People today read Targum
Onkelos and search it for derash, halakhah, and homiletical
teachings. The following will show that the rabbis in the Talmuds and Midrashim
and the Bible commentators who used the Targum before the thirteenth
century recognized that the Aramaic translation only contains the Torah’s peshat,
its plain meaning, and not sermonic material. It will survey how the
pre-thirteenth century rabbis and scholars used Onkelos and how
Nachmanides changed the way the Targum was understood. It was only after
this Nachmanides change that other interpreters of Onkelos read derash
into this Targum. The article also introduces the reader to Onkelos
and explains why the Talmudic rabbis required that it be read and why many
Jews failed to observe this rabbinic requirement.

The Law

The Earliest Understanding of Targum Onkelos

The conclusion that Onkelos contains only the simple meaning of
the Torah is supported by an examination of how the ancients, living before the
thirteenth century, consistently and without exception, used Onkelos only
for its peshat. Although many of these Bible commentators were
interested in and devoted to the derash that could be derived from
biblical verses, and although they were constantly using Onkelos for its
peshat, they never employed the Targum to find derash or
to support their conclusion that the verse they were discussing contained derash.
This situation changed when for the first time Nachmanides mined the Targum to
uncover derash.[10]
Nachmanides used Onkelos to support his interpretation of the Torah.

Midrashim and Talmuds

Die Masorah Zum Targum
Onkelos

Menachem ibn Saruq

Samuel ben Hofni Gaon

Samuel Ben Hofni Gaon headed the
Babylonian Academy at Sura in Babylonia during the years 997-1013 and wrote a
biblical commentary. He refers to Targum Onkelos on several occasions,[17]
uses the Targum to understand the meaning of words, and always treats it
as a literal translation without derash.

Rashi

No biblical commentator relied
more on Onkelos than Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, better known as Rashi, born
in 1040. He extols Onkelos, as stated above, mentions the targumist by
name hundreds of times,[18]
and incorporates the targumic interpretation without attribution in hundreds of
other comments. He has a non-rigid blend of peshat and derash in
his commentary,[19] and
frequently quotes the Talmuds and Midrashim as the origin of his derash.
He never uses Onkelos as a source for his derash or treats the Targum
other than as a translation. It should be obvious that since Rashi relied on Onkelos,
whom he considered holy, for peshat, if he saw derash in the Targum
he would have said so.

Rashbam

Rashi’s grandson Samuel ben Meir
(also known as Rashbam, about 1085 – 1174) wrote his Bible commentary in large
measure to liberate people from derash and to show his disagreement with
Rashi’s frequent use of derash.[20]
He seldom mentions his sources, but draws from Onkelos with respect,
usually by name. In Genesis, for example, where Rashi is only named in
37:2, Onkelos is quoted in 21:16, 25:28, 26:26, 28:2, 40:11, and 41:45.
In Deuteronomy, to cite another example, Onkelos is mentioned in
4:28, 16:2, 16:9, 17:18, and 23:13. While he criticizes his grandfather with
and without attribution for his use of derash,[21]
and occasionally disagrees with Onkelos, he never rebukes the targumist
for using derash.[22]
Like his predecessors, he saw no derash in Targum Onkelos.

Abraham ibn Ezra

Abraham ibn Ezra (1089 -1164),
like Rashbam, was determined to distance himself from derash and
establish the literal meaning of the biblical text in his Bible commentaries,
as he states in his two introductions. He uses Onkelos frequently as a
translation, and only as a translation, to prove the meaning of words.

Ibn Ezra was the first to note
some few isolated instances of derash in the Targum. This first
observation of derash in Onkelos, I believe, is because derash
did not exist in the original Targum text.[23]
Various over-zealous well-meaning scribes embedded it at a later period,
probably around the time that Ibn Ezra discovered it. Ibn Ezra recognizes that Onkelos’
purpose is to offer peshat because he states that the targumist is
following his (ibn Ezra’s) own method, the “straight (or right) way” of peshat
to interpret the Hebrew according to grammatical rules.[24]

Maimonides

Radak

Where, then, did the derash
that many people today think that they see in Targum Onkelos come from?
First of all, I am convinced that most of the targumic readings that
individuals read as derash were really intended by the targumist as peshat,
the text’s simple meaning; people differ is what they see. Second, Ch. Heller
has shown us many examples where most, if not all, of the presently found derash
did not exist in the original Targum text.[28]
His findings are supported by the previously mentioned history showing that ibn
Ezra was the first to observe any derash at all in our Targum.

Nachmanides was the first Bible commentator to read derash into Onkelos

Examples of Nachmanides’
problematical interpretations of Onkelos

In a detailed separate study,
which is still in draft, I studied all the instances where Nachmanides interprets
Onkelos. I found that Nachmanides mentions Targum Onkelos in his Commentary
to the Pentateuch while analyzing 230 verses. Most of his attempts to
see the targumist teaching homiletical lessons and mysticism seem forced. He
reads more into the Aramaic than the words themselves state.

There are 129 puzzling
interpretations of Onkelos in these 230 verses. This represents about 56
percent of the total 230. However, 55 of the 230 Nachmanidean comments are only
references to the Targum without any analysis. When these 55 comments
are subtracted from the total of 230, we are left with 175 times that
Nachmanides analyzes the Targum. The 129 problematical interpretations
represent about 75 percent of the 175 times that the sage discusses Onkelos and
uses it to support his interpretation of the biblical verse. The following are
seven examples.

1. Genesis 1:31 states: “And
God saw everything that He made, and, behold, it was very good (Torah: tov
meod – Onkelos: takin lachada).”

2. After creating man,
God, according to Genesis 2:7, “breathed into his nostrils the breath of
life, and man became a living being.” The bible uses nefesh for “breath”
and “being.” In later Hebrew, nefesh came to mean “soul,” a meaning it
did not have in the Pentateuch. Since the Hebrew “breath of life” does not
indicate how humans excel other creations, Onkelos alters the text and
clarifies that “man acquired the power of speech,” ruach memalela
(literally, “speaking breath”). Thus humans transcend animals by their
intelligence in general and their ability to speak, communicate, and reason in
particular. This is the Aristotelian concept, accepted by Moses Maimonides
(1138-1204), that the essence of a human is intelligence and people have a duty
to develop that intelligence.[36]

Nachmanides, the mystic, disagreed
with Maimonides, the rationalist, and interprets the biblical nefesh
anachronistically as “soul.” The Hebrew verse, he declares, alludes to the
superiority of the soul that is composed of three forces: growth, movement, and
rationality.[37] Onkelos,
he maintains, is reflecting this concept of the tri-partite soul and that the
rational soul that God breathed into man’s nostrils became a speaking soul. How
the two Aramaic words, literally meaning “speaking breath,” suggests this
elaborate tri-partite theology is problematical. Again, Nachmanides seemingly
desired to have Onkelos, which he admired, reflect his own idea even
though what he reads into the Targum is not its plain meaning.

3. Genesis 4:1 states that
when Eve gave birth to Cain, she exclaimed, “I have acquired a man with the
Lord.” Since this statement has an anthropomorphic sound, suggesting physical
help from God, our Targum adds qadam, “before (the Lord),”
thereby supplanting, or at least softening this implication of physical aid by
distancing God from the birth.

4. In Genesis 17:17, Onkelos
changes a significant detail in the Aramaic translation. Abraham does not
“laugh” (Hebrew, vayitzchak) when he hears he will have a child in his
old age, but “rejoices” (Aramaic, vachadi). This alteration is not made
in 18:12 where Sarah “laughed” when she heard the same news. Rashi explains
that the couple reacted differently. Abraham trusted God and rejoiced at the
good news, while Sarah lacked trust and sneered; therefore God chastised her in
18:13.

Review of James A. Diamond, “Maimonides and the Shaping of the Jewish
Canon” (2014)

by Menachem Kellner

Menachem Kellner
is Chair of the Department of Philosophy and Jewish Thought at Shalem College,
Jerusalem, and the Wolfson Professor Emeritus of Jewish Thought at the
University of Haifa, where, among many other posts, he served as Dean of
Students and Chair of the Department of Maritime Civilizations, and founding
director of Be-Zavta, a program in Jewish enrichment. His most recent book is Menachem Kellner: Jewish Universalism,
edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron Hughes in Brill’s Library of Contemporary
Jewish Philosophers, and is available here.
Bar-Ilan University Press is about to publish his next book, Gam Hem Keruyim Adam: Ha-Nokhri be-Einei
ha-Rambam.

This is
Professor Kellner’s second contribution to the
Seforim blog. His previous essay, “Who is the Person Whom Rambam Says Can
be ‘Consecrated as the Holy of Holies’?” was published in 2007 and is available
here.

In People of the Book: Canon, Meaning, and
Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) Moshe Halbertal
distinguishes between normative and formative canons. Texts which are canonical
in the normative sense are obeyed and followed; they provide the group loyal to
the text with guides to behavior and belief. Formative canonical texts, on the
other hand, are “taught, read, transmitted, and interpreted … they provide
a society or a profession with a shared vocabulary” (p. 3).

In his brave new
book, Maimonides and the Shaping of the
Jewish Canon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), James A.
Diamond, the Lebovic Professor of Jewish Studies at the University of Waterloo
(link),
sets out to prove that “at virtually every critical turn in Jewish
thought, one confronts Maimonidean formulations in one way or another” (p.
263). Diamond’s claim is actually much stronger than that. He sets out to prove
that the collected works of Rambam, alongside the Bible, Talmud, and Zohar
“comprise the core spiritual and intellectual canon of Judaism” (p.
266).

Diamond makes
his argument through a series of case studies, each one focusing on a different
thinker: Ramban, Ritva, Abravanel, ibn Gabbai, Spinoza, Hermann Cohen, Neziv,
and finally Rav Kook. These chapters constitute “a discussion of the long
and continuing history of exegetical entanglements with Maimonidean
thought…” (p. 26).

Diamond sets the
stage with two chapters on Rambam himself, in which he makes a subtle and
sophisticated argument to the effect that Rambam set the agenda for the future
of Jewish thought by providing an “inextricable link between philosophy,
law, and narrative” (p. 11).

In these two
chapters Diamond continues the methodological breakthroughs of his two previous
books on Rambam, Maimonides and the
Hermeneutics of Concealment (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002) and Converts, Heretics, and Lepers: Maimonides
and the Outsider (Noted Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2007). The first
book has literally changed the face of academic Maimonidean studies and
deserves to be much better known outside of the academy. The book exemplifies a
sophisticated methodology for reading the Guide
of the Perplexed. This approach may be characterized as follows: Diamond
takes Rambam at his word – to wit, that he was writing a book of biblical and
rabbinic exegesis – and cleverly and closely follows Rambam’s exegesis of his
sources. It takes a person of rare abilities to do this as well as Diamond
does; he is blessed with an impressive mixture of native literary abilities
combined with extensive reading of rabbinic sources and rigid training in law
and philosophy (he was originally a lawyer before realizing that life could be
much more interesting with a PhD in philosophy). Prof. Diamond’s reading of
Rambam’s exegesis of his sources is extremely convincing. Diamond also follows
my wife’s safe advice. She constantly reminds me: remember to tell your
students, Rambam was also a rabbi
(and not just a philosopher).

Diamond’s second
book consists of a series of extraordinarily close readings of core texts of
Rambam’s, readings which illuminate the delicate and multilayered interplay
between philosophical and religious ideas in his thought. As in his previous
work, Diamond convincingly illustrated the way in which Ramabam carefully
chooses, subtly interprets, and circumspectly weaves together rabbinic
materials to address philosophers and talmudists alike, each in their own
idiom.

In his first two
books, Diamond takes a linguistic pebble and throws it into the sea of Rambam’s
thought, following the ripples where they lead: verses connect to verses and to
rabbinic glosses upon them, which in turn lead to further exegetical and
philosophical ripples. In this, his third book, he uses the same subtle and
learned method to analyze the ways in which eight prominent post-Maimonideans
from the Thirteenth Century through the Twentieth engage Rambam’s thought, in
order to break away from it, or break it away from its medieval context to
adapt it to the ages in which they lived (p. 5).

