1

More on The Rebbe

You might have noticed, and might have even been actively following the very-current and lively-debate about the recent volume by Samuel Heilman & Menachem Friedman, The Rebbe: The Life and Afterlife of Menachem Mendel Schneerson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) at the Seforim blog, which began with a review essay (“The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life”) by frequent contributor to the Seforim blog, Chaim Rapoport, available here, which elicited a response by Samuel Heilman & Menachem Friedman, followed by a rejoinder by Chaim Rapoport, both available here. The exchange continued and following a back-and-forth in the comments section, here, and Samuel Heilman’s & Menachem Friedman’s response here (PDF) at the Seforim blog, followed by a twelve-page response (written in a mere twenty hours) by Chaim Rapoport, available here (PDF).



Response and Rejoinder to Chaim Rapoport’s The Afterlife of Scholarship

In response to the recent review by Chaim Rapoport, “The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life,” the Seforim blog (14 June 2010), available here, of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman, The Rebbe: The Life and Afterlife of Menachem Mendel Schneerson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), available here, the editors of the Seforim blog are proud to present a response by Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman (submitted on Tuesday, 22 June 2010), available here (PDF) with a rejoinder by Chaim Rapoport (submitted on Tuesday, 29 June 2010), available here (PDF).



Chaim Rapoport Review

In response to a request from the editorial board of the Seforim blog, we are pleased to present a monograph-length review essay of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman, The Rebbe: The Life and Afterlife of Menachem Mendel Schneerson (Princeton University Press, 2010), by Rabbi Chaim Rapoport, who is a frequent contributor to the Seforim blog (see here for his earlier essays at the Seforim blog).
We believe that Chaim Rapoport, “The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life,” the Seforim blog (14 June 2010), available here (http://seforim.blogspot.com/2010/06/chaim-rapoport-review.html) greatly contributes to the growing study of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement during the latter half of the twentieth century.
The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life
Two Books for the Price of One
‘The Rebbe: The Life and Afterlife of Menachem Mendel Schneerson’ by Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman (Princeton University Press, 2010), 382 pages.
This book is comprised of two studies.
Firstly, we have a sociological study of the Lubavitch ‘mission establishment’ (shlichus); a layman’s guide to the now global phenomenon of shluchim,[1], shluchos and their Chabad Houses – at least as they have become consolidated over the last two or three decades. The authors describe the dedication of these emissaries; their ambitions, achievements and the (messianic) ethos that spurs them to work tirelessly with the aim of drawing the hearts of all Jewish People closer to their Father in Heaven.
In this section they speak, often quite fondly, of the sterling work performed by the shluchim and their families who go and live in small towns, far-flung cities and secular university campuses in order to re-ignite religious life; providing Jewish amenities for both residents and itinerants, observant or otherwise, across the globe. They emphasize the novelty of this phenomenon, in contradistinction to other chasidic and haredi groups who tend to retreat into their insular communities, shunning exposure to the outside world and its religiously threatening elements. They depict the ‘equal rights’ and privileges of women on shlichus, describing the uniqueness of this somewhat ‘egalitarian’ phenomenon within an otherwise ultra-traditional group. They explore the motives that they believe drive so many young, talented and charismatic couples to choose such a challenging life-long career, and describe how they maintain the high level of inspiration, stamina and perseverance that are essential for success in this vocation. Finally, they demonstrate how such families see themselves, as astonishing as this may seem, to be acting as emissaries of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902-1994), the seventh Rebbe of the Chabad Lubavitch dynasty [henceforth: ‘the Rebbe’]; who passed away in 1994.
Secondly, and most importantly, we have an attempt to present the life-story of the Rebbe, the man who created this mission, and the one who, to this day, inspires those who have embraced it. The authors do not merely endeavor to reconstruct the factual data of his life, much of which, they allege, is shrouded in mystery, but they also venture to penetrate the deepest recesses of his psyche. They purport to reveal his unspoken thoughts, feelings, incentives, and they sometimes even second guess his actions or reactions at any given time of his life. As Sue Fishkoff has put it, Heilman and Friedman “take a psycho-bio approach to Schneerson’s life, trying to get inside the man’s head to uncover his motivation” [2] – a tall order indeed!
The Focus of This Review
Although the biography of the Rebbe and the history of his movement are presented as intrinsically intertwined, the critical analysis I offer hereby, will focus primarily on the biographical section of the book. I propose to appraise the methodology of its authors, their sources, inferences, pre-suppositions and conclusions, and ultimately judge the quality of this biography as a work of scholarly research. At the conclusion, however, I will also make some remarks that are relevant to the work of the Chabad emissaries and the future of their mission, inasmuch as these are related to the concept of the Messiah and Redemption, subjects that are central to both the biographical and sociological sections of Heilman and Friedman’s work.
A reliable biography of a 20th century figure usually relies on several sources of information: (a) hard documentation; (b) autobiographical testimony of the subject; (c) [interviews with eye] witnesses; (d) anecdotal evidence and hearsay: “mi-pee ha-shemuah”; (e) the objective, un-prejudiced analysis and interpretation of a, b, c and d.
The subject of the biography will be ‘constructed’ by the reasonable and balanced usage of these five construction tools. This equilibrium requires that priority is given to (a) over (b) and (c) over (d) etc. [To an extent, the credentials of the biographer as a historian in general can be tested by the way he utilizes these five informants].
It is, working from this vantage point that I proceed to explore the work of Heilman and Friedman. But before I commence this task, a preliminary remark is called for. [3]
To read the entire (forty-five page) review essay, click here (PDF).
Notes:
[1] In their first endnote on the book Heilman and Friedman express surprise that Lubavitch emissaries are referred to as shluchim: “The precise Hebrew or Yiddish word for emissaries would be ‘shlichim,’ but for whatever reason, Lubavitchers have chosen to use the term ‘shluchim,’ perhaps to distinguish themselves from all other types of emissaries, religious or otherwise.” Heilman and Friedman, chapter 1, note 1. This comment bespeaks ignorance in the Hebrew language. Whilst it is true that in Modern Hebrew (the Ivrit of Ben Yehudah) the plural shlichim is used, in rabbinic Hebrew (and therefore Yiddish) it is virtually unused. The term shluchim and its derivatives are found in hundreds of places in rabbinic writings.
[2] Sue Fishkoff, “New bios of Lubavitcher rebbe dig for the man behind the myth,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (17th May 2010), available here (http://www.jta.org/news/article/2010/05/17/2394846/new-bios-of-lubavitcher-rebbe-dig-for-the-man-behind-the-myth).
[3] There are those who would have it that only non-Israeli’s can pass judgment on the Arab-Israeli conflict; only indifferent Jews can assess the qualities of Jewish Orthodoxy; only atheists can write impartially about religion; and only academic sociologists can write objective history. I disagree.
I am an orthodox Jew. I consider myself to be a disciple of the late Lubavitcher Rebbe, and although I studied in other Yeshivot (Manchester and Gateshead), and I am familiar with a broad array of orthodox theologies, my main training was in Lubavitch. Nevertheless I consider myself to be a fair and reasonable thinker, even with regards to matters that relate to Judaism, orthodoxy, and, yes, Lubavitch. I acknowledge that I may not be able to achieve the maximum possible degree of objectivity with regard to any of the above, but on the other hand, I believe that my first-hand experience of Jewish, Orthodox and Chasidic life affords me advantages that outside scholars often lack.
Moreover, as many recent studies have demonstrated, the vantage point of the outsider is not always free from bias and prejudice. All too often, the so-called detached scholars have their own axes to grind. Not all ‘external’ expertise is objective, and, not all insiders are blind. I therefore appeal to readers to avoid pre-judging the value of my essay, by resorting to the knee-jerk: “Well, he is a Lubavitcher; what else do you expect him to say?!” Rather, listen to my argumentation, look up the sources, and judge for yourself with the maximum possible degree of objectivity that you are able to achieve.
Chaim Rapoport, “The Afterlife of Scholarship: A Critical Exploration of Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman’s Presentation of the Rebbe’s Life,” the Seforim blog (14 June 2010): 3, available here (http://seforim.blogspot.com/2010/06/chaim-rapoport-review.html).



Censorship: The Autobiography of R. Eliyahu David Rabinowitz, ADeReT

Censorship: The Autobiography of R. Eliyahu David Rabinowitz, ADeReT

There are a handful of rabbinic autobiographies, R. Yehuda Areyeh of Modena, Hayyei Yehudah, R. Yaakov Emden, Megillat Sefer, and a few others.[1]  One of the more recent rabbinic autobiographies is that of R. Eliyahu David Rabinowitz, otherwise known as Aderet.  This work, was first published in the journal, Ha-Peles edited by Aderet’s nephew, Eliyahu Akiva Rabinowitz.  Only a portion of the autobiography appears in Ha-Peles. However, the editor did give us the title of this work for posterity.  Although Aderet did not title the work, in Ha-Peles it appears under the title, Seder Eliyahu, this title remains today.[1a] In reality, Seder Eliyahu is one part of three part work, the second part, Nefesh David, records various customs (and has been reprinted a few times), and the third part, regarding how to handle Aderet’s body after his death, Achar Eliyahu or Acharei David, apparently was never written. 

Aderet’s autobiography was first published in its entirety in 1983 by Mossad ha-Rav Kook.   The Mossad received the manuscript from Aderet’s grandson.  As will become apparent, much of what was written, prior to 1983, regarding Aderet is lacking because  prior to its publication in 1983,  his autobiography was virtually unknown.  As an aside, the New Encyclopaedia Judaica reuses the article on Aderet from the original Encyclopaedia Judaica and is but one example of the shortcomings of the New Encyclopaedia, for more examples see Dr. Leiman’s critique here, and Dr. Havlin’s critique here, and Dr. Richler’s critique here of the New Encyclopaedia Judaica. 

The 1983 edition, however, has been out-of-print for years, and this year, some of Aderet’s desendents republished Seder Eliyahu (additionally, they also reprint Nefesh David in this volume).  The editors of this new edition thank Mossad ha-Rav Kook for allowing them to reprint this work.  But, in their introduction, they argue that Aderet “never intended to publish this work and allow others to read it, instead, it was meant for his family.” Seder Eliyahu, Jerusalem, 2010, at 7 (“Jer. ed.” or “New Edition”).  Based upon this assertion, the editors of this edition justify “removing various passages that were never intended for outsiders to read.”  Id. at 9.  They explain that whenever they removed text “three lines (- – -) serve to indicate missing text.”  Id.  As we shall see they are inconsistent at best at using the three dash device and many instances of removal are not noted. 

Regarding the claim that Aderet never intended this book to be published. The original publication in 1983 includes the entire text with no omissions.  Recall that this text was obtained by Mossad ha-Rav Kook from Aderet’s grandson, we have no indication that he objected to publishing the entire text.  Moreover, the first time the autobiography (partially) appeared in Ha-Peles much of the “offensive” material was included. Recall that Aderet’s nephew was the editor of Ha-Peles  and he saw no need to censore anything. Finally, although there may be some indications that an autobiography was merely written for family members and not intended for broader publication, this device is common in autobiographies.  R. Emden also implies that he didn’t intend his autobiography to be widely distributed, but as Dr. Schacter demonstrates, Emden wanted others to read it.[2]  Indeed, according to Schacter, R. Emden’s autobiography can be classified as “that of ‘autobiography as polemic.'”  As Emden writes of his purpose, “[i]n order that the sun of my righteousness should shine forth . . . [and because] many of [my enemies] libelous writings will certainly remain extant in the world for some time.  Therefore, necessity has compelled me to clarify my case before God and man. . . . Behold [this autobiography] will serve as a vindication for me, for my children and my descendants.”[3] Thus, “there is equally no question that the overriding primary impetus behind Megillat sefer was a desire on the part of Emden to clear his name and vindicate himself in his controversy with Eybeschutz,” and “[t]here is no doubt that it is the Emden-Eybeschutz controversy that serves as the ‘center of gravity’ for” Megillat Sefer.[4]  Of course, for R. Emden to be publicly vindicated, presumably the public would need to be aware of the work.[5]

With Emden’s motives in mind, it is important to distinguish Aderet’s work.  While Aderet includes descriptions of others in his work, and, at times, some of these descriptions are far from flattering, it does not appear that Aderet was looking for vindication or had a polemic motive in mind.  While Aderet did not get along with his constituents in Ponovitch, that dispute was mainly surrounding Aderet’s salary and how the community treated him.  Aderet wasn’t involved in any global disputes like the Emden-Eybeschutz controversy and thus Aderet wasn’t required to vindicate himself.  Moreover, Aderet ultimately came out on top, becoming Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazim in Jerusalem.  Thus, he was well-respected and had no reason to resurrect his image – his image was already good.

Perhaps a better understanding of some of the material as it relates to others in Seder Eliyahu may be better understood by looking at Marcus Mosley’s comments[6] and quote from Rousseau: 

Autobiography operates upon an entirely different set of criteria. For the autobiographer, the significance of the other is determined solely by the role that he or she plays in the formation of the self, regardless of social standing. Thus Rousseau, in the “Neuchatel” variant of the preamble to the Confeinddow: “The relationships I have had with several people compel me to speak as freely of them as of myself. I can only succeed in making myself known by making them known also.” Many of the more decisive encounters with the other in the shaping of the autobiographer’s self occur in the years of childhood and adolescence. Parents, teachers, schoolmates, and domestic staff may thus achieve a prominence in the autobiography that would, in the memoir, be reserved for generals and prime ministers, renowned men of letters, and so on. This is not to say that the formative encounters with the other in an autobiography are restricted to the historically obscure. But when the great do drift in and out of the pages of an autobiography, it is often not on account of the qualities that granted them this status that they are recalled.
Thus, Aderet’s comments about others, most notably regarding R. Yitzhak Elchonon Spector, may be understood as merely providing insight into Aderet’s own life rather than commenting on R. Spector, for example.

The new edition of Seder Eliyahu, however, leaves out much of Aderet’s comments about others, depriving the reader of fully understanding the Aderet as well as distorting history.  We will provide all the examples of where the new edition has altered or removed material from the 1983 edition. 

Biography of Aderet

The basic outlines of Aderet’s biography are not in dispute.  Here are the highlights.  Aderet was born, with his twin, on the first day of Shavout in 1843.  His father was a rabbi and Aderet’s family were descendant from famous rabbinic figures from both his father’s and mother’s side.  When he was five, his mother died and his father remarried.  At twelve, Aderet began writing his first sefer, and began wearing tefflin for his entire twelth year.  At thirteen, he had his bar mitzvah and, contrary to the custom, was allowed to read the haftorah for the first day of Shavout. This haftorah is typically reserved for the rabbi or a talmid hakham due to the content of the haftorah.  But, Aderet’s father argued that it was appropriate for his son to read the haftorah.  Soon after his bar mitzvah he completed his first work with his twin brother, Shevet Achim.  At fifteen he became engaged to girl, and soon after was appointed rabbi of Ragali.  The engagement didn’t end well. His fiancee’s mother died and the step-mother was lax in her observance and the marriage was called off.  But, in due course, Aderet was engaged again to the daughter of a prominent family in Ponovitch.  This time, Aderet went through with the wedding.  He remained in Ponovitch, supported by his in-laws, and studied in a small bet midrash.  In 1875, Aderet was selected to be the rabbi of Ponovitch.  In 1893, the town of Mir approached Aderet to become its rabbi.  Aderet accepted.  Ponovitch, however, wanted its rabbi to remain, but, after receiving advice from various rabbis, eventually, Aderet left and went to Mir.  In 1901 he was invited and accepted to become Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazim in Jerusalem.  On the 3rd of Adar I, 1905, Aderet died in Jerusalem.

