much imagination to realize what the Talmud is referring to by “Sunday”, and in the uncensored text it actually has  נוצרי, נוצרים or  יום הנוצרי instead of “Sunday”. Yet ArtScroll in its translation states that the Talmud is referring to “Babylonian pagans who observe a sun-worshiping festival every Sunday.” It is true that Meiri states as much.[10] Meiri also claims that when the Talmud uses the word נוצרים it does not mean followers of ישו הנוצרי, but refers to the use of the term in Jeremiah 4:16, which Meiri claims is derived from the word נבוכדנצר.[11] While it is true that R. David Kimhi also sees the word in Jeremiah 4:16 as related to נבוכדנצר, it is Meiri alone who claims that this is also intended when the Talmud refers to נוצרים.
It is certainly appropriate that ArtScroll cited Meiri’s explanation in a note, but how is it that this is the only explanation cited, when other than Meiri everyone else has assumed, with good reason, that נוצרים refers to Christians? This can only be an example of ArtScroll shading the truth for apologetic reasons. People can debate the appropriateness of this, but there can be no doubt that ArtScroll is not being frank in its presentation here.
In the ArtScroll Hebrew edition it also quotes Meiri and states the that Talmud is not referring to Christians. Yet unlike in the English edition, in the Hebrew ArtScroll there is a note which states: “See Rambam, Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 9:4”. If you open up the Mishneh Torah what you find is that the Rambam states:
הנוצרים עובדי עבודה זרה הן ויום ראשון יום אידם הוא
In other words, by referring to the Mishneh Torah after mentioning Meiri, ArtScroll is alerting readers to the fact that the Rambam does not agree with Meiri and believes that the passage in Avodah Zarah 6a indeed refers to Christians. Yet this is never spelled out in ArtScroll, and you need to take their suggestion to consult the Mishneh Torah in order to learn that not everyone agrees that when the Talmud mentions those who make Sunday their holiday that it is referring to Babylonian pagans. (In fact, as already mentioned, only Meiri advocates this position.) Does the average person who learns daf yomi realize this?
In case anyone has any doubts as to what I am saying, please note the following. After referring to Maimonides, the note in the Hebrew ArtScroll calls attention to the Venice edition of the Talmud with Rashi, and to Dikdukei Soferim. Again, only one who examines these sources will learn that they offer an interpretation at odds with Meiri. If you look at the Venice Talmud or Dikdukei Soferim (or even Steinsaltz) you will find that in Avodah Zarah 6a Rashi explains:
נוצרי, ההולך בטעותו של אותו איש שצוה להם לעשות להם יום איד בא’ בשבת
In other words, Rashi tells us, just like Maimonides, that when the Talmud refers to those who celebrate נוצרי יום it means the Christians who follow Jesus.I find it significant that even in the Hebrew edition ArtScroll feels the need to only allude to the explanation of Rashi and Maimonides, while presenting Meiri’s explanation as the standard understanding of the text. ArtScroll certainly knows that this is not the standard understanding, and ArtScroll itself cannot believe that Meiri’s understanding is what the Talmud really means. After all, every other medieval commentator agrees with Rashi and Maimonides. In this case, the only explanation is that ArtScroll is following a long apologetic tradition, which was based on fear of what the non-Jews would say if they knew the true meaning of certain talmudic passages.

Another example of this tendency was called to my attention by R. Moshe Maimon. Ketubot 15a discusses the case of A killing B, when A actually intended to kill another person. In its discussion the Talmud refers to “Canaanites”, which in the current context simply means non-Jews. In fact, in all manuscripts and early printings what appears is not “Canaanites” but “goyim”.[12] “Canaanites” is simply a “correction” of the censor. Yet ArtScroll has a note explaining that “The Canaanites were the pagan people who lived in Eretz Yisrael before the Israelites entered the land.” The implication of this comment is that the halakhah stated in the Talmud was only applicable with the ancient Canaanites but not with regard to other non-Jews. This is false and ArtScroll knows it is false, but it is no different than the “note to reader” found in many seforim that all the halakhot about non-Jews only refer to the pagans in faraway places. In the latter case everyone knew (and knows) that these words are not to be taken seriously, but I would assume that the typical user of the ArtScroll English Talmud does not realize this. It is noteworthy that the ArtScroll Hebrew Talmud does not include the note about the Canaanites.[13]
In 1728, an era in which Jewish-Gentile relations were not the best, R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz printed Tractate Berakhot with many deletions, as this was the only way he was given permission to publish the volume. Here is the title page.
The volume can be found at hebrewbooks.org here. True to form, R. Jacob Emden accused R. Eybeschuetz of being in league with the bishop of Prague and intent only on making money from his new printing.[14] There was also a lot of controversy about this edition, not only because of the many deletions but even more so because of the instances where the talmudic text was rewritten. While non-Jewish censorship has a long history, this latter practice, of Jews agreeing to rewrite sections of the talmudic text, was a new and more dangerous phenomenon. Other tractates were later printed, but R. Eybeschuetz had nothing to do with them, and in any event the controversy focused on Berakhot as the other tractates simply printed the censored text from the earlier Basel edition, but did not add anything new.[15]
In his recent outstanding study of this episode, which makes use of manuscript sources, Pawel Maciejko writes:
In both academic scholarship and Jewish collective memory, the best-known controversies concerning Rabbi Jonathan Eibeschütz (1690-1764) are those about his kabbalistic tract Va-avo ha-yom el ha-‘ayin . . . and about the allegedly Sabbatean amulets that he distributed to the members of the communities of Metz and Altona, Hamburg, and Wandsbeck in the 1750s. However, during his early years, the most important controversy concerning Eibeschütz was not the dispute surrounding his suspected Sabbateanism and the heterodox writings attributed to him but rather the outrage engendered by his friendly relations with the local Catholic clergy and his alleged involvement in the publication of heavily censored editions of the Pentateuch, the Talmud, and the prayer book. In the eyes of many contemporaries, the damage caused by the appearance of these latter publications vastly overshadowed any harm stemming from the heretical views expressed in Eibeschütz’s kabbalistic works and amulets.[16]
Maciejko notes that R. Moses Hagiz was so outraged by R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud that he asked other rabbis to issue a ruling that it be burnt!
Shortly after the publication of R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud someone wrote a defense of it, explaining why it was necessary to print a censored Talmud.[17] Raphael Kirchheim, who published this document, cites another who states that its author was none other than R. Eybeschuetz, since the author refers to R. Abraham Broda as his teacher.[18] R. Broda had served as rosh yeshiva in Prague, and later rav of Metz and Frankfurt.
While Maciejko also accepts this view,[19] the reference to R. Broda as the author’s teacher, מורי ורבי, would appear to show that R. Eybeschuetz could not have written the letter, since he was not a student of R. Broda.
We have good information about R. Eybeschuetz’s life, but there still is a lot we don’t know. Even though R. Eybeschuetz is not recorded as R. Broda’s student in the standard biographies, one could claim that it is possible that he studied for a short time under him, and for some reason this fact was not known to the biographers.[20] Yet in this case we can indeed make the definitive statement that R. Eybeschuetz did not study with R. Broda since R. Eybeschuetz tells us this himself. Some thirty years after R. Broda’s death in 1717 his Eshel Avraham was published (Frankfurt, 1747). Here is the title page.
Among those who provided an approbation was R. Eybeschuetz, who at that time was in Metz. His respect for R. Broda is great, but he leaves no doubt that he never studied with him:
ממש רובי חכמי ישראל בדור הזה השלימי’ המה שותי מימיו ואף אני אם לא זכיתי לאורו לחזות לרבי מקמא כי בבואי לפראג שנת תע”ל כבר חמק דודי ופנה הודו לכאן ק”ק מיץ היא העיר אשר כעת אני יושב בה בתוך עמי, מ”מ נפתולי נפתלתי עם גדולי תלמידיו הרבני’ וחכמי’ מובהקים ושלימים במדע אשר נשארו שם ושמעתי’ תמיד בבי מדרשי’ בדיבוק חברי’
Returning to the document published by Kirchheim, it describes the history of the banning of the Talmud in the years before R. Eybeschuetz printed his volume. Interestingly, it tells about the confiscation of Jewish books from the Jews of Prague, which were then handed over to the Jesuits to be examined for anything against Christianity. From other sources we know that the Jesuits burnt the copies of the Talmud they confiscated, and “[i]n the 10 years from 1715 to 1725, very few copies (according to some sources, none) of the Talmud existed in Bohemia.”[21]
This need for copies of the Talmud explains why R. Eybeschuetz had to take the step he did. The document also tells of the punishment of a man from Nikolsburg who was caught smuggling Talmuds into the Prague ghetto. He was forced, in chains, to clean the streets for a year. The smuggled Talmuds were supposed to be burnt, but this was somehow prevented (probably with a good bribe).
The only way to print a Talmud in Prague was to remove everything the Jesuits viewed as offensive to Christianity. They also viewed certain aggadot as objectionable, such as the description of God wearing tefillin in Berakhot 6a, and these too had to be removed.[22] The document tells us that having the Church agree to publication of the Talmud, even with these restrictions, was regarded as a great achievement. It also tells us that all the important rabbis in Prague permitted the publication of the bowdlerized Talmud.[23]
וכאשר הגיעו לידינו רשימה אספנו להגאון מורנו ורבנו האב”ד ור”י נר”ו בצירוף כל חכמי רבינו [!] עירנו אשר ת”ל המה גדולים בחכמה ובמנין וטבעם יצא בכל ארץ לעיון במילין אם כשר ונאות לעשות כן אם לא ואחר הלנת דין פעמים ושלש ומשא ומתן עלתה הסכמה להדפיס מס’ ברכות הנודע הגהתן וסדר זרעים אשר לא יחסר בו דבר, אך ממסכת שבת והלאה לא עבר הסכמתן כי לא נודע עדיין טיב הגהות נוצרים בו אם מעט אם רב
The document then quotes a statement issued by the scholars of Prague defending their decision, a statement that was only intended to be viewed by other learned Jews. In justifying their decision to publish a censored Talmud – since this was all they were permitted and it was a censored Talmud or nothing – we find the following very interesting passage:[24]
ודאי שנכון הדבר לעשות לבלי כושל ועיכוב כלל כי ודאי שניתן הש”ס להצילו באחד מאיבריו ולא יהיה הש”ס חמור מג”ע וש”ד אשר ק”ל יהרג ואל יעבר קימו לן אם מיחדים על אחד ימסר להם ואל יהרגו וכ”ש הדבר בש”ס שבזמן שמיחדים לומר השמיטו דא מאתכם שיהא הנשאר לפליטה שישמיטו זאת ולא יצאו כולם לבית השריפה מבלי שריד באהלינו אהל תורה ובפרט כי חז”ל שיסדו התלמוד לא על זה יסדו להיותו בדפוס גלוי לכל עמים כי אם כתבוהו בכתיבה תמה ומסרו זאת לזרע אמונים להנחיל לבניהם אחריהם לחלקם ביעקב ולהפיץ בישראל.
The last sentence is making the point that there are certain things in the Talmud that should not be published for all to see, as these are the sorts of things that could create great problems with non-Jews. The Prague scholars then state that it is actually a good thing to cut out certain passages from the Talmud. In other words, they are acknowledging that even without Christian demands, it would be best in internally censor certain passages so as to prevent problems from arising. This is exactly what ArtScroll is doing today. No one is forcing them to self-censor, but they see matters as the sages of Prague who wrote (emphasis added)[25]:
וזה לערך ר’ שנה שהחל להתפשט ספרינו בדפוס לתקנות אחינו למען יהיו להם הספרים בנקל ומצוי, אמנם בדברים כאלו תקנתם קלקלתם שגורמים סכנה לכל ספריהם ומטילים איבת הנוצרים עלינו ודאי ראוים שדברים אלו יהיו חוזרים לאיתנם הראשון מבלי לחוקקם בעט ברזל ועופרת.
They are not saying that the censored matters should be forgotten about. Rather, they should be only be passed on in a non-published form (“Torah she-Ba’al Peh”) to advanced students who study the Talmud; they should not be put down in print for all to see and thus create a Christian backlash. The sages of Prague make the same point about strange Aggadot that are not to be taken literally and can only be understood by a few, and which have become subject to Christian mockery. These too should be omitted[26] להציל דברי חז”ל. When possible, the Prague sages state, one should not delete an entire passage but simply change certain words. In this way the sense of the passage is not changed for any learned person, but problematic words are removed thus helping to blunt anti-Semitic attacks:[27]
ומכ”ש לשנות הלשון במילות ושמות נרדפים באופן שלא ישתנה הענין פשיטא שמותר
The Prague sages then state that if necessary it is even permitted to alter (i.e., falsify) halakhic rulings that appear in the Talmud in order to prevent anti-Semitism (which obviously could lead to real danger). They note that R. Solomon Luria disagrees but that the accepted practice is not in accord with what he wrote, a point that was later made by R. Moses Feinstein:[28]
דעת מהרש”ל להחמיר אף במקום סכנה. אמנם מעשים בכל יום שמהפכין הדין ומשנין מדרכי השלום בהפקעת הלואה וכדומה ולא שמענו פוצה פה לעולם וכן נראה היפוכו בדברי מהר”ם רבק”ש בש”ע ח”מ סי תכ”ה ודברים המה מועתקים בספרים רבים.
It is interesting that the Prague sages quoted the famous words of R. Moses Rivkes in his commentary to Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:5, who responds to a particular anti-Gentile law as follows:
The Rabbis said this in relation to the pagans of their own times only, who worshipped stars and the constellations and did not believe in the Exodus or in creatio ex nihilo. But the people in whose shade we, the people of Israel, are exiled and amongst whom we are dispersed do in fact believe in creatio ex nihilo and in the Exodus and in the main principles of religion, and their whole aim and intent is to the Maker of heaven and earth, as the codifiers have written. .  . . So far, then from our not being forbidden to save them, we are on the contrary obliged to pray for their welfare.[29]
Some, such as Jacob Katz,[30] have seen R. Rivkes’ words as reflecting a new tolerant approach. However, the sages of Prague, who were closer to the time R. Rivkes lived, saw his words as merely designed for non-Jewish eyes and not to be taken seriously by Jews. R. Rivkes’ comment would therefore be no different than the declarations found at the beginning of many seforim that all negative statements about non-Jews are only directed towards pagans but have nothing to do with the Christians of Europe who worship God and allow the Jews to dwell among them.
Unlike what has been described by the Prague sages, Maciejko does not view the “corrections” in R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud as simply defensive. He writes:
Eibeschütz believed that there was no final, fixed, and canonized text of the Talmud. . . . Eibeschütz put himself in the shoes of the ancient sages and saw himself not as expurgating but rather as creating the text of the Talmud.[31]
Maciejko further writes:
Eibeschütz seems to have been the only early modern Jewish author who believed that the talmudic sages needed to be edited for style. For themselves, such changes were only possible thanks to the editorial freedom Eibeschütz granted himself in his “Apology and Answer of the Rabbis Prague”: Eibeschütz considered the talmudic text open and unfinished and therefore felt free to “correct” it even in instances in which he experienced no external pressure from the church or from any other powerbrokers. As for the character of these changes, one thing can be said with certainty: most of them aimed to create a neater and simpler text of the Talmud, one that avoids intricate grammatical constructions or potentially misleading expressions.[32]
It is hard for me to accept that R. Eybeschuetz could have viewed himself as “updating” the Talmud. Yet Maciejko is correct that we are confronted with the fact that R. Eybeschuetz’s Talmud contains linguistic and stylistic changes that were not required by the censor. Unlike Maciejko, I would explain matters in the following way: Since the Talmud was already being published in a censored fashion, with numerous passages deleted or rewritten, R. Eybeschuetz saw no reason not to make other changes that would create a more user-friendly text. However, this has nothing to do with the talmudic text being “open and unfinished” as Maciejko puts it. It wasn’t that he was improving on the original Talmud or seeking to replace it, but since the Talmud he was publishing was already “damaged”, as it were, he did not see a problem making other changes if these changes could be of assistance to the reader. Furthermore, everyone who bought this Talmud knew that it was a she’at ha-dehak publication and that it was only to be used if one had no access to an uncensored text. I have no doubt that R. Eybeschuetz felt the exact same way, and thus I would need more evidence before accepting Maciejko’s theory.
Maciejko makes a further claim that R. Eybeschuetz’s “editing” of the Talmud hints to his secret universalist religious views that are also found in Va-Avo ha-Yom el ha-Ayin. This is a much more provocative claim than what I discussed in the previous paragraph, and I am curious as to what other scholars will have to say about it.
In addition to being given permission to print an expurgated Talmud, the non-Jewish authorities also permitted “strange” aggadic passages to remain if a good explanation could be provided for them. In R. Eybeschuetz’s edition of Berakhot such explanations are found at the back of the volume, and the reader is alerted to them by a note on the talmudic page.[33]
Until Hebrewbooks.org put the Prague edition of Berakhot online, it was a very rare book, and Maciejko knows of only three copies in existence.[34] In 1981 Professor Shnayer Leiman republished R. Eybeschuetz’s explanations to Berakhot.[35]
To be continued