Diamond’s claim
is stronger than the oft-noted influence of Rambam on radically different
thinkers. Indeed, there is hardly a Jewish thinker who does not claim to
represent Rambam in his or her world – as I often say, the two greatest
misrepresenters of Rambam in the 20th century were the Rebbe of
Lubavitch and the Rebbe of (Yeshayahu) Leibowitz. We have recently been treated
to a new-agish Rambam by Micah Goodman (Maimonides
and the Book That Changed Judaism: Secrets of the Guide for the Perplexed)
and (once again!) to a Kabbalistic Rambam in Mevikh Maskilim (!) by Rabbi Shlomo Toledano. In the chapters of
this book James Diamond does more than show how various thinkers have
appropriated Rambam to their needs – he demonstrates how Rambam was a formative
influence on the Jewish self-perceptions of a wide variety of central Jewish
thinkers.

In the first of
these chapters, on Ramban (“Launching the Kabbalistic Assault”),
Diamond shows how Ramban’s theology 
“can only be fully appreciated in its counterexegesis, reaction to,
and reworking of Maimonides’ own theology and philosophical exegesis” (p.
69). Fully aware of what Rambam was doing, Ramban sought to present an
alternative vision of Judaism (just as I have argued elsewhere, Rambam himself
sought to present an alternative vision of Judaism to that which found
expression in Halevi’s Kuzari). Thus,
for example, for Ramban “Jewish history inheres in Abraham’s biography
both physically and metaphysically, to be played out by his biological
descendants, [while] for Maimonides Abraham’s life provides a manual on how to
qualify as his ideological offspring” (p. 74). In this typically
beautifully written and densely packed sentence, Diamond presents one of the core
differences between the Judaisms of Rambam and of Ramban. Students of the two
rabbis will see here hints at Ramban’s view of Torah stories as prefiguring
Jewish history (itself a cunning subversion of a classic Christian trope) and
at Rambam’s opposed essential lack of interest in history per se (even Jewish
history) and his construal of Judaism as a community of true believers, defined
by ideology, not by descent.

This is just one
of the many ways in which James Diamond teases out the essential differences
between Rambam and Ramban. I would like to stress that as much as Ramban was
clearly aware of these differences (as brilliantly elucidated by Diamond), and
as much as he rejected Rambam’s picture of Judaism, Voltare- like he still
defended Rambam’s right to be wrong. It would be wonderful if today’s rabbinic
leadership would take a “musar
haskel” from Ramban’s behavior in this matter.

Rabbi Yom Tov
Ishbili (Ritva) belonged to Ramban’s school, and I would like to think that one
of the lessons he learned from Ramban was to defend Rambam without agreeing
with him, as he does in Sefer ha-Zikkaron,
closely analyzed by Diamond in chapter four, “Pushing Back the  Assault.” Diamond detects in Ritva an
“ideological retreat from Nahmanideanism toward Maimonideanism” (p.
88). This “retreat” is not a rejection of the world of Ramban,  but, rather, an attempt to salvage
“rationalism and reserve a space for it alongside Kabbalah within Jewish
practice and belief” (p. 113).

In chapter five
we are presented with a Don Isaac Abravanel “who struggled with
Maimonides’ thought throughout his prolific career” (p. 116); a specific
locus of that struggle was Rambam’s account of the Akedah. Abravanel, it has famously been reported, used to end
lectures on Rambam in Lisbon with the statement: “these are the views of
Rabbenu Moshe, but not those of Moshe Rabbenu.” Here again, we see an
attempt to keep Rambam within the fold, without denying the challenges he
presents to more conservative interpretations of Judaism. It is one of the most
important contributions of Diamond’s book that time and again he shows us how
medieval thinkers rejected much of what Rambam taught, without denying that he
taught it. Comparing the approaches of Ramban, Ritva, and Abravanel to the
furor surrounding the so-called Slifkin affair and the writings of many
contemporary rabbis, makes one almost believe in the decline of the
generations.

The chapter
which I personally found most interesting was about Meir ibn Gabbai, the
Sixteenth Century kabbalist, largely because he is the figure treated by
Diamond about whom I knew the least. Chapter Six, “The Aimlessness of
Philosophy” examines ibn Gabbai’s Avodat
ha-Kodesh, one of the most popular works of pre-Lurianic Kabbalah. This
kabbalistic digest is “inextricably intertwined with a withering critique
of  Maimonidean rationalism” (p.
138), further evidence for  Moshe Idel’s
claim  that Rambam was a “negative
catalyzer” for kabbalistic conceptions. Ibn Gabbai’s world was thus one
“where Maimonides’ thought inspired fierce rejection, while ironically at
the same time providing  a fertile
repository of ideas, exegesis, and terminology for the advancement of
kabbalistic thought and interpretation” (p. 137).

Rambam was so
important for a figure like ibn Gabbai that the latter felt forced to accept
the widespread legend concerning Rambam’s 
alleged “conversion” to Kabbalah at the end of his life. That
this legend was so widespread, and that ibn Gabbai and many others contributed to
spreading it, is powerful support for the thesis of Diamond’s book about the
centrality of Rambam in forming the Jewish canon. Rambam is so important and
central a figure, that a Kabbalist cannot allow him to remain outside the fold.

I will leave
discussions of the last four chapters of Maimonides
and the Shaping of the Jewish Canon (on Spinoza, Hermann Cohen, Neziv, and
Rav Kook) to specialists in modern Jewish thought. To this reader, at least,
they appeared every bit as insightful and illuminating as the six chapters
outlined here. One comment, however begs to be made. Diamond’s concluding
chapter deals with a twentieth century writer one rarely sees, if ever,
mentioned alongside Maimonides — Franz Kafka. Intriguingly, Diamond’s argument
is that even a contemporary, secular, Jewish diarist, thinker, and novelist is
both made possible and understood better when read against the grain of
Maimonides. In this case  Diamond argues that Kafka, the pessimistic
prophet of gloom and alienation in the modern age, takes Maimonides’ negative
theology to its logical extreme and leaves us with a sobering thought
  especially in a post-Shoah age. If Maimonides’ “theology of
negation ends in the breakdown of both intellect and language,” then perhaps it
also “can all too easily lead to a theology of brokenness and alienation, and
to the parables of Kafka.”

Did Maimonides
indeed shape the Jewish canon alongside Bible, Talmud, Midrash, and Zohar? Each
reader of this remarkable book will have to make up her or his mind on this
issue. What cannot be denied is that each such reader will finish the book
enriched, enlightened, and challenged.

על שיבושי
הצנזורה שנמצאים בהדפסות החדשות של התלמוד

הרב
ברוך אבערלאנדער

אב”ד
הבד”צ דקהילות החרדים דבודאפעסט

ורב
דקהילת חברה ש”ס – ליובאוויטש

בהמשך
לרשימה שהופיעה ב’ספרים-בלוג‘ אודות
הצנזורה הנני מפרסם כאן מתוך מה שרשמתי בענין.

הצנזורה
בתלמוד מאז ‘דפוס באסיליאה’

לפני קרוב
לארבע מאות וחמשים שנה, בשנים של”ח-שמ”א, נדפסה התלמוד הבבלי בעיר בזל
שבשוצריה. ש”ס זה ידוע בשם ‘דפוס באסיליאה’ של הנוצרי אמברוסיאו פרוביאנו. מהדורה
זו נדפסה על-פי ביקורת הצנזור מארקו מארינו, וזה השחית את תוכן המסכתות במאות
מקומות. מסכת עבודה זרה לא הדפיסו כלל – והטעם מובן. הדפוסים הבאים נמשכו אחרי
דפוס זו בלי לתקן השינויים ולהשלים ההשמטות שנעשו מפני הצנזורה.

אמנם קיים ספר
‘חסרונות הש”ס'[1], “והוא ספר קבוצת ההשמטות כולל כל
הדברים חסרים בתלמוד בבלי ורש”י ותוספות ורא”ש והג”א ופי’ המשניות
להרמב”ם… וכן השלמת החסרון חדושי הלכות ובח”א מהרש”א…”.
בהסכמתו לספר כותב הגאון בעל ‘הכתב והקבלה’: “איש נבון דעת ישתדל להוציא לאור
העולם את הספר הנקרא בשם ‘קבוצת ההשמטות’, וכל איש משכיל יודע התועלת הגדולה בל
ישכחו ברוב ימים, ומהראוי לעמוד בימין עזרתו ולסייעו להוציא מחשבתו הטובה מן הכח
אל הפועל”.

הלכה שלמד
הגר”מ פיינשטיין מתופעת הצנזורה

פסק
המהרש”ל ב’ים של שלמה’ (בבא קמא פ”ד סי’ ט, ע”פ גמרא שם לח, א
ותוד”ה קראו), שאם שאלו גוי על דין מדיני התורה ואינו יכול להישמט ממנו, ואם
יאמר לו את הדין יוכל לבוא לידי סכנה, אסור לו לשנות את הדין, שכל דבר ודבר מן
התורה נקרא תורת השם, ואם הוא משנה מפטור לחיוב וכיוצא בזה הריהו ככופר בכל התורה,
ולכן צריך למסור נפשו על זה, עיי”ש באריכות. (דברי המהרש”ל נעתקו בספרים שונים וכן ב’אנציקלופדיה
תלמודית’ כרך כב עמ’ ע והערה 193 שם.)

וכתב הרב
דוד קאהן בספרו ‘העקוב למישור’ (עמ’ לד) שהציע פעם את דברי היש”ש להגאון ר’ משה
פיינשטיין זצ”ל, “וענה לי הגר”מ זצ”ל דלית הלכתא כוותיה, שהרי
אנו רואים שהמדפיסים כתבו שכל מקום שנאמר עכו”ם או כותי בש”ס או בספרים
שונים אין המכוון לגוי שבימיהם ולא מיחו בידם חכמי הדור”[2].

אמנם יש
לציין שמצינו להגרמ”פ בכמה מקומות בספריו שהסתמך על דברי היש”ש
הנ”ל – שו”ת ‘אגרות משה’ (או”ח ח”ב סי’ נא), ‘דברות משה’
עמ”ס שבת (עמ’ קנט) ו’דברות משה’ עמ”ס כתובות (תשובה ג שבסוף הספר אות
ו).

‘שבט
הלוי’: “ההשמטות של הצנזורה… מצוה גמורה איכא להשלים החסר”

מעניין מאד
מכתבו של הגאון ר’ שמואל הלוי ואזנר זצ”ל, בשו”ת ‘שבט הלוי’ (ח”ח
סי’ רכה), ואעתיקו מפני חשיבותו:

כבוד ידידי המכובד
מאד פאר היחס והמעש הה”ג השלם כש”ת מוה”ר שבתי פרנקל שליט”א.

אחדשה”ט
וש”ת באה”ר.

העיר ה’ את כבודו
נ”י לפאר גם את התלמוד בבלי (אחרי שזכה לזה בהרמב”ם) בהוספות יקרות,
ולרגל עבוה”ק נולד ספק לכ”ת למעשה היות ידוע כי במשך הדורות גרמו הגוים
לשנות לשונות בהש”ס וגם להוציא קטעים שלמים ממנו, וגם בש”ס וילנא עם כל
הבקורת והגה עדין נשארו טעויות הדפוס למאות כידוע, ועד עכשיו כל המדפיסים לא
הסתכלו על זה רק מצלמים או מעתיקים הש”ס וילנא כמות שהוא עם המעלות וחסרונות
הטעויות, והיות כי ע”י טכניקה של היום אפשר לתקן את הסילופים של הצנזורה ואת
טעויות הדפוס שנשארו עדין אלא שעולה הרבה כסף, ע”כ נסתפק כ”ת לדינא, אם
מצלם את הש”ס כמות שהוא הוא [אי] ארוך להלכה כי כבר דשו ורגילים בו כלל ישראל,
או כיון שסו”ס אפשר בעולם לתקנו לגמרי ואם אינו מגיהו עד הסוף עדין עובר על
לא תשכון באהליך עולה שנדרש בכתובות י”ט ע”ב על המשהה ספר שאינו מוגה ל’
יום, ונפסק להלכה ביו”ד סי’ רע”ט. אלו דברי מכ”ת בתוס’ קצת, וגם
העיר מתשובת הרמ”א סי’ י’ שפסק כעין זה בנוגע לספרי הרמב”ם.

…פשוט בעיני
שכיון שהש”ס הזה הוגה בשעתו אלא לרבוי התיבות ואותיות לאלפי אלפים רבבות לא
יתכן בלי טעויות, מכ”מ הטעויות אינם יסודים בהלכה, ואין חשש שיצא מזה מכשול
בהוראה, בפרט לדידן שפוסקים מתוך השו”ע לא מהש”ס, א”כ אין בזה משום
אל תשכון באהליך עולה, ואפילו ההשמטות של הצנזורה נהי דמצוה גמורה איכא להשלים
החסר אבל גם בזה אין חסרון הזה יכול לגרום בלבול בהוראה וכיו”ב.