Aderet is known as having a phenomenal memory.  He was also a prolific author, but much of his writings remained in manuscript.  In the last decade or so, many of his books have been published, a bibliography of which will appear soon. 

The above provides a basic outline of Aderet’s biography, but a close examination of his autobiography provides additional detail.    

Autobiography of Aderet

There are a few important gaps in Aderet’s biography that can be filled only by utilizing his autobiography.  For example, Aderet’s father’s second wife.  If one reads some of the biographies, she is mentioned only in passing.  But, Aderet explains she was no minor figure.  To the contrary, it appears that Aderet’s step-mother and his father had a horrible marriage.  Indeed, Aderet couldn’t stand her and he was especially bothered the way she treated his father.  After Aderet’s father died, Aderet immediately left town as he couldn’t bear remaining with her.  He turned down his father’s position as rabbi of Vilkomer because that would mean he would have to live in the same city as his step-mother.  Aderet recalls bitterly how he sped home once and therefore missed out on meeting various rabbis only to find out that his step-mother hadn’t told anyone he was coming and no one was there when Aderet returned causing him to miss meeting the rabbis and not seeing family.

Some biographies make it appear that Aderet had a great relationship with the people of Ponovitch.  These biographies point to the fact that when Mir approached him, Ponovitch tried its hardest to keep Aderet. But, in his autobiography Aderet explains how horrible the people of Ponovich were to him.  They paid him almost nothing and even that little amount wasn’t always timely.  He was so poor that he didn’t have his own bed and had to sleep on a few chairs.  Although Aderet had some of his children die and others were sick, for the most part, the people of Ponovitch made his life even more difficult.  The town didn’t help when he had sick children.  One particularly shocking incident was one of the Ponovitch community members became gabbi.  Aderet didn’t like waiting between Kabbalat Shabbat and Ma’ariv because waiting only meant that people ended up talking and not acting as one should in Shul.  The gabbi, however, wanted to talk and wanted a break.  Thus, when Aderet asked the hazzan to immediately begin ma’ariv, the gabbi told the hazzan “it’s not time yet.”  This type of maltreatment by the Ponovitch community members was not uncommon.  Therefore, when Mir came knocking, and, although Mir was a significantly smaller community, Aderet wanted to get out of Ponovitch and accepted Mir’s offer.

As Aderet was almost always looking to leave Ponovitch, he competed for a job in Riga.  And, although he was the most qualified candidate, the position was given to someone else. Aderet lost out on the position because R. Yitzhak Elchonon Spector backed Aderet’s rival.  Aderet was extremely upset at R. Yitzhak Elchonon and even sent a very nasty letter to R. Yitzhak Elchonon.  R. Yitzhak Elchonon’s reaction was that “the letter was so disrespectful that but for Aderet’s reputation as a talmid hakham, he [R. Yitzhak Elchonon] would see to it that Aderet couldn’t even get a job a beadle in a bet midrash.”  Aderet was so embittered by this episode he remarks that he never forgave R. Yitzhak Elchonon. This was not the only time Aderet had a falling out with R. Yitzhak Elchonon.  At a rabbinic conference, led by R. Yitzhak Elchonon, there was a miscommunication which R. Yitzhak Elchonon took personally.  As such, R. Yitzhak Elchonon refused to entertain anything else during the conference and the conference was totally unsuccessful. Aderet was appalled that R. Yitzhak Elchonon’s personal feelings didn’t allow the conference to produce anything of value. 

Aside from making Aderet’s life miserable, the treatment of the town of Ponovitch also forced Aderet to allow his son-in-law, R. Abraham Isaac Kook, to leave and take up his own rabbinic position.  Although Ponovitch had promised Aderet a higher salary, the town never came through and thus Aderet couldn’t support his daughter and son-in-law.  In his autobiography, he describes how heartbroken he was when his son-in-law and daughter left. 

Comparison of the New Edition and 1983 Edition of Aderet’s Autobiography


As noted above, the editors of the New Edition provide that they have removed material from Seder Eliyahu, and that they have noted any time anything is removed.  This is false.  Although it is true that the editors have removed material but they have not always noted when they did so.  At times removed material is noted by “- – – ” in the text, many times there is no indication that anything is missing.  Moreover, the editors are inconsistent when they alter the text.  That is, in correcting typos or when removing abbreviation, sometimes they note they are altering the text and other times they do not.  Of course, this omission is less serious than wholesale removal of text, but consistency is still important.  For example, in the 1983 edition many persons are only referred to in abbreviated form, while in the New Edition their full name is used; thus the original reads “my uncle רפ”ק” while in the New Edition it reads “my uncle Rabbi Pinchus Cantor.”  The editors don’t note that they have inserted his full name; however, whenever the text uses an abbreviation to refer to R. Shmuel Mohilever – “הגרש”מ” in the New Edition they provide his full name but do so in brackets indicating an insertion into the text. Compare 1983 ed. pp. 84 &  92 & Jer. ed. at 71 & 76. It is unclear why they decided to consistently indicate this insertion and not others.

Turning the censored materials. These materials can roughly be divided into three categories.  (1) materials that mention Zionism or are related to Zionism; (2)  in this category we include what is best described as negative comments about women and marriage; and (3) personal attacks or observations about other Rabbis.  We must note that many of these omissions have been cataloged here as well.

First Category – Zionism

Items from this category include material that appears in the footnotes to the 1983 edition as well as items in the text itself.  The New Edition resuses almost all the footnotes that appear in the 1983 edition but leave out information when that information relates to Zionism.  Thus:

1983 ed. (p. 17 n.5) provides a footnote when the text mentions R. Moshe Telsher “for more information see Sefer Zikhron le-[Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook] 1945″  Jer. Ed. (p. 15) doesn’t include this note at all. 
1983 ed.  (p. 28 n.14) contains a citation to Maimon’s Sa’arei ha-Meah, Jer. ed. (p. 26 n. 17) removes citation no notation anything is missing.
1983 ed. (p. 29 n.16) explains that R. Mordechai Gimpel Yaffo “was one who espoused emigration to Israel and himself emigrated in 1888”, Jer. ed. (p. 23 n.19) removes this text without notation.
1983 ed. (p. 59 n.46) regarding R. Mordechai Elisberg, the note explains “one of the leaders of the Hovvei Tzion movement,” Jer. ed. (p. 57 n.55), removes this text, no notation.
1983 ed. (p. 72 n.57) regarding R. Shmuel Mohliver “was the head and founder of the Hovvei Tzion movement,” Jer. ed. (p. 69 n.68) removes this text, no notation.
1983 ed. (p. 102 n.78) explaining that the author of Chavush Pe’ar “is R. Kook,” Jer. ed. (p. 96) the note is missing.

We should noted that the editors of the Jerusalem edition didn’t excise every Zionistic mention.  Instead, they retain the sentence “the Hovvei Tzion chapter in Bialystok requested that I [Aderet] give a derasha.”  Jer. ed. at 81.  Similarly, Aderet describes how heart broken he was when his son-in-law and daughter had to leave because Aderet couldn’t support them and how happy Aderet was when he met up with his son-in-law later that year and spent time together.  In the text, however, Aderet doesn’t identify by name his son-in-law.  The New Edition retains the footnote from the 1983 edition which identifies the son-in-law as “The Gaon R. Abraham Isaac Kook ZT”L.”  Jer. ed. at 60 n.57.

Second Category – comments about women

The vast majority of these changes relate to women, and specifically, when there was martial discord or divorce.  There are essentially two women whose mention is censored, Adert’s step-mother and Aderet’s nephew’s first wife.  As mentioned above, Aderet had serious issues with his step-mother and he is very vocal about those problems in his autobiography.  Additionally, Aderet’s nephew’s first marriage didn’t work out.  The first wife was the daughter of R Eliezer the chief rabbi of Anchin but she was uninterested in leading a religious life and thus this marraige ended in divorce.  Whenever mention of either of these two women occurs in Seder Eliyahu the Jerusalem edition leaves them out.  Thus, there is no mention in the Jerusalem edition that Aderet didn’t get along with his step-mother and that the nephew’s first wife wasn’t religious. Rather than explain what is missing each time, as the excised portions are generally similar, we have indicated where a passage relating to Aderet’s feelings about his step-mother is missing and where the excised passage relates to the non-religious first wife of Aderet’s nephew.  We will, however, indicate where there is missing text and the editors of the new edition fail to note that they have removed text.

Step-mother
1983 ed. (18-19) lacking in Jer. ed. (16) noted with – – –
1983 ed. (23) lacking in Jer. ed. (21) no notation
1983 ed. (35) lacking in Jer. ed. (33) noted with – – –
1983 ed. (37) lacking in Jer. ed. (35) noted with – – –
1983 ed. (46) lacking in Jer. ed. (44) noted with – – –
Non-religious wife
1983 ed. (64) lacking in Jer. ed. (60) no notation
1983 ed. (71) lacking in Jer. ed. (68) noted with – – –

There is one final example that arguably fits in this category although it relates to neither of the above mentioned women.  Instead, this instance relates to Aderet spening time in Vienna and meet R. Shlomo Netar.  As part of their conversation R. Netar related some of his problems to Aderet.  One related to his wife who is described – in the 1983 ed. (42)- as “the really horrible woman, may God save us, who is the granddaughter of R. Simcha Bunim Peshischa (or so I [Aderet] recall).” This quote is lacking in the Jer. ed. but is noted with – – -.

We should note that much of the material regarding Aderet’s step-mother appears, in toto, in a separate biography of Aderet that is appended to the beginning of Hiddushei ha-Gaon ha-Aderet, Machon Kitvei Yad ha-Aderet be-Artzot ha-Brit, Israel, 2003.  This is somewhat ironic in that this biography is very careful what it mentions, or doesn’t mention.  Specifically, although Aderet’s son-in-law (and, ultimately, after the untimely death of Aderet’s daughter and remarrying Aderet’s niece, became Aderet’s nephew), R. Abraham Isaac Kook, wrote a fine biography of Aderet, Adar ha-Yakar, and Kook’s biography is used in the biography appearing in Hiddushei, R. Kook’s name is never mentioned.  That is, the mention of R. Kook was controversial (this may be related to the fact that the publisher of this volume is a member of the Satamar sect).[7]  But, regarding Aderet’s step-mother, all that material appears in the biography in HiddusheiSee Hiddushei, at pp. 4, 6, 8 and 10 almost all of which are taken, almost verbatim, from the autobiography. Thus, even without access to the autobiography, any reader can find the relevant passages. 

Third Category – personal observations or attacks on other rabbis

Some of these negative assesments relate to R. Yitzhak Elchonon although comments about other rabbis are also censored. 

1983 ed. (60-61) discussing Aderet’s failed bid to become Riga’s chief rabbi, and, specifically, how R. Yitzhak Elchonon sunk Aderet’s bid.  Additionally, Aderet notes that he sent R. Yitzhak Elchonon a very nasty letter explaining how disappointed Aderet was with R. Yitzhak Elchonon’s involvement and decision to pick someone else.  Jer. ed. (68) the entire story is missing and there is no notation anything was removed.  
1983 ed. (62) Aderet expresses his displeasure with some Ponovitch residents regarding salary negotiations and essentially calls them animals.  Jer. ed. (69) lacking the name calling, no notation anything is missing.
1983 ed. (78) Aderet records the comments of a beadle who questioned R. Yitzhak Elchonon’s authority.  Jer. ed. lacking but noted with – – – .
1983 ed. (79) Aderet meets someone who is wearing two pairs of teffilin neither of which are in their proper place.  Aderet goes on to explain while this person passed himself off as a miracle worker, in reality he was a fraud.  Aderet says the person “is the author of the book Kav Chen.”  This must be incorrect.  The author of Kav Chen, R. Noach mi-Koruv, died in 1855, but Aderet says this meeting took place in 1890. What is more likely is that Aderet was referring to the publisher of Kav Chen, R. Noach’s grandson, R. Hayyim Moshe Ze’ev.  In all events, rather than attempting to correct or ascertain who Aderet is referring to, the Jer. ed. (75) “solves” the problem by removing the passage “the author of the book Kav Chen” and replace it with – – -. 
1983 ed. (83) Aderet mentions “Leib Grabman” who involved the secular authorities in a communal dispute.  Jer. ed. removes “Leib Grabman” and replaced with – – -.  
1983 ed. (87-88) Aderet discusses a rabbinic conference he attended.  In attendence was also R. Yitzhak Elchonon who became personally insulted after a miscommunication.  As such, R. Yitzhak Elchonon refused to allow passage of any of the many “good ideas” the conference attendees offered.  To add insult to injury, in the Jewish press, R. Yitzhak Elchonon blamed the poor result on everyone else.  Jer. ed. (84) removes the entire story and replaced it with – – -.  
1983 ed. (91) Aderet describes some rather insulting behavior directed at him by members of the Ponovitch community, including the gabbi ignoring Aderet.  Jer. ed. (85) leaves out these stories and replaces them with – – -.
1983 ed. (93) after the Aderet leaves Ponovitch a very prominent member of the Ponovitch community died suddenly and “some people said his death was because he failed to show Aderet proper respect and to pay Aderet on time.  As such Aderet is said to have cursed the dead man and his family.”  Jer. ed. (86) removed and replaced with – – -.  
1983 ed. (98) discusses a plan, by persons unconnected to Aderet, to trick R. Yitzhak Elchonon that was ultimately unsucessful. Jer. ed. (91) removed and replaced with – – – .
1983 ed. (99) Aderet details how various rabbis/roshei Yeshiva of Mir weren’t completely honest with Aderet.  Aderet refers to these persons by name.  Jer. ed. (92) removed entirely and replaced with – – -.
1983 ed. (103-04) Aderet details attempts at thwarting him from becoming a teacher at Yeshivat Mir.  Jer. ed. (97) removed and replaced with – – -.  Inetrestingly, much of the background and history of this incident is found in Pinchus Lipschutz’s – the editor of Ya’ated Ne’eman – book Peneni Chen, Monsey, 2000, p. 17 (thanks to a Seforim Blog reader for this citation).  

Additional Comments Regarding Aderet’s Autobiography

Aside from the issues raised above, it should be noted that Aderet’s biography is full of facinating information both about him and his contemporaries as well as of general interest to students of Jewish history, custom, and law. While we intend to devote an entire post to the full contents of Seder Eliyahu we wanted to provide a few particularly interesting passages from Seder Eliyahu.  All of the following examples appear in both editions of Seder Eliyahu.  As mentioned above, Aderet, when he was in Vienna, met R. Shlomo Netar, who was also bookseller and who studied in the Yeshiva of Hatam Sofer.  R. Netar related that he was in class with Hatam Sofer’s son, R. Shimon Sofer (eventual author of Michtav Sofer), was in the same class.  R. Shimon Sofer “was often hit with sticks [by the teacher] and this was at the request of R. Shimon’s father,” Hatam Sofer.  1983 ed. at 42; Jer. ed. at 40.

A few halacha/custom related items.  Aderet records that when he travelled by ship, once the gangplank was lifted and the ship was underway he recited tefillat ha-derekh.  Someone on board the ship questioned this practice arguing that since the ship hadn’t left the city limits, one cannot recite teffilat ha-derekh.  Aderet, however, responded by distinguishing between normal overland transport and ships (and presumably airplanes).  Aderet explained that when going overland there is a fear that one may decide to return home thus one needs to wait until leaving the city limits, the point of no return.  But, once one is onboard a ship and the gangplank is removed one can’t leave and therefore one can immediately recite teffilat ha-derekh. 1983 ed. at 42; Jer. ed. at 40.

