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Sefer HaNer on Mesechet Bava Kamma

Sefer HaNer on Mesechet Bava Kamma: A Review
by:Rabbi Yosaif Mordechai Dubovick

Not every important work written by a Rishon is blessed with popularity.[1] While many texts were available throughout the generations and utilized to their utmost; others were relegated to obscurity, being published as recently as this century, or even this year. Nearly a month doesn’t pass without a “new” Rishon being made available to the public, and often enough in a critical edition. While each work must be evaluated on its own merit, as a whole, every commentary, every volume of Halachic rulings adds to our knowledge and Torah study.[2]          From the Geonic era through the Rishonim, North Africa was blessed with flourishing Torah centers, Kairouan in Tunisia (800-1057),[3] Fostat (Old Cairo) in Egypt, and many smaller cities as well. Perhaps the crown jewel of “pre-Rambam” Torah study was the sefer Hilchot Alfasi by R’ Yitchock Alfasi (the Rif).[4] Many Rishonim focused their novella around the study of Rif,[5] the Rambam taught Rif in lieu of Talmud,[6] and a pseudo-Rashi and Tosefot were developed to encompass the texts used and accompany its study.[7]

In Aghmat, a little known city in Morocco, circa the Rambam’s lifetime, rose up a little known Chacham whose work is invaluable in studying Rif, and by correlation, the Talmud Bavli as a whole. Yet, this Chacham was unheard of, for the most part, until the past half century. R’ Zechariya b. Yehuda of Aghmat, authored a compendium of Geonim, Rishonim, and personal exegesis on Rif. Spanning a period of 200 years of Talmud commentary of the first order, this work was also unique in its approach. Various editors have justly compared it to a work of similar nature and provenance, Shittah Mikubetzet by R. Betzalel Ashkenazi.

However, this source of Talmudic material from an almost blank period remained unknown until HaRav Prof. Simha Assaf published several leaves on Mesechet Berachot.[8] This followed by a semi-critical edition of a complete manuscript, by Meir David Ben-Shem bearing its rightful title, Sefer HaNer.[9] Later, J. Leveen published a facsimile version of a manuscript in the British Museum[10] on the three “Bavot” along with an English preface, indexes and a brief critique of Ben-Shem’s edition of Berachot. Since, many articles have been written about the work[11] and the Torah world has been blessed to see several volumes in print.

To date we are in possession of Sefer HaNer on Berachot,[12] Shabbat,[13] Eruvin, Moed Katan[14] and Mesechet Nezikin; namely the three Bavot.[15] In general, R’ Zechariah complied his work from the following sources, most of which were unknown as a work, and sometimes even the author was unknown. These Pirushim include Geonim; Rav Hai in particular, Rabbeinu Chananel,[16] R’ Yosef ibn Migash, R’ Baruch Sefardi (RB”S),[17] R’ Yitzchok Ghiyyat, Rav Natan author of Sefer ha Aruch, Rashi,[18] Rambam,[19] as well as material of unknown authorship.[20] Further, a notable portion of the material is in Judeo-Arabic of that period, including Geonic response and commentary, citations from R”Y ibn Migash, the Rambam’s commentary on Mishnah, and even short remarks within other commentaries as well. Accurately translating the material is a handicap, limiting the sefer’s use, and perhaps played a part in its falling into disuse at the decline of a Judeo-Arabic speaking Talmudist audience. [Much like the loss of many (non-translated) Judeo-Arabic Geonic works over time].          Recently, a new edition of HaNer on Mesechet Bava Kamma has been published; this article will attempt a comparison between the two printed editions, focus remaining upon the newer edition. While parts of the material of the manuscript (British Museum OR 10013) have been utilized in the past,[21] never has the manuscript been published as a whole, with critical notes. In 5761, as a part of Ohel Yeshayahu, a compilation of works on B”K, R. Hillel Mann published the relevant portion of Sefer HaNer from this manuscript. While this edition was surprisingly accurate to the mss. (the facsimile published by Leveen is available on Otzar HaChochmah), his notes are exceptionally lacking, with only the barest citation to what could be best described as “yeshivishe reid“; the common knowledge on the topic as discussed in the Yeshivot of today. Certainly not the optimal choice when editing and annotating a work based on Geonic and early Rishonic material, with many variant readings in the Talmud, as well novel commentaries hitherto unutilized.

Upon perusal of this edition, one cannot help but notice that in sharp contrast to the remaining nine chapters, the first chapter seems well edited, and the material in the footnotes is richer. The answer to this oddity is found in Mann’s preface; in 5752, an article containing a critical edition of the first perek was published by R’ Yehoshua Hutner of Machon Talmud Yisraeli[22]. This material had been meticulously edited by R’ Dov Havlin shlit”a and R’ Yosef haKohen Klien ob”m. Mann made use of the extensive notes, gleaned what he felt valuable, and ignored what he deemed he could.[23] According to Mann, R’ Tzvi Rotstein[24] copied the mss., and R’ Yosef Kafich translated the Arabic text.

Several months ago, a new edition of this work graced our tables. R’ Dov Havlin, the editor of the Talmud Yisraeli article, and his family[25] received permission to publish the work in its entirety.[26] Using the material previously assembled, and R’ Kafich’s translations, a preface was added, and the book printed. A mere glance at the first footnote to the preface shows the thoroughness and care taken when approaching a Rishon. As opposed to an “on-the-job training” attitude displayed by some authors, here the appropriate material was gathered and made use of in order to assess the task at hand.

The preface offers the uninitiated a précis of the academic papers written on R’ Zechariah, and deals with the author, his era and his works. Alongside, a chapter is devoted to R’ Baruch Sefardi, if only for the sake of providing the public exposure to Abramson’s pamphlet.[27] In one paragraph, the editor explains his decision to title the work “Shitta MiKubetzet Kadmon” although the author R’ Zechariah named it “HaNer”. I must confess I was not persuaded to concede to the change, and regret the license taken.[28]

Another liberty taken is the exclusion of the abbreviation “Pir'”, short for “Pirush”. This nomenclature has been edited out and replaced with a dash, although no mention was made of this in the preface.[29] This is not the case in the original article, and it would appear that this was done solely by the new editor(s). In addition, Arabic pieces, be they ever so brief, are replaced with the translation, and while the replacement is noted the original text is lacking. Mann’s edition reproduces the original, and relegates the translation to a footnote as the original article. By way of comparison, the original sports 261 footnotes on the first perek, the newer model, 98, and Mann’s version contains 102. Clearly, editing has been done, and while citations previously footnoted are now in the body of the text (parenthesized and font size lowered), one wonders what else has been omitted, and at what cost.[30]Diacritics found in the mss. are sorely lacking in all three editions, and HaShem’s name, typically written as three letters “yud”, is modernized to two.[31] Further, abbreviations have been expanded; Mann remained true to the text. Many of Mann’s mistaken readings are especially accurate in the new edition, yet typographical errors (as is wont) remain.As the work is based upon Rif, and collates many authorities, attempts to correlate the work to the Talmud’s present pagination is daunting. Many times R’ Zechariah will continue to copy a commentator, covering material spanning several folios, only to backtrack in order to begin a parallel commentary. Special attention need be given to this, and often Mann has rearranged material to fit within the parameters of one page; Havlin et al reproduce the original order.[32] The mss, while largely legible, has many additions, in different hands. Some addenda are written perpendicular to the text as marginal glossa, in a smaller hand. Mann has lost text in this fashion, as opposed to the Havlin edition wherein they are preserved. Publishing any edition of a manuscript reverts at some point to become eclectic. The editor is forced to decide on punctuation placement, and sentence/paragraph breaks, causing differing interpretations. While I cannot agree to the many changes made in the new edition,[33] this treasure trove of valuable material has now been made available to the public, and our thanks due. The text is highly accurate to the manuscript, the notes offer useful information, cross references and variant readings. This new addition to the Talmudic bookcase is most welcome, and while the implication given by the publisher that the next two meschtot are not on the agenda, may any continuation of so worthy a project be expediently brought to light.


[1] See Zohar, Bamidbar (3:134a) “everything is dependant upon fate, even the Sefer Torah in the Heichal”.

[2] See E. Soloveitchik, ‘Al Pirush Kadmon lMesechet Sukkah’, Tzfunot 18 (5752), pp 9-13. See also Prof. R’ S. Z. Havlin, Sefer Vaad lChachomim, Yerushalayim 5763, p 13-35/

[3] Home of the Yeshiva of R’ Chananel and R’ Nissim Gaon, among others. See M. Ben-Sasson, Tzemichat haKehillah haYihudit bArtzot haIslam, Yerushalayim 5757.

[4] See Ta-Shma, Sifrut Ha-parshanit le-Talmud vol. 1, Yerushalayim 5760, pg 156-159.

[5] See E. Chwat, Doctoral Dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5750. See also S. Gottesman, Yeshurun 9 (5761) and Nitzutzei Aish, Memorial Volume, (Newhouse) Israel 2004.

[6] See E. Chwat, Yeshrun 20 (5768); M.A. Friedman, Tarbiz 62 (4) (5752).

[7] Chwat ibid. see also TaShma, ‘Klitatam shel Sifrei haRif, Rach, vHalachot Gedolot bTzarfat ubAshkenaz bMaot 11 v12’ (Knesset Mechkarim 1, Yerushalayim 5764, previously, Kiryat Sefer 54 (a)). See also Prof. Shamma Yehuda Freidman, ‘MiTosefot Rashbam lRif’, Kovetz al Yad 8 (5736).

[8] S. Assaf, ‘Chelek miPirush Kadmon liMesechet Brachot liEchad miBnei Zemani shel haRambam’, in ‘L’Zichron R’ Z’ P’ Chayyes, Yerushalayim 5693.

[9] Yerushalayim, 5718 [available here at hebrewbooks]

[10] A digest of commentaries on the tractates Babah kamma, Babha mesi’a and Babha bhathera of the Babylonian Talmud, compiled by Zachariah Ben Judah Aghmati; reproduced in facsimile from the unique manuscript in the British Museum OR. 10013; edited, with an introduction by Jacob Leveen, London 1961.

[11] C. Z. Hirschburg, Tarbiz 42 (5733); Ta Shma ‘Sifrut Haparshanit’ pg 156-159.

[12] Ben-Shem ibid.

[13] S. Eidison, Yerushalayim 5770.

[14] N. Sachs, Harry Fischel Institute, Yerushalayim 5726.

[15] B”M in Kovetz Sakosah lRoshi, Bnei Brak 5763. B”B (ch. 1-3), R’ Yekutiel Cohen, Yerushalayim 5748

[16] One of the more problematic references in HaNer is to “Miktzat”, see Abramson, ‘Pirush Rav Baruch b”r Shmuel haSefardi lTalmud’, who offers a possible theory that Miktzat means R’ Chananel’s pirush “brought in part”, as opposed to “some [commentators]”, at least in some instances.

[17] See S Abramson ‘Pirush Rav Baruch b”r Shmuel haSefardi lTalmud’, Bar Ilan Annual 26-27 (YD Gilat Jubilee volume) 5754.

[18] See Y. Malchi, ‘R, Zechariah Aghmati, haIsh, Yitzirato, haParshanit, vYachasah lPirushei Rashi’, Shanan 14 (5769) pg 65-73.

[19] See Abramson, Mechkarei Talmud 3.

[20] See Abramson ‘Pirush Rav Baruch b”r Shmuel haSefardi lTalmud’.

[21] R. M.Y. Blau, Shittas HaKadmonim B”M, B”B (2 volumes) and Three Bavot. See also TaShma, Kovetz al Yad, 10.

[22] Sefer Zikaron le R’ Yitzchok Yedidyah Frankel, Tel Aviv 5752.

[23] This explains the unintelligible note no. 81, citing Rav Nissim Gaon on B”K. After searching through Prof. Abramson’s work on RN”G, the passage (then) existed only in a re-creation of RN”G based upon Prof. Abramson’s hypothesis. Comparison to the article in the Frankel volume revels not only the true source material (Abramson), but also an additional citation to Abramson’s work Inyanut (Yerushalayim 5734, p 300), wherein a fragment of RN”G is published, verifying Abramson’s earlier thesis. All this is lacking in Mann’s note, leaving the reader at a loss.

[24] Of Rif reknown. It was Rotstein who brought the fragment mentioned in the above note to Abramson, under the impression the material was Rif. Additionally, R’ Rotstein is listed translator of the Arabic material in HaNer Bava Metziea (Sakosa lRoshi). R’ Eliezer Brodt once mentioned to me in the name of R’ Shmuel Ashkenazi that R’ Rotstein was not fluent in the language and had others translate the Rif material for him. Assumedly, one can rely on the accuracy.

[25] I am not clear as to the involvement and responsibility of each party. The preface is unsigned, R’ Havlin’s daughters are credited with copying the mss. and notes, and at the close of the preface, one R’ Bunim Shwartz’s passing is lamented, being cited as with the acronymic usage of “father”. One tends to understand that R’ Havlin’s son in law was instrumental in the ultimate publishing. This is corroborated by the disclaimer on the inside of the title page.

[26] The publication was done privately, and mention of the Machon is due to having used material penned under their auspices and ownership. However, the volume does not bear the logo nor name of the Machon and carries a private publisher (HaMesorah) on the title page’s reverse.

[27] While the original publication was in the Gilat volume [see above note no.[17], Abramson re-published the article (privately?) as a pamphlet, with corrections and additional material. I have only a photocopy of it, and welcome any information towards procuring an original.

[28] Similarly is “Chochmat Betzalel“, R’ Betzalel of Rensburg, Mossad HaRav Kook. The author had titled the book “Pitchay Niddah” and the manuscript owner and publisher, R’ Maimon took the liberty of changing the name.

[29] The dash has been implemented as a punctuation tool as well; I am unclear why this was done at all.

[30] From the outset, it seems notes detailing textual emendations based on the text of the Talmud have been omitted, and the reader is required to infer from the standard “[…]” that the text has been altered with some “self-evident” basis. It is noteworthy that the editors chose to revise the text of R’ Chananel in this fashion, by use of parentheses. Even in the case where the mss. (Add. 27194) used by the Vilna Shas is identical with the print, variant readings of Rach are common between mss, and may be based upon provenance. See J. Rovner ‘An Introduction to the Commentary of Rav Hananel ben Hushiel of Kairawan of Tractate Bava Metzia, Accompanied by a Reconstruction of the Lost Commentary to the Second Part of the Tractate based upon Cairo Genizah Fragments and Citations in the Rishonim’ (1993) Ph.D.

[31] See Y. S. Spiegel, Amudim bToldot Hasefer HaIvri, vol. 2 pg 565-632.

[32] C.f. 42b. However, on 94b, Havlin transfers text as well.

[33] It escapes me the need for semi-colon usage in Talmudic text, especially enmass.




Benefits of the Internet: Besamim Rosh and its History

Benefits of the Internet: Besamim Rosh and its History
By: Dan Rabinowitz & Eliezer Brodt
    In a new series we wanted to highlight how much important material is now available online.  This, first post, illustrates the proliferation of online materials with regard to the controversy surrounding the work Besamim Rosh (“BR”). 

[We must note at the outset that recently a program has been designed by Moshe Koppel which enables one, via various mathematical algorithims, to identify documents authored by the same author. We hope, using this program, to provide a future update that will show what this program can demonstrate regarding the authorship of the BR and if indeed the Rosh authored these responsa.]

Background

    Before turning to the BR and discussing its history we need to first discuss another work.  R. Raphael Cohen the chief rabbi of triple community, Altona-Hamburg-Wansbeck (“AH”W”), [1] published a book, Torat Yekuseil, Amsterdam, 1772 regarding the laws of Yoreh DeahTorat Yekuseil is a standard commentary and is unremarkable when compared to other works of this genre.  While the book is unremarkable in and of itself, what followed is rather remarkable. 

    Some years later, in 1789, a work with the putative author listed listed as Ovadiah bar Barukh and titled Mitzpeh Yokteil [2] was published to counter R. Raphael Cohen’s Torat Yekuseil (“TY”)Mitzpeh Yokteil (“MY”), was a vicious attack both against the work TY as well as its author, R. Raphael Cohen.  R. Raphael Cohen was a well-known and well-respected Rabbi. In fact, he was the Chief Rabbi of the triple community of AH”W.  The attack against him and his work did not go unanswered.  Indeed, the beit din of Altona-Wansbeck placed the putative author, Ovadiah, and his work, under a ban.

    The Altona-Wansbeck beit din could not limit the ban to just Altona-Wansbeck as the attack in the MY was intended to embarrass R. Raphael Cohen across Europe.  Indeed, the end of the introduction to MY indicates that copies were sent to a list of thirteen prominent rabbis across Europe.  Specifically, copies were sent to the Chief Rabbis of Prague, Amsterdam, Frankfort A.M., Hanover, Bresslau, Gloga, Lissa, etc., “as well as The Universally Know Goan haHassid  R. Eliyahu from Vilna.”  Thus, the intent of the book was to diminish R. Raphael Cohen’s standing amongst his peers. 

    The Altona-Wansbeck beit din, recognizing the intent of the book, appealed to other cities courts to similarly ban the author and book MY – the ban, entitled, Pesak mi-Beit Din Tzedek, the only known extant copy was recently sold at Sotheby’s (Important Judaica, Nov. 24, 2009, lot 136).[3]
 

 
These concerns lead the ban’s proponents to the Chief Rabbi of Berlin, R. Tzvi Hirsch Berlin, and to solicit him to join the ban. Initially, it appeared that R. Tzvi Hirsch would go along with the ban.  But, as he was nearing deciding in favor of signing the ban, someone whispered in his ear the verse in Kings 2, 6:5, אהה אדני והוא שאול – which R. Tzvi Hirsch understood to be a play on the word “שאול” in the context of the verse meaning borrow, but, in this case, to be a reference to his son, Saul. That is, the real author of MY was Saul Berlin, Tzvi Hirsch’s son.  Needless to say, R. Tzvi Hirsch did not sign the ban. [4]

    Not only did he not sign the ban, he also came to his son’s defense.  Aside from the various bans that were issued, a small pamphlet of ten pages, lacking a title page, was printed against MY and Saul. [5]  Saul decided that he must respond to these attacks.  He published Teshuvot ha-Rav. . . Saul le-haRav [] Moshe  Yetz,[6] which also includes a responsum from R. Tzvi Hirsch, Saul’s father.  Saul defends himself arguing that rabbinic disagreement, in very strong terms, has a long history.  Thus, a ban is wholly inappropriate in the present case. 