אבל בין בזה בין
בזה עכ”פ תבא עליו ברכה איכא בודאי, וגם מצוה לתקן, וע”כ השבושים
שמזדמנים לכם דרך עבודת הקודש שלכם בודאי מצוה וחיוב לתקן ובפרט במקום שרואים
בעליל שהוא מטעות המדפיסים, אבל לחפש עוד אין שום חיוב נגד מה שנדפס כזה כבר עשרות
פעמים, אבל בדרך תבא עליו ברכה אם אפשר כן ולהמציא לכלל ישראל דבר מושלם ומתוקן
ביותר מה טוב ומה נעים ותבא על כ”ת ברכת טוב.

ועל מה
שכתב ש”ההשמטות של הצנזורה… אין חסרון הזה יכול לגרום בלבול בהוראה”
יש להעיר מפסק הרמב”ם (הל’ ע”ז פ”ה ה”י): “ואפילו להזכיר
שם עבודה זרה שלא דרך שבועה אסור”, וכתב ב’הגהות מיימונית’ (סוף אות ג
במהדורת פרנקל): “…אבל שם הדיוטות כגון שמות בעלמא כשמות הגוים, אע”פ
שעשאוהו אלוה, כיון שבזה השם אין בו אלהות ואדנות וגם לא ניתן לו לשם כך מותר…
ובכמה מקומות בתלמוד הוזכרו ישו הנוצרי ותלמידיו, ואין אלוה גוים יותר ממנו”
(והועתק ב’ביאור הגר”א’ יו”ד סי’ קמז סק”ג). הרי שלומדים הלכה
מהסיפורים שבהם הוזכרו “ישו הנוצרי ותלמידיו” בתלמוד, הרי שגם סיפורי
ישו ותלמידיו חשובים להלכה.

דעתו של
כ”ק אדמו”ר זי”ע מליובאוויטש על הדפסת ההשמטות

בענין הדפסת
הקטעים שנשמטו על-ידי הצנזורה האריך פרופ’ יעקב ש’ שפיגל בספרו ‘עמודים בתולדות
הספר העברי – הגהות ומגיהים’ (מהדורה שניה עמ’ 584-588, 592-595), והביא הדברים
השונים שנכתבו בזה עיי”ש.

ואתעכב בזה
רק על פרט אחד, על מה שהביא בשמי שם (עמ’ 587 הערה 45) להעיר מדעתו של הרבי
מליובאוויטש בזה. ויש להוסיף ולתקן שהכוונה למבואר ב’תורת מנחם’ תשי”ב (ח”ב
עמ’ 46-47, 51-52). ואלו דברי הרבי שם:

“ספרתי כמה
פעמים שכאשר כ”ק מו”ח אדמו”ר ביקר בווינא נטפלו אליו יהודים
מהקהילה החרדית… שיש להם טענות על הנהגתו: ישנו סימן בשולחן ערוך [חו”מ סוף
סי’ תכה] – טענו הם –שיש בו פס”ד אודות אלה ש’לא מעלין ולא מורידין’, ויתירה
מזה, ‘מורידין ולא מעלין’, ח”ו, וכיון שכן – טענו הם – למה צריכים להחמיר
יותר מהשו”ע… ולהתעסק בהצלתם של יהודים כאלה שהם בגדר ד’לא מעלין ולא
מורידין’, ועאכו”כ להתעסק בהצלתם של יהודים כאלה שהם בגדר ד’מורידין ולא
מעלין’?!…

…אם לא די בכך
שפרטי הדינים הנ”ל הם באחד הסימנים האחרונים שבחלק האחרון
דהשו”ע (שבזה מודגש כאמור שלימודם צ”ל לאחרי לימוד וקיום כל
השו”ע) – היתה בזה גם השמטת ה’צענזור’ של הקיסר.

– הוא (ה’צענזור’)
בעצמו חשב שהסיבה לכך היא מפני שאין זה מתאים לחוקי המלכות של ממשלתו, אבל האמת
היא שישנה סיבה אחרת לדבר: כיון שהעלם והסתר הגלות התגבר ביותר עד כדי כך שקיימת
אפשרות לעשות שימוש בסימן הנ”ל בשו”ע… בנוגע לקיום הדברים בפועל
ממש… לכן, סיבבו מלמעלה שיבוא גוי, שאינו בעל-בחירה, וישמיט חלק
מהתורה, רחמנא ליצלן, כדי שלא יהיו כאלה שיטעו להתנהג בהתאם לכך – ביחס
ליהודי אחר – בפועל ממש!”

וע”ז
כתב פרופ’ שפיגל שם:

“אמנם אפשר
שדברי האדמו”ר היו למקומם ולשעתם, והוא רצה בזה ‘להביא ראיה’ לגישת חסידות
חב”ד, שיש לקרב כל יהודי, וח”ו לומר לגביו ‘לא מעלין ולא מורידין’ וכד’.
אבל גם האדמו”ר יודה שאם נבוא להדפיס היום את השולחן ערוך יש להעדיף להדפיסו
ללא ההשמטות הללו”.

למרות
שפרופ’ שפיגל מהסס לקבוע דברים באופן ברור, לדעתי אין מקום לספק כלל שלדעת הרבי יש
להדפיס היום את ה’שלחן ערוך’ ללא ההשמטות. ושתי הוכחות ברורות לדבר.

א) בריבוי
מקומות בכתבי הרבי אנו מוצאים שמתייחס ל”דפוסים שלא שלטה יד הצענזור”,
וכן ש”יש לחפש בדפוסים ובכתבי-יד שלא שלטה בהם יד הצענזור”, ולדוגמא
אציין כמה הפניות ב’ליקוטי שיחות’ (חלק כה
עמ’ 56 הערה 29, חלק כו עמ’ 160 הערה 5, חלק ל עמ’ 130 הערה 34, חלק לד עמ’ 24
הערה 7), ב’אגרות קודש’
שלו (חלק יח עמ’ שלא, חלק
ל עמ’ עז) וב’תורת מנחם’ (תשי”א ח”א עמ’ 218 הערה ב,
תשט”ז ח”ב עמ’ 257, תשמ”ב ח”ד עמ’ 1951, תשמ”ג ח”ג
עמ’ 1333, תשמ”ה ח”ג עמ’ 2001, תשמ”ו ח”א עמ’ 608). ועוד.

ב) כשהרבי
התחיל להדיר מחדש בשנת תש”כ את שו”ע אדה”ז בעל ה’תניא’, ציין ב’פתח
דבר’ לחלק הראשון בין הדברים המיוחדים שנתחדשו בהוצאה זו: “לאחר חלק ששי בא
שער ההוספות, הכולל: א) השמטות בשו”ע רב[י]נו שנשמטו מפני יראת
הצענזאר…”. לפועל כשאכן נדפס החלק הששי בשנת תשכ”ח לא נכללו בו
ההשמטות הללו “מפני סיבות טכניות” (כפי שציינו מערכת ‘אוצר החסידים’ ב’הקדמה’
שם), אמנם אלו נתפרסמו
בסוף ספרי ‘מראי מקומות וציונים’ שנערכו לכל חלקי שו”ע אדה”ז, ויצאו
לאור ע”י הוצאת קה”ת[3].

על יסוד
דברי הרבי הנ”ל אכן תוקנו בפנים כל השינויים וההשמטות במהדורת קה”ת
החדשה (שנדפס משנת תשס”א ואילך).

ש”ס ‘נהרדעא’
לעומת הוצאת ‘עוז והדר’

בהוצאות
החדשות של התלמוד בבלי שיצאו לאחרונה ישנן מגמות הפוכות.

ב’מבוא
קצר’ שבראש מסכת ברכות של הש”ס ‘נהרדעא’, שיוצא לאור על-ידי הוצאת וגשל, כותב
המו”ל (בפרק “השלמת הגהות והערות”): “במהדורה זו הושלמו כל
חסרונות הש”ס שהושמטו על ידי הצנזור הנוצרי, ושייכים לגמרא, ובמהדורתינו
הושלמו להחזירם למקומם על הדף. (מלבד תיבות מיוחדות שסילפו בכל הש”ס במקום
‘גוי’ תיבת עובד כוכבים, ובמקום ‘משומד’ 
כתבו מומר, ובמקום ‘גמרא’ כתבו ש”ס, תלמוד[4]. דבזה לא החזרנו התיבות כבמקור ודי בהערה
זו כאן)”.

ואילו
ב’מבוא לתלמוד בבלי מהדורת עוז והדר’ שבראש מסכת ברכות (עמ’ ו) כתוב: “בגוף
הגמרא השארנו בדרך כלל את שבושי צנזורה שבש”ס וילנא (עי’ שו”ת ארץ צבי
ח”ב סי’ עד), והערנו עליהם בהגהות וציונים. במפרשים שבסוף מסכת תיקננו אותם
לפעמים”.

מי הורה
לעורכי ‘עוז והדר’ שלא לתקן את שיבושי הצנזורה?

אחי הרה”ח
ר’ שלום שי’ אבערלאנדער העביר לי צילום מאמר שהופיע בעיתון באידיש שיצא לאור בניו
יארק (‘דער איד’ ה’ טבת תשס”ח, צווייטע אפטיילונג ב/36), לכבוד סיום עריכת
והדפסת הש”ס מהדורת ‘עוז והדר’.

המאמר
מגולל חלק מההיסטוריה של הצנזורה בהדפסות התלמוד. ושוב מספר שעורכי ‘עוז והדר’ היו
להם ספיקות גדולות האם להחזיר עטרה ליושנה ולנקות את התלמוד משיבושי הצנזורה, ועל
כן הם פנו להגאון ר’ יצחק טובי’ ווייס שליט”א גאב”ד העדה החרדית
בירושלים, שהכריע נגד זה, כיון שגם היום יש לחשוש מעלילות מצד הנכרים למיניהם.

אני מסופק
מאד באמיתות הסיפור, נוסף לזה שידיעה חשובה זו לא מופיעה ב’מבוא’ הנ”ל, הרי
לפי שיטה זו מה הועילו חכמים בזה שלא החזירו את ההשמטות למקומם, הרי אחרי שאלו
מופיעים בלשונם בשולי הגליון, הרי שוב יש לחשוש מפגיעתם רעה של מחפשי רעתנו.

שיבושי
הצנזורה בש”ס ‘נהרדעא’, בהוצאת ‘עוז והדר’ ובפירוש ‘שוטנשטיין’

דוגמא א

סנהדרין
מג, א אודות משפט ישו
ותלמידיו הוא ודאי הדוגמא הכי בולטת על אופן ההתייחסות לדברים שנשמטו מפני צנזורה.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ החזירו את ההשמטה למקומה בפנים הגמרא, ובהערה (אות י) העירו: “מכאן
ועד סוף העמוד הושמט ע”י הצנזורה ונוסף כאן ע”פ ויניציאה ר”פ
וס”א”.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ לא החזירו את ההשמטה למקומה, אמנם העתיקו את זה ב’הגהות וציונים’ (אות
ב): “בדפו”י (שלפני הצענזור) נוסף… (כל הענין נשמט בדפוסים מפני
הצענזור והעתקנוהו מדפו”י עם הוספות ותיקונים ע”פ כת”י)”.

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק נדפס “תבנית ש”ס ווילנא מהדורת עוז והדר” מהדורה קמא
(שבו לא מופיע מדור ‘הגהות וציונים’) ששם זה לא מופיע. ובעמוד שממול בפירוש סתמו כתבו:
“המשך הדיון בענין אינו מופיע לפנינו בגמרא”. והוסיפו בשוה”ג (הערה
38): “בגירסת הש”ס של הדפוסים שלפנינו, חסר בגמרא החלק הבא אחר שאלה זו.
לנוסח השלם של הדברים, ראה דקדוקי סופרים”. הקורא אינו מקבל אפילו רמז לתוכן
ההשמטה הארוכה.

אציג עכשיו
לפי סדר הש”ס עוד דוגמאות שונות להשמטות ותיקונים והאופן שבו זה מופיע
בהוצאות השונות.

דוגמא ב

ברכות יב,
א: וקורין עשרת
הדברות שמע והיה אם שמוע ויאמר אמת ויציב ועבודה וברכת כהנים. אמר רב יהודה אמר
שמואל: אף בגבולין בקשו לקרות כן, אלא שכבר בטלום מפני תרעומת המינין (שלא יאמרו
לעמי הארץ אין שאר תורה אמת, ותדעו שאין קורין אלא מה שאמר הקב”ה ושמעו מפיו
בסיני. רש”י). ומפרש רש”י: “המינין. עכו”ם”.