Another time, Aderet also advocated for a novel halachic position.  In this case, Aderet wanted to personally perform the circumcision of his son. But, the circumcision fell on Saturday, and, as Aderet hadn’t ever performed a circumcision previously, the rule is that one cannot perform their first circumcision on Saturday.  Aderet, however, argued that the prohibition on performing one’s first circumcision on Saturday applies if one is circumcising someone other than their own child. That is, as there is a unique obligation to circumcise one’s child that trumps the prohibition against performing the first circumcision on Saturday.  Aderet marshalled various sources that supported his position and presented his argument to R. Yosef Zechariah Stern (an equally impressive contemporary) who rejected Aderet’s argument.  Aderet concludes that he “decided to refrain from deciding law in way that runs counter to Shulchan Orach and thus would appear strange to the public.”  1983 ed. 52; Jer. ed. at 51.  

On one Saturday, there was a communal rift which resulted in the secular authorities confiscating the shul’s sefer torah.  Thus, the shul didn’t complete the weekly mandatory reading.  Although Aderet ended up hearing the reading in another shul, Aderet argued that the shul whose sefer torah was confiscated was required the next week to make up the reading it missed.  He argued this position to R. Aaron Halberstam, son of R. Hayyim Halberstam, the Sanzer Rav.  R. Aaron disagreed.  He explained that the torah reading obligation is communal in nature and so long as a community shul recited the proper reading, those in the community that missed it need not repeat it.  Aderet, however, argued that while one needs a minyan and thus is communal in nature, there is an individual obligation to read the weekly portion and if one shul didn’t hear the weekly portion then they need to recite it the next week.  [Hida in his diary/travelouge seems to support Aderet’s postion, see Ma’agel Tov ha-Shalem when he too missed the torah reading].  1983 ed. at 80; Jer. ed. at 77.

One final story relating to custom.  Aderet spends some time on why he picked particular names for his children. One name, however, is particularly noteworthy.  Aderet named one of his sons Mordechai Yonah.  Aderet explains that he picked Yonah because “of [his] mother’s name” Tova which is the Yiddish equivalent of Yonah.  This practice indicates that Aderet wasn’t bothered giving a boy a woman’s name or that naming for someone does not necessarly means using the same form as the original name.  1983 ed. at 51; Jer. ed. at 50.

Post Script Regarding Aderet’s Works & Works About Aderet

Besides for not using the Aderet’s autobiography at all or enough. It is worth pointing out that in the past recent years there has been a virtual explosion of the Aderet’s works which, until now, have remained in manuscript.  The Aderet authored over one hundred works although most still remain in manuscript and are scatered all over the world in various collections.

A few notable works of Aderet that have recently been published.  Mechon Ahavat Shalom has printed eight volumes of Aderet’s works, and, in addition, have published many shorter pieces  in their journal Mekabziel. Worth noting is the recent lengthy correspondence which Machon Ahavat Shalom printed between the Aderet and Yakov Reifman. Mechon Yerushalayim has printed three volumes of the Aderet’s comments on Humash aside from the many pieces they have printed in their journal Moriah. Additionally, there are some other volumes that have been printed from manuscripts. One worth mentioning is the Over Orach which was printed by Mechon Me’or the editor of this work proudly told me how he took out many pieces from this manuscript before printing it for the public as he felt it was not “kovod” for the Aderet. Now this censorship isn’t mentioned anywhere in the work.  Besides for the significance of the Torah found in these works which will be the subject of its own post including a in depth bibliography and description of the works. There is also much important material about Aderet’s life that can be gleaned from these recently published works. 

Below is a (non-comprehensive) list of articles discussing Aderet’s biography, although some are better than others:

Ehad be-Doro, vol. 1, 191-202
Seder Parsheyot le-Aderet, vol. 1, Machon Yerushalyim, Jerusalem, 2004, 329-99 (includes bibliography)
Shlomo Albert, Aderet Eliyahu, Jerusalem, 2003
Hiddushei ha-Gaon ha-Aderet, Machon Kitvei Yad ha-Aderet be-Artzot ha-Brit, Israel, 2003, Katzman 1-42.
Moshe Tzinovitz, Ishim u-Kehilot, Tel Aviv, 1990 128-30
Moshe Tzinovitz, Mir, Tolodot Yeshivat Mir, Tel Aviv, 1981, 175-83
Rabbotenu she-beGoleh, Jerusalem, 1996, vol. 1, 121-28
Asher Yetzaveh, Mechon Ahavat Shalom, Jerusalem, 2004, vol. 1, pp. 395-425 (Nefesh David is reprinted in this work, however, the editors fail to mention that they copied it from the 1983 ed.). 

  
Notes:
[1]  See Jacob J. Schacter, “History & Memory of Self:  The Autobiography of Rabbi Jacob Emden,” in Jewish History & Jewish Memory, Essays in Honor of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, eds. E. Carlebach, J. Efron, D. Myers, Brandeis University Press, 1998, 429 and nn. 6-8 discussing these autobiographies and providing additional examples. Emden’s autobiography, the Kahana edition is available online at here, and here with Gershom Scholem’s notes. Scholem penned his own autobiography (although it only covers a small portion of his life), Gershom Scholem, From Berlin to Jerusalem, tr. Harry Zohn, New York, 1980. Elliot Horowitz discusses Scholem’s autobiography in Horowitz’s article, “Confessions of a Jewish Autobiography Reader,” in JQR (n.s.), 95 (1), Winter 2005, pp. 74-80 & Saverio Campanini, “A Case for Sainte-Beuve, Some Remarks on Gershom Scholem’s Autobiography,” in Creation & Re-Creation in Jewish Thought, eds. R. Elior & P. Schafer, Paul Mohr Verlag, 2005, pp. 363-400.  More recently, Scholem’s diaries have also been published, Lamentations of Youth:  The Diaries of Gershom Scholem 1913-1919, ed. & tr. A.D. Skinner, Cambridge, Mass, 2007, a review appears here.   
Returning to Emden’s autobiography aside from the Kahana edition linked to above, there is another edition published by Abraham Bick-Shauli in Jerusalem in 1979, however, Schacter has serious reservations about this edition.  Schacter’s assesment of Bick-Shauli’s edition is that it “is absolutely and totally worthless.”  Schacter, id. at 446 n.13.  Of late, someone attempted to question the authenticity of Emden’s autobiography, Schacter’s comments are equally appropriate regarding this work as well.
Regarding Modena’s autobiography, see also Ariel Rathaus, “Leon Modena’s Autobiography & His Realistic Poetics,” in Italia, ed. Robert Bonfil, Conference Supplement Series, 1, Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 2003, 131-42. Of course, regarding Modena one should always consult Howard Ernest Adelman, Success & Failure in the Seventeenth Century Ghetto of Venice:  The Life of Leon Modena, 1571-1643, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Brandeis Univ., 1985, and this post by Yitzhak and this follow-up post on Ishim ve-Shitos. Modena’s autobiography is available in excellent editions in both Hebrew and English (part of which is online at Google books here), The Autobiography of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi: Leon Modena’s Life of Judah, ed. Mark R. Cohen, Princeton Univ. Press, 1998 (English) & Sefer Hayyi Yehuda, ed. Daniel Carpi, Tel Aviv Univ., Tel Aviv, 1985. 
Additionally, regarding Jewish autobiography generally this discussion here, and see  M. Stanislawski, Autobiographical Jews, Essays in Jewish Self- Fashioning, Univ. Washington Press, 2004.  Thanks to both Menachem Butler and Eliezer Brodt for providing many of these sources.
[1a] The Ha-Peles piece has a very nice footnote where Aderet’s sister’s erudition is described.  “She knew Hebrew and the Talmudic language. During the winter, on Friday nights, she would sit by the fire and study the responsa literature of the rishonim, such as the responsa of Rashi, Rambam, Rosh and similar titles that don’t contain pilpul. She was fluent in many responsa.  She also studied the Sefer Hassidim daily.”  She was so well-versed in Sefer Hassidim that her father, when he was unsure of a citation in Sefer Hassidim would ask her. Eliyahu Akiva Rabinowitz also records that after Aderet published an article in Yagdil Torah she read it and asked an insightful question, which Aderet subsequently published, in her name, in Yagdil TorahSee ha-Peles, 720 n.2.
[2]  See id. at 438 and nn. 58-59 (Schacter offers citations to other similar works who employ this device).
[3] Id. at 431 quoting Megillat Sefer, Kahana ed. (“with slight corrections from the manuscript”) pp. 54-55. 
[4] Id. at 433.  
[5] Assuming that Schacter is correct regarding Emden’s motives, the lingering question is why wasn’t Megillat Sefer published during Emden’s lifetime or soon after? Emden had his own press and was not shy about publishing his own works that defended his position, no matter how controversial those works were.  Why didn’t Emden do the same with his autobiography?  Unfortunately, Schacter doesn’t address this question, perhaps in his forthcoming translation of Megillat Sefer, he will provide more background regarding the publication of Megillat Sefer.
[6] Marcus Mosley, “Jewish Autobiography:  The Elusive Subject,” in JQR (n.s.), 95, 1 (Winter 2005), 25.   
[7] The author of this biography, however, is not Satmar.  The author of the biography portion is R. Eliezer Katzman who is perhaps the only person who has demonstrated the similarities between various positions of R. Abraham Isaac Kook and the Satmar Rebbi.  See Eliezer Katzman,  in Ketonet Yosef, ed. D. Gotlieb et. al. New York, 2002.   



More on Chaim Bloch

More on Chaim Bloch
By Marc B. Shapiro
In a previous post I mentioned how the non-Jewish Austrian minister Leon Bilinski was descended from the rav of Posen, R. Samuel ben Moses Falkenfeld, the Beit Shmuel Aharon. More information about Bilinski’s Jewish roots is found in Chaim Bloch’s Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv (New York, 1943), p. 74 n. 1. In general, I have found that when Bloch is reporting about other people’s biographies and history in general, he is very reliable. It is only when he is somehow involved in the story that he is full of lies.1 His Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv is a good example. Here is the title page.
In this book he makes up an entire story that he was asked by an important Catholic figure to answer questions from the Vatican dealing with Judaism. The whole story is a fiction, as is so much else he writes about himself. As for Bilinski, Bloch tells us that he is in possession of Bilinski’s 1146 page (!) unpublished diary. As Bloch himself notes, he provided various scholars (e.g.., N. M. Gelber) with selections of this diary which they then used in their own works, thus misleading the world. In these selections, Bilinski comes off as a strong anti-Zionist, who even warns Herzl about how the Arabs will never accept a Jewish state in Palestine.2 In an article in the Herzl Year Book, Bloch published what he claimed was an 1893 letter from Herzl and uses this to prove that Herzl was interested in the Jewish problem already in 1893, a year before the 1894 Dreyfus trial which is usually cited as having turned Herzl to Jewish matters.3 Various scholars have cited this letter, as they understandably regard it as significant in understanding Herzl, but of course it is a forgery. Another way Bloch misled scholars, in particular Gelber, is with regard to an anonymous booklet that speaks of a return of the Jews to the Land of Israel and the establishment of a state.4 According to Billinski’s diary, so Bloch tells us, the author of this booklet was Benjamin Disraeli. Bilinski would certainly have been in a position to know this information, and therefore a number of people have been misled by this, thinking the diary authentic
Look how Bloch’s forgeries were able to have such an impact. I think, in the end, this is what gives the forger satisfaction, watching everyone taken in by his creation. In 1948 no one would have believed that Bloch was capable of this. In fact, if not for his blatant forgeries in Dovev Siftei Yeshenim, some people today would still assume that he is reliable. As the Talmud tells us, tafasta merubah lo tafasta! Bloch should have stuck with his smaller forgeries, because when he decided to publish complete volumes of forged material, that’s when people really began to take notice. It is therefore very surprising that no less a scholar than Robert S. Wistrich, who is aware of the accusations of forgery against Bloch, nevertheless cites material from Bloch’s Mi Natan li-Meshisah and states that in his opinion at least some of the material must be considered authentic. Why he thinks this he doesn’t tell us. The truth is that this book, like Dovev Siftei Yeshenim, is full of Bloch’s forgeries, and not only of rabbis but also of political leaders (including summaries of supposed letters from Bismark about Zionism!)5

Just to illustrate that you can’t judge people by appearances, here is a picture of Bloch, which previously appeared in Dr. Shnayer Leiman’s post on the Seforim Blog.6

Throughout Bloch’s various books, he quotes numerous letters from gedolim who were no longer alive, and none of these letters are found in his archives, currently kept at YIVO and the Leo Baeck Institute. In other words, he simply made up these letters, as he did with the entire volumes of anti-Zionist letters of gedolim that he published. The rule is that whenever Bloch cites a previously unpublished letter from someone, either addressed to himself or to another, and the author of the letter is no longer alive, you can assume that the letter is forged. We know this now, after Shmuel Weingarten’s exposé of Dovev Siftei Yeshenim.7 Yet the evidence was there all along, had people paid attention. But people had no reason to assumed that Bloch was not reliable. R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, however, who was involved in a terrible dispute with Bloch, did accuse Bloch of dishonesty, and pointed out that he would attribute quotes to rabbis who were no longer alive so that he couldn’t be contradicted. In the late 1930’s Bloch published a letter from R. Kook. R. Zvi Yehudah Kook was very skeptical of its authenticity and requested that Bloch send him a copy of it. Bloch replied that he was unable to do so since he had lost the original.8 This was Bloch’s pattern, and I assume that all of the many letters he published from leading rabbis and hasidic leaders, beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, are forgeries.9

Here is another example of Bloch’s tendency to fabricate things. It comes from his Heikhal le-Divrei Chazal u-Fitgameihem (New York, 1948), p. 9. Everything he reports here is a fantasy. As with some of his other forgeries, Bloch is obviously motivated here by good intentions, but it is all complete nonsense.

Ve-Da Ma she-Tashiv also contains forged letters. I am certain that the letter of R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski on pp. 52-53 is an example of this. Anyone can look at the style of R. Chaim Ozer’s many letters and see how he consistently used certain formulas in concluding his letters. Nowhere does R. Chaim Ozer conclude a letter with
ונזכה כולנו לראות בישועת עמנו במהרה
He does use the expression
ועיניהם תחזינה בישועת עמנו במהרה

and this is found in a letter that Bloch would have had access to, the letter of R. Chaim Ozer to Agudat ha-Rabbanim about the Louis Epstein proposal.10 I assume he used the concluding portion of this letter to help him create his forgery. But in other areas he wasn’t so careful. For example, in the supposed letter of R. Chaim Ozer to Bloch, he refers to the latter as a צנא מלא ספרא , yet this expression does not appear in R. Chaim Ozer’s other letters (based on Otzar ha-Hokhmah’s database, which only has the first edition of R. Chaim Ozer’s letters, not the expanded Iggerot R. Chaim Ozer.)
We should assume the same for all of the other letters in this book from people who were not alive when the book was written. It is fascinating that on p. 44 n. 1 Bloch refers to the anti-Zionist letters he would later publish in Dovev Siftei Yeshenim. Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv was published in 1943 and the first volume of Dovev Siftei Yeshenim didn’t appear until 1959, meaning that this forgery was very long in the making, and Bloch was setting the stage for it many years prior.
There is more to say about this book, in particular his argument that there are passages in the Talmud that were inserted by heretics – a viewpoint earlier mentioned by R. Joseph Zvi Duenner, as I have pointed out elsewhere, see here.