 

[1] See also Jeremy Brown’s post here and regarding Brown’s post see David Zilberberg’s earlier post here.
[2] Only in the last year or so have I started to examine the ArtScroll Talmud on a regular basis and I am continuously impressed. This has to be one of the most significant Torah publications of the twentieth century. Since that is the case, I don’t see why such effort is being put into producing the new Koren Talmud. While it sometimes has points that do not appear in ArtScroll, I don’t know why anyone would prefer it over ArtScroll. I have had a chance to use both ArtScroll and Koren in reviewing some sugyot in Berakhot with my son, and in my mind ArtScroll always comes out on top. I even found one place where Soncino is to be preferred to Koren (although generally this is not the case). In Berakhot 29a it states: “Corresponding to what were these twenty-four blessings of the Amida prayer of the fast days instituted?” Unlike Soncino, Koren provides no note to this sentence and most people who read it will have no clue what it is talking about since when they look in the siddur they will not find twenty-four blessings in the Amidah on fast days (as they will assume that the fast days referred to are Yom Kippur, Tisha be-Av, etc.). ArtScroll helpfully explains as follows: “On certain public fast days decreed in times of drought, an additional six blessings, enumerated in the Mishnah in Taanis 15a, are added to the eighteen regular blessings of the Shemoneh Esrei, for a total of twenty-four blessings.” I would only add that the proper transliteration of עשרה is esreh, not esrei.
[3] See here where Chwat also posts a page of R. Hananel from the censored Sanhedrin 43a.
[4] See his letter in Moshe Chaim Ephraim Bloch, Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgameihem (New York, 1948), p. 8. For more opposition to publishing the censored talmudic texts, see Eliezer Zvi Zweifel, Saneigor (Warsaw, 1885), pp. 265-266
[5] (Los Angeles, 2014). Regarding the Sanhedrin 67a text, see Maciejko’s English introduction, pp. xlviii-xlix.
[6] P. xix.
[7] Perush ha-Torah (Johannesburg, 1950), p. 69.
[8] David Brodsky also discusses בית הרחם as a synonym for “va–na”. See A Bride Without a Blessing (Tübingen, 2006), pp. 55, 65, 84. In Alcalay’s English-Hebrew dictionary, s.v. va–na, it gives three Hebrew definitions, one of which is .בית הרחם
[9] Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer 1, no. 102. This appears in the second to last paragraph of the responsum. The last paragraph is where R. Moshe presents his famous view that living in the Land of Israel is not an obligatory mitzvah, a mitzvah hiyuvit, but rather a mitzvah kiyumit.Here is a good time to cite an email I received from a Lakewood scholar which I think is quite insightful, and relates to the “immodest” title pages I discuss in my recent book. This scholar writes:

There is one comment that I want to make right now regarding the pictures of the topless women that appeared and then disappeared in seforim. In addition to a point that I already once made that perhaps in earlier times the breasts were associated more with breastfeeding than with romance (it certainly was associated with that as well as can be seen from the Song of Songs, but not exclusively as today; perhaps it was more like a woman’s hair which can be seen in pictures), I would like to add a stronger point regarding these pictures.

It would seem to me that before photography when it wasn’t possible to produce real live looking pictures, people would be inclined to consider drawing an ערוה. But after the advent of real photographs, one gets the feeling that he is looking at a real image of a woman. It is for this reason, perhaps, that pictures of topless women became taboo. Once photographs began to be associated with ערוה, paintings and drawings followed since they are so similar to photographs. In other words, they became guilty by association.

If there is any merit to this argument (or speculation) then one can go a step further and say that the advent of color motion pictures which is more alive caused further stringency in this area. A picture of a woman is not that “problematic”, but to watch her video is already more like “mingling without a mechitza”. Once the women are struck from the videos, it is natural that they should be expunged from the magazines as well. It is worth noting that both the laws outlawing pornography and the invention of photography coincided with one another. It would seem that it wasn’t outlawed as long as it was only in the form of a drawing, painting, or sculpture.

While it is true that earlier sources do speak of the sexual nature of breasts (see my post here note 19), I think that my correspondent has put his finger on a very important point. It would appear that breasts were more commonly associated with breastfeeding which meant that it was not problematic to show them in pictures. We even find such a portrayal on two tombstones in the old Sephardic cemetery in Altona. Here are the pictures as they appear in Michael Studemund-Halevy and Gaby Zuern, Zerstoert die Erinnerung Nicht. Der Juedische Friedhof Koenigstrasse in Hamburg (Munich, 2002), p. 109.

There are also a whole series of paintings and sculptures showing the Virgin Mary breastfeeding, obviously showing that this was not regarded as immodest in Christian circles.

The non-sexual nature of breasts also explains Shabbat 13a:

 עולא כי הוי אתי מבי רב הוה מנשק להו לאחוותיה אבי חדייהו
(Perhaps because he found this text so strange, the Hatam Sofer interpreted it allegorically: היה מנשק החכמה. See Hiddushei Hatam Sofer, ad loc.)In response to the email from the Lakewood scholar, S. commented as follows

Another point which I think needs to be brought up about nude art is just how ubiquitous it was in Europe, statues, frescoes, and title pages in books, etc., very much influenced by Classical culture, which was of utmost importance in European learning and culture. If you’re in Venice or Prague or any major city in Europe you can’t avoid seeing it. The style of title pages may have changed, as styles do, so it is not surprising that Jewish printing culture changed as well. And eventually these seforim became one, two, and three centuries old and were only seen by individuals. Nudity in art was not ubiquitous in Eretz Yisrael and America, and it is not surprising that we woke up in the 20th century in American and EY and found these things surprising. My point is that it doesn’t necessarily have to do with them seeing breasts as sexual or not (what about thighs and bare midriffs? And seforim even depicted nude women bathing in the mikveh.) It is also important to note that in the writing of many great people they refer to specific editions they used, and it is clear that they saw it and neither defaced or said anything about it. So attitudes might be a European city vs. non-European city thing as well.

In an earlier post here I dealt with this picture which appears in the Venice 1574 edition of the Mishneh Torah.

Jacob D. called my attention to Shlomo Zalman Havlin’s comment in Yeshurun 29 (2013), p. 791 n. 7. Here Havlin states that when he attended the Chevron yeshiva its library had the Venice 1574 Mishneh Torah, but the yeshiva attempted to keep this edition from students due to the “immodest” picture reproduced above. Havlin also notes that some great rabbis were involved in the publication of this edition of the Mishneh Torah, including R. Menahem Azariah of Fano and R. Moses Provencal.

[10] Meiri to Avodah Zarah p. 4.

[11] Meiri to Avodah Zarah p. 4, Ta’anit 27b (p. 97). Regarding Meiri’s claim, see Lawrence Zalcman, “Christians, Noserim, and Nebuchadnezzar’s Daughter,” JQR 81 (1991), pp. 411-426. Zalcman argues that Meiri did not just make up his interpretation for apologetic reasons, but was aware of Mandaeans who were known as natzurai and were linked to Nebuchadnezzar.
[12] See Dikdukei Soferim ha-Shalem, ad loc.
[13] The Talmud pages used by ArtScroll in its most recent printings are taken from Oz ve-Hadar’s edition (minus certain notes that appear only in the Oz ve-Hadar Talmuds). This means that ArtScroll omits the Shitah Mekubetzet, citing Meiri’s and R. Jonathan of Lunel’s tolerant comments, which appears in the standard Vilna edition, Bava Kamma 38a and 113a.
[14] Hit’avkut, p. 2a.
[15] See R. Raphael Rabbinovics, Ma’amar al Hadpasat ha-Talmud, ed. Haberman (Jerusalem, 1952), pp.112ff.; David Leib Zuenz, Gedulat Yehonatan (Petrokov, 1930), vol. 1, pp. 12ff.
[16] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit” On Rabbi Jonathan Eibeschütz and Father Franciscus Haselbauer Editing the Talmud,” Jewish Social Studies 10 (Winter 2014), pp. 147-148.
[17] The defense was published in installments in Ha-Magid, May 9, 16, 23, 30, 1877. Sections of the document appear in  Zweifel, Saneigor, pp. 264-265, and in Saul Pinchas Rabinowitz’s edition of H. Graetz, Divrei Yemei Yisrael, vol. 8, p. 464 in the note. The complete document was published in Zuenz, Gedulat Yehonatan, pp. 135ff., but he does not identify its source, leading the reader to assume that he is quoting from a manuscript.
[18] See Ha-Magid, May 9, 1877, pp. 170-171. (The reference to R. Broda as his teacher appears on p. 171.) As we shall see, R. Eybeschuetz had a great deal of respect for R. Broda. Yet R. Jacob Emden’s father, the Hakham Zvi, had a different perspective. See Yehezkel Duckesz, Ivah le-Moshav (Cracow, 1903), p. 14.
[19] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 166.
[20] S. points out an interesting source which gives an unknown, but presumably true, biographical detail of R. Eybeschuetz’s life in the spiritual autobiography of an apostate Jew named Salomon Duitsch, A Short Account of the Wonderful Conversion to Christianity of Solomon Duitsch … Extracted from the Original Published in the Dutch Language (London 1771).S. wrote to me as follows:

Prone to mystical visions and ascetic practices like fasting, he was regarded locally as a tzadik, but he eventually became convinced of Christianity. When this became known was forced to divorce his wife. After a period of wandering he ended up in Altona. He still looked Jewish and his issues were unknown there. He writes of meeting and staying the night at R. Eybeschuetz, who was very delighted to host him on account that R. Eybeschuetz was educated and taken care of as an orphan in the house of his great-grandfather in Nikolsburg. This information about a Nikolsburg period in R. Eybeschuetz’s life, and who this great-grandfather might be, is not mentioned in the biographies, and is a reminder that much information about people’s lives is not necessarily in books.

[21] Maciejko, p. 150.
[22] For details see ibid., pp. 169ff.
[23] Ha-Magid, May 16, 1874, p. 180.
[24] Ibid., May 23, p. 188.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., May 30, 1877, p. 199.
[27] Ibid. In my post here I discussed how R. Jehiel Michel Epstein engaged in self-censorship in the Arukh ha-Shulhan in order not to have problems with the non-Jewish authorities. Rabbi Shalom Baum called my attention to Arukh ha Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 480:1, for another example of this. I have underlined the words which any educated reader would understand were not to be taken seriously (since how could contemporary Jews ask God to pour out his wrath on the Babylonians who departed the historical stage over two thousand years ago?):
ואחר ששתו הכוס השלישי נוהגין לומר שפוך חמתך וגו’ ולפתוח הדלת כדי לזכור שהוא ליל שמורים ובזכות אמונה זו יבא משיח וישפוך חמתו על הבבליים שחרבו בהמק
[28] Ha-Magid, May 30, 1877, p. 199. Regarding the views of R. Luria and R. Feinstein, see my Changing the Immutable, p. 42.
[29] I have used the translation in Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), p. 165.
[30] Ibid., pp. 164ff.
[31] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 167.
[32] Ibid., pp. 173-174.
[33] I don’t know why this procedure was not required for the other tractates published in Prague.
[34] “The Rabbi and the Jesuit,” p. 179
[35] Or ha-Mizrah 29 (1981), pp. 418-428. Leiman’s publication remains valuable because of his introduction and notes.



Truth be Told[1] Comments on Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro

Truth be Told[1] 
by Aryeh A. Frimer*
Comments on Changing the ImmutableHow Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History by Marc B. Shapiro (Oxford – Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2015).
*Rabbi Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer holds the Ethel and David Resnick Chair of Active Oxygen Chemistry at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel; email: Aryeh.Frimer@biu.ac.il. He has lectured and published widely on various aspects of “Women and Halakha;” see here. His most recent paper is: “Women, Kri’at haTorah and Aliyyot (with an Addendum on Partnership Minyanim),” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 46:4 (Winter, 2013), 67-238, available online here.
            I found R. Prof. Marc Shapiro’s new book Changing the Immutable a fascinating read and very hard to put down. The first seven chapters deal with censorship of halakhic and philosophical works, while the eighth focuses on lying and misrepresentation in pesak. As we know from his previous works, Shapiro has a very fluid writing style and the subject matter is always well researched. He does his best to be honest, unbiased and complete in his presentation. He is, moreover, intrigued with exploring the limits of the traditional consensus, which makes for some captivating reading. Yet, despite all these wonderful qualities – or perhaps, because of them, I found the present volume particularly unsettling and disconcerting.
R. Jacob J Schacter’s classic article “Facing the Truths of History” had already sensitized me to the fact that publishers censor and even rewrite portions of the books they bring to press.[2] They do so because they find some of their author’s positions “unacceptable” – views which don’t fit the publishers’ or the intended reader’s “party line.” That such censorship continues unabashedly in the 21st century is disappointing, but then “there is no shame anymore.” But these are, by and large, sins of omission; somehow, with that I could live.
            But what I found particularly troubling with Changing the Immutable was the last chapter, which deals with lying in pesak. After going through the many examples Shapiro cites, the reader is left with one clear impression. One sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek, since he may well be misrepresenting something in his ruling. It could be the source and authority of the prohibition. For example, is the prohibition based on a biblical commandment (positive or negative), rabbinic edict, custom or mere public policy (slippery slope) considerations? Alternatively, the expressed reason may not be the real grounds for the prohibition. In addition, the application may be much broader than halakhically permitted. To my mind these are shocking revelations: these are not sins of omission but commission; the perpetrators are scholars and religious leaders; and these deviations constitute intellectual dishonesty at its worst.
Our author is not insensitive to this dissonance. In an attempt to explain how these scholars justify not being fully honest in pesak, Shapiro writes in the last two pages of the book (pp. 284-285) about “redefining truth.” He indicates that these decisors see nothing wrong in what they are doing, since their ultimate goal is the “higher good”. As they see it, they have ultimately prevented their respective communities and congregants from sinning and deviating from the proper path of shemirat mitsvot. The fact that these scholars have bent the truth, and distorted Jewish law in the process, is of lesser importance. The ends in these cases, justify the means.
It is with these jarring observations that the book comes to an abrupt end, without any further comment or soul-searching. This is despite the fact that on page 239ff, Shapiro brings one citation from Hazal after another about the centrality of truth, and the seriousness of the sin of lying. After all, the Torah itself commands us: “mi-Devar sheker tirhak” – “From untruthfulness, distance thyself” (Exodus 23:7). If what the author writes in the last chapter is true, then Hazal’s eloquent statements about the importance of honesty have become nothing but a mockery. It raises serious moral questions with insufficient and unsatisfying answers. How are we now supposed to educate our children and talmidim as to the cardinal nature of truth and truthfulness?! How are we to live with such a clash between theory and practice?
In the course of our own study of Women’s Tefilla Groups, my brother R. Prof. Dov Frimer and I researched misrepresentation in pesak in the context of women’s issues.[3] Many leading Rabbis were deeply and justifiably concerned that some of the feminist practices introduced were ultimately “bad for the Jews” on public policy grounds.[4] But instead of saying so clearly, some rabbis adduced reasons that were not halakhically sound. Our own research has led us to the clear conclusion that the vast majority of the gedolim do not condone this type of misrepresentation or that discussed in the last chapter of Changing the Immutable. Giving an erroneous ruling – despite one’s good intentions, or even misstating the reason or source for a prohibition, violates the prohibition “mi-Devar sheker tirhak“, if not a variety of other issurim.
We begin our discussion of this issue with the famous Pesak Din (halakhic ruling) promulgated by a conference of rabbis who met in Michalowce Hungary in 1865. This edict initially signed by twenty-five leading rabbinic figures and subsequently by many more, ruled that nine practices (including, inter alia, synagogue choirs, sermons in the vernacular, synagogues weddings, absence of a central bima, canonical robes for the Hazan) were halakhically forbidden. Leading rabbis Moses Schick and Esriel Hildesheimer and many of their colleagues refused to sign. The fundamental claim of Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer was that, contrary to the impression given by the Pesak Din, the only grounds for some of the edicts were public policy (mi-gdar milta) – not halakhic – considerations.[5] The term “Pesak Din” (legal ruling) was in fact a conscious misnomer, an attempt to hide the truth, and, hence, a flagrant deviation from Jewish law with which they could take no part. R. Schick also argued that, since the Pesak Din was promulgated by a Jewish court, it violated bal tosif, adding a mitsva to the Torah.[6]
Similarly, R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes[7] argues that it is forbidden to call a rabbinic edict a biblical prohibition because it violates not only bal tosif but also mi-devar sheker tirhak. Similarly, R. Chayim Hirschensohn[8] charges those rabbis who forbid women to become involved in politics with violating both bal tosif and lying. R. Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk[9], maintains that both Ra’avad and Rambam agree that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” forbids a posek from claiming that a rabbinic injunction is biblical. R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky,[10] refuting the suggestion that it is forbidden to take part in elections in the secular State of Israel, writes: “…And your Honor should know that even to be zealous, it is forbidden to teach Torah not according to the halakha (Avot V:8), and that which is not true will not succeed at all.” R. Haim David Halevi[11] prohibits a posek from misrepresenting halakha and/or giving an erroneous reason for a prohibition for two basic reasons: (1) the biblical prohibition of “mi-devar sheker tirhak” and (2) a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority would result should the truth become known (see more below). [See also the related opinions of Rabbis Ehrenberg, Rogeler and Sobel cited below.]
As Prof. Shapiro documents in Changing the Immutable, some posekim dissent. They argued, on various grounds, that “mi-devar sheker tirhak” is not applicable to cases where halakha is misrepresented so as to prevent future violations of Jewish law. Other scholars argue that the dispensation to modify the truth in order to maintain peace (me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalomYevamot 65b) also applies to misrepresenting halakha in order to maintain peace between kelal Yisrael and the Almighty. Yet others maintain that if a posek believes an action should be prohibited because of mi-gdar milta, he may misrepresent the reason for or source of a prohibition; since there will be no change in the legal outcome, mi-devar sheker tirhak does not apply.[12] Finally, some have argued that mi-devar sheker tirhak only refers to lying in court.[13]
But these arguments have been seriously and vigorously challenged. Thus, R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg[14] demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose (ve-afilu li-devar mitsva). Similarly, R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin[15] chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble. R. Ovadiah Yosef[16] discusses at length whether a judge, maintaining a minority position on a three judge panel, can lie and say “I do not know what to rule,” – so that two more judges will be added to the panel and his minority opinion will have a chance to become the majority view; he concludes that it is forbidden. R. Solomon Sobel[17] explicitly states that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom only allows one to change the facts, not the halakha. Both R. Jacob Ettlinger and R. Reuben Margaliot[18] maintain that me-shanim mi-penei ha-shalom allows one only to obfuscate by using language which can be understood in different ways, but not to lie; hence, misrepresenting halakhic reasons or sources would also be forbidden.
Also unmentioned is the long list of posekim (including the Radba”z)[19] who maintain that even if one is theoretically permitted to misrepresent Halakha, under certain unique circumstances – one is nevertheless forbidden to do so in practice. This is because “the truth will out.”   Not only will this revelation ultimately lead to a terrible hillul Hashem, but it will undermine peoples’ trust in the rabbinic establishment. In this regard R. Benjamin Lau has observed:[20]
The rabbi is expected to know and present the various aspects of each issue and not to conceal those aspects that are inconsistent with his own point of view. If a rabbi is untrue to the sources and reaches his decision without taking account of conflicting views, he will be seen to be untrustworthy. And a lack of trust between a rabbi and his community of questioners will drive a wedge between that community and the Torah overall. Stating the truth, of course, does not require the decisor to remain neutral; his role requires him to reach a decision one way or the other. But the decision must be reached through disclosure, not concealment, of the alternatives….. Now, when everyone has access to the [Bar Ilan] Responsa Project data base and Google provides answers to all imaginable questions, everyone can check every responsum and examine its trustworthiness. A rabbi who rules in an oversimplified way, whether strictly or leniently, in a area of halakhic complexity will be caught as untrustworthy.
Having lived through the crises and confrontations of women’s prayer groups, women on religious councils, women in communal leadership roles and women’s aliyyot – I can testify that there is great need for both in-depth knowledge and truthfulness. The “hillul Hashem and loss of trust” argument is not just hype – but painfully all too accurate! Many of the rabbis in the 1970s lost control of the religious leadership of their communities because they were unprepared or unwilling to deal with the challenges honestly and head on. Many rabbis simply tried to stonewall the situation, while others were not forthright about the real reason for forbidding such practices. As previously noted, the Rabbis may well have been correct that many of the feminist practices introduced were halakhically unsound or “bad for the Jews” on a variety of public policy grounds.[21] But instead of saying so clearly (as Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt”l had urged and himself practiced), some rabbis waffled, while others prevaricated. But the halakhic truth quickly became known – a consequence of the “information age.” And as a result, many balebatim lost trust in the religious leadership as a whole. For them the conclusion was simply: “Everything boils down to politics.” 
            It is, therefore, critically important to reiterate that the cases cited by our author, exemplify neither pesak in general, nor the consensus view of the posekim. It is forbidden to misrepresent in halakhic rulings as a matter of law and policy.  In essence, then, Prof Shapiro’s scholarly and well-documented book presents the reader with a most fascinating review of an approach within halakhic decision making, which has been rejected by mainstream pesak. Indeed, such cases need to be actively addressed if they are to be uprooted.
Response by Marc B. Shapiro
I understand why Professor Frimer is troubled by what I wrote, and to a large extent my conclusions diverge from his own. All I would say is that the matter is complex, and rather than attempt to simplify matters, as I feel Frimer has done, we must attempt to understand how the same Sages who spoke about the importance of truth could at times countenance departure from it. This is a challenge that requires sensitivity and nuance, and appreciation of changing times and values. When Frimer sees a text that permits false attribution, he sees prevarication and hypocrisy. But a historically attuned outlook would seek to understand rather than condemn. Ironically, it is Frimer who is judging the Sages and decisors, because if their ideas do not conform to his understanding then these ideas are regarded by him as problematic.
Thus, Frimer cites the famous 1865 pesak din of Michalowce and tells us that R. Moses Schick and R. Esriel Hildesheimer opposed it since they saw it as departing from the truth. While their position is certainly significant, what about the fact that among Hungarian rabbis they were a minority, and most of the leading Hungarian rabbis supported the pesak? How is my argument refuted by citing Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer if they were opposed by most of their colleagues? Doesn’t the fact that most of the Hungarian rabbis opposed Rabbis Schick and Hildesheimer support my position? 
As for the various rabbinic opinions cited by Frimer, I don’t deny that these opinions exist, and in my book I refer to Frimer’s famous article on women’s prayer groups in which he cites these opinions. But I also make the point that there is an alternative tradition which allows much more leeway for authorities to at times diverge from the truth. I also believe, contrary to Frimer, that this is a mainstream position. Since this position is held by R. Ovadiah Yosef and R. Hayyim Kanievsky, I don’t see how it is possible for one to state that it is not a mainstream position.
The point of the chapter, however, was not to advocate for one position or the other, but to focus on the alternative tradition, the existence of which is more or less suppressed today. I was explicit that my aim was to show how far some were willing to go in sanctioning deviations from the truth, and I indicate that there are views in opposition to these. However, my intent was to study the views of those with a “liberal” perspective on the importance of truth. It is this tradition that I wished to explore, and to rescue it, as it were, from the well-intentioned apologetics. I never state that this is the only authentic position. On the contrary, one can find the opposite perspective presented in numerous articles. This is why I thought it was important to present alternative views, from the Talmud until the present, views which I think show that there is a rabbinic conception of the Noble Lie.
I also must dispute the following statement by Frimer: “R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg demonstrates that the consensus of posekim – rishonim and aharonim – is that mi-devar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, inside court and out. R. Ehrenberg further argues that this is true even if it is intended to promote a religious purpose.” How can Frimer state that R. Ehrenberg “demonstrates” such a thing? What R. Ehrenberg does is present an argument, and everyone can evaluate its cogency. The fact is that numerous authorities do not accept R. Ehrenberg’s position, which means that they would not agree that he has proven his case.
To Frimer, and others like him who have the same reaction after reading chapter 7, I can only say that modern views of how to understand texts, and what we today regard as truth, cannot be used as a measure with which to judge people who lived in a very different time and had a very different understanding of these sorts of matters. It is their understanding that I seek to explore, rather than foisting my own value judgments upon them. Unlike Frimer, who is involved in halakhic writing and attempting to influence the community in religious matters, I write from a more “objective” perspective, without such concerns. As such, while Frimer wishes to “uproot” what he regards as unacceptable views of certain poskim. I seek to understand the phenomenon and to describe it.
When, on p. 284, I speak about redefining truth, I am not speaking about poskim per se but about how to understand the entire phenomenon that I have documented in the book. The question is how does the importance of truth coexist with what we have seen, and it is in this context that I discuss how truth need not be seen as equivalent to factual or historical truth.
I agree with Frimer that none of the great poskim supported lying in pesak as a normative option on a regular basis. Yet as I have already indicated,  I believe that there is a tradition that allows for not being frank at certain times, when it is thought that other values are at stake. In the book I state that we should understand this position in a sympathetic fashion even if it is at odds with how today we generally approach matters.
Frimer asks how are we supposed to educate our children and students as to the importance of truth and truthfulness if what I say is correct. This is a good question with which educators need to struggle, but it is not a refutation of what I have written. If my position is correct, the world will not collapse. It will just be one more Torah matter, alongside Amalek, yefat toar, slavery, homosexuality, etc., that at certain times is not in line with contemporary values.
Here are some more comments relevant to the issue of truth.
1. Amichai Markowitz called my attention to a talmudic text that I overlooked. Nedarim 23b states: “The Tanna has intentionally obscured the law, in order that vows should not be lightly treated.” This relates to the issue of the truth not being made available to all. See also Kovetz Iggerot Hazon Ish, vol. 2, no. 78, that one should not reveal to the masses that the Sages forbade things that the Torah permitted.[22]
2. R. Joseph Ibn Caspi writes that at times it is appropriate for members of the intellectual elite to lie.[23] This explains how Joseph lied to his brothers when he accused them of being spies (Gen. 42:9). In support of this view Ibn Caspi cites both Maimonides and Aristotle.[24] The mention of Maimonides no doubt refers to the latter’s notion of “necessary beliefs”, but it is not clear where Ibn Caspi got his quote from Aristotle, since as far as I can determine Aristotle says no such thing.[25]
3. R. Abraham Arbel writes as follows[26]:
ואם מצא לנכון המגדל עז לשבח חכם כהרמב”ם שלא שקר והיה אמיתי, משמע דפשיטא ליה שגם אצל חכם בדרגתו אפשר למצוא שישקר משום כבודו.
R. Arbel also adds the following passage which I am sure will be very troubling to Frimer (as Frimer rejects the notion that “one sometimes needs to be careful about trusting a Posek”). R. Arbel’s words should be understood in line with the many sources I cite in the last chapter of my book.
וע”ע טהרת ישראל (סי’ קפה אות סו) בדין אשה שאמרה שהחכם טהר לה הכתם ועתה מכחיש אותה החכם לומר שלא שאלה אותו, דחישינן שהחכם רואה עתה שטעה שטהר, ובוש לומר שטעה, ולכן משקר עתה לומר שלא שאלה אותו. וכ”כ בהפלאה (קונ’ אחרון סי קטו סק”א( שהחכם לא נאמן להכחיש אשה, שאומרת שהחכם טהר, כשהכתם לפנינו והוא טמא, שהרי הוא נוגע בדבר שהרי טעה.
4. R. Ovadiah Yosef stated that if X tells you something he wrote, you can tell others that you read it in X’s book, and this is not considered a lie.[27]
5. In Changing the Immutable, p. 253, I cite a passage from Devarim Rabbah which states that for the sake of peace, even “Scripture itself” recorded something false. I should have also cited Midrash Tanhuma 96:7, which is even more striking, attributing the falsehood directly to God (as opposed to merely speaking of “Scripture”):
ארשב”ג גדול הוא השלום שהכתיב [שכתב] הקב”ה דברים בתורה שלא היו אלא בשביל השלום.
6. Let me offer another example of censorship in halakhic matters, the sort of thing that Frimer claims must be battled against and “uprooted” for the sake of Torah truth.[28] Here is page 141 from R. Yitzhak Zilberstein’s and R. Moshe Rothschild’s Torat ha-Yoledet.

The matter dealt with is whether a husband can be in the delivery room. The authors quote the opinion that if there is a need the husband can be in the room. In note 2, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah II, no. 75, is quoted as follows:
הנה אם יש צורך, איני רואה איסור. אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .
However, if you look at the actual text of Iggerot Moshe, what he says is something different.
הנה אם יש צורך איני רואה איסור ואף בלא צורך איני רואה איסור, אבל אסור לו להסתכל ביציאת הולד ממש . . .
I have underlined the words that are deleted by Torat ha-Yoledet. This deletion allows them to present R. Moshe Feinstein as saying that only if there is a need for the husband to be in the room can be there. Yet R. Moshe explicitly states that even if there is no “need”, he can still remain with his wife.

I know that there are some who are thinking that I am making a big deal out of nothing, and that it must have been an accident that the words were deleted as that no one would dare to purposely alter what R. Moshe wrote. I am sorry to say that this is not the case. Here are two pages from R. Pesach Eliyahu Falk’s Levushah shel Torah.[29]

From it we see that someone asked R. Zilberstein about the words that were deleted, and R. Zilberstein did not say that they were deleted in error. On the contrary, he tells the questioner that the words were deleted on purpose, after consultation with “gedolei ha-poskim”. In other words, these poskim disagreed with R. Moshe and therefore instructed R. Zilberstein that when he quoted Iggerot Moshe he should censor R. Moshe’s words so that people should not learn the extent of R. Moshe’s lenient view. After all that I have written in my book, I don’t think people will be surprised by this. Frimer, however, who has assured us that this sort of thing is not “mainstream”, and indeed is “forbidden”, will have to explain how it is that a respected posek like R. Zilberstein, acting on the instruction of other great poskim, could adopt such an approach, an approach which stands as a refutation of Frimer’s point.
As I have said already, I am not claiming that this sort of distortion is an everyday phenomenon. But I do claim that many poskim believe that they have the authority to alter the truth when they think that this is necessary. We can’t pretend that the texts I have cited don’t exist.
7. In his post Frimer writes: “R. Elijah [ben Samuel] of Lublin  chastises a colleague for lying in a decision, even though his intentions were noble.” I don’t think the word “chastises” is appropriate in this case. R. Elijah disagrees with the other rabbi, but the disagreement is not strident. For example, R. Elijah writes as follows in Yad Eliyahu, no. 62:
ע”ד אשר האריך רום מעלתו בלשונו בשפת אמת להעמיד שפת שקר במקומי אני עומד שאינו כדאי להיות רגיל בכך ואף שמותר בו מאיזה טעם שיהיה.
8. In the next issue of Masorah le-Yosef my article on “necessary beliefs” will appear. In this article I discuss how Maimonides and other figures say things that do not reflect their true opinion, but are merely “necessary beliefs”, i.e., “beliefs” that the masses should accept but which are not really true at all. If these authorities think that the masses can be fed false ideas when it comes to theology, why should halakhah be any different?