בדפוס
ונציה נדפס (תחילת ע”ב): “המינין – תלמידי ישו”.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות ט): “בס”א: תלמידי ישו”.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ז): “בדפו”י: תלמידי ישו”.

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק פירשו: “מפני תרעומת מינין (עובדי עבודה זרה)”, והרחיבו על
כך בשוה”ג (הערה 3): “רש”י. ואין הכוונה כאן לאותם ה’מינים’
הנזכרים לקמן עמוד ב, ובמקומות אחרים, שהם יהודים המאמינים בתורה שבכתב אלא
שכופרים בקבלת חז”ל והופכים דברי התורה שלא כהלכה. [עיין צל”ח
ומהר”ץ חיות; ועיין גם מגדים חדשים.]”

פיענוח
הדברים: הצל”ח מדייק בלשון רש”י שפירש “המינין. עכו”ם”,
שבא לשלול מינין שמאמינים בתושבע”פ. אמנם ה’מגדים חדשים’ העיר: “הצל”ח
כתב דבריו לפי מש”כ ברש”י לפנינו המינין עכו”ם. אמנם אין זה מלשון
רש”י, אלא הוא ‘תיקון’ מעשה ידי הצנזור” (וכן העירו על כך בהערה טו בצל”ח
שי”ל ע”י מכון ירושלים). ולפי
הגירסא האמיתית ברש”י הרי גם המינין שבעמוד א, וגם המינין שבעמוד, שניהם הם
תלמידי הנוצרי.

דוגמא ג

ברכות יב,
ב: פרשת ציצית מפני
מה קבעוה? אמר רבי יהודה בר חביבא: מפני שיש בה חמשה דברים: מצות ציצית, יציאת
מצרים, עול מצות, ודעת מינים, הרהור עבירה, והרהור עבודה זרה וכו’. והרהור עבודה
זרה מנלן? דתניא: אַחֲרֵי לְבַבְכֶם [במדבר
טו, לט] – זו מינות.
ופרש”י: “ההופכים טעמי התורה למדרש טעות ואליל”.

בדפוס
ונציה נדפס (דף יג, א): “תלמידי הנוצרי ההופכים טעמי התורה למדרש טעות ואליל”.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות מ): “בס”א: תלמידי הנוצרי”.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ח): “בדפו”י: תלמידי ישו הנוצרי”.

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק לא העתיקו דברי רש”י, וסתמו לכתוב: “שלא להתבונן בדברי
מינות”.

דוגמא ד

ברכות יז,
ב: אין פרץ – שלא תהא
סיעתנו כסיעתו של דוד שיצא ממנו אחיתופל, ואין יוצאת – שלא תהא סיעתנו כסיעתו של
שאול שיצא ממנו דואג האדומי, ואין צוחה – שלא תהא סיעתנו כסיעתו של אלישע שיצא
ממנו גחזי, ברחובותינו – שלא יהא לנו בן או תלמיד שמקדיח תבשילו ברבים.

בדפוס
ונציה נדפס (דף יח, א): “תלמיד שמקדיח תבשילו ברבים, כגון הנוצרי”.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ לא תוקן ואף לא העירו ע”ז.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ב): “בדפו”י ובכת”י ובע”י נוסף: כגון
ישו הנוצרי”.

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק לא העירו כלום.

דוגמא ה

גיטין נו,
ב–נז, א: אונקלוס
בר קלוניקוס בר אחתיה דטיטוס הוה, בעי לאיגיורי, אזל אסקיה לטיטוס בנגידא וכו’. אזל
אסקיה לבלעם בנגידא וכו’. אזל אסקיה בנגידא לפושעי ישראל וכו’.

בדפוס
ונציה נדפס: “אזל אסקיה לישו בנגידא”.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות ב): “בס”א: ליש”ו”.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות ג): “צ”ל אסקיה לישו בנגידא (דפו”י לפני
הצענזור)”.

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק פירשו: “ועלה באוב אחד מפושעי ישראל”, והרחיבו על כך
בשוה”ג (הערה 4): “לפי כתבי יד ודפוסים ישנים, מדובר בתלמיד רבי יהושע
בן פרחיה שיצא לתרבות רעה והסית והדיח את ישראל (ראה סוטה מז, א; סנהדרין קז,
ב)”.

דוגמא ו

סנהדרין יז,
א: אמר רבי יוחנן:
אין מושיבין בסנהדרי אלא בעלי קומה, ובעלי חכמה, ובעלי מראה, ובעלי זקנה, ובעלי
כשפים. ופרש”י: “להמית מכשפים הבוטחים בכשפיהם להנצל מידי בית דין,
ולגלות על המכשפין המסיתין ומדיחין בכשפיהן, כגון המצרים“.

בדפוס
ונציה נדפס: “כגון [ישו] הנוצרי”.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ העירו (אות י): “בס”א: נוצרי או הנוצרים”.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ העירו (אות נ): “צ”ל כגון ישו נוצרי (דק”ס ע”פ
דפו”י שלפני הצענזור)”.

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק סתמו ולא העירו כלום.

דוגמא ז

סנהדרין קז,
ב: תנו רבנן לעולם
תהא שמאל דוחה וימין מקרבת. לא כאלישע שדחפו לגחזי בשתי ידים.

בדפוס
ונציה נוסף בסוף דברי הברייתא: “ולא כרבי יהושע בן פרחיא שדחפו לישו בשתי ידים”.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ הוסיפו את זה בגליון (אות ז), וכתבו בסוף: “הושמט ע”י הצנזורה
ונוסף כאן ויניציאה ר”פ וס”א”.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ הוסיפו את זה בגליון (אות ג) וכתבו: “בדפו”י (לפני הצענזור)
נוסף…”.

אודות ‘שוטנשטיין’
ראה לקמן דוגמא ז.

דוגמא ח

בהמשך דברי
הגמרא שם נוסף בדפוס ונציה: ר’ יהושע בן פרחיה מאי היא? כדקטלינהו ינאי מלכא לרבנן
אזל רבי יהושע בן פרחיה וישו לאלכסנדריא של מצרים. [ובהמשך מובא סיפור ארוך שקרה
בין הרב והתלמיד.]

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ הוסיפו את זה בתוך דברי הגמרא, ובגליון (אות ט) כתבו: “מכאן עד את
ישראל הושמט ע”י הצנזורה והועתק ע”פ ויניציאה ר”פ וס”א”.

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ הוסיפו את זה בגליון (אות ג) וכתבו: “בדפו”י (לפני הצענזור)
נוסף…”.

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק הוסיפו תוכנו של קטע זה והקודם (דוגמא ז) בשוה”ג (הערה 17) בהשמטת
שמו התלמיד, וכתבו: “בהשמטות הש”ס מובא מקרה נוסף של רב שדגחה את תלמידו
בשתי ידיו והתוצאות הקשות שיצאו מאותה דחיה…”.

סיכום
העריכה במהדורות השונות

בהוצאת
‘עוז והדר’ אפשר
להבחין בשיטה עקבית. ה’מהדורה קמא’ שלהם, שבו לא מופיע מדור ‘הגהות וציונים’, היתה
העתק מושלם של ש”ס ווילנא וההוצאות הקודמות לו, כולל כל השמטות הצנזור
והתיקונים שנשארו בתוך הטקסט בלי להעיר עליהם. גם ב’מהדורה בתרא’ שלהם לא תיקנו
כלום בתוך הטקסט של הגמרא או של פירושי הגמרא, אבל במדור ‘הגהות וציונים’ העירו באופן
עקבי על כל השינויים והעתיקו אותם בלשונם, ואף נתנו לקורא להבין שהשינויים הללו
קשורים ל”דפו”י שלפני הצענזור”.

בש”ס
‘נהרדעא’ אין שיטה
עקבית. יש שהחזירו את ההשמטה לתוך דברי הגמרא (דוגמא א), אמנם לפעמים השמיטו גם הם ואף לא העירו על
כך (דוגמא ד), אמנם ברוב המקרים לא החזירו את ההשמטה
לתוך דברי הגמרא אמנם העירו על השינויים בגליון והעתיקו אותם בלשונם (דוגמאות ב-ג, ה-ו). ויש שבאותו עמוד עצמו החזירוו קטע אחד
לתוך דברי הגמרא וקטע אחר העתיקו רק בגליון (דוגמאות
ז-ח). ברוב המקרים אין
לומד מבין ממה נובעים השינויים ש”בס”א [=בספרים אחרים]”, אמנם יש
והם מגלים שזה קשור לצנזורה (דוגמאות ז-ח).

ב’שוטנשטיין’
בלה”ק החליטו
שאין להזכיר את שמו של הנוצרי כלל וכלל, ועל כן יש שמשמיטים לגמרי קטעים מהגמרא (דוגמא א, ד, ו), ויש שמצטטים את התוכן (ולא את לשון
הגמרא!) אבל משמיטים את שמו (דוגמא ה,
ח). בפירושם יש
שמתעלמים מדברי רש”י הלא מצונזרים (דוגמא
ג), ועוד יותר תמוה
לפרש לפי הגירסא המצונזרת דוקא (דוגמא ב)[5].

אמנם להעיר
שלפעמים כן מעירים לשיבושי הצנזורה וכגון: “הגירסא שלפנינו ‘לכותים’ היא
משיבושי הצנזורה, וצריך לומר ‘לגוים'” (ביצה
כ, ב הערה 16),
“כידוע ‘לעובדי כוכבים’ הוא משיבושי הצנזורה, וצריך לומר כאן ובכל הסוגיא
להלן ‘לגוים'” (שם כא, א
הערה 24). אמנם מסיימים:
“לא שינינו בפנים את הגירסא שלפנינו” (הוריות יא, א הערה 37).

“ליקוטי
רש”י” מיוסד על שיבושי הצנזורה

שיטתם של
עורכי מהדורת ‘עוז והדר’ להעיר על השינויים רק ב’הגהות וציונים’ גורם לטעויות,
וכגון בראש השנה (יז, א), ששם אומרת הגמרא ש”המינין… יורדין לגיהנם
ונידונין בה לדורות”, מפרש רש”י (כפי שנדפס בדפוסים שלפנינו):
“האנשים אשר הפכו דברי אלהים חיים לרעה, כגון צדוקים ובייתוסים”, ובצדק
העירו שם במהדורת ‘עוז והדר’ (הערה ע) שהגירסא הנכונה היא: “תלמידי ישו
הנוצרי אשר הפכו דברי אלהים חיים לרעה”.

אמנם
ב’ליקוטי רש”י’ שם ליקטו מדברי רש”י בכמה מקומות בש”ס:
“המינין. עכו”ם [ברכות
יב.]. משרתים לעבודה
זרה [שבת קטז.]. שאינם מאמינים לדברי רז”ל כגון
צדוקים [חגיגה ה:]. תלמידי ישו שאינם מאמינים לדברי רבותינו
זכרונם לברכה [שם
ע”פ רש”י ישן]. כומרין
לעבודת כוכבים בין עובדי כוכבים בין ישראלים [ע”ז כו:]”[6].

אמנם חלק
מהציטוטים אלו אינם אלא משיבושי הצנזורה, וכך זה יראה באם נגיה אותם ע”פ
הדפו”י שרובם נעתקו ב’הגהות וציונים’: “המינין. עכו”ם תלמידי ישו
[ברכות יב.]. משרתים משומדין לעבודה זרה [שבת קטז.]. שאינם מאמינים לדברי רז”ל כגון צדוקים
[חגיגה ה:]. תלמידי ישו שאינם מאמינים מודים לדברי
רבותינו
זכרונם לברכה חכמים [שם ע”פ רש”י ישן]. כומרין לעבודת כוכבים לעבודה זרה
בין עובדי
כוכבים גוים בין ישראלים [ע”ז כו:]”.

בָּרוּךְ הַמַּבְדִּיל בֵּין
קֹדֶשׁ לְקֹדֶשׁ.

By Israel Drazin

The Babylonian Talmud has the earliest report of the authorship and date of Targum Onkelos. It states that an individual named Onkelos composed the translation in the first third of the second century CE. Since the nineteenth century, scholars have generally rejected this recollection and dated the Targum, or its final redaction, in the third century CE. I will show that the proper date is more likely the late fourth or early fifth century CE. This dating is supported by seeing the consistent use of the targumist of the final version of tannaitic Midrashim that were not edited until the late fourth century.