I will leave that for another time, but to give you an example of what I am referring to, here is a passage from p. 39 (emphasis in the original):
אופינית היא “המעשיה” בר’ שמעון בן גמליאל “שהיה על גב מעלה בהר הבית וראה נכרית אחת נאה ביותר. אמר: מה רבו מעשיך ד'” (ע”ז כ ע”א) המאמר הזה זיוף  . . . לא יעלה בדעתנו, שר’ שמעון בן גמליאל הביט על אשה, היינו הך, נכרית או ישראלי – לשם יפיה. ומצאתי עוד מאמר בשם רב, שזיופו עומד מחוץ לכל ספק: “בשעה שבקש נבוכדנצר לעשות לאותו צדיק (צדקיהו) כך, נמשכה ערלתו ש’ אמה והיתה מחזרת על כל המסבה כולה שנאמר: שבעת קלון מכבוד, שתה גם אתה והערל” (שבת קמט ע”ב). מלבד הנבול שבמאמר זה, הוא חסר טעם, ולא יתכן, שמפי רב יצאו הדברים.
I don’t know which position is “frummer”? To defend the honor of the sages and therefore deny that these “obscene” passages are authentic, or to defend the Talmud as we have it and thus have to deal with these passages.
Yet whatever the answer to this is, if Bloch were alive today, the haredi world would put him in herem for another reason. Here is what he writes on p. 38, with regard to how to view Aggadah in contrast to the halakhic sections of the Talmud. (What he says is nothing other than the Geonic and Spanish tradition, which is largely unknown in today’s yeshiva world.):
היא אינה נחשבת ליסוד קיומה של היהדות ויש לה אופי של ספר עם . . . לחלק האגדה נכנסו דברי מוסר ודרך ארץ, מליצות ובדיחות, סגולות ורפואות, אזהרות ועצות, פתרון חלומות ואגדות, שלהרבה מהם יש ערך גם מחוץ להיהדות. יתכן שהרבה הושפעו בעלי התלמוד בזה מהעמים שכניהם.
Also interesting is that in Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv, p. 44 n. 1,  he refers very positively to R. Henkin, something that would later change when their great battle began.
Bloch claimed that he had a close relationship with the great R. Judah Leib Zirelson of Kishinev (Speaking for myself, Zirelson’s greatest achievement had to have been standing up to the extreme anti-Zionist elements in Agudat Israel, led by R. Elhanan Wasserman and R. Aaron Kotler. They wanted the Agudah to officially oppose the creation of a Jewish state. Zirelson, as president of the 1937 Kenesiah Ha-Gedolah in Marienbad, was able to convince the Moetzet Gedolei ha-Torah to agree with his own position, which was not to oppose a state but to attempt to bring Torah values into it. See Ha-Pardes, Oct. 1937, p. 8). In this book, Bloch cites a number of things from Zirelson of which, again, I have no doubt that he has made them up. For example, can anyone imagine that Zirelson would offer the following Haskalah-Reformist interpretation that Bloch puts in his mouth (p. 34)?
יתכן שהיתה כוונתו של ר’ שמעון בן יוחאי, בחפשו יסוד במקרא שהנכרים אינם מטמאים באוהל, כדי שלא ימצאו הרומיים תואנות ואמתלאות חדשות על ישראל, ומאימת המלכות הורה כן.
Although I can’t go into it in any detail now, the truth is that we do on occasion find Haskalah-Reformist types of interpretation even in traditional sources,11 but since these are very rare and we have no evidence that Zirelson ever said what is attributed to him, I assume it is another of Bloch’s forgeries. In other words, as he did so often, Bloch attributed his own understanding to one of the great Torah sages.
In chapter fourteen of Ve-Da Mah She-Tashiv, where he stresses the need for honesty in one’s dealings with non-Jews, he claims that Zirelson told him about a Zoharic passage in parashat Lekh Lekha that states:
כל מאן דמשקר בהאי עלמא בערל כמאן דמשקר בשמיה דקוב”ה
This is a beautiful thought. The only problem is that it doesn’t exist anywhere in the Zohar. I am certain that Zirelson would never have misquoted the Zohar and that the mistake is Bloch’s. I assume that the mistake is unintentional, perhaps quoting from memory, since a great forger like Bloch would never have dared falsely attribute anything to the Zohar, the accuracy of which could easily be checked.
Here is the actual Zohar text (vol. 1, p. 93a):
דכל מאן דמשקר בהאי כמאן דמשקר בשמיה דקב”ה
If you examine the entire passage you will find that it has nothing to do with being honest, and the word משקר here does not mean “to lie”, but “to betray”. The text is actually speaking about berit milah and how one is obligated to treat it properly, especially דלא עייל ליה ברשותא אחרא, which certainly refers to refraining from having sex with non-Jewish women. What the text is saying is that if you have illicit sex you betray the mark of the circumcision, and this is like betraying God’s name.
Since I mentioned Haskalah-Reformist interpretations in traditional texts, let me note one of the most famous of these. In Shabbat 140b, R. Papa’s states that if one can drink beer but instead drinks wine, he violates the prohibition on baal tashchit. Maharsha explains that R. Papa said this because he was a beer salesman! What this apparently means is that R. Papa lied about the halakhah in order to drum up more business for himself. How else to interpret Maharsha’s explanation?
ורב פפא לטובת עצמו אמרה שהוא הי’ עושה שכר.
This explanation is, to be sure, quite shocking. If you want to stretch things a bit you can say that according to Maharsha, R. Papa didn’t consciously alter the halakhah to benefit himself, but since he was a beer maker he was unconsciously led to this position, as it would benefit him. This explanation – which could easily have been offered by Jacob Katz – is suggested by the noted Yemenite posek, R. Yitzhak Ratsaby12:
והנה כל העובר ישום וישרוק, היתכן כדבר הזה שרב פפא יפסוק הלכה משום ריוח ממונו?! . . . ובודאי גם לדעת מהרש”א לא יתכן שרב פפא יאמר פסקי הלכה רק מתוך נגיעה, חלילה לו. אלא היה זה כעין “שוחד סמוי”, שלא הרגיש בו הוא עצמו, שמתוך כך בא לידי טעות בהלכה זו. כמו שהכתוב צווח ואומר (שמות כג, ח): “כי השוחד יעוור פקחים ויסלף דברי צדיקים”, ועל דרך שמצינו בכתובות (קט, ב) בגדולי עולם שאמרו על עצמם שהשוחד היטה את ליבם.
I think most people will tell you that this sort of explanation, which points to unconscious factors influencing halakhic decisions, was not how people thought in the days of the Maharsha. I myself do not see this as an anachronistic explanation, as the Talmud, Ketubot 105b, already discusses precisely this sort of unconscious influence.13  I believe that this is also how we are to understand all the discussions about נוגע בדבר, and how it applies even to the greatest tzadikim. It is not that these people will consciously twist the truth, but that unconsciously this is what can happen. Presumably, this is also the meaning of Hullin 49a:  ישמעאל כהנא מסייע כהני

I think this is also how we are to understand R. Moses Isserles, Yoreh Deah 242:36:
תלמיד חכם שאמר דבר הלכה בדבר השייך לדידיה . . . אין שומעין לדידיה דלמא מדמי דברים להדדי שאינן דומים
See also Ritva, Yevamot 77a:
דחיישינן שמא מתוך שנושא ונותן בהלכה כדי לקיים את דבריו אמר בדדמי כסבור שקיבל מרבו
I am not going to analyze the Maharsha in any depth, because either way you explain him, this is the exact sort of explanation that according to the Rav is heretical as it falls under the Rambam’s category of מכחיש מגידה.14 And it is not just the Rav who would be shocked by what Maharsha wrote. R. Yehoshua Heschel of Monistritch15 states:
ועל מאמר המהרש”א הזה צווחי קמאי 
R. Abraham Vengrober16 says concerning the standard explanation of Maharsha (before offering a different understanding of his words):
ופריצי עמנו מצאנו בקעה לדבר סרה על רז”ל . . . גם רבינו המהרש”א ז”ל לא כיוון בזה ח”ו להכוונה אשר העולם סוברים שבשביל זה שהי’ מסחרו שבח את הדבר לטובת עצמו.
R. Samuel Strashun in his commentary to the passage takes strong issue with Maharsha, and R. Hayyim Hezekiah Medini17 is astounded by what Maharsha wrote:
הדבר תמוה לפרש דנחשד רב פפא לדבר שקר חלילה לטובת עצמו.
I assume it is only a matter of time before this explanation of Maharsha is deleted from a future printing.
Here is another example (Taanit 14a-14b):
In the time of R. Judah the Prince there was distress. He ordained thirteen fast days and their prayer was not answered. He thought of ordaining additional fasts but R. Ammi said to him, “Did not [the Sages] declare we should not trouble the community unduly.” Said R. Abba the son of R. Hiyya b. Abba, “R. Ammi [in saying this] was studying his own interests.”
  
Rashi explains R. Abba’s declaration:
לעצמו דרש: דלא אמר אלא לפי שהוא לא היה רוצה להתענות
If anyone other than Rashi wrote this, wouldn’t it be regarded as an example of מכחיש מגידה?
Here is another example, from the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 6:1:
R. Abbahu in the name of R. Yohanan, “It is permitted for a man to teach Greek to his daughter, because such learning is an ornament for her” Simeon bar Ba heard and said, “It is because R. Abbahu wants to teach his daughter such that he has assigned the teaching to R. Yohanan.”
R. Abbahu responded quite sharply to Simeon bar Ba, proclaiming: “May a curse come upon me, if I did not hear it from R Yohanan.” But I am more interested in Simeon bar Ba’s accusation. He assumed that the great R. Abbahu would falsely attribute a halakhic ruling to an earlier sage in order that his daughter would benefit. When Geiger and Graetz said things like this, no one was surprised, and the Orthodox condemned them for these type of interpretations. Yet here you have a Haskalah-Reformist type of interpretation offered by one of the Sages.
Returning to Bloch, another example where he deceived the world is found in his Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgemeihem, pp. 591-592. In line with his apologetic approach to Jewish sources, he claims that he saw an old version of the Passover prayer Shefokh Hamotkha, that went as follows:

שפוך אהבתך על הגוים אשר ידעוך

Even a great scholar such as Naftali Ben-Menachem was taken in by Bloch (and if you search online you will find a number of others who assume that Shefokh Ahavatkha is a real text, rather than another Bloch forgery18). Ben Menachem’s article appears in Mahanayim 80 (1963), and here is the page where he refers to Bloch’s version.

Incidentally, in Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal Bloch claims that he wrote about this version at length in his 1935 book Der Judenhass im Spiegel der Jahrtausende, and also printed a copy of the manuscript there. (In 1935 Bloch was living in Vienna.) Although he mentions this book in a couple of his other writings, there is no evidence that any such book ever appeared. Now we have the internet which allows us to check all the greatest libraries in a minute, yet in a prior era, simply mentioning that he had published such a book and that it contained a copy of the manuscript would have been enough to convince everyone. After all, it was not like people in the United States, England, or Palestine/Israel could easily check the holdings of libraries in Austria and Germany.
Meir Hershkovitz, in his fine book on R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, also quotes Bloch a number of times. Bloch claimed to have seen unpublished material from Chajes and he included some of it in his Heikhal, but everything he mentions is fraudulent, and some of the comments are really outrageous. For example, on p. 565 he quotes Chajes as saying as follows about Rabbi Akiva19:

ר”ע מבני בניו של סיסרא היה ולמרות קדושת התורה ששלטה בו נשאר בו משהו מאופיו של סיסרא
(Some are probably wondering why I didn’t underline the first part as well, which states that R. Akiva was descended from Sisera. After all, in a few weeks Daf Yomi will reach Sanhedrin 96b and there you find the following, with no mention of R. Akiva: “Descendants of Sisera studied20 Torah in Jerusalem; descendants of Sennacherib taught Torah to the multitude. Who were these? Shemaya and Avtalion. Descendants of Haman studied Torah in Bnei Brak.” Yet numerous texts21 record a version of this passage that identifies R. Akiva as among the descendants of Sisera.)

What motivated Bloch to invent this negative comment about R. Akiva? I think that this too can be attributed to anti-Zionist motivations (an anonymous commenter on Soferim u-Seforim offered a similar explanation; see the link in n. 1). R. Akiva was associated with Bar Kokhba’s rebellion, and in the popular mind at least, this was a matter of pride for twentieth-century Jews. The thrust of the comment attributed to Chajes is to see this “warlike” aspect of R. Akiva as a throwback to Sisera. In other words, this is not something good. We see another example of Bloch’s anti-Zionism in his attempts to argue that a passage in Maimonides’ Letter on Astrology is not authentic. In this passage, Maimonides states that the Temple was destroyed and the Jews exiled because instead of focusing on “the art of military training and conquering lands,” they involved themselves with astrology, thinking it would help them. (Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Sheilat, vol. 2, p. 480) This passage was too “Zionistic” for Bloch, and not surprisingly he argues that it is a forged interpolation. See his article in Ha-Pardes 34 (April 1960), pp. 39-42, where once again it is Bloch who is the forger, citing a supposed letter from a Christian scholar to Dr. [Daviid?] Kaufmann and also telling us about the support he supposedly received from the Tchortkover Rebbe. (This Rebbe, incidentally, happened to be a one of the leading Agudah supporters of settlement in the Land of Israel.) One of Bloch’s major proofs that Maimonides could not have written this passage is his assumption that Maimonides was not impressed with R. Akiva’s support of Bar Kokhba. He bases this argument on Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 11:3. Yet Maimonides’ viewpoint in this matter is not enough for Bloch, and to achieve his purpose he has to actually find fault with R. Akiva’s character, something Maimonides would never do. Bloch even attacks some modern writers (such as Aaron Zeitlin and Hillel Seidman) who had stressed the contemporary significance of Maimonides’ words. In Bloch’s mind, by doing so they were showing the non-Jews that the Protocols of Elders of Zion were correct, namely, that Jews really did want to conquer the world! Bloch’s Neturei Karta side comes out very well in this article.

As a way of covering himself, so that people will believe the manuscripts of Chajes are authentic, Bloch states that he assumes that the material he is quoting from has survived in Israel, either with the family or at the National Library (Heikhal, pp. 520, 560). Yet in Hershkovitz, this supposition is stated as fact (Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Chajes, p. 438). It is quite surprising that Hershkowitz, who wrote such a comprehensive biography of Chajes, didn’t attempt to track down these manuscripts. Had he done so, he would have realized that they don’t exist.
*    *    *
This is a blog about seforim, but with Dan’s permission, in a future post I am going to write about the various blogs and news sites, both haredi and Modern Orthodox, that focus on Jewish matters (halakhah, hashkafah, etc.). In the last six months I have visited them a good deal, left a number of comments (some quite provocative and opposed to my own outlook [e.g., dealing with sexual abuse, Zionism, Daas Torah, Torah mi-Sinai, etc.], and always under a pseudonym) and gathered the reactions. I also corresponded with people I met on the sites and with various anonymous baalei ha-blogs. I tried to be a bit of a reporter, gathering information, and just like a reporter sometimes has to hide his identify, I felt that in this circumstance it was permissible, especially as almost everyone I was dealing with was also anonymous. We all know that the ability to be anonymous is basic to the internet (and there has been a good deal of discussion recently about whether this is a good idea). I also felt that if I got involved in a debate on a haredi or Modern Orthodox site, my name would be recognizable to some of the people and they might respond differently than if I was some anonymous person.

Most of the information is publicly available (as are my comments), but I won’t cite any names, as I am not interested in individuals but in some of the thought processes that I observed. As always, I will tie this in with seforim, especially the phenomenon of anonymous and pseudonymous (as opposed to pseudepigraphal) seforim and articles, and also discuss the modern anonymous halakhic questions that R. Yuval Sherlow has written about. (He has also published a couple of volumes of his answers to these questions.) How is Judaism perceived and portrayed when people can live in two worlds, the public one and the private anonymous world of the internet? What does it mean when most people who comment about controversial topics choose to do so under a pseudonym? I think that what I found also has implications to an issue I have been concerned with for a long time, namely, the value of private letters and conversations vs. published word in seeking to evaluate the personality of an individual. This directly relates to David Holzer’s book on the Rav and was also a topic that became a dispute between the late Prof. Twersky and myself when writing my dissertation on R. Weinberg–more on that to come.