9. See R. Mordechai Eliasburg, Shevil ha-Zahav (Warsaw, 1897), p. 27-28, who claims that both Nahmanides and R. Jacob Emden recorded things in their writings that they did not really believe.

10. R. Chaim Sunitzky called my attention to R. Israel Weltz, Divrei Yisrael, vol. 3, no. 170, who doesn’t see such a problem with false stories if they lead people in a good direction.

.אין זה נורא כ”כ בספורי מעשיות כאלה כשהכוונה היא לטובה ללמוד ממנה מוסר ודרכי הי”ת
And now for some comic relief. A few weeks ago Ezra Glinter reviewed my book for the Forward. See here.
He used this opportunity to take some hits at the haredi world, focusing on matters that are not mentioned in the book. Rabbi Avi Shafran, who is paid to respond to this sort of thing, penned his own piece for the Forward available here.
The comedy starts in the first two paragraphs which read:
Psst! I’ve got a secret to share. It’s from deep inside the Orthodox Jewish world. Come closer… Okay, here it is: Orthodoxy changes!
It’s not much of a secret, actually. At least in these here parts. But it seems to be an unfamiliar concept for Marc Shapiro, a University of Scranton professor and author of the recent book, “Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History.”
It is obvious that Shafran has never even looked at my book and is only basing his comments on what appears in Glinter’s review. Those who have read the book know that a major theme of it is precisely how Orthodoxy changes. In fact, there is no one in the world today whose scholarship is more associated with the thesis that Orthodoxy changes than me. Much of the criticism of me is on precisely this point, that I have exaggerated the amount of change. Yet here Shafran comes and says that I am ignorant about how Orthodoxy changes. This is what I mean by comic relief.
Shafran then writes:
If a biography of Bertrand Russell can choose to elide the great philosopher’s serial marital infidelities and not be accused of rewriting the past, a hagiography of a great rabbi should certainly be permitted to overlook judgments he made with the best of intentions that in retrospect might seem misguided to some today. Such acts of civility are at times portrayed as scandalous by Shapiro and his reviewer.
A biography of Russel that chooses to omit his marital infidelities would indeed be rightly accused of rewriting the past. As for the second part of the sentence, I agree that a hagiography can leave out material of the sort Shafran mentions, but that is because it is a hagiography! If it intended to be a biography, then no, it cannot overlook mistaken judgments made by the subject, or else it ceases to be biography. I also do not think that it is an act of civility to refrain from writing about such mistaken judgments (as for example, R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg’s early misjudgment of the Nazi regime).
Shafran provides a few examples of how practice in Orthodoxy has changed, none of which I disagree with. But then again, my book has nothing to do with this. He writes:
One opinion in the Talmud, for example, permits fowl and milk to be cooked together and eaten. Just try ordering milk-braised chicken in your local kosher eatery these days; they’ll sic the mashgiach on you in a Borough Park moment. Men using mirrors was once forbidden as a “womanly” act, a once-true assessment that, for most Orthodox men today, is no longer considered applicable.
Let us say that a new edition of the Talmud was published that deleted the lines that tell us that one opinion permitted fowl and milk to be cooked and eaten together? Would Shafran be OK with this? I assume not, and it is thus unfortunate that he doesn’t know that it is precisely this sort of censorship that my book is focused on. What we have here is not only criticism without having read the book, but criticism without having any clue as to what the book is about. 
And then, to top off the comic relief, Shafran ends his piece as follows:

“Why is that so hard for Orthodoxy’s critics to understand?”

I have been called some different things in my life, but this is the first time I have been referred to as one of “Orthodoxy’s critics”.

Let me also add that Changing the Immutable has sold very well in the haredi world, and this is not surprising since it is not an anti-haredi book at all.

[1] AAF would like to thank Dov I. Frimer, Shael I. Frimer, David A. Kessler and Joel B. Wolowelsky for their insightful comments and suggestions on previous drafts.
[2] R. Jacob J. Schacter, “Facing the Truths of History,” Torah u-Madda Journal, 8 [1998-1999]: pp. 200-273.
[3] Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women’s Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 – Theory,” Tradition, 32:2 (Winter 1998), pp. 5-118. PDF available online
here. See in particular Addendum, part 6.
[4] See our discussion in Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Section E therein.
[5] R. Moses Schick in Likutei Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, R. Israel Stern, ed. (London, 1965), sec. 82, pp. 73-75; Meir Hildesheimer, “She’eilot u-Teshuvot Maharam Schick,” Tsefunot, 2:2(6) (Tevet 5750), pp. 87-95, at p. 93; Yona Emanuel, “Me’a Shana lePetirat haRav Azriel Hildesheimer Zatsal,” haMa’ayn, XXXIX, 4 (Tammuz 5759), pp. 1-7, “Al Kinus haRabbanim be-Mikhalovitch” pp. 2-4; Michael K. Silber, “The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Invention of a Tradition,” In The Uses of Tradition, Jack Wertheimer, ed. (New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1992), p. 23-84; Mordechai Eliav, “Mekomo shel Rav Azriel Hildesheimer be-Ma’avak al Demutah shel Yahadutr Hungariah,” Zion 27 (1962), 59-86; Nethanel Katzburg, “Pesak Din shel Michalovitch 5726,” in Perakim be-Toldot ha-Hevrah ha-Yehudit be-Yemei ha-Beinayim u-be-Et ha-Hadashah, Emanuel Etkes and Yosef Salmon, eds. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1980), 273-286; Jacob Katz, The Unhealed Breach: The Secession of Orthodox Jewry from the General Community in Hungary and Germany (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1994 – see especially Chapter 8.
[6] See Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3, Addendum, part 5.
[7]  R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Darkei Hora’asiman 6, first footnote,
[8]  R. Chayim Hirschensohn Resp. Malki baKodesh, II, sec. 4, p. 13.
[9] Cited in R. Zvi [Hershel] Schachter, Nefesh haRav (Jerusalem: Reishit Yerushalayyim, 1994), p.178.
[10] R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky, Keraina deIggarta, letter 203, pp. 219-220.
[11] Responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 and published in RespMayyim Hayyim, III, sec. 55.
[12] R. Chaim Kanievsky, Masekhet Kutim, 1:14, Me-taher, note 30, and conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer (February 20, 1995),
[13] R. Zelig Epstein, in a conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Noach Dear (March 8, 1996). R. Jerucham Fishel Perlau, Commentary to Rav Sa’adia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvot, I, p. 156b.
[14] R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg, Resp. Devar Yehoshua, I, addendum to sec. 19, no. 6 (see also V, Y.D. sec 12). See also R. Nahum Yavruv, Niv Sefatayyim (Jerusalem, 1989) Niv Sefatayyim, kelal 1; R. Eliezer Judah Waldenberg, Resp. Tsits Eliezer 15:12:2.
[15] R. Elijah Rogeler, Resp. Yad Eliyahu, sec. 61 and 62
[16] R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, II, H.M., sec. 3
[17] R. Solomon Sobel, Salma Hadasha, Mahadura Tinyana, Haftarat Toledot; cited in R. Jacob Yehizkiyah Fisch, Titen Emet leYa’akov (Jerusalem, 1982), sec. 5, no. 36.
[18] R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh leNer, Yevamot 65b, s.v. she-Ne’emar avikha tsiva” and “Ko tomeru leYosef,” and R. Reuben Margaliot, Kunteres Hasdei Olam, sec. 1061, at the end of his edition of Sefer Hasidim (Mossad haRav Kook: Jerusalem, 5724). See also R. Moses David Maccabbi Leventhal, “Shinui beDevar haShalom,” Zohar, 3 (Spring 5760), pp. 49-64.
[19] R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Resp. Benei Vanim, I, sec. 37, no. 12, argues that such misrepresentation most often results in gossip, hate, unlawful leniencies in other areas, hillul Hashem, and a total loss of trust in rabbinic authority should the truth become known. (This despite the fact that R. Y.H. Henkin maintains that when a posek upgrades a prohibition for a just cause, there is no prohibition of either bal Tosif or lying). Similar views are expressed by Resp. Torah liShma, sec. 371; R. Moses Jehiel Weiss, Beit Yehezkel, p. 77; R. Abraham Isaac haKohen Kook, Orah Mishpat, no. 111 (pp. 117-120) and 112 (pp. 120-129); R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, Teshuvot Ivra, sec. 52, no. 3 (in Kitvei haGri Henkin, II); R. Haim David Halevi, responsum to Aryeh A. Frimer, dated 7 Shevat 5756 – published in Resp. Mayyim Hayyim, III, sec.55; and R. David Feinstein, conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, March 19, 1995. See also the commentary of Radbaz to M.T., Melakhim 6:3, where even normally permitted lying is forbidden lest it result in hillul Hashem should the truth be discovered. Similarly, in discussing Sanhedrin 29a and the cause of Adam and Eve’s sin, R. Hanokh Zundel, Eits Yosefad loc., s.v. Ma,” comments that one must be particularly careful how a stringency and its rationale are formulated, for if no distinction is drawn between a stringency and the original ordinance, any error found in the stringency may lead the masses to believe that there is an error in the original ordinance itself.
[20] R. Benjamin Lau, “The Challenge of Halakhic Innovation,” Meorot 8 Tishrei 5771, pp 43-57 at pp. 45-46, available online here.
[21] See our discussion in Section E of Frimer and Frimer, supra note 3.
[22] It could be that the Hazon Ish would not be opposed if this information was revealed in a responsible way. I say this since his language is
והבא להכריז בין המון העם כי חכמים גזרו עלינו דברים שהתורה לא אסרתן כונתו ידועה . . . והתוצאות ידועות
(Emphasis added) This might mean that it is only objectionable if someone makes a big deal out of the fact that a certain prohibition is only rabbinic
[23] Mishneh Kesef (Cracow, 1906), vol. 2, to Gen 42:12 (pp. 93-94).
[24] His quote of Aristotle is: נכון לגדול הנפש שיכזכ בהיות זה הכרחי
[25] See Jane S. Zembaty, “Aristotle on Lying,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993), pp. 7-29.
[26] Ahoti Kalah (Jerusalem, 2007), p. 149.
[27] Eliyahu Sheetrit, Rabbenu (Jerusalem, 2014), p. 266.
[28] This example, and also R. Falk’s Levushah shel Torah, were called to my attention by R. Yonason Rosman.
[29] (Jerusalem, 2007), vol. 2, pp. 783-784.



“שוק באשה ערוה”, לאיזה אבר התכוונו חז”ל?