The Babylonian talmudic scholars gave preference to the literal Aramaic translation of the Pentateuch, which they called targum didan (“our translation”), over other translations.[1] However, they had but a single unreliable memory of its author.

            A Palestinian Amora (in Megillah 3a) curiously states that Onkelos composed the authorized translation after it had been forgotten.

            The Babylonian Talmud states that Onkelos was the son of Kolonikos, who was the nephew of the Roman Emperor Titus. He converted to Judaism. Several miraculous stories are revealed about him.[3] These tales are virtually identical with those conveyed of the Greek translator Aquilas, and, as we shall see, were confusedly ascribed to Onkelos.[4] Thus, according to R. Jeremiah and the Babylonian Talmud, Targum Onkelos was composed about 130 CE.

            There are several serious problems with R. Jeremiah’s opinion. The Babylonian Talmud translates pentateuchal words eighteen times using the term u’m’targuminun, “and it is translated,” or “the Targum states.”[5] Despite R. Jeremiah’s view of authorship, in none of these instances is Onkelos mentioned by name. Midrashim use the same formula seventeen times and Onkelos is cited only once, in a late twelfth-century midrash (Numbers Rabbah 9).[6] An opinion is attributed to an individual called Onkelos only once in the Talmud. This opinion is in no way related to the Targum.[7]

            There is good authority confirming that Aquilas translated the Bible into Greek about 130 CE. There is, however, no corroboration for connecting the Aramaic translation currently called Targum Onkelos with a person named Onkelos other than the single statement in the
tractate Megillah. The talmudic sages, R. Jeremiah or R. Hiyya, obviously confused the two translations.[8] It is hardly possible that R. Eleazar and R. Joshua had two students with virtually identical names, both of whom were born of the same noble lineage under highly unusual circumstances, and both of whom underwent remarkably similar miraculous events.

            It is more likely that the redactors of the Babylonian Talmud did not know who composed their “authorized” or “officially accepted” translation. They recalled that the Jerusalem Talmud of several generations earlier had stated that Aquilas composed the authorized Greek translation. They ascribed their Aramaic version to him as well.[9]

            The only essential difference between the names of Onkelos and Aquilas in Hebrew script is the addition of the letter nun, a characteristic insertion in Babylonian Aramaic. Onkelos is thus a Babylonian equivalent of the name Aquilas.[10]

            There are indicators that suggest, although admittedly they do not prove, that Targum Onkelos could not have been composed in the second century. If Onkelos existed, aside from the unbelievable circumstance that both he and Aquilas underwent the same curious life experiences, there must have been some differences. Why is no difference mentioned in the two stories? Moreover, why is there no allusion to Onkelos in the Talmud, where the Targum is extolled? If the Babylonian talmudic rabbis knew the author of the Targum, we would expect that Onkelos’ name should have been cited whenever the Targum is mentioned.[11] If Onkelos was a noted Palestinian scholar of the second century, he should have been included in the Jerusalem Talmud whose final redaction occurred at the end of the fourth century. Further, if the author of the Targum was known, there should have been no need for the tradition of R. Jeremiah, and the Talmud should never have questioned this tradition.

            Even more significantly, if Onkelos composed the Targum in the second century, why is his name not mentioned in the tannaitic midrashim that were edited in the late fourth century? Jewish tradition is meticulous about naming the source of every teaching.[12] Furthermore, the Mishnah in the Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 8b, edited after the traditionally held composition date of the Onkelos Targum, quotes R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who lived during and after the traditional composition date of Targum Onkelos. He identified only the Greek translation as being holy. The Mishnah knows nothing of Targum Onkelos. The Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 9b, comments upon this Mishnah and states in the name of R. Abbahu (circa 300 CE), who made his statement in the name of R. Johanan (circa 250 CE, both living several generations after the supposed composition of Targum Onkelos), that the halakhah follows R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.

The problems that refute the talmudic view of the dating of Targum Onkelos also confront and refute the views of modern scholarship. Some writers, such as M. H. Goshen-Gottstein and B. Grossfeld, accept the talmudic dating.[13] Grossfeld, for example, maintains that Onkelos and Aquila are the same person, argues that the parallels between the Targum and the midrashim point to a common tradition upon which both genres of scriptural interpretations rest, and concludes that where the school of R. Akiba and R. Ishmael differ, Onkelos upholds the views of R. Akiba’s school. Grossfeld knew only 153 cases in the Pentateuch where Targum Onkelos and the tannaitic midrashim parallel each other. He attributes Onkelos’ translation to the Akiban school because he notes that in 19 of these 153 instances the Targum’s deviation were like those of R. Akiba. Grossfeld did not know that Targum Onkelos parallels the tannaitic Midrashim in 698 instances, as we will show, in just four of the pentateuchal books, and he did not analyze the parallels or take note of the frequent times that the targumist differed with the Akiban school (e.g. Exodus 21:3, 19; 22:3).

            Most scholars reject the Talmud’s date and assign the date of composition to the first half of the third century CE. They rely on references to the Targum in a volume on targumic traditions collected in Die Masorah zum Targum Onkelos,[14] which is said to have been composed in the first half of the third century CE.[15] There is no evidence of the time of composition of this Masorah and no certainty that many elements were not added at later dates. A second proof for the third century dating is the existence of non-halakhic material in the Targum. The argument is that later rabbis could not have authorized divergences from halakhah. These scholars fail to note that rabbinic tradition has always tolerated dissident opinions as to the peshat, the literal sense of the text. Contra-halakhic biblical interpretations occur in the early midrashim and the Talmuds, as well as in the later commentaries of Rashi, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, Nachmanides, and others. There is no rabbinic statement indicating that Targum Onkelos has halakhic authority. The rabbis only forbade teachings which encourage “behavior” that is contrary to halakhah.

While studying, translating and commenting upon Targum Onkelos to the Pentateuch,[16] I noted the remarkable reliance of this Aramaic translation upon the present version of all of the tannaitic midrashim.[17] This has led us to date the Targum to a time following the final redaction of these midrashim.[18]

            I will illustrate this conclusion by focusing on the book of Numbers. A comparison of the words used in Targum Onkelos and Sifrei to Numbers shows the reliance of the author(s) of the Targum upon this late fourth-century midrash[19] and shows the many similarities between the two documents.[20] The findings are rather startling when one realizes that the two documents were not only written in different languages, but that their authors and editors, as will be seen, had totally different agendas. While space constraints restrict us from detailing the findings in the other pentateuchal books, we will also outline these findings briefly and show the consistency of the targumic borrowings.

            The method used in the following study of Numbers is relatively simple. Whenever the Onkelos translation replaces the biblical Hebrew word with a word that deviates from being an exact translation of the original, the tannaitic midrash is examined.

            We will see, for example, that there are five instances where our targumist relied on Sifrei to Numbers’ definitions. Sifrei defined words with what we may call a full definition formula: ein bakhal makom elah (‘there is no place that X means anything else but ‘Y’). Onkelos quotes Sifrei’s word definition each time this formula is used, except where the midrash differentiates dabeir, ‘speak’, from amar, ‘said’.[21]

            Similarly, Sifrei uses what we could call a short definition formula, in (‘There is no… but’), thirteen times.[22] Again, Onkelos incorporates Sifrei’s exact word or uses a synonym of the midrashic term in each instance. Thus, repeatedly and consistently, Onkelos defines the biblical terms exactly like the midrash whenever the midrash states that it is giving a definition. In each instance, the targumist used Sifrei as a dictionary.

            Additionally, our targumist repeats – one might even say “quotes” – Sifrei’s exact word in 53 other verses and is similar to the midrash an additional 35 times in the book of Numbers. Thus, when Onkelos parallels the midrash, it is more likely to repeat the midrash’s exact word than to use a synonym. These numbers are extraordinary since the Targum is an Aramaic translation and the midrash is a Hebrew documentary, and there is extant midrash on only a third of the biblical text.

            In total, Targum Onkelos parallels Sifrei to Numbers in 106 instances, in over a third of the verses where Sifrei has commentary. This is not happenstance. The Targum uses the word because the targumist drew it from the midrash.[23]

            The Onkelos targumist not only drew his translation, indeed his very words, from Sifrei to Numbers but did so as well with the tannaitic midrash Sifrei Zutta to Numbers.

            Sifrei Zutta does not use the full definition formula contained in Sifrei, but it has the short formula ein in five verses (7:3, 10:31, 11:3, 11:18 and 15:38). In each of these instances, our targumist deviates from the biblical text and uses an Aramaic synonym for Sifrei Zutta’s word.

            In addition, Onkelos quotes Sifrei Zutta’s exact word 61 times and is similar to the midrash 38 times. In total, the Targum parallels this midrash in 104 places.[24]

Turning now to the opposite perspective, the following answers the question: why did the targumist not copy everything in the midrash and why did he include material not in the midrash? This will help us understand that the targumist consistently drew his material from the midrash and only failed to do so because of good reasons.

            As mentioned earlier, the targumist and the midrash compilers had different agendas. The targumist quotes the midrash when their purposes are the same, when the midrash translates the text’s simple meaning. He deviates from the midrash when the midrash goes beyond this task. He adds material that is not in the midrash when the midrash did not attempt to clarify the text’s meaning and his rendering does so.

            The following list catalogues some of the kinds of deviations inserted by the targumist to clarify the text that are not in Sifrei. These changes, which are explained in chapter 3 and in the author’s Targum Onkelos to Numbers, either did not concern the halakhic and aggadic-minded commentators of the midrash, or they are insertions that the compilers of the midrash did not feel compelled to add to every verse when they had already commented upon it elsewhere (e.g. Shekhinah or adding a preposition).[25]

Explaining the text with an Aramaic idiom

Replacing el, which means “God,” with “idol”

Changing the harsh “take” to the softer “lead”

Grammatical and tense replacements

Explanation of metaphors

Using words to avoid anthropomorphisms, such as memra

Treating a name as verb

Updating and thereby identifying a place name

Being more explicit than the Bible

Avoiding an anthropomorphism and anthropopathism

Changes to preserve Israelite honor

Changes to protect God’s honor

Removing redundancies

Replacing the plural Elohim with the Tetragrammaton

            Thus, the targumic insertions that are of not in the midrash are absent from the midrash because they do not concern the midrashic authors. Conversely, the targumist only incorporates Sifrei material that interprets biblical verses according to their literal meaning. He avoids using derash, interpretations trying to disclose the text’s hidden meaning, or where the midrash has halakhah, theology, legends, and parables.

            Examples of midrashic derash that Onkelos refrains from using are: the Massoretic Text’s (MT’s) “uncover the woman’s head” (Numbers 5:18) teaches that Israelite women should keep their heads covered. MT’s “place in her hands” (5:18) is required to tire her out so that she will repent. MT’s “two turtledoves and two young pigeons” (6:10) implies that people may not substitute turtledoves for pigeons or pigeons for turtledoves.

            Halakhic elements are on virtually every Sifrei page. They appear only rarely in the Aramaic translation, which also has contra-halakhic matter, and then only when they help readers understand the text’s simple meaning. MT’s “command” (5:2) is said to apply immediately and for future generations. MT’s “his sin” clarifies that one does not confess his father’s sins. MT’s “eyes” (5:11) excludes a blind person.

            Aside from its avoidance of anthropomorphisms, theology and morality are also generally absent from Onkelos, but abound in the midrash. Sifrei derives the lesson that strength is granted to those who are strong, and encouragement to those who are stout of heart (5:2), Aaron was righteous because he did exactly what Moses told him to do (8:1), and the Israelites were virtuous because they did what Moses instructed (9:1). Merit flows to the meritorious and humiliation to those who are disgraceful (9:1).

            Various legends and parables do not appear in Onkelos. For example, each of the seven days of preparing the Tabernacle, Moses set it up and then dismantled it (7:1). Aaron’s sons did not literally die before the Lord; they fell outside so as not to render the Tabernacle unclean. In fact, an angel sustained them after they had been struck with fire, helped them outside, and allowed them to fall in the courtyard (7:1). The Israelite desert leaders were the same individuals who were assigned as their supervisors while they were slaves in Egypt (7:3).

            In summary, the Onkelos targumist consistently drew the explanations and definitions from the late fourth century midrashim that helped explain the text’s simple meaning, and frequently even quoted the midrash. He ignored material that did not further this agenda. Thus he could not have composed his translation before the end of the fourth century.

We read in the Talmud (Baba Metziah
85a):

R. Zeira, when he moved to the land of
Israel, observed a hundred fasts to forget the teachings of Babylonia, [1] so
that they should not disturb him.
He fasted another hundred times so that R.
Elazar should not die during his years and the responsibilities of the
community not fall upon him.He fasted another hundred times so that
the fire of Gehenna should have no power over him.