    R. Tzvi Hirsch explained that while MY disagreed with R. Cohen, there is nothing wrong with doing so.  The author of MY, as a rabbi – Saul was, at the time, Chief Rabbi of Frankfort – Saul is entitled to disagree with other rabbis.  Of course, Saul’s name is never explicitly mentioned. Moreover, in the course of R. Tzvi Hirsch’s defense he solicits the opinions of other rabbis, including R. Ezekiel Landau.  R. Landau, as well as others, noted that aside from the propriety of disagreement within Judaism, the power of any one particular beit din is limited by geography.  Thus, the Altona-Wansbeck’s beit din‘s power is limited to placing residents of Hamburg under a ban but not residents of Berlin, including R. Saul Berlin, the author of MY.[7]

    The controversy surrounding the MY was not limited to Jewish audiences. The theater critic, H.W. Seyfried, published in his German newspaper, Chronik von Berlin, translations of the relevant documents and provided updates on the controversy.  Seyfried agitated on behalf of the maskilim and editorlized that the Danish government should take actions against R. Cohen. It appears, however, that Seyfried’s pleas were not acted upon.[8] 

The Publication of Besamim Rosh


    With this background in mind, we can now turn to the Besamim Rosh.  Prior to publishing the full BR, in 1792, Saul Berlin published examples of the responsa and commentary found in the BR – a prospectus, Arugat ha-Bosem.  This small work whose purpose was to solicit subscribers for the ultimate publication of BR. It appears that while Saul may have been trying for significant rabbinic support, the majority of his sponsors were householders. 

    In 1793, the BR was published.  The BR contains 392 responsa (besamim equals 392) from either R. Asher b. Yeheil (Rosh) (1259-1327) or his contemporaries.  This manuscript belonged to R. Yitzhak di Molina who lived during the same time period as R. Yosef Karo, the author of Shulchan Orakh.  Additionally, Saul appended a commentary of his own to these responsa, Kasa de-Harshana

    The BR contains two approbations, one from R. Tzvi Hirsch Berlin and the other from R. Yehezkel Landau.  R. Landau’s approbation first explains that Rosh’s responsa need no approbation.  With regard to R. Saul Berlin’s commentary, he too doesn’t need an approbation according to R. Landau.  This is so because R. Saul’s reputation is well-known.  R. Landau’s rationale, R. Saul’s fame, appears a bit odd in light of the fact that among some (many?) R. Saul’s reputation was very poor due to the MY. 

    R. Tzvi Hirsch’s approbation also contains an interesting assertion. Saul’s father explains that this book should put to rest any lingering question regarding his son.    

    In addition to the approbations there are two introductions, one from di Molina and the other from Saul. Di Molina explained the tortured journey of the manuscript. He explains that, while in Alexandria, he saw a pile of manuscripts that contained many responsa from Rosh that had never before been published. He culled the unpublished ones and copied and collected them in this collection.  What is worthy of noting is that throughout the introduction di Molina repeatedly asks “how does the reader know these responsa are genuinely from Rosh.” 

    R. Saul, in his introduction, first notes that the concept of including introductions is an invention long after Rosh, and is not found amongst any of the Rishonim. 

    As mentioned previously, the BR is a collection of 392 responsa mostly from Rosh or his contemporaries.  Additionally, R. Saul wrote his own commentary on these responsa, Kasa diHarshena. [9]  This commentary would contain the first problem for Saul and the BR.  In responsum 40, Rosh discusses the position of Rabbenu Tam with regard to shaving during the intermediate days (ho ha-moad).  While Rosh ultimately concludes that one is prohibited from shaving on hol ha-moad, R. Saul, in his commentary, however, concludes that shaving on hol ha-moad is permissible.  In so holding, R. Saul recognized that this position disagreed with that of his father.  Almost immediately after publication, R. Saul printed a retraction regarding this position allowing for shaving on hol ha-mo’ad.  This retraction, Mo’dah Rabba, explains that Saul failed to apprise his father of this position and, as Saul’s father still stands behind his negative position, Saul therefore retracts his lenient position. [Historically, this is not the only time a father and son disagreed about shaving on hol ha-moad.  R. Yitzhak Shmuel Reggio (YaSHaR)and his father, Abraham, disagreed on the topic as well.  As was the case with Saul and his father, the son, YaSHaR took the lenient position and his father the stringent.  Not only did they disagree, after YaSHaR published his book explaining his theory, his father attacked him in an anonymous response.  For more on this controversy see Meir Benayahu, Shaving on the Intermediary Days of the Festival, Jerusalem, 1995.] 

    This retraction, while may be interperated as evidence of Saul humbleness in his willingness to admit error and not stand on ceremony, others used this retraction against him.  The first work published that questioned the legitimacy of BR is Ze’ev Yetrof, Frankfort d’Oder, 1793, by R. Ze’ev Wolf son of Shlomo Zalman.  (This book is very rare and, to my knowledge, is not online.  Although not online, a copy is available in microfiche as part of the collection of books from the JTS Library, and on Otzar Hachomah see below)  The author explains that eight responsa in BR are problematic because they reach conclusion that appear to run counter to accepted halahik norms. In addition, the author states in his introduction, “that already we see that there is something fishy as it is known that the author [Saul Berlin] has retracted his position regarding shaving.” It should be noted that no where does R. Ze’ev Wolf challenge the authenticity of the manuscript for internal reasons – it is incorrectly dated, incorrectly attributed etc.  Apparently, Ze’ev Yetrof, was not well-known as it is not cited by other contemporaries who too doubted the authenticity of BR.  Samat theorizes that either wasn’t printed until later or, was destroyed.[10]  

    The second person to question the legitimacy of BR was R. Rafael Hamburg’s mechutan, R. Ya’akov Katzenellenbogen.  In particular, he wrote to R. Cohen’s student, R. Mordechai Benat. As was the case with Wolf, R. Katzenellenbogen located 13 responsa where he disagreed with the conclusions.  R. Katzenellenbogen indicated that R. Benet shold review the BR himself and apprise R. Katzenellenbogen regarding R. Benet’s conclusions. 

    R. Katzenellenbogen also wrote to Saul’s father, Tzvi Hirsch, and Tzvi Hirsch eventually responded in a small pamphlet.  R. Tzvi Hirsch first deals with the predicate question, is the manuscript legitimate. That is, prior to discussing the conclusions of particular responsum, regarding the manuscript, R. Tzvi Hirsch testifies that he is intimately familiar with this manuscript. He explains that for 11 years, the manuscript was in his house.  In fact, R. Tzvi Hirsch created the index that appears in BR from this manuscript.  Additionally, he had his other son Hirschel (eventual Chief Rabbi of London) copy the manuscript for publication.  Thus, R. Tzvi Hirsch argues that should put to rest any doubt regarding the authenticity of the manuscript.

    R. Tzvi Hirsch then turns to the issue regarding conclusions of some of the responsa. He first notes, that at most, there are a but a small number of questionable responsa.  Indeed, it is at most approximately 5% of the total responsa in BR.  That is, no one questions 95% of the responsa (at least not then).  Second, with regard to the conclusions themselves, that some conclusions are different than the halahik norms, that can be found in numerous books, none of which anyone questions their authenticity.  Thus, conclusions prove nothing.

Leaving the history and turning to the content of BR.  One of the more controversial responsa is the one discussing suicide.  In particular, according to the responsum attributed to Rosh, the historic practices that were applied to a suicide – lack of Jewish burial, no mourning customs – are not applicable any longer.  This is so, because suicides can be attributed to the poor conditions of the Jews and not philosophical reasons.  Thus, we can attribute the motivations of a suicide to depression and remove the restrictions that applied to suicides. 

    This responsum was what lead some, including R. Moshe Sofer (Hatam Sofer), to conclude that the entire BR was a forgery.  Indeed, this responsum was one of the two that were removed in the second edition.  Others, however, point out this responsum and its conclusions are not in any conflict with any accepted halakhic norms.  And, instead, while providing new insight into the current motivations of a suicide, the ultimate conclusion can be reconciled with all relevant laws.  [11]  

This particular example illustrates the problematic nature of merely relying upon a particular conclusion to demonstrate the authenticity or lack thereof of a work. Although R. Sofer was certain this responsum ran counter to a statement of the Talmud, others were easily able to reconcile the Talmudic statement with the conclusion of the responsum.

    Another controversial responsa deals with someone who is stuck on the highway as the Shabbat is fast approaching.  The traveler is thus faced with the following dilemma, stop in a city where he will require the charity of strangers or continue on and get home.  The BR rules that the traveller can continue and is not required to resort to charity.  This, like the responum above, was similarly removed from the second edition. These are the only two responsa removed from the second edition.  Of course, this removal isn’t noted anywhere except that the numbers skip over those two.  In fact, the index retains the listing for the two responsa. 

    Other controversial responsa include one dealing with belief in the afterlife and messianic era, kitnoyot – BR would abolish the custom, and issues relating to mikvah. 

Today, common practice regarding suicide appears, for the most part, to conform with the position of BR.

Status Today

    After its publication in 1793, it would be almost one hundred years before the BR would be reprinted.  In 1881, the BR was reprinted in Cracow.  This edition was published by “the well-known Rabbi Yosef Lazer from Tarnow'” R. Lazer’s was part of a well-known Hassidic family.  His grandfather, R. Menachem Mendel Lazer was the author of Sova Semochot, Zolkiov, 1845.[12] It appears that the BR was the only controversial book that R. Yosef Lazer published.  Although he published approximately 30 books, the are mainly run-of-the mill works, Machzorim, haggadot, as well as some standard rabbinic works. It is unclear what prompted R. Lazer to republish the BR.  Lazer provides no explanation.  Although Lazer’s publishing activities are difficult to reconcile with his publication of the BR, the printers, Yosef Fischer and Saul Deutscher, other publications indicate that they were more open to printing all types of books. For example, the same year they published BR, they published a translation of Kant, Me-Ko’ach ha-Nefesh, Cracow, 1881.  In all events, it appears that Lazer (or perhaps the printers) was aware of the controversy surrounding the BR as he removed Saul Berlin’s introduction as well as two of the more controversial responsa, one discussing suicide and the other allowing one to continue to travel home after sunset on Friday to avoid having to rely upon the charity of strangers.  In addition, one responsa was accidentally placed at the end of the volume, not in its proper order.[13]  Although the two responsa were removed in the text, they still appear in the index. A photo-mechanical reproduction of this edition was published in New York in 1970, and a copy is available on Hebrewbooks. 

    In 1984, the BR was reprinted for only the third time.  This edition, edited by R. Reuven Amar and includes an extensive introduction, Kuntres Yafe le-Besamim, about BR.  Additionally, commentary on the BR by various rabbis is included.  The text of this edition is a photo-mechanical reproduction of the first edition.  This edition contains two approbations, one from R. Ovadiah Yosef, who in his responsa accepts that BR is a product of R. Saul Berlin, but R. Yosef holds that doesn’t diminish the BR’s value.  The second approbation is from R. Benyamin Silber.  But, R. Silber provides notes in the back of this edition and explains that he holds the BR is a forgery and that he remains unconvinced of Amar’s arguments to the contrary.

    In his introduction, Amar attempts to rehabilitate the BR.  Initially, it should be noted that Amar relies heavily upon Samet’s articles on BR, but never once cites him.  Samet had complied a bibliography of works about BR as well as where the BR is cited, Amar also provides the latter in a sixty four page Kuntres, ריח בשבמים, in the back of his edition. In his introduction Amar relates the history of the BR and attempts to demonstrate that many accepted the BR and those that did not, Amar argues that many really did accept BR.  This introduction contains some very basic errors, many of which have been pointed out by Shmuel Ashkenazi in his notes that appear after the introduction.  

Difficulties in Authentication   

    Today, various theories have been put forth to demonstrate that the BR is a forgery.  Specifically, some have pointed to “hints” or “clues” that R. Saul left for the careful reader which would indicate that BR is a carefully created forgery.  For example, some note that the number of responsa, 392, the Hebrew representation of that number is שצ”ב which can be read to be an abbreviation of Saul’s name – Saul ben Tzvi.  Others take this one step further and point to the was R. Asher (Rosh) is referenced – רא”ש – which again can be read R. Saul.  Obviously, these clues are by no means conclusive.  In the academic world, the BR is written off as a “trojan horse” intended to surreptitiously get R. Saul’s masklik positions out in the masses or something similar.  All of these positions, however, rely upon a handful of responsa at best and no one has been able to conclusively demonstrate that the entirety of BR is a forgery. At best, we are still left with the original criticisms – that a few of the responsa’s conclusions espouse positions that appear to be more 18th century in nature than 13th century. [14]   

 R. Yeruchum Fischel Perlow aptly sums up much of what has been written regarding the question of authenticity of BR:

Just about all who have examined [the question of the authenticity of BR] walk around like the blind in the dark, and even after all their long-winded essays, they are left with only their personal feelings about the BR without ever adducing any substantive proofs in support of their position. And, on the rare occasions that they actual do provide proofs for their positions, it only takes a cursory examination to determine that their is nothing behind those proofs. [R. Yeruchum Fischel Perlow, “Regarding the book ‘Besamim Rosh,'” Noam 2 (1959), p. 317. For some reason this article is lacking in some editions of Noam]

    Assuming that one discounts the testimony of Saul and his father regarding the manuscript, it is not easy to determine if the BR is authentic or not.  For example, responsum 192, according to R. Moshe Hazan, one of the defenders of BR, this responsum “is clear to anyone who is familiar with the language and style of the Rishonim, from the Rishonim.” Responsum 192, is attributed to R. Shlomo ben Aderet (Rashba), and discusses the opinion of Rosh that allowed for capital punishment for pregnancy out of wedlock.  Thus, according to R. Hazan, 192 is conclusive proof that BR is authentic. 

    Simcha Assaf, however, has shown that responsum 192 is a forgery – or there is a misattribution.  Assaf explains that if one looks at the date of this incident, responsum 192 could not have been written by Rashba.  Rashba died 10 years prior to this event.  Simcha Assaf, Ha-Onshim Ahrei Hatemat ha-Talmud, Jerusalem, 1928, pp. 69-70.  Thus, the very same responsum whose “language and style” demonstrated that it was from the times of the rishonim has attribution problems.  To be sure, Assaf isn’t saying this responsum isn’t necessarily from the rishonim period, however, it surely isn’t from Rashba.[15]

    Or, to take another example. Talya Fishman argues that “[halakhic literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . . climbed to new (and fantastic) heights of theoretical speculation, creating, in effect, a body of non applied law.”  Talya Fishman, “Forging Jewish Memory: BR and the Invention of Pre-emancipation Jewish Culture,” in Jewish History and Jewish Memory, ed. Carlbach et al., Hanover and London: 1998, pp. 70-88.  Based on this understanding of seventeenth and eighteenth century literature, as contrasted with literature from the period of Rosh, she turns to the BR and finds such speculative responsa.  This, according to Fishman, implicitly demonstrates that BR is a product of the seventeenth or eighteenth century. Indeed, Fishman concludes “[i]n short, [BR], has an unusually high concentration of eyebrow-raising cases.”  Id. at 76. 

    But, if one subjects Fishman’s argument to even a minimal amount of scrutiny, her argument, as presented, is unconvincing.  First, in support of Fishman’s “high concentration” of odd responsa, Fishman provides three examples.  That is, Fishman points to three out of 392 responsa that contain “eyebrow-raising cases” and concludes this represents “an unusually high concentration.”  I think that most would agree that less than 1% does not represents an unusually high concentration.  Second, of the three examples Fishman does provide, one is from Kasa deHarshena, which everyone agrees is a product of the eighteenth century.  Third, one of the examples, no. 100, it appears that Fishman misread the responsa.  Fishman provides that responsa 100 is a “bizarre question about whether a one-armed man should don tefilin shel yad on his forehead alongside tefilin shel rosh.”  Id. at 76.  Indeed,  responsa 100 is about a one-armed man and whether because he cannot fulfill the arm portion of tefilin if that absolves him of the head portion.  Nowhere, however, not in BR or Kasa de-harshena, does it mention the possibility of putting the tefilin shel yad on one’s forehead.  Thus, if we discount these two responsa, Fishman is left with a single responsum to prove her generalization about BR.[16]   

    Regarding the manuscript, that too is an unsolved mystery.  We know that a manuscript that may have been the copy which R. Hirschel made is extant but the manuscript from di Molena is unknown.  Additionally, although we know that the Leningrad/St. Petersberg library had Tzvi Hirsch’s copy with his annotations, the current location of that book is unknown. See Benjamin Richler’s post regarding the manuscript here.

    The BR’s most lasting effect may be in that this was to be the first of many newly discovered manuscripts to be accused of forgery because of the conclusions reached.  Subsequent to the BR, responsa or works in other areas of Jewish literature were tarred with cry of forgery because of their conclusions. [See Yaakov Shmuel Spiegel, Chapters in the History of the Jewish Book, Writing and Transmission, Ramat-Gan, 2005, 244-75, (“until the publication of BR, there were no questions raised regarding the authenticity of a book”) Spiegel also demonstrates that we now know that in many instances that the charge of forgery was wholly without basis and today there is no question that some of the books that are alleged forgeries are legitimate.]

Other Works by Saul Berlin

    One final point.  While we discussed Saul’s work prior to BR, there was another book that he wrote, that was published posthumously.  This work, Ketav Yosher, defended Naftail Wessley and his changes to the Jewish educational system.  Indeed, Ketav Yosher, is a scathing attack on many traditional sacred cows. [17]  Ketav Yosher, like MY, was published without Saul’s name, but again, we have testimony that Saul was in fact the author.  In light of the position Ketav Yosher takes, it is no surprise that this book doesn’t help Saul’s standing among traditionalists.  

    Saul may have written additional works as well, however, like the BR itself, there is some controversy surrounding those additional works.  R. Saul’s son, R. Areyeh Leib records an additional 11 works that Saul left behind after he died.  The problem is these very same works – although all remaining in manuscript – have been attributed to someone else.  But, before one jumps to conclusions, it should be pointed out that this story gets even more complicated.  The book which attributes these works to another is itself problematic.  Indeed, whether this list attributing the books to another even exists is a matter debate.  And, while that sounds implausible, that, indeed is the case.  Ben Yaakov, Otzar ha-Seforim (p. 599 entry 994) says there is a 1779 Frankfort Order edition of Sha’ar ha-Yihud/Hovot ha-Levovot that includes an introduction (and other material) that lists various manuscripts which the editor, according to Ben Ya’akov, was a grandson of Yitzhak Yosef Toemim, ascribes to his grandfather – and not Saul. Weiner, in his bibliography, Kohelet Moshe, (p. 478, no. 3922) says that Ben Ya’akov is wrong – not about the edition, Weiner agrees there was a 1779 Frankfort Oder edition, just Weiner says there is no introduction and Toemim wasn’t the editor (and other material is missing). Vinograd, Otzar Sefer ha-Ivri lists such a book – 1779 Frankfort Oder, Hovot ha-Levovot/Sha’ar ha-Yichud, but there is no such edition listed in any catalog that we have seen including JNUL, JTS, Harvard, British Library etc. It appears that Samat couldn’t locate a copy either as although he records the dispute between Weiner and Ben Yaakov, he doesn’t offer anything more.  Thus, Saul’s other writings, for now, remains an enigma.

    It is worthwhile to conclude with the words of R. Matisyahu Strashun regarding Saul and the BR:

“After all these analyses, even if we were able to prove that the entire BR from the begininning to end is the product of R. Saul, one cannot brush the work aside . . . as the work is full of Torah like a pomegranate, and the smell of besamim is apparent, it is a work full of insight and displays great breadth, the author delves into the intricacies of the Talmud and the Rishonim, the author is one of the greats of his generation.”  Shmuel Yosef Finn, Kiryah Ne’amanah, notes of R. Strashun, p. 93.