                                          “שוק באשה ערוה”, לאיזה אבר התכוונו חז”ל?
                                                        מאת זאב וגנר
מאמר
זה לקוח מהספר “אוצר רש”י” (בערך “שוק”), העומד לצאת בע”ה
בקרוב והוא מילון אנציקלופדי המכיל כעשרת אלפים ערכים, הכוללים את הגדרותיו
הלשוניות של רש”י במקרא ובתלמוד.
 הנושא הנידון הוא בירור מיקום אבר השוק באדם
(שוק היא לשון נקבה, אך לא נקפיד בכך בהרצאת הדברים), כיצד נוצר הספק בדבר מיקומו
וכן כיצד “מטפלים” במשנה ברורה “סורר” הפוסק שזה החלק העליון
של הרגל בניגוד לדעת רוב שאר הפוסקים.
במילון
אבן שושן מגדיר שוק “חלק הרגל הנמצא בין הברך ובין כף הרגל” וזו המשמעות
המקובלת בשפה העברית המדוברת. לעומת זאת, בעולם התורני ישנה מחלוקת עתיקה בענין זה
והיא, האם שוק הוא החלק התחתון של הרגל (וזו הדעה העיקרית)? או האם זה חלק הרגל
העליון (הנקרא ירך בשפה המדוברת) הנמשך מהברך ועד המותן? עצם העובדה שיש בכלל
מחלוקת הלכתית בענין אומר דרשני וכמדומה אין עוד שום אבר אחר באדם שיש לגביו ספק
בדבר מיקומו (נסו לבקש מאנשים להצביע על שוקם ותווכחו).
ערב
אחד שמעתי הרצאה מאחת הרבניות המרצות בעניני צניעות (שהוא הנושא החביב עליהן),
ובין יתר הדברים אמרה את המשפט הבא: “ישנו אבר אחד באדם והוא השוק, שהוא  החלק התחתון של הרגל, מן הברך ועד הקרסול
(שהוא העצם הבולט ברגל במקום חבור פסת הרגל אל השוק) שאין שום מחלוקת בדבר זהותו
והנחשב ערוה לכל השיטות והדעות ולכן צריך לכסותו כדי שלא יראה אפילו במקצת.
קביעה
זו שהשוק היא ערוה אכן נכונה, כיון שיש גמרא מפורשת האומרת זאת (בברכות כד
ע”א וכפי שנרחיב להלן), אך בדבר המיקום, נראה שההפך הוא הנכון וזהו האבר
היחיד שיש לגביו מחלוקת. רוב המפרשים והפוסקים אכן סוברים ששוק הוא החלק התחתון של
הרגל, וכך ג”כ ניתן להבין מדברי המחבר בשו”ע יו”ד קצה ס”י:
נחתך הולד במעיה (של היולדת) ויצא אבר אבר, בין שיצא על סדר האברים, כגון שיצא
הרגל, ואחריה השוק ואחריה הירך… מכאן רואים בבירור שלדעת הבית יוסף סדר האיברים
הוא שוק ומעליו ירך.
בפירוש
הבועז (מבעל התפארת ישראל) לאהלות פ”א מ”ח אות י”ד מסביר שיש חילוק
בדבר משמעות השוק בין לשון המקרא ללשון התלמוד וכותב כך: וכבר ידוע דלשון תורה
לחוד ולשון חכמים לחוד, דהרי בלשון תורה שוק הניתן משלמים לכהן הן ב’ עצמות ארוכות
של יד הבהמה (כחולין קלב ע”ב), וכן בכל דוכתא שנזכר שם שוק בקרא בין ביד או
ברגל משמעותו ב’ העצמות העליונות שבכל אחד. אבל הכא הרי מוכח שהשוק הוא רק העצם
הארוך התחתון של רגל למטה מהברך, עכ”ד.
כדי
להבין במה מדובר ראוי לפרט את איברי הרגל באדם ובבהמה כפי שרגיל בפי הבריות. הרגל
מתחברת לגוף האדם בכף הירך, החלק הארוך מתחתיו והנמשך עד הברך נקרא ירך. הברך (או
פיקת הברך) מחברת בין הירך והשוק הנמשך מתחתיה 
עד הקרסול ומשם מתחיל כף הרגל ולבסוף האצבעות. (ישנם עוד איברים אך הם אינם
מעניננו). בבהמה לעומת זאת מבנה הרגל שונה. המקום בו מתחברת רגל הבהמה לגוף נקרא
בוקא דאטמא שממנו יורדת הקולית (או הירך, שהוא האבר הארוך הראשון של הרגל הקרוב
לגוף הבהמה) עד עצם הערקוב (שהוא מקביל לברך באדם), מהערקוב יורד השוק עד הערקום
(וזה נחשב האבר השני או האמצעי), האבר המקביל לקרסול בבהמה הוא עצם האיסתווירא
ומשם יורד עצם הרגל (המקביל לכף הרגל באדם והוא האבר השלישי) הנמשך עד הטלפים (שהם
מקבילים לאצבעות כף הרגל).
כאשר
נשווה בין מבנה רגל האדם לרגל הבהמה, ניתן מיד להבחין שלאדם יש שני איברים ארוכים
עומדים המחוברים ע”י הברך, ואילו לבהמה יש שני איברים ארוכים עומדים ואחד
הקצר יותר. מכאן נובע מקור הבעיה כאשר מנסים להשוות ביניהם, כיוון שהחלק השלישי
בבהמה (הסמוך לקרקע) מקביל לכף הרגל באדם אלא שהוא מאונך בניגוד לכף הרגל באדם
שהוא מאוזן ונראה כמעט בוודאות שזה שרש הבעיה מדוע מחליפים בין שוק לירך ולפי הסבר
זה אין ספק שהשוק הוא החלק התחתון של רגל האדם.
לפני
שאנו ניגשים לחלק היותר עסיסי של המאמר, נביא מספר מקורות הדנים במיקום השוק ולמי
שאין בכך ענין יכול לדלג על הדברים. המקור לכך ששוק באשה ערוה הוא בברכות כד
ע”א ולמדים זאת בגמרא מהפסוק בישע’ מז ב-ג “חשפי שבל גלי שוק עברי נהרות
תגל ערותך גם תראה חרפתך”. תלמיד רש”י, המהר”י קרא מפרש על אתר:
שוק – הוא הירך העליון וכך ג”כ מבאר בשו”ת בני בנים (יהודה הרצל הנקין)
ח”ד סימן ט’. מפירושי רש”י השונים, וביחוד לפי המובא בערך איסתוירא
(מנחות לג ע”א ) שהוא מקום חיבור השוק וכף הרגל, נראה לכאורה שהוא סובר ששוק
הוא החלק התחתון של רגל האדם וכן נראה מסנה’ צו ע”ב ד”ה גלי – תגלי
(אצ”ל תגלו) קלעי ראשיכם ושוקיכם ותלכו בגלות. נראה שמדובר בגילוי החלק
התחתון שכן לא מסתבר שיגלו את החלק מעל הברך שלכל הדעות הוא מקום ערוה.
בברכות
סא ע”א מובא: כל העובר אחורי אשה בנהר אין לו חלק לעולם הבא, וברש”י
ד”ה אחורי אשה בנהר – אחורי אשת איש, (כיון ש)מגבהת בגדיה מפני המים… וכן
בב”ב נז ע”ב ד”ה לפי שאין דרכן… להתבזות – שצריכות לעמוד שם
יחיפות לגלות שוק לעמוד בנהר. מהפסוקים האלה, המדברים בהרמת השמלה בשביל שלא תרטב,
קשה להחליט האם מדובר בגילוי החלק התחתון או גם העליון.
בערובין
ד ע”א, רש”י ד”ה ואינו מטמא באהל – שום עצם בלא בשר עד שיהא שם
שדרה שלימה או גולגולת או רוב בנינו, שתי שוקיים וירך אחת. מכאן נראה שמדובר בחלק
העליון, כיון שיותר מסתבר שהחלק החסר הוא היותר תחתון שברגל. באופן דומה מובא
בבכורות מה ע”א ד”ה הואיל, ושם מפרש דשני שוקיים וירך אחד הוי רוב גובה
הגוף, אך מתוס’ יבמות קג ע”א ד”ה “מאן דמסגי” וברש”י
ד”ה “על ליחתא” נראה שמדובר בחלק התחתון.
בספר
שערים המצויינים בהלכה (מגילה יד ע”ב ד”ה שגילתה שוקה), מציין לתשובות
הרדב”ז (סוף חלק ז’, תקנות עגונות סימן כ”ט) הדן בקושיית התוס’ (שם
ד”ה שגלתה) היאך גילתה אביגיל את שוקה (כמובא בש”א כה כ) והלך דוד לאורה
ג’ פרסאות? ומפרש שהיא לא גילתה שוקה (מעצמה), אלא בזמן שהיתה יורדת בסתר ההר נשב
הרוח ונתגלה שוקה והיא לא ידעה מזה… ואפשר שצ”ל “שנתגלה” מעצמו.
עכ”ל. לסיכום, עדיין לא ברור מעל לכל ספק מכל הנ”ל מהו השוק, כיון שיש
צדדים לכאן ולכאן וכפי שמאריך החזון איש באו”ח סט”ז אות ח בענין השוק
ומביא ראיות לכל צד ומסיים “דקשה להכריע בדבר” (אך בסידורים של הוצאת
ארטסקרול באנגלית כן הכריעו בדבר ותרגמו את הפסוק בתהלים קמז י: “לא בשוקי
האיש ירצה” במשמעות ירך (thigh)
שבאנגלית משמעו החלק העליון של הרגל).
כאמור,
השוק נחשב ערווה כפי שקובעת הגמרא ולכן וצריך לכסותו כדי שלא יראה, כדין כל אבר
באשה הנחשב ערווה. לאותם פוסקים 
(המ”ב ועוד) הסוברים שזהו החלק העליון מספיק שהשמלה תגיע עד קמצת מתחת
לברך (ועוד קצת כדי שלא יתגלה בשעת הישיבה) והשאר אינו צריך כיסוי כלל. ולאותם
פוסקים הסוברים שזה החלק התחתון (והיא דעת רוב הפוסקים), צריך ללבוש שמלה המגיעה
עד הקרסול כדי שלא יראה טפח מהשוק (ולהיותר מחמירים כגון בגילוי השער אפילו טפח
אסור יהיה לגלות) ועל אחת כמה וכמה שלא ניתן יהיה לראות את צורת השוק כפי שאסור
הדבר בחלק הגוף העליון של האשה, כדי שלא יראה חיטוב האיברים.
כעת
ניתן לגשת לעיקר הנושא והוא הבעיה ההלכתית שנוצרה עקב השינוי שחל בסגנון לבוש
הנשים בדורות האחרונים. עד שנות העשרים של המאה הקודמת בעולם המערבי לבשו הנשים
שמלות ארוכות עד הקרסול ומאז החלו הנשים אט אט לקצר את אורך השמלות. באותה עת החלה
רוח הציונות לנשב ועמה רעיון שיבת א”י, רעיון שנתפס אליו נוער רב. נוער זה
בניגוד לאופנה המשתנה לבש שמלות ארוכות. כידוע בעניני צניעות כולל מלבושי נשים
המגמה היא להחמיר יותר ויותר, ואילו כאן למרבה הפלא החלו הנשים היהודיות לקצר את
שמלותיהם ולא נשמע קול מחאה. ניתן להניח (וזו השערה בלבד ויתכן שישנן עוד סיבות
שאיני מודע להם) שגורמים כלשהם עודדו תופעה זו כדי להרחיק מסימן ההיכר של הנוער
הציוני. אפילו היום בבתי ספר היותר חרדיים ישנן תקנות  שאוסרות על התלמידות ללבוש חצאית או שמלה ארוכה ומזהירים את ההורים
שישגיחו על לבוש בתם, כיון שכל בת שתתפס בלבוש כזה, אחת דתה להיזרק מבית הספר.
כאמור
הנשים בלי יוצא מן הכלל לבשו שמלות ארוכות שהסתירו את כל הרגל, וכעת נוצר מצב
הפוך, שהנשים החלו  לקצר את שמלותיהם
(בגלל סיבה זו או אחרת תהיה אשר תהיה), וכעת ניתן לראות חלק מהשוק שחז”ל
קוראים לו ערוה והעלול לגרום להרהורים ולבעיות אחרות בעניני צניעות שאין כאן המקום
לפרטן ולמרבה הפלא לא נשמע קול מחאה. בשאלה זו דן בשו”ת אשר חנן (אפללו, חלק
ו-ז אה”ע סימן פ”ח, וכן בחלק ח סימן קס”ב): האם אפשר לאשה ללכת
מחוץ לביתה בשמלה ארוכה עד הקרסול, כיון שיש הסוברים שזה לבוש בלתי צנוע ורחובי?
ועונה שאין שום מקור לכך, וכמו שאסור ללבוש חולצה הדוקה, אין היתר ללבוש גרב הדוק
כדי לכסות את חלק הרגל התחתון. (וכך מובא ג”כ בספר אחותי כלה מאת ר’ אברהם
ארבל, תשס”ז עמ’ קל”ט, בקונטרס באתי לגני סימן י”א, וראה עוד
לקמן).
רוב
הפוסקים כאמור הסיקו הלכה למעשה ששוק הוא החלק התחתון, אך למרבה הפלא,
“הפוסק” שספרו נתקבל כספר היסוד של ההלכה בימינו, החפץ חיים בספרו משנה
ברורה (סימן ע”ה סעיף א סק”ב) הולך בעקבות הפרי מגדים (משבצות זהב סימן
ע”ה סק”א) הקובע ששוק זה מן הברך ולמעלה, (ולפעמים נקרא ירך) וכותב כך:
“אבל פניה וידיה כפי המנהג שדרך להיות מגולה באותו מקום, בפרסות רגל עד השוק
(והוא עד המקום שנקרא קני”א בלשון אשכנז)”. כלומר מדברי המ”ב ברור
מעל לכל ספק שסובר שהשוק הוא החלק העליון (מעל ה”קניא” שהוא ברך בלשון
לעז). בשו”ת מגידות מהפמ”ג (שנדפס מכ”י בברוקלין תשע”ג
ח”א סימן כ”ד וכן כ”ו), דן בענין ומסיים “וצריך עיון בכל
זה”.
דברי
המ”ב הנ”ל גורמים מבוכה לאלה הנוטים להחמיר בעניני צניעות לבוש הנשים,
ולכן מנסים להקהות ולטשטש את דבריו ונביא מספר דוגמאות. בספר הליכות בת ישראל
(יצחק יעקב פוקס, ירושלים תשד”מ) פ”ד ס”ט סוף הערה כ”ח כותב:
הרש”ז אויערבאך שליט”א “כתב לי” שמן הדין אפשר להקל לאשה
הנמצאת בביתה במשך היום ואינה יוצאת לרחוב, שאינה חייבת לגרוב גרביים (גם בנוכחות
אחרים), וכן שאשה בשעת נידתה אינה צריכה לגרוב גרביים בפני בעלה… עיי”ש.
לעומת זאת במהדורה האנגלית שיצאה שנה אח”כ עמ’ 37, משמיט את רוב הדברים וכותב
בקיצור: הגאון רש”ז אויערבאך “כותב” (ולא “כתב לי”) שלפי
הדין אשה אינה צריכה ללבוש גרביים בנוכחות בעלה… (דבר פשוט ומובן ומובן מאליו
ולא קשור כלל לנושא המדובר). היוצא מדבריו שהדברים שכתב במהדורה העברית כנראה גררו
תגובות שרצוי להשמיט דברים אלו, כיון שמעתה כל בנות ישראל יפסיקו לגרוב גרביונים.
בספר
הלבוש כהלכתו (החסר כל פרט מזהה), פט”ו סימן א’ מסרס ומשמיט את דברי
המ”ב על מיקום השוק ומשלבם יחד עם דברי החיי אדם (הקובע ששוק הוא החלק
התחתון), והרי לשונו בדיוק: כתב המשנה ברורה, כל גופה של אשה, מה שדרכה להיות
מכוסה, נקרא ערוה. אבל פניה וידיה, במקום שאין דרכה להיות מכוסה, לא נקרא ערוה,
כיון שרגילים בזה אין כאן הרהור, וכן פרסות רגליה במקום שהדרך לילך יחף, מותר. אבל
זרועותיה ושוקה, אפילו רגילין בכך כדרך הפרוצות, אסור (משנה ברורה עה, ב חיי אדם
ד, ב). במהדורה השביעית (טבת תשע”ה עמ’ 131 הערה ז)  נוספה הארה ארוכה הדנה בנושא ובין השאר כותב
המחבר עלום השם: ולגודל וחומר הקושיות (על המ”ב) נראה לומר שלפי המצב בדורו,
שחלה הידרדרות בקיום התורה בכלל ובעניני הצניעות בפרט (כמבואר בספרו גדר עולם), לא
רצה לכתוב בבירור אלא מה שאין בו שום צד היתר, והעתיק את שתי הדיעות במשפט אחד
וסמך על המעיין שידקדק היטב בדבריו (ומסיים: הנלע”ד כתבתי). לפי דבריו,
המ”ב הסתיר את כוונתו וסמך על בינתו של הלומד להבין את עומק דבריו, שהוא בעצם
סובר שהשוק היא האבר התחתון. כלומר עשה את ספר המ”ב כספר קבלה שרק  יחידי סגולה יודעי סוד יכולים להבינו ולרדת
לעומק דעתו (ומכאן תשובה לאלו השואלים האם החפץ חיים עסק בקבלה).
בספר
בגדי תפארתך מר’ י”א רוזנבוים (ביתר תשע”ד עמ’ 23) מובאת דרך מקורית
נוספת והיא שינוי סדר המילים במ”ב: פרסות הרגל עד השוק [ו(השוק) הוא עד מקום
שנקרא קניא (ברך) בל”א] במקום שדרכן לילך יחף (ואז האזור שמפרסות הרגל עד
השוק מגולה) מותר לקרות כנגדו (היינו כנגד האזור הנ”ל, אבל למעלה מכפות
הרגלים חשיב שוק ואסור לגלותו או לקרות כנגדו, ואינו תלוי במנהג המקומות). כלומר
הוא משכתב מחדש את דברי המ”ב (ולפי השיכתוב מסתבר שהמ”ב סובר שהשוק היא
החלק התחתון) ואח”כ מסביר במפורש “שזה מה שבאמת הח”ח רצה
לכתוב” (אך קרה מה שקרה ובאה יד המלאך ודחפה את ידו של הח”ח ובמקום
לכתוב את הנ”ל כתב מה שכתב ואין להתייחס לדבריו). בדרך זו ניתן לשכתב את כל
התורה כולה כי הלא אנו יודעים יותר מכותבי הדברים מה באמת היתה כוונתם.
בדרך
גאונית דומה נוקט בקונטרס “שוקיו עמודי שש” (חש”מ, ירושלים
תשע”ב) המסביר שהמ”ב בא להגן על כבודו של הפמ”ג, ולכן משנה את
דבריו וכותב בצורה נסתרת (שרק בעלי סוד יכולים להבין) את כוונתו והיא שבאמת השוק
הוא החלק התחתון. בקונטרס התנהגות בין אנשים לנשים עפ”י הלכה (ר’ יוסף יצחק
ראזענפעלד, מאנסי תשס”א) עמ’ ע”ב כותב: “יש אומרים שדברי המ”ב
האלו, לא הוא כתבם”. גם זו שיטה מקורית ביותר. מהיום והלאה כל מה שלא נראה
למאן דהוא בספר כלשהוא יכתוב בצידי הספר “לא הוא כתבם” ושלום על ישראל
(ולקמן מובא סיפור משעשע בנושא לא הוא כתבם).
בספר
הצניעות בהלכה מר’ שמואל הלוי שישא מסביר שיש חוסר הבנה במבנה רגל האדם ביחס לרגל
הבהמה ואם נשוה אותם נגלה שבשניהם השוק הוא החלק התחתון ומסביר שהפ”מ
“טעה” (פשוטו כמשמעו) וחזר בו (בשו”ת מגידות) והמ”ב נגרר
אחריו ולא ידע שהפ”מ חזר בו. יוצא מדבריו שגם הפמ”ג וגם המ”ב טעו
ואין להם הבנה במבנה רגל הבהמה ורגל האדם (וכנראה אינו דורש את הפסוק בקהלת ג יט
“ומותר האדם מן הבהמה, אין”). כלומר, לדבריו אין יותר בעיה לחלוק על
הראשונים, אלא כל דבר שלא נראה למאן דהוא יכתוב שטעה המחבר כיון שלא ידע ונפטרה
הבעיה.
בירחון
ישורון (גליון ל”א עמ’ תתל”ד, מאמר “לדרכי פסיקת המ”ב
והחזו”א”) מר’ יהושע ענבל, כותב שבנושא יסודי אחד מיקל המ”ב, והרבה
פוסקים תמהו על קולתו, ומ”מ המנהג הוא כמו פשרה. לדעת המ”ב שוק הוא החלק
העליון של הרגל, ואין לחלק התחתון דין ערוה. אמנם הוא תמוה… ולכן אנן פוסקים
שצריך לכסות, אבל מקילים שהכיסוי (של חלק “התחתון” של השוק) יהיה
ע”י גרב בצורת הרגל ובצבע הרגל… כלומר מדבריו יוצא הסבר מקורי ביותר, ששני
חלקי הרגל נקראים שוק, אלא יש שוק עליון ושוק תחתון ואנו מקילים בשוק התחתון לגרוב
גרביונים, כלומר הוא ביטל במחי יד את אבר הירך וקורא לו שוק עליון (ולדבריו נראה
שמספיק שאורך השמלה תהיה עד הברך ותו לא).
מומלץ
לכל אחד לעיין בספרים אלא ולא להסתמך על המובא כאן, לכולם יש מכנה אחד משותף והוא,
שהם קובעים בצורה החלטית שהמ”ב והפ”מ טעו בצורה זו או אחרת בדבר מיקום
השוק ולכן אין לקבל את דבריהם להלכה. כותב כך במפורש בספר אחותי כלה (ר’ אברהם
ארבל, תשס”ז עמ’ קל”ח סימן יא) שאין שום ספק שהמ”ב טעה (ובלשונו:
נדחה) וצריך לקיים מצוות לא תגורו מפני איש… ואין נושאים פנים בהלכה וכו’,
ובהמשך דבריו מביא את דברי ר’ שלמה אבינר בספר גן נעול (בענין כח ההכרעה של המ”ב),
המצטט את ר”ח גורדזינסקי בשו”ת אחיעזר, פרקי חיים תר”ע “לאחר
שיביע הח”ח את דעתו, מצווים אנו לא לחלוק על דבריו כנאמר לא תחלוק על
רב”. וכן דברי ר’ אלחנן וסרמן בתולדות הח”ח עמ’ תע”ח “דברי
הח”ח הם כדברי הראשונים שאין לאל ידי האחרונים ואפילו הגדולים לחלוק
עליהם”, ומסיים (א”א הנ”ל, שלמרות דבריהם, הוא) לא מאמין שיצאו
דברים אלו מפי הגדולים הנ”ל, אלא תלמיד טועה כתבם… (ועיין באגרות משה מר’
משה פיינשטיין, יו”ד ח”ג סימן קט”ו, בדבר ספר פירושי התורה לר’
יהודה החסיד וספר “הציוני” על התורה, שמביאים דברים זרים ויש לאסרם…
וע”ז עונה בשו”ת משנה הלכות מר’ מנשה קליין, חי”ב סימן רי”ד
שאינו מאמין שדברים אלו יצאו מפי הגרמ”פ, אלא נראה לפי עניות דעתו שאיזה
תלמיד טועה כתב את התשובה והכניסה בין כתביו לאחר פטירתו… ולא ר”מ
פיינשטיין כתבה).
אפילו
נניח שיש במ”ב איזו שהיא שגגה או ט”ס, המ”ב חוזר על דבריו בסימן
קכ”ח ס”ק ט”ז “בתי שוקים (מה שאנו קוראים מגפיים) – הוא
מנעלים ארֻכים המגיעים עד ארכובות הרגל, היינו סמוך לשוק…” לא מסתבר
שהמ”ב יחזור על אותה שגגה בדבר מיקום השוק פעמיים. במהדורת המ”ב עם
הערות ביצחק יקרא מר’ אביגדור הלוי נבנצל (ירושלים תשס”ד), בהשלמות בסוף
ח”א כותב “שמעתי מאדמו”ר זללה”ה (הכוונה לר’ שלמה זלמן
אויערבאך שהיה פוסק הדור ורבו המובהק) להקל כמשנ”ב, אבל לא רצה להורות לקולא
למי ששאל אותו” (ועיין באגרות משה אה”ע ח”ד סימן ק’ אות ד).
דברים
אלו (של א”א הנ”ל) חמורים ביותר ובעלי השלכות מרחיקות לכת. ראשית הוא
כותב בהחלטיות שהמ”ב טועה ואין לערער בדבר. שנית, קובע שאיזה תלמיד טועה שם
דברי שקר בפי האחיעזר ור’ אלחנן וסרמן. א”כ לדבריו, איבדנו את אמונת החכמים
ואת האמון בכל מה שמובא בספר כלשהוא, ויכול כל אחד לבנות במה לעצמו ולומר לא נראים
הדברים, תלמיד טועה כתבם וכו’ וכו’, ועוד לפי מסקנת דבריו יוצא שמבטל במחי יד את
כל נאמנות מסירת התורה שבכתב ובע”פ ועל זה נאמר “חכמים הזהרו
בדבריכם”.
ידוע
במדע האקולוגיה שכאשר משנים דבר ידוע וקבוע עלולים להתקל בתוצאות בלתי רצויות
וצפויות מראש. לדוגמא נהר הנילוס זרם במשך אלפי שנים וגרם לאדמת מצרים סביבותיו
להיות פוריה ביותר בשל המשקעים שנשא עמו (כמובא בסוף ספר בראשית ותחילת ספר שמות).
כאשר בנו את סכר אסואן, במטרה שתהיה אספקת מים סדירה, הוא חסם את המשקעים ופריון
האדמה ירד בצורה חדה ועמו כמות היבול שהניבה ומעתה היו צריכים לספק זבלים לחקלאים
דבר שהעלה את עלות הגידולים. באופן דומה, בשל הרצון להתרחק מהמלבוש הציוני
והרחובי, שינו את לבוש הנשים שהיה נהוג במשך אלפי שנים, ועקב כך נוצר מצב שאבר
שהיה תמיד מכוסה (ללא קשר שמו), כעת תמיד מגולה לשליש לחצי או לרביע. וכדי לחפות
על הדבר, במקום לחזור למנהג המקורי של לבישת שמלות ארוכות דורשים מהנשים שילבשו
גרביונים יותר ויותר עבים, דבר המאוד לא נוח ביחוד בימי הקיץ הלוהטים, ומסבירים
להם זאת שזו מסירות הנפש שלהם (משהוא בדומה למסירות הנפש של הצפרדעים במצרים שקפצו
לתנורים).
לסיכום
נביא מקצת דברי שבח שנאמרו על המ”ב. בספר שיעורי משמר הלוי על מסכת ערכין,
(משה מרדכי שולזינגר, ב”ב, תשע”ב עמ’ רכ”ב) כותב: יש לדעת, אין כזה
דבר טעות במ”ב… וסיפר שפעם נפגשה בת מבית יעקב עם בחור ישיבה, והבחור אמר
לה שלפעמים מוצאים טעויות במ”ב. הלך אבי הבת אל הרב שך זצ”ל וסיפר לו
דברים כהווייתן, נזדעזע מרן זצ”ל ואמר לו נחרצות, מיד תלך ותנתק את השידוך…
כי לדבר כך זה גובל באפיקורסות.
במ”ב
המבואר ברכת אשר מר’ אפרים פאדאווער (ברוקלין, תש”ע) עמ’ 62, כללי הפסק בנוגע
להמ”ב והבה”ל כותב ששמע בע”פ מהגאון ר’ חיים קנייבסקי… שאלתי את
הגר”ח אם אמת הוא מה שאומרים שכשנדמה שיש סתירה בין דברי המ”ב במקום אחד
לדבריו במקום אחר, שאפשר לתרץ ולומר שאחד מהם נכתב ע”י הח”ח בעצמו והאחר
ע”י בנו או חתנו ושהם כתבו דינם ע”פ מקורות אחרים? והשיב לי רבינו
שליט”א (ר”ח קנייבסקי) שאינו אמת כלל, ובשום אופן א”א לתרץ כן…
והוסיף לי… שאף שאמת הוא שיש סימנים במ”ב שעיקרם נכתבו ע”י בנו או
חתנו זצ”ל, מ”מ הח”ח עבר עליהם בעצמו והסכים עליהם. ונמצא שבסופו
של דבר כל המ”ב יצא מתחת ידו של מרן הח”ח זצ”ל בעצמו…
בחוברת
יחלק שלל, גליון ה’ עמ’ כ”ו סימן ד’, מהליכותיו בתפילה של ר’ הלל זקס מובא
שנזף במי שאמר שהחפץ חיים היה בעצמו לא נוהג בכמה דברים להלכה כפי שכתב
במ”ב… והקפיד על כך מאוד ואמר שזהו דבר שאסור לאומרו… ונסיים בדברי החזון
אי”ש הידועים בקובץ אגרות ח”ב אגרת מ”א: סוף דבר ההוראה המקובלת
מפי רבותינו אשר מפיהם אנו חיים, כמו הב”י ומ”א והמ”ב… היא הוראה
מקוימת כמו מפי סנהדרין בלשכת הגזית…