I mention all this because I have a request: If anyone is aware of a similar study with regard to Christian or political blogs and websites, please let me know. As a friend commented to me when I told him about my project, “we all know that there are registered Democrats on the Upper West Side who secretly vote Republican, but in order not to scandalize their friends, will only post their true opinions anonymously.” Yet has anyone written about this? There are serious methodological issues that must be dealt with in any such inquiry.
*    *    *

My new Torah in Motion class begins this Monday. I invite all who are free on Monday nights at 9PM Eastern to join us. This semester we are covering R. Eliezer Berkovits, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, R. Elijah Benamozegh and R. Joseph Messas. You can sign up for it here
If you want to watch or listen to previous classes, to get a sense of how they work, you can download them here.
Notes
1 For a recent discussion of Bloch, see here which contains a number of informative comments.
2 See Bloch, Mi Natan li-Meshisah Yaakov ve-Yisrael le-Vozezim (Bronx, n.d.), pp. 54ff.
3 “Herzl’s First Years of Struggle: Unknown Episodes and Personal Recollections” Herzl Year Book 3 (1960), pp. 77-90.
4 The booklet is found in N. M. Gelber, Tokhnit ha-Medinah ha-Yehudit le-Lord Beaconsfield (Tel Aviv, 1947),  pp. 35ff. Gelber’s book is devoted to this booklet.
5 “Zionism and its Religious Critics in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,” in S. Almog, et al., eds., Zionism and Religion (Hanover, 1998), pp. 150, 157 n. 45.
6 See here.
7 Mikhtavim Mezuyafim Neged ha-Tziyonut (Jerusalem, 1981).
8 See Weingarten, Mikhtavim, pp. 164-165. In Ha-Posek 11 (1950), p. 802, Bloch published another letter from R. Kook. It is also found in Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgamehem, p. 614. Again he tells us that he only has a copy of the letter, as the original was lost, and here too the letter in unquestionably a forgery. Bloch had R. Kook sign the letter עבד לעם קדוש , which he knew is found in numerous authentic letters. But the letter also contains the phrase כל יקר ראתה עיני , and this does not appear in any of the almost 2000 letters and responsa of R. Kook, as can be determined from the new database of R. Kook’s writings
9 I don’t know whether this also applies to halakhic writings, e.g., the supposed manuscript from R. Shalom Schwadron that came from Bloch and is published in R. Isaac Liebes, Beit Avi, vol. 3 no. 157. Incidentally, a few responsa after this, in no. 161, Liebes discusses whether a rabbinic organization could publicly advocate the institution of the death penalty, since it might happen that a Jew would also be sentenced to death (sound familiar?). Liebes begins his reply:
לא רק שמותר להתריע בכיוון זה רק מצוה לעורר את דעת העם את חומר הסכנה המרחפת על תושבי הארץ.
During the discussions about the Grossman execution, I looked at some of the haredi websites (until the comments made me sick). What I found interesting was the incredible level of ignorance of most of the writers, all of whom had been in yeshiva and many of whom had studied there for years. They were able to declare that a murderer can’t be executed unless he was observed by two kosher witnesses and was given warning, which they thought settled matters. Had these people known a bit of responsa literature, there would have understood how things worked in the real world, and especially what was done in the days of the rishonim. Do these people think that if a guy stood up in shul and opened fire with a machine gun, killing 20 people, that a Jewish court couldn’t execute him because he was never given a warning? Let’s continue with R. Liebes:
יש כח להבי”ד בזמן שרואין צורך השעה לענוש עונש מות אפילו בכל יום אפילו אם מן התורה פטורין הם כדי שעל ידי זה כל העם ישמעו וייראו ולא יזידון עוד.
As for the possibility that a Jewish man will be executed:
מצוה וחיוב לעורר את דעת הקהל להתריע את בתי המשפט שיראו להעביר בכל המדינה משפט מות ולענוש בכל החומר הרוצחים והפושעים ואת מדינתינו ארצות הברית אשר מאמינה בתנ”ך יכולים לשכנע אותה ולהראות לה עד היכן תוה”ק מקפידה לבער את רשעי הארץ בתור חיוב ומצוה. ומש”כ כת”ר לחשוש דלפעמים ימצא רוצח יהודי א”כ אנחנו נהיה אשמים במיתתו זה אינו כלום . . . מוכח מזה דהמחוייב מיתה עפי דין המלכות מותר למסרו להם מטעם דינא דמלכותא. מובן ממילא שכל דברינו מוסבים רק על המדינות שיש להם שוויון הזכויות לכל אזרחיה בלי שום אנטישמיות ושנאת ישראל ולכן אם ח”ו יהודי נתפס באיזה עון ופשע הרי הוא נידון כמו כל אזרחי המדינה.
Many who commented on the various sites were people who never opposed the death penalty before and do not oppose it now, yet they were anti-death penalty in this case because, quite simply, they think the death penalty is just fine except when it is a Jew being executed. They vote for all the right wing candidates and then have the chutzpah to complain when their man actually follows through on his support of capital punishment and doesn’t share their view that a supposed baal teshuvah (whose last meal on earth was a non-kosher chicken sandwich bought from the prison canteen) should not be executed. Some of them cited Sanhedrin 17a, סנהדרי שראו כולן לחובה פוטרין אותו , as if this had any relevance. First of all, this passage only means that he is not executed in the normal fashion, but he can certainly be executed as an emergency measure. In addition, some understand this passage to mean that if on the first day of deliberations all conclude that he is guilty, he is not condemned to death immediately but the case is revisited on the next day. If then, all find him guilty, he is executed. None of the commenters who mentioned this law quoted the view of R. Meir ha-Levi Abulafia (cited in many sources) and the Tosafot Hakhmei Anglia that the meaning of פוטרין אותו is ממהרין אותו להורגו .  This understanding is praised by the Reisher Rav, R. Aharon Lewin, Ha-Derash ve-ha-Iyun, Deut. no. 119:5, and R. Baruch Epstein, Torah Temimah, Ex. 23:2. Epstein is convinced that this understanding is correct because otherwise היש לך חוטא גדול ונשכר מזה .  For more on the subject, see Zorach Warhaftig, “Rov u-Miut be-Veit ha-Din,” in Itamar Warhaftig, ed., Minhah le-Ish (Jerusalem, 2001), pp. 100ff. See also R. Reuven Margaliot, Margaliyot ha-Yam, Sanhedrin 17a, no. 19, who cites the Tashbetz:
שהם ז”ל לא אמרו ב”ד שהסכימו כולם לחובה פטור, חלילה להם שיאמרו ככה, ואם על פי הרוב הורגים כל שכן ע”פ כולם ויותר טוב ויותר משובח הוא שיהיה הפסק דין מוסכם מהכל ולא שיהיה שום חולק.
There is a good deal more to say on this topic, but in the interests of space I will leave it for another time. Suffice it to say that as in all such matters one can find a variety of viewpoints. See e.g., R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, Havot Yair, no. 146. Some poskim have even ruled that when a murderer has been sentenced to death it is forbidden to try and save him. See R. Nathan Leiter, Tziyun le-Nefesh Hayah, no. 121. (Others disagree, see e.g., Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, vol. 6, no. 14.) Obviously, such a ruling has no relevance to people who oppose the death penalty on principle, but it does speak directly to those who normally support it—as I daresay includes most, if not virtually all of the people who were commenting so outrageously on the haredi sites. Let me close by citing a responsum of R. Meir Zak in Teshuvot Eitan ha-Ezrahi, no. 45. What he said in the seventeenth century, in a case involving a Jewish murderer, is just as relevant today, and it is incredible how this responsum speaks to the Grossman case (he even uses the term “hillul ha-shem”!). Notice how he also includes the manhigei ha-dor in his criticism.
מאחר שניתן ביד גוים ערכאות הם יעשו בו משפט וידינו לא תהיה בו . . . ואפשר שעל נדון דידן נאמר מורידין מאחר שכתב הרב מהר”ד ה”ל האב”ד דק”ק ה”ל שדעתו לעשות כפרה והיה כל ימיו חוטא גדול ופושע, נאמר לישרי’ ביה גודא רבא ואף אם יאמר שרוצה לעשות תשובה ולפי דעתי על אלו אמרו חז”ל אין נחת רוח בתשובתן של רשעים להקב”ה כי ראה עצמו ביד גוים רוצה לרמות אותנו, אבל להפריז ממון לפדות אותו בשביל שאומר שרוצה לעשות תשובה זה הוא חילול השם שיאמרו אין עונש שפיכות דמים אצל יהודים נחשב חטא והיה אם גוי יהרוג ח”ו ליהודי ג”כ לא ידונו לעשות נקמה. ותמיד אני צועק ככרוכיא על מנהיגי הדור שכל גנב או חוטא שבא למאסר עושין השתדלות לפדות אותו ע”י שחדים דבר זה בעו”ה מרבה פשעים וגניבות כל א’ עושה מה שלבו חפץ ורבו פריצי הדור כאלו אנחנו רואים בעו”ה רוב גנבי ישראל ע”כ שלא לתת פרוטה לפוטרו ממות.
Isn’t it amazing that hundreds of years ago he was condemning the leaders who think that every thief or sinner who goes to jail should be the focus of pidyon shevuyim? From this responsum we learn that the warped values we have seen these last few years go back a long time. And what is one to make about his statement that the majority of thieves are Jewish? (using the language of Avodah Zarah 70a). I pray we never reach this point, although we probably have to do keriah over the fact that the Agudah spokesmen have been insistent in letters to the editor and in interviews that Orthodox Jews are not more dishonest than anyone else. In other words, no one, neither Jew nor non-Jew, even assumes anymore that being an Orthodox Jew means that you hold yourself to a high ethical standard. Their goal now is to convince the public that when it comes to obeying the law, Orthodox Jews (and their institutions) are simply no worse than everyone else. If that is not an indictment of our entire educational system, I don’t know what is.
For those interested in pursuing further the topic of Jewish murderers, here is a nineteenth-century responsum by the Moroccan R. Joseph Berdugo (Divrei Yosef no. 381).

10 Le-Dor Aharon (Brooklyn, 1937), p. 36. In this letter R. Chaim Ozer uses the expression והנני חותם בברכה , and this also appears in his supposed letter to Bloch.
11 In my Studies in Maimonides, I tried to show that “academic” interpretations of Maimonides can also be found in the most traditional sources. The same thing can be done with regard to the Talmud, and Prof. Halivni has cited many examples of traditionalists who offered explanations of the sort he focuses on (Higher Criticism). When “academic” explanations are found in rishonim, even the most conservative will be hesitant to attack them. But that was not always the case a few hundred years ago. For example, R. Nissim writes as follows in his commentary on the Rif, Megillah 26a, s.v. zo divrei R. Menahem:
ודאמרינן במעמדות לאו דוקא ומשום אשגרת לישן נקטיה
(This same view is actually advocated by Ramban, as noted in Gilyon ha-Shas, Megillah 26a.) This was too much for R. David Pardo, Mikhtam le-David, Orah Hayyim no. 14:
מלבד הלחץ זה הדחק שסובל הדבר בעצמו לומר דהש”ס וכל הפוס’ מעתיקי הש”ס נקטו באשגרת לישן מלתא דשקרא ממש דבר זר ורחוק.
12 Paamei Yaakov, Adar II 5768, p. 108.
13 The Talmud deals there with how even the desire of one of the parties in a dispute to give a gift to a rabbi who will rule on the case impairs his objectivity. This talmudic passage provides all the explanation one needs to understand how so many learned rabbis remained silent as the Tropper scandal played out. If amoraim admitted that they couldn’t properly judge a matter if they had only been offered a gift, certainly one in our day who actually received such a gift is not capable of judging the case of his benefactor. The Steipler refused to take as much as a cigarette from one of his admirers whose case he was to judge, and continued to refuse gifts from this person even after the case was concluded. See Avraham Yeshayahu Kanievsky, Toldot Yaakov (Bnei Brak, 1995), p. 208.
With regard to the more troubling (and I believe rare) circumstance of rabbis who will actually lie to benefit themselves, I have a number of sources on this. For now, let me just cite the words of the Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 314:1:
הכהנים חשודים להטיל מום בבכור אפילו אם הוא חכם ויושב בישיבה
As for the sordid details of the Tropper scandal itself, and those who refused at first to believe what they heard with their own ears (not to mention the Elon scandal as well as others), here is what the hasidic master, R. Meshulam Feivish Heller (died 1794), had to say in an earlier era, a presumably holier era as yet uncontaminated by television and the internet (Yosher Divrei Emet [Jerusalem, 1974]), p. 113:
והלא ידוע ומפורסם שיש בעוה”ר כמה לומדים שהם בעלי ניאוף רח”ל, ובעלי עבירות ידועים.
R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira, Divrei Torah 5:82, writes about
הרבנים ובפרט האדמורי”ם הגונבים דעת ולבות הבריות, וכל כונתם אך לטובתם, בעצמם בגופם ובשרם וממונם ותאותם.
This is what the Ropshitzer is reported to have said:
דעו כי קודם ביאת המשיח יתרבה כ”כ השקר בעולם עד שרב העיר יסע יחדו עם אשה נכריה בעגלה אחת, ורבים מבני העיר יאמרו אחריו אין קדוש כמוהו.
R. Isaiah Asher Zelig Margulies, Ashrei ha-Ish (Jerusalem, 1927), p. 49, who records the saying, assumes that the Gentile woman spoken of really means “heresy”, but I don’t know why it should not be understood literally. It is not like the Ropshitzer was confronted with many secularly educated rabbis that he would need to make such a statement. (I assume that Margulies was led to his assumption by Maimonides’ famous letter to R. Jonathan of Lunel, where he speaks of non-Torah studies—which for Margulies equals heresy—as being נשים נכריות . See Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Sheilat, vol. 2, p. 502.)
Since a concern with kavod is also so often present in the various scandals, the following comment by R. Elimelech of Lizhensk is noteworthy (quoted in Or Elimelekh [Jerusalem, 2003], no. 75):
מצוה עם כבוד גרוע יותר מעבירות ניאוף רח”ל.
14 See the text of the Rav’s lecture here.
15 See R. Aharon Perlow, Margaliyot ha-Shas al Masekhet Shabbat (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 471.
16 Likutei Avraham (Jerusalem, 1976), p. 319.
17 Sedei Hemed, maarekhet lamed, kelal 108.
18 See also Alan Brill’s recent post here.
19 For an example of genealogy in the reverse direction – i.e., from righteous to wicked, see Rashi to I Kings 10:1, where it very strangely states that Nebuchanezar was the son of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. This only appears in the later printed editions of Rashi, and is cited in the name of R. Isaac Luria. It is difficult to know what to make of this. I find it hard to believe that the passage ever could have been meant literally, since Solomon lived some three hundred years before Nebuchadnezar. Even legends, if understood literally, have to make chronological sense. Perhaps it means that the origin of the later disaster involving Nebuchadnezar can be traced to Solomon involving himself with foreign women such as the Queen of Sheba. In other words, not that Solomon is the literal father of Nebuchadnezar, but rather he is his “ultimate cause”.
As for the ultimate origin of the notion that Solomon was Nebuchadnezar’s father, I have been unable to find any other source that records that this was stated by R. Isaac Luria. R. Menahem Azariah de Fano (1548-1620), Asarah Maamarot (Jerusalem, 2005), pp. 412-413 (Maamar Eim Kol Hai 2:23), states that Nebuchadnezar descended from Solomon. Two points are significant here. First, he does not say that Solomon is his father, and second, he does not attribute this to any source, which presumably means that it was a well-known kabbalistic idea. R. Jehiel ben Solomon Heilprin, Seder ha-Dorot, year 2935, states that according to a Midrash, Solomon fathered a daughter with the Queen, and Nebuchadnezar was her son. R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, Midbar Kedemot, maarekhet yod, no. 47, claims that Nebuchadnezar was descended from this daughter. See also R. Joseph Palache, Yosef et Ehav (n.p., 2005), maarekhet bet, no. 17.
20 למדו תורה . This should probably be read as לימדו תורה , “taught Torah”, since in the parallel text in Gittin 57b it has למדו תינוקות, which means “taught children”. See also Dikdukei Soferim, Sanhedrin 96b.
21 To give just one, here is a page from R. Nissim Gaon’s Sefer ha-Mafteah to Berakhot 27b.