There are some difficulties with R. Zeira
forgetting the teachings of Babylonia:

1) Both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmud
contain many interactions between sages who travelled from the land of Israel
to Babylon or from Babylon to the land of Israel. These sages shared their own teachings
and traditions with their counterparts. By forgetting Babylonian teachings, R.
Zeira is choosing not to participate in this knowledge transfer. Why? [2]

2) R. Zeira is mentioned many times in
the Jerusalem Talmud and sometimes he transmits in the name of his Babylonian
teachers. Many of these exchanges clearly took place when he already was in the
land of Israel. How can he transfer Torah information that he has supposedly forgotten?
[3]

3) The Talmud (Shabbat 41a) relates that
when R Zeira was about to leave for the land of Israel, he went out of his way to
hear one more teaching from his teacher, Rav Yehuda.  Why would he go to the trouble of amassing
more Babylonian teachings if he intended to immediately forget them?

4) Forgetting one’s learning purposefully
isn’t a pious thing to do. The Mishna Pirkei Avot 3:10 strongly discourages it,
as does the Talmud:  R. Elazar said:  One who forgets a word of his learning (Talmud)
causes his descendants to be exiled – Yoma 38b. Resh Laqish said:  One who forgets a word of his learning (Talmud)
transgresses a negative commandment – Menachot 
99b.

We can find a simple solution to these
questions in one of the manuscripts of Baba Metzia, written around 1137
and housed in the National Central Library in Florence. The manuscript disagrees
with the premise that R. Zeira ever forgot his learning:

R. Zeira fasted so that he would not
forget the teachings of Babylon.

He observed another forty fasts so that
R Il’a should not die in his lifetime.

He observed another forty fasts that the
fire of Gehenna should have no power over him.

The paragraph that precedes the story of
R. Zeira (in all versions) tells of Rav Yosef (R. Zeira’s colleague) who also observed
a series of three sets of forty intermittent fasts. The purpose of Rav Yosef’s
fasts was to guarantee that the knowledge of the Torah would not depart from
himself, from his children and from his grandchildren. The goal of Rav Yosef’s
fasts seems to agree with the goal of R. Zeira’s fasts; to remember (i.e., not
forget) the teachings of Babylonia.

According to this manuscript, all of R.
Zeira’s fasts have something in common with each other. He fasted so he would
not forget, he fasted so that R. Ila’i would not die, and he fasted so that the
fire of Gehina would not harm him. He always seems to be fasting so that
something should not happen.

However, many authorities have discussed
the standard version, and no one (as far as I know) has relied on this reading
to resolve the original questions. [6]

Here
are some of the classical interpretations that attempt to solve the problems of
R. Zeira’s forgetting.

Rashi
writes (BM 85a) that the students in the land of Israel were not בני מחלוקת, were not contentious, ונוחין זה לזה, they were pleasant to each other]  . . .   ומיישבין את
הטעמים בלא קושיות ופירוקין and they explained their reasoning without challenging each
other with difficulties and rebuttals.

According
to Rashi , R. Zeira forgets the “atmosphere” of the Babylonian academies.  [7]

Maharsha (1555-1631), disagrees with
Rashi. He argues that the sages in the land of Israel do engage in questioning
and answering like their counterparts in Babylonia.  He cites the Gemara (Baba Metzia 84a) where
R. Yohanan says about Reish Laqish:  he
would raise twenty-four objections, and I would reply with twenty-four answers.

Therefore, Maharsha explains that
possibly the Babylonian piplul was faulty and similar to a style of piplul
that existed in his own time דוגמת חילוקים
שבדור הזה. He objects to this style of questioning and answering because it
distances one from the truth, and can’t help one rule on halakhic issues. Accordingly,
R. Zeira fasted in order to forget how to piplul the Babylonian way.

Abravanel (1437-1508) in his commentary
on Pirkei Avot (on the Mishna in chapter 5 which begins: There are four types
who study with the sages) writes somewhat similarly. The problem with the one who
is compared to a sponge, who soaks up everything – is that he retains things
that are untrue. In the search for truth, there are necessary steps which themselves
are untrue:  כי לא תברר האמת כי אם בהפכו truth can only
be evaluated when compared with its opposite. R. Zeira fasts to forget the stages in
the arguments of the Babylonian Talmud that were untrue.

In summary, all three of these
interpretations agree that R. Zeira didn’t literally forget the Babylonian
teachings. He forgot the “atmosphere” of the Babylonian academies or the
interim discussions that took place there.  [8]

I’d like now to give some examples of
how the story of R. Zeira is presented in some early Hassidic sermons, to show
how the Rebbes and their audiences understood the story of R. Zeira. These
sources aren’t concerned with explaining our Gemara; R. Zeira’s story is cited
to support an ethical or moral lesson.

Torah Or is a collection of sermons by
R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi (1745-1812). On
page 69c, in a discussion about spiritual worlds, the author says:

The purpose of the river diNur, (fiery
river (or maybe fiery light)), in which the soul submerges itself as it passes from
this world to Gan Eden, is to erase its memories of this physical world. If the
soul remembers its encounter with materiality, it can’t experience Gan Eden.
And when the soul goes from the lower Gan Eden to the higher Gan Eden it also must
pass through a river diNur to forget the comprehension and pleasures of the
lower Gan Eden. (Zohar part 2 210a) This is the idea in the Gemara: R. Zeira
observed 100 fasts to forget the Talmud of Babylonia even though he had studied
it with devotion.

In Likutei Moharan (ch. 246), R. Nachman
of Bratslav (1772 – 1810) writes:

In these examples of Hassidic thought there
is no difficulty with the idea that R. Zeira forgets his learning in order to reach
higher spiritual plateau. Forgetting is a purification process that is both
necessary and exemplary. [9]

Returning now to the literal sense of the
Gemara:

R. Issac Halevi (Rabinowitz)
(1847-1914), the author of Dorot Harishonim addresses our problem in a footnote
(Dorot II p 427 footnote 93). He posits that in R.  Zeira’s time there were already two canonized
collections of Talmudic material arranged around the Mishna; each in its own
distinct form and style.

כבר הי׳ להם סתמא דהש”ס על המשנה שגרסו כבר במטבע קבועה,
וכן הי׳  להם אז כבר גם בארץ ישראל.

R. Zeira chose to
forget the Babylonian Talmud (as it existed in his time), because it interfered
with his studies in the land of Israel.

According to this
interpretation, R. Zeira forgot only the redaction or arrangement of the
teachings he had learned.  He didn’t forget
the teachings themselves (or the study method). [10]

I’d like to suggest
an original explanation. It’s based on passages in the Talmud about R. Zeira
and additionally can explain why only R. Zeira decided to forget the teachings
of Babylon when he moved to the land of Israel.

We
see that the teachings of the land of Israel (especially R. Yohanan’s) did
reach R. Zeira while he was still in Babylon [11]. R. Zeira, however, didn’t really
trust these teachings. Sometimes he thought they were attributed incorrectly,
or their content was not accurate. He doubted if a statement in the name of R.
Eleazar was correct. [12] He was unsure if R. Yohanan agreed with R. Aqiba’s
position or not. He distinguished between the different amoraim who
transmitted teachings. In general he looked at Torah that reached Babylon as
something that was possibly unreliable, inaccurate or “damaged in transit”.

  

R. Zeira was
only able to resolve his doubts when he moved to the land of Israel and learned
the Torah of the land of Israel there. He then forgot the imprecise version of
these teachings that he had previously memorized in Babylon – “the teachings of
Babylon”. He could forget them because they were superseded by accurate
teachings that he now received in the land of Israel. [13]

I’d like to thank Reb Gary Gleam who
provided the cabbage rolls and coffee, and the late night sounding board.

————————————————————————————————————————–

[1] תלמודא בבלאה is sometimes translated
as Babylonian Talmud, which I think is an anachronism. I will use the translation
“Babylonian teachings”. All the available manuscripts have תלמודא דבבל  =  the teachings of Babylonia. The phrase Talmuda
dBabel or Talmuda Babelah occurs only here
(Google). Talmud in the sense of teachings occurs many times, often in
comparison to mikra or mishna.

 [2]
Compare Rosh Hashana 20b: “When R. Zeira went up [to the land of Israel], he
sent [a letter] to his colleagues [in Babylonia]  . . .”  R.
Zeira didn’t break off all contact with the old country. He taught them what he
heard and learned in the land of Israel.

[3] See Goldberg, Abraham. “Rabbi Ze’ira
and Babylonian Custom in Palestine” (Hebrew) Tarbiz vol. 36 1967 (pages
319-341), for examples of Babylonian traditions that R. Zeira brought to the
land of Israel. The following quote is from the online abstract:

“R.
Zeira is the outstanding figure among many who came from an area of unmixed
Babylonian tradition and who tried to impose their own Babylonian practice upon
Palestinian custom.”

[5] The words “so that it should not disturb
him” would be out of place in this version of the story, since according to
this version, R. Zeria never forgot the Babylonian teachings, but the idea is
that the text is short. There is a geniza fragment from The Friedberg
Project for Talmud Bavli Variants and it is equally as short. (Note
that it matches the standard editions with regard to the goal of R. Zeira’s
fast.)

Translation of the geniza fragment:

R. Zeira observed forty fasts to forget
the teachings of Babylon.

He fasted another forty times that R
Il’a should not die in his lifetime.

He fasted another forty times that the fire of
Gehenna should have no power over him.

[6]
The author of Dikduke Soferim mentions this version but doesn’t suggest that its
reading is better than the standard one. Dikduke Sofreim has written elsewhere
that this specific manuscript belonged to Christians who translated (into Latin)
passages that were regularly used against Jews in inter-faith disputations.
There’s no Latin on this page, but you can see Latin on some other pages.

[7]
Rashi mentions his source as Sanhedrin 24a. He understands that the students of
Babylon were antagonistic to each other unlike the students in the land of
Israel who were pleasant to each other. Rashi apparently was thinking of this in
his commentary on the prayer of R. Nehunya ben HaKanah – Berachot 28b. The
prayer reads: “May it be Your will that I don’t make a mistake in a halakhic
ruling, and that my colleagues rejoice with me  . . .”  Rashi
understands the prayer this way – May it be Your will that I don’t make a
mistake in a halakhic ruling and my colleagues make fun of me.

[8]
The explanations of Maharsha and Abravanel have prompted subversive
interpretations by the school of the German Jewish historians of the
Talmud.  In the Soncino translation of
Shabbat 41a, the translator, Rabbi DR. Freedman (1901-1982) writes:  “Weiss, Dor, III, p. 188, maintains that R.
Zera’s desire to emigrate was occasioned by dissatisfaction with Rab Judah’s
method of study; this is vigorously combatted by Halevi, Doroth, II pp. 421 et
seq.”

Jacob Neusner’s
in his book A History of the Jews in Babylonia page 218, also questions the
idea that sages of the land of Israel rejected the Babylonian methods of study,
and finds “Halevi’s strong demurrer quite convincing”.

[9]
In this context, the Talmudic statement: גדולה עבירה לשמה ממצווה שלא לשמה   – מסכת הוריות י’ ע”ב may be somewhat
relevant.

[10] I’m not sure, according to R.
Halevi,  did R. Zeira also forget the
anonymous Talmudic layer (stam or redactor) that existed in his time? 

[11]
The first of these conversations definitely took place in Babylon. The fourth
interaction occurred in the land of Israel but revises a teaching that R. Zeira
probably heard in Babylonia. The middle two quotes are may describe R. Zeira in
Babylon, but even if they occurred when R. Zeira was already in the land of
Israel, they reflect doubts that he had while in Babylon.  The number 40 in the last example is also
remarkable. He repeats something 40 times in order to remember. He fasts 40
times to forget. 

[12]
R. Eleazar teaches without citing his source but everyone knows that his
teachings are R. Yohanan’s (Yerushalmi Berakot 2:1 and Yerushalmi Shekalim 2:5).

[13] R. Zeira didn’t forget the native
Babylonian teachings, authored and recorded by the Babylonian amoraim. He
never doubted their accuracy. He brought those teachings to the land of Israel
and enriched the Torah of the land of Israel with them. 