Rabboni Jesus – Confirmation from the Talmud?

Rabboni Jesus – Confirmation from the Talmud?
David M. Goldenberg*
The exchange one year ago between Pope Francis and Prime Minister Netanyahu over the language spoken by Jesus overshadowed any other news of the pope’s visit to Israel. The pope was right, of course, Jesus spoke Aramaic, not Hebrew, although Netanyahu could have offered a better rejoinder than his weak “But he knew Hebrew.” He could have said: “But he prayed in Hebrew.”
Among the proofs that Aramaic was the spoken language of Jesus’ time and place is the evidence of the New Testament, which no doubt informed the pope’s comment. Of the Aramaic words and phrases recorded in this text, perhaps the most cited is the word rabbouni (ραββουνι) or rabboni (ραββωνι), which is how Jesus is referred to by the blind man in Mark 10:51 and by Mary Magdalene in John 20:16. The text in John glosses the word by adding: “which means teacher.”
Years ago the spelling of this word caused confusion, since Jewish Aramaic and Hebrew texts traditionally vocalize the first letter with a ḥiriq (as in ribbono shel  ‘olam). But then the pataḥ vocalization was discovered in Palestinian Targum fragments from the geniza and in Targum Neofiti, as also in Samaritan Aramaic texts.  Some time later it was also found in Hebrew manuscripts.  Where the Mishna in Ta’anit 3.8 records Ḥoni ha-Ma’agal’s reference to God as ribbono shel olam, both MS Kaufmann and MS Parma vocalize the first word with pataḥ (Kaufmann as rabbuno; Parma as rabbono). Then geniza liturgical fragments of birkhot ha-shaḥar (Palestinian rite) turned up with the phrase רבון כל העולמים vocalized with a pataḥ under the resh.[1]
MSS Kaufmann and Parma have another point in common: as opposed to the printed editions of the Mishna, the original text of the manuscripts does not have the words של עולם; Kaufmann has them added above the line, and Parma in the margin (in both cases as clitics, written as one word). As scholars have noted, this indicates that the original was רבוני alone but a later hand added של עולם and extended the yod of רבוני (which is grammatically required and graphically obvious) to make it into a vav, thus producing עולם של רבונו.
The first person possessive suffix recalls the New Testament reference to Jesus as rabbouni /rabboni. In addition to the New Testament, the word with the first person suffix (‘my teacher’) is commonly found in several of the Aramaic texts mentioned above.  In regard to Hebrew texts, besides MSS Kaufmann and Parma, רבוני is commonly found in geniza manuscripts of Hebrew midrashic works. A search of the word on the Friedberg Genizah database (genizah.org) results in 23 hits of רבוני, all but one in Hebrew texts, and that figure does not even take into account cases where the reading is obvious but not certain and the search results did not therefore include it.[2]
An interesting example of רבוני in a Hebrew context is found in a reconstructed text of Bavli, ’Avoda Zara 17a. Here we find the story of R. Eliezer’s arrest for heresy. R. Eliezer, who lived in the second half of the first century and the beginning of the second century, explained his heresy to R. Akiva as follows (additions in curly brackets follow the uncensored Munich 95 and Paris 1337 manuscripts):

פעם אחת הייתי מהלך בשוק העליון של ציפורי ומצאתי אחד {מתלמידי יש”ו הנוצרי} ויעקב איש כפר סכניא שמו אמר לי כתוב בתורתכם (דברים כג) לא תביא אתנן זונה [וגו’] מהו לעשות הימנו בהכ”ס לכ”ג ולא אמרתי לו כלום אמר לי כך לימדני {יש”ו הנוצרי} (מיכה א) [כי] מאתנן זונה קבצה ועד אתנן זונה ישובו ממקום הטנופת באו למקום הטנופת ילכו. 

Translation: I was once walking in the upper market of Sepphoris when I came across one of the disciples of Jesus the Nazarene, Jacob of Kefar Sekhania by name, who said to me: “It is written in your Torah, You shall not bring the hire of a harlot . . . into the house of the Lord your  God (Deut. 23:19). May such money be used to build a toilet for the High Priest? I didn’t answer him. He said to me: “Thus Jesus the Nazarene taught me: For of the hire of a harlot has she gathered them and to the hire of a harlot shall they return (Micah 1:7) – They came from a place of filth, let them go to a place of filth.”

In place of אמר לי כך לימדני {יש”ו הנוצרי} [כי] מאתנן זונה קבצה…., the superior Marx-Abramson manuscript (JTS Rab 15) of ’Avoda Zara reads:  אמ’ לי כך למדו ישו רבו כי מאתנן זונה קבצה …. with an inserted ש over the כ of כך, and a notation mark inserted above the line between רבו and כי, as seen below.

In the printed edition, as well as MSS Paris and Munich, R. Eliezer recounts the disciple’s comments in direct discourse: “He said to me: ‘It is written in your Torah ….’” and “He said to me: ‘Thus Jesus the Nazarene taught me/us ….’” MS JTS, however, presents the first phrase in direct discourse, but the second in indirect discourse, as indicated by the third person pronominal suffixes in למדו and רבו (“Thus Jesus his teacher taught him”). Thus,[3]
Ed.:                 אמר לי כך לימדני [כי] אמר לי כתוב בתורתכם /
Paris:               אמ’ לי כתו’ בתורת’ / אמ’ לי כך למדנו ישו הנוצרי כי
Munich:  א’ לי כתו’ בתורתכ’ / א’ לי כך למדני ישו הנוצרי כי
JTS:           אמ’ לי כתוב כתורתכם / אמ’ לי [ש]כך למדו ישו רבו כי
The change to indirect discourse was, no doubt, what caused the scribe to insert the ש above כך. But clearly direct discourse is called for as indicated by the preceding direct discourse in אמר לי כתוב in MS JTS, and in the lack of ש in ישו כך לימדני/למדנו אמר לי in the other witnesses. What would have caused the (confusing) change to indirect discourse in the MS JTS?  
The notation mark above the line between רבו and כי gives a clue. That mark points to a marginal notation. Such notations in this manuscript often refer to another reading of the indicated text. Unfortunately, whatever the scribe wrote in the left margin has been covered by a strip of paper glued to the page to strengthen it and prevent its separation from the codex. But I wouldn’t be surprised if the marginal comment presented the reading רבוני, like that found in the Kaufmann and Parma manuscripts of the Mishna Ta’anit.  Perhaps an indication that רבוני was the original reading is the directly following quote from Micah 1:7, which begins with the word כי (כי מאתנן זונה קבצה ועד אתנן זונה ישובו). The anomalous reading of  רבוin MS JTS may well have derived from an original רבוני, which became רבו כי due to the graphic similarity of kaf and nun, and the fact that the verse in Micah began with כי. Once רבוני became רבו כי, other changes were required to conform to the third person suffix of רבו and the resulting indirect discourse of the text, and so לימדני was changed to למדו and a ש was inserted to turn כך into שכך. The missing כי in the printed edition may also derive from this confusion.
If this reconstruction is correct, not only do we have another case of the Hebrew word רבון with a first person pronominal suffix (רבוני ), but the word is used to refer to Jesus just as it is in the New Testament. So in addition to the blind man and Mary Magdalene, we have another who called Jesus רבוני – Jacob of Kefar Sekhania, the disciple of Jesus, who taught R. Eliezer an interpretation of a biblical verse.
The Gospel of John glosses the word רבוני as ‘teacher.’ Shouldn’t the possessive suffix (רבוני) require a translation ‘my teacher,’ just as the Aramaic and Hebrew uses of the word clearly indicate a translation ‘my teacher’?[4] Not necessarily. A translation without the possessive would be similar to the term רבי/Rabbi, in which the suffix lost its possessive meaning (‘my’) and the word, as a frozen term, came to mean ‘teacher’ or ‘master.’ Support for this may be found, although from a later period, in Arabic literature. The Qur’an (5:47, 66) preserves the word رباني (rabbānī), which, as the Kisters (father and son) showed, derives from רבוני.[5] But the word cannot mean ‘my teacher’ because in the Qur’anic context it appears in the absolute plural: ربانيون (rabbānīyuna) i.e., ‘teachers.’ In other words, the final vowel in רבוני did not function as a pronominal suffix, as the Kisters noted. The word, rather, evolved as a frozen term from an original meaning ‘my teacher’ into the meaning ‘teacher,’ just as John glossed rabbouni as ‘teacher,’ and just as רבי evolved in meaning from ‘my teacher/master’ to ‘teacher/master’ (Rabbi), which, incidentally, is how John elsewhere (1:38) translates rabbi (ραββι). Y. Kutscher explained the word רבן (as in רבן גמליאל) the same way, comparing it with the French monsignor.[6] In the final analysis, not only was the pope right that Jesus spoke Aramaic, but the evidence of Jesus’ speech in the New Testament records precisely the pronunciation and meaning of the Aramaic of his time and place.