Note how Jacob Goldenthal, the editor, assumes that it is actually Haman from whom R. Akiva is descended! Jacob Reifman agreed with this. See Iggeret Bikoret, ed. Ben Menahem (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 17. Louis Finkelstein, Akiba, p. 321 speaks of the R. Akiva-Sisera connection as a “legend widely repeated in medieval works.” He doesn’t seem to realize that the medieval works were citing from their texts of the Talmud. See also Dikdukei Soferim, Sanhedrin 96b, which cites one such manuscript.




“A Woman Is Not an Elephant”

“A Woman Is Not an Elephant” – Some Jewish, Islamic and Classical Perspectives On the Conflict Between Authority and Truth

by Yitzhak of Bein Din Ledin

Unusually Long (Human) Gestations: Islam

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) reports (hat tip: Rabbi Natan Slifkin):

Egyptian Medical Doctor Criticizes the Phenomenon of Accepting Unscientific Islamic Beliefs, like the Notion that a Woman's Pregnancy Can Last Up to Four Years

In an article on the liberal website Elaph, Dr. Khaled Montasser, a liberal Egyptian physician, criticizes the phenomenon of endorsing traditional ideas that have been disproven by science, such as the Muslim belief that a woman can be pregnant for up to four years. He points out that this notion is believed even by some Muslim doctors, and is acknowledged in the laws of some Arab countries, including those that are not theocracies. He calls on the Muslims not to accept outdated and unscientific ideas just because they were proposed by important clerics, stressing that contesting the opinions of religious scholars is not tantamount to attacking or disparaging the religion itself.Following are excerpts from his article:

At a Medical Conference, a Professor Raised the Notion of a Hidden Pregnancy Lasting One to Four Years

"In a medical conference held at one of the faculties of general medicine, a professor asked for permission to speak, and said: 'Why doesn't this conference deal with [the phenomenon of] hidden pregnancy?' When the participants asked what he meant by 'hidden pregnancy,' he replied: 'I mean a pregnancy that lasts one, two, three or four [years].' The conferees, both the students and the professors, were puzzled and asked one another, 'Is there such a thing as a pregnancy that lasts three or four years?' The professor answered confidently, with contempt for his colleagues' ignorance: 'Of course. Imam Malik [founder of the Maliki school of Islam] stayed in his mother's womb for three years.'"The danger posed by this belief is that, [in this case], the one who held it was a professor of medicine, who is probably schooled in the doctrine of scientific thinking, and relies on medical journals as his source [of knowledge]. Faced with a medical question, such as how long a pregnancy can last, he [is expected to] rely on what he has learned and read in these [scientific] sources, rather than on what he has read in texts of Islamic jurisprudence."Unfortunately, however, this doctor was not [just] speaking for himself. He represents a phenomenon, namely the victory of tradition over reason. He represents a school of thought that is willing to sacrifice all medical learning in order to uphold the predominance of jurisprudential Islamic texts and traditional fatwas. Proof of this is [the fact] that it is not only this professor who holds such views. I will have you know that the chief proponent of female circumcision [in Egypt] is a professor of gynecology and obstetrics, who even argued against the minister of health in a court hearing [about this matter]."

The Notion of Hidden Pregnancy Has Crept into the State Laws

"Some Islamic scholars, like those of the Hanafi [school], believe that a pregnancy can last up to two years, while those of the Maliki and Shafi'i schools think it can last up to four years, and some of them [have said] even five years or more. We [can] accept these statements as a kind of folklore, but not as any kind of scientific truth… I refuse to let anyone force me to accept this nonsense under the pretext of implementing the shari'a. Islam is a religion of reason, and [cannot] be associated with these medieval notions. Moreover, my mind refuses to accept something just because the Mufti wrote it in his book or because it appears in the Al-Azhar curriculum. How can I accept this as science when not a single gynecologist or obstetrician has ever witnessed [such an event] since the advent of scientific gynecology and obstetrics?… And from a moral perspective, how can I provide a jurisprudential loophole for a woman who was probably promiscuous after the death of her husband and then presented her baby, conceived in sin, as a baby of her dead husband by relying on the [notion] of a hidden pregnancy or on a fatwa issued by some [cleric] or religious school? This is what happened on December 14, 1927 at a shari'a court in Mecca. The qadi… ruled that the baby was conceived by the woman's dead husband who had died five years previously."The important question is whether the notion of a 'hidden pregnancy' is confined to religious legal texts and is acknowledged only in [Muslim] theocracies, or has [also] found its way into the laws of non-theocratic [Muslim] states that have been terrorized [into submission] by the slogans of the pressure group called political Islam. [Is Egypt] a state that respects reason and [rational] thinking or one that sanctifies tradition and accusations of heresy?"Science is familiar with the notion of a fetus, but does not recognize the notion of a hidden pregnancy or a pregnancy lasting more than ten months, let alone two to four years. The law is expected to be guided by [science] instead of pandering to religious scholars at the expense of science. [The ideas about 'hidden pregnancy'] are religious opinions that [reflect the beliefs] of past eras, and they should be treated as such, not as a sword that hangs over the neck of the legislator."It seems inconceivable that the laws of Egypt, Syria, or the Gulf states should include clauses about hidden pregnancy that reflect beliefs from the fourth century – [but the fact is that they do]. For example, [Egyptian] Law No. 15 from 1929 states that 'a woman's appeal to acknowledge her dead husband [as the father of] her child will not be considered if [the baby] was born over a year after [the husband's] death.' Law No. 131 from 1948 includes a clause stipulating that 'the law will take into account the rights of [a child] born as the result of a hidden pregnancy,' and Law No. 67 from 1980 [states that] 'a hidden pregnancy is legitimate [grounds] for granting rights.' Article 29 of the Personal Status Code [says]: 'The guardian of a child born [as a result of] a hidden pregnancy must inform the Attorney General's [office] when the pregnancy ends.' Article 128 in the Syrian legal code and the property guardianship law in Bahrain say the same thing."

A Woman Is Not an Elephant – She Can't Be Pregnant for More than 10 Months

"The proponents of tradition and enemies of rationality always argue that the religious scholars are [simply] cognizant of [unusual] cases that are possible, though rare. But there is a big difference between rare and impossible. It is impossible that a woman, who belongs to the human race, should suddenly turn into an Asian elephant and be pregnant for over two years. Even [a pregnancy lasting] one whole year… is impossible… The womb is not a storeroom… When a fetus stays in his mother's womb over 42 weeks, he is in danger of dying in utero, and if he stays there more than 43 weeks he will surely die… A 50-week fetus will certainly start to rot in his mother's womb… The duration of pregnancy is not a random affair; it is not a matter of possibilities, of changes in human nature or of changes that occur with time. Someone who says today that Imam Malik stayed in his mother's womb for three years is making light of a serious matter – and the blame lies not with those who said this in the past, but with those who endorse this opinion today."Debating and criticizing the opinions of religious scholars does not mean criticizing or disparaging religion. We mustn't be too sensitive to discuss a scientific issue that was misunderstood by the religious scholars of the past. There is no need to wave swords when discussing such issues. The fault lies not with those who [dare to] contest the [opinions of the religious scholars], but with those who think that these opinions are synonymous with the religion itself. The despicable questions that the clerics ask, [such as] 'Are you saying that the religious scholars were liars?' or 'Who are you to [argue] with figures of their caliber?' – are an impediment to any progress in science and in thinking."We are not accusing the religious scholars of lying, but are [merely] treating their opinions as part of [the beliefs] that prevailed in their time. We do not regard [these opinions] as sacrosanct just because those who held them were authoritative figures. Scientific truths are judged by other criteria that have nothing to do with the piety or devoutness of those who propose them. Moreover, one who contests a clerical opinion having to do with science is not attacking or disparaging the religious scholars, even if he is less pious than they. But he is probably equipped with modern research tools that are more effective than those that were available to those scholars. This does not in any way detract from their importance [as religious scholars] or from the [value] of their religious opinions…"The issue of hidden pregnancy opens a gateway to debating all the scientific and medical notions that appear in the jurisprudential texts. It is inconceivable that today, in the 21st century, we should repeat the opinions of ancient religious scholars – [such as the notion] that the menstrual blood feeds the fetus during pregnancy and turns into breast milk [after birth] – and discard everything science has taught us about gynecology… It is inconceivable that we should use terms like 'the man's [white] fluid' and 'the woman's [yellow] fluid' in discussing genetics, sexology, or infertility, while discarding [terms like] semen, ova, and the enormous wealth of knowledge gained since the discovery of DNA. The same goes for all the religious notions about medicine that are treated as religious commandments instead of as outdated medical [ideas], such as the notion of bloodletting which is defended so much that you would think it’s the sixth Koranic Pillar [of Islam]."

Unusually Long (Human) Gestations: Judaism

And what does our religion say about the possibility of abnormally long pregnancies? The Halachic discussion revolves around this Sugya: תניא איזהו בן שמנה כל שלא כלו לו חדשיו רבי אומר סימנין מוכיחין עליו שערו וצפרניו שלא גמרו טעמא דלא גמרו הא גמרו אמרינן האי בר ז' הוא ואישתהויי הוא דאישתהיאלא הא דעבד רבא תוספאה עובדא באשה שהלך בעלה למדינת הים ואישתהי עד תריסר ירחי שתא ואכשריה כמאן כרבי דאמר משתהאכיון דאיכא רבן שמעון בן גמליאל דאמר משתהי כרבים עבד דתניא רשב"ג אומר כל ששהה ל' יום באדם אינו נפל[1]The Shulhan Aruch, following the preponderant opinion of the Poskim, accepts the ruling of רבה תוספאה: האשב שהיה בעלה במדינת הים ושהה שם יותר מי"ב חדש וילדה אחר י"ב חדש הולד ממזר שאין הולד שוהה במעי אמו יותר מי"ב חדש ויש מי שאומר שאינו בחזקת ממזר וכיון דפלוגתא הוא הוי ספק ממזר: הגה אבל תוך י"ב חדש אין לחוש דאמרינן דאשתהי כל כך במעי אמו ודוקא שלא ראו בה דבר מכוער אבל אם ראו בה דבר מכוער לא אמרינן דאשתהי כל כך וחיישינן ליה[2]So normative Halachah recognizes pregnancies of up to twelve months as possible, if improbable,[3] but of longer than twelve months as impossible. There are, however, minority opinions that dissent from this position in both directions:

Even Longer Pregnancies

Meiri recounts a remarkable incident in his day of a woman who gave birth after a gestation of fifteen months, and although he acknowledges that Rambam, as well as his teachers, in the name of "The Book of Healing", by "great sages" in that discipline, deny that possibility, he stubbornly insists that his empirical experience trumps that view: ואחר שכן [שמכשירין את הולד שנולד לסוף י"ב חודש] אף ביתר משנים עשר חדש ואף בימינו אירע מעשה באשה ששהתה חמש עשרה חדשים וילדה והיה עיבורה ניכר כל ימי העבור שלא היה בה שום חשד והיו כל בני המחוז תמהים עליה וסבורים שהיה חולי הקרוי ריחים וילדה בן והיו שערו וצפרניו גדולים כאלו נולד ונתגדלוגדולי המחברים כתבו שאין העובר משתהא במעי אמו יותר משנים עשר חדש ואף רבותי העידו לי כן באותו זמן בשם ספר הרפואה לגדולי החכמים שבה אלא שמעשה שהיה כך היה ונראה לי לדון בה למעשה.[4]Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai (Hida) cites a manuscript comment of Rav Yosef (Haim) Corinaldi, which cites an incident from "their histories" that the wife of one Caesar had a fourteen month gestation, and the resulting son eventually succeeded his father as Caesar: ראיתי להרב מהר"ר דוד קורינאלדי זלה"ה בעל בית דוד על המשניות שכתב דבדברי הימים שלהם כתוב דאשת קיסר שהה הולד במעיה ארבעה עשר חדש והיה קיסר אחר אביו והיה עולה על לב דרבה תוספאה דהכשיר עד תריסר ירחי מעשה שהיה כך היה והוא הדין אם שהה יותר כל שלא ראו בה דבר מכוער אבל כבר כתב הרמב"ם דאין הולד שוהה במעי אמו יותר מי"ב חדש וגם בה"ג דאמר דאינו בחזקת ממזר לא אמרה מטעם דשוהה יותר אלא משום דיש לומר בצנעא בא כמו שכתב בטור ובבית יוסף וחלילה להקל נגד מה שפסק מרן דהוי ספק ממזר עכ"ל בהגהותיו כ"י:[5]Hida then mentions Meiri, but concludes by accepting as Halachah the opinion of Maran (and Rav Corinaldi), and declaring that we "obviously pay no attention to their histories": וראה זה חדש שראיתי בפסקי הרב המאירי ז"ל ליבמות שנדפסו מחדש … והוא פלא דנקטינן שאינו משתהא יותר מי"ב חדש. ומכל מקום לענין הלכה כל שנשתהא טפי מי"ב חדש הוי ספק ממזר כמו שכתב מרן וכמו שכתב הרב מהרד"ק הנזכר ופשיטא דאין להשגיח בדברי הימים שלהם. ומה שכתב הרב המאירי ז"ל הוא מציאות רחוק מאד מאד ומה גם דשם ניכר בשינוי שערו וצפרניו גדולים. הלכך טפי מי"ב חדש הוא ספק ממזר See also Ozar Ha'Poskim[6] for various other sources on the issue of abnormally long pregnancies, including several who emphatically insist on the impossibility of a gestation of longer than twelve months, but also a couple who seem to consider it possible.