The Internet


    As hopefully should be apparent, most of the books discussed above or referenced below are available online.  These include the rare retraction that R. Saul published regarding his position on shaving on hol ha-ma’od, Ketav Yosher, the prospectus for BR, as well as the BR itself.  Indeed, not only is the BR online but both editions are online. And, the BR exemplifies why one should be aware of multiple internet sources.  Hebrewbooks has a copy of BR which they indicate is the first edition “Berlin, 1793,” however, in reality it is the later, 1881 Warsaw edition of the BR.  As noted above, that edition, however, is lacking two responsa.  This highlights an issue with Hebrewbooks, the bibliographical data is not necessarily correct.  The JNUL, has the first edition. Indeed, in the case of the JNUL, the bibliographical information is much more reliable than Hebrewbooks. Thus, one needs to use both the JNUL as well as Hebrewbooks if one wants to get a full picture of the BR. Or, another example.  Both the JNUL site as well as Hebrewbooks has MY online; but, the JNUL version was bound with two rare letters at the end and those appear online as well.  Additionally, when it comes to Hebrewbooks, one must be aware that they have removed books that someone presumably finds objectionable so although MY and KY are there now, there is no guarantee it will be in the future.  Similarly, although not online, and unlike the MY the JNUL has, Otzar haChomah has the Ze’ev Yitrof with additional material bound in the back. Besides for all these rare seforim mentioned, many of the other seforim quoted in this post, as is apparent from the links, can now be found on the web in a matter of seconds instead of what just a few short years ago would have taken a nice long trip to an excellent library.

Saul’s Epithet, he was buried in the Alderney Road Cemetery in London, next to his brother, Hirschel, Chief Rabbi 
Notes

[1] For more on R. Raphael Cohen see the amazingly comprehensive and insightful bibliography by the bibliophile R. Eliezer Katzman, “A Book’s Luck,” Yeshurun 1 (1996), p. 469-471 n.2. See also R. Moshe Shaprio, R Moshe Shmuel ve-Doro pp.103-110 especially on the BR see 108-09. C. Dembinzer, Klielas Yoffee, 1:134b, 2:78b writes that the work on TY caused R. Saul to lose his position as Chief-Rabbi of Frankfort and his wife divorced him because of it. See also, S. Agnon, Sefer Sofer Vesipur, p.337. On R. Raphael Cohen and his connection with the Gra and Chasidus see D. Kamenetsky, Yeshurun, 21, p. 840-56. As an aside this article generated much controversy for example see the recent issue of Heichal Habesht, 29, p.202-216 and here.
[2] Regarding the correct pronunciation of this title see Moshe Pelli, “The Religious Reforms of ‘Traditionalist’ Rabbi Saul Berlin,” HUCA (1971) p. 11.  See also R. Shmuel Ashkenzi’s notes in the BR, Jerusalem, 1983 ed., introduction, n.p., “Notes of R. Shmuel Ashkenzi on Kuntres Yefe le-Besamim, note 6.  
Additionally, MY was not Saul’s first literary production, nor was it his first that was critical of another’s book.  Instead, while he was in Italy in 1784, he authored a kunteres of criticisms of R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai’s Birkei Yosef.  See R. R. Margolis, Arshet pp. 411-417; Moshe Samat, “Saul Berlin and his Works,” Kiryat Sefer 43 (1968) 429-441, esp. pp. 429-30, 438 n.62.  On Chida’s opinion of the BR see for example Shem Hagedolim:

עתה מקרוב נדפס ספר זה בברלין… ועוד יש הגהות כסא דהרסנא. ואשמע אחרי קול רעש כי יש בספר זה קצת דברים זרים ואמרו שהמעתיק הראשון בארץ תורגמה מכ”י הרב יצחק די מולינא ז”ל יש לחוש שהוסיף וגרע. ולכן הקורא בסי’ זה לא יסמוך עליו דאפשר דתלי בוקי סריקי בגדולים עד אשר יחקור ויברר הדברים ודברי אמת ניכירים ודי בזה… (שם הגדולים, ערך בשמים ראש, וראה שם, ערך מר רב אברהם גאון)

See also the important comments of R.Yakov Chaim Sofer, Menuchas Sholom, 8, pp. 227-230 about the Chida.
[3]  Eliezer Landshut, Toldot Anshei Shem u-Puolotum be-Adat Berlin, Berlin: 1884, 89-90 for the text of the ban as well as its history.  Additionally, for the proclamation read in the main synagogue of Altona see id. at 90-1. This proclomation has been described as “one of the harshest condemnations” of the time.  See Shmuel Feiner, The Jewish Enlightenment in the Eighteenth-Century, Jerusalem: 2002, p. 310. 
[4]  Id. at 91. Samat, however, notes that neither Saul nor his father ever admitted Saul’s authorship of MY.  Samat, “Saul Berlin and his Works,” p. 432, 4.  
[5] According to A. Berliner, the author of this pamphlet is R. Eliezer Heilbot. See Samat, id. Saul and MY were not the only ones attacked. The publisher of MY, Hinukh Ne’arim, was also attacked and, not only MY but all the books they published were prohibited by some. The publishers, however, defended their decision to publish MY.  They argued that the whole point of MY was to ascertain if R. Raphael Cohen’s book was riddled with errors or, the author of MY was mistaken.  The publishers pointed to the above mentioned introduction to MY wherein the MY’s author explains that he has sent copies of the book to leading rabbis to determine the question regarding R. Cohen’s book. Thus, MY is either right or wrong, but there can be nothing wrong with merely publishing it.  See id. at 92-3.
Additionally, it should be noted that according to some, Saul authored a second attack on R. Raphael.  R. Raphael published Marpeh Lashon, Altona, 1790, and was soon after attacked in the journal Ha-Meassef by someone writing under the pen-name EM”T.  Many posit that this is none other than Saul.  Katzman, Yeshurun 1, 471 n.3, disagrees and points to internal evidence that it is unlikly that Saul is the author of this critique. 
According to Feiner, these attacks were not one-sided.  Feiner argues that R. Cohen criticizes Saul, albeit in a veiled manner, in Marpeh Lashon.  See Feiner, Jewish Enlightenment, op. cit., 314-15.  
[6] Landshuth, id., suggests that Moshe is a non-existent figure like MY’s putative author Ovadiah. See also, Samet, “Saul Berlin and his Works,” 432 n.4 who similarly questions the existence of Moshe.  Carmilly-Weinberg makes the incredible statement that his Moshe is none other than Moses Mendelssohn.  Carmilly-Weinberg, Sefer ve-Seiyif,  New York, 1967, p. 215, (Carmilly-Weinberg’s discussion about both MY and BR are riddled with errors).  As Pelli notes this is impossible as the letter is signed 1789, the same year MY was printed, and Mendelssohn died three years prior. Pelli resurrects Moshe and links him with a known person from Amsterdam, Saul brother-in-law. See Pelli, HUCA (1971) p. 13 n.75.  Ultimately, however, Pelli rejects this and demonstrates that Moshe is indeed a pseudonym but a well-selected one.  See id.  
[7]  See Landshuth, 93-9; Pelli, 13-15.  See also R. Alexander Sender Margolioth, Shu”t ha-RA”M, Lemberg, 1897, no. 9.    
[8] See Feiner, The Jewish Enlightenment, op. cit., 312-13.  This newspaper is online here, and Feiner provides the relevant issues which are 1789 pp. 484-88, 520-24, 574-81, 680-82, 768-74, 791-802, 867-92, 932-72.   
One of which includes this portrait of R. Cohen.
Which is a very different portrait, both in time and look, to the one appearing in E. Duckesz, Ivoh le-Moshav, Cracow, 1903.

[9] For the deeper meaning of the title Kasa de-Harshena, see Moshe Pelli, The Age of Haskalah, University Press of America, 2006, 183 n.51.
[10] See Samat, who discusses the exact progression of the ban.

[11] See Yechezkel Shrage Lichtenstein, Suicide: Halakhic, Historical, and Theological Aspects, Tel-Aviv, 2008, pp. 438-44. See also,Yeshurun 13:570-587 especially pp.578-581; Marc B. Shapiro, “Suicide and the World-To-Come,” AJS Review, 18/2 (1993), 245-63. 
On the issue of suicide there are others who similarly reach the same holding as the BR see Strashun in his מתת-יה pp. 72a-72b (this source is not quoted by Samet or Amar).
[12] Biographical information on R. Yosef Lazer is scant.  For information on his father and grandfather, see Meir Wunder, Me’orei Galicia, Israel, 1986, vol. III, pp. 456, 462-3. See also T.I. Abramsky, “‘Besamim Rosh’ in the Hassidic Milieu,” Taggim, (3-4), 56-58.   
[13] Samat only notes the removal of one responsum, he fails to note that exclusion of the second.  He does, however, note the misplaced responsum.  Additionally, Kuntres ha-Teshuvot ha-Hadash, fails to record that any are missing or that one responsum was moved to the end. 
[14] See Pelli, Age of Haskalah, pp. 185-89, comparing a few responsa with 18th century haskalah literature.
[15] Assaf was not the first to use this responsa and note its historical anacronisms.  Leopold Zunz, also highlights the issues with this responsum (as well as others).  Leopold Zunz, Die Ritus des Synagogalen Gottesdienstes, Geschichtlich Entwickelt, Berlin: 1859, 226-28.  Zunz’s critique is quoted, almost in its entirety by Schrijver, but Schrijver appears to be unaware of Assaf’s additional criticisms of the responsum (and others).
Assaf provides one other example where he shows through internal data that there is a misattribution.  Assaf concludes that he has other examples of historical anacronisms in BR but doesn’t provide them here or, to our knowledge, anywhere else.
[16] For another critique of Fishman’s position see Emile G.L. Schrijver, “Saul Berlin’s Besamim Rosh: The Maskilic Appreciation of Medieval Knowledge,” in Sepharad in Ashkenaz, Netherlands: 2007, pp. 249-259, esp. pp. 253-54. 
[17] Regarding Ketav Yoshor see Pelli, Age, 176-79. See also here and here.

Additional Bibliography:
M. Samet has two articles on the topic, R. Saul Berlin and his Writings, Kiryat Sefer, 43 (1969) 429-41; “Besamim Rosh” of Saul Berlin, Kiryat Sefer 48 (1973) 509-23, neither of which are included in the recent book of Samet’s articles.

To add to Samet’s and Amar’s very comprehensive lists of Achronim who quote BR: (I am sure searches on the various search engines will show even more): Malbim in Artzos Hachaim, 9:41 (in Hameir Learetz); Shut Zecher Yosef,1:32b; Keter Kehunah p. 30; Matzav Hayashar 1:2a; Pischei Olam 2:218,228; Birchat Yitchcak (Eiskson), pp. 6,14,24; Maznei Tzedek, p.26,45,254; R.Yakov Shor, Birchat Yakov, pp.212  Sefer Segulos Yisroel pp.116b; R. Rabinowitz, Afekei Yam 2:14; R. Leiter, Zion Lenefesh Chayah# 43; Shut Sefas Hayam, OC siman 14; R Meir Soleiveitck, Hameir Laretz 45a, 45b, 54b, 55a; Emrei Chaim p.26; R. Sholom Zalman Auerbach, Meorei Eish p. 108 b

In general on BR see: R.Yakov Shor,Eytaim Lebinah (on Sefer Haeytim) p. 256; Pardes Yosef, Vayikrah 220b Pardes Yosef, Shelach p. 517; R.Yakov Chaim Sofer, Menuchas Sholom, 8, pp. 222- 230; Shar Reven p. 54; A. Freimann, HaRosh ; Y. Rafel, Rishonim Veachronim, pp. 123-130; B. Lau, MeMaran Ad Maran, pp.133; S. Agnon, Sefer Sofer Vesipur, pp.337-339.

R. Pinhas Eliyahu Horowitz writes:

ולפעמים תולים דבריהם באילן גדול וכותבים מה שרוצים בשם איזה קדמון אשר לא עלה על לבו… כספר בשמים ראש שחיבר בעל כסא דהרנסא לא הרא”ש וזקני ישראל תופסי התורה יעלו על ראשם… (ספר הברית, עמ’ 232).

The Steipler was of the opinion in regard to the BR that:
שבאמת ניכר מהרבה תשובות שהם מהרא”ש ז”ל רק כנראה שיש שם הרבה תשובות מזויפות שהמעתיק הכניס מעצמו כי ישנם שם דברים מאד מזורים ואיומים  (ארחות רבנו, א, עמ’ רפה)

R Zevin writes in Sofrim Veseforim (Chabad) p.354 :
אלא שבתשובות בשמים ראש המיחוס להרא”ש ושכידוע נמנו וגמרו שמזוייף הוא

R. Yakov Kamenetsky said: “Do you think Just we (he meant people of his own caliber) were fooled? Even R. Akiva Eiger was fooled.” (Making of a Godol, pp.183-184)

About Rav Kook and the BR see: http://www.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/5-2006/Gutel.pdf

R. Avigdor Nebensal writes:

כשמביאם את הבשמים ראש ראוי להזכיר שיש מסתייגים חריפות מהספר הזה (השתנות הטבעים, עמ’ 16).
R Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg writes:
אכן בעיקר הענין אם להביא דברי בשמים ראש בודאי צדק הג”א נבנצל שליט”א שיש להביאו בהסתייגות, ובפרט בענינים אלו שהוחזק למזייף ולמביא עקומות וכוזבות (השתנות הטבעים, עמ’ רסד).




More on Chaim Bloch

More on Chaim Bloch
By Marc B. Shapiro
In a previous post I mentioned how the non-Jewish Austrian minister Leon Bilinski was descended from the rav of Posen, R. Samuel ben Moses Falkenfeld, the Beit Shmuel Aharon. More information about Bilinski’s Jewish roots is found in Chaim Bloch’s Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv (New York, 1943), p. 74 n. 1. In general, I have found that when Bloch is reporting about other people’s biographies and history in general, he is very reliable. It is only when he is somehow involved in the story that he is full of lies.1 His Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv is a good example. Here is the title page.
In this book he makes up an entire story that he was asked by an important Catholic figure to answer questions from the Vatican dealing with Judaism. The whole story is a fiction, as is so much else he writes about himself. As for Bilinski, Bloch tells us that he is in possession of Bilinski’s 1146 page (!) unpublished diary. As Bloch himself notes, he provided various scholars (e.g.., N. M. Gelber) with selections of this diary which they then used in their own works, thus misleading the world. In these selections, Bilinski comes off as a strong anti-Zionist, who even warns Herzl about how the Arabs will never accept a Jewish state in Palestine.2 In an article in the Herzl Year Book, Bloch published what he claimed was an 1893 letter from Herzl and uses this to prove that Herzl was interested in the Jewish problem already in 1893, a year before the 1894 Dreyfus trial which is usually cited as having turned Herzl to Jewish matters.3 Various scholars have cited this letter, as they understandably regard it as significant in understanding Herzl, but of course it is a forgery. Another way Bloch misled scholars, in particular Gelber, is with regard to an anonymous booklet that speaks of a return of the Jews to the Land of Israel and the establishment of a state.4 According to Billinski’s diary, so Bloch tells us, the author of this booklet was Benjamin Disraeli. Bilinski would certainly have been in a position to know this information, and therefore a number of people have been misled by this, thinking the diary authentic
Look how Bloch’s forgeries were able to have such an impact. I think, in the end, this is what gives the forger satisfaction, watching everyone taken in by his creation. In 1948 no one would have believed that Bloch was capable of this. In fact, if not for his blatant forgeries in Dovev Siftei Yeshenim, some people today would still assume that he is reliable. As the Talmud tells us, tafasta merubah lo tafasta! Bloch should have stuck with his smaller forgeries, because when he decided to publish complete volumes of forged material, that’s when people really began to take notice. It is therefore very surprising that no less a scholar than Robert S. Wistrich, who is aware of the accusations of forgery against Bloch, nevertheless cites material from Bloch’s Mi Natan li-Meshisah and states that in his opinion at least some of the material must be considered authentic. Why he thinks this he doesn’t tell us. The truth is that this book, like Dovev Siftei Yeshenim, is full of Bloch’s forgeries, and not only of rabbis but also of political leaders (including summaries of supposed letters from Bismark about Zionism!)5

Just to illustrate that you can’t judge people by appearances, here is a picture of Bloch, which previously appeared in Dr. Shnayer Leiman’s post on the Seforim Blog.6

Throughout Bloch’s various books, he quotes numerous letters from gedolim who were no longer alive, and none of these letters are found in his archives, currently kept at YIVO and the Leo Baeck Institute. In other words, he simply made up these letters, as he did with the entire volumes of anti-Zionist letters of gedolim that he published. The rule is that whenever Bloch cites a previously unpublished letter from someone, either addressed to himself or to another, and the author of the letter is no longer alive, you can assume that the letter is forged. We know this now, after Shmuel Weingarten’s exposé of Dovev Siftei Yeshenim.7 Yet the evidence was there all along, had people paid attention. But people had no reason to assumed that Bloch was not reliable. R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, however, who was involved in a terrible dispute with Bloch, did accuse Bloch of dishonesty, and pointed out that he would attribute quotes to rabbis who were no longer alive so that he couldn’t be contradicted. In the late 1930’s Bloch published a letter from R. Kook. R. Zvi Yehudah Kook was very skeptical of its authenticity and requested that Bloch send him a copy of it. Bloch replied that he was unable to do so since he had lost the original.8 This was Bloch’s pattern, and I assume that all of the many letters he published from leading rabbis and hasidic leaders, beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, are forgeries.9

Here is another example of Bloch’s tendency to fabricate things. It comes from his Heikhal le-Divrei Chazal u-Fitgameihem (New York, 1948), p. 9. Everything he reports here is a fantasy. As with some of his other forgeries, Bloch is obviously motivated here by good intentions, but it is all complete nonsense.

Ve-Da Ma she-Tashiv also contains forged letters. I am certain that the letter of R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski on pp. 52-53 is an example of this. Anyone can look at the style of R. Chaim Ozer’s many letters and see how he consistently used certain formulas in concluding his letters. Nowhere does R. Chaim Ozer conclude a letter with
ונזכה כולנו לראות בישועת עמנו במהרה
He does use the expression
ועיניהם תחזינה בישועת עמנו במהרה

and this is found in a letter that Bloch would have had access to, the letter of R. Chaim Ozer to Agudat ha-Rabbanim about the Louis Epstein proposal.10 I assume he used the concluding portion of this letter to help him create his forgery. But in other areas he wasn’t so careful. For example, in the supposed letter of R. Chaim Ozer to Bloch, he refers to the latter as a צנא מלא ספרא , yet this expression does not appear in R. Chaim Ozer’s other letters (based on Otzar ha-Hokhmah’s database, which only has the first edition of R. Chaim Ozer’s letters, not the expanded Iggerot R. Chaim Ozer.)
We should assume the same for all of the other letters in this book from people who were not alive when the book was written. It is fascinating that on p. 44 n. 1 Bloch refers to the anti-Zionist letters he would later publish in Dovev Siftei Yeshenim. Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv was published in 1943 and the first volume of Dovev Siftei Yeshenim didn’t appear until 1959, meaning that this forgery was very long in the making, and Bloch was setting the stage for it many years prior.
There is more to say about this book, in particular his argument that there are passages in the Talmud that were inserted by heretics – a viewpoint earlier mentioned by R. Joseph Zvi Duenner, as I have pointed out elsewhere, see here.