* See David M. Goldenberg’s other articles on his website at http://sites.sas.upenn.edu/dmg2 or at https://upenn.academia.edu/DavidGoldenberg.

[1] See Ḥ. Yalon in Leshonenu 24 (1960) 162; Y. Kutscher, “Leshon ḥazal,” in Sefer anok Yalon (Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 268-271 (reprinted in Kutscher, Meḥqarim be-Ivrit uve-Aramit, Jerusalem, 1977, pp. צה-צח); Z. Ben-Ḥayyim. ’Ivrit we-Aramit nusaḥ Shomron 3.2 (Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 37-38. Targum Neofit references are in Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period (Ramat-Gan/Baltimore, 1990, 2003), s.v. רבון. In addition to the references in these articles, note that a Syriac version of the original Greek Transitus beatae Mariae virginis has Mary refer to Jesus as “Rabbuli, the messiah” which W. Wright takes as “Rabbuni, the messiah” (W. Wright, trans. and notes, Contributions to the Apocryphal Literature of the New Testament, collected and edited from Syriac Manuscripts in the British Museum, London, 1865), pp. 19, trans.; 28 text; 60 note.  The liturgical fragments: Naftali Wieder, “Ha-ṣura rabbun bi-mqorot ’Ivriim,” Leshonenu 27-28 (1963-64) 214-217.
[2] With two exceptions (a piyyu‹ and a medieval letter), all are midrashic texts.
[3] The readings from MSS Paris and Munich are taken fromשאול ליברמן  מאגר עדי הנוסח של התלמוד הבבלי ע”ש = Sol and Evelyn Henkind Talmud Text Databank.
[4] Of the 23 instances recorded in the Friedberg database, all but one are petitions to God as רבוני, usually made by Moses. One (T-S Misc. 36.198 2v, lines 14 and 16) parallel רבוני and מרי, ’my master.’ In Aramaic, e.g., Targum Neofiti translates אדוני אברהם in Gen. 24:27 as רבוני אברהם.
[5] M.Y. and Menaḥem Kister, “Al Yehudei Arav — he’arot,” Tarbiẓ 48 (1979), pp. 233-234.
[6] Y. Kutscher, “Ha-Aramit shel ha-Shomronim,” in his Meḥqarim be-Ivrit uve-Aramit, Jerusalem, 1977, pp. רסג-רסב.



“Be-Esek Atevata”: A Contextual Interpretation of an Elusive Phrase in Akdamut Millin

“Be-Esek Atevata”: A Contextual Interpretation of an Elusive Phrase in Akdamut Millin
by David S. Zinberg
A centerpiece of the Ashkenazic liturgy for Shavuot, Akdamut Millin is an artistically sophisticated, epically dramatic, and emotionally charged piyyut.  After nearly a millennium, the liturgical-narrative masterpiece of R. Meir ben Yitzhak Sheliah Tzibbur continues to intrigue and to inspire.[1] 
Towards the middle of the poem, the poet abruptly changes scenes.  Speaking in his own voice, he announces that he will now praise God “before empires”:

שְׁבַח ריבון עַלְמָא, אֲמִירָא דַכְוָתָא:
שְׁפַר עֲלֵיהּ לְחַווּיֵהּ, בְּאַפֵּי מַלְכְּוָתָא:
What follows, without warning, is a confrontation – almost a poetic disputation – between the gentile nations and Israel. 

Intended, perhaps, to evoke the insecurity of the Jewish experience, the narrative turn is unexpected and jarring.  Following a meditation on the heavenly realms and the superiority of Israel over the angels, the poet imagines a coalition of nations gathering, “like waves,” to confront the Jewish community. 
Their tone first seems benign, even sympathetic.  They are impressed by the Jews and their steadfast religious devotion.  But their assimilationist agenda, backed by a hint of violence – “Join us, it’s for your own good, you know” — comes to the surface before long.
In these six lines, the nations appear and present their argument:

1          תָּאִין וּמִתְכַּנְשִׁין, כְּחֵיזוּ אַדְוָתָא:
2          תְּמֵהִין וְשַׁיְילִין לֵיהּ, בְּעֵסֶק אַתְוָתָא:
3          מְנָן וּמָאן הוּא רְחִימָךְ, שַׁפִּירָא בְּרֵיוָתָא:
4          אֲרוּם בְּגִינֵהּ סָפִית, מְדוֹר אַרְיְוָתָא:
5          יְקָרָא וְיָאָה אַתְּ אִין תַּעַרְבִי לְמַרְוָתָא:
6          רְעוּתֵךְ נַעֲבֵיד לִיךְ, בְּכָל אַתְרְוָתָא:

My translation:

1          They approach, gathering like waves
2          Amazed, question one another about her signs
3          “From where and who is your Beloved, most beautiful,
4          For whose sake you perish in the lions’ den?
5          You are so dear and so lovely!  If you join the hegemony,
6          We will grant you whatever you desire, everywhere”

This finely crafted passage is woven from a set of midrashim revolving around a dialogue in the Song of Songs (5:8-6:2) between the רַעְיָה, the beloved woman, and בְּנוֹת יְרוּשָׁלָיִם, the daughters of Jerusalem.
Below is the text separated by speaker:

הָרַעְיָה:
הִשְׁבַּעְתִּי אֶתְכֶם בְּנוֹת יְרוּשָׁלִָם אִם תִּמְצְאוּ אֶת דּוֹדִי מַה תַּגִּידוּ לוֹ שֶׁחוֹלַת אַהֲבָה אָנִי:

בְּנוֹת יְרוּשָׁלָיִם:
מַה דּוֹדֵךְ מִדּוֹד הַיָּפָה בַּנָּשִׁים מַה דּוֹדֵךְ מִדּוֹד שֶׁכָּכָה הִשְׁבַּעְתָּנוּ:

הָרַעְיָה:
דּוֹדִי צַח וְאָדוֹם דָּגוּל מֵרְבָבָה:
רֹאשׁוֹ כֶּתֶם פָּז קְוֻצּוֹתָיו תַּלְתַּלִּים שְׁחֹרוֹת כָּעוֹרֵב:
עֵינָיו כְּיוֹנִים עַל אֲפִיקֵי מָיִם רֹחֲצוֹת בֶּחָלָב יֹשְׁבוֹת עַל מִלֵּאת:
לְחָיָו כַּעֲרוּגַת הַבֹּשֶׂם מִגְדְּלוֹת מֶרְקָחִים שִׂפְתוֹתָיו שׁוֹשַׁנִּים נֹטְפוֹת מוֹר עֹבֵר:
יָדָיו גְּלִילֵי זָהָב מְמֻלָּאִים בַּתַּרְשִׁישׁ מֵעָיו עֶשֶׁת שֵׁן מְעֻלֶּפֶת סַפִּירִים:
שׁוֹקָיו עַמּוּדֵי שֵׁשׁ מְיֻסָּדִים עַל אַדְנֵי פָז מַרְאֵהוּ כַּלְּבָנוֹן בָּחוּר כָּאֲרָזִים:
חִכּוֹ מַמְתַקִּים וְכֻלּוֹ מַחֲמַדִּים זֶה דוֹדִי וְזֶה רֵעִי בְּנוֹת יְרוּשָׁלִָם:

בְּנוֹת יְרוּשָׁלָיִם:
אָנָה הָלַךְ דּוֹדֵךְ הַיָּפָה בַּנָּשִׁים אָנָה פָּנָה דוֹדֵךְ וּנְבַקְשֶׁנּוּ עִמָּךְ:

הָרַעְיָה:
דּוֹדִי יָרַד לְגַנּוֹ לַעֲרוּגוֹת הַבֹּשֶׂם לִרְעוֹת בַּגַּנִּים וְלִלְקֹט שׁוֹשַׁנִּים:
אֲנִי לְדוֹדִי וְדוֹדִי לִי הָרֹעֶה בַּשּׁוֹשַׁנִּים:

The רַעְיָה begs the Jerusalemite girls to find her love and to tell him of her longing.  They first ask, מַה דּוֹדֵךְ מִדּוֹד – how will we identify him?  In response, she provides detailed signs, in seven lines of verse, of his beauty and charm.  Their next question follows naturally:
אָנָה הָלַךְ דּוֹדֵךְ הַיָּפָה בַּנָּשִׁים אָנָה פָּנָה דוֹדֵךְ וּנְבַקְשֶׁנּוּ עִמָּךְ — now that we know something about your beloved, where did he go?  Tell us, and we will help you search for him. 
In the allegorical reading of the Song – and in the poet’s imagination – the רַעְיָה is Israel, the דּוֹד is God, and the daughters of Jerusalem represent the nations. 
Below are excerpts from the midrashic sources relevant to our passage (language which inspired the poet is highlighted in bold):

מכילתא דרבי ישמעאל בשלח – מסכתא דשירה ג
זה אלי . . . ר’ עקיבא אומר אדבר בנאותיו ובשבחיו של מי שאמר והיה העולם בפני כל אומות העולם. שהרי אומות העולם שואלין את ישראל לומר מה דודך מדוד שככה השבעתנו (שיר השירים ה) שכך אתם מתים עליו וכך אתם נהרגין עליו שנ’ על כן עלמות אהבוך (שם א) אהבוך עד מות, וכתיב כי עליך הורגנו כל היום (תהלים מד). הרי אתם נאים, הרי אתם גבורים, בואו והתערבו עמנו. וישראל אומרים להם לאומות העולם, מכירין אתם אותו [2]נאמר לכם מקצת שבחו: דודי צח ואדום דגול מרבבה (שיר השירים ה). כיון ששומעין שכך שבחו אומרים לישראל נלכה עמכם שנ’ אנה הולך דודך היפה בנשים אנה פנה דודך ונבקשנו עמך (שם ו) וישראל אומרים להם אין לכם חלק בו אלא דודי לי ואני לו וגו’ (שם ב) אני לדודי ודודי לי הרועה בשושנים (שם ו).
במדבר רבה ב:ד

אִישׁ עַל-דִּגְלוֹ בְאֹתֹת (במדבר ב): הה”ד (שיר השירים ו) מי זאת הנשקפה כמו שחר יפה כלבנה ברה כחמה אימה כנדגלות.  קדושים וגדולים היו ישראל בדגליהם וכל האומות מסתכלין בהם ותמהין ואומרים מי זאת הנשקפה וגו’ אומרים להם האומות שובי שובי השולמית (שיר השירים ז) הדבקו לנו בואו אצלנו ואנו עושין אתכם שלטונים הגמונים דוכסין אפרכין אסטרטליטין, שובי שובי ונחזה בך ואין נחזה אלא שררה שכן אמר יתרו למשה (שמות יט) ואתה תחזה וגו’ שובי שובי ונחזה בך
במדבר רבה ב:טז

ד”א והיה במקום וגו’ הה”ד (שיר השירים ח) מים רבים לא יוכלו לכבות את האהבה וגו’ ואומר אם יתן איש את וגו’ אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמן בשתי אהבות הכתוב הזה מדבר. ראשו מדבר באהבתו של ישראל. שאם יתכנסו כל אומות העולם ליטול את האהבה שבינו לבין ישראל אינן יכולין, שנאמר מים רבים לא יוכלו לכבות את האהבה ואין מים רבים אלא אומות העולם שנאמר (ישעיה יז) הוי המון עמים רבים וגו’.
שמות רבה כג:ה
מראש שניר (שיר השירים ד), בזכות יצחק, וחרמון, בזכות יעקב, ממעונות אריות, גלות בבל ומדי, מהררי נמרים, זו אדום
Below, we match each line or half-line from our Akdamut passage to its associated biblical or midrashic expression.  Note how each phrase either quotes directly from or alludes to imagery in the Song and its related midrashim.  For now, we will leave line 2 aside.  This line will be addressed separately.
1          תָּאִין וּמִתְכַּנְשִׁין כְּחֵיזוּ אַדְוָתָא
מים רבים לא יוכלו לכבות את האהבה וגו’ . . .  שאם יתכנסו כל אומות העולם ליטול את האהבה שבינו לבין ישראל אינן יכולין . . .ואין מים רבים אלא אומות העולם . ) . . במדבר רבה ב:טז(
 
3          מְנָן וּמָאן הוּא רְחִימָךְ, שַׁפִּירָא בְּרֵיוָתָא
שהרי אומות העולם שואלין את ישראל לומר מַה דּוֹדֵךְ מִדּוֹד שֶׁכָּכָה הִשְׁבַּעְתָּנוּ )מכילתא דרבי ישמעאל בשלח – מסכתא דשירה ג(
1.      מְנָן (“from where”) — אָנָה הָלַךְ דּוֹדֵךְ הַיָּפָה בַּנָּשִׁים אָנָה פָּנָה דוֹדֵךְ
2.      וּמָאן  — (“and who”)מַה דּוֹדֵךְ מִדּוֹד הַיָּפָה בַּנָּשִׁים

4a        אֲרוּם בְּגִינֵהּ סָפִית
שכך אתם מתים עליו וכך אתם נהרגין עליו[3])  מכילתא דר”י שם(
4b        מְדוֹר אַרְיְוָתָא
ממעונות אריות, גלות בבל ומדי, מהררי נמרים, זו אדום (שמות רבה כג:ה)  
         יְקָרָא וְיָאָה אַתְּ, אִין תַּעַרְבִי לְמַרְוָתָא
הרי אתם נאים, הרי אתם גבורים, בואו והתערבו עמנו) מכילתא דר”י שם(
         רְעוּתֵךְ נַעֲבֵיד לִיךְ, בְּכָל אַתְרְוָתָא
הדבקו לנו בואו אצלנו ואנו עושין אתכם שלטונים הגמונים דוכסין אפרכין אסטרטליטין) מכילתא דר”י שם(
Line 2 of this Akdamut passage – תְּמֵהִין וְשַׁיְילִין לֵיהּ, בְּעֵסֶק אַתְוָתָא – is particularly challenging.  What does the poet mean by בְּעֵסֶק אַתְוָתָא?  To which “signs” (אַתְוָתָא = אותות) does he refer?
Several translators and commentators on Akdamut interpret אַתְוָתָא as “miracles.”[4]  But that rendering is completely unsatisfactory, as this section of the poem does not address miracles.  Furthermore, in all the source-midrashim from which the nations’ argument is derived, there is no reference to miracles.  Indeed, had it referred to “miracles,” this line would be an aberration, as every other phrase in these six lines echoes specific language in the sources cited.