The Two Hundred and Seventy One Day Maximum

In counterpoint to the view of Meiri is the stance of some of the Tosaphists and their followers, who maintain that Le'Halachah, any baby born after a gestation of longer than two hundred and seventy one days (nine "full" months of thirty days each) is considered a mamzer. Helkas Mehokek and Beis Shemuel mention this view, although it is not clear how much weight they give it: התוספות בנדה (דף ל"ח בד"ה שפורא גרים) כתבו דלא קיימא לן כרבה תוספאה (דממנו הוציא הרב דין זה) ואין הולד משתהי יותר מרע"א ימים היינו ט' חדשים שלמים כל אחד ל' יום:[7]מיהו התוספות נדה דף ל"ח כתבו דלא קיימא לן אשתהי וכן פסק באגודה[8]See Ozar Ha'Poskim[9] for more sources on this view.[After I had completed this paper, Eliezer Brodt showed me a fascinating and remarkably erudite thirty eight page comprehensive survey, by יעקב ישראל סטל, of references in Jewish literature to unusually long pregnancies.[10]  This exhaustive article cites the aforementioned sources as well as numerous others, and includes suggestions that Yissachar, son of Ya'akov, experienced a gestation of twelve months or longer, and that Binyamin, son of Ya'akov, experienced a gestation of twenty four months, or even thirty months!I have not had a chance to carefully read the entire article, but I did notice one apparent error: the author repeatedly asserts that the Talmudic passage that we have cited clearly rejects the possibility of a pregnancy lasting longer than twelve months, to the extent that he wonders why a couple of Aharonim claim merely that such pregnancies are “against nature”, and not that they are “against the Talmud and the Halachah”.[11]  But as we have seen, the Talmudic passage itself merely asserts that pregnancies lasting up to twelve months are possible; it is not at all clear that longer ones are impossible, and those who insist that they are, such as Hida, are relying primarily on the authority of Rambam and Maran.Incidentally, one of these Aharonim is Rav Ya'akov Emden, whose comment appears in the midst of his “expurgation of the Zohar”:[12]אך זה שכתוב עוד שם. ומן דרחל אתעברת מבנימין. לא אתעכב תמן. זה אי אפשר. לפי חשבון ששהה יעקב אבינו ע"ה בדרך שתי שנים. עד שנולד בנימין. כמו שכתב בסדר עולם ומוסכם בתלמוד  מאין חולק. והרי בכאן מאריך ספר הזוהר ימי עיבורו של בנימין חוץ לטבע. מה שלא נמצא דוגמתו.[13]]

Rejecting Incorrect Scientific Opinions of Religious Scholars: Islam

We have seen Dr. Montasser's claim that: Debating and criticizing the opinions of religious scholars does not mean criticizing or disparaging religion.R. Slifkin comments that: The parallels are interesting – including how, 800 years ago, Muslims would definitely not have been so traditionalist!Indeed. As the great Muslim thinker Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī writes in the Introduction to his great classic Tahafut Al Falasifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers): [T]here are those things in which the philosophers believe, and which do not come into conflict with any religious principle. And, therefore, disagreement with the philosophers with respect to those things is not a necessary condition for the faith in the prophets and the apostles (may God bless them all). An example is their theory that the lunar eclipse occurs when the light of the Moon disappears as a consequence of the interposition of the Earth between the Moon and the Sun. For the Moon derives its light from the Sun, and the Earth is a round body surrounded by Heaven on all the sides. Therefore, when the Moon falls under the shadow of the Earth, the light of the Sun is cut off from it. Another example is their theory that the solar eclipse means that the interposition of the body of the Moon between the Sun and the observer, which occurs when the Sun and and the Moon are stationed at the intersection of their nodes at the same degree. We are not interested in refuting such theories either; for the refutation will serve no purpose. He who thinks that it his religious duty to disbelieve such things is really unjust to religion and weakens its cause. For these things have been established by astronomical and mathematical evidence which leaves no room for doubt. If you tell a man who has studied such things – so that he has sifted all the data relating to them, and is, therefore, in a position to forecast when a lunar or a solar eclipse will take place; whether it will be total or partial; and how long it will last – that these things are contrary to religion, your assertion will shake his faith in religion, not in these things. Greater harm is done to religion by an immethodical helper than by an enemy whose actions, however hostile, are yet regular. For, as the proverb goes, a wise enemy is better than an ignorant friend. If someone says:The Prophet (may God bless him) has said: The Sun and the Moon are two signs among the signs of God. Their eclipse is not caused by the death or the life of a man. When you see an eclipse, you must seek refuge in the contemplation of God and in prayer." How can this tradition be reconciled with what the philosophers say?We will answer:There is nothing in this tradition to contradict the philosophers. … The atheists would have the greatest satisfaction if the supporters of religion made a positive assertion that things of this kind are contrary to religion. For it would then be easier for them to refute religion which stood or fell with its opposition to these things. (It is, therefore, necessary for the supporter of religion not to commit himself on these questions,) because the fundamental question at issue between him and the philosophers is only whether the world is eternal or began in time. If its beginning in time is proved, it is all the same whether it is a round body, or a simple thing, or an octagonal or hexagonal figure; and whether the heavens and all that is below them form – as the philosophers say – thirteen layers, or more, or less. Investigation into these facts is no more relevant to metaphysical inquiries than an investigation into the number of layers of an onion, or the number of seeds in a pomegranate, would be. What we are interested in this is that the world is the product of God's creative action, whatever the manner of that action may be.[14]Note that this ringing endorsement of at least a certain basic rationalistic insistence on the preposterousness of rejecting the ineluctable conclusions of mathematics and astronomy actually occurs in the Preface to a work whose goal is the defense of religion against what the author perceives as the deeply misguided, heretical arrogance of the philosophers. The book is, after all, titled Incoherence of the Philosophers, and virtually every single chapter title contains either the phrase "their inability to prove" or "refutation [of some belief of the philosophers]". As al-Ghazālī writes (in that same Introduction): Now, I have observed that there is a class of men who believe in their superiority to others because of their intelligence and insight. They have abandoned all the religious duties Islam imposes on its followers. They laugh at all positive commandments of religion which enjoin the performance of acts of devotion, and the abstinence from forbidden things. They defy the injunctions of the Sacred Law. Not only do they overstep the limits prescribed by it, but they have renounced the faith altogether, by having engaged in diverse speculations, wherein they followed the example of those people who "turn men aside from the path of God, and seek to render it crooked; and who do not believe in the life to come." The heresy of these people has its basis only in an uncritical acceptance – like that of the Jews and Christians – of whatever one hears from others or sees all around. … The heretics in our times have heard the awe-inspiring names of people like Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. They have been deceived by the exaggerations made by the followers of these philosophers – exaggerations to the effect that the ancient masters possessed extraordinary intellectual powers; that the principles they have discovered are unquestionable; that the mathematical, logical, physical and metaphysical sciences developed by them are the most profound; that their excellent intelligence justifies their bold attempts to discover the Hidden Things by deductive methods; and that with all the subtlety of their intelligence and the originality of their accomplishments they repudiated the authority of religious laws; denied the validity of the positive contents of historical religions; and believed that all such things are only sanctimonious lies and trivialities. When such stuff was dinned into their ears, and struck a responsive chord in their hearts, the heretics in our times thought that it would be an honour to join the company of great thinkers for which the renunciation of their faith would prepare them. Emulation of the example of the learned held out to them the promise of an elevated status far above the general level of common men. They refused to be content with the religion followed by their ancestors. They flattered themselves with the idea that it would do them honour not to accept even truth uncritically. They failed to see that a change from one kind of intellectual bondage to another is only a self-deception, a stupidity. What position in this world of God can be baser than that of one who thinks that it is honourable to renounce the truth which is accepted on authority, and then relapses into an acceptance of falsehood which is still a matter of blind faith, unaided by independent inquiry? Such a scandalous attitude is never taken by the unsophisticated masses of men; for they have an instinctive aversion to following the example of misguided genius. Surely, their simplicity is nearer to salvation than sterile genius can be. For total blindness is less dangerous than oblique vision.[15]

Rejecting Incorrect Scientific Opinions of Religious Scholars: Judaism

Rav Yitzhak Arama vigorously endorses al-Ghazālī's stance, applying it, mutatis mutandis, to Hazal's parallel statement about the causes of eclipses: [אמרו חז"ל] בגמרא סוכה (כ"ט.) על ד' דברים מאורות לוקים על כותבי פלסתר ועל מעידי עדות שקר ועל מגדלי בהמה דקה בארץ ישראל ועל קוצצי אילנות טובות.כי פשוטו מבואר הביטול. ורש"י כתב שם בסמוך על מאמר הדומה לו אשר אזכרנו עוד. לא שמעתי טעם הדבר. ואמר זה לפי שפשוטו שקר מבואר. שהרי הלקיות הם מחוייבים שיחולו ברגע היום ההוא או הלילה היוצא על פי חשבון תנועת גלגלי המאורות הידוע משערי החכמה ההוא. ואינן נתלים בחטאת האדם וזכיותיו. ואין מתנאי התורני לקבל שקרים מפורסמים ולהעמיד דמיונות לקיים פשט דברי הנביאים או החכמים. וזה הענין בעצמו כתבו החכם אל"גזלי בתחלת ספר הפלת הפלוסופים על מה שטענו על מאמר נמצא מפי מניח דת הישמעאלים. וזה נוסחו. השמש והירח הם שני אותות מאותות הקל יתברך שאינן לוקין רק בסבת מות אחר חיותו. וכאשר תראו אותו גורו לכם והחזיקו בתפלה וזכרון הקלעד כאן. וכבר היה זה המאמר לסבה שאמרנו לשמצה בקמיהם. אמר זה לשונו. ומי שחשב שהויכוח בבטל את זה הוא מן האמונה כבר נשתגע באמונה ונחלש ענינו. לפי שאלו הענינים כבר עמדו עליהם המופתים ההנדסיים המספריים וכו': ואמר מי שיפקפק בהם לומר שהוא כנגד התורה לא יפקפק רק בתורה. וההזק הנמשך לתורה במי שעיין בה שלא כדרכה יהיה רב מההזק הנמשך ממי שיטעון ויחלוק עליה כדרכה: והנה זה הוא כמי שיאמר שהאויב[16] המשכיל הוא טוב מהאוהב הכסיל עד כאן דבריו: ואנו צריכין לקבל האמת ממי שאמרו ולדעת שאין כוונת הדברים האלה למניחיהן כפשוטן. רק להורות בהם ענינים נכבדים על דרך הרמז יושגו למעיינים בהם בדברים יש קצת יחס להם עם נגליהם:[17]Indeed, Rav Arama is so enamored of al-Ghazālī's clarion call  that he approvingly invokes it once again, in the context of the problematic passage in the Torah implying that rainbows are special signs from God, and not purely naturalistic phenomena:[18]הנה הרמב"ן ז"ל נתפרסם מגדולי המאמינים וכתב על ברית הקשת ז"ל. ואנחנו על כרחנו נאמין לדברי היונים שמלהט השמש באויר הלח יהיה הקשת בתולדת כי בכלי מים לפני השמש יראה כמראה הקשת וכאשר נסתכל עוד בלשון הכתוב נבין כך. כי יאמר את קשתי נתתי בענן ולא אמר אני נותן כאשר אמר זאת אות הברית אשר אני נותן. ומלת קשתי תורה שהיתה לו הקשת תחלה. עכ"ל.הנה הודה בהכרח על האמת המפורסם מהנסיון וגם אשר יאמתהו הנביא באומרו כמראה הקשת אשר יהיה בענן ביום הגשם (יחזקאל א') כמו שאמרנו בספקות והוא המוסר הישר אשר כתבנו בפתיחה מפי החכם בספר ההפלה שכתב על ענין הלקיות מהנזק המגיע אל התורה מהליץ בעדה שלא כדרכה ממה שיחלוק עליה כדרכה.[19]

Captain James Cook's Tahitian Expedition

Here is Rav Pinhas Eliyahu Horowitz of Vilna's vivid and picturesque account of the predictability of eclipses:ואני ראיתי אשר נעשה תחת השמים לקוי [השמש] על ידי הלבנה ב' פעמים א' בק"ק האג אשר במדינת (האלאנד) ואחד בק"ק ווילנא אשר במדינת (ליטא) עיר מולדתי,[20]I do not know which eclipses he is referring to, but he now discusses the Transit of Venus of 1769, which was accurately predicted years in advance by astronomers at “the University” in England:גם היה בימי לקוי שמש פעם אחת על ידי כוכב נוגה הנקרא (פענוס) שעבר לפני השמש כנקודה קטנה שחורה ועגולה, כי כמו הירח לא יאיר אלא כשהוא לנוכח השמש אבל כשהוא תחת השמש הוא חשוך כן מראה הנוגה חשוך כשהיא תחת השמש אף על פי שהוא יפה מאד כשהוא לנגד השמש,וזה הלקוי היה מפורסם בעולם בטרם היותה זמן רב. כי חכמי התכונה בבית מדרש החכמה הנקרא (אוניווערזיטעט) אשר (בענגלאנד) חקרו וחשבו מהלכי כוכבי לכת ומצאו שעתיד לבא עת ידוע אשר יעבור נוגה את פני חמה וכתבו זה בספר כמה שנים קודם שכך יקרה בעת ההיא ויהיה נראה במדינה זו בזו השעה, ובמדינה זו בזו השעה וכאשר כתבו כן נראה בכל מדינה ומדינה באותה שעה ממש,He proceeds to describe Captain James Cook's first voyage to Tahiti in “a mighty ship” (the celebrated bark HMS Endeavour) to observe the Transit:ולכן בשנה שלפניה נסעו הרבה בני שרים וחורי ארץ ממדינת (ענגלאנד) למדינה רחוקה מאוד מעבר לים בצי אדיר מהלך שנה תמימה היא אי אחת מאיי הים הנקרא (אטעהייטע) אשר במדינת (אמעריקא) לראות שם הנהיה הדבר הזה באותה מדינה כשאר כתבו ואיש כלי מחזה בידו וכלים המגדלים את הראות אשר כל אדם חזו בו היטב, הן המה כלי ההבטה הנקראים (פערען גלעזער) אשר המציאו חכמי (דיאפטיקא), ויהי כאשר באו שמה יום אחד לפני היום המוגבל הכינו את אשר הביאו מאותן הכלים במקום ידוע למען יעמדו ויהיו נכונים ליום מחר לראות על ידם הלקוי ההוא, ובלילה ההוא גנבו אנשי הארץ ההיא הכלים ההם מן המקום ההוא גנבו וגם כחשו, וכמעט היה בחנם כל נסיעתם וטרחתם, ועל ידי השתדלות רב החזירו להם, וכאשר פתרו כן היה נראה שמה גם כן לקוי חמה מנוגה נגדו ובאותה שעה אשר כתבו לא נפל דבר מכל אשר כתבו:The instrument stolen by the locals was apparently actually a quadrant, not a telescope:Used for fixing longitude from the stars with a 19 mm diameter objective and focal length of 330 mm and radius arm of 300 mm this instrument was stolen by the locals who thought it must have great powers because it was moved around in a wooden box and guarded with a sentry.it was recovered, attempts had been made to pull it to pieces but it was put back together again some would say that it had lost its original alignment and accuracy. The counter weight hanging at the left hand side was immersed in water to dampen any vibrations that might occur during observations. A mahogany tripod was used to support the quadrant when used on location around Tahiti.[The above is taken from here; see the page for the photographs of the instrument.]R. Horowitz then claims that the ability to retrodict eclipses enables us to refute a Chinese claim that the earth is much older than the Biblical five millenniums believed by the Europeans:ואל תתמה על החפץ כי אף גם כל לקות החמה והלבנה יחשבו החכמים יודעי העתים מקודם כאשר מחשבים את המולד ואת התקופה העתידה לבא, וכמו כן נוכל לחשוב עתה כל הלקות למפרע הפונה קדים (א פאסטריארי) לדעת הלקות אשר היו מימי קדם כי על חשבון צדק יהלך {הלקות} החמה או הלבנה יחשב לו כפי שניו אשר היה מחויב להיות אז כאשר נוכל לחשוב כל המולדות והתקופות למפרע עד התחלת הבריאה וראשית היצירה.ועל ידי תחבולות חכמה זו נצחו חכמי (אירופא) לתושבי ארץ (חינא) האומרים העולם הזה כבר עברו עליו אלפים רבבות שנים באמרם כי כן נמצא כתוב על ספר דברי הימים שלהם כמה רבבות מלכים אשר מלכו בארצם זה אחר זה וכמה שנים מלך כל אחד וכמה מלחמות עשה וכל הקורות אותו וכל לקוי חמה ולבנה אשר היו בימיו.וחכמי (אירופא) נתנו עיניהם בלקות חמה ולבנה הנמצא כתוב אצלם בחשבון חשבו עליהם ובדקו אחריהם בעיון יפה על פי חשבון האמיתי דרך הקדים למפרע ומצאו כל הלקות אשר מפאת קדמה עד ראשית הבריאה המפורסם אצלנו ואצל כל גויי הארצות הכל אמת צדקו יחדו, ואשר שם ולמעלה ההולך קדמה הבריאה לא מצאו אפילו אחד בהם שבא בעתו ובזמנו הראוי לו על פי החשבון, וזה לנו האות אשר פיהם דבר שוא בכל שארי הדברים והקורות מימי קדם קדמתה גם כן, וכל הנמצא כתוב על ספר שלהם דברי כזב הם והכל שקר כי לא היה ולא נברא עדיין העולם, ונחזיק טובה לחכמי (אירופא) אשר במזימות זו חשבו ודידן נצח, כי אין מעשה וחשבון ודעת אחר בכל ספרי הבל שלהם אשר מראש מקדמי ארץ שנוכל לברר השקר נגד פניהם כמו ענין הלקות והוא בנין אב לכל שאר דבריהם כי הכל הבל, וכל ענין ומספר לפי רוב השנים קדמוניות אשר בידם ירושה אינם אלא במוחם החלושה.וזה הלקוי על ידי נוגה היה בשנת תקכ"ט לפ"ק.I do not know exactly what Chinese records he is referring to, but here's Wikipedia's discussion of historical eclipses:Historical eclipses are a valuable resource for historians, in that they allow a few historical events to be dated precisely, from which other dates and a society's calendar may be deduced. Aryabhata (476–550) concluded the Heliocentric theory in solar eclipse. A solar eclipse of June 15, 763 BCE mentioned in an Assyrian text is important for the Chronology of the Ancient Orient. Also known as the eclipse of Bur Sagale, it is the earliest solar eclipse mentioned in historical sources that has been identified successfully. Perhaps the earliest still-unproven claim is that of archaeologist Bruce Masse asserting on the basis of several ancient flood myths, which mention a total solar eclipse, he links an eclipse that occurred May 10, 2807 BCE with a possible meteor impact in the Indian Ocean. There have been other claims to date earlier eclipses, notably that of Mursili II (likely 1312 BCE), in Babylonia, and also in China, during the Fifth Year (2084 BCE) of the regime of Emperor Zhong Kang of Xia dynasty, but these are highly disputed and rely on much supposition.