                                     THE SEVEN NATIONS OF CANAAN[1]

By Reuven Kimelman

This study deals with the war and the
seven Canaanite nations.[2] It complements my previous post on Amalek of March 13, 2014, “The Ethics of the Case of Amalek: An
Alternative Reading of the Biblical Data and the Jewish Tradition. “The popular
conception in both cases is that the Bible demands their extermination thereby
providing a precedent for genocide.[3] The popular reading of the Canaanites filters it through the prism of
Deuteronomy. The popular reading of
Amalek filters the Torah material through the prism of Saul’s battle against
Amalek in the Book of Samuel. In actuality, the biblical data is much
more ambiguous making the most destructive comments the exception not the rule as
will be evident from a systematic analysis of the Canaanite material in the
Bible as was previously done with Amalek.  

            This
post will deal with the following seven questions with regard to the nations of
Canaan:

a). What are the different biblical
approaches to the native nations of Canaan?

b). According to the Bible, what
actually happened to them?

c). What is the evidence that the
Bible is sensitive to the moral issues involved?

d). How has the Jewish tradition
removed the category of the seven nations from its ethical agenda?

e). What is the role of the
doctrine of repentance?

f). What is the relevance of the
“Sennacherib principle”?

g). How relevant is the category
“holy war”?

            With
regard to the extermination of the seven nations of Canaan,[4] sometimes called Canaanites sometimes Amorites, the biblical record is also not
of one cloth. The clarification of their status in the Bible requires a
systematic treatment of all the data book by book. 

Genesis (12:6, 15:16) is aware that the
Canaanites were in the land when Abraham arrived and would remain for
generations.  From Genesis 38 and the end
of The Book of Ruth we learn that from the progeny of Abraham’s great grandson
Judah and the Canaanite Tamar will issue King David. Also  Simeon’s son is identified as “Saul the son
of a Cannanite women” (Genesis 46:10, Exodus 6:15) without comment.

Exodus (23)’s position on the
elimination of the Canaanites (v. 23) is a gradual dispossession by God, not by
the Israelites:[5]

27 I will send forth My terror before
you, and I will throw into panic all the people among whom you come, and I will
make all your enemies turn tail before you. 28 I will send a plague ahead of
you, and it shall drive out before you the Hivites, the Canaanites, and the
Hittites.[6] 29 I will not drive them out before you in a single year, lest the land become
desolate and the wild beasts multiply to your hurt. 30 I will drive them out
before you little by little, until you have increased and possess the land.

Leviticus (18) refers to God casting out
of the nations:

24 Do not defile yourselves in any of
those ways, for it is by such that the nations that I am casting out before you
defiled themselves. 25 Thus the land became defiled; and I called it to account
for its iniquity, and the land spewed out its inhabitants.

Here there is a coordination between God
and land.  The land spews out its
inhabitants for defiling it and God expels them.  

Numbers (33) refers to the Israelites
deporting the local inhabitants:

51 Speak to the Israelite people and say
to them:

When you cross the Jordan into the land
of Canaan, 52 you shall dispossess all the inhabitants of the land; you shall
destroy all their figured objects; you shall destroy all their molten images,
and you shall demolish all their cult places. 53 And you shall take possession
of the land and settle in it, for I have assigned the land to you to possess.

It is clear that the issue here is not
ethnic but religio-cultural. The fear is that Israel will be ensnared,
especially through intermarriage, by the local moral and cultic practices
. 

Exodus 34 emphasizes the religious
factor:

12b Beware of making a covenant with the
inhabitants of the land against which you are advancing, lest they be a snare
in your midst. 13 Rather you must tear down their altars, smash their
pillars,and cut down their sacred posts; 14 for you must not worship any other
God, because the Lord, whose name is Impassioned, is an impassioned God. 15 You
must not make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, for they will lust
after their gods and sacrifice to their gods and invite you, and you will eat
of their sacrifices. 16 And when you take wives from among their daughters for
your sons, their daughters will lust after their gods and will cause your sons
to lust after their gods.[7]

Leviticus 18 emphasizes the moral
factor:

26 But you must keep My laws and My
rules, and you must not do any of those abhorrent things, neither the citizen
nor the stranger who resides among you; 27 for all those abhorrent things were
done by the people who were in the land before you, and the land became
defiled. 28 So let not the land spew you out for defiling it as it spewed out
the nation that came before you. 29 All who do any of those abhorrent
things—such persons shall be cut off from their people. 30 You shall keep My
charge not to engage in any of the abhorrent practices that were carried on
before you, and you shall not defile yourselves through them: I the Lord am
your God.

Numbers 33 warns Israel against
assimilating Canaanite norms lest they share their fate of expulsion. “55 But if
you do not dispossess the inhabitants of the land, those whom you allow to
remain shall be stings in your eyes and thorns in your sides, and they shall
harass you in the land in which you live; 56 so that I will do to you what I
planned to do to them.”

            The exception is Deuteronomy 7
which demands total destruction:

1 When the Lord your God brings you to
the land that you are about to enter and possess, and He dislodges many nations
before you— the Hittites, Girgashites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites,
Hivites, and Jebusites, seven nations much larger than you—2and the Lord your
God delivers them to you and you defeat them, you must doom them to
destruction: grant them no terms and give them no quarter.

Even according to Deuteronomy the fear
is not of their DNA but moral assimilation, for it goes on to say:  “Lest they lead you into doing all the
abhorrent things that they have done for their gods and you stand guilty before
the Lord your God” (20:18). For Deuteronomy (12:31; 18:9-12), the abhorrent
things include child sacrifice.

Strangely, Deuteronomy continues with a
provision against intermarriage:

3 You shall not intermarry with them: do
not give your daughters to their sons or take their daughters for your sons.
4 For they will turn your children away from Me to worship other gods, and the
Lord’s anger will blaze forth against you and He will promptly wipe you out.
5 Instead, this is what you shall do to them: you shall tear down their altars,
smash their pillars, cut down their sacred posts, and consign their images to
the fire.

Apprehension about intermarriage or coming to terms with an eradicated people
is strange unless Deuteronomy is aware that its demand to doom them will not be
(or was not) implemented. And, in fact, as we shall see the evidence from
Judges 3 is that they did intermarry.

 Alternatively, ḥerem does not entail
the elimination of the Canaanites only their isolation, that is, they are to be
quarantined. This understanding follows its Semitic cognates where it means to
separate, to set aside.[8] The goal is to exclude any intercourse with them. Thus verse 5 only refers to
the elimination of their objects of worship not their persons. This opens the
possibility that “What we have is a retention of the … traditional language
of ḥerem, but a shift in the direction of its acquiring significance as
a metaphor … for religious fidelity.”[9]

 Even stranger is the description of the
confrontation with Sihon king of the Amorites. Within the context of
Deuteronomy, one would expect an outright attack when God says to Moses: “See,
I give into your power Sihon the Amorite, king of Heshbon, and his land. Begin
the occupation: engage him in battle” (2:24). Instead, what does Moses do:

26 Then I sent messengers from the
wilderness of Kedemoth to King Sihon of Heshbon with an offer of peace, as
follows, 27 “Let me pass through your country. I will keep strictly to the
highway, turning off neither to the right nor to the left. 28 What food I eat
you will supply for money, and what water I drink you will furnish for money;
just let me pass through.”

Sihon rejects the offer and attacks
Israel. They are destroyed only in the counterattack.

If there is no evidence for the
expulsion of the Canaanites, whence the position of Deuteronomy 7:1-2?
It has been speculated that Deuteronomy took “both the expulsion law of Exodus
23:20-33, directed against the inhabitants of Canaan, and the ḥerem
(total destruction) law of Exodus 22:19 (“Whoever sacrifices to a God other
than the Lord shall be proscribed), directed against the individual Israelite,
and fused them into a new law that applies ḥerem to all idolaters,
Israelites and non-Israelites alike.”[10] In other words, the ḥerem is not against Canaanites as Canaanites, but
idolaters as idolaters. Thus Deuteronomy (13:13-19) imposes the very punishment
on Israelite idolaters. The choice of the word ḥerem also promotes a
sense of quid pro quod, for, according to Numbers 14:45, the Canaanites and the
Amalekites pummeled Israel to Hormah a word which could simply designate a
place or also serve as a toponym since ad haḥormah could be
rendered “to utter destruction.”[11] The point of the paronomasia is that the Canaanites and the Amalekites got as
they gave.

In any case, except for some sources in
Joshua (6:21 and chapters 10-11) the later biblical sources follow the earlier
biblical books from Exodus to Numbers rather than Deuteronomy. Even the Joshua
material raises some questions. According to Joshua 10:33, Joshua totally
destroyed the people of Gezer. Yet Joshua 16:10 (like Judges 1:29) states: “They
failed to dispossess the Canaanites who dwelt in Gezer; so the Canaanites
remained in the midst of Ephraim, as is still the case. But they had to perform
forced labor.” In actuality, they stayed there until the reign of Solomon only
to be killed off by Pharaoh as noted in I Kings 9:16. Apparently, once the
people were defanged by having its army destroyed, they were given quarter.[12] As a subject nation they apparently present no religious threat. In fact, save
for the peculiar case of Judges 3:5, the surrounding nations, not the
Canaanites, are blamed for Israelite apostasy.[13] In fact, according to Joshua 8:29 and 10:27, the bodies of Canaanite kings hung
by Joshua were buried by nightfall just as Deuteronomy 21:23 enjoins.
Apparently, Human dignity is inalienable even for Canaanite kings.

The triumphal picture of Joshua is
undermined by the facts on the ground. For example, Joshua 11:12 gives the
impression that Joshua wiped out all the cities in the area of Hazor and burned
them to the ground. Yet the next verse says: “However, all those towns that are
still standing on their mounds were not burned down by Israel; it was Hazor
alone that Joshua burned down.” In fact, only two other cities were burned —
Jericho and Ai.

Similarly, Joshua 11:23 claims: “Thus
Joshua conquered the whole country, just as the Lord had promised Moses,”
whereas 13:1 concedes “and very much of the land still remains to be taken
possession of.” Even where Israel spread out much of the native population was
allowed to remain in their midst, as it says later in the same chapter: “the
Israelites failed to dispossess the Geshurites and the Maacathites, and Geshur
and Maacath remain among Israel to this day” (13:13). The sparing of the
Canaanite population was common. With regard to southern Israel, Joshua 15:63
says: “But the Judites could not dispossess the Jebusites, the inhabitants of
Jerusalem; so the Judites dwell with the Jebusites in Jerusalem to this day.”
With regard to central Israel, Joshua 16:10 says: “However, they failed to
dispossess the Canaanites who dwelt in Gezer; so the Canaanites remained in the
midst of Ephraim, as is still the case. But they had to perform forced labor.”
And with regard to northern Israel, Joshua 17:12-13 says: “The Manassites could
not dispossess [the inhabitants of] these towns, and the Canaanites stubbornly
remained in this region. When the Israelites became stronger, they imposed
tribute on the Canaanites; but they did not dispossess them.”

Judges 1:27-36 follows suit. It begins:

27 Manasseh did not dispossess [the
inhabitants of] Beth-shean and its dependencies, or [of] Taanach and its
dependencies, or the inhabitants of Dor and its dependencies, or the
inhabitants of Ibleam and its dependencies, or the inhabitants of Megiddo and
its dependencies. The Canaanites persisted in dwelling in this region. 28 And
when Israel gained the upper hand, they subjected the Canaanites to forced
labor; but they did not dispossess them. 29Nor did Ephraim dispossess the
Canaanites who inhabited Gezer; so the Canaanites dwelt in their midst at
Gezer…

All these sources mention the failure to
dispossess the Canaanites, despite the Israelites’ power to do so. No mention
is made of any extermination.[14] Joshua 24:13 does mention the expulsion of two kings but without resorting to
the sword and bow, a point reiterated in Psalm 44:5. Most remarkable is the
story in Judges 4. There it is told that God punished the Israelites by handing
them over to Yabin the king of Canaan and Sisera his general. In the divinely
commanded revolt against them, God promised to deliver them into the hands of
the Israelites not to wipe them out.

Joshua concedes in his farewell address
the failure of his policy. The most he can hope is that “The Lord your God
Himself will thrust them out on your account and drive them out to make way for
you” (Joshua 23:5). In the meantime, they are exhorted to be resolute not “to
intermingle with these nations that are left among you. Do not utter the names
of their gods or swear by them” (23:7). He them mentions the apprehension of
Deuteronomy of intermarriage: “For should you turn away and attach yourselves
to the remnant of those nations — to those that are left among you–and
intermarry with the you joining them and they joining you, know for certain
that the Lord your God will not continue to drive these nations out before you;
they shall become a snare and a trap for you” (23:12-13).