I will leave that for another time, but to give you an example of what I am referring to, here is a passage from p. 39 (emphasis in the original):
אופינית היא “המעשיה” בר’ שמעון בן גמליאל “שהיה על גב מעלה בהר הבית וראה נכרית אחת נאה ביותר. אמר: מה רבו מעשיך ד'” (ע”ז כ ע”א) המאמר הזה זיוף  . . . לא יעלה בדעתנו, שר’ שמעון בן גמליאל הביט על אשה, היינו הך, נכרית או ישראלי – לשם יפיה. ומצאתי עוד מאמר בשם רב, שזיופו עומד מחוץ לכל ספק: “בשעה שבקש נבוכדנצר לעשות לאותו צדיק (צדקיהו) כך, נמשכה ערלתו ש’ אמה והיתה מחזרת על כל המסבה כולה שנאמר: שבעת קלון מכבוד, שתה גם אתה והערל” (שבת קמט ע”ב). מלבד הנבול שבמאמר זה, הוא חסר טעם, ולא יתכן, שמפי רב יצאו הדברים.
I don’t know which position is “frummer”? To defend the honor of the sages and therefore deny that these “obscene” passages are authentic, or to defend the Talmud as we have it and thus have to deal with these passages.
Yet whatever the answer to this is, if Bloch were alive today, the haredi world would put him in herem for another reason. Here is what he writes on p. 38, with regard to how to view Aggadah in contrast to the halakhic sections of the Talmud. (What he says is nothing other than the Geonic and Spanish tradition, which is largely unknown in today’s yeshiva world.):
היא אינה נחשבת ליסוד קיומה של היהדות ויש לה אופי של ספר עם . . . לחלק האגדה נכנסו דברי מוסר ודרך ארץ, מליצות ובדיחות, סגולות ורפואות, אזהרות ועצות, פתרון חלומות ואגדות, שלהרבה מהם יש ערך גם מחוץ להיהדות. יתכן שהרבה הושפעו בעלי התלמוד בזה מהעמים שכניהם.
Also interesting is that in Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv, p. 44 n. 1,  he refers very positively to R. Henkin, something that would later change when their great battle began.
Bloch claimed that he had a close relationship with the great R. Judah Leib Zirelson of Kishinev (Speaking for myself, Zirelson’s greatest achievement had to have been standing up to the extreme anti-Zionist elements in Agudat Israel, led by R. Elhanan Wasserman and R. Aaron Kotler. They wanted the Agudah to officially oppose the creation of a Jewish state. Zirelson, as president of the 1937 Kenesiah Ha-Gedolah in Marienbad, was able to convince the Moetzet Gedolei ha-Torah to agree with his own position, which was not to oppose a state but to attempt to bring Torah values into it. See Ha-Pardes, Oct. 1937, p. 8). In this book, Bloch cites a number of things from Zirelson of which, again, I have no doubt that he has made them up. For example, can anyone imagine that Zirelson would offer the following Haskalah-Reformist interpretation that Bloch puts in his mouth (p. 34)?
יתכן שהיתה כוונתו של ר’ שמעון בן יוחאי, בחפשו יסוד במקרא שהנכרים אינם מטמאים באוהל, כדי שלא ימצאו הרומיים תואנות ואמתלאות חדשות על ישראל, ומאימת המלכות הורה כן.
Although I can’t go into it in any detail now, the truth is that we do on occasion find Haskalah-Reformist types of interpretation even in traditional sources,11 but since these are very rare and we have no evidence that Zirelson ever said what is attributed to him, I assume it is another of Bloch’s forgeries. In other words, as he did so often, Bloch attributed his own understanding to one of the great Torah sages.
In chapter fourteen of Ve-Da Mah She-Tashiv, where he stresses the need for honesty in one’s dealings with non-Jews, he claims that Zirelson told him about a Zoharic passage in parashat Lekh Lekha that states:
כל מאן דמשקר בהאי עלמא בערל כמאן דמשקר בשמיה דקוב”ה
This is a beautiful thought. The only problem is that it doesn’t exist anywhere in the Zohar. I am certain that Zirelson would never have misquoted the Zohar and that the mistake is Bloch’s. I assume that the mistake is unintentional, perhaps quoting from memory, since a great forger like Bloch would never have dared falsely attribute anything to the Zohar, the accuracy of which could easily be checked.
Here is the actual Zohar text (vol. 1, p. 93a):
דכל מאן דמשקר בהאי כמאן דמשקר בשמיה דקב”ה
If you examine the entire passage you will find that it has nothing to do with being honest, and the word משקר here does not mean “to lie”, but “to betray”. The text is actually speaking about berit milah and how one is obligated to treat it properly, especially דלא עייל ליה ברשותא אחרא, which certainly refers to refraining from having sex with non-Jewish women. What the text is saying is that if you have illicit sex you betray the mark of the circumcision, and this is like betraying God’s name.
Since I mentioned Haskalah-Reformist interpretations in traditional texts, let me note one of the most famous of these. In Shabbat 140b, R. Papa’s states that if one can drink beer but instead drinks wine, he violates the prohibition on baal tashchit. Maharsha explains that R. Papa said this because he was a beer salesman! What this apparently means is that R. Papa lied about the halakhah in order to drum up more business for himself. How else to interpret Maharsha’s explanation?
ורב פפא לטובת עצמו אמרה שהוא הי’ עושה שכר.
This explanation is, to be sure, quite shocking. If you want to stretch things a bit you can say that according to Maharsha, R. Papa didn’t consciously alter the halakhah to benefit himself, but since he was a beer maker he was unconsciously led to this position, as it would benefit him. This explanation – which could easily have been offered by Jacob Katz – is suggested by the noted Yemenite posek, R. Yitzhak Ratsaby12:
והנה כל העובר ישום וישרוק, היתכן כדבר הזה שרב פפא יפסוק הלכה משום ריוח ממונו?! . . . ובודאי גם לדעת מהרש”א לא יתכן שרב פפא יאמר פסקי הלכה רק מתוך נגיעה, חלילה לו. אלא היה זה כעין “שוחד סמוי”, שלא הרגיש בו הוא עצמו, שמתוך כך בא לידי טעות בהלכה זו. כמו שהכתוב צווח ואומר (שמות כג, ח): “כי השוחד יעוור פקחים ויסלף דברי צדיקים”, ועל דרך שמצינו בכתובות (קט, ב) בגדולי עולם שאמרו על עצמם שהשוחד היטה את ליבם.
I think most people will tell you that this sort of explanation, which points to unconscious factors influencing halakhic decisions, was not how people thought in the days of the Maharsha. I myself do not see this as an anachronistic explanation, as the Talmud, Ketubot 105b, already discusses precisely this sort of unconscious influence.13  I believe that this is also how we are to understand all the discussions about נוגע בדבר, and how it applies even to the greatest tzadikim. It is not that these people will consciously twist the truth, but that unconsciously this is what can happen. Presumably, this is also the meaning of Hullin 49a:  ישמעאל כהנא מסייע כהני

I think this is also how we are to understand R. Moses Isserles, Yoreh Deah 242:36:
תלמיד חכם שאמר דבר הלכה בדבר השייך לדידיה . . . אין שומעין לדידיה דלמא מדמי דברים להדדי שאינן דומים
See also Ritva, Yevamot 77a:
דחיישינן שמא מתוך שנושא ונותן בהלכה כדי לקיים את דבריו אמר בדדמי כסבור שקיבל מרבו
I am not going to analyze the Maharsha in any depth, because either way you explain him, this is the exact sort of explanation that according to the Rav is heretical as it falls under the Rambam’s category of מכחיש מגידה.14 And it is not just the Rav who would be shocked by what Maharsha wrote. R. Yehoshua Heschel of Monistritch15 states:
ועל מאמר המהרש”א הזה צווחי קמאי 
R. Abraham Vengrober16 says concerning the standard explanation of Maharsha (before offering a different understanding of his words):
ופריצי עמנו מצאנו בקעה לדבר סרה על רז”ל . . . גם רבינו המהרש”א ז”ל לא כיוון בזה ח”ו להכוונה אשר העולם סוברים שבשביל זה שהי’ מסחרו שבח את הדבר לטובת עצמו.
R. Samuel Strashun in his commentary to the passage takes strong issue with Maharsha, and R. Hayyim Hezekiah Medini17 is astounded by what Maharsha wrote:
הדבר תמוה לפרש דנחשד רב פפא לדבר שקר חלילה לטובת עצמו.
I assume it is only a matter of time before this explanation of Maharsha is deleted from a future printing.
Here is another example (Taanit 14a-14b):
In the time of R. Judah the Prince there was distress. He ordained thirteen fast days and their prayer was not answered. He thought of ordaining additional fasts but R. Ammi said to him, “Did not [the Sages] declare we should not trouble the community unduly.” Said R. Abba the son of R. Hiyya b. Abba, “R. Ammi [in saying this] was studying his own interests.”
  
Rashi explains R. Abba’s declaration:
לעצמו דרש: דלא אמר אלא לפי שהוא לא היה רוצה להתענות
If anyone other than Rashi wrote this, wouldn’t it be regarded as an example of מכחיש מגידה?
Here is another example, from the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 6:1:
R. Abbahu in the name of R. Yohanan, “It is permitted for a man to teach Greek to his daughter, because such learning is an ornament for her” Simeon bar Ba heard and said, “It is because R. Abbahu wants to teach his daughter such that he has assigned the teaching to R. Yohanan.”
R. Abbahu responded quite sharply to Simeon bar Ba, proclaiming: “May a curse come upon me, if I did not hear it from R Yohanan.” But I am more interested in Simeon bar Ba’s accusation. He assumed that the great R. Abbahu would falsely attribute a halakhic ruling to an earlier sage in order that his daughter would benefit. When Geiger and Graetz said things like this, no one was surprised, and the Orthodox condemned them for these type of interpretations. Yet here you have a Haskalah-Reformist type of interpretation offered by one of the Sages.
Returning to Bloch, another example where he deceived the world is found in his Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgemeihem, pp. 591-592. In line with his apologetic approach to Jewish sources, he claims that he saw an old version of the Passover prayer Shefokh Hamotkha, that went as follows:

שפוך אהבתך על הגוים אשר ידעוך

Even a great scholar such as Naftali Ben-Menachem was taken in by Bloch (and if you search online you will find a number of others who assume that Shefokh Ahavatkha is a real text, rather than another Bloch forgery18). Ben Menachem’s article appears in Mahanayim 80 (1963), and here is the page where he refers to Bloch’s version.

Incidentally, in Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal Bloch claims that he wrote about this version at length in his 1935 book Der Judenhass im Spiegel der Jahrtausende, and also printed a copy of the manuscript there. (In 1935 Bloch was living in Vienna.) Although he mentions this book in a couple of his other writings, there is no evidence that any such book ever appeared. Now we have the internet which allows us to check all the greatest libraries in a minute, yet in a prior era, simply mentioning that he had published such a book and that it contained a copy of the manuscript would have been enough to convince everyone. After all, it was not like people in the United States, England, or Palestine/Israel could easily check the holdings of libraries in Austria and Germany.
Meir Hershkovitz, in his fine book on R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, also quotes Bloch a number of times. Bloch claimed to have seen unpublished material from Chajes and he included some of it in his Heikhal, but everything he mentions is fraudulent, and some of the comments are really outrageous. For example, on p. 565 he quotes Chajes as saying as follows about Rabbi Akiva19:

ר”ע מבני בניו של סיסרא היה ולמרות קדושת התורה ששלטה בו נשאר בו משהו מאופיו של סיסרא
(Some are probably wondering why I didn’t underline the first part as well, which states that R. Akiva was descended from Sisera. After all, in a few weeks Daf Yomi will reach Sanhedrin 96b and there you find the following, with no mention of R. Akiva: “Descendants of Sisera studied20 Torah in Jerusalem; descendants of Sennacherib taught Torah to the multitude. Who were these? Shemaya and Avtalion. Descendants of Haman studied Torah in Bnei Brak.” Yet numerous texts21 record a version of this passage that identifies R. Akiva as among the descendants of Sisera.)

What motivated Bloch to invent this negative comment about R. Akiva? I think that this too can be attributed to anti-Zionist motivations (an anonymous commenter on Soferim u-Seforim offered a similar explanation; see the link in n. 1). R. Akiva was associated with Bar Kokhba’s rebellion, and in the popular mind at least, this was a matter of pride for twentieth-century Jews. The thrust of the comment attributed to Chajes is to see this “warlike” aspect of R. Akiva as a throwback to Sisera. In other words, this is not something good. We see another example of Bloch’s anti-Zionism in his attempts to argue that a passage in Maimonides’ Letter on Astrology is not authentic. In this passage, Maimonides states that the Temple was destroyed and the Jews exiled because instead of focusing on “the art of military training and conquering lands,” they involved themselves with astrology, thinking it would help them. (Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Sheilat, vol. 2, p. 480) This passage was too “Zionistic” for Bloch, and not surprisingly he argues that it is a forged interpolation. See his article in Ha-Pardes 34 (April 1960), pp. 39-42, where once again it is Bloch who is the forger, citing a supposed letter from a Christian scholar to Dr. [Daviid?] Kaufmann and also telling us about the support he supposedly received from the Tchortkover Rebbe. (This Rebbe, incidentally, happened to be a one of the leading Agudah supporters of settlement in the Land of Israel.) One of Bloch’s major proofs that Maimonides could not have written this passage is his assumption that Maimonides was not impressed with R. Akiva’s support of Bar Kokhba. He bases this argument on Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 11:3. Yet Maimonides’ viewpoint in this matter is not enough for Bloch, and to achieve his purpose he has to actually find fault with R. Akiva’s character, something Maimonides would never do. Bloch even attacks some modern writers (such as Aaron Zeitlin and Hillel Seidman) who had stressed the contemporary significance of Maimonides’ words. In Bloch’s mind, by doing so they were showing the non-Jews that the Protocols of Elders of Zion were correct, namely, that Jews really did want to conquer the world! Bloch’s Neturei Karta side comes out very well in this article.

As a way of covering himself, so that people will believe the manuscripts of Chajes are authentic, Bloch states that he assumes that the material he is quoting from has survived in Israel, either with the family or at the National Library (Heikhal, pp. 520, 560). Yet in Hershkovitz, this supposition is stated as fact (Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Chajes, p. 438). It is quite surprising that Hershkowitz, who wrote such a comprehensive biography of Chajes, didn’t attempt to track down these manuscripts. Had he done so, he would have realized that they don’t exist.
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This is a blog about seforim, but with Dan’s permission, in a future post I am going to write about the various blogs and news sites, both haredi and Modern Orthodox, that focus on Jewish matters (halakhah, hashkafah, etc.). In the last six months I have visited them a good deal, left a number of comments (some quite provocative and opposed to my own outlook [e.g., dealing with sexual abuse, Zionism, Daas Torah, Torah mi-Sinai, etc.], and always under a pseudonym) and gathered the reactions. I also corresponded with people I met on the sites and with various anonymous baalei ha-blogs. I tried to be a bit of a reporter, gathering information, and just like a reporter sometimes has to hide his identify, I felt that in this circumstance it was permissible, especially as almost everyone I was dealing with was also anonymous. We all know that the ability to be anonymous is basic to the internet (and there has been a good deal of discussion recently about whether this is a good idea). I also felt that if I got involved in a debate on a haredi or Modern Orthodox site, my name would be recognizable to some of the people and they might respond differently than if I was some anonymous person.

Most of the information is publicly available (as are my comments), but I won’t cite any names, as I am not interested in individuals but in some of the thought processes that I observed. As always, I will tie this in with seforim, especially the phenomenon of anonymous and pseudonymous (as opposed to pseudepigraphal) seforim and articles, and also discuss the modern anonymous halakhic questions that R. Yuval Sherlow has written about. (He has also published a couple of volumes of his answers to these questions.) How is Judaism perceived and portrayed when people can live in two worlds, the public one and the private anonymous world of the internet? What does it mean when most people who comment about controversial topics choose to do so under a pseudonym? I think that what I found also has implications to an issue I have been concerned with for a long time, namely, the value of private letters and conversations vs. published word in seeking to evaluate the personality of an individual. This directly relates to David Holzer’s book on the Rav and was also a topic that became a dispute between the late Prof. Twersky and myself when writing my dissertation on R. Weinberg–more on that to come.