Taking a completely different approach, the ArtScroll Machzor renders אַתְוָתָא as “proofs”; i.e., in light of Israel’s endless suffering in exile, the nations demand proof that God still watches over Israel and plans to send the Messiah to redeem her.[5]

This interpretation has some merit, since it links line 2 to the nations’ adjacent observation regarding Israel’s persecution, i.e., אֲרוּם בְּגִינֵהּ סָפִית, מְדוֹר אַרְיְוָתָא (line 4).  Still, “proofs” is forced and unsupported by the biblical and midrashic sources.

I believe, instead, that the correct translation of בְּעֵסֶק אַתְוָתָא is “about her signs,” i.e., Israel’s signs.  This phrase was clearly borrowed from the Bemidbar Rabba passage (2:4) cited above, a discourse on the banners or “signs” (אֹתוֹת) of the tribes, as described in Numbers 2:2.  Note the association in Bemidbar Rabba 2:4 between עַל-דִּגְלוֹ בְאֹתֹת of Numbers and אימה כנדגלות of Song 6:10.  The Sages read the latter as a reference by the nations to Israel’s impressive banners (נדגלות = דגלים). 

Also note how the poet’s תְּמֵהִין וְשַׁיְילִין לֵיהּ is taken nearly verbatim from the expression וכל האומות מסתכלין בהם ותמהין ואומרים of Bemidbar Rabba, which is used in the context of the flags.   

Of course, the biblical אֹתוֹת often connotes an extraordinary, miraculous phenomenon.  For example:
וְהָיָה אִם-לֹא יַאֲמִינוּ גַּם לִשְׁנֵי הָאֹתוֹת הָאֵלֶּה וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּן לְקֹלֶךָ וְלָקַחְתָּ מִמֵּימֵי הַיְאֹר וְשָׁפַכְתָּ הַיַּבָּשָׁה וְהָיוּ הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר תִּקַּח מִן-הַיְאֹר וְהָיוּ לְדָם בַּיַּבָּשֶׁת  (שמות ד:ט)
וַיּוֹצִאֵנוּ ה’ מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָד חֲזָקָה וּבִזְרֹעַ נְטוּיָה וּבְמֹרָא גָּדֹל וּבְאֹתוֹת וּבְמֹפְתִים  (דברים כו:ח)
However, it appears certain – based on Bemidbar Rabba 2:4 – that the “signs” to which line 2 refers are Israel’s flags, rather than God’s miracles. Here, then, is the final midrashic source for our Akdamut passage:  
2          תְּמֵהִין וְשַׁיְילִין לֵיהּ, בְּעֵסֶק אַתְוָתָא
איש על דגלו באותות – הה”ד מי זאת הנשקפה וגו’ קדושים וגדולים היו ישראל בדגליהם וכל האומות מסתכלין בהם ותמהין ואומרים מי זאת הנשקפה וגו’)  במדבר רבה ב:ד(
What may have motivated the interpretation of אַתְוָתָא as “miracles” was a presumed link between two distinct reactions of the nations: תְּמֵהִין וְשַׁיְילִין לֵיה of line 2 andמְנָן וּמָאן הוּא רְחִימָך of line 3.
The nations’ focus in line 3 is, of course, on God (רְחִימָךְ – your Beloved).  The phrase מְנָן וּמָאן הוּא רְחִימָך is a conflation of אָנָה הָלַךְ דּוֹדֵךְ and מַה דּוֹדֵךְ מִדּוֹד, whose referent is God.  But in line 1 — תָּאִין וּמִתְכַּנְשִׁין — they accost Israel and, in line 2 — תְּמֵהִין וְשַׁיְילִין לֵיה — express wonder among themselves about Israel.  Their response in line 2 is to Israel, rather than to God.  They shift their inquiries to God only in line 3.

[1] On R. Meir ben Yitzhak, see Eliezer Landshut, Amudei Ha-Avoda (Berlin, 1862), pp. 162ff; Avraham Grossman, Hakhmei Ashkenaz Ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 292ff.
[2] The variant text in Mekhilta De-Rabbi Shimon Bar Yohai – אי אתם מכירין אותו – is more readable.
[3] See also Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba 7:1:
אומות העולם אומרות לישראל עד מתי אתם מתים על אלהיכם ומשלמין לו . . .  ועד מתי אתם נהרגין עליו . . .  ועד מתי אתם גומלין טובות עליו ולו לעצמו, והוא גומל לכם רעות
[4] E.g., Mahzor Le-Hag Ha-Shavuot, ed. Wolf Heidenheim (Rodelheim, 1805 and reprints); Mahzor Shavuot, ed. Yonah Fraenkel (Jerusalem, 2000), p. 390, n. 22; and, most recently, Jeffrey Hoffman, “Akdamut: History, Folklore, and Meaning,” The Jewish Quarterly Review, 99:2 (Spring 2009), p. 178.
[5] The Complete ArtScroll Machzor – Shavuos (Brooklyn, 1995), p. 269.  The note on p. 269 attributes this idea to Mevo Ha-Shir by Shmuel Hayyim Yellin (Pietrokow, 1926).  However, “proofs” was already proposed by Aharon ben Yehiel Mikhel Ha-Levi in his Mahzor commentary Mateh Levi.  Yellin renders בְּעֵסֶק אַתְוָתָא as “on the matter of the arrival (of the Messiah),” based on an erroneous association of אַתְוָתָא with ואתא, Aramaic for  ויבא (“he arrived”).  The comments of Mateh Levi and Mevo Ha-Shir can both be viewed here.



Megilat Rut: The night of Boaz and Rut Revisited

Megilat Rut[1]:
The night of Boaz and Rut Revisited
 By Chaim Sunitsky
In a well known story of Megilat
Rut, Naomi tells Ruth to bathe herself, put on her [best] clothes and go down
at night to where Boaz is sleeping. Boaz then will “tell her” what to do. The
simple implication of this story is that Ruth would be sent to make a marriage
proposal to Boaz who could simply consummate the marriage immediately.[2]
It has been already noted[3]
that the story of Boaz and Ruth contains many elements of “yibum” procedure and
therefore it was concluded that at that time “yibum” was practiced by other
close relatives, not just the brother of the deceased.[4]
In theory Boaz could have relations with Ruth and thus do yibum immediately
that night, but since there was a closer kin[5]
he did not touch Ruth but waited until the morning. When in the presence of the
elders Boaz offered the closer relative to redeem the fields left for Ruth, he
was willing to do this, but when Boaz stipulated that he would have to marry
Ruth as well he refused saying: פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי (lest I destroy
my “inheritance”). Hazal[6]
understand him to argue with Boaz’s opinion that a female from Moav is
permitted to “enter the congregation of Israel” i.e. marry a regular Jew. The
word “inheritance” is thus taken to mean descendants who will not be kosher
Jews and won’t be able to marry others in the Jewish nation[7]. 
Before we go on it’s important to
understand a related issue: in the laws of yibum, what is the meaning of
(Devarim 25:6): “The first child born shall stand up in memory of the deceased
brother.” Hazal understand this not to mean the actual name of the person but
rather to be talking about inheritance belonging to the deceased brother.
However they explain[8]
that this inheritance is transferred to the brother that did the yibum.
According to Shadal[9] this
explanation was needed in order to encourage[10]
the brother to want to do yibum, but the original meaning of the Torah was
actually that yibum caused financial loss to the brother doing it as he would
not partake of the inheritance[11]
as it would all belong to the son born[12].
Another important point we need
to discuss before we continue is the issue of “kri” and “ketiv”: “written” and
“read” forms of words. It is well known that certain words in Tanach are not
read the same way as they are written. The Talmud[13]
assumes that this is part of “halacha leMoshe miSinai[14]”
– part of oral traditions stemming from Moshe who received them at Mt. Sinai.
The difficulty with this is that many of these “kri” and “ketiv” forms are in
Neviim and Ketuvim – prophetic works written long after Moshe. R. Reuven
Margolies therefore concludes[15]  that the expression “halacha leMoshe
miSinai” can mean a decision in some generation by the Great Sanhedrin[16].
Another explanation of “kri” and “ketiv” is offered by Radak[17]
and others: the two are preserved in some of the cases when different
manuscripts[18] had
different version of the word(s). Another possibility[19]
is that “kri” can be a kind of correction to the “ketiv” that the “Men of Great
Assembly” made for various reasons. Many of the “kri” and “ketiv” cases in fact
support this last opinion[20].
Some of the “kri” and “ketiv” differ only in that one of them reads as two
words what the other reads as one word. For example, the “ketiv” in “Devarim
39:2 is “Eshadot” but the “kri” is “Esh” “Dat” – fire of religion. Shadal[21]
writes that Dat is a Persian word and therefore the original meaning must have
been according to the “ketiv[22]”.
Coming back to the story of Ruth,
the key verse (4:5) has a “written” and “read” form:
 וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז בְּיוֹם קְנוֹתְךָ הַשָּׂדֶה מִיַּד נָעֳמִי
וּמֵאֵת רוּת הַמּוֹאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת הַמֵּת קָנִיתָה לְהָקִים שֵׁם הַמֵּת
עַל נַחֲלָתוֹ
The key word is written קניתי but is read as קָנִיתָה. It has been noted by modern scholarship[23]
that according to the ketiv (the written form) an opposite[24]
from traditional understanding immerges. According to “ketiv” Boaz did
consummate the marriage and when talking to the kinsman he says that Ruth is
already his wife. If he will later have a child from Ruth, the child will
inherit her husband’s property and the money the other relative paid to redeem
the field will go to waste.[25]
This then is the meaning of the other relative’s rejection of the offer (4:6):
לֹא אוּכַל
<לגאול> לִגְאָל לִי פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי גְּאַל לְךָ אַתָּה אֶת
גְּאֻלָּתִי כִּי לֹא אוּכַל לִגְאֹל:
“I will not redeem lest I harm my inheritance”, literally
meaning he would lose the field he would purchase.
[1] Many reasons are offered as to why we read Megilat
Ruth on Shavuot, the simplest being that the main action takes place when
gathering barley and wheat crop, around the time of Shavuot.
[2] While most commentators try to avoid this obvious
interpretation, this is implied by Rut Rabbah 7:4. See also Taz, Yore Deah
192:1 who assumes this and discusses why the gezeira of seven days due to “dam
chimud” did not apply.
[3] See for instance Malbim (Ruth 3:4), see also Ramban,
Devarim 25:6.
[4] Boaz was a cousin of Ruth’s husband Machlon (Baba
Batra 91a).
[5] Referred to as “ploni almoni”, he was Machlon’s
uncle.
[6] Ruth Rabbah 7:7.
[7] The simple meaning may be that he did not want to
marry Ruth since he already had another wife (see Targum ad loc) or so that his
older children won’t have to split the inheritance with his children from her
(see similarly Rema, Even Haezer 1:8).
[8] Rashi in the name of Yevamot 40a.
[9] Ad loc.
[10] Similarly later when Ashkenazi Jews encouraged
halitzah, a financial incentive was used for this too, see Rema, Even Haezer
163:2.
[11] Maybe this is the reason Yehudah’s son Onan did not
want Tamar to have children.
[12] The Ramban hints that this son will have the soul of
the deceased thus the inheritance coming back to the original owner.
[13] Nedarim 37b although it might be this is not the only
opinion in this sugia, see also Orach Chaim 141:8.
[14] Presumably this implies that both kri and ketiv have
meaning. Various propositions have been offered regarding the relationship
between the two.
[15] Yesod Hamishna Vearichata, chapter 2 in
berurim (page 36).
[16] The Rishonim already noticed that at least some of
“halacha leMoshe miSinai” statements should not be taken literally see for
instance Rosh in the beginning of Mikvaot, see also Pesachim 110b.
[17] See his introduction to the prophets; see also R.
Marc Shapiro, Limits of Orthodox Theology, page 101 who brings other
Rishonim that follow the same opinion. In one place in his commentary Radak
goes a step further and notices that Targum Yonatan seems to have a reading
where a letter is moved from the beginning of the word to the end of previous
word (Melachim 1:20:33, see also our next note).
[18] We know that there were variant manuscripts of Tanach
in the times of Second Temple and probably before that as well. There are many
examples of this, see for instance Tosafot s.v. Maavirim and R. Akiva
Eiger, Shabbat 55b. One of the famous examples seems to be the well known
drasha in the Agada that criticizes the “wicked” son for excluding himself from
other participants: “lachem velo lo”. The obvious difficulty is that the wise son
also says: “etchem” (to you). Now we know that in some manuscripts the verse in
Devarim 6:20 indeed uses the expression “otanu” (us), see also Yerushalmi
Pesachim 10:4 (70b), Mechilta, end of Bo (chapter 18 in some editions,
paragraph 125 in others). Note also that many of the variants can be learned by
studying the old Torah translations, for instance Septuagint. It seems that
some of “deliberate changes” mentioned in Megila 9a-b were actually based on
variant manuscripts. In case of “naarei bnei yisrael”, we actually learn from
Masechet Sofrim 6:4 and parallel sources that there were variant manuscripts.
Additional examples can include “hamor” – “hemed” and “bekirba” – “bekroveah”,
where the words are very similar. R. Reuven Margolies in his “Hamikra Vahamesora”,
chapter 17 brings some interesting examples of translations that were based on
variant manuscripts. Without knowing this we can’t understand some words of
Hazal correctly. Just to bring two examples here, the question of how to read
“dodecha” in Shir Hashirim 1:2 (see Avoda Zara 29b) can be understood in light
of Septuagint translation as “breasts” (from the word “dad”; this also explains
why this particular question was asked when discussing the prohibition of
non-Jewish cheese; the verses describe that the Jewish nation’s wine, oil, and
breasts, i.e. milk are the best, and we should not use any of these products
made by non-Jews). In this example the difference with Masoretic text is only
in the vowels that are not written in the scrolls (see another example in
Mishley 12:28 that has in our Masoretic text “al mavet” – “not death” but
according to the Aramaic Targum the verse seems to read “el mavet” – “towards
death”). Another example with a real textual difference in consonants is in the
verse of Bereshit 26:32. The Bereshit Rabbah (end of 64) seems to at first not
be sure whether they found water or not. R. Reuven Margolies claims that the
uncertainty was whether the correct reading is “we did NOT find water” (based
on Septuagint translation) or “we found water” (as it is in our Masoretic
text). The difference is whether the word “Lo” should be with “Vav” (they said
to him) or with Aleph (they said: “we didn’t”, see however Rashash ad loc who
thinks that even according to the Masoretic text there is a possibility to
understand Lo with Vav as “not”).
[19] A similar idea is brought in Abarbanel’s introduction
to Yirmiyahu. This may be related to a similar question of what is “tikun
sofrim
”, see R. Marc Shapiro, Limits of Orthodox Theology, starting
with page 98 and R. Saul Lieberman “Hellenism in Jewish Palestine
starting with page 28.  Indeed in
Midrash Tanchuma (Beshalach 16) the tradition is brought that tikun
sofrim is an actual change made by Anshey Kneset Hagedola.
[20] This might be especially true when the “kri” is a
synonym of “ketiv” but the expression used is a softer form, when the “ketiv”
is too crude, see Devarim 28:27 and 28:30, see also Talmud Bavli Megilah 25b.
[21] Ad loc.
[22] In general some of the commentators sometimes follow
the “ketiv” but most explain the meaning of verses according to the “kri”.
[23] Professor Cyrus Gordon “Forgotten Scripts
1982, page 171. He additionally writes based on discoveries in Ebla that ומאת is to be
understood not as “and from” but rather “but”. For Hazal’s understanding of
this “kri” and “ketiv” see Ruth Rabbah 7:10.
[24] It’s actually quite unusual that kri and ketiv would
offer the exact opposite understanding.
[25] Apparently this is the field that Ruth was selling.
It seems that according to the practice of the time a widow of a person was
able to enjoy some of the rights to his property or possibly make decision as
to which of the relatives takes possession of it.