Mikva Revisited – Understanding Shabbat 13a-b in light of Parshat Metzora

Mikva Revisited –

Understanding
Shabbat 13a-b in light of Parshat Metzora

by Chaim Sunitsky
(with some additional comments by Marc B. Shapiro)

It is well known that when
describing the purification of niddah and zava the Torah does not explicitly
mention that immersion is required.[1]
The present article will briefly examine the proofs given for such an immersion
and show a novel understanding of a story brought in the Talmud (Shabbat
13a-b).

There are 5 most commonly brought
proofs for mikva immersion. Three are brought in Tosafot (Hagiga 11a
s.v. lo nitzrecha, Yevamot 47b s.v. bimakom and Yoma
78a mikan), one in Rambam (Isurey Biah 4:3), one in Ramban (Shabbat
13b s.v. bimey and in his Chumash commentary Vayikra 15:11). One of
Tosafot’s proofs is in the Gemara itself (Shabbat 64b): “and she shall
remain in her niddah status”. The earlier sages used to understand this to mean
that a woman during her menstruation should not use makeup or wear nice clothes[2]
until R. Akiva came and said that this way he will divorce her[3]
and explained rather that she shall be niddah until she immerses. Needless to
say, there is no direct proof of immersion in this statement.[4]

Tosafot (ibid) bring an
additional proof from newly obtained vessels after the war with Midian, where
according to Hazal’s understanding they required immersion as the Torah states
(Bamidbar 31:23): “the waters of niddah”, seemingly implying that niddah needs
an immersion too.[5] The simple
meaning of the Torah in this verse is that water with ashes of “red cow” had to
be sprinkled on these vessels.[6]
Indeed there is an understanding based on Rambam[7]
that immersing new vessels is not Deoraita at all.

The third proof of the Tosafot in
the name of a Gaon[8] is from the
fact that even those that touched a bed of niddah need to immerse to become
pure, how much more so niddah herself. However, this would only at best prove
that a niddah needs to immerse in order not to cause ritual impurity to spread
on the objects[9].

Ramban’s proof that immersion is
required is based on the case of a male zav.[10]
The problem with this is that zav requires immersion in “mayim chaim” (a
natural source of water) whereas a niddah can immerse even in regular mikva
made from snow or rain water.[11]
Rambam’s proof is that all purifications require immersion so it must be that
niddah does too,[12] though the
verse he uses as a proof is also talking about ritual purity and not
necessarily implying any marital prohibition.[13]

After we see that there is no
conclusive proof that the immersion of niddah is a Biblical law, we may gain a
better understanding of a story in the Talmud (Shabbat 13a-b, Avot
Derabbi Natan, 2). It tells us that a certain rabbinical student used to
sleep in one bed[14] with his
wife after her seven days of niddah were over until she counted the “seven
clean days” and went to the mikva. The implication seems to be that after the
Biblical period of seven days the prohibition is only Rabbinical.[15]
The Rishonim are quite surprised at this as there is absolutely no relaxation[16]
of the prohibition for a woman who is niddah after the seven days are over as
she remains biblically prohibited to her husband until she immerses in the
mikva. Some Rishonim therefore suppose that the minhag at that time was for a
woman to go to the mikva twice, once in the end of the seven days of niddah and
one at the end of “seven clean days”. However according to what we wrote it is
possible that this student thought that the entire immersion in the mikva is
also rabbinical in nature and therefore was more lenient once the Biblical
seven days were over.[17]

* * *

I sent this post to Marc Shapiro
and here are his comments:

See Shem Tov’s
commentary on Maimonides, Guide 3:47, where he has a radical view that
according to Maimonides immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic. R. Kafih, in
his commentary on the Guide, ibid., is outraged by Shem Tov’s comment:

ראה
שם טוב ששאל “ומה יאמר הרב בטבילת זבה ונדה במים קרים בסתיו”, והמשיך
בדברי הבל שאסור לשמען שכאלו דעת רבנו שטבילת נדה וזבה מדרבנן. וחלילה חלילה.