I mention all this because I have a request: If anyone is aware of a similar study with regard to Christian or political blogs and websites, please let me know. As a friend commented to me when I told him about my project, “we all know that there are registered Democrats on the Upper West Side who secretly vote Republican, but in order not to scandalize their friends, will only post their true opinions anonymously.” Yet has anyone written about this? There are serious methodological issues that must be dealt with in any such inquiry.
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My new Torah in Motion class begins this Monday. I invite all who are free on Monday nights at 9PM Eastern to join us. This semester we are covering R. Eliezer Berkovits, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, R. Elijah Benamozegh and R. Joseph Messas. You can sign up for it here
If you want to watch or listen to previous classes, to get a sense of how they work, you can download them here.
Notes
1 For a recent discussion of Bloch, see here which contains a number of informative comments.
2 See Bloch, Mi Natan li-Meshisah Yaakov ve-Yisrael le-Vozezim (Bronx, n.d.), pp. 54ff.
3 “Herzl’s First Years of Struggle: Unknown Episodes and Personal Recollections” Herzl Year Book 3 (1960), pp. 77-90.
4 The booklet is found in N. M. Gelber, Tokhnit ha-Medinah ha-Yehudit le-Lord Beaconsfield (Tel Aviv, 1947),  pp. 35ff. Gelber’s book is devoted to this booklet.
5 “Zionism and its Religious Critics in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,” in S. Almog, et al., eds., Zionism and Religion (Hanover, 1998), pp. 150, 157 n. 45.
6 See here.
7 Mikhtavim Mezuyafim Neged ha-Tziyonut (Jerusalem, 1981).
8 See Weingarten, Mikhtavim, pp. 164-165. In Ha-Posek 11 (1950), p. 802, Bloch published another letter from R. Kook. It is also found in Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgamehem, p. 614. Again he tells us that he only has a copy of the letter, as the original was lost, and here too the letter in unquestionably a forgery. Bloch had R. Kook sign the letter עבד לעם קדוש , which he knew is found in numerous authentic letters. But the letter also contains the phrase כל יקר ראתה עיני , and this does not appear in any of the almost 2000 letters and responsa of R. Kook, as can be determined from the new database of R. Kook’s writings
9 I don’t know whether this also applies to halakhic writings, e.g., the supposed manuscript from R. Shalom Schwadron that came from Bloch and is published in R. Isaac Liebes, Beit Avi, vol. 3 no. 157. Incidentally, a few responsa after this, in no. 161, Liebes discusses whether a rabbinic organization could publicly advocate the institution of the death penalty, since it might happen that a Jew would also be sentenced to death (sound familiar?). Liebes begins his reply:
לא רק שמותר להתריע בכיוון זה רק מצוה לעורר את דעת העם את חומר הסכנה המרחפת על תושבי הארץ.
During the discussions about the Grossman execution, I looked at some of the haredi websites (until the comments made me sick). What I found interesting was the incredible level of ignorance of most of the writers, all of whom had been in yeshiva and many of whom had studied there for years. They were able to declare that a murderer can’t be executed unless he was observed by two kosher witnesses and was given warning, which they thought settled matters. Had these people known a bit of responsa literature, there would have understood how things worked in the real world, and especially what was done in the days of the rishonim. Do these people think that if a guy stood up in shul and opened fire with a machine gun, killing 20 people, that a Jewish court couldn’t execute him because he was never given a warning? Let’s continue with R. Liebes:
יש כח להבי”ד בזמן שרואין צורך השעה לענוש עונש מות אפילו בכל יום אפילו אם מן התורה פטורין הם כדי שעל ידי זה כל העם ישמעו וייראו ולא יזידון עוד.
As for the possibility that a Jewish man will be executed:
מצוה וחיוב לעורר את דעת הקהל להתריע את בתי המשפט שיראו להעביר בכל המדינה משפט מות ולענוש בכל החומר הרוצחים והפושעים ואת מדינתינו ארצות הברית אשר מאמינה בתנ”ך יכולים לשכנע אותה ולהראות לה עד היכן תוה”ק מקפידה לבער את רשעי הארץ בתור חיוב ומצוה. ומש”כ כת”ר לחשוש דלפעמים ימצא רוצח יהודי א”כ אנחנו נהיה אשמים במיתתו זה אינו כלום . . . מוכח מזה דהמחוייב מיתה עפי דין המלכות מותר למסרו להם מטעם דינא דמלכותא. מובן ממילא שכל דברינו מוסבים רק על המדינות שיש להם שוויון הזכויות לכל אזרחיה בלי שום אנטישמיות ושנאת ישראל ולכן אם ח”ו יהודי נתפס באיזה עון ופשע הרי הוא נידון כמו כל אזרחי המדינה.
Many who commented on the various sites were people who never opposed the death penalty before and do not oppose it now, yet they were anti-death penalty in this case because, quite simply, they think the death penalty is just fine except when it is a Jew being executed. They vote for all the right wing candidates and then have the chutzpah to complain when their man actually follows through on his support of capital punishment and doesn’t share their view that a supposed baal teshuvah (whose last meal on earth was a non-kosher chicken sandwich bought from the prison canteen) should not be executed. Some of them cited Sanhedrin 17a, סנהדרי שראו כולן לחובה פוטרין אותו , as if this had any relevance. First of all, this passage only means that he is not executed in the normal fashion, but he can certainly be executed as an emergency measure. In addition, some understand this passage to mean that if on the first day of deliberations all conclude that he is guilty, he is not condemned to death immediately but the case is revisited on the next day. If then, all find him guilty, he is executed. None of the commenters who mentioned this law quoted the view of R. Meir ha-Levi Abulafia (cited in many sources) and the Tosafot Hakhmei Anglia that the meaning of פוטרין אותו is ממהרין אותו להורגו .  This understanding is praised by the Reisher Rav, R. Aharon Lewin, Ha-Derash ve-ha-Iyun, Deut. no. 119:5, and R. Baruch Epstein, Torah Temimah, Ex. 23:2. Epstein is convinced that this understanding is correct because otherwise היש לך חוטא גדול ונשכר מזה .  For more on the subject, see Zorach Warhaftig, “Rov u-Miut be-Veit ha-Din,” in Itamar Warhaftig, ed., Minhah le-Ish (Jerusalem, 2001), pp. 100ff. See also R. Reuven Margaliot, Margaliyot ha-Yam, Sanhedrin 17a, no. 19, who cites the Tashbetz:
שהם ז”ל לא אמרו ב”ד שהסכימו כולם לחובה פטור, חלילה להם שיאמרו ככה, ואם על פי הרוב הורגים כל שכן ע”פ כולם ויותר טוב ויותר משובח הוא שיהיה הפסק דין מוסכם מהכל ולא שיהיה שום חולק.
There is a good deal more to say on this topic, but in the interests of space I will leave it for another time. Suffice it to say that as in all such matters one can find a variety of viewpoints. See e.g., R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, Havot Yair, no. 146. Some poskim have even ruled that when a murderer has been sentenced to death it is forbidden to try and save him. See R. Nathan Leiter, Tziyun le-Nefesh Hayah, no. 121. (Others disagree, see e.g., Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, vol. 6, no. 14.) Obviously, such a ruling has no relevance to people who oppose the death penalty on principle, but it does speak directly to those who normally support it—as I daresay includes most, if not virtually all of the people who were commenting so outrageously on the haredi sites. Let me close by citing a responsum of R. Meir Zak in Teshuvot Eitan ha-Ezrahi, no. 45. What he said in the seventeenth century, in a case involving a Jewish murderer, is just as relevant today, and it is incredible how this responsum speaks to the Grossman case (he even uses the term “hillul ha-shem”!). Notice how he also includes the manhigei ha-dor in his criticism.
מאחר שניתן ביד גוים ערכאות הם יעשו בו משפט וידינו לא תהיה בו . . . ואפשר שעל נדון דידן נאמר מורידין מאחר שכתב הרב מהר”ד ה”ל האב”ד דק”ק ה”ל שדעתו לעשות כפרה והיה כל ימיו חוטא גדול ופושע, נאמר לישרי’ ביה גודא רבא ואף אם יאמר שרוצה לעשות תשובה ולפי דעתי על אלו אמרו חז”ל אין נחת רוח בתשובתן של רשעים להקב”ה כי ראה עצמו ביד גוים רוצה לרמות אותנו, אבל להפריז ממון לפדות אותו בשביל שאומר שרוצה לעשות תשובה זה הוא חילול השם שיאמרו אין עונש שפיכות דמים אצל יהודים נחשב חטא והיה אם גוי יהרוג ח”ו ליהודי ג”כ לא ידונו לעשות נקמה. ותמיד אני צועק ככרוכיא על מנהיגי הדור שכל גנב או חוטא שבא למאסר עושין השתדלות לפדות אותו ע”י שחדים דבר זה בעו”ה מרבה פשעים וגניבות כל א’ עושה מה שלבו חפץ ורבו פריצי הדור כאלו אנחנו רואים בעו”ה רוב גנבי ישראל ע”כ שלא לתת פרוטה לפוטרו ממות.
Isn’t it amazing that hundreds of years ago he was condemning the leaders who think that every thief or sinner who goes to jail should be the focus of pidyon shevuyim? From this responsum we learn that the warped values we have seen these last few years go back a long time. And what is one to make about his statement that the majority of thieves are Jewish? (using the language of Avodah Zarah 70a). I pray we never reach this point, although we probably have to do keriah over the fact that the Agudah spokesmen have been insistent in letters to the editor and in interviews that Orthodox Jews are not more dishonest than anyone else. In other words, no one, neither Jew nor non-Jew, even assumes anymore that being an Orthodox Jew means that you hold yourself to a high ethical standard. Their goal now is to convince the public that when it comes to obeying the law, Orthodox Jews (and their institutions) are simply no worse than everyone else. If that is not an indictment of our entire educational system, I don’t know what is.
For those interested in pursuing further the topic of Jewish murderers, here is a nineteenth-century responsum by the Moroccan R. Joseph Berdugo (Divrei Yosef no. 381).

10 Le-Dor Aharon (Brooklyn, 1937), p. 36. In this letter R. Chaim Ozer uses the expression והנני חותם בברכה , and this also appears in his supposed letter to Bloch.
11 In my Studies in Maimonides, I tried to show that “academic” interpretations of Maimonides can also be found in the most traditional sources. The same thing can be done with regard to the Talmud, and Prof. Halivni has cited many examples of traditionalists who offered explanations of the sort he focuses on (Higher Criticism). When “academic” explanations are found in rishonim, even the most conservative will be hesitant to attack them. But that was not always the case a few hundred years ago. For example, R. Nissim writes as follows in his commentary on the Rif, Megillah 26a, s.v. zo divrei R. Menahem:
ודאמרינן במעמדות לאו דוקא ומשום אשגרת לישן נקטיה
(This same view is actually advocated by Ramban, as noted in Gilyon ha-Shas, Megillah 26a.) This was too much for R. David Pardo, Mikhtam le-David, Orah Hayyim no. 14:
מלבד הלחץ זה הדחק שסובל הדבר בעצמו לומר דהש”ס וכל הפוס’ מעתיקי הש”ס נקטו באשגרת לישן מלתא דשקרא ממש דבר זר ורחוק.
12 Paamei Yaakov, Adar II 5768, p. 108.
13 The Talmud deals there with how even the desire of one of the parties in a dispute to give a gift to a rabbi who will rule on the case impairs his objectivity. This talmudic passage provides all the explanation one needs to understand how so many learned rabbis remained silent as the Tropper scandal played out. If amoraim admitted that they couldn’t properly judge a matter if they had only been offered a gift, certainly one in our day who actually received such a gift is not capable of judging the case of his benefactor. The Steipler refused to take as much as a cigarette from one of his admirers whose case he was to judge, and continued to refuse gifts from this person even after the case was concluded. See Avraham Yeshayahu Kanievsky, Toldot Yaakov (Bnei Brak, 1995), p. 208.
With regard to the more troubling (and I believe rare) circumstance of rabbis who will actually lie to benefit themselves, I have a number of sources on this. For now, let me just cite the words of the Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 314:1:
הכהנים חשודים להטיל מום בבכור אפילו אם הוא חכם ויושב בישיבה
As for the sordid details of the Tropper scandal itself, and those who refused at first to believe what they heard with their own ears (not to mention the Elon scandal as well as others), here is what the hasidic master, R. Meshulam Feivish Heller (died 1794), had to say in an earlier era, a presumably holier era as yet uncontaminated by television and the internet (Yosher Divrei Emet [Jerusalem, 1974]), p. 113:
והלא ידוע ומפורסם שיש בעוה”ר כמה לומדים שהם בעלי ניאוף רח”ל, ובעלי עבירות ידועים.
R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira, Divrei Torah 5:82, writes about
הרבנים ובפרט האדמורי”ם הגונבים דעת ולבות הבריות, וכל כונתם אך לטובתם, בעצמם בגופם ובשרם וממונם ותאותם.
This is what the Ropshitzer is reported to have said:
דעו כי קודם ביאת המשיח יתרבה כ”כ השקר בעולם עד שרב העיר יסע יחדו עם אשה נכריה בעגלה אחת, ורבים מבני העיר יאמרו אחריו אין קדוש כמוהו.
R. Isaiah Asher Zelig Margulies, Ashrei ha-Ish (Jerusalem, 1927), p. 49, who records the saying, assumes that the Gentile woman spoken of really means “heresy”, but I don’t know why it should not be understood literally. It is not like the Ropshitzer was confronted with many secularly educated rabbis that he would need to make such a statement. (I assume that Margulies was led to his assumption by Maimonides’ famous letter to R. Jonathan of Lunel, where he speaks of non-Torah studies—which for Margulies equals heresy—as being נשים נכריות . See Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Sheilat, vol. 2, p. 502.)
Since a concern with kavod is also so often present in the various scandals, the following comment by R. Elimelech of Lizhensk is noteworthy (quoted in Or Elimelekh [Jerusalem, 2003], no. 75):
מצוה עם כבוד גרוע יותר מעבירות ניאוף רח”ל.
14 See the text of the Rav’s lecture here.
15 See R. Aharon Perlow, Margaliyot ha-Shas al Masekhet Shabbat (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 471.
16 Likutei Avraham (Jerusalem, 1976), p. 319.
17 Sedei Hemed, maarekhet lamed, kelal 108.
18 See also Alan Brill’s recent post here.
19 For an example of genealogy in the reverse direction – i.e., from righteous to wicked, see Rashi to I Kings 10:1, where it very strangely states that Nebuchanezar was the son of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. This only appears in the later printed editions of Rashi, and is cited in the name of R. Isaac Luria. It is difficult to know what to make of this. I find it hard to believe that the passage ever could have been meant literally, since Solomon lived some three hundred years before Nebuchadnezar. Even legends, if understood literally, have to make chronological sense. Perhaps it means that the origin of the later disaster involving Nebuchadnezar can be traced to Solomon involving himself with foreign women such as the Queen of Sheba. In other words, not that Solomon is the literal father of Nebuchadnezar, but rather he is his “ultimate cause”.
As for the ultimate origin of the notion that Solomon was Nebuchadnezar’s father, I have been unable to find any other source that records that this was stated by R. Isaac Luria. R. Menahem Azariah de Fano (1548-1620), Asarah Maamarot (Jerusalem, 2005), pp. 412-413 (Maamar Eim Kol Hai 2:23), states that Nebuchadnezar descended from Solomon. Two points are significant here. First, he does not say that Solomon is his father, and second, he does not attribute this to any source, which presumably means that it was a well-known kabbalistic idea. R. Jehiel ben Solomon Heilprin, Seder ha-Dorot, year 2935, states that according to a Midrash, Solomon fathered a daughter with the Queen, and Nebuchadnezar was her son. R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, Midbar Kedemot, maarekhet yod, no. 47, claims that Nebuchadnezar was descended from this daughter. See also R. Joseph Palache, Yosef et Ehav (n.p., 2005), maarekhet bet, no. 17.
20 למדו תורה . This should probably be read as לימדו תורה , “taught Torah”, since in the parallel text in Gittin 57b it has למדו תינוקות, which means “taught children”. See also Dikdukei Soferim, Sanhedrin 96b.
21 To give just one, here is a page from R. Nissim Gaon’s Sefer ha-Mafteah to Berakhot 27b.


Note how Jacob Goldenthal, the editor, assumes that it is actually Haman from whom R. Akiva is descended! Jacob Reifman agreed with this. See Iggeret Bikoret, ed. Ben Menahem (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 17. Louis Finkelstein, Akiba, p. 321 speaks of the R. Akiva-Sisera connection as a “legend widely repeated in medieval works.” He doesn’t seem to realize that the medieval works were citing from their texts of the Talmud. See also Dikdukei Soferim, Sanhedrin 96b, which cites one such manuscript.




Seforim for Sale, List II

Seforim for Sale, List II
by: Eliezer Brodt
This is the second list of out-of-print seforim.  At the end of the list I provide suggestions, divided by subject matter.  Additionally, where appropriate I have provided information about specific titles.
Most of the titles mentioned here are out of print and, for some of the listed titles; there are only a few copies available. For example, for-some of the titles there are only two copies available for sale while others there are many more available. Thus, these books are on a first come first serve basis. These books will not be available much longer. All these books are brand new and are in mint condition.

Special: If one buys five books he will receive a ten percent discount off that total (not including the shipping). If one buys ten or more books he will receive twenty percent off that total (not including the shipping).
How to Order:  E-mail your order to EliezerSeforim-at-gmail.com. I will than send you a bill based on what is available, sale is first come first serve. Payment has to be done Via Pay Pal. Shipping is available, it’s about $5 a sefer (on average size seforim, some of the books are over sized so they cost a little more to mail). If one buys 5 seforim the price on shipping, goes down a bit. All books will be air mailed out shortly after I receive the money. All questions about information of the seforim should be sent to the above e-mail address. I will be putting up another list or two soon enough. Enjoy!

 I received requests to give a bit of details on the seforim. I will try to in this list for some of the titles. I will also give some details for the ones I mentioned in the first list.

Second list:
Philosophy:

פילוסופיא: א. תורת העיקרים מאת מנחם קלנר, 238 עמודים, כריכה רכה,  $10This is a translation of his book Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought  ב. עמודי המחשבה הישראלית, שמחה בונם אורבעך- חלק ג' מנשתו הפילוסופית של ר' חסדאי קרשקש 442 עמודים, $14This work is very important if one wants to make a brave attempt to understand R. Crescas complex Philosophy. ג. המחשבה היהודית בימי הביניים, המשך או מפנה, ד"ר נחום אריאלי, תשנ"ה, כריכה רכה, 293 עמודים $11The author is the son of R. Yitzchak Arielie, author of Eynayim Lemishpat (in yeshiva world terms he is the uncle of R. Asher Arielie).

 
Minhag/Halacha

מנהגהלכה
ד. מנהג אשכנז הקדמון ,ישראל תא שמע, ספר חשוב מאוד, $16For anyone involved on any level with the topic of development of Minhaghim this is a very important work. The book includes an in depth overview on Minhag Askenaz and has nineteen chapters dealing with specific topics, ten related to Shabbas, four related to Pesach and five related to Tefilah.

 
Biblical Period

תקופת המקרא:ה. איורי תנ"ך עבריים מלנינגרד, כריכה רכה, $15This work is ILLUMINATIONS FROM HEBREW BIBLES OF LENINGRAD originally published by Baron Ginsburg includes an introduction and New Descriptions by Bezalel Narkiss, 220 pages. [The facsimile editions of the paintings are sold for a few hundred dollars if someone is interested I can get a very reduced price for them.]
ו..תרגום ואגדה בו – אביגדור שנאן $16
This is an important book related to the agadah statements found in Targum Yonason Ben Uziel.

ז.מחקרים בתולדות ישראל – תקופות המקרא, 508 עמודים, כריכה רכה, $15This is a collection of twenty six articles focusing on many aspects related to Tanach.ח.מיהושע ועד יאשיהו $17
Talmudic Period
תקופת התלמוד
ט. הקהילה היהודית בארץ-ישראל בתקופת המשנה והתלמוד– זאב ספראי  $17
י.מחורבן לתקומה, $17
יא.מחקרים בתולדות ישראל, תקופות המשנה והתלמוד, 408 עמודים, כריכה רכה, $15

This is a collection of twenty articles focusing on many aspects related to the Mishana and Talmud
 
Geonic Period

  תקופת הגאונים:יב.לתולדות נוסח השאילתות ירחמיאל ברודי $9
יג.משלי סעיד בן באבשאד, מכון יצחק בן צבי, מהדיר: עזרא פליישר, 319 עמודים, $14 (ספר זה נכתב בסוף תקופות הגאונים, והוא בא מקארו גניזה).
Medieval Period
תקופת הראשונים -ימי הבינים
יד. תרבות וחברה בתולדות ישראל בימי הבינים $20This is an excellent collection of articles related to history of Middle ages, 734 pages featuring articles from many big Guns of the academic world.

טו. מורשת ספרד $20

This work is an excellent collection of articles related to Spanish Jewry, 760 pages.טז.מחובות הלבבות לשירת הלבבות $17Haskalah
השכלה
יז. מגמות וצורות בספרות ההשכלה, $16

יח. השכלה והיסטוריה: תולדותיה של הכרת-עבר יהודית מודרנית, 523 עמודים, ש. פיינר $17.
יט.הקרע שלא נתאחה: פרישת האורתודוקסים מכלל הקהילות בהונגריה ובגרמניה– יעקב כ"ץ $15

This is a hard cover edition the edition being sold currently by Shazar is paperback.
 