In fact, Judges 3 states that they did
intermarry: “The Israelites settled among the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites,
Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites; they took their daughters to wife and gave
their own daughters to their sons, and they worshiped their gods” (5-6).
Intermarriage was likely a factor in the absence of biblical or extra biblical
evidence for Israel’s expulsion of the Canaanites. 

The archaeological record confirms that
Israel primarily settled in previously unoccupied territory in the central
highlands rather than rebuilt towns on destroyed Canaanite cites. In Judges 2,
they are threatened with the consequences of not dispossessing them:

1 An angel of the Lord came up from
Gilgal to Bochim and said, “I brought you up from Egypt and I took you into the
land which I had promised on oath to your fathers. And I said, ‘I will never
break My covenant with you. 2 And you, for your part, must make no covenant with
the inhabitants of this land; you must tear down their altars.’ But you have
not obeyed Me—look what you have done! 3 Therefore, I have resolved not to drive
them out before you; they shall become your oppressors, and their gods shall be
a snare to you.”
The Israelites not only did not drive out the inhabitants, they concluded
treaties with them. Their expulsion by God was contingent upon Israel’s refusal
to conclude a treaty with them. Neither took place.

Even at the height of ancient Israelite
power under the reign of Solomon there was no move to do away with them only to
subject them to forced labor, as I Kings 9 (= 2 Chronicles 8:7-8) states:

20All the people that were left of the
Amorites, Hittites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites who were not of the
Israelite stock—21those of their descendants who remained in the land and whom
the Israelites were not able to annihilate—of these Solomon made a slave force,
as is still the case.[15]

Nonetheless, Uriah the Hittite not only
marries Bathsheba but also serves as a trusted officer in David’s army.

            Psalm
106 laments the total failure of the policy. According to it, everything that
Joshua warned against, they did and more. Following Deuteronomy 12:31, it also
provides the moral basis by documenting the abhorrent behavior of the
Canaanites to their own children:

34 They did not destroy the nations as
the Lord had commanded them, 35 but mingled with the nations and learned their
ways. 36 They worshiped their idols, which became a snare for them. 37 Their own
sons and daughters they sacrificed to demons. 38 They shed innocent blood, the
blood of their sons and daughters, whom they sacrificed to the idols of Canaan;
so the land was polluted with bloodguilt. 39 Thus they became defiled by their
acts, debauched through their deeds.[16]

Verses 34-35 attest to the non
implementation of the policy of Deuteronomy 20:17-18.

            Remarkably,
the Rabbis explain the non implementation through the conversion of the
nations: 

R. Samuel bar Nahman began his discourse
with the verse: “But if you will not drive out the inhabitants
of the Land before you, then shall those that remain of them be as thorns in
your eyes and as pricks in your sides” (Numbers 33:55). The Holy One reminded
Israel: I said to you, “You shall utterly destroy them: the
Hittite and the Amorite” (Deuteronomy 20:17). But you did not do so; for “Rahab
the harlot, and her father’s household, and all that she had, did Joshua save
alive” (Joshua 6:25). Behold, Jeremiah will spring from the children’s children
of Rahab the harlot and will thrust such words into you as will be thorns in
your eyes and pricks in your sides.[17]

Irony of ironies, the thorny and prickly
issue is no longer the continuity of pagan practices but the pointed prophetic
barbs from the progeny of converts.

The tendency to blunt the impact of the
seven-nations policy of Deuteronomy is also furthered by two other comments in
rabbinic literature. The first contends that Joshua sent three missives before
embarking on the conquest of the Land of Israel. The first said: “whoever wants
to leave — may leave;” the second: “whoever wants to make peace — make
peace;” and the third: “whoever wants to make war — make war.”[18] War was only conducted against those who opted for war.[19]

That war was not waged against those who did not opt for war may be supported
by the following verse in Joshua:

When all the kings of the Amorites on
the western side of the Jordan, and all the kings of the Canaanites near the
Sea, heard how the Lord had dried up the waters of the Jordan for the sake of
the Israelites until they crossed over, they lost heart, and no spirit was left
in them because of the Israelites (5:1).

No war no killing. Similarly, Joshua 9
mentions that all six nations of Cannaan mobilized for war against Israel as
opposed to the Gibeonites who made peace with them. Even though the peace was
made under false pretenses, Joshua in chapter 10 honored his “treaty to
guarantee their lives” (9:15) by rescuing them from the attack of the five
Amorite kings. The treaty here entails security arrangements in exchange for
submission.  Also in the beginning of
chapter 11 Joshua defeats those nations that had mobilized for war against him.
None of these accounts attribute their destruction to their religious
depravity, only to their initiation of attack on Israel.[20]

The other rabbinic comment rules that by
transplanting and mingling the populations he conquered, the Assyrian king
Sennacherib dissolved the national identity of the Canaanite nations in ancient
times.[21] Accordingly, Maimonides ruled that all trace of them has vanished.[22] Harav Abraham Kook, former chief rabbi, attained the same goal by limiting the
commandment to expel the Canaanites to the generation of Joshua. He writes:

If it were an absolute duty for every
Jewish king to conquer all the seven nations, how would David have refrained
from doing so? Therefore, in my humble opinion, the original duty rested only
on Joshua and his generation. Afterwards, it was only a commandment to realize
the inheritance of the land promised to the patriarchs.[23]

Moreover, non-Canaanites captured along
with a majority of Canaanites were to be spared just as Canaanites caught with
a majority of non-Canaanites were to be spared[24] reducing possibilities of any wholesale slaughter. In fact one commentator
contends that the destruction of a city is predicated upon the unanimous
opposition to submission to the Israelites for “we cannot impose a death
penalty on them (women and children) because of the sin of their fathers and
the guilt of their husbands.”[25] Finally, the Maimonidean ruling that all war must be preceded by an overture of
peace and that only the nations of Canaan that maintained their abhorrent ways
are to be doomed reduced the possibility of any war of total destruction.[26] His position is rooted in the repeated classical rabbinic comment to the verse
“Lest they lead you into doing all the abhorrent things that they have done for
their gods and you stand guilty before the Lord your God” (20:18) — “This
teaches that if they repent they are not killed.”[27] The assumption is that the Canaanites got special attention not only because of
their geography, but also because “they were enmeshed in idolatry more than all
the nations of the world.”[28]

Similarly, The Wisdom of Solomon notes that the
Israelites did not wipe out the Canaanites “at once, but judging them gradually
You gave them space for repentance” (12:10).

The best biblical example of judging
Canaanites by their behavior and not by their genes is the case of Rahab of
Jericho. Since she acknowledged the God of Israel as “the God of heaven and
earth” (Joshua 2:12) and threw her lot in with Israel, she and her household
were not only spared but were welcomed “into the midst of Israel” (Joshua
6:25). Rabbinic tradition extended this welcome to marrying Joshua and becoming
the progenitor of priests and prophets.[29] Moreover, based on the fact that “The young men . . . went in and brought out
Rahab . . . and her brethren . . . all her kindred also” (Joshua 6:23), it was
understood that her immediate relatives, and also their relatives totaling many
hundreds were also spared.[30] The other salutary example is the Canaanite Tamar who not only trumped Judah
morally (see Genesis 38:26), but, according to the genealogy at the end of the
Book of Ruth, became the progenitress of King David. The other progenitress was
Ruth the Moabite who is linked to Tamar in Ruth 4:12. That behavior or
life-style trumps genes explains the permissibility of marrying the captured
woman in Deuteronomy 21:10. Having left her previous ways she no longer
presents a temptation of apostasy. Rabbinic tradition following suit
specifically included a Canaanite as long as she had shed her idolatrous ways.[31]

In the same vein, rabbinic tradition
held that the descendants of the Canaanite general Sisera became Torah teachers
in Jerusalem,[32] and that Abraham’s servant Eliezer was removed from the category of Canaanite
due to his loyalty to Abraham,[33] indeed, deemed his peer in piety,[34] worthy of entering Paradise alive.[35]

In the light of the biblical doctrine of
repentance (“For it is not My desire that anyone shall die—declares the Lord
God. Repent, therefore, and live!” — Ezekiel 18:32), it is hard to contemplate
an alternative. Such a doctrine does not sit well with the possibility of
irredeemable evil. A lesson that Jonah had a hard time learning. According to
The Book of Jonah, even Nineveh, the capital of the empire that brought ruin on
the lost tribes of Israel and annihilated everything in its path (see Isaiah
37:11), could avert destruction by engaging in repentance. Finally, the
evidence that the issue was all along ethical and not ethnic lies in the fact
that Abraham was prevented from taking possession of the land in his day
“because the iniquity of the Amorites was not yet complete” (Genesis 15:16),
whereas his descendants were allowed to take possession because of the
“wickedness of these nations” (Deuteronomy 9:4-5).

The midrashic tradition followed the
biblical categorization of groups through a combination of ethics and
ethnicity. With regard to repentance, the Midrash pointed out that the Torah
was given in the third month whose Zodiac symbol is twins to make the point
that were Jacob’s twin Esau to repent and convert and study Torah God would
accept him.[36] In fact, God looks forward “to  the
nations of the world repenting so that He might bring them nigh beneath His
wings.”[37] Kindness is also a criterion for inclusion; its absence a criterion for
exclusion. The Cannanite Rahab is allowed in for her act of her kindness.[38] Even Egyptians, according to Deuteronomy 23:8b-9, are accepted after
three generations apparently for having initially extended kindness to Israel.[39] The case of the Moabite Ruth is exemplary. According to Deuteronomy 23:4-5,
Moabites are not allowed into the Congregation of the Lord because of their
lack of human decency and hospitality to Israel after the Exodus. In contrast,
Ruth is accepted because of her decency and kindness to her Jewish
mother-in-law.[40] Her example led to the wholesale exemption of women from the Deuteronomic
prohibition.[41]

She in fact is a latter day Tamar. Both Tamar and Ruth are erstwhile barren
foreign widows of Israelite men who insinuate themselves into the messianic
line through linking up with prominent progenitors of David through a
combination of feminine wiles and moral rectitude.

In the same vein, Eliezer’s criterion,
according to Genesis 24:14, for incorporating a woman into Abraham’s family was
precisely kindness and hospitality to strangers. In fact, the midrash lists ten
biblical women of Egyptian, Midianite, Cannanite, Moabite, and Kenite origin
whose kindness accounts for their acceptance as converts.[42] As noted, kindness qualifies one for inclusion as its absence qualifies one for
exclusion, as the Talmud says, “Anyone who has mercy on people, is presumed to
be of our father Abraham’s seed; and anyone who does not have mercy on people,
is presumed not to be of our father Abraham’s seed.”[43]  Maimonides follows suit by defining
charitableness as “the sign of the righteous person, the seed of Abraham our
Father. Indeed if someone is cruel and does not show mercy, there are grounds
to suspect his or her lineage.”[44] Obviously, Abrahamic lineage has also an ethical DNA marker. 

            In sum, there are basically
four strategies for removing the seven-nations ruling from the post-biblical
ethical agenda and vitiating it as a precedent for contemporary practice:

1. The recognition that the mandate for their extermination was a minority
position in the Bible, significantly limited to Deuteronomy 7:1-2, and was only
thought to be partially implemented in parts of the Book of Joshua.
2. The realization that since the threat was posed by their religion and ethics
a change in them brings about a change in their status.
3. The limitation of the jurisdiction of the ruling to the conditions of
ancient Canaan at the time of Joshua.
4. The application of the “Sennacherib principle” that holds that under the
Assyrian empire conquered peoples lost their national identity.

 These four stratagems of the biblical and
post-biblical exegetical tradition mitigate if not undermind the ruling
regarding the destruction of the Canaanites. In both cases, ethics end up
trumping genealogy. This understanding helps account for the absence of any
drive to exterminate or dispossess the seven nations even when Israel was at
the height of its power under the reigns of David and Solomon. 

                                                Postscript
According to John Yoder’s When War Is Unjust, holy wars differ from just
wars in the following five respects:

1. holy wars are validated by a
transcendent cause;

2. the cause is known by revelation;

3. the adversary has no rights;   

4. the criterion of last resort need not
apply;

5. it need not be “winnable.”[45]

This study illustrates how the antidotes
to 3-5 were woven into the ethical fabric of the biblical wars of destruction.
In most cases the resort to war even against the Canaanites was only pursuant
to overtures of peace or in counterattack, and even the chances of success
against Midian were weighed by the Urim and Tumim. It is therefore not
surprising that the expression “holy war” is absent not only from the Bible but
also from the subsequent Jewish ethical and military lexicon.[46]