A Famous, Pseudepigraphic Aphorism

al-Ghazālī

Incidentally, in that same Introduction al-Ghazālī cites this purported aphorism of Aristotle: This is Aristotle, who refuted all his predecessors – including his own teacher, whom the philosophers call the divine Plato. Having refuted Plato, Aristotle excused himself by saying: "Plato is dear to us. And truth is dear, too. Nay, truth is dearer than Plato."

Ibn Janah and Rav Zerahiah Ha'Levi

Educated medieval Jews were also familiar with this aphorism; a version of it even appears in the introduction to the Sefer Ha'Meoros, where Rav Zerahiah Ha'Levi, in the course of his gathering numerous sources in justification of his temerity in disputing some positions of Rif, notes that Rav Yonah (Abu-l-walīd Marwān) Ibn Janah marshals the aphorism in defense of his boldness in dissenting from aspects of the grammar of his revered predecessor Rav Yehudah (Abu Zakariyya Yahya ibn Dawūd) Ibn Hayyuj: וזה המנהג נהגו כל חכמי העולם כמו שכתב החכם המורה אבן גנא"ח בהשיבו על המורה הגדול בעל הדקדוק רבי יהודה ז"ל הזכיר דברי הפילוסוף שהשיב על רבו ואמרריב לאמת עם אפלטון ושניהם אהובנו אך האמת אהוב יותר[21]

Rav Yosef Kimhi

Versions of the aphorism also appear at least twice in the writing of Rav Yosef Kimhi (Rikam, surnamed Maistre Petit): ואמר פילוסוף אחד בהשיבו על אפלטון ראש החכמים אמר האמת ואפלטון שניהם אהובינו והאמת יותר חביבנו[22]ענה חכם בלבבו בר, בחלקו על דברחכמה ומדע, ותט לו אוזן והוא נדיבנוכי האמת אהוב ונחמד ורצוי, ואפלטוןגדול ורב ומאד צורב, גם הוא אהובינו,משפט שניהם נבחרה לנו, אך האמת יותר חביבנו:[23]Answer the wise in a fair, honest way when they discuss a matter with knowledge and wisdom; give ear to such, and they will become thy benefactors, for truth is a thing to be loved, desired, and received with favor; and even though our friend be a Plato, great and exalted, and renowned for his learning, the right of our judgment we claim in the matter of truth, for Truth is to us a friend dearer by far than aught.[24]These citations by Rav Zerahiah and Rav Kimhi are discussed by Prof. Howard Jacobson, in a brief JQR note,[25] in which he actually implies that Rav Zerahiah's citation of Ibn Janah is more complete than the defective extant text of the latter's Kitab al-Mustalḥaḳ, in which the aphorism apparently appears.[26]The Canadian folklorist Yehudah Leib Zlotnick (Avida) has an article on this aphorism in his מדרש המליצה העברית אמרי חכמה ואמרי אנשי, in which he collects numerous citations of versions of it by various Jewish authors, and he goes so far as to claim that: הננו רואים כי זהו מאמר מהמפורסמים ביותר אצלנו, אבל הנוסחאות שונות ומענינות[27]Here are some of the sources he mentions:

Rashba

ולא עוד, אלא שאף מצד החקירה אין לנו לדון לבטל דבר שחקירת חכם מן החכמים מחייב בטולו, אם יש בידינו קבלה על קיומו. ולמה נסמוך על חקירת החכם ההוא, ואולי חקירתו כוזבת מצד מיעוט ידיעתו בעניין ההוא. ואולי אם יעמוד חכם ממנו, יגלה סתירת דבריו וקיום מה שסתר, וכמו שקרה לחכמים שקדמו לאפלטון עם אפלטון. ושקרה לאפלטון עם ארסטו תלמידו הבא אחריו, ואמר שיש ריב לאמת עמו. ואיני אומר שנסמוך על הדין הזה להכזיב כל מה שיאמר כל חכם, כי אילו אמרנו כן היה כסילות באמת. אך אני אומר: במקום שיש מצווה או אפילו קבלה, אין מדין האמת לבטל הקבלה מפני דברי החכם ההוא, מן הצד הזה שאמרתי.[28]

Menasseh Ben Israel

מודעת זאת בכל הארץ שירמיה הנביא אחר שנבא ארבעים שנה ונחרב הבית הלך לו לארץ מצרים ועמד שם שנים רבות עד יום מותו וממנו קבל אפלטון רוב חכמתו כאשר חכמי היונים מעידים. וכן תראה שרוב דרכיו דרכי נועם וכל נתיבותיו שלום עם חכמי האמת והצדק. ובפרט בדברו על עסקי הנפש יחשוב שיש לנשמה צורות רשומות שעל ידיהן היא לומדת. כי הלמוד אצלו אינו רק הזכרה מה ששכח מיום היותה על האדמה. ואחריו בא תלמידו ארסטו ולהראות שחכמתו גדולה משלו ולהגדיל תפארתו בעיני העמים וששומעו ילך בכל הארצות חלק עליו בכל תוקף ואמר. אהוב אפלטון אהוב סוקרט אבל יותר אהובה האמת. …[29]Regarding the claim that Plato learned his wisdom from Yirmiyahu, see R. Josh Waxman's excellent discussion of this legend.

Rav Yair Haim Bacharach

כתב ראש הפילוסופים היוני אהוב סקראט אהוב אפלטון רק האמת אהוב יותר הביאו בספר נשמת חיים מ"ב פ"י ובספר מאור עינים חלק אמרי בינה פמ"ח. ובספר בא גד פ"ד ובהקדמת ספר חזוק האמונה ובהקדמת ספר האמונות ובכמה דוכתי ובכהאי גוונא כתב ריב"ש תשובה סימן ע'.[30]

Rav Tam Ibn Yahya

הן אמת כי נפלאה אהבתי אליך וחפצתי צדקך למען תזכה בשפטך. אך האמת יותר אהובה אצלי וארשתיה לי לעולם ולא אוכל כפרה.[31]One last mention of the aphorism, by R. Horowitz, who uses it to counter what he considers excessive deference to Rambam on matters of science:ותמהני על הרבה אנשים שלדעתם כל אשר ימצאו כתוב על ספר להרמב"ם ז"ל יחשבון שהודאי כן הוא עליו אין להוסיף וממנו אין לגרוע והפכו נמנע, ולא כן אבי, אבל האמת הוא שלא בכל הענינים כיוון לאמיתו של דבר והרבה יש בדבריו אשר הפכם הוא האמת כאשר כתבו שרים רבים ונכבדים מחכמי ישראל בספריהם הקדושים, כמו ספר עין הקורא לר' שם טוב ברבי שם טוב ועבודת הקודש לרבי מאיר גבאי ובעל נוה שלם ואור ד' לר' חסדאי ובדומה לאלה ספרים הרבה בשם הגדולים אשר בארץ החיים, ואנכי איש רש ונקלה לפני כבודו כגרגר חרדל לפני עולם מלא גם אני וכל מאמינים שהוא ואין בלתו ואין דוגמתו ביהודה וישראל החכמה והמדע והתורה הכל יכול וכוללם יחד כי מי כמוהו מורה בדת ודין במצות התורה בכל זאת אם בספרו היד החזקה אשר לפניו תכרע כל ברך יש בו כמה דברים שלא פסקינן כמותו מכל שכן בשאר ענינים:וכבר כתב בעל גבעת המורה בהקדמת ספרו שהסיבה מה שנתאחרה הפילוסופיא להגיע אל שלמותה זמן רב היה בעבור גודל חכמת (אריסטו) ופרסומו הנפלא ועל ידי כן נמשכו כל חכמי דור ודור בעיונם זמן רב אחר דעותיו והנחותיו בחשבם החולק עליו כחולק על דבר שאין ספק באמיתו עכ"ל.ככה ממש הסיבה מה שנתאחרה האמת להגיע באומתנו זמן רב הוא בעבור שרבים חושבים כי החולק על דבר מדברי הרמב"ם ז"ל כחולק על דבר שאין ספק באמיתו, וכמעט היינו הך כי כל דבריו משפט העיון אשר לאריסטו כי הוא ז"ל הלך בעקבותיו בעיוניות כידוע, אמנם כל איש ישר הולך אוהב הרמב"ם ז"ל ואוהב האמת יותר כאשר אמר החכם אהוב אריסטו אהוב סאקראט והאמת אהוב יותר:[32]The thesis that an unhealthy reverence for Aristotle had greatly retarded European scientific progress for centuries is the premise of L. Sprague de Camp's classic science fiction alternative history / time travel short story Aristotle and the Gun:Speculating that small changes in past history might have profound consequences on the present day world, scientist Sherman Weaver appropriates an experimental time machine to project himself back to the era of Philip II of Macedon. There he hopes to meet Aristotle, his belief being that the influential ancient philosopher's lack of interest in such had retarded scientific progress through much of subsequent history. Equipped with modern-day marvels and pretending to be a conventional traveler from India, which he represents as their source, he attempts to demonstrate to his new acquaintance the value of experimentation in the furtherance of knowledge.The Aphorism's Actual Provenance

Although the actual aphorism does not actually appear in any of Aristotle's writings, Prof. Henry Guerlac (bio: PDF)) has suggested that "there is more than a grain of truth" in the association of the aphorism with Aristotle, and he notes that Aristotle himself is "indebted to Plato … for the idea":

Indeed the aphorism has sometimes been associated with Aristotle himself; and in this there is more than a grain of truth: while it does not appear verbatim in any of Aristotle's works, the proverb is a succinct paraphrase of a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle, discussing the Idea of Form of the universal Good, remarks that the inquiry "is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.Aristotle is, in fact, indebted to Plato, the inventor of the Forms, for the idea expressed in that passage. In the Republic (X, 595) Plato has Socrates arguing that poetry is dangerous to the state, and remarking Although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer … for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out. Again, in the Phaedo, Socrates says: This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates. But clearly we are far from having the sentiment compressed into an aphorism. …[33]See the rest of Guerlac's paper, summarized here, for the various medieval sources of the aphorism, its classical antecedents, and its appearances in the literature of the medieval period and subsequent ones.[1]              יבמות פ: – קשר[2]              שולחן ערוך אה"ע סימן ד' סעיף י"ד[3]              The degree of improbability is the matter of some dispute: see Ozar Ha'Poskim 7:46:1.[4]              בית הבחירה, יבמות דף פ' ע"ב ד"ה וגלגלו בה מעשה באשה שהלך בעלה למדית הים[5]              יוסף אומץ סימן צ"ד אות ג' – קשר[6]              7:43:4[7]              חלקת מחוקק שם ס"ק י[8]              בית שמואל שם ס"ק י"ז[9]              7:48:5-6.  See also the suggestion of Rav Meir Posner (published in Resp. Rabbi Akiva Eiger I:100, cited in Pis'he Teshuvah EH 11:11) that one can plead קים לי according to this view.[10]              אמרות טהורות חיצוניות ופנימיות (ירושלים תשסו), מילואים מאמר ו[11]              Notes 147 and 166.[12]              This description of the Mitpahas Sefarim is from the Jewish Encyclopedia entry on Rav Emden by Max Seligsohn and Solomon Schechter.[13]              Mitpahas Sefarim (Altona 1768), Part I Chapter 4 #24 – link.[14]              Tahafut Al Falasifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers) (Pakistan Philosophical Congress: 1963 – Lahore), translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Preface Two, pp. 6-8, available here: (PDF).[15]              ibid. pp. 2-3.[16]              בנדפס "שהאוהב", והיא טעות מוחלטת, כמובן, וכמבואר במקור באל"גזלי כנ"ל. ונראה שנתחלף להמהדיר "אויב" ב "אוהב"[17]              עקידת יצחק, מבוא שערים בשם ד', עמודים י"ט: – כ. – קשר[18]              See the exegesis of Ibn Ezra, Commentary to Genesis, 9:14 – link, and Ramban, Commentary to Genesis, ibid.link, (a portion of which is cited by Rav Arama). It is ironic that Ramban is the one who is convinced here of the correctness of the naturalistic explanation of the Greek scholars, while Ibn Ezra, usually seen as the greater rationalist, hedges.  See also R. Pinhas Eliyahu Horowitz's discussion in his Sefer Ha'Bris (see below) Section I Essay 10 Chapter 12.[19]              עקידת יצחק, שער ארבעה עשר (פרשת נח), עמוד קכו: – קשר[20]              ספר הברית (ירושלים תש"ן) חלק א' מאמר ד' שני המאורות פרק י"ב ד"ה ואני ראיתי. דפוס ראשון (ברין תקנ"ז): קשר. הקטע בענין הויכוח עם "חינא" לא נמצא שם, וכנראה שהוא מההוספות במהדורה השניה.[21]              הקדמה לספר המאורות[22]              ספר הגלוי, הקדמה עמוד 2 – קשר[23]              שקל הקודש, #254 – קשר[24]              Translation of Professor Hermann Golancz – link.[25]              "A Note on Joseph Qimkhi's "Sefer Ha-Galuy"", The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 85, No. 3/4 (Jan. – Apr., 1995), pp. 413-414 – link.[26]              See fn. 2, ibid.[27]              מדרש המליצה העברית – אמרי חכמה ואמרי אנשי, עמוד 18 – קשר[28]              שו"ת הרשב"א חלק א' סימן ט' – קשר. הרבה מתשובה זו מועתקת פה[29]              נשמת חיים מאמר שני ריש פרק י' – קשר[30]              שו"ת חות יאיר ריש סימן ט' –קשר[31]              תומת ישרים / אהלי תם – קשר[32]              ספר הברית שם מאמר ב' חוג שמים פרק ו' ד"ה ותמהני[33]              Henry Guerlac, "Amicus Plato and Other Friends", Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1978), pp. 627-633 – link. I am indebted to Mississippi Fred Macdowell for providing me with a copy of the article.