Biography

אישים:
כ.החכם המופלא – הרב שלמה הכהן אהרנסון הרב הראשי הראשון של תל אביב חייו ופעלו- יצחק אלפסי, 224 עמודים, $14

כא.בקורות ומסה, דוד תמר, אישים וספרים, – מקובלי צפת וירושלים צרפת מיורן וטבריה, יוצרים ויצירות בחכמת ישראל ובספרות העברית. ראובן מס תשל"ג, 203 עמודים, $12
Misc.
נושאים שונים
כב.ארוס אירוסין ואיסורים: מיניות ומשפחה בהיסטוריה 427 עמודים, $17
כג. קורות – כרך ט חוברת יא-יב תשנ"ב, בטאון לתולדות הרפואה ולמדעי הטבע 270 עמודים, כריכה רכה, חלק בעברית וחלק באנגליש $12This particular volume has a collection of very nice articles. Some are related to Milah, one on Leprosy and some on other very interesting medical topics.
כד. קדושת החיים וחירוף הנפש: קובץ מאמרים $15This is a hard cover version the version being sold currently by Shazar is paperback. This is an excellent collection of articles related to Kiddish Hashem throughout Jewish history.
שואה:כה. האנציקלופדיה של השואה ה' חלקים (סט) $85

פיוט -שירה:
כו.השירה העברית בצפון אפריקה $16
כז.עיונים בשירת המזמורים העברית והאוגריתית $15
כח.השיר דבור על אופניו מאת דן פגיס עריכה עזרא פליישר $17
כט. יסודי צורות הפיוט $8

לשון:
ל.עיונים בבלשנות עברית $17
לא. צורות הקשר והפסק בעברית שבמקרא $18

שונות:

לב. ספרייה וספר בארץ-ישראל בשלהי התקופה העות'מאנית $17

לג. ברנר, אסתרקה, וייצמן השני $12

לד. מנחה לשרה, מחקרים בפילוסופיה יהודית ובקבלה מוגשים לפרופסור שרה א' הלר וילנסקי, $17

לה. תרבות והיסטוריה, עורך יוסף דן, 201 עמודים, כריכה קשה,$11

1. The Elders in Ancient Israel $14
2.Historical Geography of the Bible: The Tribal Territories of Israel  Special price for this book is $75

3.Anthology of Hassidic music Special price for this book is $90

4. Chess in Jewish History and Hebrew Literature $35

5. The Land That Became Israel: Studies in Historical Geography $15

In my first list I tried to include books on wide ranging topics.
Chazal:
If one is interested in Works of Chazal than I recommend item number eighteen. This is a critical edition of the work Pisron Torah, a pretty unknown lost likut of medrashi Chazal (which has been unavailable for a while). The Medrashim are related to Chumash Vayikra, Bamedbar and Devarim. [As an interesting note, R Chaim Kanievsky quotes this work in his writings.] This edition was annotated by E.E. Auerbach and includes a extensive introduction about the work from him. Yakov Zussman refers to this Medrash in his article where he deals with E.Aurbach and his works:ליקוט המדרשים המיוחד במינו מבחינות הרבה (מוסף מדעי היהדות, תשנ"ג, עמ' 107). Rishonim:Three works of critical edition of Rishonim are items number fourת fourteen and fifteen. Item number four is a critical edition of the Kimchi Family on Mishlei the most famous of them being the Radak, it is 569 pages. Number fourteen is a very important collection of Shut from the Rishonim. In an article about the editor of this work E. Kuffer, Professor Ta Shema writes:יותר מכל אלה נתפרסמה בין הלומדים מהדורת תשובות ופסקים מאת חכמי אשכנז וצרפת ספר זה רב הכמות ורב האיכות, לא מש משולחנם של העוסקים בספרות הרבנית של ימי הביניים, לא רק משום תוכנו המקורי והחשוב, אלא גם על שום הערותיו המחכימות של המהדיר המלוות את הספר לכל אורכו, ומפנות את המעיין אל הקשרן הרחב יותר של התשובות (כנסת מחקרים עיונים בספרות הרבנית בימי הביניים כרך ד, עמ' 349).PiyyutIf one is interested in Piyyut I included six titles, 3 of them being texts with critical editions (# 8-10), (#16) a work of a Rishon related to Piyyut (very hard to find for a while) and two volumes of academic works on the topic from some of the experts in the field (# 7,27). Especially worth noting is #27 as it is a very nice size volume (683 pps.) of the collected writings of M. Zulai on the topic of piut which has been out of print for some time.
History Of Chazal era:
If one is interested in the history of Chazal (specifically Mishna era) and time of the Beis ha-Mikdash I highly recommend the excellent work of collected articles from S. Safrai. These two volumes (# 5) have been out of print for some time. For another book related to Talmud see item number three.
Another very important title is the collected writings of E. Auerbach. This valuable collection of two volumes of articles includes many of the over three hundred articles which he wrote of all fields related to his many areas of expertise. Starting from the time period of Chazal and going through Rishonim and Achronim. Dealing with various specific incidents, some texts of Rishonim and of course some of his famous book reviews. These volumes have been out of print for some time and were expensive when they were in print. Another important and useful book is number twenty this is a nice collection of articles related to many different aspects revolving around the Asres Hadebros.
Dead Sea Scrolls:
If one is interested in the Dead Sea scrolls there are two titles (# 17,26). Of special interest in this area is book number seventeen as it includes three works in one volume of Lawrence Schiffman on the topic a renowned expert in this field. It has been unavailable for some time.
History of Sixteenth century:
If one is interested in the history of the Jews in the sixteenth and seventeenth century especially in Poland and Germany I highly recommend this now classic work in the field from Yakov Elbaum (#1). It has not been available for some time it includes a wealth of information about this very important time period. Another important title (#2) also from Yakov Elbaum is Teshuvos Halev Vekabalos Yisurim. This is a very useful book on the topic of Teshuva in the writings of the Chachmei Poland and Ashkenaz from 1348-1648. Another book on Poland and Lithuania is item number nineteen.
Kabbalah:
If one is interested in a book related to history of Kabbalah I recommend the volume Al Hakedusha from Joseph Dan. Of course I must point out item number twenty eight, Binyan Ariel related to the Kabalah of Arizal and R Chaim Vital which has caused much controversy in the past.
Aleph Beis:
If one is looking for works on the development of the writing of the Aleph beis there are two out of print works from Yosef Nevah items number twenty two and twenty three on the list.
Folklore:
If one is interested in Jewish Folklore I highly recommended item number twenty five a collection of some articles of the famous Dov Sadan on the topic (one nice chapter is related to Hamantaschen).
If one is looking for a nice work of short articles on various Achronim I recommend item number twenty four.
Item number twenty one is a book from R Yechazkel Abramasky son for some reason I could not find mention of him in the recent book on Rav Abramsky (perhaps I did not look hard enough).




Marc Shapiro: R. Kook on Sacrifices & Other Assorted Comments

R. Kook on Sacrifices and Other Assorted Comments
by: Marc B. Shapiro

1. At the beginning of my previous post (the Gurock review) I mentioned R. Solomon Isaac Scheinfeld (1860-1943). The source of the comment I quote is his Olam ha-Sheker (Milwaukee, 1936), p. 77.1 Scheinfeld was the unofficial chief rabbi in Milwaukee, arriving there in 1902 and serving until his death in 1943. Here is his picture.

He had a traditional education, having studied for three years in the Kovno Kollel under R. Isaac Elhanan Spektor, from whom he received semikhah.2 He also had a very original mind, and wrote a number of books and essays. One of his most fascinating works is the article he published under the pseudonym Even Shayish. In this article he argued that since sacrifices will never be revived, they are now irrelevant to Judaism and all references to them should be removed from the prayer book.
R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg has a lengthy essay in which he critiques Scheinfeld’s position. A Hebrew translation of this essay appears in volume 2 of Kitvei R. Weinberg. Yet Weinberg himself leaves open the possibility that there won’t be a return to sacrifices (p. 255):
אין דנים כאן על עצם הרעיון היסודי של הקרבנות. לו היתה היום קיימת אצלנו שאלה כזאת והיא דורשת פתרון דחוף – אין מספר מצומצם של יהודים בארץ אחת בני סמכות להכריע בענין זה, וכל שכן כאשר הם אינם מייצגים את כלל ישראל. שאלה זאת חייבים להביא לפני הבית דין של כלל ישראל. רק לבית דין כזה הרשות לקבוע אם להשאיר טקס מקודש בעם בתוקפו או לבטלו. היום שאין לנו ארץ ולא בית המקדש ולא כהנים הרי זה מגוחך ומצער כאחת להעלות תביעה לבטל עבודת קרבנות!
Weinberg doesn’t mention Maimonides, but this is usually to where people turn when seeking to argue against a revival of sacrifices. According to the Guide 3:32, Maimonides thought that sacrifices were a concession to the masses’ primitive religious notions, developed in an idolatrous society. While Maimonides is explicit in the Mishneh Torah that there will be a return of the sacrificial order, his reason for sacrifices offered in the Guide led some people to assume that his true opinion was that there will not be sacrifices in the future. One example is R. Simhah Paltrovitch, Simhat Avot (New York, 1917), pp. 7-8, who offers a mystical approach:
אמנם מה נעשה במה שדברי מורנו ורבנו הרמב”ם ז”ל שהוא בסברתו מתנגד לאלה הדברים, ואומר כי בימים הבאים עת קץ משיחנו, יבוטל עבודה בקרבנות ולא יהיה עוד . . . להעולם הזה נתנו הפשט והדרוש, ובעולם השני יקויים הרמז והסוד . . .וכן ממש הוא טעם של הרמב”ם ז”ל שיבוטל הקרבנות, כי אז יהי’ התורה על צד הרמז וסוד כמו שארי המצוות המבוארות בתורה, כי יתחלפון מן הפשט לרמז וסוד שמשונים מן הפשט.
R. Joseph Messas also cites Maimonides’ reason for sacrifices and concludes that there will be no return of the sacrificial order (Otzar ha-Mikhtavim, vol. 2, no. 1305).
לפי”ז יתבטלו לעתיד כל הקרבנות כי זה אלפי שנים משנעקרה ע”ז מישראל, וישראל גוי אחד, עובדים רק לאל אחד ועל ידי ישראל בגלותם נעקרה ע”ז גם מכל האומות.
What about the problem that the abolition of sacrifices would mean a change in Torah law, which is a point that R. Kook will also deal with? Messas answers simply:
ואין בזה שנוי בתורה חלילה, דזיל בתר טעמא
What this means, I think, is that from the beginning sacrifices were only intended to be offered in a society in which people were attached to primitive religious notions associated with idolatry, and the animal sacrifices that went along with this. However, once this era has passed from the scene, then there will no longer be any obligation for sacrifices.

A really shocking comment against sacrfices appears in a supposed letter from R. Yaakov of Lissa to R. Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (published in Ha-Posek, Kislev 5712). Responding to Kalischer’s advocacy of renewing sacrifices even before the coming of the Messiah, R. Yaakov claims that to do so would cause Jews to be a subject of mockery by the Gentiles and the non-religious Jews.

לבי נוקף ונפשי מלא רטט ורעד כי אם ישמעו הגויים והקלים בישראל שאנחנו מקריבים קרבנות ימלאו שחוק פיהם ונהיה 
ח”ו ללעג ולקלס וה’ יודע כמה צרות וקלקולים יצמחו מזה

It is very unlikely, to put it mildly, that a gadol be-Yisrael would give this as his reason for not fulfilling a mitzvah. When one realizes that the person who published this letter was the famous forger Chaim Bloch, then all doubts are removed: The letter, like so much else published by Bloch, is a complete forgery. Apparently Bloch had some negative feelings about sacrifices and transferred them to R. Yaakov. Interestingly, when this letter was republished in Dovev Siftei Yeshenim, vol. 1, Bloch made a subtle change in the letter, which as far as I know, no one has yet pointed out. The letter’s authenticity had been attacked by Zvi Harkavy in Kol Torah (Nisan-Iyar 5712), and one of the things he pointed to was this line, and that R. Yaakov could never have written it. So when Bloch republished the letter, in an attempt to bolster its authenticity, he altered it to read as follows (I have underlined the newly added words):

כי אם ישמעו הגויים והקלים בישראל שאנחנו מקריבים קרבנות בזמן הזה לפני ביאת משיח צדקנו ובטרם עומד בית מקדשנו 
על מכונו, ימלאו שחוק פיהם ונהיה ח”ו ללעג ולקלס

Had he been smart enough to have added these extra words in the first edition of his forgery, it would have been more believable. Now R. Yaakov is not speaking of the non-Jews and the non-religious mocking the offering of sacrifices, but only mocking the offering of them before the coming of the Messiah and the building of the Temple.

Michael Friedlaender’s The Jewish Religion (London, 1891), was for many years regarded as a standard work of Orthodox belief. As far as I know, it was the first of its kind in English and can still hold its own against many more recently published books. You can see it here. On pages 162-163, 417-418, he speaks of the return of the sacrificial order in Messianic days, and how we should look forward to this, even if it is contrary to our taste. He says that we should not model Divine Law according to our liking, but rather model our liking according to the will of God. Yet despite these strong statements, he was also sensitive to those who were not comfortable with sacrifices. He writes as follows (p. 452):

References to the Sacrificial Service, and especially prayers for its restoration, are disliked by some, who think such restoration undesirable. Let no one pray for a thing against his will; let him whose heart is not with his fellow-worshippers in any of their supplications silently substitute his own prayers for them; but let him not interfere with the devotion of those to whom “the statues of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart” . . . and who yearn for the opportunity of fulfilling Divine commandments which they cannot observe at present.

This passage is quoted by British Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz in his Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 532. Upon seeing this, R. Yerucham Leiner, then living in London, wrote a letter to the Jewish Chronicle (Dec. 17, 1943; I learnt of this from Louis Jacobs, Tree of Life, second ed., p. xxix). Before quoting from his letter, let me reproduce what Wikipedia says about this most incredible figure.

Grand Rabbi Yerucham Leiner of Radzin, son of Likutei Divrei Torah, author of Tiferes Yerucham, Zikaron LaRishonim, Mipi Hashmua, Zohar HaRakiya. Moved from Chelm to London to America. Continuation of the Radziner line in America, and one of the last direct descendants of the Leiner family. After the war, he did not reinstitute the wearing of techeiles as other branches of Radzin did, even though his father, Grand Rabbi Avraham Yehoshua Heschel Leiner of Radzin-Chelm, wore them, as he was a chosid of his older brother, the Orchos Chayim, who had reinstituted the wearing of techeiles. Reb Yerucham believed that the original formula of his uncle was lost during the war. This is the reason that his family doesn’t wear techeiles today, only pairs that were left from pre-war Europe. Reb Yerucham was an expert in all areas of Torah and scholarship. There existed very few admorim/tzaddikim since the beginning of Chassidus who were also lamdanim in both the Polish and Lithuanian styles of learning, bibliographers, Jewish historians, very learned in Kabbalah works, philologists, and masters of both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. Reb Yerucham was very close with the Satmar Rebbe, Rabbi Yoelish Teitelbaum ZTVK”L. He always made sure to spend a few weeks vacationing with the him, specifically learning Midrashei Chazal, of which they were both masters. He studied and visited with Rabbi Yitzchok Hutner, and they were good friends in later life. They always treated one another with special respect. He established the Radziner shtiebel in Boro Park. Died 20 Av 5724 (1964). Buried in Beth Israel Cemetery, Woodbridge, New Jersey

Responding to the quote from Friedlaender, Leiner wrote: “This opinion was put forward by the founders of Reform Judaism, Holdheim and Geiger. But it is hardly in accord with Orthodox traditions of Judaism.” The editor of the Jewish Chronicle responsed: “The words quoted with regard to the Musaph are those of the great and sainted scholar, Dr. Michael Friedlander, for 42 years Principal of Jews College: and it is certainly strange to class him with Holdheim and Geiger.”

The most famous of our sages to speak of a Messianic era without animal sacrifices is, of course, R. Kook, who envisions vegetable sacrifices. He writes this in his commentary to the siddur, Olat ha-Reiyah, vol. 1, p. 292. In the preface R. Zvi Yehudah tells us that he began writing this commentary during World War I. I don’t need to go into any detail on this, as I have done so already in The Limits of Orthodox Theology, where I also mention passages in R. Kook’s writings that offer a different approach. The notion that there will only be vegetable sacrifices in Messianic days is, of course, a radical position, and many who don’t know R. Kook’s writings find it impossible to accept that he could have said this. This is what happened when R. Yosef Kanefsky of Los Angeles published an essay in which he mentioned R. Kook’s view.3 He was attacked by some prominent rabbis since they found it impossible to believe that R. Kook could say what was attributed to him. Yet it was Kanefsky who was right, not his opponents.

In my book I dealt with R. Kook’s position on sacrifices, because positing that there will be no sacrifices in the future would seem to be in contradiction to Maimonides’ Principle that the commandments of the Torah are eternal. That consideration is precisely what makes his position so radical. A couple of years ago one of R. Kook’s notebooks dating from his time as rabbi in Bausk, which lasted until 1904, was published. We actually have two publications of this, one by Boaz Ofen called Kevatzim mi-Ketav Yad Kodsho, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 2008), and the other, which comes out of the world of Merkaz ha-Rav, called Pinkesei ha-Reiyah (Jerusalem, 2008).

This is not the first competing publications of the same material by these people, and as I will show in my forthcoming book, the Merkaz editions are tainted by censorship in that “problematic” passages are removed.4 Those who claim to be the greatest adherents of R. Kook have once again taken it upon themselves to save their master from himself, as it were, and decided which writings of R. Kook should appear and which should not. Yet in the passage I am interested in now (no. 8 in the Ofen edition and no. 6 in the Merkaz edition), the two books are identical. The passage is very significant since it shows you that even in his earlier years R. Kook had the same notion later expressed in Olat ha-Reiyah, that the future would only know vegetable sacrifices. (In case people are wondering, R. Kook was not a vegetarian. Yet he did see vegetarianism as part of the eschatological future. His great student, the Nazir, was a vegetarian, as was Nazir’s son-in-law, R. Shlomo Goren, and as is his son, R. Shear Yashuv Cohen.5)

This passage gives us new insight into R. Kook’s view of sacrifices, and how things will change in the future era. He begins by speaking of the abandonment of meat-eating in the Messianic era, since this will not be something that people desire. Recall that in speaking of eating meat, the Torah writes (Deut. 12:6): כי תאוה נפשך לאכל בשר, which means “when thy soul desires to eat meat.” The Messianic era is not a time when people will have this desire, as R. Kook also explains in his famous essay on vegetarianism, “Afikim ba-Negev”.

What about the sacrifices that are required by the Torah? R. Kook offers a few possibilities. One is that sacrifices will still be necessary. Yet he also speculates that perhaps certain animals will be so spiritually advanced that they will on their own offer themselves as sacrifices, in acknowledgment of the great benefit that will come to them and the world through their actions.6 This solves the problem of people deliberately killing animals, which goes against his conception of the eschaton.