R. Kafih continues by explaining why Shem Tov is
mistaken and concludes:

והארכתי מפני שכבר הטעה את קלי
הדעת

In his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, Sefer
Kedushah, vol. 1, p. 184, R. Kafih returns to this matter:

והבל
יפצה פיהו של בעל שם טוב מפרש המורה, בח”ג פרק מז שכאלו סובר רבנו שטבילת נדה
דרבנן, וענה גם כאן שקר ברבנו ותלה בו מה שלא אמר ולא עלתה על לבו חלילה

The matter you discuss in your post also concerned
R. Solomon Zvi Schueck. In his Torah Shelemah, vol. 2, p. 129b, he
prefaces his discussion as follows:

ורבים
מגדולי הראשונים והאחרונים (עיי’ תורה תמימה במקומו) עמדו להקשות וכי עיקר גדול
כטבילת נדה שקדושת ישראל תלוי בה לא תמצא בתורה רק ברמז דק וקל. ועוד מקשים, כפי
משמעות הגמרא בשבת הנ”ל דרשו זקנים הראשונים מן והדוה בנדתה רק שלא תכחול ולא
תתקשט הנדה בימי נדותה, אכן לא שנלמוד טבילת נדה במי מקוה, עד שבא רע”ק ולימד
בנדתה תהא עד שתבא במים, וכי עד רבי עקיבה לא טבלו?

See R. Schueck’s extended discussion as it is
quite interesting, even though it is complete speculation.

You cite Halakhot Gedolot, Hilkhot Niddah,
no. 41 (p. 439 in the Machon Yerushalayim edition), that the law of immersion
for a niddah is rabbinic:

זב וזבה טבילתן מדאוריתא, נדה
מדרבנן היא

This is a well-known passage that has been
discussed. Let me just make three comments.

1. See Teshuvot u-Fesakim me’et Hakhmei
Ashkenaz ve-Tzarfat, ed. Kupfer (Jerusalem, 1973), no. 158, p. 246 which
states:

ובהלכות גדולות פוסק טבילת
נידה דרבנן ושרא להו מרייהו

2. R. David Zvi Rotstein points out that the
Karaites were very stringent regarding niddah, and therefore it is possible
that the Behag’s comment, that the law of immersion for a niddah is only
rabbinic, does not reflect is true viewpoint but was only directed against the
Karaites. See Ohel Sarah Leah (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 638 in the note. As
far as I am concerned, this makes absolutely no sense. If something is a
rabbinic prohibition, and the Karaites were arguing that it is unnecessary,
then I can understand a rabbinic figure (falsely) stating that the matter in
question is a Torah law, in order to shore up observance. (I discuss this in my
new book.) But what sense does it make to do this in the reverse, i.e.,
declaring that something is only rabbinic because the Karaites took it as a
Torah law?

3. This view of Halakhot Gedolot is
mentioned in Besamim Rosh, no. 175. Here it is attributed to R. Yehudai
Gaon. As Saul Berlin explains in Kasa de-Harsana, some rishonim assumed
that R. Yehudai authored Halakhot Gedolot.

The case in Besamim Rosh deals with a man who
would publicly hug and kiss his wife even though she was a niddah. The rabbi
who wrote to “R. Asher” did not place the man in herem, and one of his reasons
was that the law of immersion of a niddah is only rabbinic, and therefore since
the man was not violating a Torah prohibition “better an unwitting sinner than
a willful sinner.” “R. Asher” rejects this position and thus on the surface
this responsum might appear quite pious. But as with a number of other responsa
in Besamim Rosh, what the forger Saul Berlin has done is put the radical
view in the public eye, even if in the end “R. Asher” rejects it. From this
responsum people will see that there is an argument to be made for not being
strict with the laws of niddah, since after all, they are only rabbinic. In his
reply “R. Asher” also mentions that many am ha’aratzim are more stringent when
it comes to the laws of niddah than the scholars. I see this too as an attempt
by Berlin to subvert traditional Judaism by making it seem as if the common
practices regarding the laws of niddah are based on ignorance.