What is most interesting for our purpose is another suggestion by R. Kook, namely, that the Sanhedrin will use its power to uproot a matter from the Torah in order to abolish obligatory animal sacrifices. Their reason for doing this will be that the killing of animals will no longer be part of the culture in Messianic days. R. Kook even shows how the Rabbis will be able to find support for this step from the Torah. What he is doing, I think, is imagining himself as part of the future Sanhedrin that abolishes sacrifices, and informing us of the derashah that will be used to support this. This is related to what I wrote in an earlier post, see here, and I repeat it now:

As to the general problem of laws that trouble the ethical sense of people, we find that it is R. Kook who takes the bull by the horns and suggests a radical approach. The issue was much more vexing for R. Kook than for other sages, as in these types of matters he could not simply tell people that their consciences were leading them astray and that they should submerge their inherent feelings of right and wrong. It is R. Kook, after all, who famously says that fear of heaven cannot push aside one’s natural morality (Shemonah Kevatzim 1:75):

אסור ליראת שמים שתדחק את המוסר הטבעי של האדם, כי אז אינה עוד יראת שמים טהורה. סימן ליראת שמים טהורה הוא, כשהמוסר הטבעי, הנטוע בטבע הישר של האדם, הולך ועולה על פיה במעלות יותר גבוהות ממה שהוא עומד מבלעדיה. אבל אם תצוייר יראת שמים בתכונה כזאת, שבלא השפעתה על החיים היו החיים יותר נוטים לפעול טוב, ולהוציא אל הפועל דברים מועילים לפרט ולכלל, ועל פי השפעתה מתמעט כח הפועל ההוא, יראת שמים כזאת היא יראה פסולה.

These are incredible words. R. Kook was also “confident that if a particular moral intuition reflecting the divine will achieves widespread popularity, it will no doubt enable the halakhic authorities to find genuine textual basis for their new understanding.” R. Kook formulates his idea as follows (Iggerot ha-Reiyah, vol. 1, p. 103):

ואם תפול שאלה על איזה משפט שבתורה, שלפי מושגי המוסר יהיה נראה שצריך להיות מובן באופן אחר, אז אם באמת ע”פ ב”ד הגדול יוחלט שזה המשפט לא נאמר כ”א באותם התנאים שכבר אינם, ודאי ימצא ע”ז מקור בתורה.

R. Kook is not speaking about apologetics here, but a revealing of Torah truth that was previously hidden. The truth is latent, and with the development of moral ideas, which is driven by God, the new insight in the Torah becomes apparent.

Ad kan leshoni in the previous post.

In other words, R. Kook sees the Sanhedrin as able to actualize new moral and religious insights that have become apparent. That is why it is important for the Sanhedrin to use derashot when dealing with these matters, as this shows that the idea is not something new that has been developed, but something that was latent in the Torah, and only now has become apparent.

So what derashah can be used to justify an abolishment of animal sacrifices? R. Kook points to Num 28:2: את קרבני לחמי לאשי . This is usually translated as “My food which is presented to Me for offerings made by fire”. Yet the word לחמי actually means “my bread.” Right after this, in discussing the particulars of the sacrifice, the Torah states: “The one lamb thou shalt offer in the morning.” R. Kook’s proposed messianic derashah is: “Whenever animals are killed for personal consumption, you should use them for sacrifices, but when they are not killed for personal use, make sacrifices of bread.”

I don’t think I am exaggerating in saying that this is one of the most provocative and radical texts in R. Kook’s writings. I say this not because of his advocacy of abolishing sacrifices, which I don’t think to be that significant in the larger scheme, but due to how he is envisioning the process by which the Rabbis will actually use derashot to create a Messianic Judaism.

The Rambam, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1, speaks of laws derived from the hermeneutical principles that can be altered by a future beit din ha-gadol (even one not as great as the one that established the original law). This was the great fear of the opponents of a reconstituted Sanhedrin, that the Mizrachi rabbis would take upon themselves to do precisely this. Since so many of our laws are based on derashot, Judaism as we practice it can be entirely reworked. R. Kook is showing us how this can be done, but he is going further than anything Maimonides envisioned, since sacrifices are not matters that have been established based on a rabbinic derashah but are commanded by explicit biblical verses.

Basically, what R. Kook is doing is recreating the world of the Pharisees, before Judaism was bound to codes (beginning with the Mishnah). It was a time when Jewish law was developing and the biblical verses could be read—some would say “read”— in all sorts of ways. In the days of the Pharisees much of the halakhah as we know it was created, and to a large extent that can be done again in the Messianic era.
Here are R. Kook’s words (note also his exegesis with ריח ניחוח) :

שהסנהדרין אז ימצאו לנכון, ע”פ הכח שיש להם לעקור דבר מה”ת בשוא”ת, לפטור מקרבנות החובה של מין החי, כיון שכבר חדלה הריגת החי מן המנהג של תשמישי הרשות והמקרא מסייע, שקרא הכתוב לקרבן לחם, “את קרבני לחמי לאשי”, ואח”כ אומר “את הכבש אחד”, הא כיצד? כל זמן שבע”ח קרבים לתשמיש הרשות, עשה בע”ח לגבוה, אבל כשבע”ח אינם קרבים לרשות, עשה הקרבנות מלחם, ועל זה רמזו חז”ל: “כל הקרבנות בטלין וקרבן תודה אינה בטלה” שיש בה לחם . . . רק כעת עד זמן ההשלמה תאמר להם שיקריבו כבשים, ומותנה תמיד לריח ניחוח, וכיון שיבורר בזמן ההשלמה שהריגת הבע”ח [אינה ראויה] אי אפשר שתהיה לריח ניחוח.

R. Kook then cites the proof he mentions in Olat ha-Reiyah and in his essay “Afikim ba-Negev” (Otzarot ha-Reiyah [Rishon le-Tziyon, 2002], vol. 2, p. 103), that Malachi 3:4 writes: וערבה לה’ מנחת יהודה וירושלים כימי עולם וכשנים קדמוניות . This verse, in speaking of a sacrificial offering in Messianic days, mentions the minhah sacrifice, which is not an animal offering.

As mentioned, the passage from R. Kook is so interesting because it shows that he was not merely thinking about the Messianic era, but also the actual functioning of the future Sanhedrin. He was imagining the derashot that could be used to “update” Judaism. I am unaware if this aspect of R. Kook’s thought was known before the publication of this latest volume. I also don’t know if any scholars have taken note of it even subsequent to the publication. However, in “Afikim ba-Negev” (Otzarot ha-Reiyah, vol. 2, p. 103), R. Kook also, in an offhand sentence, provides a possible derashah to justify the abolishment of sacrifices. He doesn’t develop the idea, but just puts it out there. Here is the sentence:

והגביל “לרצונכם תזבחהו” (ויקרא יט, ה) שיהיה אפשר וראוי לומר “רוצה אני”. (רש”י על ויקרא א, ג).

The Talmud, Rosh ha-Shanah 6a, which is quoted by Rashi, Lev, 1:3, states that one cannot bring a sacrifice unless it arises from one’s free will. Now the Talmud, which is speaking of one particular sacrifice, actually says that we force him to bring it until he agrees, and this means that he is “willing.” But R. Kook is using this passage to hint at a different matter. In future times, when sacrifices will be so far from human sentiment, it will be impossible to do it willingly. The derashah, לרצונכם תזבחהו , will then come into play. Since this teaches that one can only bring a sacrifice when one is willing, at a time when animal sacrifices are not considered acceptable, and thus not something people “want” to do, animal sacrifices will no longer be a requirement. Remember, R. Kook describes this future era as one in which the animals will be far advanced of what they are now. It is only when the animals are at the low state that they currently are, that we can offer them as sacrifices and eat them. He writes (Otzarot ha-Reiyah, vol. 2, p. 101), in a passage in which animals are compared to one’s children:

מי לא יבין שאי אפשר להעלות על הדעת שיקח האדם את בניו, ברוח אשר יטפחם וירבה אותם להיטיב ולהשכיל, ויזבחם וישפך דמם?

The texts we have seen are important in explaining how his viewpoint of the abolishment of sacrifices relates to the Ninth Principle of Maimonides. As mentioned, in my book I listed R. Kook’s view as being in opposition to the Principle. R. Kook is certainly great enough to disagree with Maimonides in this matter had he chosen to. Yet we see from his newly published writings that he would not have regarded himself in disagreement, because he understands the abolishment of sacrifices to be carried out in a purely halakhic fashion. Since the Rabbis have the exegetical authority to do such things, an authority given to them by the Torah, we are not speaking of a revision of Torah law. This case is then no different than any of the other examples where the Sages interpret Torah law different that the peshat of the verse.

Returning to the newly published text, R. Kook’s imagination continues to run, and he doesn’t stop with sacrifices. In my book I called attention to R. Hayyim Halberstam’s view that in Messianic days the first born will take the place of the kohanim. R. Kook must have been attracted to this view for kabbalistic reasons, and here he provides a possible basis for how this too can be justified by the Rabbis. He also notes that since the change can be justified, “it is not uprooting a Torah matter, but rather fulfilling the Torah.”! In other words, built into the Torah is the notion that the kohanim would only be temporarily in charge of the divine worship. R. Kook argues that since the First Born were removed from their role because of the sin of the Golden Calf, it is impossible for the effects of this sin to last forever, as repentance is a more powerful force. Therefore, when the sin of the Golden Calf is atoned for there will no longer any reason for the First Born to be kept from the Avodah, and it will return to them.

Following this, R. Kook offers another way of explaining why his view of sacrifices should not be seen as a “reform” or as evidence of the Torah changing (he obviously was sensitive to this point). He says ויש לדרוש, in other words, he is once again providing the halakhic justification that can be used by a future Sanhedrin in abolishing sacrifices. His new exegetical reasoning goes as follows: The obligation of animal sacrifices was only intended for an era when the kohanim were in charge of the Avodah. This is how one is to understand the verse (Lev. 11:1) ושחט אותו על ירך המזבח . . . וזרקו בני אהרן הכהנים את דמו. In other words, it is only to the descendants of Aaron that animal sacrifice is commanded,

אבל כשיהיו כשרים ג”כ בכורות, אז מטעם העילוי של בע”ח וכלל המציאות אין הבע”ח נהוגים כ”א לחם ומנחה . . . וכך הוא המדה בכל מקום שנמצא פסוק בתורה וסברא ישרה שיש כח ביד ב”ד הגדול, מכש”כ כבצירוף הנביאים לפסוק הוראת גדולות כאלה.

Note that R. Kook ties together a verse in the Torah with logic. When both are present, then the Beit Din ha-Gadol is able to act in order to make adjustments to Torah law. In this matter, the “sevarah yesharah” is the sense that animal sacrifices will not suitable for the future eschatological era, and the verses in the Torah that he cites give “cover” to the sevarah yesharah. That is, they provide the exegetical justification. (I wonder though, is R. Kook really correct when he implies that the only time the Sages could uproot a commandment was when they also had a biblical verse to justify this?)

R. Kook concludes that all that he is speaking about is a long way off, and it is possible that the Resurrection will come before this and then all sorts of things will change. Yet all his prior ruminations here are about a pre-Resurrection era, when the Beit Din ha-Gadol is functioning and adjusting Torah law by means of derashot and sevarah yesharah. This is not the sort of thing that will be taking place post-Resurrection.7

Finally, lest anyone start using R. Kook’s thoughts in an antinomian fashion, he throws in the following for good measure:

וזה היה מקור תרבות והרע ד”אחר”, שחזי שהמצות יש להן יחש מוגבל ותכליתי, חשב שבאמת אפשר להתעלות למעלה מהמעשים, גם בלא עת, ובאמת הכל אחדות יחיד היה הוה ויהיה, וכל עת וזמן את חובותיה נשמור, בלא נדנוד צל פקפוק.

Earlier in this post, I referred to the implications of R. Kook’s ideas with regard to Jewish law being adjusted because of new moral insights. In fact, I think it is R. Kook who provides the most comprehensive and satisfying approach to this issue. I don’t want to get into that subject at present, as I plan on returning to it, especially as a number of people have written to me about R. Kook’s views. In my future post I will illustrate my point by citing a number of examples of rulings and statements by mainstream halakhists from earlier centuries which could never be made today. The only way to explain this, I will argue, is that there has been a change in societal norms and this has made certain approaches not just practically impossible but simply wrong for our times. (See here where I cite in this regard R. Weinberg and R. Aviner.) However, I promised someone that I would give one example in this post, so here it is. R. Hayyim Benveniste, Keneset ha-Gedolah, Even ha-Ezer 154, Hagahot Beit Yosef no. 59, in discussing when we can force a husband to give a divorce, writes as follows:

ובעל משפט צדק ח”א סי’ נ”ט כתב דאפי’ רודף אחריה בסכין להכותה אין כופין אותו לגרש ואפי’ לו’ לו שחייב להוציא.

Can anyone imagine a posek, from even the most right-wing community, advocating such a viewpoint? I assume the logic behind this position is that even if the man is running after her with the knife, we don’t assume that he will actually kill her. He must just be doing it to scare her, and that is not enough of a reason to force him to divorce her. And if we are wrong, and he really does kill her? I guess the reply would be that this isn’t anything we could have anticipated even if we saw the knife in his hand, sort of like all those who have let pedophiles run loose in the yeshivot, presumably on the assumption that just because a man abused children in the past, that doesn’t mean that he will continue to do so.8

Notes

1 Among other interesting passages in this book, see p. 24, where he objects to people who write “ethical wills.” Quite apart from the frauds who wrote them, in order to show that they were really great people when they were in fact far from it, many tzadikim also wrote these wills. Yet Scheinfeld says that this was a mistake, since many of their children, and even more their grandchildren, assimilated among the Gentiles. He continues by lamenting how much worse things have gotten in his day:

ובימינו אלה בודאי אינו מהראוי לכתוב צוואות, כמעט כל הבנים מתרחקים והולכים מדרכי אביהם, אינם רוצים ואינם יכולים ללכת בדרכיהם: “וכשם שמצוה לאמר דבר הנשמע, כך מצוה שלא לאמר דבר שאינו נשמע.”

On pp. 82-83 he criticizes the “inflation” with regard to rabbinic titles that he saw in his day, and which has increased a great deal more since his time. Here is a very good example of this “inflation,” from responsa written by R. Moshe Malka, Ve-Heshiv Moshe, nos. 34-35. In this case I can guarantee you that the recipient is not deserving of the titles he has been given.



For another example of such exalted titles with regard to a non-rabbinic figure, see R. Michel Shurkin, Meged Givot Olam (Jerusalem, 2005), vol. 2, p. 5, who is speaking of Prof. Samuel Soloveitchik:

כיוצא בזה ראיתי מעשה, כשבשנת תשכ”ז נפטרו במשך תקופה קצרה אחיו של הגרי”ב זצ”ל, הגאון ר’ שמואל זצ”ל . . .

In R. Weinberg’s letter to Samuel Atlas, published in Torah u-Madda Journal 7 (1997), pp. 107-108, he writes: “’Geonim’ sprout up there as grass in the field. Those who were emissaries of the yeshivot and unimportant mashgihim have overnight become outstanding geonim.”

For more on the nonsense of elaborate titles of praise, see the many sources quoted by R. Pinchas Meyers, Nahalat Pinchas (Jerusalem, 1995), vol., 2, no. 41. See also R. Chaim Hirschensohn, Malki ba-Kodesh, vol. 1, p. 90, vol. 6, pp. 198, 200, 237-238.

Returning to Scheinfeld, here is what he has to say on the topic (pp. 82-83):

לרב פשוט מתארים “הרב הגאון”. לרב גדול בתורה באמת מתארים “מאור הגולה, בקי בכל חדרי התורה”. באמעריקא, ארץ החנופה והשקר, מתארים לכל דרשן פטפטן “הרב המטיף הגדול, פה מפיק מרגליות” ועוד. מגוזמים, מגוחכים עוד יותר תוארי-הכבוד של רביי החסידים: “אד”מור, סבא קדישא, בוצינא קדישא, צדיק יסוד עולם, בנן של קדושים, פרי צדיק, גזע ישישים, פטיש החזק, עמוד הימיני” ועוד ועוד. בעולם הקולטורי נוהגים: כשכותבים מכתב לאדם שקבל התואר Ph.D. מאיזה בית מדעים, מתארים אותו בתואר דר. ודי בזה. אפילו כשכותבים לדר. איינשטיין, לא היה שום אדם כותב: “כבוד הדר. החוזה בכוכבים, נהירין לו שבילי דרקיע” ועוד, דברים שהם ראויים לייחס לו באמת.

After seeing what the term “Gaon” has become in our time, it is worth recalling what appears in R. Malachi ha-Kohen, Yad Malachi, Kelalei ha-Geonim 1. If we use the following definition of Gaon, you can count the living geonim on one hand, and perhaps still have some fingers not counted:

ושמעתי אומרים שתנאי הגאון היה לידע ש”ס על פה גמ’ ומשניות.

The Hatam Sofer states (Sheelot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer ha-Hadashot, Yoreh Deah no. 33):

ידע מעלתו מיום שהורגלו בני מדינתו בתואר “גאון אמיתי”, גילו ופרסמו שסתם גאון אינו אמיתי, אבל חוששני שגם אמיתי אינו אמת.

The exaggerated titles are most often found in haskamot, and with this in mind see the haskamah published by Jacob Goldman in his book Peret ve-Olelot (Jerusalem, 1930).

This is not the only example of an author giving himself a haskamah (the Aderet comes to mind), but I think it is the only example of an author giving himself a haskamah which tells the world how unqualified he is.
2 See Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee (Philadelphia, 1963), p. 209.
3 “Willingness to Sacrifice,” Jewish Journal, available here
4 Speaking of editions, I don’t understand why people continue to cite works such as Orot and Orot ha-Kodesh. Now that we are fortunate to have the Shemonah Kevatzim, and can cite R. Kook from the source, why would anyone continue to refer to writings that have been edited, and touched up, by R. Zvi Yehudah and the Nazir?
5 In an earlier post I called attention to Joseph Ibn Caspi’s incredible comments about how we are to treat animals, wherein he notes that “we are very close to them and we both have one father”!

See here.

Elsewhere in Caspi’s writings we see ambivalence towards eating meat. There too he explains that that an animal is אחינו בן אבינו החי

He also writes

עיקר הכוונה שלא נאכל בשר, כי יספיקו לנו הצמחים. ולכן בבראשית לא הותר לנו רק עשב השדה, ואחר המבול נתפשט אכילת בעלי החיים שהוא כאילו נאכל אבינו [!] כי הוא סוגנו [סוג שלנו] הקרוב

Both of these sources, from Caspi’s Gevia Kesef, p. 31, and Metzaref le-Kesef, p. 294, are cited in Hannah Kasher, “‘Eikh Yetzavenu ha-Shem La’asot Toevah ka-Zot:’ Bikoret Akedat Yitzhak al pi R. Yosef Ibn Caspi,” Et ha-Daat 1 (1997), p. 41.

For an opposing viewpoint to that of Caspi, see R. Gershon Ashkenazi, Avodat ha-Gershuni, no. 13:
צער בעלי חיים לא שייך אלא בבעל חיים כשהוא בחיים חיותו . . . מי שנוחר את הבהמה במקום שיוכל לשחטה אין בזה משום צער בעלי חיים, וכי הבהמה אחינו הוא לברור לה מיתה יפה.

R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, Or li-Netivati, pp. 245-246, expresses himself similarly to Caspi:

בהשקפת האחדות השלמה לא נראה את עצמנו בתור דבר פרטי מיוחד בפני עצמו, וכן לא את כל אחד ואחד מכל יצורי עולם, לא את החי, לא את הצומח ולא את הדומם, אלא כולם וכולנו דבר אחד ממש . . . לא זה אוכל את זה כי אם הכל אוכל את הכל.

For the view, expressed by a couple of rishonim as well as the Aderet, that before his sin Adam was permitted to eat meat, see R. Bezalel Naor, Maamar al Yishmael (Spring Valley, 2008), pp. 52ff. (first pagination; there is an enormous amount of learning in this book. In addition, it opens with a Hebrew letter to Naor from Prof. Isadore Twersky.).
.
6 In the following section (no. 9 in the Ofen edition and censored from the Merkaz edition for reasons unclear), he offers another possible reason for the continuation of sacrifices:

יתכן שימשכו הקורבנות גם בזמן התקופה של השלמת הבעלי חיים רק בתור עזר לתקן הנפשות המגולגלות בבהמות, וכפי המעלה הגדולה של הדעת אז תהי’ הדעת ברורה מי יבוחר לקרבן.
7 Regarding the authority of the Court to uproot a mitzvah from the Torah, see the interesting observation of R. Hayyim Hirschensohn, Commentary to Horayot, vol. 1, p. 3b (Hirschensohn’s numbering):

אמר ר’ יוסי לא שהורו מותר לאכל חלב יודעין היו שאסור לאכול חלב והתורה נתנה רשות לב”ד להורות, וזה לא נקרא לדעת הירושלמי עקירת כל הגוף, שטעו שיש כח לב”ד לעקור דבר מן התורה אפילו בקום ועשה, וזה נקרא הגוף קים רק עקירת מקצת, לאמר שאין נצחיות ח”ו לחוקי התורה שיוכל הב”ד לעקרם כרצונם, כדעת רבני הרפארים היום החושבים שמפני צורך הזמן יכולים להתר איסורים מפורשים וקבועים בתורה, ולא נקראים בזה כופרים בעיקר, רק ב”ד טועים ולו הי’ בהם שאר תנאי פר העלם דבר היו חייבים עדת הראפרים בפר העלם דבר.

8 There is another theory as to why the sectarian hasidic world in particular has had so many cases of covering up and defending child sex abusers. It is that they simply do not regard these people as so terrible. The evidence for this appears obvious, in that in case of after case we see that they continue to allow sex abusers to teach and refuse to turn them over to the authorities and warn the parent body. Had they caught the rebbe eating at McDonald’s, you can be sure he would have been fired, but not so when it comes to fooling around with kids. The question is why do they have this outlook, and how come they don’t regard child sex abusers as so terrible? Here is a possible answer (which a wise person suggested). Look at where these societies get their information about human nature, the information that they regard as authentic and true. It does not come from modern psychology, but from Torah sources and folk beliefs. If you look only at traditional rabbinic literature, you won’t conclude that child sex abuse is as terrible as modern society views it. Yes, it is a sin and the person who commits it must repent as he must do with all sins, but there is nothing in the traditional literature that speaks to the great trauma suffered by the victim. How do we know about this trauma? Only from modern psychology and the testimony of the victims. Yet this type of evidence does not have much significance in the insular hasidic world (unless it is your own child who has been abused). Certainly modern psychology, which is often attacked by figures in that community, is not given much credence, especially not when they are confronted with an issur of mesirah. This theory makes a lot of sense to me and I am curious to hear what others have to say.



Marc B. Shapiro – Review: Orthodox Jews in America

 
Orthodox Jews in America
 
reviewed by Marc B. Shapiro
 
This is the first part of a four part post. It begins with a review I was asked to write that in the end was never published. The format of the review was not designed for the arcane stuff and numerous footnotes that are usual fare for the Seforim blog. Yet have no fear, these will return in parts 2-4. 
 
Jeffrey S. Gurock, Orthodox Jews in America (Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2009)
 
Pretty much everyone has seen an image that would have been unimaginable fifty years ago. It could be in a restaurant, playground, sporting event, or just on the street. The image is that of a typical American grandparent, with no identifying signs of being Jewish, doting on grandchildren who are wearing long skirts, big kippot and sometimes even have sidelocks. Many have also seen another image, a Shabbat morning with father and son walking to synagogue. Father is dressed in suit and tie and son also has a suit and tie. Yet the son's suit is black and the shirt is white. He is also wearing the obligatory black hat (and in so doing is helping keep alive a business—hat making—that seems to have no other client base).
From one perspective, these images are understandable, as children have often rejected the religious lifestyle of their parents. Yet what makes the story significant is that until recently the movement was almost always in one direction, with children becoming less observant. Seventy-five years ago Rabbi Solomon Isaac Scheinfeld of Milwaukee could declare that there were no baalei teshuvah (newly religious) in the “Land of Columbus.” Yet today we see both plenty of newly religious and, even more significant from my perspective, many who were raised Orthodox adopting a more stringent observance and narrower outlook on life than their parents. This is all part of the historic revival of Orthodoxy. How we got to this place should be a question on the mind of every thinking Jew.
Many have set out to answer this question, and the study of Orthodox Judaism in all of its forms has been a growth industry for the last couple of decades. Recent years have seen an explosion of writings on the topic, both articles and full-length books. There have also been a number of conferences focusing on Orthodoxy, and many of the proceedings have been published. On the internet there are loads of sites devoted to aspects of Orthodox life and culture from all different angles. Even though the Orthodox are significantly smaller than the other denominations, the amount written about them in recent years dwarfs what we can point to with regard to the Conservative and Reform movements. In terms of blogs and other internet sites, there also is no comparison. How to explain all this?
When it comes to the blogs and more popular sites on the internet the answer is not hard to find. It is true that the other denominations have more “members” than the Orthodox. Yet if we are talking about those who are educated Jewishly, and interested in Jewish matters, the Orthodox unquestionably outnumber the other denominations. Since the internet is the great equalizer, with everyone able to set up his or her soapbox, it is no wonder that it is crawling with Orthodox sites. Furthermore, average Orthodox Jews, by which I mean those who are not in the rabbinate or the academy, buy books of Jewish interest to a much greater extent than other laypeople. Since they are bound to be interested in their own denomination, this would explain why books dealing with aspects of Orthodoxy sell well.
Yet how are we to explain the great scholarly interest that has also taken root? Are the academics fascinated by a movement that defied predictions of its demise, and instead shows incredible dynamism and often seems to be changing before our eyes? To be sure, this is bound to interest those in the academy, especially the phenomenon of a movement supposedly committed to continuity with the past that nevertheless shows an incredible ability to alter its traditional practices. After all, it wasn’t too long ago that for most products one determined if they were kosher by looking at the ingredients. Yet the consensus today in the United States, even among the Modern Orthodox, is that a product cannot be kosher without rabbinical supervision (and the supervision itself has to be regarded as reputable). Kosher consumers are now told by the various kashrut organizations that canned vegetables, which contain only vegetables and water, need supervision, not to mention mouthwash, tin foil pans, and a host of other items. They are further told that some fruits and vegetables, such as strawberries and broccoli, can’t be eaten at all, or at least not without a cleaning regimen (complete with liquid soap) that would discourage most. These are all relatively new practices that have developed, and as such are bound to spark the interest of historians, sociologists, and even psychologists.
The latest contribution to the study of Orthodoxy comes from Jeffrey S. Gurock. Gurock was one of the first scholars to write about Orthodoxy, beginning with his classic 1983 essay “Resisters and Accommodators: Varieties of Orthodox Rabbis in America, 1886-1983.” Since that time, he has written on a variety of aspects of American Orthodoxy, and his latest book can be seen as a culmination of his work in this area. Orthodox Jews in America is the first attempt at a complete history of traditional Judaism in the United States (and the colonies).
Let me note at the outset that intellectual history is not part of the story Gurock tells. Other than Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, who is briefly treated, there is no analysis of important Orthodox thinkers such as Eliezer Berkovits, Leo Jung, and Emanuel Rackman, and how their ideas were influenced by their American experience. The only time the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneersohn, is mentioned is when Gurock notes that some Lubavitchers regard him as the Messiah. I think this is an important lacuna as Schneersohn's role as thinker and builder are certainly significant enough for inclusion even in a book not focused on intellectual history. In fact, it was the success of Lubavitch that encouraged the non-hasidic haredim (ultra-Orthodox) to also move into “outreach,” and today they are the major force in drawing newcomers to Orthodoxy.
This is ironic considering that some of the leaders of this world mocked the Lubavitch for doing precisely what the non-hasidic “outreach professionials” are doing today. In fact, it seems that the demographic realities of America have affected their perspective even more than Lubavitch. How else to explain that Aish Hatorah, a supposedly haredi organization, honors intermarried celebrities at its events and prominently features them in its programming and on its website? This is certainly something that R. Aaron Kotler (died 1962), who more than anyone else is the ideological forebear of the non-hasidic American haredim, could never have imagined.
In analyzing Orthodoxy we must not forget that more than anything else, it is a movement that revolves around Jewish law. Yet Gurock also pays no attention to how the halakhic system was impacted by the New World. I refer to both specific halakhic questions that arose in the United States (e.g., can one eat Turkey on Thanksgiving?), as well as the wider issue of how the democratic ethos of America influenced the outlook of the halakhic decisors, in particular men such as Joseph Elijah Henkin and Moses Feinstein. How the rabbinic leaders of both the United States and Europe regarded American Jewry, a community whose observance was often tenuous, is also an important part of the story that remains to be told.
For example, Gurock writes about the common practice of “Orthodox” Jews going to work on the Sabbath, a phenomenon he himself witnessed and offers a personal description. He even refers to a synagogue in Atlanta that in 1932 began holding Friday night services, not at sunset, but at a time that would permit members “to attend the synagogue after work or before the theatre.” In some synagogues, especially in the big cities, there was an early Saturday morning service that enabled those in attendance to go from there to work.
Not mentioned by Gurock is that there were rabbis who actually justified some of these Sabbath violators (that is, those who went to work, not the theatre goers). These rabbis asserted that those who worked on the Sabbath did so because they felt this was necessary in order to survive. Therefore, from a halakhic standpoint they could not be regarded as typical Sabbath violators. This is only one example of how the American reality influenced the halakhic response, and the writings of Rabbi Hayyim Hirschenson are most significant in this regard.
 
Finally, there is no attention paid to the wider religious context of Orthodoxy in modern times. The turn to traditional religion is certainly not confined to Judaism. The same phenomenon can be observed in Christianity and Islam, which means that there are no doubt broad cross-cultural factors that can explain some of the Orthodox revival of recent decades. In fact, this latter point, which I think is of great significance, is also entirely ignored in Haym Soloveitchik’s “Rupture and Reconstruction,” a classic article on the topic of Orthodoxy’s turn to the right. Soloveitchik describes late twentieth-century Orthodoxy’s evolution to a book culture from what had been a living culture. With this book culture, that is, modeling one’s behavior on the rulings found in traditional halakhic texts, as opposed to how Jews actually lived in the “real world,” came increasing stringency. There is a great deal of truth in this, but as is always the case, no important phenomenon can be explained by one cause. I make these points not to criticize Gurock, but only to call attention to how much work still needs to be done, even after Gurock’s book of almost four hundred pages.
Gurock’s strength is social history, and it is with this in mind that his book should be appreciated. He gives us insight into how Orthodox Jews lived, the peddler and merchant of years ago and the white collar professional of today, in places where there were many like them and in areas far removed from other Jews. Newspaper articles and memoirs are much more valuable for this type of history than the rabbinical writings, which are intended for the intellectuals and often give a very different slant. The story he tells is compelling reading, sometimes maddening (as with the various Orthodox disputes and scandals mentioned), and other times inspiring. I put the book down convinced more than ever that Orthodoxy, in all of its permutations, is where the future of American Judaism will be found. At the very least, its power and influence will be of much greater significance than today.
 
The one major negative that the community has to contend with, and which has always acted as a major hurdle to more people joining, is the incredible cost of day school tuition. Yet even here a new paradigm might be emerging, as some Orthodox parents have begun to send their children to public school. This is a new development that has just begun to pick up some steam and although not included in Gurock’s book, might be part of the Orthodox story in another twenty years.
Gurock begins his story from the start of Jewish settlement in colonial America, and I found the second chapter, dealing with nineteenth-century Orthodoxy and the difficulties it faced throughout the vast country, particularly fascinating. The bulk of the book is understandably devoted to the era beginning with large-scale Jewish immigration towards the end of the nineteenth century. It was then that American Orthodoxy really came into its own.
While some leading rabbis of the time, such as R. Jacob David Wilovsky of Chicago, assumed that no real synagogue could have English sermons, others were more attuned to where the American future would be. Although there were plans in New York and elsewhere to create European-type communities, complete with chief rabbis, the American scene, with its stress on religious autonomy, was not fertile ground for the European model. When one self-styled chief rabbi of New York was asked who actually appointed him to this august position, he is alleged to have replied, “the sign maker.” Even if apocryphal, the story accurately portrays the futility of transferring European models of authority to an increasingly complicated American scene. It is here that Gurock does a fine job showing the reader the complexity of what was taking place.
The twentieth century saw Orthodoxy really come into its own. The challenge of Conservative Judaism, the struggle to create a market for kosher products, and the varied attempts to create an attractive school system for the young are all part of the twentieth-century story recounted by Gurock. Although by mid-century any sociologist worth his salt was ready to proclaim that Orthodoxy would never survive in America—one famously declared that American Orthodoxy was a “case study of institutional decay”—by 1960 it should have been clear that Orthodoxy had made tremendous strides and was here to stay.
While there is much of significance in the book, I feel that Gurock is at his best in his treatment of what I call "old-time Orthodoxy," the type Gurock describes growing up with and has focused on in a few essays. This approach to Judaism, characterized by an identification with Orthodoxy while being less than fully observant in one’s personal life, was the dominant form of Orthodox Judaism in the United States for much of the twentieth country. Gurock has even spoken of the years 1900-1960 as “American Orthodoxy’s era of non-observance.” This “non-observant Orthodoxy” increasingly came under challenge in the latter half of the twentieth century, as stricter observance of kashrut and the Sabbath laws became part of the Orthodox mainstream. As the century came to a close levels of observance continued to rise.
Many of the older generation would have difficulty recognizing the form of Orthodoxy that has developed in the last thirty years. Unlike when they were growing up, today's Orthodoxy does not offer social dances for singles and synagogue trips to Broadway musicals. The mehitzah has been raised and the after-school Talmud Torahs have been closed down since almost all children attend day schools. Orthodoxy no longer feels very welcoming to one who drives to synagogue on Shabbat. In many congregations one who “eats fish out” will have to keep this quiet unless he wishes to appear as a religious deviant. These changes in Orthodoxy happened at the same time that most Orthodox Jews have become completely at home in American society and culture, to the extent of having kosher hot dogs sold at baseball games for all those who wish to take part in the great American pastime. 
By creating the day schools and yeshivot to which they sent their children, the old-time Orthodox planted the seeds of the future revolution in American Orthodoxy, a revolution that has brought great satisfaction to some and heartache to others. Their children discovered that Judaism as practiced in their homes was far removed from what the rabbis and the Jewish texts had to say. Unlike their parents, whose major exposure to Judaism was in the home, the children's major exposure was in the schools. It is therefore not surprising that with their new knowledge they often examined their parents' lifestyle and found in wanting. Many of these people spent time in advanced Torah study in Israel, and as part of the quest for a more serious religious life were ready to accept added stringencies (e. g., glatt kosher and even sometimes halav yisrael [milk produced by Jews]).
One sign of the haredi infiltration, as it were, of Modern Orthodox synagogues is the ubiquity of the Artscroll prayer book and Humash, which present an “East European” flavor combined with a quasi-fundamentalism. It didn’t have to be this way. Yet Modern Orthodox intellectuals were so busy writing learned essays to be read by each other, that they abandoned the masses to the right wing, producing virtually no literature directed towards them. It was only in 2009 that Rabbi Jonathan Sacks produced a competing prayer book to Artscroll, one more in line with the Modern Orthodox ethos. Yet I doubt that it can win over many of the synagogues that years ago switched over to Artscroll.
The increasing visibility and power of the right-wing Orthodox, combined with the turn to the right in Modern Orthodoxy, was bound to engender a counter reaction. Gurock has a chapter dealing with Orthodox feminism, which is just one aspect of an incipient move to the left on the part of some in the Modern Orthodox world. This new liberal Orthodoxy, not as powerful or confident as its adherents would like, has begun to focus on issues that the mainstream Orthodox shy away from, including interdenominational and interfaith dialogue. Yet Gurock is correct in sensing that the women’s issue is central to the self-understanding of the new liberal Orthodox, many of whom seek rabbinic guidance from the recently established Yeshivat Chovevei Torah in New York. It is too soon to tell what the enduring role of this new institution will be. However, the strong attacks on it by both right-wing and centrist Orthodox figures, who see it as the beginning of a new Conservative movement, show that the institution and its rabbis are already viewed as a threat.
The liberal Orthodox first found their voice in dealing with the agunah problem, and have also worked to expand the role of women in the synagogue and communal life. There are now synagogues that regard themselves as Orthodox yet function in a semi-egalitarian fashion, and full egalitarianism might just be a matter of time. Too recent to be included in the book, a woman has just been given a rabbinic ordination, and presumably there will soon be other Orthodox women rabbis. Yet there are also other aspects of the liberal Orthodox vision that Gurock does not mention. For example, social justice has emerged as an issue that they feel strongly about. A new kosher certification has even been unveiled, one that focuses on how the workers are treated. Some in this camp have even begun to speak about the need for a new approach to homosexuality. It is thus very difficult to predict where this segment of the community will be in another fifty years, and if the mainstream will even regard it as part of wider Orthodoxy. Indeed, some of the liberals see themselves as part of a new era, one that is both committed to halakhah and post-denominational in mindset.
At the end of the book, Gurock describes his trip to an Arizona hotel for Passover. Here, around the pool, he witnessed the persistence of old-time Orthodoxy, which he describes as those “Jews on the edges of Orthodoxy’s contemporary tent.” Yet the people he describes are not on the edges at all, but part of mainstream Modern Orthodoxy, especially when one leaves the great population centers. It is true that organized religious life has moved to the right. As mentioned already, you will no longer find synagogues sponsoring trips to a Broadway musical, and the once ubiquitous synagogue dance barely survives. It is also the case that many of the young generation are more observant than their parents. For example, it was almost unheard of for a married woman in America in the 1950’s and 1960’s to cover her hair. If her rabbi’s wife didn’t (and that was almost always the case), then why should she? Yet today, there are many young women in the Modern Orthodox world who do follow this practice.
However, old-time Orthodoxy, which combines a middle or upper class American lifestyle with traditional ritual observance, both survives and is reproducing. Throughout the country pools and beaches are packed with Orthodox Jews, and despite their synagogue’s lack of sponsorship, on any night one can find Orthodox in attendance at Broadway shows and the opera. The synagogue dance might have disappeared, but husbands and wives can dance to the oldies (for many this means “YMCA”) at plenty of Orthodox weddings and bar mitzvahs.
 
What we can say is that the ritual instinct of many Modern Orthodox Jews has zeroed in on matters such as kashrut and the Sabbath, so that these areas are observed much more carefully than in previous years. However, other areas of Jewish law are treated not much differently than a generation or two ago. While some observers have spoken of a future haredi takeover of American Orthodoxy, there is good reason to assume that the varieties of Orthodox experience described by Gurock will continue for a long time to come.